G.R. No.

92140 February 19, 1991

REYNALDO D. LOPEZ, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROMEO V. LUZ, JR., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana,
was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal,
Manila South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively.Pursuant to Executive Order
No. 125, the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
was reorganized. The reduction of the number of Assistant Harbor Masters (now
designated as Harbor Masters) in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) from three (3) to two
(2). A reevaluation of the qualifications of petitioner Lopez, Luz, and Abellana was
conducted by a placement committee of the PPA to determine who should assume the two
positions. The records show that respondent Luz rated third.

Luz protested Lopez's appointment after it was approved by the Assistant Director of the
Civil Service Field Office, Guillermo R. Silva. On February 15, 1989, the protest/appeal
was denied by the PPA General Manager who explained that Luz was not qualified for any
of the two slots according to the over-all standing of the contenders.

Luz then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC directed that
"comparative assessments" be made by an appropriate Placement Committee. These
assessments would then be the basis of the appointments.

On October 17, 1989, the CSC denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the PPA and
ordered the submission of the results of the re-assessment which the PPA complied.

Despite this compliance by the PPA, the Commission found that the re-assessment was
not in order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was in the best
position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-consultant who
was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed the
appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez appoinment and instead substituting its
decision for that of the PPA.

RULING:

The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting
the morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is not
disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment
delegated to the heads of departments or agencies of the government is not controverted
by the respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service
employees according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is
assisted by a screening committee composed of persons who are in the best position to
screen the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance
and capabilities of the future appointees.

The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess
the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. To go
beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing authority
and to give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not
confer. This does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or disapproving
becomes ministerial.

The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments
shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. In the case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the Commission is actually
authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate
eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved." We further
ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it
believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.

BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint
for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging
that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be
declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands,
which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay,
night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees
with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees
of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted
certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices .
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution
of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In the meantime, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. To
this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction.. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to
dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was also denied. petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before this Court. The Court, through the Third Division,
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision on the referred case. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision.
In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R.
No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the
Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration.. Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter

RULING:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. On the other hand, Sec.14 of E.O No. 180
provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted
by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees ...
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." In the absence of
any legislation allowing government employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters" and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the
civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being
the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Neither the DOLE or the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the
Publlic Sector Labor- Management council which is not granted by law authority to issue
writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the
general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.