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CAMPOREDONDO VS. NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner Baltazar Camporedondo was employed by the Philippine National Red Cross sine
1980 until his early retirement on 15 Dec 1995. On 21 Nov 1995, PNRC Secretary General
Celso Samson required petitioner to restitute the total sum of P135,927.78 representing cash
shortages, technical shortage and unremitted collection. On 28 May 1996, petitioner filed with
the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and underpayment of wages against the
PNRC and its key officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PNRC is a government-owned and controlled corporation.
RULING:
YES. The PNRC is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter
under R.A. No. 95, as amended. Those with special charters are government corporations
subject to its provisions and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. The
PNRC was not impliedly converted to a private sector corporation simply because its character
was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties,
taxes, fees, and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive
use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and fund
raising drives, among others.
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) V. NLRC (1988)
FACTS:
Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a
domestic corporation, which provided security guards as well as other similar manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank. During her employment, she was administratively
charged for non-compliance with entry procedures in the company billing statements. She
was placed on forced leave and eventually terminated. Credo then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of NASECO, but the NLRC reversed the decision
and ordered the reinstatement of Credo. NASECO argued that NLRC had no jurisdiction to
issue said order because NASECO is a government corporation by virtue of its being a
subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary
wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned
corporation. Hence, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed
by the Civil Service Law, as stated in the case of National Housing Corporation vs. Juco.
HELD:
NLRC Jurisdiction
1. The NLRC has jurisdiction. In the interest of justice, the holding in the Juco case should not
be given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January
1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated,
because under the 1973 Constitution, but prior to the Juco ruling (1985), the applicability of
the Labor Code, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over disputes involving
terms and conditions of employment in government owned or controlled corporations had
been recognized.
1973 Constitution vs. 1987 Constitution Civil Service coverage
2. The 1973 Constitution, in which the Juco case is based, and 1987 Constitution starkly
varies as regards the coverage of the civil service of government-owned or controlled
corporations.
The 1973 Constitution provides that “ [t]he civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or
controlled corporation …”
The 1987 Constitution provides that “ [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter.”
3. Under the 1987 Constitutional provision which embraces GOCCs with original charter,
the Civil Service doesnot include government-owned or controlled corporations which are
organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the
general corporation law. (i.e., GOCCs incorporated under the Corporation Code)
4. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission also shed light on the
Constitutional intent and meaning in the use of the phrase "with original charter." It defined
corporations with ‘original charters’ as those corporations created by law, by an act of
Congress, or by special law, and not under the general corporation law.
NASECO is a GOCC without original charter
5. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is
the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord
relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB,
the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.
REYNALDO D. LOPEZ, VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROMEO V. LUZ, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was
appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal, Manila South
Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the DOTC was
reorganized, and the number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
was reduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a careful evaluation of a placement committee of
the PPA, Luz was rated third. Luz protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA
General Manager said Luz was not qualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC.
The CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA complied. Still, the CSC found that the
re-assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was
in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-
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consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed the
appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez’ appointment and instead substituting
its decision for that of the PPA.
RULING:
The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting the
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is not disputed
by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to
the heads of departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by the
respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service employees
according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a
screening committee composed of persons who are in the best position to screen the
qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and capabilities
of the future appointees. The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the
appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing
else. To go beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing
authority and to give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does
not confer. This does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or disapproving
becomes ministerial. The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval
of appointments shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. In the case of Luego v.
Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the Commission is
actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and
appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved." We
further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it
believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The Commission
cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority. Petition is
GRANTED.
RODELA D. TORREGOZA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT
FACTS:
The petitioner has been working as Staff Aide position in the Legal Office, Office of the
President, Malacanang, Manila, since January 18, 1978, to the present. His original
appointment was for only six months. On June 5, 1978, less than five months after the first
appointment, petitioner was given another appointment to the same position effective "as of
June 18, 1978" and with a notation that "This appointment is declared confidential." Then on
March 5, 1990, respondent Commission issued the "Rules Implementing Republic Act No.
6850, enabling the petitioner to file her application for the appropriate eligibility to the position
she has been occupying for the last thirteen (13) years and having accordingly rendered
efficient service. The petitioner’s request returned unacted for the reason that the position held
was declared confidential. After the Salary Standardization Law (Republic Act No. 6758) was
passed, the same position was reclassified as Clerk II in July 1989.
Subsequently, Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento sent a letter to the respondent
dated November 7, 1990, requesting that based on the present certified function and actual
duties of the petitioner, the position be restored to the career service and that said petitioner
be granted the civil service eligibility under R.A. No. 6850. Respondent commission denied the
request stating the position was declared “confidential in nature” by the Office of the President.
The respondent however restored the position of Clerk II to career service but still denied the
petition for reconsideration of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of mandamus may be issued by the Court to compel the
respondent Commission to grant the petitioner the privilege of securing an appropriate civil
service eligibility under Republic Act No. 6850.
RULING:
The court cannot compel the commission to grant the privilege of civil service eligibility under
RA 6850. The simple reason being that under the law granting the privilege to government
employees, there is a wide latitude of discretion given to the Commission which determines in
Section 1 thereof, "who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege granted under this
Act." With such discretion, Section 2 of the same law requires the Civil Service Commission to
promulgate the rules and regulations to implement this Act using certain standards. Besides
what the law granted is a privilege and not a right, therefore the discretion lies with the
commission itself. As provided by Sec 1 of RA 6850
; "The Civil Service Commission shall formulate performance evaluation standards in order to
determine those temporary employees who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege g
ranted under this Act.
"The civil service eligibility herein granted may apply to such other positions as the Civil Servi
ce Commission maydeem appropriate.
Petition was hereby dismissed due to lack of merit.
MANUEL LEYSON VS. OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
The Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies failed to comply with its contract
agreement with the International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC) for the transport
of coconut oil in bulk. ITTC Executive Vice President Manuel Leyson, Jr. filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman for breach of contract, among others. The complaint was
dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to further act on the
complaint.
RULING:
NO. All three corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock
corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of Legaspi Oil, 91.24% of the
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shares of GranExport, and 92.85% of the shares of United Coconut. Obviously, the below
51% shares of stock in Legaspi Oil removes it from the definition of a government-owned or
controlled corporation. There is no showing that GranExport and United Coconut was vested
with functions relating to publi cneeds whether governmental or proprietary in nature. Thus,
the CIIF companies are private corporations not within the scope of the Ombudsman’s
jurisdiction.
GILDA CRUZ VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS:
CSC received a letter from Carmelita B. Esteban, claiming that, during the examinations for
non-professional in the career civil service, Zenaida C. Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, falsely pretending to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee in the
said office, took the examinations for the latter. Carmelita Esteban requested the CSC to
investigate the matter.
The CSC issued Resolution No. 981695 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges and
ordered their dismissal from the government service. Petitioners then went up to the Court of
Appeals assailing the resolution of the CSC. The CA dismissed the petition before it. The
motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1,
Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all
administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and
where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case.
RULING:
Petitioners' invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is applicable to instances where
administrative cases are filed against erring employees in connection with their duties and
functions of the office. This is, however, not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It
must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in
the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination. The examinations were under the direct
control and supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government
employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after
the petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether they were indeed guilty of
dishonesty , the penalty meted was dismissal from the office.
Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provides
that the CSC can rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected to
the examinations, as it reads:
Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and
employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities."
Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted
as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners
is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide
administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions
of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3,
Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
MANUEL L. ONTIVEROS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and
the DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
FACTS:
Petitioner was Security Officer I in the Investigation and Security Division of the Ministry of
tourism, he was dismissed from the service for inefficiency, incompetence, and unauthorized
absences. Petitioner appealed to the CSC, invoking his status as a civil service eligible and a
permanent employee. CSC Director IV Angelito G. Grande informed petitioner that jurisdiction
over his appeal was vested in the Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17 of
then President Corazon C. Aquino and for that reason his (petitioner's) appeal could not be
given due course by the CSC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CSC. Petitioner
filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals. But his petition, as well as his motion for
reconsideration, was denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC had no jurisdiction over
petitioner's appeal, the proper appellate body being the Review Committee established under
E.O. No.17. In addition, the appeals court held that review of petitioner's dismissal was barred
by laches. Hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that his case does not fall under the Review Committee's jurisdiction because
his separation from the service was not in consequence of the reorganization of the
government, as provided in the Provisional Constitution (also known as the Freedom
Constitution), but was for cause; hence, appeal lies with the CSC.
ISSUE: Whether the case fall under the Review Committee's jurisdiction or with the CSC.
RULING:
Art. III, §2 of the Provisional Constitution provided that "All elective and appointive officials
and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986" (emphasis
added). To be sure, petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of a proclamation or executive order
of the President of the Philippines nor by reason of the designation or appointment and
qualification of his successor. It must also be noted that E.O. No.120, which reorganized the
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then Ministry of Tourism, was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino only on January 20,
1987, whereas petitioner was dismissed on May 26, 1986.
However, the memorandum of then Tourism Minister Jose Antonio U. Gonzales, dismissing
petitioner from the service, clearly stated that it was being issued pursuant to Art. III, §2 of
the Provisional Constitution. And indeed, just two days after petitioner had been dismissed,
E.O. No.17 was issued on May 28, 1986.
In Radia v. Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17,[9] the retroactive application of
E.O. No.17 to past dismissals was affirmed.
In this case, it is clear that petitioner's dismissal came within the coverage of E.O. No.17,
§3(3) and (5). Pursuant to §2 of the order, the memorandum of dismissal of Minister
Gonzales is considered the act of the then President.
Nor can it be argued that this case is not covered by Art. III, §2 of the Provisional Constitution
since the grounds for petitioner's dismissal are grounds under civil service laws and regulations.
E.O. No.17 provided the grounds for the separation of employees from the service not to bring
their cases under ordinary civil service laws and regulations but to provide limits on what
otherwise would be absolute discretion and thus prevent an abuse of power. But certainly, it
was not the intention to make such cases subject to processing by regular procedures that
could defeat the summary nature required by government reorganization following the
establishment of a revolutionary government.
HON. ALMA DE LEON v. CA
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jacob Montesa was appointed as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV in
the Ministry of Local Government, now (DILG) by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Inspite of
not being a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive
Service (CES), private respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission.
Subsequently, then President Corazon Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 262,
reorganizing the DILG. Then Secretary Luis Santos designated Nicanor Patricio as Chief of
Legal Service in place of private respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of
the Secretary to perform special assignments. This prompted private respondent to file before
the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against Secretary Luis Santos and Nicanor
Patricio. On September 26, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of private respondent and
ordered his reinstatement to his former position.
Meanwhile,the Salary Standardization Law took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the
position of Department Service Chiefs, which include the Department Legal Counsel, was
reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the generic position title of
Director III. Hence, in the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court, respondent was
reinstated to the position: Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III.
Then Secretary Rafael Alunan III, issued Department Order No. 94-370 on July 26, 1994. This
order relieved private respondent of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigned him
as Director III or Assistant Regional Director of Region XI.
Private respondent, however, did not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a
90-day sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum for then acting
Secretary Alexander Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department
Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services.
Accordingly, private respondent was advised to report to Region XI immediately. Private
respondent wrote a memorandum requesting for reconsideration of the department order, but
to no avail.
On appeal to the CSC by private respondent, the former issued a resolution which sustained
the latter’s reassignment. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
by the CSC.
The DILG directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post in Region XI, stressing
that his continued non-compliance with the department order is prejudicial to the interest of
public service. Private respondent was also warned that upon his failure to comply, the DILG
shall be constrained to consider him on absence without leave and as a consequence, drop
him from the rolls of public service. Instead of complying therewith, private respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction but the issuance of the same was denied by the
court.
Upon the recommendation of the DILG, President Fidel Ramos, issued Administrative Order
No. 235, dropping private respondent from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of
duty and absences without leave.
Later, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the petition in favor of private respondent
and rendered as null and void Department Order No. 94370. The Court of Appeals ordered that
private respondent be retained in his position as Chief, Legal Service or Department Legal
Counsel in the DILG, without loss of seniority, rank, emolument and privileges.
The DILG Secretary was ordered to release to petitioner his withheld salaries and his back
salaries, if also withheld.
Both petitioners and private respondent moved for reconsideration. In his Motion for
Clarification and/or Partial Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent prayed for
backwages and his salary that was illegally withheld from the time the resolution of the CSC
was issued up to his actual reinstatement to office.
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Petitioners, on the other hand, posited that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not confluent
with Administrative Order No. 235 issued by President Ramos which dropped petitioner from
the roster of public servants. They further argued that until and unless the said order is declared
invalid, the presumption is in favor of its validity and it is incumbent upon private respondent to
comply therewith so as not to prejudice the public service.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents for lack
of merit and granted petitioner's Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Motion for
Reconsideration. It modified its earlier decision by ordering the DILG Secretary to release to
petitioner his withheld salaries and backwages, including allowances or RATA and other
benefits, to which petitioner would have been entitled had he not been illegally removed.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not an individual who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position
can be appointed to it in a permanent capacity.
RULING: No. The position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career
Executive Service.
Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made by the President
from a list of career executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be
made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the
incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent
positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a CES
eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required CES examination
and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in such examination.
Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and
the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by
the Board through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's performance
in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.
In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al., the Court held that: a permanent appointment can
be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. If not, the appointment could be
regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing
authority and at a moment's notice.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security or tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it.
A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
In the present case, private respondent does not have the required Career Executive Service
eligibility as evidenced by his admission in his Comment that he is not a Career Executive
Service Officer or a member of the Career Executive Service. Hence, private respondent's
appointment did not attain permanency.
Not having taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite
eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed
eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely
temporary.
The cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no application in the
present case. As his appointment was merely temporary, he could be transferred or reassigned
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
Private respondent’s contention, that the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of
personnel under the Career Executive Service do not apply to him because he is not a Career
Executive Service Officer, is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
non-eligible holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain
immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium vesting them
with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy.
Hence, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set
aside and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were reinstated.
PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA
FACTS:
Administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and loss of confidence were brought against Carlos Rilloraza, a casino
operations manager of petitioner PAGCOR. On 02 Dec 1997, the PAGCOR Board issued a
resolution dismissing respondent.
Petitioner submits that since respondents are confidential employees, pursuant to Section 16
of Presidential Decree No. 1869 (the PAGCOR Charter), they did not have fixed term of office;
their tenure of employment was dependent on the continued confidence of their superiors; such
confidence was lost because it was proven that they committed dishonest acts in the
performance of their duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not all PAGCOR employees are confidential employees.
RULING:
NO. The classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-determining or
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highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not
conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. The exemption
provided in the charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to
determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the
mantle of security of tenure.
It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive
examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that
these positions are covered by security of tenure, although they are considered non-
competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo
competitive examinations for purposes of determining merit and fitness.
In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its questioned resolution
wherein it stated that "the declaration of a position as primarily confidential if at all, merely
exempts the position from the civil service eligibility requirement." Accordingly, the Piñero
doctrine continues to be applicable up to the present and is hereby maintained. Such being the
case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential
appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91-830
must be rejected.
Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify respondents' dismissal on loss of trust and confidence since
the latter are not confidential employees. Being regular employees that enjoy security of tenure,
respondents can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, notice and hearing.
Petitioner cannot, in the alternative, allege that respondents are being dismissed for dishonesty
since petitioner's thesis, in its motion for reconsideration in the CSC and petition before the CA,
has always been that respondents, as confidential employees, can be dismissed for loss of
trust and confidence. Besides, dishonesty is not the reason for which they were dismissed per
the letter of dismissal of July 23, 1997, but for loss of trust and confidence.
ABELLA JR VS CSC
FACTS:
Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), as Department
Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of
Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and
Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850,
which was then the required eligibility for said position.
The CSC issued issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 (Pertinent provision:
Positions covered by the CES: (a) the position is a career position, (b) above division chief level
(c) duties and responsibilities require performance of executive or managerial functions. Upon
promotion or transfer to other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents
shall be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.’)
“Two years after retirement, petitioner was hired by the SBMA on a contractual basis. He was
issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment
Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to CSC Regional Office No. III, it was
disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was
advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued
a temporary appointment.
The CSC affirmed the disapproval of his permanent appointment. The CA shunned the issue
of constitutionality of the Memo Circular. It ruled that petitioner has no standing as only the
appointing officer may request reconsideration of the action taken by the CSC. Also, petitioner
was not the real party in interest as his appointment was dependent on the CSC’s approval.
1st ISSUE: Who may file reconsideration or appeal
RULING:
A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the
requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the
provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated pursuant thereto. It implies the civil
service eligibility of the appointee. The law requires the appointment to be submitted to the
CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the
position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed.
The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively,
make an appointment complete. In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether
the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If
the appointee does, the appointment must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved.
According to the CA, only the appointing authority had the right to challenge the CSC’s
disapproval. It relied on Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998, which
provides: “Section 2. Request for Reconsideration of, or appeal from, the disapproval of an
appointment may be made by the appointing authority and submitted to the Commission within
fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the disapproved appointment.”
Appointing Authority’s Right to Challenge CSC Disapproval
The power of appointment necessarily entails the exercise of judgment and discretion.
Significantly, “the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his
qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the prerogative
of the appointing authority.” No tribunal, not even this Court, may compel the exercise of an
appointment for a favored person.
The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing
authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the
disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified
insofar as it allows the appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.
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Appointee’s Legal Standing to Challenge the CSC Disapproval
While there is justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval,
there is none to preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved
parties, including the CSC, should be given the right to file MRs or to appeal.
Although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
“legal standing” and “real party in interest” are different concepts. “The question in standing is
whether such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. On the other hand,
the question as to ‘real party-in-interest’ is whether he is ‘the party who would be [benefited] or
injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’”
If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part, then more so should petitioner
be allowed to contest the CSC Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly, he was prejudiced
by the disapproval, since he could not continue his office. Although petitioner had no vested
right to the position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he
should be granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the
outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his permanent
appointment.
The Appointee a Real Party in Interest
The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere
expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The appointee
is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is
prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily
benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him
all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.
Appointee Allowed Procedural Relief
The view that only the appointing authority may request reconsideration or appeal is too
narrow. The appointee should have the same right. , CSC Resolution 99-1936 recognizes the
right of the adversely affected party to appeal to the CSC Regional Offices prior to elevating a
matter to the CSC Central Office. The adversely affected party necessarily includes the
appointee. This judicial pronouncement does not override Mathay v. CSC, which the CA relied
on. The Court merely noted in passing -- by way of obiter -- that based on a similar provision,
only the appointing officer could request reconsideration of actions taken by the CSC on
appointments.
In that case, QC Mayor Mathay Jr. sought the nullification of CSC Resolutions that recalled his
appointment. He filed a Petition assailing the CA Decision, which had previously denied his
Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and for being filed out of time. The CSC
Resolutions then were already final and could no longer be elevated to the CA. Mathay’s
Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA was improper, because there was an available remedy
of appeal. And the CSC could not have acted without jurisdiction, considering that it was
empowered to recall an appointment initially approved.
The right of the appointee to seek MR or appeal was not the issue in Mathay. At any rate, the
present case is being decided en banc, and the ruling may reverse previous doctrines laid down
by this Court.
2nd ISSUE: WON Section 4 of the CSC Memo Circular is unconstitutional
RULING:
In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify
positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines
to meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
Career Service Classified by Levels
Positions in the career service, for which appointments require examinations, are grouped into
three major levels:
“(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which
involve non-professional or sub[-]professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory
capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
“(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring
at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
“(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.”
Entrance to the different levels requires the corresponding civil service eligibility. Those in the
third level (CES positions) require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement
for permanent appointment.
The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES
position; however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the
requirements of the position, which in petitioner’s case was a CSEE.
Rights Protected
The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in the
positions to which they were previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their positions in
a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the
rule of prospectivity of regulations; hence, there is no basis to argue that it is an ex post facto
law or a bill of attainder. These terms, which have settled meanings in criminal jurisprudence,
are clearly inapplicable here.
The government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain
in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment
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years later as department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply
with the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.
Security of Tenure Not Impaired
First, security of tenure in the Career Executive Service -- except in the case of first and second
level employees in the civil service -- pertains only to rank, not to the position to which the
employee may be appointed Second, petitioner had neither rank nor position prior to his
reemployment. One cannot claim security of tenure if one held no tenure prior to appointment.
Due Process Not Violated
The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial,
issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing are necessary.
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons
before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and
the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are
essential for the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due
process requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements
include prior notice and hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the
government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process,
are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of
departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued
as an incident of the administrative body’s power to issue guidelines for government officials to
follow in performing their duties.
Disapproval of Appointment
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent
appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the
action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in
approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment
with the law and the appointee’s possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the
disqualification.
U.P. VS. REGINO
FACTS:
Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School of
Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination questions in Economics 106 under
Prof. Solita Monsod. He sought relief from Merit Systems Board after his appeal was denied
by UP Board of Regents. MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement with back
wages. CSC sustained MSB’s decision. Pamplina’s motion for execution was granted by QC
RTC. When it remained unheeded, writ of mandamus was issued in favor of Pamplina. UP then
filed a petition for certiorari to seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court and the
orders of the Commission directing the reinstatement of Pamplina. Under its charter, to wit, Act
1870, it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy.
Section 6(e) grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of
the president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of
the university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation
and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.
ISSUE: Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the university which was vested under its
charter, Act No. 1870, with academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
RULING:
YES. Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations,
regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. As a mere
government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under
the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and
has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD
607 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
SAMSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Feliciano Talens was Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan. The newly-elected mayor,
Marcial Samson, released an Administrative Order qualifying the services of Talens as non-
competitive and terminating his employment on the ground of “lack and loss of confidence”.
He appointed Liwas as replacement. Petitioner justifies that as Assistant Secretary, like the
Secretary, renders non-competitive service which is primarily confidential and highly technical
in nature where termination may be made due to lack and loss of confidence. However,
respondent contends that he is competitive employee and thus, can only be removed for cause
and after due process has been observed. Thus, he filed with the Court of First Instance of
Caloocan to annul the disputed administrative order. The CFI, as well as the CA, ruled in favor
of Talens.
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Petitioner contends that the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor should be considered
as in the non-competitive service and that the tenure of assistant secretary lasts only as long
as the Mayor’s confidence in him remains. Petitioners’ submission is that the assistant
secretary is no less a secretary to the mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Secretary to the mayor is a non-competitive
service.
RULING:
No. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The position of Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor is deemed to belong to the competitive service. Only secretaries to governors and
mayors are expressly enumerated as non-competitive. The position of Secretary to the Mayor
and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and distinct positions.
CSC VS. DELA CRUZ
FACTS:
Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air TransportationOffice, he was a Check Pilot
II. He was promoted to the position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation
Safety Division. His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not meet the 4 yr
managerial & supervisory qualification for the position. CSC-NCR upheld the protest and
recalled the approval of the appointment of Dela Cruz. Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo,
CSC reversed itself and approved the appointment. (Decision of the CSC kept changing)CA
approved the appointment. He has the required qualifications “planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the
activities of flying schools.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has sufficiently complied with the required experience
standards.
RULING:
As noted by the CSC-NCR, the contested position required four years of work experience in
managerial position(s) per the Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s.
1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and
supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing,
rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools
per the above-stated ATO-DOTC Qualification Standards.
Petitioner's insistence that respondent failed to meet the four-year managerial and supervisory
experience requirement is misplaced. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the
use of the term "and/or" means that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used
interchangeably. The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence
of one thing from another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term "or" in this controversy connotes
that either the standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in
determining whether a prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify.
Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the
contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly
followed. At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation
Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from
his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993.
However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment
was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the
activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13
years prior to his appointment.
Before respondent was appointed to the contested position, he had held several other
positions in the ATO, namely:
March 6, 1981 to July 15, 1981
July 16, 1981 to February 5, 1983
Supply Checker
Junior Aeronautical Engineer
February 6, 1983 to February 29, 1984
Air Carrier Safety Inspector
March 1, 1984 to February 28, 1987
March 1, 1987 to November 27, 1994
November 28, 1994 to date
Check Pilot I
Check Pilot II
Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer
These positions, spanning more than 13 years, in four of the five sections of the Aviation
Safety Division of the ATO definitely met the minimum supervisory experience required of
respondent for the position.
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