LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS CASE DIGESTS:
May petitioner be exempt from the payment of
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN UNTIL JOSON v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DIGESTED AND COMPILED BY: EH 403
MONSANTO V FACTORAN- CABALLES
One liner: Pardon does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and its conviction and it
involves forgiveness, not forgetfulness
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer
of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. She was
sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC
affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended by then President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at
that time, the rule was that clemency could be
given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to
the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of
a new appointment not earlier than the date she
was extended the absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the
full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the
entire period of her suspension; and that she
should not be required to pay the proportionate
share of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the
President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran
denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that
the pardon does not reinstate her former
position.
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without
need of a new appointment?
3.
the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as
blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does
not operate for all purposes. The very essence of
a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It
involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation
for what has been suffered. “Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were
in force is presumed to have been rightfully done
and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can
be required.” This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted
in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that.
To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by
the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's
civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the
debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
Garcia vs Chair of Commission on
Audit-CADELEÑA
One Liner: A pardon based on the innocence of a
dismissed public officer because of a criminal and
administrative charge against him, signifies that
he does not need to apply to be reinstated to his
former employment as he is restored to his office
ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Facts:
Garcia was a Supervising Lineman of the Bureau
of Telecommunications. He was summarily
dismissed from service on the ground of
dishonesty for the loss of several telegraph poles.
A criminal case was for qualified theft was filed
against him, but was acquitted. He sought for
reinstatement to his former position, but it was
denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications.
He pleaded to the President for executive
clemency and it was granted. He then filed with
the Commission on Audit for a claim for payment
of back salaries but it was denied as the executive
clemency granted to him did not provide for the
payment of back salaries and that he has not
been reinstated in service. He again filed for the
back salaries but it was denied again as the
executive clemency was silent on the payment of
back wages and that he had not rendered service
during the period of his claim.
He appealed in the Office of the President but was
denied as the Court is the proper forum to take
cognizance of the appeal from the decision of the
Commission on Audit.
Petitioner’s Contention/s:
The award of the back salaries is implicit in the
grant of executive clemency as the ultimate
objective of which is to accord full justice to
petitioner.
Respondent’s Contention/s:
Garcia’s acquittal in the criminal case did not free
him from administrative liability; his unexplained
failure to appeal the decision in the administrative
case was a waiver to his right to backwages; the
executive clemency was granted for the purpose
of reinstatement only since it was silent on the
matter of backwages; the backwages is allowed
only if the respondent is exonerated from the
administrative charge; and he did not render any
service during the period before his
reinstatement.
Issue:
Whether or not Garcia is entitled for the award of
the payment of back salaries.
RuIing:
YES. The Constitution vests the president the
power and the exclusive prerogative to extend
executive clemency. The clemency granted to
Garcia partakes of the nature of an executive
pardon. The very essence of pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt and not
forgetfulness. Pardon frees the individual from all
the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to
him all civil rights.
A pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
appointment to public office which was forfeited
by reason of the conviction of the offense. But it
does not result in automatic backwages because
the offender has to apply for reappointment.
However, if the pardon is based on the innocence
of the individual or it was given because he did
not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves
the party from all punitive consequences of the
criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean
name, good reputation, and unstained character.
Application:
Garcia was found administratively liable for
dishonesty and was dismissed. However, he was
acquitted of the criminal charge of qualified theft
based on the very same acts for which he was
dismissed. His acquittal was not on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that he
did not commit the offense. His innocence is the
primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency.
The executive clemency obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decisions. This can
be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating Garcia from the administrative
charge and directing his reinstatement. This
signifies that he need no longer to apply to be
reinstated to his former employment as he is
restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
of clemency.
Garcia’s automatic reinstatement entitles him to
backwages. It affords relief to him who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation of
what he has suffered of his unjust dismissal.
Backwages are afforded to those who have been
illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those who were acquitted of the
charges against them.
Garcia’s dismissal was not a result of a criminal
conviction that carried forfeiture of the right to
hold public office, but as a direct consequence of
an administrative decision of the Executive
Department. The president has control over the
latter. In ordering Garcia’s pardon and
reinstatement his dismissal and administrative
liability is nullified and after being acquitted
because of his innocence of the criminal charge
he should not be considered to left his office for all
legal purposes.
Side discussion of Backwages:
Jurisprudence fixes the recovery of backwages to
a period of five years. However, the case deviated
this rule. Garcia’s reinstatement was because of
the executive clemency as he did not commit the
offense charged. Equity and justice dictates that
Garcia be afforded compassion for the
embarrassment, humiliation, and injustice
caused by the unfounded dismissal. It was fair to
grant him a full backwages from the time he was
illegally dismissed in April 1, 1975 to the time of
his reinstatement on March 12, 1984.
EFFECT OF AMNESTY
MAGDALO v. COMELEC (2012)-VILLA
One liner: The COMELEC has the power to deny
registration of a political party which seeks to
achieve its goals by means of violent and unlawful
means, and such decision of denial is not affected
by a subsequent proclamation of amnesty, but
amnesty can now allow the members to
individually register as a party list, provided that
they renounce violence.
FACTS: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago
(MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in
the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and
Local Elections. COMELEC issued its Resolution
denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa
Pagbabago should be refused registration in
accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution. It is common knowledge that the
partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio
F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in
the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July
27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact
that they were in full battle gear at the time of the
mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing
violence and using unlawful means to achieve
their goals in the process defying the laws of
organized societies. MAGDALO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed
a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution
dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its
intention to participate in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it denied the Petition
for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground
that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through
violent or unlawful means?
HELD: COMELECS Resolutions are sustained. To
join electoral contests, a party or organization
must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court
explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC: x x x
Registration is the act that bestows juridical
personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the
privileged participation that our election laws
grant to qualified registered parties. x x x
Accreditation can only be granted to a registered
political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place
before a request for accreditation can be made.
Once registration has been carried out,
accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987
Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions
that "seek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means" shall be denied registration.
This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of
B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party
which seeks to achieve its goal through violence
shall be entitled to accreditation." Violence is the
unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually
with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage
or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully
exercised; abuse of force; that force which is
employed against common right, against the laws,
and against public liberty. On the other hand, an
unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and
need not be a crime, considering that the latter
must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.
Effect of Amnesty given to Magdalo Members
The Court recognizes that members of the
Magdalo were given amnesty by President Aquino
and such proclamation was subsequently
concurred by Congress. In light of these events,
to still sustain the finding, based on the
participation of its members in the Oakwood
incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or
other harmful means would be inconsistent with
the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would
not be in accord with the express intention of both
the Executive and the Legislative branches, in
granting the said amnesty, to promote an
atmosphere conducive to attaining peace in line
with the governments peace and reconciliation
initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the
apprehensions of the COMELEC as regards the
use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to
file another Petition for Registration, its officers
must individually execute affidavits renouncing
the use of violence or other harmful means to
achieve the objectives of their organization.
Further, it must also be underscored that the
membership of MAGDALO cannot include military
officers and/or enlisted personnel in active
service, as this act would run counter to the
express provisions of the Constitution.
Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. 80455-56, April 10, 1989-VARGAS
ONE LINER: The appointing authority has the
management prerogative in the selection and
appointment of its employees, where the Civil
Service Commission can revoke such
appointment in light of the qualifications set by
law.
Facts:
· On October 3, 1984, the Promotions Board of
Central Bank with a representative from CSC
decided on filling up the vacant position of
Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank
(Salary Grade 22).
· Dr. Jordan (Coordinating Assistant – SG 20) was
the only next-in-rank employee, so the Board
certified her for promotion and submitted the
proposal to the Office of the Governor.
· However, in July, respondent Borja filed an
application for Medical Director and was acted
upon by the Promotions Board. The proposal was
approved, and Borja was issued an appointment
as physician (SG 16).
· Later on, Dr. Jordan was promoted as it was
approved by the Senior Deputy Governor and was
issued an appointment.
· Borja contested this, stating that he was more
qualified and was a next-in-rank employee.
· (BANK DECISION) Dismissed the protest
because it was filed beyond the reglementary
period, Borja is not the next-in-rank employee,
and has no legal personality.
· (MSB DECISION) An appeal was made to the
Merit Systems Board. The appeal was sustained,
stating that Borja should have been appointed.
The decision was reversed upon appeal by the
Bank.
· (CSC DECISION) The Civil Service Commission
set aside the decision of MSB, directing
appointment of Borja to the position.
· Central Bank filed a petition of reconsideration
that the department head has discretion in
choosing appointments, where the question of
competence is irrelevant because Borja was not
yet an employee at the time Dr. Jordan was
considered for promotion.
· Petition is denied for being filed after the
decision became final and executory. Basically,
it’s a contest over who is to be appointed. Dr.
Jordan says it should be her because she was
appointed. Borja says it should be him because
he’s more qualified (in terms of positions sa
rank-and-file employees).
Issues: May the Civil Service Commission
disapprove an appointment and require the
appointment of another person whom it believes
is more qualified for the position?
Ruling:
THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY IS GIVEN AMPLE
DISCRETION IN SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT
OF QUALIFIED PERSONS TO VACANT POSITIONS
· This is a management prerogative that is
unhampered by judicial intervention. The right to
select and appoint employees is the prerogative
of the employer which may be exercised without
being held liable AS LONG AS it is in good faith in
advancing the employer’s interest.
· The Central Bank of the Philippines is vested
with this power under law.
· The Commissioner of Civil Service (CSC) has the
final authority, but all that has changed under the
new law PD 807 (Civil Service Decree) where the
Commission is NOT AUTHORIZED to curtail the
discretion of the appointing official. It is limited to
approving or reviewing appointment in the light
of the requirements.
· In this case, Dr. Jordan’s qualifications were
never disputed. Even if Borja was more qualified,
the Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment based on the ground that the other
is more qualified. It is an encroachment of the
discretionary power of whomsoever is vested.
ALTHOUGH THE APPOINTMENT IS SUBJECT TO
CSC’S APPROVAL, IT IS LIMITED ONLY WITH
REGARD TO WHETHER OR NOT THE AUTHORITY
COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW
· The power of the commission to revoke the
appointment is limited only to appointments that
were done without fulfilling requirements set by
law.
· It is true that Borja has an edge over Dr. Jordan
in educational attainment since he has a degree
in medicine from outside the country and has
experience both in the Philippines and outside.
· In selection of employees for promotion, the
only factors to be considered are educational
attainment and training experience. The other
factors are performance rating, experience,
accomplishments, physical characteristics,
personality traits, and potential.
· Dr. Jordan outranks others in terms of the above
requirements. She graduated at UP with a PhD in
Medicine. She basically passes all the
requirements.
· There is no rigid or mechanical standard on
appointing power. The appointing person enjoys
sufficient discretion to select and appoint.
BORJA IS NOT NEXT-IN-RANK FOR
APPOINTMENT, BEING IN A SALARY GRADE 16
POSITION COMPARED TO DR. JORDAN WHO IS
IN A SALARY GRADE 20 POSITION
· Commission disregarded the performance
ratings of Dr. Jordan submitted to the Central
Bank, stating that it was not signed by Dr.
Jordan’s superior – Dr. Ricarte. This is impossible
since Ricarte retired in 1984. Mr. Palanca Jr.
signed it.
· Borja is a mere Physician (SG 16) whereas Dr.
Jordan is a Coordinating Assistant (SG 20). The
Commission should have dismissed the appeal for
lacking legal personality.
LACSON v. ROMERO (1949)-DADOL
One-liner: In making a valid and permanent
appointment, there must first, a nomination
made by the President, second, the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments (COA) of
that nomination, lastly, the acceptance of the
appointee to the nomination and confirmation by
assuming office.
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was appointed by the
President as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental
which was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (COA). Later on, he was again
nominated by the President as a provincial fiscal
of Tarlac. Which in turn, nominated respondent
Romero as a provincial fiscal in Negros Oriental.
These two appointments made by the President
to Lacson and Romero were both affirmed by the
COA. However, such appointment was not
accepted by the petitioner nor assumed the said
office in Tarlac, whereas, the respondent
assumed office in Negros Oriental. As he arrived
in Dumaguete City, he notified the petitioner of
his intention on taking over the office which was
objected by the latter. This lead to a case where
the respondent appeared, yet, the petitioner
objected and even asked the judge to strike out
the respondent from the record. This was denied
by the said judge, thus, recognizing the
respondent as fiscal of Negros Oriental.
Furthermore, when the petitioner asked for his
salary as provincial fiscal, the provincial treasurer
disapproved his request. The salary was then
given to the respondent pursuant to the reply of
the Sec. of Justice upon the treasurer’s query
concerning “who is the fiscal in Negros Oriental.”
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not, there was a valid
appointment made to Lacson without his consent
or acceptance? 2) Whether or not, the nomination
and confirmation of Lacson to Tarlac was
equivalent to a vaid removal from office? 3)
Whether or not, the President, who is the
appointing authority, could validly remove him
from office?
RULING:
First Issue No. There was an invalid appointment
due to Lacson’s non-acceptance. For an
appointment to be valid, the following are to be
considered: STAGES OF APPOINTMENT 1. There
must first be, a NOMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.
2. Secondly, the nomination is to be CONFIRMED
BY THE COA of the Legislature in order to make
that appointment valid and permanent. (These
two stages only constitute an offer for a post.
These are considered acts of the executive and
legislative departments.) 3. Lastly, there must be
an ACCEPTANCE made by the appointee by his
ASSUMPTION TO OFFICE. Take note: • The last
stage is the necessary stage towards making the
appointment complete and effective. • The
appointee has the sole right to either accept or
reject the appointment because “there was no
power in this country which can compel a man to
accept an office,”
. Second Issue No. It was an invalid removal. The
Court ruled that a provincial fiscal could only be
removed from office by a CAUSE PROVIDED BY
LAW; thus, the appointee enjoys security of
tenure. As to the nature of office of the provincial
fiscal, there are two types of persons in the Civil
Service, namely; Classified or Unclassified. Under
Section 671 (b) of the Revised Administrative
Code, a provincial fiscal who is nominated and
appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments belongs to the
UNCLASSIFIED service of the Civil Service.
Third Issue No. The President could not validly
remove him from office. The Committee on Civil
Service of the Constitutional Convention
advocated the MERIT SYSTEM. It asserted that
the adoption of said system has secured
efficiency and social justice. It eliminates the
political factors in the selection of civil employees
which is the first essential towards an efficient
personnel system. It ensures equality of
opportunity to all deserving applicants desirous of
a career in the public service. In making the Merit
System effective, the Committee’s report
requires that removals shall be made only for
causes and in the manner provided by law. Hence,
a provincial fiscal as a civil service official may not
be removed from office even by the President
who appointed him, and even with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. By the
mandate of Sections 64 and 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code, before a civil service official
or employee could be removed, there must first
be an investigation at which he must be given a
fair hearing and an opportunity to defend himself.
This affords to public employees to a reasonable
Security of Tenure.
In the case at hand, the respondent argued that
the power of removal is inherent in the power to
appoint, hence the President could remove the
petitioner and transfer him. More so, he argued
that the appointment of a provincial fiscal is not
for a fixed term and no tenure of office. To which,
granting that a provincial fiscal could only be
removed on valid cause, the law however does
not provide for any grounds constituting valid
cause. The Court ruled that the President’s power
is QUALIFIED AND LIMITED, thus, the removal
SHOULD BE FOR A VALID CAUSE.
Also, a provincial fiscal also enjoys tenure of
office because aside from the removal only for a
valid cause, Section 1673 of the Administrative
Code likewise provided that after Dec. 31, 1932, a
provincial fiscal over 65 years of age shall vacate
his office. Thus, he shall continue to serve until
the age of 65 unless, there is a valid cause to
warrant a removal from office. Among the valid
grounds include, falsification of daily time record,
gambling, drunkenness, dishonesty, oppression,
grave misconduct and neglect in performance of
duty.
SEVILLA v. SANTOS (1992)-VILLA
One liner: An "acting" appointment is merely
temporary, one which is good only until another
appointment is made to take its place. Thus, the
appointee’s right to the office he/she occupies
ends when the appointing authority appoints
another person to take his/her place in an official
capacity.
FACTS:
The petitioner has been in the government
service since 1949. His last appointment was last
Assistant City Engineer of Palayan City which he
discharged until he was designated Acting City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 2, 1981. He
unhesitatingly assumed the latter position and
discharged its functions and responsibilities until
"People Power" and the EDSA Revolution
intervened. On August 18, 1986, the then
Officer-in charge (OIC Mayor) of Cabanatuan City,
Cesar Vergara, appointed defendant-appellant
Santos as city engineer of Cabanatuan City, and
on August 28, 1986, defendant-appellant Santos
assumed the position of city engineer. On that
very same day, a memorandum informing
petitioner-appellee Sevilla of the appointment of
defendant-appellant Santos was sent by then OIC
Mayor. As petitioner-appellee Sevilla was on
leave at the time, the memorandum was received
on his behalf by Anita de Guzman, the
administrative officer of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Office of
Cabanatuan City, where petitioner-appellee
Sevilla also holds office. Petitioner-appellee then
returned to Cabanatuan City. On March 27, 1987,
he filed a petition for quo warranto against
defendant-appellant Santos. On January 29,
1988, the lower rendered the impugned decision
reinstating petitioner-appellee Sevilla and
entitling him payment of vacation and sick leaves
for the duration of his absence.
On August 18, 1986, the OIC Mayor of
Cabanatuan City, Cesar Vergara, appointed
Nerito L. Santos as the new city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. Santos assumed the position on
August 28 1986. On the same day, a
memorandum was addressed to Sevilla informing
him of Santos' appointment as city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. Anita de Guzman,
administrative officer of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) unit in Cabanatuan
City received the notice for Sevilla who was on
leave on that time. Sevilla filed a petition for quo
warranto against Santos, the lower court
rendered a decision reinstating Sevilla as acting
City Engineer of Cabanatuan City with right to
payment of vacation and sick leaves for the
duration of his absence.
Santos appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a decision dated May 31, 1989, the
Court of Appeals set aside the lower court's
decision and entered a new one, dismissing the
petition for quo warranto. The Court of Appeals
held that by accepting another office. Sevilla in
effect voluntarily surrendered his former office,
and was thereby precluded from maintaining a
quo warranto action against Santos. When he
accepted the position in Pasay City, he lost his
right to the position in Cabanatuan City
ISSUE:
Whether an officer who was appointed to an office
in an "acting" capacity, bring a quo warranto
action against the permanent appointee to the
position?
HELD:
An "acting" appointment is merely temporary,
one which is good only until another appointment
is made to take its place. Hence, petitioner's right
to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City" was merely temporary. It
lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as
the permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City
on August 18, 1986.
Petitioner was the incumbent city engineer of
Palayan City when he was designated as Acting
City Engineering of Cabanatuan City. There is a
difference between an appointment an
appointment and a designation. Appointment is
the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of an
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition of additional duties, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of
an earlier appointment or election. the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in
dismissing petitioner's action for quo warranto.
Petitioner's ouster upon, and by virtue of, Santos'
appointment as City Engineer of Cabanatuan City,
was not illegal for the petitioner's right to
discharge the functions of Acting City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City was extinguished when a
permanent appointment to the same office was
made in favor of the private respondent, Engineer
Nerito L. Santos.
Santiago v. COA-DY
One-liner: There is a legal distinction between
appointment and designation, but when these
words are used in its general sense, the
distinction disappears as in Sec.9 EO 966
Facts:
Santiago was a State Auditor IV in COA with a
monthly salary of 7.2k. He was later on
designated (thru a Resolution by the board of
directors of MIAA) as Acting Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration (AAGM)
of MIAA and in this capacity, he collected an
additional salary of 5.8k for a total compensation
of 13k. He served as AAGM for over 3 months.
He was basically occupying 2 positions: State
Auditor IV and Acting Assistant GM for Finance
and Admin. When he retired after 44 years in
government service, GSIS computed his
retirement benefits using the 13k as basis but
COA disagreed, arguing that the base should only
be 7.2k, his salary as State Auditor IV.
Santiago invokes Sec.9 of EO 966 as follows,
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. — The
compensation of salary or pay which may be used
in computing the retirement benefits shall be
limited to the highest salary rate actually received
by an official/employee as fixed by law and/or
indicated in his duly approved appointment. This
shall include salary adjustments duly authorized
and implemented by the presidential issuance(s)
and budget circular(s), additional basic
compensation or salary indicated in an
appointment duly approved as an exception to
the prohibition on additional or double
compensation, merit increases, and
compensation for substitutionary services or in an
acting capacity. For this purpose, all other
compensation and/or fringe benefits such as per
diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay,
honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees,
consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in
correcting and/or releasing examination papers
shall not be considered in the computation of the
retirement benefits of an official/employee. The
Sol Gen argues that Sec. 9 does not apply to
Santiago because he was only designated, not
appointed, to MIAA. Ruling: Strictly speaking,
there is a legal distinction between appointment
and designation.
However, in EO 966, the term "appointment" was
used in a general sense to include the term
"designation." In other words, no distinction was
intended between the two terms in Section 9 of
Executive Order No. 966.
As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the
petitioner, who was designated Acting Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration
in the office order issued by Secretary Reyes on
August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant
and could be filled either by permanent
appointment or by temporary designation. It
cannot be said that the second position was only
an extension of the petitioner's office as State
Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as
otherwise there would have been no need for his
designation thereto. The second office was
distinct and separate from his position in the
Commission on Audit. For the additional services
he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to
additional compensation which, following the
letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in
his highest basic salary rate.
SANTIAGO, JR. vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION G.R. No. 81467. October 27,
1989.-ESTAVILLA
ONE LINER:
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential
consideration for promotion but it does not
necessarily follow that he and no one else can be
appointed.
FACTS:
1. In this case, petitioner Santiago Jr. received a
promotion from the Customs Commissioner from
the rank of Customs Collector I to Customs
Collector III.
2. Private respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II,
filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion
Board (MSPB) against the petitioner’s
promotional appointment stating that he was the
next-in-rank to the position of Collector of
Customs III.
3. This was referred by the Board to the Customs
Commissioner wherein he upheld the validity of
the promotion of petitioner Santiago Jr. on the
grounds that:
a) The next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory.
b) The protestee is competent and qualified for
the position.
c) Existing law and jurisprudence gives wide
latitude of discretion to the appointing authority.
4. Private respondent Jose appealed to the Board
wherein it ruled in favor of the private respondent
and revoked petitioner’s appointment and
directed the private respondent to be appointed.
5. Respondent Commission affirmed the Board
Resolution stating that:
a) SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the
position of Customs Collector III, however,
respondent JOSE far better qualifications
(educational attainment, civil service eligibilities,
relevant seminars and training courses taken,
and holding a position higher-in-rank)
b) Commission is empowered to administer and
enforce the merit system as mandated by the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional,
to positions in the civil service, subject to
specified exceptions.
ISSUE:
WON the next-in-rank rule is mandatory.
RULING:
NEXT-IN-RANK RULE
No. The next-in-rank rule is not mandatory.
The Court cited the ruling in Taduran v. CSC,
wherein it is stated that, “ There is no mandatory
nor peremptory requirement in the CSC that
persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in
appointment. What it does provide is that they
would be among the first to be considered for
vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not
filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by
transfer or other modes of appointment. “
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential
consideration for promotion but it does not
necessarily follow that he and no one else can be
appointed.
The rule neither grants a vested right to the
holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the
appointing authority to promote such person to
the next higher position.
“The appointing authority may promote an
employee who is not next-in-rank but who
possesses superior qualifications and
competence compared to a next-in-rank
employee who merely meets the minimum
requirements for the position. “
The Customs Commissioner explained the
reasons behind the petitioner’s appointment:
1. Respondent JOSE, was assigned to Camarines
Norte, however, he never assumed that position
and there is no official record of any activity that
recommends him for promotion. While Petitioner
SANTIAGO JR., was credited for being the chief of
a task force, which has been credited with the
seizure of millions of pesos worth of smuggled
shipments, which was duly recorded.
2. SANTIAGO Jr., has also been a recipient of
awards for two consecutive years for exemplary
performance of official duties, particularly
investigation and prosecution.
COMMISSION’S APPOINTING AUTHORITY
True, the Commission is empowered to approve
all appointments, whether original or promotional,
to positions in the civil service and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required qualification
(paragraph (h), Section 9, P.D. No. 807).
However, consistent with our ruling in Luego vs.
CSC (L-69137, 5 August 1986, 143 SCRA 327),
"all the commission is actually allowed to do is
check whether or not the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is
approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other
criterion is permitted by law to be employed by
the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree
says, "approves" or "disapproves" an
appointment made by the proper authorities. . . .
To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the
private respondent was better qualified for that
would have constituted an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely (in the appointing
authority)."
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 87-554 of the Civil
Service Commission is SET ASIDE and
petitioner's promotional appointment as Customs
Collector III is hereby UPHELD.
Lapinid v. CSC-GAZO
ONE LINER: The CSC cannot review, revoke or
make appointments except as to its own
personnel or that of another body except only as ONE LINER: The determination of the whether
to qualifications of the appointee. the appointment to be extended is permanent or
temporary lies in the official vested by law with
the appointing power and not the CSC such that if
an appointee is qualified, the CSC has no choice
FACTS: Renato Lapinid was appointed by the but to attest to the appointment.
Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International
Container Terminal. Juanito Junsay protested the
appointment before the Appeals Board of the PPA, Facts:
contending that he has a preferential right
Petitioner was appointed as Administrative
thereto. Since PPA did not act on the protest, he
Officer II by Mayor Solon of Cebu City. The
raised the matter before the Civil Service
appointment was described as “permanent” but
Commission, which directed the appointment of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved it
Junsay in place of Lapinid since the prior
as “temporary” subject to the final action taken in
evaluation shows Junsay to be the most qualified
the protest filed by the private respondent and
and Lapinid only placing third. Lapinid moved to
provided there was no pending administrative
reconsider contending he was not informed of the
case against Luego, no pending protest against
appeal and was not heard thereon. PPA also
the appointment nor any decision by competent
moved to reconsider. Both were denied. A second
authority that will adversely affect the approval of
motion to reconsider based on the
the appointment.
re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating was denied.
However, the CSC later on found the private
respondent to be better qualified than the
ISSUE: W/n the Civil Service Commission petitioner for the contested position and directed
authorized to disapprove a permanent that the private respondent be appointed to the
appointment on the ground that another person is position in place of Luego whose appointment
better qualified than the appointee and, on the was revoked.
basis of this finding, order his replacement by the
latter?
Issue:

WoN CSC is authorized to disapprove a

RULING: No. The Civil Service Commission has no
permanent appointment on the ground that
power of appointment except over its own
another person is better qualified than an
personnel. Neither does it have the authority to
appointee and order his replacement by the
review the appointments made by other offices
latter.
except only to ascertain if the appointee
possesses the required qualifications. The
determination of who among aspirants with the
minimum statutory qualifications should be OSG Argument:
preferred belongs to the appointing authority and
not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot Luego could be replaced because his appointment
disallow an appointment because it believes was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn
another person is better qualified and much less at will, with or without cause. Having accepted
can it direct the appointment of its own choice. such appointment, petitioner has waived his
security of tenure and consequently ran the risk
of an abrupt separation from his office without
violation of the Constitution.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that
even this Court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject
of mandamus, the selection itself of the Ruling: No, while the principle of OSG’s argument
appointee—taking into account the totality of his is correct, it is not correctly applied in this case.
qualifications, including those abstract qualities
The appointment of Luego was not temporary but
that define his personality—is the prerogative of
permanent and therefore protected by the
the appointing authority. This is a matter
Constitution. The appointing authority was within
addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
his right to indicate the petitioner’s appointment
authority. It is a political question that the Civil
as permanent and it was not for CSC to reverse
Service Commission has no power to review
him and call it temporary.
under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
The Stamping of the words “APPROVED AS
TEMPORARY” did not change the character of the
Luego v. CSC-RUIZ appointment. What was temporary was the
“approval” of the appointment and not the
appointment itself. And what made the approval
temporary was the fact that it was made to
depend on the condition specified therein and on
the verification of the qualification of the
appointee to the position.
The determination of the kind of appointment to
be extended lies in the official vested by law with
the appointing power and not the CSC. when an
appointee is qualified, the CSC has no choice but
to attest to the appointment. Such attestation is
required of the CSC merely as a check to assure
compliance with the Civil Service Laws.
It is understandable if one is misled by the
language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil
Service Decree which provides:
"9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original
or promotional, to positions in the civil service,
except those presidential appointees, members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police
forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications."
(emphasis supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision makes it
clear that all the commission is actually allowed to
do is check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility
or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved, if not, it is disapproved.
The acknowledgment of the Commission that
both the petitioner and private respondent were
qualified for the position alone rendered it functus
officio in the case and prevented it from acting
further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
petitioner’s appointment.
BORROMEO V MARIANO-LIGUTOM
One-liner: Appointment is the sole act of those
vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is
the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be
chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in
these Islands which can compel a man to accept
the office.
Facts:
Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as
Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District,
Heduly qualified and took possession of the office .
Later on he was appointed Judge of the
Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano
was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth
Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has consistently
refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first
Judicial District.
Thereby a Quo Warranto proceedings have been
instituted in the SC en banc to determine the right
of the plaintiff and of the defendant to the office
of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
Issue: Who has the right to the office of Judge?
Held: Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the
possession of the office of Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial
District.
There is no power in these Islands which can
compel a man to accept the office. If, therefore,
anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of
first instance to a particular district, when once
appointment to this district is accepted, he has
exactly the same right to refuse an appointment
to another district. No other person could be
placed in the position of this Judge of First
Instance since another rule of public officers is,
that an appointment may not be made to an office
which is not vacant.
The language of the proviso to section 155 of the
Administrative Code, interpreted with reference
to the law of public officers, does not empower
the Governor-General to force upon the judge of
one district an appointment to another district
against his will, thereby removing him from his
district. Judges of first instance are removable
only through a fixed procedure. Moreover,
impeachment proceedings, as conducted by the
Supreme Court, may be in the nature of
jurisdiction, conferred upon the Supreme Court
by ratification of the Congress of the United
States.
The SC opinion IS that the reasonable force of the
language used in the proviso to Section 155 of the
Administrative Code taken in connection with the
whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted
canons of interpretation, and the principles of the
law of public officers, that a Judge of First
Instance may be made a judge of another district
only with his consent.
ABAS KIDA vs SENATE- MANIT
One-liner: Where the constitution has itself
made a determination or given its mandate, then
the matter so determined should be respected
until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable
constitutional process.
Facts: On August 1, 1989 or two years after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through RA 6734 “An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao.” A plebiscite was held on November 6,
1990 as required by Section 18(2) Art. X of RA
6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). RA 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the
officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA 9054 was the next legislative act passed. This
law provided further refinement in the basic
ARMM structure first defined in the original
organic act and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the 2nd Monday of
September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM -
RA 9140 - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the
first regular elections originally scheduled under
RA 9054 to November 26, 2001. It likewise set
the plebiscite to ratify RA 9054 to not later than
August 15, 2001.
RA 9054 was ratified.
RA 9333 was subsequently passed to reset the
ARMM election to the 2nd Monday of August 2005
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter
and this law was not ratified.
Pursuant to RA 9333, the next ARMM regional
election should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA 10153 was
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections on May
2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections. With such COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. On
September 13, 2011, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA 10153 and ordering the
incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue
to perform their function should these cases not
be decided by the end of their term on September
30, 2011.
Issue: Is holdover option in RA 9054
Constitutional?
Ruling: The Holdover for those who were elected
in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option of
Congress could not have been chosen because
the holdover violates sec. 8 Art. X of the
Constitution.
Sec. 8 - the term of office of elective local officials
except the brgy officials which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials,
they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit and they cannot extend their term
through a holdover.
Where the constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the
matter so determined should be respected until
the Constitution itself is changed by amendment
or repeal through the applicable constitutional
process.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is
effectively another term mandated by Congress,
the net result is for Congress to create a new term
and to appoint the occupant for the new term.
This view is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly.
In the past the rule of holdover can only apply as
an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary is evident.
Congress in passing RA 10153, made it explicitly
clear that it had the intention to suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA 9054 by
completely removing this provision.
Carabeo v. CA - Melendez
ONE LINER:A preventive suspension is issued to
protect the integrity of the investigation and the
public official under preventive suspension
cannot be injured because a public office is not a
property.
FACTS: The Department of Finance-Revenue
Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against Carabeo, Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
the Office of the Treasurer of Parañaque City.
ALLEGATIONS: Carabeo is currently
designated as City Treasurer. When he first
started as Revenue Collection Clerk, he earned
an annual gross salary of 8,400. As the City
Treasurer of Parañaque, he earns an annual
gross salary of 291,036. They alleged that the
net worth of Carabeo has ballooned, from
114,900 in 1981 to approximately 7.5 million in
2004. He also steadily accumulated expensive
properties from real properties to vehicles to
club shares ownership. In the last 9 years,
Carabeo was able to purchase 2 residential lots
in Tagaytay, a townhouse in Cavite, and 3
separate parcels of land in Laguna. He was also
able to purchase a Ford F150, a Mazda Familia,
a Chevrolet Cassia, a Mitsubishi Lancer, and a
Honda CRV. They also alleged that Carabeo did
not declare most of the vehicles in his SALN.
Carabeo alleged that he did not own most cars,
but the records of the LTO shows that he and
his spouse owns at least 7 vehicles. Carabeo
also did not disclose his property in Tagaytay.
They further alleged that his failure to disclose
his properties amounts to a violation of Section
7 of RA 3019 and Section 8(a) of RA 6713
requiring him to file under oath the true and
detailed statement of his assets. He also
recently purchased a share in The Palms
Country Club in Alabang, amounting to
745,000, in cash. While Carabeo claims to have
various investments, the information gathered
indicates that these investments could not
possibly justify the purchases. Lastly,
Carabeo’s wife did not even have any tax
payments with the BIR. It was also discovered
that from 1996 to 2004, Carabeo went abroad
at least fifteen times.
The Office of the Ombudsman directed
Secretary Teves to place Carabeo under
preventive suspension for a period not to
exceed 6 months without pay. Aggrieved,
Carabeo filed a petition for certiorari alleging
GAD amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
CA ruling: In dismissing the petition, the CA
held that a preventive suspension is not a
penalty but only a means taken to insure the
proper and impartial conduct of an
investigation, which does not require prior
notice and hearing.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed GAD in not
considering the complaint against Carabeo a
violation of Section 10 of RA 6713 which
entitles Carabeo to be informed beforehand
and to take necessary corrective action (2
other issued, unrelated)
HELD: We dismiss the petition.
Carabeo's non-disclosure of assets in his SALN
constitutes a violation of RA 3019, among others.
Carabeo claims that the complaint against him
involves a violation of Section 10, RA 6713, or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, which entitles
him to be informed beforehand of his omission
and to take the necessary corrective action.
Section 10 of RA 6713 provides:
Section 10. Review of Compliance Procedure. —
(a) The designated Committees of both Houses of
the Congress shall establish procedures for the
review of statements to determine whether said
statements which have been submitted on time,
are complete, and are in proper form. In the
event a determination is made that a statement is
not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so
inform the reporting individual and direct him to
take the necessary corrective action.
While Section 10 of RA 6713 indeed allows for
corrective measures, Carabeo is charged not
only with violation of RA 6713, but also with
violation of the Revised Penal Code, RA 1379,
and RA 3019, as amended, specifically Sections
7 and 8 thereof, which read:
Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. —
Every public officer, within thirty days after
assuming office, and thereafter, on or before the
fifteenth day of April following the close of every
calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of
his term of office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file with
the office of corresponding Department Head, or
in the case of a Head Department or chief of an
independent office, with the Office of the
President, a true, detailed and sworn statement
of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and
the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year: Provided, That public
officers assuming office less than two months
before the end of the calendar year, may file their
first statement on or before the fifteenth day of
April following the close of said calendar year.
Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due
to Unexplained Wealth. — If in accordance with
the provisions of Republic Act 1379, a public
official has been found to have acquired during
his incumbency, whether in his name or in the
name of other persons, an amount of property
and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact
shall be ground for dismissal or removal.
Properties in the name of the spouse and
dependents of such public official may be taken
into consideration, when their acquisition through
legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.
Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly
excessive expenditures incurred by the public
official, his spouse or any of their dependents
including but not limited to activities in any club
or association or any ostentatious display of
wealth including frequent travel abroad of a
non-official character by any public official when
such activities entail expenses evidently out of
proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be
taken into consideration in the enforcement of
this Section, notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove
mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the
administrative suspension of the public official
concerned for an indefinite period until the
investigation of the unexplained wealth is
completed.
In Ombudsman v. Valeroso, the Court
explained fully the significance of these
provisions, to wit:
Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful
acquisition of wealth, the evil sought
to be suppressed and avoided, and
Section 7, which mandates full
disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a
means of preventing said evil and is
aimed particularly at curtailing and
minimizing, the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public
service. "Unexplained" matter
normally results from
"non-disclosure" or concealment of
vital facts. SALN, which all public
officials and employees are mandated
to file, are the means to achieve the
policy of accountability of all public
officers and employees in the
government. By the SALN, the public
are able to monitor movement in the
fortune of a public official; it is a valid
check and balance mechanism to
verify undisclosed properties and
wealth.
Significantly, Carabeo failed to show any
requirement under RA 3019 that prior notice
of the non-completion of the SALN and its
correction precede the filing of charges for
violation of its provisions. Neither are these
measures needed for the charges of
dishonesty and grave misconduct, which
Carabeo presently faces.
 s needed for the charges of dishonesty and
grave misconduct, which Carabeo presently
faces.
Scope of Authority
Doctrine of Necessary Implication
Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil 636, 638 (1946)
- NEGADO
ONE LINER:Where the law does not restrict the
scope of authority conferred by it, one is
presumably given all the duties of public office
within its scope.
Facts:
• Gregorio Lantin, the Acting Chief of the
Medico-Legal Section in the Department of
Justice, was given an assignment by Acting
Secretary Quisumbing to temporarily assist
the City Fiscal in the discharge of duties with
same powers and functions as an assistant city
fiscal.
• Doctor and lawyer Lantin then signed and filed
informations after conducting preliminary
investigations. The attorneys for the
defendants filed motions to quash. Where two
motions were denied and one was sustained, the
losing parties initiated proceedings for certiorari.
• According to the Revised Administrative Code,
“the Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer
to temporarily assist a fiscal or prosecuting
attorney.”
Issues: Should the scope of authority given
to lawyers by the city fiscal be limited in
terms of duties?
Ruling:
THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY
DISTINCTION AS TO WHERE THE DUTIES IN
THE CITY FISCAL’S APPOINTMENT IS
RESTRICTED
• The law uses general terms. The provisions
here should not be given a restricted
meaning where no restriction is indicated.
The law does not confine the duties to specific
ones.
• If the legislature wanted to forbid the
lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal and to
other functions, it would have indicated its
intention by clear implication.
• There is nothing sacred in signing the
complaints, making investigations, and
conducting prosecutions that only an officer
appointed by the President or one expressly
empowered by law may be permitted to assume
these functions.
• Laws must receive sensible interpretation to
promote the ends for which they were enacted.
• It is not to the point to inquire whether the
Solicitor General has the power to sign
informations. The power to sign informations,
make investigations, and conduct prosecutions is
INHERENT in the power to assist a prosecuting
attorney.
• It does not emanate from the powers of the
Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred
upon the office. IT IS INGRAINED IN THE
OFFICE OR DESIGNATION ITSELF.
Joson v. Executive Secretary - REBOJA
One-liner: As head of the Executive Department,
the President may delegate some of his powers to
the Cabinet members except when he is required
by the Constitution to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he acts
personally. Each head of a department is, and
must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters
of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.
FACTS:
The case at bar involves the validity of the
suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo
Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of
Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is
the Vice-Governor of said province while private
respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S.
Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and
Napoleon Interior are members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On September 17, 1996, private respondents
filed with the Office of the President a
letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997
charging petitioner with grave misconduct and
abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged
that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they
were at the session hall of the provincial capitol
for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently
barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the
door and chairs in the Hall and uttered
threatening words at them; close behind
petitioner were several men with long and short
firearms who encircled the area.
Private respondents claim that this incident was
an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that
the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150
million from the Philippine National Bank; that
petitioner's acts were intended to harass them
into approving this loan; that fortunately, no
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was
held that day for lack of quorum and the proposed
legislative measure was not considered; that
private respondents opposed the loan because
the province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated
obligation of more than P70 million incurred
without prior authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget officer
and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the
province could not afford to contract another
obligation; that petitioner's act of barging in and
intimidating private respondents was a serious
insult to the integrity and independence of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the
presence of his private army posed grave danger
to private respondents' lives and safety.
Private respondents prayed for the suspension or
removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of
the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the
review of the proposed loan in light of the
financial condition of the province.
President Ramos noted that the situation of "12
Sep at the Session Hall," i.e., the refusal of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
approve the proposed loan, did not appear to
justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed
followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary
of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG)
Robert Barbers to "take appropriate preemptive
and investigative actions," but to "break not the
peace."
Acting upon the instructions of the President,
Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case
against him and attached to the notice a copy of
the complaint and its annexes. In the same notice,
Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit
his verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion
to dismiss, together with such documentary
evidence that he has in support thereof, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt.
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers
proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned
petitioner and private respondents to a
conference to settle the controversy. The parties
entered into an agreement whereby petitioner
promised to maintain peace and order in the
province while private respondents promised to
refrain from filing cases that would adversely
affect their peaceful co-existence.
The peace agreement was not respected by the
parties and the private respondents reiterated
their letter complaint. (a)
Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to
the letter-complaint within fifteen days from
receipt. Petitioner submitted requests for
extension to submit his answer and was each
request was granted each time.
Three months later, Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG,
issued an order declaring petitioner in default and
to have waived his right to present evidence.
Private respondents were ordered to present their
evidence ex-parte. Respondent was hereby
declared in default. On June 24, 1997, petitioner,
through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss."
Petitioner alleged that the letter complaint was
not verified on the day it was filed with the Office
of the President; and that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority to
require him, to answer the complaint.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of
Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres issued an order, by authority of the
President, placing petitioner under preventive
suspension for sixty (60) days pending
investigation of the charges against him.
Secretary Barbers directed the PNP to assist in
the implementation of the order of preventive
suspension. In petitioner's stead, Secretary
Barbers designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as
Acting Governor until such time as petitioner's
temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased to
exist. Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals challenging the order of preventive
suspension and the order of default.
The CA dismissed petitioner's petition. A few days
after filing the petition before this Court,
petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Herein
Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction." Petitioner alleged that
subsequent to the institution of this petition, the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments
rendered a resolution on the case finding him
guilty of the offenses charged. His finding was
based on the position papers and affidavits of
witnesses submitted by the parties.
The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of
complainants' witnesses to be "more natural,
reasonable and probable" than those of herein
petitioner Joson's. On January 8, 1998, the
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the
DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the
penalty of suspension from office for six (6)
months without pay.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:(a) Preventive suspension is
proper;(b) Procedural due process is violated;(c)
The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the
ground of undue delegation; that it is the
President who is the Disciplining Authority, not
the Secretary of DILG;
RULING:
Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the
issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt
is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense,
there is great probability that the respondent,
who continues to hold office, could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. The
act of respondent in allegedly barging violently
into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the company of armed men
constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of
complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit
of two
(2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Respondent who is the chief executive of the province
is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the
history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary
measures be taken.
(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation denied him procedural due process.
Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating
Authority shall summon the parties to consider
whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating
Authority the discretion to determine whether a
formal investigation would be conducted. The
records show that petitioner filed a motion for
formal investigation. There is nothing in the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide
that administrative cases against elective local
officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating
Authority may require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda but this is only after
formal investigation and hearing.

c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President

remains the Disciplining Authority. What is
delegated is the power to investigate, not the
power to discipline. The power to discipline
evidently includes the power to investigate. As
the Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the
power to investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be constituted
by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency

“…which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of

the President provided in the Constitution.
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of
the presidency. As head of the Executive
Department, the President, however, may
delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the
Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he acts personally. The
members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of
the President in certain matters because the
President cannot be expected to exercise his
control (and supervisory) powers personally all
the time. Each head of a department is, and must
be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by
law to exercise authority.