The 14th International Graduate Conference

in Political Science, International Relations, and Public Policy

Speaking Bullshit to Power:

Populism and the Rhetoric of Bullshit –
a Conceptual Investigation

Avishai Green
Hebrew University
Political Science Department
Abstract

This paper posits four possible reasons there may exist a fundamental, non-incidental

connection between populism and the rhetoric of bullshit, as defined by Frankfurt as

speech whose truth value its speaker is indifferent towards: 1) “Bullshit as Partisanship”:

populists’ audiences are likely to assess their claims as true regardless of content; 2)

“Bullshit as Infallibility”: Populists regard as infallible a central claim – the exclusivity of

their claim to popular representation; 3) “Bullshit as Symbolism”: populist

communication is frequently primarily meant to convey symbolic, unarticulated

messages, leading literal meaning to be overlooked; 4) “Bullshit as Sincerity”: Populists’

claim to authentically represent “the people” and their “folk” values, combined with their

wholesale rejection of the intellectual class and their values, makes them value sincerity

over accuracy, leading them to construct statements with little regard for their veracity.

1

Donald Trump’s public record of dishonestly is both breathtakingly extensive and

unprecedentedly documented: as of November 2018, the Washington Post has tallied

over 6,000 “false or misleading” claims made by the president (Kessler et al. 2018), and

the fact-checking website Politifact has rated 69% of his scrutinized claims scrutinized to

be either “Mostly False”, “False” or “Pants on Fire” (Politifact 2018). It is tempting, then,

to label the U.S. President a liar (as many have indeed done) - but is this the most

accurate designation? A lie is a statement the speaker believes to be false, uttered with

intent to deceive (Williams 2002, 96). Yet Trump often makes claims which are

observably false (claiming to have the largest inauguration crowd ever), self-

contradictory (Trump’s consecutive statements that a letter from Kim Jong-un was both

“very nice” and hadn’t yet been opened [Mindock, 2018]), or ridiculous to the point of

comedy (“nobody has more respect for women than I do” [NBC News, 2016]) –

characteristics which hardly seem to fit the goal of deceiving listeners. A better

classification than “lies” for such statements, some have suggested, is “bullshit”.

In On Bullshit, Frankfurt defines “bullshit” as any statement whose truth value its

speaker is indifferent towards. This distinguishes it from a lie, which requires its teller to

be both aware of the relevant truth (or at least to think he is) and be motivated to conceal

it; all bullshit demands is that its speaker be unconcerned with whether his claim is true

or not (thus, bullshit can even be true, but only incidentally so). Bullshitting does

however involve deceit, not about content but about intent: what the bullshitter hides “is

that his intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it” (Frankfurt 1986, 14). This

concept seems useful for describing statements of the kind previously described, whose

glaring inaccuracy belies an intention to arrive at a correct representation of the world,

but which are delivered with a conviction which suggests the opposite (an impression

strengthened by Trump’s unprecedentedly frequent invocation of the term “believe me”

[Schnoebelen, 2016]). Observing Trump in 2016, Frankfurt commented that he "makes

statements of whose truth he is uncertain—and he is indifferent to the fact that he doesn’t

actually regard them as true”, concluding he “indulges freely” in bullshit (Frankfurt

2016).

Here we come to something of a puzzle. Based on the above, it would stand to

reason that Trump’s supporters like him because of reasons such as his policy positions,

party affiliation, or overall personality, and that such considerations overshadow the

question of truthfulness, which they hold to be of secondary importance. Yet this does not

seem to be the case at all. Available evidence suggests that, on the contrary, Trump draws

support because of, not despite, his relationship to the truth; it is just that his relationship

is interpreted by his supporters in a dramatically different way than the data would lead us

to expect. An overwhelming majority of Republicans view Trump as “honest”

(Greenwood, 2018). The phrase “he tells it like it is” was and is a fixture of interviews with

Trump supporters, often the very first reason given to explain their support.1 How to

suggest this oddity? The answer, I suggest, lies at least in large part in Trump’s brand of

politics: populism.

1
An exit poll in the Republican South Carolina primary revealed that 78% of voters who

claimed “telling it like it is” to be their top priority in selecting a candidate supported

Trump (Gamio and Clement, 2016).

 “Populism” is an oft-debated term in political science, with much discussion

surrounding the question of its category: ideology, phenomenon or style of discourse. Yet

despite these disagreements, there exists an “analytical core” (Panizza 2005, 1) - a short

list of attributes upon which there is scholarly consensus: Populism is, at its core, a political

appeal to “the people” as sovereigns, against a demonized elitist “other”. This definition

is, firstly, a descriptive understanding of society as comprising two antagonistic and

homogenous units, internally monolithic yet profoundly alien to each other, whose interests

are purely at odds. It is, secondly, a normative conception of “the people” as a morally

valorous democratic sovereign and of the “others” as an illegitimate, immoral usurper - an

understanding amounting to the claim that society should be governed by the “general will”

of “the people”, and by it alone. These beliefs, coupled with the claim that populists are

the authentic and exclusive representatives of said “people”, form the basis of populists’

political legitimacy (Müller 2016).

Populists are often accused of engaging in bullshit. A vivid recent example is

Brexit, in which the populist Leave campaign frequently issued claims without attempting

to ascertain their veracity, and continued to propagate them even after they had been

debunked. Hopkin and Rosamond focus on one such claim, and conclude that it was

bullshit in the Frankfurtian sense (Hopkin and Rosamond, 2017). On the other hand,

populists everywhere purport to be concerned with honesty (Canovan 1981, 212). So much
so, that (confusingly) populists often invoke the term “bullshit” in attacking opponents”,2

thus portraying non-populist political actors as fundamentally dishonest, while positioning

themselves as “‘straight-shooters’ who cut through the ‘bullshit’ of mainstream politics”

(Moffitt 2015, 204).

These facts offer a compelling direction in which to search for an answer: populism

itself. If different actors who adhere to a common brand of politics also happen to share a

seemingly bizarre proclivity, it stands to reason that this political type is a promising place

to look for an explanation. This leads to this paper’s research question: Is there a

fundamental, non-incidental connection between populism and the rhetoric of bullshit?

Before proceeding, a few clarifications: First, the type of connection sought is not

a necessary one, but rather a tendency. Second, this paper does not seek to establish a

correlation between populism and bullshit, but rather, as a matter of necessity and on the

basis of examples, assumes one. The research question can thus be reformulated, with

greater simplicity, as: if populists tend to bullshit – why? Is there anything about this kind

of politics which makes its adherents more susceptible to display a disregard for the truth?

Thirdly, by the term “populist” I will refer at all times to political actors practicing

populism, a group I distinguish from their supporters. Lastly, the paper is geared towards

an analysis of populism in general, not right-wing or left-wing populism in particular.

2
Kid Rock, while toying with the prospect of a senate run in 2017, announced his goal

was letting politicians know that “We the People are sick and tired of their bullshit!”

(KidRock.com, 2017).
 Before delving into theoretical analysis, it may be useful to begin by examining

and evaluating a naïve answer to this question which comes to mind: perhaps populists

bullshit because they are uniformed. This claim derives from the basic fact that populists

tend to have little political experience; “it’s more credible to run against existing elites if

one isn’t obviously one of them” (Müller, 34). Political campaigns require candidates to

be interviewed frequently and extensively, and incentivize expressing an opinion on a

huge range of complex issues. This creates a situation in which the likelihood of bullshit

is extremely high; as Frankfurt states, “bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances

require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about” (Frankfurt 1986, 16).

This explanation, then, can illuminate instances in which populists speak in grossly

inaccurate ways without having any apparent motivation for doing so, save for creating

the overall impression of knowledgeability. In Trump’s case, this explanation has a

potent explanatory power, illuminating many instances of incoherent and lengthy

comments on (for example) policy matters, punctuated by remarks such as “I know more

about the big bills … than any president that’s ever been in office” (NY Times, 2017).

Yet this connection has limits: it applies only to populists who are indeed political

newcomers; it cannot explain the actions of those populists who do happen to be

experienced politicians, such as Victor Orban or Nigel Farage. More generally, it is

irrelevant for any instances in which populists bullshit about things of which they do have

knowledge. It cannot explain why a populist would bullshit about himself (Trump’s claim

to have the most respect for women), about facts of which he has direct knowledge

(Trump’s claim that he “ended” the birther controversy [Jacobson 2016]) or which are

observably false (the inauguration crowd claim), or why he would produce statements
which are contradictory (the Kim Jong-un letter claims). Clearly, while this connection is

useful, there is more going on. Additional explanations are needed, and this paper will

attempt to provide them.

This is done through theoretical inquiry, wherein on the basis of scholarly literature,

different possible connections between populism and Frankfurt’s concept of “bullshit” are

developed, entertained and evaluated on grounds of both plausibility and fruitfulness. For

each connection, I ask: How helpful is this explanation in illuminating the phenomena of

populist bullshit, and to what extent does it shed light on the puzzle of bullshitting

politicians being regarded as truthful? Throughout, Trump is used as a test case, with the

connections being appraised for their ability to explicate instances of bullshit uttered by

him which illuminate the populist nature of his political appeal.

Connection 1 – Bullshit as Partisanship

One possible answer to the question “Why do populists bullshit?” is simply: “because they

can”; That is - because they know they will be believed by those whose support they depend

on. This explanation assumes that supporters of populist causes are often situated in

epistemic bubbles, social networks inside of which truth and partisan opinion are fused,

and information not conforming to the group’s goals and beliefs is filtered out. This means

that when evaluating the truth-value of a statement, these supporters assign a far higher

weight to the perceived group affiliation of its speaker than to plausibility or evidence. This

is a simple enough explanation of why populist bullshit may be believed, which in turn can

at least partially explain why a populist politician would be incentivized to engage in it. If

the risk of being disbelieved by one’s target audience is low, and since bullshitting is
significantly easier than lying,3 why would the populist not produce bullshit which suits

his agenda?

This explanation certainly seems to apply to a good deal of bullshit propounded by

populists. In the 2016 election, belief in fabricated news items spread on social media

largely broke along party lines, with fraudulent pro-Trump articles being shared more than

four times as often as pro-Clinton ones (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). And with Trump

more generally, there no doubt exists a vicious cycle in which even his most outlandish

claims are a-priori believed by many of his supporters, while any one attempting to refute

such claims is written off as partisan - and thus, hopelessly biased. The fact that many of

those doing the refuting are not, in fact, partisan actors, but rather represent institutions

whose job it is be independent and impartial – chief among them the media – does not

present an obstacle for this theory. The type of tribal mindset described here is

dichotomous, dividing the world between those on “our” side, and all the rest. That Trump

is also sometimes repudiated by those ostensibly on his side of the aisle may seem more

problematic – but only until we realize that in these cases battle lines are immediately

redrawn so as to portray such party critics (for example, senators Jeff Flake or Bob Corker)

as playing for other team (an accusation referenced by the designation RINO - Republican

in Name Only).

While all politics is obviously partisan, and confirmation bias exists across

ideologies, there is reason to think that populism is especially vulnerable to epistemic

3
Frankurt claims lying is an act which requires “sharp focus”, whereas bullshit’s lack of
necessity to relate in any way to the truth affords the bullshitter a great deal of freedom
(Frankfurt 1986, 12).
bubbles. Populism is based on an antagonistic, even Manichean worldview (Espejo 2015,

10), in which society is divided between two groups, good (the “people”) and evil (the

“elite”). This leads to a tendency towards dualism (Taggart 2000, 113): Individuals,

institutions and even facts are never regarded as neutral but rather classified as “good” (and

hence, true or truthful) or “bad” (false or dishonest).4 All this, claims Anderson, leads

populism to activate in its supporters a disposition towards an in-group mentality (a

propensity she terms “ethnocentrism”), making them especially vulnerable to epistemic

bubbles (Anderson Forthcoming, 10).

Populism’s demonization of the “other”, as well as the typical centrality of the

leader (Wiles 1969: 167), also make it, per Anderson, activate in its audience a craving for

unity and a deep anti-pluralism (a disposition termed “authoritarianism”). She next points

to research which indicates that such a mindset is susceptible to fear, which in turn “leads

to more rigid thinking, less reliable information processing, and premature closure of

investigation” (Stenner 2005, 217, cited by Anderson, 11).

This link goes a long way towards explaining why a populist leader’s audience will

continue to believe and support him in the face of repeated bullshit. But why do people

come to support the populist cause and judge the populist leader as trustworthy in the first

place? Given that populism frequently does not constitute a stable party affiliation, but in

many countries is a type of movement which springs us periodically, and that the populist

leader is himself often an outsider to the political system, what explains the initial

4
A tweet in which Trump described media coverage as “negative (Fake)” seemingly

admitted to this collapse of distinction between truth and favorability (Trump 2018).
willingness to lend him credence? In the case of Trump, who was well-known for decades

before his entrance into politics, but never for his honesty, these questions are especially

acute. This connection is insufficient to answer this question, and thus a more fundamental

connection is needed.

Connection 2 – Bullshit as Infallibility

The next explanation I shall explore is this: Populists bullshit because they are committed

to a belief which is, frequently and demonstrably, untrue. If this is the case, then bullshit

clearly presents an appealing rhetorical strategy: As Frankfurt demonstrates, one charged

with defending that which is demonstrably false has far more to gain from bullshitting than

he does from lying. While lying, by putting out a specific falsehood, calls attention to the

very truth being concealed, bullshit does the opposite: it confuses, obscures and creates an

atmosphere in which the truth is harder than ever to ascertain (Frankfurt 1986, 15).

The belief referred to is the populist claim to representation of the “general will” of

“the people”. While it is true that almost all non-populist political actors in democracies

make a similar type of claim, there is a crucial difference: The populist claim to

representation is exclusive, and thus fundamentally anti-pluralistic (Müller, 3). Populists

conceive of themselves as the only ones capable of speaking for the people; the populist

leader perceived as “the supreme interpreter… of the vague and imprecise desires of the

multitude" (Stein 1999, 104). Hence, whereas non-populist political actors make claims to

representation “in the form of something like hypotheses that can be empirically disproven

on the basis of the actual results of regular procedures and institutions like elections”,

populists’ claims are “of a moral and symbolic - not an empirical - nature”, and thus –
“cannot be disproven” (Müller, 38). This difference leads Espejo to posit “self-limitation”

as the relevant demarcation criterion between populist and non-populist political actors.

Populists reject any limits on their claim to represent the will of the people; this claim is,

to them, unfalsifiable and infallible (Espejo).

Holding a belief to be infallible entails not only the rejection of any claims to

disprove it, but the dismissal of the notion that any evidence could even have the potential

to do so. One could question how distinctive populism is in this regard; every ideology,

after all, has tenets it holds to be true, and will thus tend to be suspicious of evidence to the

contrary. Yet rarely if ever is any ideology’s central tenet put up to as clear-cut test of its

validity as is populism’s claim to representation. Elections, if understood as fulfilling their

stated intention as true tests of public will, pose a threat to populism’s main claim. Hence,

when faced with unfavorable election results, populists are forced to deny their validity.

Since “the people’s” support for the populists is unquestionable, the election results must

be somehow wrong. As Müller notes:

“Think of Victor Orbán claiming, after losing the 2002 Hungarian elections,

that “the nation cannot be in opposition”; or of Andrés Manuel López

Obrador arguing, after his failed bid for the Mexican presidency in 2006,

that “the victory of the right is morally impossible” (and declaring himself

“the legitimate president of Mexico”); or of Tea Party Patriots claiming that

the president who won a majority of the vote is “governing against the

majority” (Müller, 32).

This dynamic can be extended from the realm of elections to any indication of

public dissatisfaction or dissent: populists must deny the authenticity of them all, claiming
polls to be fake and demonstrations to be “either staged or perpetrated by foreign agents”

(Khatchatourian 2017). These denials will invariably be spirited and detailed; but they will

not be contingent on the facts of the matter, as these are not of interest to the populist. This

is because the populist’s identity as a representative of the people is, to him, a foregone

conclusion which no evidence can counter. The claims presented to back up such denials

are thus of tactical use only, and if one ceases to be of use, another will be presented.5 Of

course, the act of making a claim whose actual truth value is of no interest to the speaker

is the very definition of bullshit à la Frankfurt. The conclusion is this: populists, when faced

with evidence calling their claim of representation into question, will tend to bullshit. And

as in a democracy such evidence tends to turn up frequently, populists will need to bullshit

often.

This connection is, in a sense, a development of the previous explanation: while all

political actors are susceptible to some level of confirmation bias, the populist condition is

far more severe, as one of populism’s fundamental claims preemptively precludes even the

possibility of being wrong. This is more than a bias; it is an implicit claim of infallibility

which is particularly conducive to bullshit. Never was this mindset stated more clearly than

5
Consider the Trump administration’s claims regarding the crowd size of Trump’s

inauguration. The implied assertion, that crowd size either constitutes or symbolizes

literal evidence of popular support, is clear. Yet after the initial claim was universally

refuted, it was amended in such a way – shifting the claim from in-person attendance to

worldwide viewership – as to render it virtually unfalsifiable, while maintaining the

larger symbolic claim.

in Trump’s suggestion that “any negative polls are fake news” (Trump 2017), or (even

more strikingly) his declaration that he would consider the election results legitimate “if I

win” (Diamond 2016).

While credible, this connection’s fruitfulness is confined to populist’s claims

regarding populist representation – a crucial, but partial, domain. It is thus partial; the

following two connections’ implications are far more wide-ranging.

Connection 3 – Bullshit as Symbolism

Populism is widely understood as depending on an interpretive process of social

construction, featuring a discursive shift from the particularistic to the dimension of “the

people”. If politics is always about “the mobilization of bias”, then the populist’s goal is to

draw the battle lines between “the people” and the elites (Canovan, 261); Reyes defines

populism as “the dimension of the political that constructs and gives meaning to 'the

people'” (Reyes, 100).

Populism depends on the bringing about of a “collective awareness” of disadvantage

amongst a sufficient section of the public (Minogue, 208). This occurs through a process

in which disparate groups and individuals in society become aware of each other’s

problems and gradually come to see them as connected, joint casualties of a corrupt system.

This “logic of equivalence” confers meaning (Laclau 2005, 37): while people’s own

troubles may seem, when isolated, trivial, when presented as “instances of the crucial moral

struggle of the time, they elevate the spirit” (Minogue, 208). The "map[s] of problematic

social reality” which populist movements offer to their adherents serve as both “solutions

to critical dilemmas" and "mobilizing agents" (Stewart, 1969: 191). Through this
“awakening”, (Pasquino, 20), populism manages to “wean” ordinary people from their

existing identifications with family, social class, or profession, and to “embrace” them into

accepting a new identification as part of “the people” (Worsley, 242). “Populism emerges”,

proclaims Taggart, when “’I’ become ‘we’ as the people are invoked as a generalized entity

subject to the same conditions and frustrations as the individual” (Taggart, 111).

Even populism’s first sufficient condition - crisis - is only important insofar as it is

perceived as such (Taggart, 4); it is a matter of interpretation which serves as populism’s

constitutive act (Müller, 43). Populism’s “mediation” and “performance” of crisis (dubbed

by Moffit “the spectacularization of failure”) are what bring about the conception of a

corrupt “other” responsible for the troubles of “the people” (Moffitt). The importance of

the perception of crisis is illustrated by Hahl et al (2018), who demonstrate that voters who

regard the political system as corrupt and illegitimate are likely to perceive even a clearly

dishonest norm-breaking politician (i.e. an “outsider”) as an authentic champion of their

interests (Hahl et al., 2018).

Populism’s success in convincing its would-be followers of its conception of society

is accomplished by a joint rhetorical blurring and abstraction: Populist discourse will -

when referring to specific frustrated individuals and groups, their demands, and the “other”

responsible for their troubles - aim to minimize the specific characteristics of these factors,

and present them in a way which exemplifies the larger confrontation between “people”

and “other” (Laclau, 39).

A major rhetorical tool employed in accomplishing this tricky task of abstraction is the

use of “empty” or “floating” signifiers, terms whose literal meaning is neutral or

indeterminate, but which are open to being filled with extra meaning (Ibid. 40). Their use
allows populists to discuss one thing explicitly, while making implicit reference to

something else entirely. The most prominent example in populist discourse is its central

concept, “the people”. Canovan claims this term surpasses any other group concept in

"sheer vagueness" (Canovan, 261), as it is never clear which of the term’s different possible

designations is being implied. Yet this ambiguity is not a liability but rather an asset; that

the term is “empty of precise meaning and full of rhetorical resonance” is precisely what

makes it such a useful “battle cry” (ibid, 286). Since “the people” can be either inclusionary

or exclusionary, its use allows populists to have it both ways, appealing to both the general

public and to a privileged group without being explicitly discriminatory, as when George

Wallace referred to “real Americans” (Müller, 27) or Nigel Farage dubbed Brexit a “victory

for real people” (Withnall 2016). The term allows populists to blur differences, isolate their

opponents, mobilize diffuse interests and induce different listeners to view themselves as

"the people", opposed to "the elites" (Müller 261).

Many other empty signifiers are utilized in populist discourse: “the elites” (which

Kazin claims was deliberately defined through "murky and meaningful phrases” [Kazin

275]); “the "silent majority" (that section of the public which supposedly supports

populists, silence being linked with virtue, and symbolizing both good citizenship and

fundamental a-politicalness [Taggart, 93]); and “the heartland”, “Middle America” and

“Middle England” (mythical spaces, signifying the parts of the country in which the

wholesome and virtuous people reside [Ibid. 3]). For these terms, vagueness is a boon, as

it allows much meaning to be communicated without the need to expressly state it: "The

so-called 'poverty' of the populist symbols is the condition of their political efficacy”

(Laclau. 40).
 More generally, populist discourse is characterized by use of powerful symbolism

(Stewart, 191). One such vehicle is metonymic representation, where specific terms are

taken to represent the whole: “law-abiding families” is taken to symbolize both the

“mainstream majority” and in turn the valorized “people” (Reyes, 112). In agrarian populist

discourse, “the city” stood for the dehumanizing capitalist system, “the country” for the

people’s authentic values (Minogue, 202). Metaphors, which Kazin terms “language

intrinsic to the dynamics of change", are also ubiquitous features of populist

communication: populists are "knights" and "soldiers" fighting “battles" and "campaigns"

against “leeches” and “pigs” (Kazin, 16); corporate wealth is the “anti-Christ” (Ibid. 33);

and the elites use “slow poison”, “sneak attacks” and “assassination” against the people

(Ibid. 173). Canovan claims all types of populism share a common imagery: symbols,

myths and fictional accounts of “everyman” figures, around which all can unite (Canovan,

294).

This exploration of populist rhetoric establishes the following: populism’s success in

attracting and mobilizing adherents is dependent on the successful conveyance of much

information which is not, and perhaps cannot successfully be, explicitly expressed. The

ontological division of society into two antagonistic units is hard, if not impossible, to

prove; it is a much more useful persuasive strategy to hint at it, indicate it without

committing to any statement which can be empirically challenged. Metaphors, metonymic

symbols and empty signifiers are all ways to convey significantly more information than

that which is being literally stated.

We arrive, then, at the following claim: In a great many cases, the literal meaning of

the populist’s speech is of secondary (or even non-existent) importance to him, as the
primary goal is not to convey falsifiable information but to implicitly transmit some facet

of the populist worldview. By Frankfurt’s definition, this aspect of populists’

communication is bullshit – it is speech whose truth value the speaker is indifferent to.

While it could be objected that overtly symbolic speech makes no claim to being

truthful (and thus should not be considered bullshit), this does not exculpate much of

populist speech. Populist discourse, claims Anderson, purposefully “hijacks empirical

discourse”, appropriating its “grammar of assertion” for purely expressive purposes

(Anderson, 17). In other words, much populist speech poses as conveying information,

while in fact being indifferent to whether it is actually doing so or not.

Trump’s claim that Obama was born in Kenya is a prime example. This claim does

ostensibly have a literal meaning, but its practical implication is legalistic and complex,

and is (crucially) completely unsubstantiated. It seems clear that the main goal of such a

claim is to convey a far deeper symbolic message: “Obama is ‘the other’”.6 Another

example is Trump’s claim that “Obama founded ISIS”. When made, the outlandishness of

this statement elicited widespread confusion, yet Trump repeatedly refused to offer any

clarification or elaboration, choosing to simply repeat the original claim word-for-word.

Even when offered sympathetic interpretations of his statement as a metaphor, Trump

refused, insisting it was both literal and true: “No, I meant he’s the founder of ISIS. I do”

(Patterson 2016). This insistence that a confusing and unconvincing statement is literally

true, combined with an adamant refusal to persuade or even explain it, belies an intent to

6
Müller claims the “birther” issue renders “almost ridiculously obvious and literal” the

populist logic of perceiving a symbiosis between elites and external groups (Müller, 23).
deceive. It is, rather, pure symbolic bullshit: its function is symbolic (illustrating Obama’s

otherness) while it reflects a complete disinterest in relating to the truth.

To conclude, I believe this connection constitutes a significant link between populism

and bullshit. While it is true that all politics and ideologies depend to an extent on the

communication of implied messages and on highlighting some facts while obscuring

others, the literature cited demonstrates that for populism, this mode of communication is

fundamental. Importantly, this connection seems to have the potential to explain many

cases of populist bullshit, in which a “symbolic truth” overshadows a literal error. This

explanation implies that when a bullshitting populist’s supporters claim he “tells it like it

is”, what they may mean is that they agree with the symbolic or expressive content implied

by his speech, rather than believe its literal (false) content. This account aligns and gives

context to the oft-cited claim that Trump’s supporters take him “seriously, not literally”.

This explanation thus seems a plausible interpretation of the “telling it like it is” claim.

That said, I believe there is at least one more aspect to this story, which I will now

present.

Connection 4 – Bullshit as Sincerity

The final connection presented is in a sense the most fundamental, in that it constitutes

a claim regarding the populist conception of truth itself. Bernard Williams defines the

concept of “truthfulness” as being comprised of two separate values: accuracy, meaning

making a genuine effort to acquire true beliefs, and sincerity, which amounts to revealing

what it is you actually believe (Williams 2002, 11). I claim populism is strongly identified
with the latter over the former, and that this fact has far-reaching implications in its relation

to bullshit.

Williams claims accuracy, in its implied willingness to expend an “investigative

investment” to arrive at ever-closer approximations of the truth (Ibid. 87), is the founding

value of science and of intellectualism in general (Ibid. 150). If accuracy is an intellectual

value, what does this tell us of its relation to populism? It is no exaggeration to characterize

intellectualism as anathema to populism. Populism tends to be primitivistic, and

“primitivism must be in some measure anti-intellectual” (Macrae, 162). Populists distrust

intellectuals both because they are educated, and because they are usually affiliated with

academia or government, which populists perceive of as artificial bodies, disconnected

from “the people” and subverting their will [Shils, 1956: 99].

Thus, populist discourse identifies intellectualism as an elite value, and intellectuals

as a prime part of the elite “other” (Shogan 2007). Intellectualism was perceived of in the

mind of early American populists as an attribute of the hated English monarchy - an elite

if there ever was one (Kazin, 15). Articulateness itself is regarded by populists as being

“monopolized by the opposition" - an elite characteristic and thus undesirable (Minogue,

202). Accordingly, leaders appealing to the populist persuasion often attempt to hide any

hint of intellectualism: Reagan and Eisenhower concealed their respective appreciations

for academic papers and classical music (Shogan, 297), and Eisenhower (perhaps

compensating for his past as president of Columbia) quipped that an intellectual is “a man

who takes more words than necessary to tell more than he knows” (Hofstadter 1963, 10).

Populist’s distrust is not reserved for abstract intellectualism, but for science and

technology as well (Wiles, 170). A prime example is the infamous Scopes Monkey Trial,
in which prominent populist politician William Jennings Bryan argued against the “expert

consensus” of evolution and for the “popular conviction” that God-fearing folk could have

their children educated as they saw fit (Canovan, 237). More recently, a prominent Leave

campaigner dismissed warnings from economists and diplomats regarding the

consequences of Brexit by stating simply: “the British people have had enough of experts”

(Portes 2017).

Interestingly (and perhaps surprisingly), there have been intellectual populists,

most notably the Russian Narodniks of the 1860’s. Yet they should probably be seen as the

exception which proves the rule. These populist intellectuals were overcome by internal

doubts stemming from a perceived internal contradiction in their identity: while their

founding motivation was to use their intellect to lead a popular revolution, some began

seeing any attempt to impose ideas on the peasant class a sin of “intellectual pride”

(Canovan, 237). Wiles perhaps summed it up best, saying of populism: “Even its

intellectuals try to be anti-intellectual” (Wiles, 167).

Populists do not only find intellectuals objectionable, but refuse to concede they are

as smart as their designation suggests, “Intellectual” being a word early American populists

“usually encased in quotes" (Kazin, 65). As against this questionable concept, populism

puts forward a competing conception of “folk wisdom” (Canovan, 232), an ideal whose

roots Canovan traces to Rousseau.7 Hofstadter writes:

7
"…There are assuredly more mistaken notions in the academy of sciences than in a

whole tribe of American Indians" (Rousseau, 1762, Cited by Canovan 1981, 243).
 “As popular democracy [populism] gained strength and confidence, it

reinforced the widespread belief in the superiority of inborn, intuitive,

folkish wisdom over the cultivated, oversophisticated and self-interested

knowledge of the literati and the well-to-do” (Hofstadter, 154).8

At the source of the Narodniks’ distress was a deep tension between a natural

appreciation for their own expertise, and an idealistic belief in the “wisdom of people”

(Canovan, 246). These are different kinds of knowledge, and populists believe in the "the

superiority of practical, manly knowledge over the abstract, speculative variety" (Kazin,

65). This mindset propelled both Andrew Jackson and Davy Crockett to explain their

success as occurring because of, not despite, lack of education (Canovan, 233). At the root

of the populist conception is a belief that common knowledge is the basis of common sense,

and that this is far better than any “bookish knowledge” (Taggart, 95).

MacRae claims populism is, at root, an ideology based on a belief that modern

society “fragments the human character”, and thus seeks to put personality above politics

(Macrae, 160). Panizza claims that populism erodes the dividing line between personal and

political (Panizza, 25), whereas Pasquino makes the strong claim that the personalization

of politics is a pre-condition for populism’s emergence (Pasquino, 27). This emphasis on

8
Continuing:

“The popular parties themselves eventually became the vehicles of a kind of primitivism

and anti-intellectualist populism hostile to the specialist, the expert, the gentleman, and

the scholar… A current of anti-intellectualism can be found in some of the earliest

expressions of popular political thought” (151).

personality leads to the aforementioned centrality of the leader in populist movements -

and the most important trait of the leader’s personality is authenticity (Shogan).

The authenticity populists expect is expressed in their leaders’ choice of dress, food

and vernacular; all are supposed to reflect the values and traditions of the “common man”.

Yet the true manifestation of authenticity in the personal sphere is the ideal of sincerity:

the genuine representation of one’s inner beliefs and thoughts. It follows that for the

populist politician, it is imperative to be seen as sincere. Sincerity is a yardstick by which,

in the populist mind, people are measured, with “real” regular folk on end of the spectrum

and artificial, “fake” ones on the other. This feeds into hatred of intellectuals, who are

regarded by populists as prima facie insincere.9

That intellectuals are perceived thus, whilst simultaneously personifying the value

of accuracy, is crucial, as populists self-consciously model themselves as the antithesis of

the elite they oppose. All this suggests the following: Populist discourse wholeheartedly

embraces the “folk” value of sincerity, while significantly neglecting the intellectual value

of accuracy. When Canovan characterizes populism as emphasizing “not expertise, but

honesty” (Canovan, 212), we would do well to associate “expertise” with “accuracy” and

to understand “honesty” as referring to “sincerity”. Populism enthusiastically takes up one

facet of truthfulness at the expense of another.

9
"Populists… are all extremely suspicious and hostile towards the more sophisticated

person, who, they think, stands apart and does not share what is on his mind with the

likes of them” (Shils 1956, 100).

 Frankfurt describes a dynamic of retreat from “correctness” (a term identical for all

intents and purposes to Williams’ “accuracy”) towards “sincerity”, and claims this is a

widespread modern phenomenon, rooted in a deep-seated skepticism of objective inquiry:

“Rather than seeking primarily to arrive at accurate

representations of a common world, the individual turns toward

trying to provide honest representations of himself” (Frankfurt

1986, 16).

Yet Frankfurt claims that the appeal of this attitude is based on a flawed assumption,

by which knowledge of ourselves is attainable, while all other types of knowledge are not.

This is wrong on both counts, says Frankfurt: As “we exist only in response to other

things”, knowledge of self is meaningless without some knowledge of the world.

Furthermore, there is no truth to the notion that self-knowledge is easily within reach:

human nature is not determinate, but elusive and inconsistent. Frankfurt concludes both

this indictment of the adoption of sincerity sans accuracy and his entire paper with the

startling assertion: “And insofar as this is the case, sincerity itself is bullshit” (Ibid.).

To summarize, the connection posited is this: Populist discourse exemplifies an

ideal of sincerity without accuracy, and is thus highly susceptible to bullshit, in a way other

ideologies are not. This connection is relevant to many example of populist bullshit

previously outlined, and it especially illuminates the fact that Trump never seems even
slightly embarrassed by his bullshit, even when pointed out and corrected.10 If all that

counts is saying what one thinks, and the actual correspondence of the saying’s content to

reality is of little or no importance, what is there to be ashamed of?

More crucially, this explanation does the best job of any in suggesting an answer to

the original puzzle posed at this paper’s outset. Perhaps populist supporters’ conception of

“truth” is a specific one: one of sincerity without accuracy. Thus, when Trump supporters

declare “he tells it like it is”, what they may mean is some approximation of “he provides

a sincere version of his thoughts and feelings”, and emphatically not that “he provides an

accurate representation of the world”. The accuracy of his statements is simply not of

interest. While this explanation may sound extreme, it renders a great deal of populist

discourse on the topic of truth far more logically coherent than a strictly literal reading

would. Populists and their followers are not indifferent to truth, nor are they simply

misinformed or confused: their working conception of truth is simply a peculiar and

particular one, placing a far greater emphasis on one component of truthfulness over

another than the rest of us tend to do.

10
When corrected for misrepresenting the size of his electoral victory, Trump responded

unapologetically: ”Well I don’t know, I was given that information. Actually I’ve seen

that information around.” (Prignano 2017).

Conclusion – Who Cares if Populism is Bullshit?

This paper puts forth several possible theories regarding the relationship between populism

and bullshit. Firstly, populism is predicated on an antagonistic worldview, which makes its

supporters especially susceptible to epistemic bubbles, which enable and even incentivize

populist politicians to bullshit (Bullshit as Partisanship). Secondly, populists have a central

claim – the exclusivity of their claim to popular representation – which they regard as

infallible, leading them to bullshit whenever evidence casting this claim into question

arises, as it invariably does (Bullshit as Infallibility). Thirdly, populism’s success is

dependent on the communication of a worldview which is best conveyed in a symbolic,

unarticulated form – leading populists to bullshit through disregard for the literal meaning

of many of their statements (Bullshit as Symbolism). Finally, populists’ claim to

authentically represent “the people” and their “folk” values, combined with their wholesale

rejection of the intellectual class and theirs, leads to an embrace of sincerity over accuracy,

which is tantamount to bullshit (Bullshit as Sincerity).

All these connections describe real reasons that there should be a fundamental, non-

incidental connection between populism and the rhetoric of bullshit. These explanations

are not mutually exclusive, and none fully explains bullshit in populism on its own –

though, as demonstrated throughout, all have instances of bullshit which they are especially

useful at illuminating. The final two connections – “Bullshit as Symbolism” and “Bullshit

as Sincerity” - are especially fruitful in providing clues towards solving the puzzle posed

at the outset: Why are populists credited with being truthful by many, even when they are

clearly not? The answer, I suggest, lies in populist tendencies to assess the truthfulness of
claims on the basis not of literal meaning, but of both implied, symbolic content and of

perceived sincerity.

From these connections, several relevant avenues for future research present

themselves. One is geared towards establishing, through falsification efforts, the paper’s

basic assumption regarding a correlation between populism and bullshit. This could be

pursued through textual analysis of factual claims in populists’ speeches and texts, as

compared to non-populists’. A second direction of research is aimed at testing the specific

connections put forward. Through surveys or interviews, populist supporters’

considerations in weighing the truth-value of politically salient claims could be examined;

their attitudes towards the values of accuracy and sincerity, or the weight they assign to the

group identity of the speaker, could be investigated. Quantitative textual analysis could

attempt to measure populists’ use of symbols in making factual claims. Interpretive textual

analysis could be applied to specific instances of populist rhetoric, such as reactions

towards evidence of lack of popular support.

All this still leaves open the question of why any of this is interesting or important:

Why is it significant if populism is indeed fundamentally characterized by bullshit - and

not, say, lies? To answer, a return to Frankfurt is necessary. Bullshit, Frankfurt claims, “is

a greater enemy of the truth than lies are”. A lie, by definition a vehicle to conceal the truth,

implies both the truth’s importance and a belief in the possibility of attaining it. Bullshit

does exactly the opposite: it implies the truth to be of no importance at all, and actively

works to create a public atmosphere where the distinction between truth and lies ceases to

have meaning (Frankfurt 1986, 15). Such a climate is destructive to democracy itself, as it
precludes a shared understanding of the world upon which discussion and cooperation

between different groups can take place (Anderson, 2).

The distinction between bullshit and lies is also important from a practical perspective.

A lie depends on deception: If it is exposed, truth can be restored. Things are not so simple

when combating bullshit. Its imperviousness to truth leads to what has been termed “the

Bullshit Asymmetry Principle”: “the amount of energy needed to refute bullshit is an order

of magnitude bigger than to produce it” (Ordre Spontané 2014). Therefore, if populists are

indeed characterized by a tendency to bullshit, this implies that tools designed to counter

lies (such as fact-checking and the highlighting of inaccuracies) will be largely ineffective

in combating this type of dishonesty. This discouraging conclusion appears to be confirmed

by the startling collective failure of the media and other arbiters of truth to hold Trump in

any way accountable for his bullshit at any point from the start of his political career and

deep into his presidency. However, the realization that current tools and practices aren’t

affective is the first step towards developing ones that are. Perhaps instances of bullshit are

more effectively countered by arguing for the speaker’s insincerity, rather than the claim’s

inaccuracy? Perhaps the solution lies in defusing the preconditions for the formation of

populist epistemic bubbles, which Anderson suggests may be achieved by diverse methods

such as recruiting in-group speakers, emphasizing sameness over difference? (Anderson,

19). These suggestions are, presently, speculative; towards more substantiated answers, a

better understanding of bullshit in populist discourse must be achieved.

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