o Eminent Domain

Who exercises the power?

G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF
MANDALUYONG CITY,Respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their
residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of
income.

On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to
authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the
petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.

The petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552
due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.

The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayorto initiate the legal steps towards
expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners
was premature.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the petitioner will propsper.

HELD:
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.In view of the absence of
the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was
dismissible for lack of cause of action.The remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing
the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners' property was issued. As ofthen, it was premature for
the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the
filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no
expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their
property under the power of eminent domain.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCILOF MANDALUYONG
CITY,G.R. No. 156684April 6, 2011 FACTS

The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meterssituated between Nueve de Febrero Street
andFernandez Street in Barangay Mauway,Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest
theyrented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and onlysource of income. Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted ResolutionNo. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos,
Sr. to takethe necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for thepurpose of developing it for low cost
housing for the less privileged but deserving cityinhabitants. ISSUEWhether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused i ts
discretion in adoptingResolution No. 552. HELDNo. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an
ordinance is alaw that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from aresolution, which is nothing
but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to sayin the light of attendant circumstances. A municipal ordinance is
different from aresolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of thesentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possessesa general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary
in nature. Additionally,the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but notfor a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion throughthe
resolution, therefore, theSangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused i ts discretion, least of all gravely, for itsexpression of
sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.
Objects of Expropriation
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT
26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the
Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it
cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for
expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to
permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The
use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a
subject to an easement of right of way.

Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [GR L-18841, 27 January 1969] En Banc, Reyes JBL [J]: 10 concur

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities,
one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order 94, in
addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of Posts. Sometime in 1933, the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT), and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages,
coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT;
and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The contracting parties
agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and
70% for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages
to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-
month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1956. Soon
after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. At that
time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000 pending applications for telephone connection. The PLDT, on
the other hand, was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications. Through the years, neither of
them has been able to fill up the demand for telephone service. The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT
on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls
passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. On 5 March 1958, the
Republic, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint
overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and
from local residents. They actually inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement. On 7
April 1958, PLDT complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which
their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the
Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general
public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12
April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services,
from the rest of the world, except the United States. On 12 April 1958, the Republic commenced suit against PLDT, in the Court
of First Instance of Manila (CFI, Civil Case 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a
contract with the Republic, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the Philippines
under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against PLDT to
restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. After trial, the lower court rendered
judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in
agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to
servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought
to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither
guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the
disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the
counterclaims. Both Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) parties appealed.

Issue:
Whether interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be an valid object for expropriation, i.e. the
exercise of eminent domain.

Held:
Although parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms
and conditions of the contract -- the freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions being of the essence of our contractual
system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence
-- and thus the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation
to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose
only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow
interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a
burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for
public use.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American corporation,
whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to
the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone System, by utilizing
its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint
overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to
execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD:

“ x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation
to be determined by the court.”
Republic v PLDT
Facts:
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual relations with e parties) entered into an
agreement where telephone messages, coming from the US and received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice versa.

The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT to
enable government offices to call private parties. One of the many rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use.

Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service where the Bureau would
convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA's station to and from local residents.

PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices
but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT gave a notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would
sever the connections -which PLDT did.

Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's
telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court finds it reasonable.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract.

Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant
upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.

When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more
or less public and all embracing in nature.

The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the
trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been
maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public
convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the
physical connection of the trunk lines.

To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA) v. RURAL BANK
OF KABACAN, INC., et al. G.R. No. 185124, 15 January 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Sereno, J.)
In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land because real
properties are characteristically indivisible; hence, the ownership of the land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil
under it.
FACTS:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan (RTC) a complaint for expropriation of
a portion of three parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters for its Malitubog-Marigadao irrigation project. The
committee formed by the RTC pegged the fair market value of the land at Php 65.00 per square meter. It also added to its
computation the value of soil excavated from portions of two lots. RTC adopted the findings of the committee despite the
objections of NIA to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land. NIA, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision. CA
deleted the value of the soil in determination of compensation but affirmed RTC’s valuation of the improvements made on the
properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the value of the excavated soil should be included in the computation of just compensation
HELD:
Petition DENIED. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties,
contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the
 expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses.
Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking. In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al. The SC
held that rights over lands are indivisible. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides: “The owner
of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.” Thus, the ownership of land extends to the
surface as well as to the subsoil under it. Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial court’s Decision when it ruled it is
preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not only for the value of the land but also for the soil excavated from UST Law
Review, Vol. LVII No. 1, November 2012 such land when such excavation is a necessary phase in the building of irrigation
projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern to the landowner who has been paid
the fair market value of his land. As pointed out by the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface
area only. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land at
the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the
construction of important public improvements.

Taking

REPUBLIC VS CASTELLVI (1974)

[58 scra 336; L-20620; August 15, 1974] Constitutional Law| Eminent Domain| Elements of Taking of Property| Just
Compensation

FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by the respondent Castellvi has been rented and occupied by the Philippine Air Force of the AFP in
1947. The petitioner, in behalf of the AFP, refused to extend the lease, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had
decided not to continue leasing the property and, demanded that the property be vacated. Hence, the petitioner Republic
instituted expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment for just compensation, the petitioner argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease
commenced in 1947 and not when the proceedings begun in 1959.
Respondent maintains that the subject land was not taken when the petitioner commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain is lacking, to wit:
1. entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and
2. devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether the the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947, when the petitioner has entered and occupied the property as
lessee, or the filing on 1959.
HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of eminent domain:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. By virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
possession of the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. The word “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean “a limited period”—not indefinite or permanent. The
lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is
temporary, and considered transitory.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.The the Republic entered the Castellvi
property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be
conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by the air
force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. The entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the
Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals.
Thus, the Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the
lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner
maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by
condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as
lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period,
(3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting
it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of
lease.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620) - Digest
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in
Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused
because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established
on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment
of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of
real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for
a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered
transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact
that the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the
owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the
lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
“intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same
for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and
was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by
the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was
terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to
pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on
June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation to be
paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower
court did not commit an error when it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

GR 165354: RP vs Heirs of Saturnino Borbon

Full Case Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No.: 165354
Date: 12 January 2015
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation
in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the
property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and that the
entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just
compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings,
informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer
necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’
property; that because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for
expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the
dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section
4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court
deems just and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain is
“the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2)
that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be
complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the concept has expanded to include utility, advantage
or productivity for the benefit of the public. “Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public
benefit,” and “public convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The
effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose.If not, it is
then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper
exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property
owner’s right to justice, fairness and equity.
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for public use. The fundamental basis then of
all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very
moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily
fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some
public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for example,
during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some
public use, it would be the duty and the obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the
appeal, if it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for public use, then it
would become the duty and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To
continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the
rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings subject to the conditions to be shortly mentioned
hereunder, and requires the return of the property to the respondents. Having said that, we must point out that NAPOCOR
entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit
any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and its entities to pay just
compensation before depriving any person of his or her property for public use. Considering that in the process of installing
transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the installation of the transmission
lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property
inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession of the property.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no need to
pay “just compensation” to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the
property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of
entry until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their
dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s
construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development
occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of
converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings. The court of origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for damages.

REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF BORBON (2015)

26 Jan 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
vs.
HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 165354; January 12, 2015] Constitutional Law| Eminent Domain|
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered into a private property owned by respondents Borbon in order to construct
and maintain transmission lines for its Power Transmission Project. NAPOCOR then filed for expropriation of an easement of
right of way over a portion of the said property. However, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a motion to
discontinue the expropriation proceedings, that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public
purpose, that because the public purpose ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the
State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation
proceedings was in accordance of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
HELD:
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, the dismissal or discontinuance of
the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the
expropriation proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been
retired. The retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings and requires the return of the property to the
respondents.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, NAPOCOR should
compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of
restoration of the possession by paying actual or other compensatory damages. The compensation must be based on what they
actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees,
plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines.Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court treats the dismissal of the expropriation
proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an action for damages.

o Deprivation of Use

 U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946] Douglas (J) Facts: Causby owns 2.8 acres near an
airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings
which were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220
feet from Causby's barn and 2,275 feet from their house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over
the property-which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide angle approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above
the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a
lease executed in May 1942, for a term commencing 1 June 1942 and ending 30 June 1942, with a provision
for renewals until 30 June 1967, or 6 months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is the
earlier. Various aircraft of the United States, i.e. bombers, transports and fighters, use this airport. Since the
United States began operations in May 1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier
type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over Causby's land buildings in considerable numbers and
rather close together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at
times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the
glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise, the Causbys had to give up their
chicken business. As many as 6 to 10 of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from
fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off. The result was the
destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. The Causbys are frequently deprived of
their sleep and the family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane
accidents on their property, there have been several accidents near the airport and close to their place.
These are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims. On the basis of these facts, it found that the
property had depreciated in value. It held that the United States had taken an easement over the property on
June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000. The United
States contends that when flights are made within the navigable airspace (Air Commerce Act of 1926, as
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) without any physical invasion of the property of the
landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that at most there was merely incidental damage
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) occurring as a consequence of authorized air
navigation. Issue: Whether there was taking of the Causby’s property, even in the light that the United States
allegedly has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space over the country. Held: The United
States conceded that if the flights over Causby's property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking
compensable under the 5th Amendment. It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of
 the value of the property taken. Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery. And
that value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use. If, by
reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could not use this land for any purpose, their loss
would be complete. It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land
and taken exclusive possession of it. Herein, there was a taking. Though it would be only an easement of
flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the
equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface
of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this
day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit the
land-that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It would not be a case of incidental
damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.
(233 U.S. 546). In that case property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for
damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like, incidental to the operations of the trains.
Herein, the line of flight is over the land, and the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were
used for the runways themselves. However, since the record in the case is not clear whether the easement
taken is a permanent or a temporary one, it would be premature for the Court to consider whether the amount
of the award made by the Court of Claims was proper, and thus the Court remanded the cause to the Court
of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with the Court's opinion.
Facts of the case
Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used
regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm,
resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business.
Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this
doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this
airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay
compensation.
Question
Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded that the ancient common law
doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while
the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the
Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage
caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated Causby's
rights, and he was entitled to compensation. (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert H. Jackson took
no part in the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)
United States v. Causby
Brief Fact Summary. Respondents claim that their property was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, by the regular army and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken farm.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment
of his land, he must have exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.

Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’
property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet
from Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above
the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this
airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal
until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United
States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights.
Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from
 fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement over the property on
June 1, 1942, and that the val
ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for
certiorari, which was granted.

Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?

United States v. Causby case brief

United States v. Causby case brief summary
328 U.S. 256 (1946)
CASE SYNOPSIS
Certiorari was granted to the Court of Claims, which rendered a judgment in respondents' favor for the value of property
destroyed and damage to their property resulting from the taking of an easement over their property by low-flying United States
military aircraft. It failed to include in its findings of fact a specific description of the nature or duration of the easement.

CASE FACTS
The lower court granted respondent landowners a judgment for the value of property destroyed, and damage to their property,
resulting from the taking of an easement over their property by low-flying United States military aircraft.

DISCUSSION
 The court agreed with the finding that there had been a taking of respondents' property within the meaning of U.S.
Constitutional Amendment V.
 The court held that a physical invasion of the property was not necessary where there was an intrusion so immediate
and direct as to subtract from respondents' full enjoyment and use of the property.
 Further, the damages were not merely consequential; they were the product of a direct invasion of respondents'
domain.
 The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action, however, on the basis that the record was not
clear whether the easement taken was temporary or permanent.
 The court remanded the cause for a determination of the necessary findings regarding the nature of the easement.

CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action involving respondents' claim of a taking of their property as
a result of low-flying United States military aircraft, on the ground that the record was not clear whether the easement taken was
permanent or temporary. The Court affirmed the finding that an easement in respondents' property had been taken within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),
petitioners vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS AND CARMELITA C. LLAMAS
G.R. No. 194190 January 25, 2017
Facts: On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action for expropriation for the widening of
Dr. A. Santos Ave. (also known as Sucat Road) in what was then the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila. This action was
brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case.
On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in the expropriation case submitted a resolution
recommending that just compensation for the expropriated areas be set to P12,000.00 per square meter.
On January 27, 1994, the Llamas Spouses filed before the Regional Trial Court a "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave
to be Allowed Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors." They claimed that they were excluded from the expropriation
case despite having properties affected by the road widening project. After a hearing on this Motion, the Regional Trial Court
allowed the Llamas Spouses to file their Answer-in-Intervention.
The Llamas Spouses filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. In it, they claimed that a total area of 298 square
meters was taken from them during the road widening project.
The Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal
Value of Expropriated Land and Improvements." On December 9, 1994, the Department of Public Works and Highways filed its
Comment/Opposition to the Llamas Spouses' Motion. On May 29, 1996, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the
payment of the value of the lots of the defendants in the expropriation case. After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the
Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution.
The Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion seeking to
suspend the Llamas Spouses' pending Motions. In an August 8, 2005 hearing, the Department of Public Works and Highways
manifested that the non-payment of the Llamas Spouses' claims was due to their continued failure to comply with their
undertaking. On the same date, the Llamas Spouses filed a Manifestation seeking the payment of their claims. The Department
of Public Works and Highways then filed a Comment/Opposition. On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order
directing the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just compensation. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. In the Order
dated May 19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration. The Llamas Spouses
then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders
of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay the Llamas Spouses just
compensation for a total of 237 square meters across three (3) lots, inclusive of the portions excluded by the Regional Trial
Court. The Court of Appeals added that the amount due to the Llamas Spouses was subject to 12% interest per annum from the
time of the taking.
Issue: Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road
lots covered by TCT No. 179165?

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner's reliance on the 1991 White Plains Decision is misplaced. The same 1991 Decision was not the end of
litigation relating to the widening of Katipunan Road. The owner and developer of White Plains Subdivision, Quezon City
Development and Financing Corporation (QCDFC), went on to file motions for reconsideration. The second of these motions was
granted in this Court's July 27, 1994 Resolution. This Resolution expressly discarded the compulsion underscored by the
Department of Public Works and Highways, and the dispositive portion of the 1991 White Plains Decision was modified
accordingly. As this Court recounted in its 1998 Decision in White Plains Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
The 1998 White Plains Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains Decision's allusion to a compulsion on
subdivision developers to cede subdivision road lots to government, so much that it characterized such compulsion as an "illegal
taking." It did away with any preference for government's capacity to compel cession and, instead, emphasized the primacy of
subdivision owners' and developers' freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces developed as roads.
The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road lots covered by TCT No. 179165 have
actually been donated to the government or that their transfer has otherwise been consummated by respondents. It only
theorizes that they have been automatically transferred. Neither has expropriation ever been fully effected. Precisely, we are
resolving this expropriation controversy only now.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed
road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents as the
government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed October 14, 2010 Decision of the Fifth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104178 is AFFIRMED.

BARTOLATA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 223334

This is a claim for just compensation on the ground that the portion of his property that was used by the government was subject
to an easement of right of way

FACTS: Bartolata acquired ownership over a parcel of land by virtue of an Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands.
Subsequently, respondents acquired 223 sq. m. of petitioner’s property for the development of the Metro Manila Skyway Project.
The parties agreed that in exchange for the acquisition, petitioner would be paid just compensation for the appraised value of the
property, an aggregate of ₱l2,265,000 for the entire affected area. Subsequently, respondents appropriated ₱l,480,000 in favor
of petitioner as partial payment.
Since the date of initial payment, petitioner continuously demanded from respondents the balance but the latter refused to settle
their outstanding obligation prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for a sum of money.
Respondents raised that the Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands granting title to petitioner over the subject property states
that the “land shall be subject to the easement and servitudes provided for in Section 109-114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended.” They also then argued that pursuant to Section 112 of CA 141 the government is entitled to an easement of right of
way not exceeding 60 meters in width, without need of payment for just compensation, save for the value of improvements
existing and any payment for the government’s use of the easement, unless made to compensate the landowner for the value of
the improvements affected, is unwarranted. Thus, they prayed, that the ₱l,480,000 partial payment made to petitioner for the
acquisition of the latter’s property, which was well within the 60-meter threshold width, be returned to the government.
Petitioner contended that PD 2004 which amended RA 730 allegedly removed the statutory lien attached to the subject property.
Respondents, however, countered that petitioner could not have benefited from PD 2004 since the removal of restrictions and
encumbrances contained in PD 2004 only applies to public land sold by the government for residential purposes without public
auction, whereas petitioner was awarded the subject property through a public auction sale.
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the property acquired by virtue of an Order of Award is subject easement of right of way in favor of
the government despite the enactment of PD 2004.
YES. First, no less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title over the subject property reads that the parcel of land
conferred to him is subject to the restrictions contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141, which necessarily includes the easement
provided in Sec. 112. Notably, petitioner was awarded the subject property in 1987, while PD 2004, which allegedly removed all
encumbrances and restrictions from awarded properties, was signed into law much earlier in 1985. This alone raises suspicion
on the applicability of PD 2004 to the subject property.
Second, the Court finds no reversible error in the RTC and CA’s interpretation of the coverage of PD 2004 and RA 730. The title
of RA 730 itself supports the rulings of the courts a quo that the laws petitioner relied upon only cover the sale of public lands for
residential purposes and to qualified applicants without public auction. xxx
x x x RA 730 was crafted as an exception to Secs. 61 and 67 of CA 141. These provisions govern the mode of disposition of the
alienable public lands enumerated under Sec. 59 of the same law. Synthesizing the provisions, CA 141 provides that public
lands under Sec. 59 can only be disposed for residential, commercial, industrial, and other similar purposes through lease or
sale, in both cases, “to the highest bidder. ” The conduct of an auction is then required under Secs. 61 and 67.
By way of exception, however, RA 730 now allows the sale of public lands without public auction to qualified applicants. It is
through this exceptional case of purchase of public land without public auction wherein PD 2004 would apply.
Under its plain meaning, only public lands acquired by qualified applicants without public auction and for residential purposes are
free from any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation. The provision is inapplicable to petitioner’s property which was
awarded to petitioner not in accordance with RA 730, but through public auction.
What is more, the easement of right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141 is not subsumed in the phrase “restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation” appearing in the amendment introduced by PD 2004. xxx
ISSUE # 2: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to just compensation.
NO.
The seminal case of Andaya likewise involved property subject to the statutory lien under Sec. 112 of CA 141. xxx
The Court affirmed the CA’s interpretation of Sec. 112 of CA 141 and ruled that the Republic was under no obligation to pay
therein respondent Andaya just compensation in enforcing its right of way. Be that as it may, the Court did not foreclose the
possibility of the property owner being entitled to just compensation if the enforcement of the right of way resulted in
the “taking” of the portions not subject to the legal easement.
Jurisprudence teaches us that “taking,” in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, “occurs not only when the government
actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical
destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.” xxx
To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property owner will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining
property under Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of right of way; and (2) that the
enforcement of the right of way results in the practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the remaining property,
or in the property owner being dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use of the said remainder.
ISSUE # 3: Whether or not the petitioner should return the initial payment made by the respondents in the amount
of ₱l,480,000.
NO. Respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering the initial payment of ₱l,480,000 from petitioner
Guilty of reiteration, Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the government’s enforcement
of its right of way. The contract allegedly entered by the parties for the government’s acquisition of the affected portion of the
property in exchange for just compensation is then void ab initio for being contrary to law. Consequently, petitioner has no right
to collect just compensation for the government’s use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent the ₱l,480,000 partial payment already
made by respondents, such amount paid shall be governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust enrichment. xxx
Regardless, respondents’ action to compel petitioner to return what was mistakenly delivered is now barred by the doctrine of
estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid
one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who
reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case.
As a general rule, the State cannot be barred by estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. But as jurisprudence
elucidates, the doctrine is subject to exceptions, viz:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except [in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may
not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations … , the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals.

DANILO BARTOLATA v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 223334, 2017-06-07

Facts:
Petitioner Danilo Bartolata acquired ownership over a 400 square meter parcel of land identified as Lot 5, Blk. 1, Phase 1, AFP
Officer's Village, Taguig, Metro Manila by virtue of an Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands dated December 14, 1987.[2] It
appears from the Order of Award that petitioner was the sole bidder for the property during a public auction conducted on August
14, 1987,[3] with the offer of P15 per square meter or P6,000 total for the 400 square meter lot.[4]Sometime in 1997,
respondents acquired 223 square meters of petitioner's property for the development of the Metro Manila Skyway Project. The
parties agreed that in exchange for the acquisition, petitioner would be paid just compensation for the appraised value of the
property, fixed at P55,000 per square meter or an aggregate of P12,265,000 for the entire affected area by the Municipal
Appraisal Committee of Taguig, Metro Manila.[5] Subsequently, on August 14, 1997, respondents appropriated P1,480,000 in
favor of petitioner as partial payment.Since the date of initial payment, petitioner had, on numerous occasions, demanded from
respondents the balance of Php10,785,000.00, but the latter refused to settle their outstanding obligation.
the RTC... dismissing plaintiffs complaint... the RTC ruled that PD 2004 could not have removed the encumbrances attached to
petitioner's property since the law does not cover public lands sold through auction. The RTC, therefore, ruled that the
government is entitled to a 60-meter width right of way on the property, for which it is not entitled to pay just compensation under
Sec. 112 of CA 141.
the CA modified the RTC ruling
Issues:
Whether or not the subject property owned by petitioner is subject easement of right of way in favor of the government;Whether
or not respondents are liable to pay just compensation to petitioner; andWhether or not petitioner should return the initial
payment made by respondents in the amount of P1,480,000.
Ruling:
First, no less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title over the subject property reads that the parcel of land conferred to
him is subject to the restrictions contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141, which necessarily includes the easement provided in
Sec. 112
Jurisprudence teaches us that "taking, " in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, "occurs not only when the government
actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical
destruction or material impairment of the value of his property."[30] As in Andaya, even though the Republic was not legally
bound to pay just compensation for enforcing its right of way, the Court nevertheless found that its project to be undertaken—the
construction of floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project—would prevent ingress and egress in
Andayas private property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River, effectively depriving
him of the normal use of the remainder of his property. To the mind of the Court, this resulted in a "taking" of what was left of
Andaya's property, entitling him to consequential damages, awarded by the Court in the form of just compensation.
two elements must concur before the property owner will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under Sec.
112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of right of way; and (2) that the enforcement of the right
of way results in the practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the remaining property, or in the property owner
being dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use of the said remainder.
Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the government's enforcement of its right of way.
The contract allegedly entered by the parties for the government's acquisition of the affected portion of the property in exchange
for just compensation is then void ab initio for being contrary to law.
petitioner has no right to collect just compensation for the government's use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent the P1,480,000
partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall be governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust
enrichment.
In this case, petitioner was erroneously paid P1,480,000 on August 14, 1997 when respondents appropriated the amount in his
favor. However, because of respondents' representation that the amount was a mere downpayment for just compensation,
petitioner never objected to the taking of his land and peacefully parted with his property, expecting to be paid in full for the value
of the taken property thereafter.
G.R. No. 223334 Danilo Bartolata, represented by his Attorney-in-fact Rebecca R. Pilot and/or Dionisio P. Pilot vs. Republic of
the Philippines, Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Transportation and Communications, and Toll
Regulatory Board

Facts: Petitioner Danilo Bartolata acquired ownership over a 400 square meter parcel of land by virtue of an Order of Award from
the Bureau of Lands. Petitioner was the sole bidder for the property during a public auction for the 400 square meter lot.
Respondents acquired 223 square meters of petitioner’s property for the development of the Metro Manila Skyway Project. The
parties agreed that in exchange for the acquisition, petitioner would be paid just compensation for the appraised value of the
property an aggregate of ₱12,265,000 for the entire affected area. Subsequently, respondents appropriated ₱1,480,000 in favor
of petitioner as partial payment.
Since the date of initial payment, petitioner had, on numerous occasions, demanded from respondents the balance of Php
10,785,000.00, but the latter refused to settle their outstanding obligation. This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for a sum
of money with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondents then argued that pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), the government is entitled to an
easement of right of way not exceeding 60 meters in width, without need of payment for just compensation, save for the value of
improvements existing. Consequently, respondents prayed, by way of counterclaim, that the ₱1,480,000 partial payment made
to petitioner for the acquisition of the latter’s property, which was well within the 60-meter threshold width, be returned to the
government.
The RTC dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence. Nevertheless, the court ruled that
petitioner is not under obligation to return the initial payment made. The RTC considered the fact that respondents effectively
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner for the acquisition of the piece of land to be used for the Metro Manila Skyway
Project, which contract of sale was consummated by respondents’ partial payment. It cannot then be said that petitioner was
illegally paid when he transacted with the government in good faith and when he relied on respondents’ representations that he
is entitled to just compensation. The Court of Appeals (CA) held that petitioner is not entitled to any form of compensation.
Consequently, the CA ordered him to return the ₱1,480,000 partial payment made, lest he be unjustly enriched by respondents’
use of the legal easement that under the law should have been free of charge.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should return the initial payment made by respondents in the amount of ₱1,480,000.
Ruling: No. Respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering the initial payment of ₱1,480,000 from petitioner.
Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the government’s enforcement of its right of way.
Consequently, petitioner has no right to collect just compensation for the government’s use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent
the ₱1,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall be governed by the provisions on solutio
indebiti or unjust enrichment.
“Solutio indebiti” arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the
latter to return what has been received through mistake. As defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, the concept has two
indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered through mistake; and second, that something was
received when there was no right to demand it.
As discussed above, petitioner was never entitled to collect and receive just compensation for the government’s enforcement of
its right of way, including the ₱1,480,000 payment made by respondents. For its part, the government erroneously made
payment to petitioner because of its failure to discover earlier on that the portion of the property acquired was subject to a
statutory lien in its favor, which it could have easily learned of upon perusal of petitioner’s Order of Award. These circumstances
satisfy the requirements for solutio indebiti to apply.
Regardless, respondents’ action to compel petitioner to return what was mistakenly delivered is now barred by the doctrine of
estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid
one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who
reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case.
In this case, petitioner was erroneously paid ₱1,480,000 when respondents appropriated the amount in his favor. However,
because of respondents’ representation that the amount was a mere down payment for just compensation, petitioner never
objected to the taking of his land and peacefully parted with his property, expecting to be paid in full for the value of the taken
property thereafter. As the events unfolded, respondents did not make good their guarantee. Instead, they would claim for the
recovery of the wrongful payment after almost twelve (12) years as a counterclaim. Indubitably, respondents are barred by
estoppel from recovering from petitioner the amount initially paid.

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits
Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of
Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause;
that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree
of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be
invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the environment against the
harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances,
on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable
and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in
Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under
Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in
Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this
milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift
justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation
that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however,
as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local
government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1)
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically
or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate
public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial
resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with
the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process
for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use
of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests
the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction,[120] nor intends to
prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of
equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis
test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine
whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and
harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the
classification must rest on substantial distinction?We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application.
Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort
and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the
harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the
classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification
that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because
it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
Principles:
Constitutional Law... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.
Political Law... taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City
The ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.
Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits
Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code... the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.
It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional... opined that the ban ran afoul with the Equal
Protection Clause inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinance - which defined the term aerial spraying - did not make reasonable
distinction between the hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the different
classes of pesticides or fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and could
enhance agricultural production.
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed ordinance because it would thereby protect the
environment and regulate property and business in the interest of the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local
Government Code;[35] that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of promoting the public welfare under the
General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code); that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because the distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of application being more deleterious than other modes... that
because of the inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide aerially applied by the respondents), there is no need to provide for a
substantial distinction based on the level of concentration;[37] that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they become air
pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999),[38] and the activity thus falls under
the authority of the local government units to ban; and that the ordinance does not only seek to protect and promote human
health but also serves as a measure against air pollution.
The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-07 on the ground that the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City has
disregarded the health of the plantation workers, contending that by imposing the ban against aerial spraying the ordinance
would place the plantation workers at a higher health risk because the alternatives of either manual or truck-boom spraying
method would be adopted; and that exposing the workers to the same risk sought to be prevented by the ordinance would defeat
its purported purpose.
The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets the
effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate time to
shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the Black Sigatoka
disease.The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering the urgency of protecting the health of the residents.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process
for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use
of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its supposed collision with the Equal Protection
Clause. The respondents submit that the ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by
prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied; and
(2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the landholding.
The petitioners finally plead that the Court should look at the merits of the ordinance based on the precautionary principle. They
argue that under the precautionary principle, the City of Davao is justified in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in order to prevent
harm to the environment and human health despite the lack of scientific certainty.
Issues:
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Ruling:
the implementation of Ordinance No. 0309-07, although the ordinance concerns the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying
in all agricultural lands within Davao City, will inevitably have a considerable impact on the country's banana industry, particularly
on export trading.
Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance of the country's economic, stability and food security. Banana is a
consistent dollar earner and the fourth largest produced commodity in the Philippines.
Despite these optimistic statistics, the banana industry players struggle to keep up with the demands of the trade by combatting
the main threat to production posed by two major fungal diseases: the Panama Disease Tropical Race 4 (Fusarium oxysprum
f.sp. cubense) and the Black Sigatoka leaf spot disease (Mycosphaerella ffiensis morelet). Pesticides have proven to be effective
only against the Black Sigatoka disease. There is yet no known cure for the Panama disease.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy)
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53[101] and Section 54[102] of The Local Government Code.
These provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to be
presented to the mayor for approval. With no issues regarding quorum during its deliberation having been raised, and with its
approval of by City Mayor Duterte not being disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for non-
compliance with the formal requisites under the Local Government Code.
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order to promote the general welfare.[103] Such legislative powers spring
from the delegation thereof by Congress through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare
Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy.[
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general legislative power and the police power proper.
General legislative power refers to the power delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the case of Dayao City,[105] to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations. This
power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and
discharge the powers and duties legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand,
authorizes the local government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their
property
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with the authority to enact legislation .aimed
at promoting the general welfare
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from
Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a
balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government unit. Accordingly, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect the health
and well-being of its constituents.
With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation workers are secured by existing state policies,
rules and regulations implemented by the FPA, among others, which the respondents are lawfully bound to comply with. The
respondents even manifested their strict compliance with these rules, including those in the UN-FAO Guidelines on Good
Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001). We should note that the Rome 2001 guidelines require the pesticide
applicators to observe the standards provided therein to ensure the health and safety of plantation workers. As such, there
cannot be any imbalance between the right to health of the residents vis-a-vis the workers even if a ban will be imposed against
aerial spraying and the consequent adoption of other modes of pesticide treatment.
Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental integrity are privileges that do not only advance the
interests of a group of individuals. The benefits of protecting human health and the environment transcend geographical
locations and even generations. This is the essence of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr.[107] we declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift
justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation
that will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however,
as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[
A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to
wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action.[113] This
means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the
ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it
employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the
ordinance must survive a due process challenge
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three months can readily be appreciated
given the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the RTC
recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying within three months in view of the costly financial
and civil works required for the conversion.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial
resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with
the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial spraying within and near the
plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the
requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be
entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land.
The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they can still cultivate
or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis
test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine
whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed in relation to the group of
individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification
under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on purpose (elimination of the mischief).
The legislative classification found in Section 4 of the ordinance refers to "all agricultural entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile,
the classification based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily discerned because the ordinance does not make any
express or implied reference to it.
The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance because of the unstable wind direction during the
aerial application, which (1) could potentially contaminate the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources; (2) was
detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most especially those living in the. nearby plantations; and (3) posed a hazard
to animals and other crops.
Understandably, aerial drift occurs using any method of application, be it through airplanes, ground sprayers, airblast sprayers or
irrigation systems.[139] Several factors contribute to the occurrence of drift depending on the method of application
The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are aerial, truck-mounted boom, truck-mounted
mechanical, and manual spraying.[140] However, Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against aerial spraying.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application.
Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort
and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the
harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the
classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification
that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because
it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.[144]
Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be "overinclusive" because its .impending
implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will
unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of
the law.[
It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be
aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents admit that they aerially treat their
plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances.
We clarify that the CA did not thereby apply the strict scrutiny approach but only evaluated the classification established by the
ordinance in relation to the purpose. This is the essence of the rational basis approach.
The petitioners should be made aware that the rational basis scrutiny is not based on a simple means-purpose correlation; nor
does the rational basis scrutiny automatically result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance or deference to the wisdom of
the local legislature.[148] To reiterate, aside from ascertaining that the means and purpose of the ordinance are reasonably
related, the classification should be based on a substantial distinction.
The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section 6 by virtue of its requirement for the
maintenance of the 30- meter buffer zone. This requirement applies regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding,
geographical location, topography, crops grown and other distinguishing characteristics that ideally should bear a reasonable
relation to the evil sought to be avoided. As earlier discussed, only large banana plantations could rely on aerial technology
because of the financial capital required therefor.The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more
burdensome to the small agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding their property;
(2) that will have to be identified through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to be plotted in a survey
plan for submission to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the crops that may be cultivated therein based on
the mandate that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified trees" taller than what are being grown therein.[149] The arbitrariness
of Section 6 all the more becomes evident when the land is presently devoted to the cultivation of root crops and vegetables, and
trees or plants slightly taller than the root crops and vegetables are then to be planted. It is seriously to be doubted whether such
circumstance will prevent the occurrence of the drift to the nearby residential areas.
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental claim that the classification
serves legitimate political ends.[150] Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory
or burdensome effect than necessary.[151] In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for
carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no scientific study. Although the precautionary
principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between the serious or irreversible harm and the
human activity, its application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective policy
choices under the precautionary principle.[159]
Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with sufficient power to govern themselves and manage
their affairs and activities, they definitely have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State's laws and policy. The Local
Government Code has been fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to guide each local government unit in
exercising its delegated powers with the view of making the local government unit a fully functioning subdivision of the State
within the constitutional and statutory restraints.[175] The Local Government Code is not intended to vest in the local government
unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate upon in the guise of serving the common
good.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the City of Davao performed an ultra vires
act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should always
conform to and reflect the will of its principal.

Public use

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983

Fact: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation
of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, The defendants filed their respective
Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration, manifestation adopting the answer.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional
provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent
to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.

Issue: Whether the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in the taking of private property for the promotion
of tourism?

Held: No, petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded to formulations of national policy
expressed in legislation. The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
Presidential Decree No. 564: 2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent Domain. — To acquire by purchase, by
negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the following
reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas declared
as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and natural assets with tourism
value, and (e) for any other purpose expressly authorized under this Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent
domain under its own name, which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation
proceedings. The Authority may use any mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the land owners:
Provided, That in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set forth in Chapter III, Section 8 to 13
inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.
Heirs of Ardona v. Hon. Reyes (CFI of Cebu) and Phil. Tourism Authority
123 SCRA 220 (Oct. 26, 1983)
Doctrine: As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of eminent domain comes into
play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use

FACTS:
The Phil. Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu for the expropriation of
282 ha of rolling land for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-
defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The PTA will construct a sports complex,
clubhouse, playground and picnic area on said land. AN electric power grid will also be
established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary support facilities
(malls, coffee shops) will also be created.
The defendants alleged that the taking is not impressed with public use under the Constitution,
that the land was covered by the land reform program and therefore the Court of Agrarian
Reform and not the CFI of Cebu has jurisdiction over the case, and that the expropriation would
impair the obligations and contracts.
Nonetheless, upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, CFI
authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the land.
ISSUE: WON the public use requirement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been complied with

HELD:
Yes. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purpose for the construction of roads,
bridges, and the like. The idea that “public use” means “use by the public” has been discarded.
As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of eminent domain comes into play.
Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use.
The petitioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the
affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. Also, the
contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise
eminent domain.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes [GR L-60549, 60553 to 60555; 26 October 1983] En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 7 concur, 1
concurs in result, 1 on leave Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu
City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's
express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without
the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for
the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value,
specifically for the construction of a sports complex (basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball
and softball diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics and
horseback riding for the use of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona (Represented by Gloria Ardona) Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Anastacio C. Cabilao, Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (Represented by Jose Cabilao) Modesta
Cabilao, Heirs of Roman Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and Prudencia Mabini, Antonio
Labrador and Lucia Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and Marcelina Sabal, Inocencio Mabini and Arsenia Reyes, Patricio Mabini and
Gregoria Borres, Aniceto Gadapan and Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome Magno and Calineca E. Magno, Alberto Cabuenas, Narciso
Cabuenas and Victoria Cabuenas, Eutiquioseno, Heirs of Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Maximina
Navaro, Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In Representation of Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno,
Fausto Arda, Maxima Cabilao, Estrella Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo, Socorro, Josefina and
Marites, All Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by Francisca Borres), Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar and Leonila
Kabahar, Antonio Labrador, Heirs of Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio Gabisay), Pacifico Labrador, Demetrio Labrador
and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar, Marino Del Mar, Heirs of Teodora Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo) Dionisia
Gabunada, Heirs of Buenaventura Francisco (Represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs of Victoria C. Cabuenas
(Represented by Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano Gabunada (Represented by Claudio Gabunada) filed their oppositions,
and had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; alleging that
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that
PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting
the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over the expropriation
cases.The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The
Heirs of Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the
expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine
Tourism Authority be considered taking for “public use.” Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly
provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and
upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. While not directly
mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on social justice and
agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. The restrictive view of
public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and
which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither
circumstance applies to the Philippines. The Philippines has never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities which impel
the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. There can
be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools,
electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals,
government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to
traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been
discarded. The Philippine Tourism Authority has stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would
give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and
electric facilities, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) better living standards. The Court’s dismissal
of the petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282
hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [GR 106440, 29 January 1996] First Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and
Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492
square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure.
In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic,
through the office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and
in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take
immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3
August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and
authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration
thereafter but were denied. The Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 15
January 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
appellate court on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes
“public use.” Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as
expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It
need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to
regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most
exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the
nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or
to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable
from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined
by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that
public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use
by the public" has long been discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be
significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but
such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of landowned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark,
because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action
to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.

Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.

Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix
Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.

Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or
parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is
the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.