Imperium and Dominium

Lee Hong hok vs David

Facts:

This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to
his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands
issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The
Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee
Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.

Issue: Whether or not Lee Hong Hok may question the government grant

Held:

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who
cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings
after claiming it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is
raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the
grant is a question between the grantee and the government. The decision of respondent Court
of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed.

IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh
concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire
property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by
the State in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and
use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution

IPRA Law

Cruz vs Secretary

Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

The NCIP filed their comment in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray
that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Issue: WON the IPRA Law is Unconstitutional

Held:

No, After due deliberation on the petition, the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

According to the separate opinion of Justice Puno, who voted to dismiss the petition. The IPRA
is a novel piece of legislation. It grants the ICC/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been theirs BY
VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE; they have lived there even before the Spanish colonization.
“Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre‐conquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of
private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been
public lands and are indisputable presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest AND Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian Doctrine in Oh Cho vs
Director of Lands: “This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors‐in‐interest since time immemorial.

Justice Kapunan in a separate opinion said that ownership of native title presupposes that the
land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors in interest in the concept of an owner
since time immemorial.

Further, Section 3(a) does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural
resources to the ICC/IPs. Its purpose is delineational and not declarative of a right or title.
Section 57 only grants “ priority rights” to ICCs/IPs in the utilization of natural resources and
not absolute ownership thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources through the imposition of requirements and conditions for
the utilization of natural resources through imposition of requirements and conditions for the
utilization of natural resources under existing laws.
 The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are
defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. -- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with
government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise
lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which
may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally
had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges
of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.[116]

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not
merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.[117]
 The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the
procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993,
signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Angel Alcala.[118] DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by
special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims
(CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP).[119] The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-
delineation.[120] This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.[121]

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth
in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification
of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law
and upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community
concerned.[122] The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or
indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to
decide in accordance with customs and traditions.[123] With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT).[124]

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before
the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.[125]

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2)
by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect
to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title-- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have
been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."[126]

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a
claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that
way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be
recognized and respected.[127] Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which
shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated.[128]

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native

title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares
ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public
land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed
to have never been public lands and are private.

Cario vs Insular Government 1906 (Decision)

Facts:

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his
inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of
Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled
in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to
him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs
Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not Mateo Cariño’s should be granted.

Held: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for
some time.

No, No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still
the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). While the State has always recognized the
right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has
always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and
obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

Here, It is known that for nearly three hundred years all attempts to convert the Igorots of the
Province of Benguet to the Christian religion completely failed, and that during that time they
remained practically in the same condition as they were when the Islands were first occupied by
the Spaniards. To presume as a matter of fact that during that time, and down to at least 1880,
the provisions of the laws relating to the grant, adjustment, and sale of public were taken
advantage of by these deeds from the Government for these lands would be to presume
something which did not exist.

Cario vs Insular Government 1909 (Resolution)

Facts:

In 1903, Mateo Cariño filed a petition for him to be granted a certificate of title over a 40 hectare
land in Baguio, Benguet. He claimed that he and his predecessors in interest had been in
possession over said parcel of land since time immemorial; that the Igorot community where
the said land was located had always considered Mateo Cariño and his predecssors/ancestors
as the owner of said land; that said parcel of land had been transferred to his predecessors and
unto him in accordance with the Igorot custom.
The land registration court granted his petition but the government through the Solicitor
General opposed said grant on the ground that Mateo Cariño and ancestors failed to register
said land during the Spanish Era. It was argued that in 1880, the Spanish government decreed
that all privately held land must be registered or else they will be reverted back to the public
domain (pursuant to the regalian doctrine).
The case reached the Philippine Supreme Court. The latter ruled against Mateo Cariño
hence Cariño further appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo Cariño’s should be granted.

HELD: Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision held by the Philippine Supreme
Court. Mateo Cariño cannot be deprived of his land simply because he failed to comply with
the formalities required by the Spanish law (or by a Philippine law). Cariño’s title, which he
acquired from his ancestors predates, by more than 50 years, the establishment of the American
government in the Philippines (in fact, even before the establishment of the Spanish
government in the Philippines).
The US Supreme Court also noted that even the Solicitor General admitted that the Igorots were
hardly ruled by the Spanish government. That being, it is unlikely that the Spanish government
would grant land titles to the Igorots even if they will register their land under the old Spanish
Law. The US Supreme Court also ruled that to follow the stand of the Solicitor General is to
deprive the land titles of the natives (not only Igorots but all native inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands). Under the Constitution: “no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws.” The term “any person” includes the natives (in
this case, the Igorots). All lands held under private ownership during the Spanish era shall
therefore be presumed to be such. Failure to register under Spanish Law did not revert said
lands to the public domain.
Palomo vs Court of Appeals
266 SCRA 392
January 21, 1997

Facts:
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, Forbes issued EO No. 40
which reserved for provincial park purposes land situated in Tiwi, Albay. Subsequently, the
then CFI of Albayordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No.
40 in the name of Diego Palomo. Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land which were
allegedly covered by OCT to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the CFI of Albay.The Register
of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. The area was
never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is
neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor
registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes
thereonand introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case for annulment and
cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the
petitioners.
The CFI ruled in favour of the Republic and against the Palomos. Declaring null and void and
no force and effect the OCT previously issued. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence this petition.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Parisrecognized the property rights of Spanish and
Filipino citizens and the American government had no inherent power to confiscate properties
of private citizens and declare them part of any kind of government reservation. They allege
that their predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the
subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration. Hence, the reservation of the lands for
provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of
private property without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court
of First Instance of Albay, which state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners' father
Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50
years at the time of their registration in 1916.

Issue: Whether or not the land in question was classified as private property.

Held:

No, the court ruled that during that time, private ownership of land could only be acquired
through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or
Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase
and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish
Mortgage Law.
Here, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title from an
old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon of the Court of First Instance of
Albaythat their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the
subject lands for 20-50 years. However, the aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First Instance
were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo
bearing the signature of the clerk of court.
Assuming that the decrees of the CFI were really issued, the lands are still not capable of
appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation
of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
The lands in question in the case were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by
the District Forester, the recordshow that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and
disposable and subject to private alienation since they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private propertyunless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.

Republic vs Candy Maker Inc.

Facts:

Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the Laguna de Bay,
On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and signed a
Subdivision Plan of the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was subdivided into two lots:
Lot No. 3138-A and Lot No. 3138-B . On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all
surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc.The buyer
declared Lot No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999. On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as
applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal, for the registration of its alleged
title over Lots under PD No. 1529.

The MTC issued an Order instructing The Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) and the Directors of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) and Forest Management
Bureau (FMB) were to submit their respective reports on the status of the parcels of land.

The CENRO of Antipolo City filed his Report declaring that the land falls within the Alienable
and Disposable Zone.

On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the
Application in which it alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be
alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within
its jurisdiction pursuant to RA No. 4850. According to the LLDA, the projection of the Lots No.
3138-A, Cad-688-D in its topographic map is located below the reglementary lake elevation of
12.50 meters, the property is a public land which forms part of the bed of the Laguna Lake.

On the other hand, the applicant presented as witnesses its Treasurer, Fernando Co Siy, and
Antonio Cruz, one of the vendees. Cruz testified that his grandparents owned the property,and
after their demise, his parents, the spouses Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio Cruz,
inherited the lot; he and his father had cultivated the property since 1937, planting palay during
the rainy season and vegetables during the dry season; his father paid the realty taxes on the
property,and he (Cruz) continued paying the taxes after his father’s death. Sometime in the
1980s, Apolonio Cruz executed an extrajudicial deed of partition in which the property was
adjudicated to Antonio Cruz and his sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five (5)
other siblings who were given other properties as their shares. Aside from this, he hired the
services of an "upahan" to cultivate the property. Sy testified that the subject lot is 3 kms. away
from Laguna de Bay, above its elevation and that of the nearby road; the property is habitable
and was utilized as a riceland at the time it was sold by the former owner.

The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels of land in order to determine its
exact elevation. A Survey Team of the of the LLDA conducted an actual ground survey of the
property. The team found that the lot is below the prescribed elevation of 12.50 m. and thus part
of the bed of the lake; as such, it could not be titled to the applicant.

Thereafter, the MTC rendered a Decision granting the application for registration over the lots.
On appeal, the appellate court rendered judgment which dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the Decision of the MTC. The CA upheld the applicant’s claim that the parcels of land were
alienable and not part of the public domain, and that it had adduced preponderant evidence to
prove that its predecessors had been tilling the land since 1937, during which palay and
vegetables were planted.
Hence, this petition. The Republic asserts that the Engineer’s Survey Report58 and the Laguna
de Bay Shoreland Survey both show that Lot is located below the reglementary lake elevation,
hence, forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists that the property belongs to the public
domain. Petitioner avers that the subject lot is incapable of private appropriation since it is a
public land owned by the State under the Regalian doctrine.

Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence to warrant the
registration of the property in its name as owner. The testimonies of the two witnesses only
proved that the possession of the land may be characterized as mere casual cultivation; they
failed to prove that its predecessors occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively,
notoriously and adversely in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Issue: Whether or not the subject land was classified as private property

Held:

No, The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural
land until July 18, 1966. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registerable title
over the property.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. —The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State.Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain.

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the government,
whether express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State.
The rationale for the period "since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945" lies in the
presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor
claim an interest thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open and
notorious possession.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the CENRO in the DENR stating that the land
subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land
classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of
the application.

In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property is alienable agricultural land. The
CENRO of,Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property "falls within the Alienable and Disposable
zone, However, under R.A. No. 4850 which was approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and
below the maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands which form
part of the bed of said lake. As gleaned from the Survey Report of the LLDA based on the ocular
inspection, the property is located below the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the
bed of the Laguna de Bay, and, as such, is public land.

Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights acquired by occupants
before the effectivity of the law are recognized. However, the respondent failed to adduce proof
that its predecessors-in-interest had acquired registerable title over the property before July 18,
1966:

First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of the property, and
even failed to mention the names of his grandparents. He likewise failed to present his
father’s death certificate to support his claim that the latter died in 1980. There is
likewise no evidence when his mother died.

Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the extrajudicial partition allegedly
executed by his parents in 1980 where the property was supposedly deeded to him and
his sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five siblings.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the property and planted palay
and vegetables, and that they had been paying the realty taxes over the property before
his parents died. However, no tax declarations under the names of the spouses Apolonio
Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblings were presented, or realty tax receipts
evidencing payment of such taxes. Indeed, while tax receipts and tax payment receipts
themselves do not convincingly prove title to the land, these are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would pay taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession. While tax receipts
and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the
least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property, particularly when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of property.
 Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he was "74
years old." He must have been born in 1927, and was thus merely 10 years old in 1937. It
is incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating the property with his father.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove how many cavans of palay were planted
on the property, as well as the extent of such cultivation, in order to support the claim of
possession with a bona fide claim of ownership.

Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker "upahan" to help him cultivate the property.
He, however, failed to state the name of the worker or to even present him as witness for
the respondent.

Chavez vs PEA

Facts:
 On November 20, 1973, the government, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. However, then
President Marcos created the Public Estates Authority (PEA)by virtue of PD 1084 tasked to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire, lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands and also directed PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so
that all future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA.
Thereafter, then President Aquino issued Special Patent, granting and transferring to PEA
the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP). Subsequently, the ROD issued Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands.
On April 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was approved by then President Ramos.
However, the Senate question the legality of the JVA since the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands. Thereafter,
petitioner Frank Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.Petitioner assails the
sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Issue: WON the transfer to AMARI of the lands reclaimed as part of the JVA violate Section
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
Yes, Under Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission, Act No. 2874 of the Philippine
Legislature and the Commonwealth Act No. 141 also known as the Public Land Act, which is
now the present law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
All these laws authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. The rationale behind this State policy why it authorized only
lease and not sale of reclaimed lands is that government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public
service. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.Thus,the
government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private
parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.
Here, there is no act from the legislature allowing PEA to sell the reclaimed lands. The
contention of PEA that PD No. 1085 which authorized them so sell the reclaimed lands
constitute the legislative authority is untenable. It is clear in the law that it is not for the
President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative concurrence.

Alba vs CA
Facts:
 Applicant Jose Lachica filed his application for title in 1958 with the claim that the land
applied for was purchased by him and his wife. The land applied for is residential situated in
the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast
by the property of the Municipality of Banga.

The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued
but those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and
Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the
Municipality of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to file
their written opposition.

Manuel c. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition and opposed he
registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the land applied for alleging
that they are the owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion and all the improvements
thereon for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-interest deriving their title
by purchase from the original owners.

Jose Rago filed his opposition as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of Apolonia
Rebeco although no special power of attorney was attached. He alleged that his principal is the
owner by right of succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its improvements
for more than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously, peacefully and
openly under claim of ownership.

Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba Vda.
de Raz, alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land applied for with an area of
2,262 square meters bounded on the north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina
Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the public
market of Banga. They claimed to have inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late
father, Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they
have been in possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the
above-mentioned portion for not less 70 years.

On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant
and the oppositor Raz, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the applicant as stated at
the outset. In dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all
surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
herself, the trial court in sum noted that said oppositors have never offered any explanation as
to the non-payment of realty taxes for the disputed portions of the subject property from 1941 to
1958 while the respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes under Tax Declaration No. 14181
covering said property from 1945-1958 when the case was filed per certification issued by the
Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga. In rendering judgment in favor of
respondent/applicant, the trial court stressed that while it is true that tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of
actual possession.

Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed

the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether private responded has acquired lawful title over the subject property.

Ruling:

No, A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in affirming the
ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 in
relation to the Civil Codes provisions on prescription on the assumption that the subject land is
private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate courts postulate. The application for
registration of private respondent is for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect title
considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public
domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.]
Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not
susceptible of private appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands. For
purposes of administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as
disposable or alienable are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential,
commercial, industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other
similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
purposes.
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined as those
alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. Thus the
term includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that these lands are
neither timber nor mineral lands.
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the registration of
private lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple which refer to:
1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during the Spanish
Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant;
b.] Concession especial or special grant; c.] Composicion con el estado title or adjustment title;
d.] Titulo de compra or title by purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory
information title, which could become a Titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title;
 2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation
of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil
Code; and
3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by law.
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private respondent hardly falls
under any of the latter classifications of land referred to by Act No. 496, as amended. Given the
foregoing facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both courts cannot be pleaded to bolster
private respondent/applicants claim because

. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied
from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state .

Further, His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No. 14181 which he
was able to procure from the Municipal Assessor of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a self-serving
affidavit which proffered the lame excuse that there was error in the statement of the area of the
land which he claimed to be 4,845 square meters instead of 620 square meters — which was the
area reflected in earlier tax declarations namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578; 1953 Tax
Declaration No. 13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528.
Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence showing that petitioners have been in open,
adverse, exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner,
considering that the testimony of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was stricken off the record.

Republic vs Imperial

Facts:

On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued OCT 408 (500) pursuant to aof the
then Court of First Instance of Albay, covering a parcel of land. OCT was subdivided and
further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subject of this
case.

The plaintiff seeks to judicially declare the transfer certificate of titles null and void and to
declare the reversion of the lots covered by the aforesaid titles to the mass of the public domain.

In support of its stand, the plaintiff contends that the land subject thereof is a foreshore land.
Subsequent investigation conducted by the DENR Region V, Legazpi City, upon the request of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disclosed that OCT No. 408 (500), from whence the
transfer certificate of titles of the defendants were derived is null and void, and was, thus,
acquired to the prejudice of the State, considering that:

a. the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) has the features of a foreshore land;
 b. natural ground plants such as mangroves and nipas thrive on certain portions of the
land in question;

c. some portions of the same land are permanently submerged in seawater even at low
tide;

d. some portions of the same land are not anymore inundated by seawater due to the
considerable amount of improvements built thereon and the placing of boulders and
other land-filling materials by the actual residents therein.

The plaintiff contended that since the land in question is a foreshore land, the same cannot be
registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, now P.D. No. 1529) in the name of
private persons since it is non-alienable and belongs to the public domain, administered and
managed by the State for the benefit of the general public.

The plaintiff further contended that under Public Land Act No. 141, as amended, such land
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise as soon as the President
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, now DENR, shall
declare that the same are not necessary for public services and are open to disposition.

On the other hand, the respondents contended: (a) the lands covered by the defendants transfer
certificate of titles which were derived from OCT No. 408 (500) was already the subject of the
cadastral proceedings in 1917 and which has been implemented by the issuance of OCT No. 408
(500) under the Torrens system.

The adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the
plaintiff since cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director
of Lands instituted the proceedings and is a direct and active participant.

Issue: whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands.

Held:

Yes, Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be
disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as that part (of the land) which is
between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is also known as a
strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government,
specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The
decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the
court. The principle behind this ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and
discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however,
when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR
Secretary.
 Here, there is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the
DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found the
land to be definitely outside of the foreshore area. Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that
subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, disclosed that the land covered
by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles were derived has the features of a foreshore land.
The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the
true nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC,
cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved.
Hence, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Director of Lands vs CA and Bisnar

Facts:

The applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of a Land
situated in President Roxas, Capiz. The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of
land and they had been paying the taxes thereon

The Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the
application on the grounds that:

1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title

to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not
having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish
Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or
special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the
'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or
possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other
recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable
laws.

2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.

3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on
March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they
hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended,
 as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as
owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)

The trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants,
herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have
been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land
under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the
filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting
coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition. The
Government alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable

agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141.

Issue: WON the subject land can be registered.

Held:

No, The court held that under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the
courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the
Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President.

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of
forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
Heirs of Maravilla vs Tupas

Facts:

According to respondent, he, along with the other heirs of the late Asiclo S. Tupas, has
maintained the occupation and possession of certain portions of the property subject of this
case. Thereafter, the late Zosimo Maravilla claimed ownership over 10,000 square meters of said
property by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 8, 1975, purportedly executed between him
and the late Asiclo S. Tupas.

Maravilla filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of possession and damages before
Branch 9 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The trial court ruled in favor of Maravilla.

On October 21, 1999, Maravilla filed another case for partition and damages before the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. The trial court ordered Tupas to restore possession thereof to the
plaintiff.

On October 31, 2008, Maravilla filed a Motion for Execution of the March 31, 2003 Decision of
the RTC-Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan.

While the motion for execution was pending before the RTC-Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan, this
Court, on October 8, 2008, declared Boracay as government property in the consolidated cases
of The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et
al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al. On February 2, 2009, a Resolution was
issued by the RTC granting the motion for execution.

Thus, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Resolution and the
Order issued by the RTC. Respondent raised as an issue that the grant of the motion for
execution is not in accordance with this Court's decision in The Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the
DENR, et al., a supervening event, and that the RTC erred in not declaring as null and void the
deed of sale of unregistered land considering that Boracay has been classified as an inalienable
land. The CA granted the petition. Hence, this petition. The petitioner contended that the CA
erred in finding that the Boracay Decision is a supervening event that prevents the trial court
from implementing the writ of execution.

Issue: whether or not this Court's decision in The Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al. can
be considered as supervening event that can prevent the execution of judgment that has already
attained finality

Held:

Yes, the petitioners' basis of their claim over the subject property is the Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land that the late Zosimo Maravilla executed with the late Asiclo S. Tupas. This
Deed of Sale has been acknowledged and adjudged by the RTC to be binding between the
parties, and in fact, has attained finality. This Court, however, in The Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of
the DENR, et al.,ruled that the entire island of Boracay as state-owned except for lands already
covered by existing titles.

Therefore, the island, being owned by the State, can only be declared or made subject of private
ownership by the Government. And only the Government can determine the manner in which
the island should be disposed of or conveyed to private individuals, pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it
is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private
ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as
under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in
the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.

Here. It was only in 2006 when certain parts of Boracay became agricultural land when then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064, positively declaring parts of
Boracay as alienable and opening the same to private ownership. It follows then that Asicio S.
Tupas was not in a position to sell that which he did not own in the first place. This is because at
the time the sale was entered into between private respondent and the late Asicio S. Tupas, the
land in dispute was not alienable and subject to disposition. Since private respondent derives
title from whatever right his predecessor-in-interest had, which unfortunately Asicio (sic) S.
Tupas had none, his claim is no longer tenable.

Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Facts:

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA).

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 raised

doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing

Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a
tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants. The RTC upheld respondents-
claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed in
toto the RTC decision. The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Issue: Won the land in question is alienable and disposable

Held:

No, The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
lands.[Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.

Further, In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute,
or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain
as public forest. The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No.
705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial
island resort, rather than a forest land.
However, Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do
not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of
trees and underbrushes. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. There is a big difference
between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of lands of
the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is
tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is
only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject
to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to
disposition.
Republic vs Hachero

Facts:

Sometime in 1996, Amor Hachero filed his Free Patent Application covering Lot before the
CENRO of Palawan located in Busuanga, Palawan. The said application for free patent was
later approved by the PENRO of Palawan.

Thereafter, Free Patent was issued to Hachero and the subject land was registered under the
Torrens System. Thereafter, in an effort to find out fake or illegal titles, the DENR created a task
force to investigate and evaluate all issued patents and titles. After an inspection and
verification were conducted by the CENRO in 2000, it was discovered that the subject land was
still classified as timberland and so not susceptible of private ownership.
Consequently, the Republic, represented by the Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed
the Complaint

for the cancellation of Free Patent and OCT and for Reversion. Despite personal receipt of the
summons and the complaint, however, Hachero did not file any responsive pleading within the
period required by law. Upon the Republic's motion, the RTC declared Hachero in default.

The RTC ruled in favor of Hachero. The RTC explained that the free patent and title had already
been issued after Hachero was found to have complied with all the requirements; that it was the
Republic itself thru the DENR-CENRO which brought the subject land under the operation of
the Torrens System; that it could not understand the complete turnabout made by the same
office and its officials who certified before that the subject land was alienable and disposable
and who approved Hachero's application; that the Republic failed to show the document which
stated that the subject land was still timberland despite the fact that said document was already
available at the CENRO office at the time of the application for free patent; that the lands
adjacent to the subject land were already alienable and disposable; that the free patent and the
title itself were public documents entitled to the presumption of regularity; and that the
verification and inspection report of one Sim Luto together with the other CENRO officials
presented by the Republic were insufficient to defeat Hachero's patent and title.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of title and the action for reversion is proper

Ruling:

Yes, Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation therefore is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee

In Republic v. Guerrero, the Court gave a more general statement that "this remedy of reversion
can only be availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or
certificates of title. However, the Court recognized in Republic v. Mangotara,24 that there were
instances when it granted reversion for reasons other than fraud:

“It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government
to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud such as
violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land or portion of a
river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight”

In this case, although the Republic's action for cancellation of patent and title and for reversion
was not based on fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Hachero, his title could still be
cancelled and the subject land reverted back to the State because the grant was made through
mistake or oversight. This could probably be the reason why, shortly after one (1) year from the
issuance of OCT to Hachero, the DENR personnel conducted another investigation and
verification on the subject land. It would appear that they suspected that a mistake was made in
their issuance of the patent as the subject land had not been reclassified or released as alienable
or disposable land. It remained plotted within the timberland classification zone. This time, they
supported their findings with maps prepared by the NAMRIA. The Republic also followed the
proper legal procedure for cancellation of patent and title and for reversion. They filed a
complaint in court and notified Hachero through summons. They gave Hachero an opportunity
to be heard in court. For unknown reasons, however, he disregarded the summons, allowed
himself to be declared in default, and forfeited his right to adduce evidence in his defense.