Ahmadi The - Syntax - and - Sense - of - The - Ahuna - Vairii PDF

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The Syntax and Sense of the Ahuna Vairiia
AMIR AHMADI
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society / Volume 22 / Issue 34 / October 2012, pp 519 540
DOI: 10.1017/S1356186312000442, Published online: 12 October 2012
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1356186312000442
How to cite this article:
AMIR AHMADI (2012). The Syntax and Sense of the Ahuna Vairiia. Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society, 22, pp 519540 doi:10.1017/S1356186312000442
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The Syntax and Sense of the Ahuna Vairiia
AMIR AHMADI
One may conclude from the lull in publications on the Gāthic Ahuna Vairiia that a satisfactory
understanding of the stanza is at hand. This is, however, not the case. The last substantial
treatment of the stanza is from Humbach (1991 II) in his 1991 two-volume edition of the
Old Avestan texts. Somewhat less extensive is the discussion we find in Kellens’ and Pirart’s
monumental three-volume edition and study of the Old Avestan texts (1991). In 1975, Insler
published a detailed article on the Ahuna Vairiia. The late 1950s saw the appearance of four
studies of the stanza by distinguished Avesta scholars: Benveniste, Humbach, Duchesne-
Guillemin and Hinz. As for the number of translations there are, it virtually equals the
number of scholars in the field. The source of the difficulties is the syntax of the stanza. The
disagreements are due for the most part to the scholar’s analysis of syntactic units. Thus the
variety of translations may be reduced to a few basic types.
Before turning to the stanza, I would like to note that the question of the significance of the
stanza has received only the most limited, and in my mind superficial, attention. Benveniste
gives it five or six lines at the end of his article: it is not so much a profession of faith,
he says, as a protection formula, like a charm, the most effective one, against the forces of
druj. It is generally pointed out that Ahura Mazdā recited the stanza before undertaking his
cosmogonic work, as stated in Later Avestan commentary on the stanza (Yasna 19), or that
Zarathuštra drove the daēvas underground by reciting it (Yašt 19.81), and so on.1 In Yašt
11.3 the Ahuna Vairiia is described as the “most victorious of words”. What does this mean,
i.e., victory over what? Why such a virtue is attributed to the stanza? In short, what is the
significance of the Ahuna Vairiia? The reason for the lack of interest in the question of the
significance must be in part due to the fact that perhaps we still do not know what the stanza
says.
I think all the translations offered thus far are marred by fundamental flaws that obscure
the sense and hence significance of the stanza. It is important to take measure of these
problems fully. I shall try to do this below. If our purpose, however, is not merely to find
more or less equivalent words and phrases in our own language for the Gāthic ones but also to
understand a discourse, then we must take the risk that any attempt at understanding faces – that
1 I was not able to consult Kellens 2010. Most recently, for Cantera (2012) the Ahuna Vairiia seems to be the
epitome of a sacrificial technique, which allows the identification of the priest with Zarathuštra and Mazdā. “Ahura
Mazdā a montré l’Ahuna Vairiia à Zaraθuštra au début des temps. Ainsi, Zaraθuštra a appris la technique sacrificielle
qui lui permet de réaliser le même sacrifice qu’Ahura Mazdā et dans lequel il tient le rôle d’Ahura Mazdā. Dans
le sacrifice quotidien, le zaotar joue le rôle de Zaraθuštra et par conséquent il endosse aussi celui d’Ahura Mazdā”
(ibid., 55). Cantera does not explain how this function or virtue is related to the content of the Ahuna Vairiia.
JRAS, Series 3, 22, 3-4 (2012), pp. 519–540

C The Royal Asiatic Society 2012
doi:10.1017/S1356186312000442
520 Amir Ahmadi
of interpretation. We have to reconstruct, in reference to alien concepts and images, the

ideological intent that animated the discourse and that alone can place us in a position to
grasp its meaning. I hope to deal with this aspect of the topic in a subsequent article.
Y 27.13aa’ yaθā ahū vaiiriō, aθā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā

bb’ vaŋh´̄uš dazdā manaŋhō, + š iiaoθńanam aŋh´̄uš mazdāi
cc’ xšaθr´mcā ahurāi.ā, yim drigubiiō dadat 0 vāstār´m
1. The problem of yaθā . . . aθā . . .
A number of translators have taken the view that the yaθā . . . aθā . . . construction is a
correlative conjunction of the type ‘X is A, so is Y’, which is an elaborate way of saying “X
is A and Y is A”. They view the verse line 27.13aa’ as an independent sentence comprising
two parallel clauses. This is what Insler does: “Just as the Lord indeed in accord with truth
must be chosen, so also the judgment in accord with truth must be chosen” (Insler 1975:
413). Taking ahū as the nominative of ahu- ‘lord’, he produces for each side what he deems
it lacks (the adverbial and the verb, respectively) by drawing on the other side. It is clear
that he reads vairiiō as a gerundive in predicative function and ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā as an adverbial; the
conjunctive adverbs coordinate the two predicative statements. The verse basically says that
both the lord and the judgment must be chosen in accordance with truth. Benveniste, who
also takes ahū as the nominative of ahu- ‘lord’ (referring to Zarathuštra), has the conjunctive
adverbs, however, bear on the verb ‘to be’, which he provides himself: “(il est) tant l’ahu
desirable que le ratu selon Arta” (Benveniste 1957: 84). Zarathuštra is the desirable ahu
and ratu in accordance with Arta. We find the same understanding of the yaθā . . . aθā . . .
structure in Gershevitch (1959: 329): “As the (or an) ahu is to be chosen (in accordance with
Truth . . . ), so the (or a) ratu (is to be chosen) in accordance with Truth”, etc. Also in Hinz
(1960: 159): “Wie er ersehnter Meister ist, so ist er auch Richtender”, etc.
Another group of translators has attempted to integrate the verse line into the rest of the
stanza by taking ratuš as one of the subjects of dazdā understood as the verb of the main
clause. This obliges them to make 27.13a a subordinate clause. But neither in grammar nor
in sense does the pāda read like a subordinate clause in their translation; it is like a stump
dangling on the supposed main clause.
Duchesne-Guillemin (1957: 67) rejects the previous interpretations of the yaθā . . . aθā . . .
structure, which see in it just an elaborate way of asserting one quality about two different
things. According to him, the structure expresses a reciprocal relation: “just as the world
must choose Ahura Mazdā, so (reciprocally) Ahura Mazdā can judge the world” (68). In
his translation the two clauses become: “Just as He is to be chosen by the world, so has
judgment, according to Justice itself, of the deeds of the world been given, from Good
Mind, to Mazdā”, etc. (70) He obviously takes vairiiō as a gerundive in predicative function
and expressing an obligation. But this situation – the world having to choose the god and the
god imperiously judging it – hardly constitutes a relation of ‘reciprocity’. This designation
seems to be dictated more by what is taken to be the contribution of the formal structure
than by the actual content. As it stands in Duchesne-Guillemin’s translation the stanza has
either of the following two senses, depending on whether the yaθā . . . aθā . . . structure is
understood either as coordinating two related statements or as a subordinated conjunction.
The Syntax and Sense of the Ahuna Vairiia 521
Under the first alternative, 27.13a-b’ means: “the world has to choose Ahura Mazdā; and the
Good Mind has given the power of judgment over worldly actions to Mazdā, in accordance
with Justice itself”. Note that “according to Justice itself” qualifies not the judgment but
its handover to the god. So two independent events are being reported, and the “just as . . .
so . . . (de même que . . . ainsi . . . )” construction has no bearing on the sense of the translated
stanza. Under the second alternative, 27.13a-b’ becomes: “insofar as Ahura Mazdā is to be
chosen by the world, the Good Mind has given the power of judgment over worldly actions
to Mazdā in accordance with Justice itself”. The qualification “in accordance with Justice
itself” would then have to be a somewhat malicious irony, since the subordinate clause can
only have the sense of an imposition: seeing that the world has no choice but to embrace the
unique god, the Good Mind has handed over the power of judgment to him – an investiture
that would be rather redundant.2
From what Kellens and Pirart say in the commentary to their translation we may gather
they have the same idea of the yaθā . . . aθā . . . correlation as Insler does, although their
actual translation of the phrase is virtually unreadable: “Harmonieux comme un (maı̂tre est
harmonieusement) digne de choix par l’existence (rituelle), le modèle des actes de l’existence
de la divine Pensée et leur emprise sont attribués au Maı̂tre Mazdā . . . ” (Kellens and Pirart
1988: p.101). It seems the correlative adverbs qualify the way both the lord and the model
are, namely harmoniously. At least that is how they explain it in their commentary: “Dans les
deux phrases, il y aurait ellipse formulaire. Cette solution s’impose parce que la correlation
yaθā . . . aθā établit clairement une comparaison entre ratuš et le mot auquel se rapporte
vairiiō: le ratu est ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā . . . comme x est digne de choix parce que lui aussi est ašāt 0cı̄t 0
hacā . . . ” (Kellens and Pirart 1991: p.13). The “comparison”, they say, is based on the
shared attribute of the lord and the model, but their paraphrase of the verse does not quite
reflect this: “the model is harmonious as the lord is worthy of being chosen because it too
is harmonious”. Obviously this phrase is not the same as “the model is harmonious as the
worthy-to-be-chosen lord is harmonious”, which is what their explanation of the yaθā . . .
aθā . . . structure requires. It “établit clairement une comparaison” between the “modèle”
and the “maı̂tre” underlying the adjective vairiia- “worthy of choice”. In any case, since they
interpret ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā as an adnominal, the conjunctive adverbs do nothing more than signal
that the two subjects share a feature. Moreover, making ašāt 0 hacā an adnominal and the basis
of comparison forces the supply of a copula on both sides, which effectively makes Y 27.13aa’
an independent sentence, something that Kellens and Pirart would not admit. This is why
their translation is impossibly contorted.
Humbach understands the word underlying vairiiō to be ratuš, which he translates as
“judgment”. “Just as (a judgment) is worthy of being chosen by the world, so the judgment,
(which) in accordance with truth itself, (is to be passed) on the actions of good thought of the
world, is assigned to the Wise one . . . ” (Humbach 1991 I: 115). ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā qualifies, it seems,
the manner of the passing of judgment by the divinity. But it is hard to see what the sense
of “just as . . . so . . . ” is in this translation, whether it is merely a comparative construction
2 According to Gershevitch (1959: 329), the three lines “appear to answer the question: ‘what is it that is to be
chosen?’” The answer given in the stanza is: 1) an ahu and ratu that is the “doer of the actions of Good Mind”,
and 2) “Ahura Mazdā’s power over the world”. One wonders what possible sense could there be in ‘choosing’ the
unique god’s “power over the world”, which Mazdā is in Gershevitch’s theorisation.
522 Amir Ahmadi
or something else. His earlier German translation has: “Weil sie durch ihren Besitz an
Lebenskraft begehrenswert ist, deshalb wird der Wahrhaftigkeit gemäß die gebührende
Zuteilung der aus dem guten Gedanken entspringenden Bewirkungen der Lebenskraft dem
Mazda dargebracht . . . ” (Humbach 1991 II: 5). It uses “since” instead of “just as”, making
the intention to subordinate ahū vairiiō clear – at least on the formal level. It also tells us
what semantic role yaθā . . . is expected to play in the stanza. It is supposed to introduce
the reason for the action described in the main clause, namely the investiture of the power
of judgment. We can use the German translation to make the English one clearer in this
respect: “since a judgment is worthy of being chosen by the world, therefore the judgment
of worldly actions is to be assigned to Ahura Mazdā”. When we do this, however, it becomes
senseless: the (power of) judgment is to be assigned to the supreme (or unique?) god because
a judgment (presumably attributable to a supernatural being) appeals to one. The only sense
this could possibly have is that of favouritism (on behalf of one’s god who thus collects credit
for what one esteems). Still, what possible sense could this have when the esteemed thing is
a “judgment”, that is to say, what does a “judgment worthy of being chosen by the world”
mean?
Let us, then, go back once again to the English version. Can we retrieve a meaning there,
keeping the yaθā clause in a subordinate role? I can come up only with this: “so that the
judgment (passed on worldly actions) would be worthy of being chosen by the world, (the
power of) judgment is to be assigned to Ahura Mazdā,” etc. The problem is that this requires
the verb of the subordinate clause to be in the subjunctive. In his translation, as it stands,
the main clause is basically independent, and the subordinate clause senseless. Incidentally,
if Humbach had taken vairiiō as a gerundive with the sense of ‘to be embraced’, as the
Gāthic agonistic development of the Indo-Iranian root var ‘choose’ might suggest, he would
have had a syntactically coherent translation of the yaθā . . . aθā . . . : “As (i.e., since) the
judgment (of worldly actions) is to be embraced by the world, so it . . . is assigned to Mazdā”,
etc. Thus, the subordinate clause gives the reason (i.e., so that the world can embrace the
judgment) for the action described in the main clause (i.e., the handover of the power of
judgment to the god). This would still leave a number of problems, to which I turn below.
Also, as far as the sense of the stanza is concerned, it would leave us wondering why should
there be any judgment at all. Since we have to submit our actions to the judgment (of a
superior being), we may as well hand over such a power to a god that judges in accordance
with truth. We have the freedom to choose the judge of our actions, but not that of doing
without a judge. Hintze (2007) too seems to subordinate the phrase introduced by yaθā,
probably as a causal clause, reading vairiia- as a gerundive in predicative function. But the
sense of the subordination is completely obscure. “Just as he is to be chosen by existence,
so the judgment according to truth about existence’s actions of good thought is attributed
to the Wise one” (ibid., 324). Can “existence” play the role of an agent? And, how does the
subordinate bear on the main clause?
The yaθā . . . aθā . . . construction does not seem to serve the purpose of coordinating
parallel statements. In Kellens’ and Pirart’s paraphrase of Y 27.13 (“le ratu est ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā . . .
comme x est digne de choix parce que lui aussi est ašāt 0 hacā . . . ”), the “lui aussi” can not
be accounted to the emphatic particle (cı̄t 0). Where does it come from? Now, it seems that
when the yaθā . . . aθā . . . structure is used in the Avesta for coordinating two statements it
has a specific semantic function and perhaps a particular illocutionary context. It does not
compare two entities in respect of a feature or an action. Comparison, where it occurs, is
not the purpose but the effect of the structure. The statements correlated by means of the
structure seem to be organised in an order of logical precedence.3 The yaθā clause gives
grounds for what the aθā clause urges or declares. We may describe it as a figure of reasoned
speech used in contexts that especially require tact, where a demand or commitment is made.
Reference is made to a truth that vouchsafes the veracity or efficacy of the declaration(s).
We find it in both the Old Avestan and Later Avestan texts. It occurs two or three times in
the Gāthās and twice in the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti. I also cite a passage from the Later Avesta, as
it happens from texts that have been called “Middle Avestan” (cf. Tremblay 2003).
We find the construction in Y 29.4c’ “aθā n´̄ aŋhat 0 yaθā huuō vasat0: so shall be for us, as
he (Ahura Mazdā) may wish”. Things will happen for us the way they will, because Ahura
Mazdā will have wanted them that way. Notwithstanding the ostensible order of the two
clauses, the logical precedence of the truth articulated in the subordinate clause is clear. The
reverse order is due to the poetic matching of the preeminent position divine power occupies
in the order of things with the place it takes in the verse structure (see Watkins 1995: 28–49).
The verse-final, stanza-final position is doubly marked as a position of privilege. This attracts
the expression of the power of god to that position and thereby reverses the normal order
of our structure. We might also note that just as the stanza begins with an expression of
the intellectual power of the divinity, so it ends with a terse statement of the power of his
disposition over existence, in a kind of miniature ring composition, an authoritative unity that
totalises in many dimensions, including time, whether or not pairı̄.ciθı̄t 0 and aipı̄.ciθı̄t0 are indeed
adverbs of time.4 In my opinion, this makes it very likely that this stanza is an interjection
by the poet, an observation by the narrator (more on this in the following section).

Y 33.1a-b’ “yaθā āiš iθā var´šaitē, yā dātā aŋh´̄uš paouruiiehiiā / ratūš š iiaoθanā razištā: as you
have wished so will have been practiced the straightest actions which were established (or:
which you established) as the measures of the primordial existence” invokes the divine will
as the ground of the practice described. The subjunctive mood of the aor. var´š- makes the
consequent nature of the action clear.5
In Y 35.6 “yaθā āt 0 utā nā vā nāirā vā vaēdā haiθı̄m aθā hat 0 vohū . . . : as, then, a man or a
woman knows (an action to be) true, so (he/she also knows its) being good”, we are told
that the insight that something is ‘true’ or ‘real’ entails the knowledge of its goodness (for
life and afterlife). Having one kind of knowledge puts us in the possession of the other.
3 Klein (1985 II: 63–130) shows that the Vedic manner adverbials áthā and ádha can function as logical
conjunctives.
4 See Schwartz 2003 and 2006 on ring construction in the Gāthās. Kellens and Pirart (1988: 108) translate Y
29.4c’ as a precatory exclamation: “Qu’il en soit pour nous comme le Maı̂tre qui sait distinguer le veut!”
5 Note that even if one takes āiš as an inst. pl. m. pronoun, as Insler (1975: 51) does, still the coordinating
adverbials are understood to constitute a subordinating logical conjunction: “As in harmony with those things
which are the laws of the foremost existence, the (final) judgment thus shall bring to realisation the most just
actions”, etc. Humbach (1991 I: 136) interprets the adverbials as simply signaling parallel structures. H.-P. Schmidt
(1985: 7) denies the “correlative” value of iθā but nonetheless gives logical value to the subordinated conjunction,
relying on the subjunctive mode of the verb: “In order that it shall be brought to realisation by exactly these laws
which are those of the pristine life, the judgment (or: norm) (shall be brought to realisation) with the most just
action”, etc. Among others, the problem with this translation is that the same verb (duplicated in the principal
clause) is interpreted once in the subjunctive and once in the future tense.
524 Amir Ahmadi
Conversely, knowledge of the ‘good thing’ requires insight into the primordial constitution
of reality. Again, the structure expresses a logical order of precedence.6
In Y 39.4 we see, again, an overt reference to an authoritative truth: “yaθā tū ı̄ ahura mazdā
m´̄n.ghācā vaocascā dåscā var´šcā yā vohū aθā tōi dad´mahı̄ aθā cı̄šmahı̄ aθā θβā āiš yazamaidē . . . :
As indeed, O Ahura Mazdā, you have conceived, expressed, established and practiced these
which (are) good, so we institute (them) for you, so we provide (them for you), so through
them we worship you”, etc. The divine actions are expressed by verbs in the aorist and those
of the worshippers by verbs in the indicative present. What the worshippers do, they do
because those actions have already been done in that way by their (authorising) god. They
draw attention of the divinity to the raison d’être of their ceremony and tactfully ask for its
success and hence their reward. As I mentioned above, comparison may be the effect but
not the purpose of this figure of speech. The two subjects are not compared and likened in
respect of a common action or feature. The worshippers perform their ritual according to
the model established by the divinity, which is thus justified. This is the sense that the figure
of speech conveys, not the comparability of the actors.
There are three other joint occurrences of aθā/iθā and yaθā (in this order) in the Old
Avesta, which do not belong to our structure. In Y 45.3c-e’ “yōi ı̄m v´̄nōit 0, iθā maθr´m
var´šń.tı̄ / yaθā ı̄m, m´̄nāicā vaocacā / aēibiiō aŋh´̄uš, auuōi aŋhat 0 ap´̄m´m: (those) of you who
will not have practised this formula the way I conceive and articulate it, ‘woe!’ will be the
last (word)”, and in Y 35.6 “yōi ı̄t 0 aθā v´r´ziian yaθā ı̄t 0 astı̄: (to those) who will execute it
the way it is”, iθā/aθā is without any semantic value. In the former, it seems to serve the
purpose of keeping to the requisite syllable count. In Y 34.6
yezı̄ aθā stā haiθı̄m, mazdā ašā vohū manaŋhā

at 0 tat 0 mōi daxšt´m dātā, ahiiā aŋh´̄uš vı̄spā maēθā
yaθā vå yaz´mnascā, uruuāidiiå stauuas aiienı̄ paitı̄
aθā is a cataphoric adverb and refers to the subordinate clause 6cc’. We may translate 6a +
cc’: “If you truly are in such a way . . . that, worshipping, praising and joyful, I may come
to you”.
As I mentioned, the figure is also attested in the Later Avestan texts. Two passages in
particular make the pragmatic context of the figure quite clear. In Y 58.5 we have an
expression of a demand for protection that uses both citation from sources of authority
(from Y 34.7, see Kellens 2008: 689) and the yaθā . . . aθā . . . figure of reasoned speech:
Y 58.5 yaθā n´̄ dātā am´šā spń.tā aθā nå θrāzdūm. θrāzdūm n´̄ vaŋhauuō θrāzdūm n´̄ vaŋv hı̄š θrāzdūm
n´̄ am´šā spń.tā huxšaθrā huδåŋhō. naēcim t´̄m anii´̄m yūšmāt 0 vaēdā ašā aθā nå θrāzdūm.
As you have created (it) for us, O Am´ša Spń.ta, so protect us! Protect (it) for us, O gods! Protect
(it) for us, O goddesses! Protect (it) for us, O possessed-of-salutary-power and benevolent Am´ša
Spń.ta! I do not know any other (protector) than you, so protect us because of aša!
6I
cannot justify here my interpretation of haiθı̄m and vohū. Kellens (1994: 109–113) takes š iiaoθana- ‘action’ to
underlie the two adjectives, which he glosses as “ritual”. The context warrants the reading, leaving out the gloss,
which is more controversial. The adjective haiθiia-, however, does not quite mean ‘cultic’ or ‘sacred’ or ‘due to the
gods’, as Kellens suggests. It literally means ‘pertaining to what is’. Its Vedic counterpart satyá- is normally translated
as ‘true’ or ‘real’.
The demand made to the gods is reasonable: the subordinate clause expresses both a truth
and an acknowledgment of their creative and protective power, and thus places the gods in
a position of responsibility.
There is, then, no reason to take the yaθā . . . aθā . . . figure as simply implying a
comparison. If, as all the translators have assumed, the yaθā . . . aθā . . . coordinates two
predications, we should rather expect to find in the subordinate clause a reason for the action
described or urged in the main clause. Further, if no comparison is made in respect of a feature
(e.g., being in accord with aša), another ground must be sought should one want to have ašāt 0
hacā on both sides of the caesura. The emphatic article (cı̄t0) does not seem to have, in any of
its occurrences in the Gāthās, the sense of ‘too’; it draws attention to the noun or pronoun
to which it is attached, sometimes with the connotation of ‘even’. I come back to this.
2. The problem of ahū

After Humbach (1957) argued, mostly on linguistic grounds, that this word should be
understood as the instrumental case of ahu- ‘existence’, and not as it was traditionally taken,
namely as the nominative of ahu- ‘lord’, most scholars took the matter as settled. As far as I
know, only Insler and Kuiper still held out for the traditional view. Whatever the linguistic
merits of the currently prevailing view may be, it has not just the Avestan exegetical tradition
against it.
Aside from the Ahuna Vairria, ahū also occurs in Y 29.6bb’ (nōit 0 aēuuā ahū vistō, naēdā ratuš
ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā) in an almost identical syntactical context. Insler (1975b: 31) translates this latter
passage: “A master has not been found by a single one (of us), nor a judgment which indeed
befits truth”. As he points out in his article on the stanza, Y 29.6b-c’ is almost certainly a
reply by the god to a question initially put to aša by the Fashioner of the Cow in Y 29.2
(Insler 1975a). Kellens and Pirart also view Y 29.6b-c’ in the same light, and provide, as
implied, the word ‘lord’, since they think the stated ahū should be read as the instrumental of
ahu- ‘existence’: “Ni (un maı̂tre) ni un modèle harmonieux ne sont connus par l’existence
unique” (Kellens and Pirart 1988: 109). Apparently they find the evidence of the context
overwhelming in favour of reading the implicit ‘lord’ in the verse. Let us look at these two
stanzas.
Y 29.2 adā tašā g´̄uš p´r´sat 0, aš´m kaθā tōi gauuōi ratuš
hiiat 0 hı̄m dātā xšaiian.tō, hadā vāstrā gaodāiiā θβaxšō
k´̄m hōi uštā ahur´m, y´̄ dr´guuō.d´bı̄š aēš´m´m vādāiiōit 0
Then the Fashioner of the Cow asks aša “of what kind (is) your measure for the cow, since you,
who have disposition (over such things), created her along with pasture and cattle-caring activity?
Which lord do you wish for her, who would be able to destroy the aēšma (perpetrated) by the
partisans of druj?”
Y 29.2bb’ (hiiat 0 . . . ) gives the reason why one of the gods is being questioned on the
matter: g´̄uš tašan- approaches them because it was they who created her and provided for
the necessities of bovine life.7 The reply by Ahura Mazdā is apparently given in Y 29.6:
7 It is unclear what the role of the Fashioner of the Cow is. Compare Kellens (1995: 351–353).
526 Amir Ahmadi
Y 29.6 at 0 ´̄ vaocat 0 ahurō, mazdå vı̄duuå vafūš viiānaiiā

nōit 0 aēuuā ahū vistō, naēdā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā
at 0 zı̄ θβā fšuiian.taēcā, vāstriiāicā θβōr´štā tatašā
Then spoke Ahura Mazdā, the knowing one, (these) verses (rhythmically?) “ . . . For indeed I,
the Sculptor, fashioned you for the cattle-breeder and the pastoralist.”
I have deliberately left out the translation of Y 29.6bb’. The translations of the passage
by Insler and by Kellens and Pirart are given above. Let us look at the case for reading
the word ‘lord’ in Y 29.6bb’, be it implied, and not worry for the moment about the
purely linguistic argument, which in any case should not be taken as the be all, end all.
The mainstay of the traditional view is textual and contextual, and not linguistic. In a short
article on the Ahuna Vairiia, Kuiper (1985: 287–288) makes the point that “Avestan nōit 0 . . .
naēdā/naēδa . . . ‘non . . . neque’ refer, with a single exception, always to coordinated nouns”.
Thus one should expect to find a noun (in the nominative) in Y 29.6b since it is coordinated
with a nominative noun in b’. Of course, the noun may well be implied (elliptical). Kellens
and Pirart, as we have seen, take this view. So what is the case for a ‘lord’, be it implied?
The translation Kellens and Pirart (1988: 108) give of Y 29.2 is: “Alors, le Charpentier de
la Vache demande à l’Harmonie: ‘Ton modèle pour la Vache consiste-t-il en ceci que, vous
qui le pouvez, vous lui avez destiné, avec la pâture, le labeur qui nourrit la Vache? Quel
maı̂tre souhaitez-vous pour elle, qui chasse la Rage ainsi que les partisans de la Tromperie?’”
This translation is problematic for four reasons. First, the interrogative kaθā does not seem
to have the sense of ‘is it so?’ in the Gāthās but always ‘how?’ (with ah ‘to be’: ‘of what
kind?’). Second, they read hı̄m in Y 29.2b as a dative whereas it is clearly an accusative in
a regular role with dā.8 Third, their translation of the interrogative phrase (“ton modèle
pour la Vache consiste-t-il en ceci que”) requires a subjunctive in the relative clause 29.2bb’
instead of the injunctive dātā that in fact it has.9 Fourth, in their translation ratu- (for the
cow) seems to mean the “model” of pastoralist care. This cannot be right. In Y 29.6 Ahura
Mazdā acknowledges that the “cow” has been fashioned for the pastoralist, which implies
that she does receive his care, but still asserts that there is no ratu- for the cow. So pastoral
care cannot be at stake in the question concerning the ratu-. The cow’s “being for the
pastoralist and cattle-breeder” does not contradict the cattle-caring activity that serves the
cow, as asserted in 29.2bb’. The reciprocity between the pastoralist and the domestic animal
is explicitly asserted in Y 39.1. Thus, the right translation of Y 29.2a’-b’ should be along
the lines given above: “ye gods who created the cow along with pasture and cattle-caring
activity, what kind of ‘measure’ did you have in mind for her?” And to this Ahura Mazdā
replies that, as things stand, there is no “measure” for the cow, while acknowledging that
she has been fashioned for the purpose of serving the pastoralist, which implies receiving
the care that is part and parcel of her purpose. This of course does not necessarily mean that
8 The reason they (1991: 34) give for this reading is not cogent in my mind.
9 This difficulty seems to be part of the reason why Kellens (1995: 354) detaches the relative clause from the
interrogative phrase that precedes it and subordinates it to the one that follows it: “‘Que dit ton plan pour la vache?
Si jamais, en cédant à l’emprise-rituelle, vous lui avez accordé le labeur qui la nourrit, quel maı̂tre voulez-vous
qu’elle ait, qui s’oppose aux trompeurs et bouscule la Rage?’”
reading an implied ‘lord’ in Y 29.6b is mistaken. Let us just note, however, that it renders
problematic the meaning Kellens and Pirart give to the Gāthic word ratu- “modèle”.10
Now, the problem is whether “nōit 0 aēuuā ahū vistō” in fact refers to the question posed
in Y 29.2 concerning the ahura-. Insler (1975a: 415ff.) draws attention to Y 29.8a-b’, which
he thinks strengthens the argument that Y 29.6bb’ should be seen as containing a response
to both parts of the question in Y 29.2. In Y 29.8a-b’ “aēm mōi idā vistō, y´̄ n´̄ aēuuō sāsnå
gūšatā / zaraθuštrō spitāmō: this one here I have found, who is the first to have listened to our
teachings: Zarathuštra Spitāma” he sees a corroboration of the nominative value of ahū in Y
29.6b’. First, there is the question, “which lord” the gods have in mind for the protection of
the cow; then, the reply that “no lord has been found”; and finally, that “one is found” after
all in Zarathuštra. This sequence, however, is specious. What is stated in Y 29.8a-b’ is clearly
a reply to the question posed immediately before it in Y 29.7cc’ where, after introducing the
“formula of libation and milk”, it is asked “kastē vohū manaŋhā, y´̄ ı̄ dāiiāt 0 ´̄á̄uuā mar´taēibiiō:
who do you have that could transfer down by means of good thought the two (formula and
milk) to the mortals?” Furthermore, Zarathuštra could not possibly be identified as an ahura
in any case. We saw that in Y 29.2c’ the one thing specifically mentioned as an attribute of
an ahura is the power to destroy the “(ritual) fury (perpetrated) by the partisans of druj”. In
Y 29.9 Zarathuštra is precisely described as anaēša- ‘listless’ and asura- ‘weak’. We can then
rule out that Y 29.8 might be able to provide support for the nominative value of ahū in Y
29.6b.
Yet, the case for reading a ‘lord’ in Y 29.6b, whether implied or explicit, remains open. Let
us assume with Humbach that ahū is an instrumental of ahu- ‘existence’ and not a nominative
of ahu- ‘lord’, and that the objection raised against it by Kuiper, namely that nōit 0 . . . naēdā . . .
coordinates nouns of the same case, can be removed by reading an implied noun in the phrase;
we would still have the problem of what this implied noun in the nominative might be. Is
it ahura-, as Kellens and Pirart think? Their viewing it as the implied nominative in Y 29.6b
seems to be based on the assumption that, having been raised as a question along with that
of ratu- in a single stanza (Y 29.2), it also has to be resolved along with the latter in a single
stanza (Y 29.6). Now this assumption cannot stand up to the facts of the text and those of
the syntax. As to the former, the question of ahura- is in fact addressed in Y 29.4, whether
one takes it as the continuation of the Fashioner’s discourse as Kellens and Pirart do11 , or as
the poet’s interjection as I believe one should.
Y 29.4 mazdå saxv ār´ mairištō, yā vāuu´r´zōi pairı̄.ciθı̄t 0

daēuuāišcā mašiiāišcā, yācā var´šaitē aipı̄.ciθı̄t 0
huuō vı̄cirō ahurō, aθā n´̄ aŋhat 0 yaθā huuō vasat 0
Mazdā best remembers performances, (those) indeed that have been done by the daēvas and men
hitherto, and (those) that may be done (by them) henceforth. He, the Ahura, discerns (whatever
has been done before and whatever may be done henceforth in respect of aša and druj). As he
may wish, so shall it be for us.12
10 Kellens (1995: 354) abandons attaching the “model” to pastoral care in 29.2. See the previous note.
11 So does Schwartz (2003: 201).
12 On mairišta- see Hintze (2007: 137–140).
528 Amir Ahmadi
The ahura in question in Y 29.2 is found in Y 29.3cc’. After the poet’s vignette
characterisation of this ahura in Y 29.4, in the following stanza we find the Soul of the
Cow along with another character taking their plea to the “strongest of beings”. The
development of the text should dissuade us from wanting to read an ahura into Y 29.6bb’.
One must admit, in any case, that it would be very strange for the supreme ahura, “hātam . . .
aojištō: the strongest of beings” (Y 29.3c), to reply with “no ahura is known” (“Ni (un maı̂tre)
ni un modèle harmoneiux ne sont connus par l’existence unique”) to the question “which
ahura do you have in mind?” posed to the gods, while in the meantime we are told that
the ahura is in fact the all-powerful Ahura Mazdā and that the Soul of the Cow has already
turned to him. What activity is at issue that this most powerful god cannot perform, or
that perhaps does not fall within the sphere of his competence? These questions cannot be
dismissed on the grounds that they belong to exegesis and not to philology. They point us
in the right direction. The interpreter must accept illumination from the sense and context
no less than from the grammar and syntax.13
The syntax also seems to be resistant to Kellens’ and Pirart’s translation of the verse: “Ni
(un maı̂tre) ni un modèle harmonieux ne sont connus par l’existence unique”. The word
ahu- ‘existence’, as far as I can tell, only ever has an abstract sense in the Gāthās, and not
the concrete meaning like ‘world’, which it seems to have in the Later Avestan texts.14 If
so, “known or found by existence” must have the sense of “known or found (along) with
existence” or “by way of existence”, i.e., no implied agency for ahu-.15 The semantics of
their translation is further marred by the problematic “unique existence”, a rather obscure
conception. Later Kellens (1995: 355) clarifies the conception in his new translation of
29.6bb’: “Jamais celui qui n’a qu’un seul état n’a trouvé ni (un Maı̂tre) ni un plan adapté
à l’Agencement”. This text reads well but creates new conceptual and linguistic problems.
First, the implication of Kellens’ translation is that except for human beings worldly creatures
have no ahura. It is hard to reconcile this conception with how the word is otherwise used in
the Gāthās. Second, in what sense should the “plan” and the “plan adapté à l’Agencement”
be understood, since elsewhere Kellens (1990: 308) translates ratu- as “modèle, prototype”?
That the role or place of the cow in the cosmic order has not been envisaged? This cannot
be right. Third, Kellens in effect treats aēuuā ahū as a possessive adjective, something like
∗
aēuuā-ahu- “one who has one existence”, whereas if such a compound existed, the sandhi
would have made it something like ∗ aēuuåŋhu- and the verse line would have been one
syllable short.
It is difficult to see what the role of the emphatic particle cı̄t 0 is in their translation. Does
ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā apply only to the “model”, or to the implied “lord” as well? If to both, is this
assimilation the contribution of cı̄t 0? As far as I can tell, the emphatic article does not seem
to have the sense of ‘too’ (“lui aussi”) in the Old Avestan texts. The emphatic sense may
intensify to mean ‘even’. The particle can attach to ka- to form indefinite pronouns. Both
13 In his 1995 essay on the Fashioner of the Cow, Kellens suggests “qu’il n’y a ni ratu ni ahura pour les êtres qui,
comme la vache, n’ont que l’état osseux” (1995: 355). Where one is convinced that there is an ahura in the stanza,
one would like to know why his lordship is denied to the cow. But the “beings that, like the cow, have only bony
existence” is a ghost. I discuss this further in the text.
14 Contra Schwartz (2003: 202).
15 Compare Hintze’s translation of Y 27.13a (2007: 324): “Just as he is to be chosen by existence”, etc.
of these roles are also attested for the Vedic counterpart cid.16 If, then, the particle does not
apply to both “model” and “lord”, how should we understand its role in Kellens’ and Pirart’s
text of the verse line? All in all, serious conceptual, syntactical and textual problems beset
their translation.
Humbach’s translation of Y 29.6 bb’ is hardly any better: “None (has been) really found
by the world, no judgment in accordance with truth itself” (Humbach 1991 I: 121). As it was
pointed out the Gāthic word ahu- ‘existence’ (Humbach translates it as “world”) can hardly
assume to the role of an agent. Also, the coordinated nominative is missing in 29.6b, where
its place is given to the “judgment” of 29.6b’ by way of anticipation, which supposedly
reveals a further characteristic about the one and the same “judgment”. But this goes against
the rule of coordination by negative adverbs, which, as Kuiper has pointed out (see above),
always coordinates different entities (nouns or, in one single case, verbs). Schwartz (2003:
202) translates 29.6b-c’: “Not one (hope), nor any judge(ment) in accord with Rightness
has been found by the world, but for the cattleman and for pasturage has the Fashioner
shaped thee”. The elliptical “hope” is taken over from the previous stanza and translates
frajiiāti- ‘survival’. The meaning Schwartz gives it is ad hoc. Also in his text, Mazdā’s speech
is disjunct. The first part presumably addresses 29.5cc’ which Schwartz (ibid.) interprets as a
question: “Is there no hope for the right-living person, none for the cattleman surrounded
by the wrongful ones?” But the second part is seemingly directed to the concern of the cow
(or the Soul of the Cow) for protection. The overall sense of the speech is strange: although
the world has no hope and no righteous judge (to set things aright?), the Fashioner has
created the cow for the (right-living) cattleman and for pasturage17 – as compensation?
Let us now examine Y 29.6bb’ more closely. There syntax of Y 29.6b’ “naēdā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0
hacā” is completely clear: “nor (is there) an ašāt 0 hacā (an attribute) ratuš (nominative)”. Note
three points. First, in all of its occurrences in the Gāthās, ašāt 0 hacā is used as an attribute
(eleven times adnominally, once by predication in a nominal phrase), although it is obviously
an ablative + hacā. Setting aside Y. 27.13 and Y 29.6, since we want to reach a conclusion
about them, of the remaining ten occurrences, eight are in stanzas that are transparently
eschatological and two in stanzas (Y 51.5 and 51.22) that seem to be so. Let me be clear: by
eschatological I mean pertaining to ascension to the abode of the gods and there attaining
immortality. We cannot go through all these passages here and have to settle for just two.
Y 43.14 hiiat 0 nā friiāi,+ vaēd´mnō isuuā daidı̄t 0
maibiiō mazdā, tauuā rafńō frāxšnń´m
hiiat 0 θβā xšaθrā, ašāt 0 hacā fraštā
uzirídiiāi, az´̄ sar´danå s´̄n.ghahiiā
mat 0 tāiš vı̄spāiš, yōi tōi maθrå marń.tı̄
To me (give) O Mazdā what a capable man, possessing (it), would give a friend: your
knowledgeable support, which one obtains18 thanks to your ašāt 0 hacā power, so that I may
ascend . . . along with all those who bear in their memory your formulas.
16 See Mayrhofer (1992–2001 I: 543).

17 The cow understandably benefits the cattleman, hence the dative. How does the cow benefit the pasturage?
18 On fraštā as an injunctive present, see Tremblay (1995: 120–121 n. 44). The last verse line of the stanza should
probably be related to the second pāda of the fourth verse line, if az´̄ etc. starts a new sentence.
530 Amir Ahmadi
The supreme god’s power allows one ‘to rise up’ (uzirídiiāi: us + ´r´- aor. of ar ‘move’).19
This power is described as ašāt 0 hacā.
Y 44.17 tat 0 θβā p´r´sā, ´r´š mōi vaocā ahurā

kaθā mazdā, zar´m carānı̄ hacā xšmat 0
āskítı̄m xšmākam, hiiat 0cā mōi x́iiāt 0 vāxš aēšō
sarōi būždiiāi, hauruuātā am´r´tātā
auuā maθrā, y´̄ rāθ´mō ašāt 0 hacā
I ask you this, speak to me straight Ahura! O Mazdā, how should I make my aspiration to be with
you into (being in) your company, and (make) such that my voice be vigorous in order to effect
(my) union with integrity and immortality by means of that formula that is ašāt 0 hacā rāθ´ma-?20
Whatever rāθ´ma- might be, it is clear, I think, that the formula by being a “ašāt 0 hacā X”
facilitates or effects for one an eschatological bliss.21 I will not go into the question of
what one should understand by this, since it is not our proposed topic. Suffice it to say
that we know very little about Gāthic aša-. The usual translation of the phrase ašāt 0 hacā
as “according to truth” or “harmonious” is based on what one believes the etymology of
the word dictates, and its ablative form. But as it happens the expression ašāt 0 hacā has a
determinable significance because it is consistently used in contexts that may be narrowly
defined as eschatological. Thus, for the sake of convenience, let us provisionally translate it
as soteriological.22 We may then translate Y 29.6b’: “nor (is there) a soteriological ratuš”.
Note that the emphatic particle cı̄t 0 is attached to the “soteriological” and not to ratu-. It
marks the soteriological ratu- presumably as opposed to other kinds of ratu-; it sets out this
kind from another kind. There is no X of type A, nor is there one of the type B. Could
this schema be a correct conclusion? Let us examine more closely the first pāda, Y 29.6b
“nōit 0 aēuuā ahū vistō”. The second word is an adverb that has an exact Vedic equivalent, evá,
which Mayrhofer (1992–2001: 270) translates as “so, auf diese Weise, allerdings, wirklich”.
It is derived from the word for “one” in Iranian languages: Old Persian aiva- and Avestan
aēuua-. How should we understand the other two words?
19 See Beekes 1979; Mayrhofer (1992–2001 I: 105–106). Compare Kellens and Pirart (1990: 205).
20 Hoffmann and Forssman (2004: 53) analyze āskíti- < ∗ āsk´ ti- < ∗ ā-skti-, and translate as “Gefolgschaft”. The
masculine noun zara- means something like ‘aspiration, striving’. Bartholomae (1961: 1670) gives “Streben, Ziel”
and links it with the Vedic háryati “er strebt nach”. For the Vedic root har Mayrhofer (1992–2001 II: 804) has “sich
freuen, Gefallen finden, gern haben”, and for haryatá “begehrenswert, erwünscht”. Incidentally, here it seems that
the abl. + hacā construction (hacā xšmat 0) can only have the sense of ‘auprès de vous’ or ‘with you’.
21 It could be that rāθ´ma- is a derivation from the root rād ‘succeed in, attain’ cf. Mayrhofer (1992–2001: 228:
rādh “Gelingen haben, Erfolg haben, den Zweck errecihen”) in -ma, meaning something like attainment or success.
The devoicing and fricativization of the Indo-Iranian d(h) before m is also attested for the derivatives of the root
rud(h) ‘grow’. See Bartholomae (1961: 1531).
22 In Y 32.13 the “messenger” of the supreme god’s “bearer of divine formula” is said to be able to hold
back unnamed but obviously hostile aspirants from “seeing aša”: 32.13cc’ “θβahiiā maθrānō dūt´̄m, y´̄ ı̄š pāt 0 dar´sāt 0
ašahiiā”. The expression “seeing aša” must mean acceding to the abode of the gods. The place where one may
enjoy the supreme god’s bliss and aša are equivalent in the two parallel contexts Y 32.1 and 32.13b’-c’. In Y 32.4,
the desired end for which one should want Mazdā’s resourcefulness is explicitly stated: aša. Depriving oneself of
Mazdā’s power is tantamount to “nasiian.tō ašāat 0cā: disappearing from the (path of) aša”. The figure of the “path of
aša” seems to be the metonymic designation of the divine sphere. Aša in Y 43.12aa’ “hiiat 0cā mōi mraoš aš´m jasō
frāxšnńē” must refer to something concrete, since the locative or accusative complement of gam ‘come’, whether
simplex or with the verbal prefix ā or aibı̄, always has a concrete sense in the Gāthās where the subject is a person.
There is a probable mention of this stanza in the Later Avestan Vr 1.5, where it is called
ahuman.t- ratuman.t- “(the text) that contains ahu and ratu”. There is no question, as has been
emphasized by Gershevitch (1959: 238 and 328–329), that the Later Avestan tradition reads
this stanza and especially Y 27.13 as containing fundamental revelations about the ahu and the
ratu, both taken as nominative and meaning something like “lord” and “guide” respectively
(Y 19.8). They seem to have referred initially to Ahura Mazdā alone but subsequently to
both the god and Zarathuštra, in such a way that the first is said to rule over the heavenly
or spiritual realm and the second over the terrestrial one (Vr 2.4). If an argument could be
made for the artificial nature of the LAv. nominative ahu, it would have to proceed from
a thorough examination of the meaning and significance of Y 27.13. Vr 1.5 singles out Y
29.6 for a special mention as one of the texts that constitutes the object of worship there,
alongside the Ahunauuaitı̄ Gāthā that contains the stanza. The formation of the speculative
nominative ahu is not just a process impacting on matters of doctrine and myth, but it is
also a matter of hearing and understanding the sacred words. The fact that over so many
centuries virtually every interpretation of the two passages (Y 27.13 and Y 29.6) has in one
way or another heard or read the word ahu in them (and here we must also include, for
the purpose of this argument, all who read an implied nominative ahura-), demonstrates the
extraordinary significance that was attached to Y 27.13 (and, perhaps by association, to Y
29.6) and made it impossible for it not to express in the materiality of the words the meaning
that it was understood to carry, namely the twofold appointment of the god as the guide
and the protector. This view of its significance comes out clearly, for instance, in the LAv.
commentary of Y 19.12–14. I leave the discussion of these issues for another article.
The process of the appearance of the nominative ahū becomes visible once we restore the
word that was its object, and once we see that this restoration produces a coherent syntax
and sense. The transmitted text of Y 29.6b is “nōit 0 aēuuā ahū vistō”. I suggest that the last
two words are the result of an ancient split. They belong together: ahū.vista-, a dependent
compound and meaning “known with existence” or “found with existence” (the second
term from either the root vid ‘know’ or the root vid ‘find’). The adjectival phrase aēuuā
×
ahū.vistō qualifies the nominative ratuš and can be translated as “indeed a worldly”, so 29.6b
becomes: “neither indeed a worldly ratu-”, that is to say, the measure that has to do with
the worldly existence, e.g., a quotidian schedule of observances. The adverb aēuuā and the
emphatic particle cı̄t 0 set apart as distinct from one another the two types of Gāthic ratu-. Thus
the text and translation of Y 29.6bb’ become “nōit 0 aēuuā × ahū.vistō, naēdā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā:
neither indeed (is there) any worldly (measure), nor (is there) a soteriological measure”. To
the question “what type of measure (e.g., observance) is there for the cow?”, the supreme
god replies “neither is there a worldly measure, nor a soteriological one”. Before turning to Y
27.13 once again I would just mention that interestingly there is a third Gāthic passage where
the word ratu- occurs with a compound of ahu-: Y 44.16c’ “ahūm.biš ratūm ciždı̄: O healer
of existence give the measure!” The epithet “healer of existence” is used to refer to Ahura
Mazdā. As for what the ‘measure’ might mean, a short discussion of it is found further below.
Let us go back now to Y 27.13aa’ “yaθā ahū vairiiō, aθā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā”. Based on the
argument given above we may make a few short observations. First and foremost, one can
no longer rely on the context and text of Y 29.6 to read an explicit or implicit ‘lord’ into
the verse line. I also tried to show that if one proposes to take the yaθā . . . aθā . . . figure
532 Amir Ahmadi
as coordinating two statements, then the Old Avestan evidence requires one to understand it
in the specific function set forth above, namely yaθā should introduce a subordinate clause
that would give the ground for the action or event expressed in the main clause. This way of
understanding the syntax would then demand that vairiiō should be interpreted as a gerundive
in the sense of an ‘ought’, especially given the semantic field of the verbal employment of var
‘choose’ in the Gāthās. Since ahura- is no longer available as the subject of the subordinate
clause that role falls to the implicit ratu-. So the sense of the verse would be something
like: “since (it is) to be embraced with existence, the measure – the soteriological one – of
the actions . . . is assigned to Mazdā”. The emphatic attribute ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā would probably
have to be understood in the sense of a notice. Since the measure that is to prevail in one’s
existence is to be chosen (as opposed to, say, being externally imposed or being a matter of
fact), so one should look to Mazdā for the measure, the soteriological one, of the actions
of existence, etc. Presumably, this implies that, as opposed to the daēvas, Mazdā values (free)
commitment, and is the only god who can provide a worldly measure of observance(s) that
ensures salvation. This rendition is coherent and syntactically derivable from the Gāthic text.
Nonetheless, I believe it is unacceptable. Although vairiia- is a gerundive in form it is only
used in the Gāthās as an adjective. More generally, none of the few words that are gerundive
in form is ever used in a predicative function in the Gāthās. They are either adjectives or
substantivised adjectives. To this extent, reading an ‘ought’ into Y 27.13a is arbitrary.23 Y
27.13a “yaθā ahū vairiiō” is not an implicit predication. This conclusion is inescapable if one
wants to be faithful to the Gāthic usage.
Thus Y 27.13 aa’ is a coordination of two modified nominatives that are likewise treated,
described by dazdā. Just as A (dazdā), so (dazdā) B. Note that this is very different from what
we said scholars had seen in the verse: A is X, so is B. ‘A is X’ does not exist, whether implicit
or explicit, and if that does not exist, nor does ‘so is B’: no predication either before or after
the caesura. In the translations that do not treat 27.13aa’ as an independent sentence, the
pāda after the caesura (‘so is B’) is supposed to perform the logical and grammatical magic of
being both a statement in its own right, for the purpose of comparative coordination with
‘A is X’, and not a statement in itself, so it can serve as the subject of the main clause.24
What we have in Y 27.13a is a (1) comparative adverb of manner plus (2) an adjectival
attribute of (3) an implicit noun in the nominative. As for the last element, we have no
basis or cause to look for any other than ratu-. The only real question is what form the
second element has. The words in the pāda we need to account for are “ahū vairiiō”. The
instrumental form of ahu- ‘existence’ cannot be understood as ‘by existence’, i.e., expressing
agency, if only because no action is taking place in the pāda, aside from the semantic reason
described above. This leads us to the one and only possible solution: to see in the two
words the result of a split. We should, then, restore the Y 27.13aa’ to yaθa × ahū.vairiiō,
aθā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā. As for the meaning of the masculine adjective ∗ ahū.vairiiō, it literally
23 See Skjærvø (2002: 403 n. 19). I came upon Skjærvø’s translation of Y 27.13 only after finishing the article.
“Inasmuch as (an ahu? is) a worthy one by the (example of the first) ahu, thus (its) Model (is) just in accordance
with Order. (The Model) of good thought (and) the works of the (first/new) ahu is (always) established for (him
who is) Mazdā ‘Memorizer’, and the (royal) command (is always assigned) to (him who is) Ahura ‘reigning Lord’,
whom one shall (thereby) establish (as) pastor for the poor” Skjærvø (2002: 403).
24 See for example Kellens and Pirart (1988: 101).
means “worthy of being chosen with existence” or, more prosaically, worthy of being chosen
throughout one’s life. The ideological force, in the Gāthās, of the underlying verbal root var
‘choose’ in the adjective ∗ ahū.vairiia- should indicate partisan adherence (i.e., to instructions
for the sake of a goal). It is enlightening to set the form and semantics of this adjective
against those of ∗ ahū.vista-. I translated the latter as worldly but perhaps one should use
‘customary’. Now, against this, the most appropriate translation of ∗ ahū.vairiia- would be
‘ethical’, understanding ethics as regulation of existence in reference to precepts. Insofar as
we are dealing with an active regimentation of daily life in view of a goal (and who could
deny this to Zoroastrianism?) we should not hesitate to use the term. Further consideration
of the issue does not have its place here.
In Y 27.13 two kinds of “measure” are distinguished. One has to do with earthly existence:
a quotidian schedule of observances; and one has its place in the realm of spirit strictu sensu
or perhaps a special kind of ritual concerned with the destiny of the soul beyond earthly
existence. Why should one be surprised by this distinction, different expressions of which
are discernable throughout the Gāthās (see under 4 below), or by the fact that the worshipper
looks to the supreme god for the “measure” of actions in each of these fundamental spheres
of being? Does not Y 32.5 fault the daēvas with deceitfully depriving the “mortal” from the
“good life” and “immortality” (hujiiātōiš am´r´tātascā)? This must be the wrong committed by
the daēvas, a twofold wrong, explicitly articulated as such. Hence: Y 27.13aa’ “yaθa × ahā.vairiiō,
aθā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā: Just as the ethical (measure), so the soteriological measure”, etc.
3. The problem of the cascade of three genitives: ratuš . . . vaNhú̄š . . . manaNhō,

+
š iiaoθnanam aNhú̄š . . . xšaθr´mcā
How to allocate the genitive determinants? Let us first quickly consider a few proposed
solutions thus far. Kellens and Pirart translate Y 27.13a’-c’ as “le modèle (harmonieux) des
actes de l’existence de la divine Pensée et leur emprise sont attribués au Maı̂tre Mazdā”. The
verb dazdā is the 3rd sing. inj. pres. in middle-passive voice of dā ‘set or place’. It is used with
an object in the dative (of person), which is the beneficiary of the action. There is a certain
semantic awkwardness in their text because of the way they understand Avestan xšaθra-:
“emprise” (hold). Whatever the appropriateness of this understanding as far as the Gāthic
doctrine is concerned, it creates the problem that the verb has to be given two opposite
senses: on the one hand, the god is the beneficiary of the worshipper’s acknowledgment
and thus established as the authority that provides the “model” of the actions of existence,
and on the other, the same god is to undergo the “hold” that the worshipper places on
him and thus become an object of manipulation. More importantly, setting aside this stanza,
one cannot find a single example of determination by a cascade of three genitives in the
Gāthās. There are seven cases of double genitive cascade, but not a single triple cascade! The
problem is palpable for Duchesne-Guillemin, who reads vaŋhú̄š . . . manaŋhō as an ablative,
which is problematic since this would be the only case of an ablative governed by dā ‘set’
and having the sense of agency. It also troubles Insler, who attempts to resolve it by semantic
liquidation of one of the genitive determinants: “poetic elaboration through the employment

of meaningful yet unnecessary terms . . . we should understand vaŋhú̄š manaŋhō š iiaoθana-

and vaŋhú̄š manaŋhō š iiaoθana- aŋhú̄š to be equivalent expressions” (Insler 1975a: 416).
534 Amir Ahmadi
Humbach accepts the triple cascade without further ado. “Just as (a judgment) is worthy
of being chosen by the world, so the judgment, (which) in accordance with truth itself, (is to
be passed) on the actions of good thought of the world, is assigned to the Wise One, and the
power (is assigned) to (Him), the Ahura, whom (people) appoint as a shepherd to the poor”
(Humbach 1991 I: 115). He takes the two genitives that determine “actions” in the sense
of (actions) proceeding from (good thought) and that of (actions) belonging to (the world).
It seems difficult to sustain the cascade in the meaning of the phrase. Also, one wonders in
what sense one should understand the passing of judgment on actions that proceed from
“good thought”, which should have an absolute value. Is it that, no matter how scrupulous
people are in their intention to follow the “good thought”, their actions are perverted by
some sinister force? So, does the judgment bear on the failure to implement? But, then,
would this be a judgment “in accordance with truth itself”, where responsibility is not justly
allocated? In the case of Kellens’ and Pirart’s translation too, one has to convince oneself that
an inherently strange situation is somehow understandable: the god provides the “model”
of the actions of “la divine Pensée” to the worshipper, who for his part enacts these same
actions of “la divine Pensée” to control the god – presumably for his own benefit. Could
not the god give what the worshipper wants in the first place, and in that way at least spare
himself the ignominy of manipulation?
But as it happens the triple genitive cascade does not exist. vaŋhú̄š manaŋhō determines
xšaθr´mo : the ‘power of good thought’.
Y 31.6 ahmāi aŋhat 0 vahišt´m, y´̄ mōi vı̄duuå vaocāt 0 haiθı̄m

manθr´m yim hauruuatātō, ašahiiā am´r´tātascā
mazdāi auuat 0 xšaθr´m, hiiat 0 hōi vohū vaxšat 0 manaŋhā
The best to him, the knowledgeable one, who would tell me the true formula of integrity, of
aša, and of immortality! To Mazdā (the best which is) the power that one will have made increase
for him by good thought!
This stanza presents no syntax or semantic problem as far as our point is concerned. It says,
with all the clarity one might desire, that the “power” of the god can be increased by means of
“good thought”. (See also Y 30.8, among others.) But one should not think that this power
is the exclusive possession of the divinity. Y 51.21b’c says “vohū xšaθr´m manŋhā / mazdå
dadāt 0 ahurō: Ahura Mazdā confers power by means (or because) of good thought”. In Y
33.5bb’ “xšaθr´m vaŋhú̄š manaŋhō: power of good thought” is characterised as “dar´gō.jiiātı̄m:
(giving) long life”. Y 34.11a-b says that “integrity and immortality” is offered for Mazdā’s
appropriation “vaŋhú̄š xšaθrā manaŋhō: through the power of good thought”. In Y 51.18
the poet asks the god for the power of good thought: “tat 0 mōi dāidı̄ ahurā hiiat 0 mazdā rap´̄n
tauuā: give me that (power), O Ahura, the helping (power) of yours, Mazdā!” And finally in
Y 46.16dd’ we are told “yaθrā vaŋhú̄š manaŋhō ı̄štā xšaθr´m: power is found in the ability that
good thought makes possible”. Again, I have to leave aside the question of how to interpret
this medium (good thought). On the other hand, Kellens’ and Pirart’s string of “(ritual)
hold of the (ritual) acts of . . . the divine Thought” is not only absent from the entire Gāthic
corpus in form but is also conceptually problematic. There are only two passages where

xšaθra- ‘power’ is in any way associated with š iiaoθńa- ‘act’ (Y 33.14 “power of the (ritual)
act” and 33.1 “power through the (ritual) act”). In each case the “ritual act” plays a role along
with other positively marked terms, which together yield “power” for the divinity, along
with other valued spiritual goods. There is no conceptually significant relationship between

š iiaoθńa- ‘act’ and xšaθra- ‘power’. We are then left with ratuš + š iiaoθananam aŋhú̄š on one
hand, and vaŋhú̄š manaŋhō xšaθr´mcā on the other: the measure of actions (or enactments)
of existence, on one hand, and the power of good thought, on the other.
4. The problem of ratu-
But what is ratu-, which I have been translating as “measure”? In the Later Avestan texts
ratu- refers to a number of things: to cyclic time periods marked by observances and festivals,
and their tutelary divinities (Y 1.3–9); to “chiefs” of living creatures (Vr 1.1)25 ; to sacred
texts that are offered in sacrifice in formal ceremonies (Y 1.10–19); and finally to Ahura
Mazdā and Zarathuštra, the supreme authorities of celestial and earthly domains respectively
(Vr 2.4). The essential work on these first chapters of Yasna and Visprad texts is Kellens’
“Commentaire sur les premiers chapitres du Yasna”. According to Kellens (1996: 102–104),
the term ratu- has four different meanings in these texts, two inherited from the Indo-
Iranian period, and two innovative ones. In the inherited usage, like its “équivalent skr.
r9tú-, ratu- désigne étymologiquement une période récurrente du temps (ou des fonctions
biologiques) et, en virtu du précieux parallèle védico-avestique RS 1.162.19 – Y 29.6, une
parole divine, qui, dans les Gāthās, est prononcée par Ahura Mazdā et consiste à définir
une régle conforme à l’Agencement (ašāt 0 hacā)”. The characterisation of ratu- as a type of
“divine speech” is problematic though, if the emphasis is placed on ‘speech’. The R . gvedic
evidence adduced almost certainly points to ‘rule’ or ‘measure’ as instituted by the gods,
which the sacrificer has to take into account and follow in his immolation.26 Kellens also
believes that Ahura Mazdā and Zarathuštra are the highest “prototypes” of living creatures,
the “first as the ratu of the celestial gods, and the second as the ratu of terrestrial humans”.
This development is based, according to him (1996: 103ff.), on priestly speculations on Y
27.13 and Y 29.6. But the context of Vr 2.4 where the designation of Mazdā and Zarathuštra
as ratu occurs does not allow Kellens’ interpretation, nor does the supposed “origin” (i.e.,
Y 27.13, 29.6) warrant such a derivation. From the Later Avestan commentary and ritual
references to Y 27.13 one may conclude that the ratu- of the Ahuna Vairiia acquired its
specific Later Avestan meaning in the context of priestly speculations about the name of
the god. In other words, if a new sense could have developed by speculation from Y 27.13,
this sense could only have been that of ‘authority’, a certain kind of authority, and not
the prototypes of categories of beings as Kellens asserts. But let us look the term in the
Gāthās.
There is a stanza, Y 33.1, that could shed light on the sense the term has in the Gāthās,
but on the condition that it is read in the context of the subsequent stanzas.
25 Kellens (2006: 24) interprets the ratu- (plural) in Vr 1.1 to mean “prototypes”.
26 For the Vedic word Mayrhofer (1992–2001: 257) gives “richtige Zeit” and “Regel”, for the Avestan
(including the Old Avestan) word, “Zuteilung des Gebührenden”, “Richterspruch”, “Zuteiler des Gebührenden”
and “Richter”, and for the Later Avestan, “Zeitabschnitt” and “Zeitraum”.
536 Amir Ahmadi
Y 33.1 yaθā āiš iθā var´šaitē, yā dātā aŋhú̄š paouruiiehiiā

ratūš š iiaoθanā razištā, dr´guuataēcā hiiat 0cā ašāunē
yex́iiācā h´̄miiāsaitē, miθahiiā yācā hōi ār´zuuā
As you have wished, so will have been practiced the straightest actions, which were established
(or: which you established) as the ratu- of the primordial existence for the partisan of druj as well
as for the ašavan, and also for the one whose crooked and upright (actions) balance each other
out.
The ratu- (plural) apply to all, it seems, if we take the last category as covering all those who
belong neither with the partisans of aša nor with those of druj. This is perhaps the reason why
scholars have thought it appropriate to translate ratu- with terms that feed the universality of
its application, as it were, back into its semantics. Its divine origin also encourages placing
it at beginnings, giving it the sense of ‘inaugurating’, e.g., a series. It must mean ‘model’
or ‘archetype’ (so Kellens and Pirart (1988: 122): “les actes (rituels) les plus directs, dont
l’existence fondamentale a fait des modèles pour le partisan de la Tromperie, le partisan de
l’Harmonie”, etc.) with the possible connotation that the gods have provided the archetypes
of (ritual) actions not only for the ašavan but also for the drugvant. For Insler (1975b: 50)
the word means divine “(final) judgment” that has all deeds meet with their just reward.
For Humbach (1991 I: 136) ratu- is the “judge” in this context but generally means divine
judgment (so his translation of Y 44.16cc’ “Accord (as) a judgment bright (things to be) in
my house, O Healer of existence”, which is incomprehensible to me). The term ‘judge’ (or
‘judgment’) seems to be a modern phenomenon, as far as I can tell. In the Later Avestan
texts ratu- generally has four related senses: a religiously significant period of time or species;
a recited text in sacrifice; or a position of authority. The latter seems to refer to an authority
of a special kind, namely one that presides over the implementation of Zoroastrian teachings
in the daily life. The rules for observances of mundane life and those for the sacrifice
proper belong to the very center of one’s existence. How one conducts oneself in the most
seemingly banal matter has a consequence not just for one’s own possibility of salvation but
also for the outcome of the cosmic struggle. Every sphere of social life has its role to play in
this affair. We learn from Y 19.16–18 that for each level of social integration there is a ratu.
Y 19.16 tells us there are five levels of ratu-ship; Y 19.18 names them. The development of
a new form of social authority responded to a need that had its root in religious observance,
both a constant occasion for priestly reflection and an object of speculative elaboration.
Y 33.2–4 refers to the most basic principles of conduct in a few, particularly significant
contexts of social life, clearly meant for the ašavan. The person who harms the partisan of
druj, and the one who offers hospitality to his guest meet the supreme god’s approval (Y
33.2). He who strives to be helpful to the partisan of aša along with his family, community
and tribe; and he who dedicates himself to caring for the cow – he will find himself in
the “pasture of aša and of good thought” (Y 33.3).27 The poet wishes to conjure away by
means of ceremonial action (or rites) all malice against the god, and remove the contempt
and deceit that he finds in his social circles, and finally cast away the evil intention from the
27 Compare RV 10.14.2ab: “Yama was the first to find the way for us, this pasture that shall not be taken away”.
The heavenly abode of the dead is characterised as gavyūti- “pasture”.
pasture of the cow (Y 33.4). Here we have the social functions of the Gāthic priest. This last
stanza prepares the shift to another register. From this point, the context is no longer that
of social life but of sacrifice, where the poet imagines himself meeting and speaking with
his divine interlocutor (Y 33.6), having indicated his competence for such an audience (Y
33.5). The metaphor of the charioteer’s arriving at his destination (auuaŋhāna-) serves as the
setting for an articulation of various elements or conditions that are involved in attaining the
company of the gods (Y 33.5–6). We see from this context that ratu- pertains to existence,
and more exactly, to the ways one should conduct oneself in respect of certain vital matters.
And, if I am not mistaken, these matters are placed in two more or less distinct registers,
social or worldly and eschatological. So in this context ratu- should perhaps be translated as
‘rule’. If I have preferred the term ‘measure’ it is because this term not only connects with
the Vedic and Later Avestan usages – in fact it already contains them in its semantic field – but
also it is etymologically most suitable, if in fact it is derived from PIE ∗ h2 er ‘join’ (Mayrhofer
1992–2001:p. 257; Rix 2001: pp. 269–270). There is a ‘measure’ of everyday life: the day is
‘measured out’ or ‘arranged’ in sections marked by observances; and so are the month and
the year (the calendar): a complete life schedule. There is also a sacrificial measure, a measure
of the rites of offering to the gods, etc., where the sequence of texts defines the measure of
the ceremony, whose very success depends on the proper arrangement of these texts, which
thus end up being designated as ‘measures’ themselves.
5. The problem of dadat0
What is dadat 0 in Y 27.13c’ “yim drigubiiā dadat 0 vāstār´m: (for Ahura) whom dadat 0 as the pastor
for the needy?” Kellens and Pirart understand it as the 3rd sing. pres. of dā ‘set or place’ in
the subjunctive mood. Humbach (1991 I: 115) reads it as the 3rd pl. injunctive present of
the same root: “whom (people) appoint as a shepherd to the poor”. Insler also interprets it
as a plural injunctive but he makes Am´ša Spń.tas the subject of the verb, and Zarathuštra
the object. “I have translated dadat 0 as 3pl., since the verbal form again markedly refers back
to the 2pl. in 29.2c k´̄m hōi uštā ahur´m. The idea is clear: once the Am´ša Spń.tas, and
particularly Vohū Manō, found Z. to be fit enough to bear the burden of caring for the cow
and the community of the truthful on earth, they invest him with this office and appoint
him prophet of the lord. These heavenly forces of the Wise Lord are the implied subject of
dadat 0, and the phrase in question is testimony to the elevation of Z. as worldly lord following
in the footsteps of god” (Insler 1975a: 420). None of this is tenable. As we have seen, there
is nothing in the text of reference (Y 29) that supports his interpretation. Hintze (2007: 324)
makes the impersonal “one” the subject: “the Lord whom one has appointed as a herdsman
for the destitute”. Is it a substitute for the anonymous plural subject, since she does not read
the verb as a subjunctive? In any case, the impersonal construction is rare in the Gāthās.
Kellens and Pirart have xšaθra- of Y 27.13c as the subject of the relative clause. This seems
to be the best option.
The subject and the object of the relative clause are named at the end of the main clause.
The object is present in the relative clause as accusative relative pronoun. The subject is
projected into the clause by the association just evoked in the previous pāda. Y 27.13c is then
a pivot on either side of which something significant is said about the relationship between
538 Amir Ahmadi
xšaθra- ‘power’ and ahura. But why is the verb of the relative clause in the subjunctive mood?
According to Kellens and Pirart (1990, 83) one of the usages of the present subjunctive in a
relative clause is to indicate a consecutive state or action. This means that this latter can take
place on the condition that the action described in the main clause is already accomplished.
Thus, not only the stanza expresses two significant relationships of ‘power’ and ahura but it
also articulates the ‘exchange system’ of sacrifice, where a whole ideology of the relation
between mortals and the gods is at stake.
Conclusion
Y 27.13aa’ yaθā × ahū.vaiiriō, aθā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā

bb’ vaŋhú̄š dazdā manaŋhō, + š iiaoθńanam aŋhú̄š mazdāi
cc’ xšaθr´mcā ahurāi.ā, yim drigubiiō dadat 0 vāstār´m
“Just as the ethical (measure), so the soteriological measure of the actions of existence is assigned
to Mazdā, and to Ahura the power of good thought, whom (that power) will make the pastor
for the needy”.
The specific translations of Gāthic expressions I have offered are obviously suggestions.
But I believe that any future improvement will have to take into account the arguments
put forward above. In the case of ašāt 0 hacā the most likely scenario is that we are dealing
with a fixed expression that designates a definite function. The orientation with respect to
a specific place (or mental notion) expressed in the ablative form takes on the further sense
of a purpose, which turns the expression into an adnominal characterising the function of
the noun that it modifies. We can have no doubt that Iranian arta (Avestan aša) has, among
others, a spatial sense; it signifies the divine sphere, a locale which is also a state of fulfilment.
In the so-called Daiva Inscription of Xerxes we come across these lines: “martiya hya avanā
dātā pariyaita tya Auramazdā nı̄štāya utā Auramazdām yadataiy × artā hacā barzmaniya hauv utā
jı̄va šiyāta bavatiy utā marta artāvā bavatiy: the man who respects these laws which Ahura
Mazdā has established, and worships Ahura Mazdā × artā hacā barzmaniya, he will be happy
(while) alive and will be artāvan (when) dead”.28 The restoration of artācā to artā hacā is due
to Herrenschmidt (1993), which, according to her, modifies barzmaniy. It would be very
interesting if artā hacā turned out to have the same functional significance as Avestan ašāt 0
hacā. However this might be, one thing is clear: once dead, if one has worshipped Ahura
Mazdā as it is required, one becomes an artāvan, a ‘companion of’ or ‘one in the company
of’ or ‘one associated with arta’. In the Yasna Haptanghāiti (Y 37.4) aša- is characterised,
among others, as raocōŋhuuat 0 “possessed of celestial lights”. In earthly life one may achieve
the quality of ašavan, but in the celestial realm one who has achieved that quality enjoys the
bliss of being in (the state of) aša.29
I have argued on syntactic, semantic and textual grounds that in Y 27.13a we have to read
ahū.vairiiō, a determinative attribute of an implied nominative, ratu-. I do not think there
can be any objection against this reading save one: that the later tradition saw in the pāda an
instruction about the ‘lord’, whether it is taken to be the supreme god or his earthly deputy.
28 See Kent 1953: 151.

29 See Gignoux 1979 and Kellens 1995: 29–38.
Did the Zoroastrian priests and scholars misunderstand this most fundamental expression of
their faith? Posing the question like this leads only to confusion. The Ahuna Vairiia was from
the beginning the vignette articulation of Zoroastrianism (even composed for this purpose?)
and hence a teaching about the supreme ‘lord’ and ‘guide’. If we wish to understand the
process of the ‘rehearing’ of the words, we have to find out of what this teaching consisted,
which at the most basic level is a doctrine about words. There is nothing roguish in this
claim: the same speculative process that resulted in expecting to find the ‘guide’ (or ‘judge’)
in ratu- also underpinned hearing in the first pāda an instruction about the ‘lord’: ahū vairiiō.
What is so natural about the semantic development of ratu- that it should bear virtually
nothing more than a notice? And what is so monstrous about the, let us say, syntactic
development of ahū that one should not want to consider it? The twofold appointment of
Ahura Mazdā as the powerful god who gives measure is seen reflected in the nominative
epithets. The occurrence of the two words ahu- and ratu- within the structure (yaθā . . .
aθā . . . ) that clearly assimilates them as designating the ‘arranger’ (dazdā as understood by
the LAv. exegete of Y 19.13) of existence produces the nominative ahū necessary for the
comprehensive formula of appointment.
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Monash University

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Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

JRAS, Series 3, 22, 3-4 (2012), pp. 519–540

of interpretation. We have to reconstruct, in reference to alien concepts and images, the

1. The problem of yaθā . . . aθā . . .

yezı̄ aθā stā haiθı̄m, mazdā ašā vohū manaŋhā

2. The problem of ahū

Y 29.6 at 0 ´̄ vaocat 0 ahurō, mazdå vı̄duuå vafūš viiānaiiā

Y 29.4 mazdå saxv ār´ mairištō, yā vāuu´r´zōi pairı̄.ciθı̄t 0

16 See Mayrhofer (1992–2001 I: 543).

Y 44.17 tat 0 θβā p´r´sā, ´r´š mōi vaocā ahurā

3. The problem of the cascade of three genitives: ratuš . . . vaNh´ūš . . . manaNhō,

Y 31.6 ahmāi aŋhat 0 vahišt´m, y´̄ mōi vı̄duuå vaocāt 0 haiθı̄m

4. The problem of ratu-

Y 33.1 yaθā āiš iθā var´šaitē, yā dātā aŋh´ūš paouruiiehiiā

5. The problem of dadat0

Y 27.13aa’ yaθā × ahū.vaiiriō, aθā ratuš ašāt 0cı̄t 0 hacā

28 See Kent 1953: 151.

Christian Bartholomae, Altiranisches Wörterbuch. (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1961).

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