SAN BEDA COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF LAW
MENDIOLA, MANILA

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DOCTRINES

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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INTRODUCTION / GENERAL CONSIDERATION

MALAGA v. PENACHOS Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
213 SCRA 516 department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and government owned or controlled corporations.

Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.
DE LA LLANA v. ALBA Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of office.
112 SCRA 296 There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It
is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect
is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance.

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

TIO v. VIDEOGRAM The true distinction is between the delegation of the power to make the law, which necessarily
REGULATORY BOARD involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
151 SCRA 208
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

U.S. v. ANG TANG HO The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law
43 PHIL 1 unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General
to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There
is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not
define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act done remains to be done to make
it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is a delegation
of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it can’t be said that it
APPELLATE COURT complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose
148 SCRA 569
sought has a gap. Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due
process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it. There was no reason why
the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with the accused
acquired the rights in the constitution. The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police
power because the method to confiscate carabaos was oppressive.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUZ Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the
177 SCRA 668 Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but
only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check – not to supplant-
the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
CARINO v. COMMISSION The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate
ON HUMAN RIGHTS all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that
204 SCRA 1991
power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant
to such rules of procedure as it may adopt, and in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted
by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending
such remedy as may be required by its findings.
LLDA v. CA While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers are as
231 SCRA 292 expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.
RIZAL EMPIRE It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
INSURANCE CORP. v. enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have
NLRC
150 SCRA 565 the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.

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QUASI – LEGISLATIVE POWER

CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG The power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion,
56 PHIL. 234 the prohibition provided in the Act does not constitute an unlawful delegation of the legislative
powers, but confers an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN When the President, it response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur
101 PHIL. 328 issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters
comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern
were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. The exercise of such authority did not,
therefore, constitute an undue delegation of the powers of Congress.
PEOPLE v. MACEREN Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must
79 SCRA 250 be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provision. By such relations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended.

An administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned.
BAUTISTA v. JUNIO Nor does it militate against the validity of the Letter of Instruction just because the ban imposed
127 SCRA 329 does not go as far as it could have and therefore could be less efficacious in character. That was
the solution which, for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended
himself. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure. He decided that what was
issued by him would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. That it did
not cover other matters which very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of
nullity.
MACEDA v. ERB The OPSF was established precisely to protect the consuming public from the erratic movement
192 SCRA 363 of oil prices and to preclude oil companies from taking advantage of fluctuations occurring
every so often. As a buffer mechanism, it stabilizes domestic prices by bringing about a uniform
rate rather than leaving pricing to the caprices of the market.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school
FOUNDATION v. DECS
fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as
153 SCRA 622
such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively
discharge its functions and duties under the law.
CIR v. FORTUNE Rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order
TOBACCO CORP. to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand
G.R. No. 167274 – 75
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF The BOT need not first summon taxicab operators to a conference on public hearing before
METRO MANILA v. BOT issuing circulars phasing out more than 6- year old taxicab because the leeway accorded to the
117 SCRA 597
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from persons who
may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority.
US v. PANLILIO While Act No. 1760 authorizes the Director of Agriculture, among other things, “to require that
28 PHIL. 608 animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed
thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him
necessary to prevent the spread of the disease,” a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture made in pursuance of such authority will not be held to be criminal unless the
statute expressly makes it so and provides a punishment.
HOLY SPIRIT Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION v.
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
DEFENSOR make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of
G.R. No. 163980 the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
OPLE v. TORRES Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
293 SCRA 141 determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can
issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
PSDSA v. DE JESUS The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
G.R. No. 157299 necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules
and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend
or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.
CAWAD v. ABAD Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of
G.R. No. 207145 rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government.
EQUI – ASIA PLACEMENT, Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required
INC. v. DFA since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.
G.R. No. 152214
As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct.

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QUASI – JUDICIAL POWER

SYQUIA v. BOARD OF Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with
POWER respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor
72 SCRA 212
in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
GLOBE WIRELESS v. The Commission is empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or
PUBLIC SERVICE failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any
COMMISSION
147 SCRA 269 orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Absence of violation by the petitioner of
said terms or orders or decisions in case at bar.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION Under the present law, members of the Philippine bar authorized by the Supreme Court to
OF LAWYERS v. AGRAVA practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent office for
105 PHIL 173
the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination
of the scope and application of the patent law and other laws applicable as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish acts involved. That part of the functions of the Patent
Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decision are
under the law taken to the Supreme Court.
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC The Commission, although it cannot be qualified as a court of justice within the meaning of the
104 PHIL. 268
Constitution, for it is merely an independent administrative body, may exercise quasi-judicial
functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its
jurisdiction. As to what questions come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the
Revised Election Code specifies.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE A quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining
v. LANTION facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by
G.R. No. 139465
the facts proved.

Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigating power, is one of the
determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-
judicial authority. This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or
to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of
witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
69 PHIL. 635 the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant
to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL Administrative determinations of contested cases are by their nature quasi-judicial. There is no
AFFAIRS SERVICE – PDEA requirement for strict adherence to technical rules that are observed in truly judicial
G.R. No. 198140
proceedings. As a rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed in administrative
proceedings in order “to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses.” By relaxing technical rules,
administrative agencies are, thus, given leeway in coming up with a decision.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ Disputes involving controversies between and among stockholders fall within the original and
149 SCRA 654 exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC under Section 5 of PD 902-A.
BERNARDO v. ABALOS A petition for certiorari from a COMELEC En Banc resolution in an election offense case fails
G.R. No. 137266 where the petitioner did not seek reconsideration of said resolution. The petitioner failed to
exhaust all remedies available to them at the COMELEC level.
INDUSTRIAL The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
ENTERPRISES v. CA and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
184 SCRA 426
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view.
GSIS v. CSC The Commission, however, is not without power. As the final arbiter on any matter concerning
204 SCRA 826 personnel action in the government, the Commission is empowered by P.D. 1409, to review
the decisions of the Board, as follows: “Section 8. Relationship with the Civil Service
Commission. Decisions of the Board involving the removal of officers and employees from the
service shall be subject to automatic review by the Commission. The Commission shall
likewise hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions
of the Commission shall be subject to review only by the Courts.
PAAT v. CA Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
266 SCRA 167 should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded to him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction the
such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power could be sought.
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exception, among
170 SCRA 256
which is when only a question of law is involved. Petitioners requires the interpretation of the
scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular
courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely
legal question.

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MANGUBAT v. OSMEÑA
105 PHIL 1308
PROS. TABAO v. JUDGE Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
LILAGAN
cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Respondent judge’s act
AM No. RTJ-01-1651
of taking cognizance of replevin suit despite non-exhaustion of administrative remedies clearly
demonstrates ignorance of law.
ARROW There is, to repeat, a great public interest in a definitive outcome of the crucial issue involved.
TRANSPORTATION v. BOT
One of the most noted authorities on Administrative Law, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis,
63 SCRA 193
discussing the ripeness concept, is of the view that the resolution of what could be a debilitating
uncertainty with the conceded ability of the judiciary to work out a solution of the problem
posed is a potent argument for minimizing the emphasis laid on its technical aspect.
KBMPBM v. DOMINGUEZ As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement
205 SCRA 92
does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of
the President bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disproved by him.

This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most
needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the
courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal.
NATIONAL The administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of
DEVELOPMENT CORP. v.
Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
HERVILLA
151 SCRA 200 jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of
rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public
lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the
determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question
(in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at
bar, the petitioner’s possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of
Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the
courts to pursue.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED Judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course subject to certain guide
MINING v. FACTORAN posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision
154 SCRA 49
should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there
has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the
administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when
palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
CARPIO v. EXECUTIVE All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
SECRETARY heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
206 SCRA 290
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
HEIRS OF EUGENIO v. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
ROXAS administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts
173 SCRA 581
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. Findings of fact by an
administrative board or officials, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not
be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers, or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or
with grave abuse of discretion.
INDUSTRIAL POWER There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative remedies,
SALES v. SINSUAT these being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is patently
160 SCRA 19
illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied or
assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention
NATIONAL Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the administrative
DEVELOPMENT CO. v. superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is
COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS undisputed that respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process.
9 SCRA 429
THE DIOCESE OF Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy
BACOLOD v. COMELEC is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
G.R. No. 205728
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court
may come into the picture.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect the

fundamental right of speech.

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II. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICES

REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

SARMIENTO v. MISON Under the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers is to exclude
156 SCRA 549
presidential appointments from confirmation on the Commission on Appointments except
appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article VII.
LUEGO v. CSC It is essentially a discretionary power and cannot be delegated; it must be performed by the
143 SCRA 327
officer upon whom it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred.
LACSON v. ROMERO The appointment of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several steps. First, comes the
84 PHIL. 740
nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the
Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step
is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps,
nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive
and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the
appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may
not accept the appointment or nomination as there is no power in this country which can
compel a man to accept an office.
COSTIN v. QUIMBO It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and
120 SCRA 159
eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There
can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed
or his appointment validly terminated. In the case at bar, since petitioner Lajer was not validly
terminated from public office and, as a matter of fact, was ordered reinstated through a writ
of mandamus, by no less than the Court of Appeals, it follows that there was no vacancy in
the office of chief of police on January 14, 1960 and there was no office to which respondent
Higinio Verra could have been appointed.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN Notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full
110 SCRA 159 agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted
felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. The rationale
is plainly evident. Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety
and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To
insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed
to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
195 SCRA 317
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants.
LABO v. COMELEC The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief
176 SCRA 1
that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently
lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve
as such.
YEE v. DIRECTOR OF Section 681 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that — In making selection
PUBLIC SCHOOLS from lists of certified eligibles furnished by the Commissioner, appointing officer shall, when
7 SCRA 832
other qualifications are equal, prefer:
First. Citizens of the Philippines.
Second. Honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and mariners of the United States, is no
argument against the limitation of holding public offices to citizens of the Philippines. The
preference provided for in the section quoted above was operative during the period before 4
July 1946 or before the Philippines became an independent nation.

Not being included in Section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code which enumerates the
officers and employees constituting the unclassified service – a public function which maybe
performed by Filipino citizens only.
LAUREL v. DESIERTO The right, authority or duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
G.R. No. 145368 fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some sovereign power of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.

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JAVIER v. The court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law,
SANDIGANBAYAN which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
G.R. No. 147026 – 27
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the Government.

Under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one’s appointment, and whether the compensation
one receives from the government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected
or appointed is still considered a public officer.

DE FACTO OFFICERS
TAYKO v. CAPISTRANO A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an
53 PHIL. 866
appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who
undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge de
jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not
expired.
RODRIGUEZ v. TAN A senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed office, but was later on ousted as a
91 PHIL. 724
result of an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator,
and is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution
provides for the position. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently
in this jurisdiction.
REGALA v. CFI of BATAAN A judge who discharges his position before hearing of the disapproval of his appointment is
77 PHIL 684
a de facto judge. Hence, all his official actions as judge de facto are so valid for all legal
purposes and for all kinds of subjects, like those of a de jure judge.
SOLIS v. CA A decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to
38 SCRA 53 be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. A judgment is a nullity if it had been
promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office.
MONROY v. CA The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former position.
20 SCRA 620 Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code (which reads “Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy”) makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment
can restore the ousted official.
MENZON v. PETILLA Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses
197 SCRA 251 no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled
to compensation. There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-
Governor under color of a known appointment.
FUNA v. CSC CHAIRMAN A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
G.R. No. 191672 appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

THE CIVIL SERVICE

JUCO v. NLRC The NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987
G.R. No. 98107
Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in lace at the time of the decision.
NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary
of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the
Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.
MATURAN v. MAGLANA Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent entirely
113 SCRA 268
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The Civil Service Commission cannot even legally
approve his appointment as provisional as this at would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
the discretion of the appointing power.
CORPUS v. CUADERNO Tenure of officials with primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence – but
13 SCRA 591
this is not so with those highly technical positions which require special skills and
qualifications. Constitution clearly distinguished highly technical from primarily confidential
posts, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the case, according to Central Bank and MB,
officers of highly technical positions may be removed anytime for lack of confidence by the
appointing power highly technical post is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly
made by the Constitution. A position may be declared both highly technical and confidential,
but such is not the category of the petitioner’s position
PINEDA v. CLAUDIO The next-in rank rule provides that he would be the first to be considered for the vacancy. He
28 SCRA 34
is not entitled to a preferential consideration but it does not follow that only he can be
promoted. The rule does not grant him vested right to the office neither does it impose a
ministerial duty on the appointing power to promote him.

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 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – RAP Reviewer

What the law purports to say is that as far as practicable the person next in rank should be
promoted, otherwise the vacancy may be filled by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or
certification, as the appointing power sees fit, provided the appointee is certified to be
qualified and eligible — which is the basic requirement of the Civil Service Act, as well as of
the Police Act and the Decentralization Law.
NATIONAL SERVICE The law mandates that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2)
CORPORATION v. NLRC written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These
168 SCRA 122
are the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN The pardon granted to petitioner resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
170 SCRA 190 employment, but to regain her former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
SSS EMPLOYEES Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
ASSOCIATION v. CA workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure
175 SCRA 686
concessions from their employers.
TUCP v. NHA The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original
173 SCRA 33 or legislative charters, that is, those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not
those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service does not
include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law.
GARCIA v. COA The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was
G.R. No. L - 75025 forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result
in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not
entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes
him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged.
When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him
his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLIC OFFICER

FESTEJO v. FERNANDO The doctrine on civil liability of civil servants states that, an officer-executive, administrative
94 PHIL. 504 quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and
without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a
civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the
plea that he is a public agent acting under color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of
the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.
AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. Thus, it is well settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative
v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on
67 SCRA 286
the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. There is no
abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains
with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a
hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who
makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.

INHIBITIONS / SALARY AND PERQUISITES

SANTOS v. CA The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of
G.R. No. 139792
the Constitution, which provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension
or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another
government position to which another government position to which another compensation is
attached. Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving
under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double compensation. He could continue
receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct
MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for
his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director
III of the MMA.
LAUREL v. CSC It is plain that, at least since the enactment of the 1959 Civil Service Act (R.A. 2260), it is the
203 SCRA 195
nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy determining or highly technical. Executive pronouncements can be no more than initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. And it must be so or else it would
then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat,
the protection of Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution." This rule stands despite the third
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 868 which pertinently reads: " . . . and only the President
may declare a position policy-determining, highly technical or primarily confidential, upon
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, the Budget Commission and the
Presidential Reorganization Commission."

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 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – RAP Reviewer

For the reason that the latter may be considered merely as the initial determination of the
Executive, which in no case forecloses judicial review. A rule that exclusively vests upon the
Executive the power to declare what position may be considered policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical would subvert the provision on the civil service
under the 1973 Constitution which was then in force at the time the decree was promulgated.
Specifically, Section 2 of Article XII of said Constitution makes reference to positions which
are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature," thereby leaving
no room for doubt that, indeed, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether
it falls within the above-mentioned classification. The 1987 Constitution retains this rule when
in Section 2 of Article IX-C, it clearly makes reference to "positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical.
CSC v. DACOYCOY Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
G.R. No. 135805 governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending
authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section, the word relative and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, that in each particular instance full
report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor
of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees." When the
AUTHORITY v. SALVAÑA
government office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law,
G.R. No. 192074
it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that "public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives." This is a principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the
government office employing the public officer.

Dishonesty is a serious offense that challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To
bar a government office from appealing a decision that lowers the penalty of the disciplined
employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the civil service employs only those with
the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.

Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions
by quasi-judicial bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and
unappealable, it would, in effect, show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant.
The quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens would end up suffering for it.

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

ARIAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good
G.R. No. 81563 faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.
PEZA v. COMMISSION ON Good faith has always been a valid defense of public officials that has been considered by this
AUDIT
Court in several cases. Good faith is a state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and
G.R. No. 210903
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of
facts which render transaction unconscientious.
TABUENA v. It is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate
SANDIGANBAYAN criminal intent on the part of the accused.
268 SCRA 332

The subordinate who, in following an order of a superior, failed to observe all auditing
procedures of disbursement, cannot escape responsibility for such omission but where he
acted in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, not criminal.
CORREA v. CFI A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope
92 SCRA 312 of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor lie any private
individual. This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer
removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that
by reason of noncompliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office,
the officials were acting outside their official authority.

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 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – RAP Reviewer

OCAMPO v. OFFICE OF THE The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against
OMBUDSMAN petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in
G.R. No. 114683
dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove
the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The
lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence.
OCA v. ENRIQUEZ There is the substantial evidence rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires in
218 SCRA 1
these cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
such conclusion.
CHAVEZ v. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to
SANDIGANBAYAN have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or
193 SCRA 282
where there is a showing of bad faith.

Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
DUMDUMA v. CSC A government employee can be dismissed from service for falsification of his eligibility for
G.R. No. 182606 appointment purposes.

Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or
belief of facts which render [a] transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a
question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a person’s
intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence
of his conduct and outward acts.
ARAULLO v. AQUINO III
G.R. No. 209287
OFFICE OF THE Under the “threefold liability rule”, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may
OMBUDSMAN v. ANDUTAN give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even in if the Ombudsman may no
G.R. No. 164679
longer file an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired,
the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate the alleged transgressions.
SAEZ v. MACAPAGAL – To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements
ARROYO must obtain:
G.R. No. 183533
a. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. The superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and
c. The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrator thereof.

The president. Being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of command
responsibility doctrine.
PEOPLE v. The dismissal of the administrative case does not necessarily prevent a criminal prosecution
SANDIGANBAYAN from proceeding. Indeed, the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of
G.R. No. 164577
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of administrative complaint. Neither
does the disposition in one case inevitably govern the resolution of another case/s and vice
versa.

Administrative liability is different from criminal liability in these 2 aspects: (1) the quantum
of evidence required, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed and (2) the
principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of
law, or the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.
TESDA v. COA In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative
G.R. No. 204869 authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,’
while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning
to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
creditors.’" On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the
laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to
changes in the country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the
purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The
pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under
the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already
set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
AGUINALDO v. SANTOS Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not to furnish
G.R. No. 94115 cause for removal and this is especially true were the Constitution provides that the penalty in
proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification
from holding office for a term for which the officer was elected or appointed.

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 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – RAP Reviewer

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection
to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor.
SALUMBINES, JR. v. OFFICE The electorates' condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official
OF THE OMBUDSMAN cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of
G.R. No. 180917
the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words,
there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to
speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.

It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing
authority that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive
positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with
the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable
appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual re-election.
OMBUDSMAN CARPIO – That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine
MORALES v. CA and BINAY in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one
G.R. No. 217126 – 27
class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete
by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the
same. It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution
means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation.

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

LECAROZ v. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
SANDIGANBAYAN term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that
G.R. No. 130872
officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but
until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office
does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and
qualified to assume it. But the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected
and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
ESTRADA v. MACAPAGAL – Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
ARROYO beyond quibble – there must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
G.R. No. 146738
relinquishment and an acceptance by the proper authority. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
COLLANTES v. CA Courtesy resignation is as effectual as any other resignation. There can be no implied promise
G.R. No. 169604 of another position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy. Any express
promise of another position is void because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the
appointing power. Public office is a public trust and cannot be made the subject of negotiations
by private persons.
GENERAL MANAGER, PPA Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
v. MONSERATE service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right to the
G.R. No. 139616
position which is protected not only by statute, but also by the constitution, an appointment
cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except
for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN Although a resignation is not completed without an acceptance thereof by the proper authority,
ANDRES v. CA an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no
G.R. No. 118883
acceptance.

Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by

the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed,
abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal
relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Nonuser refers
to a neglect to use a privilege or a right or to exercise an easement or an office.

The two essential requisites of abandonment are first, an intention to abandon and, second, an
overt “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Sec. 13, Art.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VII, CONSTITUTION must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
194 SCRA 317
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office.

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