G.R. No.
L-63915 April 24, 1985 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on
matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws
to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following
presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22,
37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303,
312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358,
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415,
427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573,
574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836,
923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166,
1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300,
1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817,
1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39,
49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141,
The respondents, through the Solicitor
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205,
209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-
261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283,
285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-
303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343,
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370,
382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-
440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594,
599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612,
615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713,
726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882,
939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58,
59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144,
1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-
1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-
1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-
1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858,
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-
2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413,
414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-
492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-
528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544,
549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568,
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-
707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7,
8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59,
76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347,
348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
436-439.
subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced
by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—
When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use a rd enjoyment
of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that
since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to
be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression.
As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that
he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the
relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call
a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice
Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that
the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this
character when a public right is
sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we
think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that
it is always dangerous to apply a
general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason
for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason
for the rule does not exist, the rule
itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar
for applying the general rule insisted
upon by counsel for the respondent.
The circumstances which surround
this case are different from those in
the United States, inasmuch as if the
relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the
duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent
the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing
a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed
to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.
Respondents further contend that publication in
the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to
take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in
accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court
has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides
for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically
correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity
of laws with the fact of publication. Considered
in the light of other statutes applicable to the
issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published
in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and
 resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the
Philippines shall determine from time
to time to have general applicability
and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision Other presidential issuances which apply only
is to give the general public adequate notice of to particular persons or class of persons such
the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis have been circularized to all concerned. 6
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of
the Philippine Republic has the publication of
laws taken so vital significance that at this time
when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by
the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and
for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much
less a definite way of informing themselves of
the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales issuances of general application, which have
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of
Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people
to be informed on matters of public concern is
to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of
a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category.
as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they
It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees,
orders and letters of instructions
which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process
and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to
obtain their official and specific
contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential
not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question
as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on
the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that
it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S.
559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed
to have become vested, of status, of
prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand
examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is
manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court
in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said
right had accrued in his favor before said law
was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of DECISION
presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absoluteRule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The
appellate court reversed the Decision2 dated
From the report submitted to the Court by the
19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in
Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85
published in the Official Gazette, only
dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
for failure to comply with Section 3 of Chapter
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of
have not been so published. 10 Neither the
1987,3 which requires the publication and filing
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
in the Office of the National Administration
be ascertained since no copies thereof are
Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances.
available. But whatever their subject matter
Thus, surcharges provided under the
may be, it is undisputed that none of these
aforementioned circular cannot be imposed
unpublished PDs has ever been implemented
upon respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Corporation.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] Respondent is a corporation duly organized
regulations and make the said penalties existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is
binding on the persons affected thereby. " The engaged in the business of refining oil,
cogency of this holding is apparently marketing petroleum, and other related
recognized by respondent officials considering activities.4
the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the The Department of Energy (DOE) is a
same shall have been published in the Official government agency under the direct control
and supervision of the Office of the President.
Gazette or in some other publication, even
The Department is mandated by Republic Act
though some criminal laws provide that they
No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate,
shall take effect immediately.
supervise and control all plans, programs,
projects and activities of the Government
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders relative to energy exploration, development,
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette utilization, distribution and conservation.
all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential
effect.
Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing
frequent price changes brought about by
SO ORDERED. exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in
world market prices of crude oil and imported
petroleum products.5
G.R. No. 173918 April 8, 2008
Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the
represented by the DEPARTMENT OF OPSF to reimburse oil companies the
ENERGY (DOE), petitioner, additional costs of importation of crude oil and
vs. petroleum products due to fluctuation in foreign
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM exchange rates to assure adequate and
CORPORATION, respondent. continuous supply of petroleum products at
reasonable prices.6
Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20
November 1984, mandated the Board of
Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory Board) to
review and reset prices of domestic oil
products every two months to reflect the
prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum.
The prices were regulated by adjusting the
OPSF impost, increasing or decreasing this
price component as necessary to maintain the
balance between revenues and claims on the
OPSF.7
On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137
was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It
expanded the sources and utilization of the
OPSF in order to maintain stability in the
domestic prices of oil products at reasonable
levels.8
On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy
Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the
respondent that respondent’s contributions to
the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for
the period December 1989 to March 1991 were
insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE
underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by
respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the surcharges due. Otherwise, the DOE
the underpayment, a surcharge
of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon
respondent. The said surcharge was imposed
pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended by Department of Finance (DOF)
Circular No. 2-94,9 which provides that:
2. Remittance of payment to the
OPSF as provided for under Section March 1996 and 11 July 1996. While it
5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be
made not later than 20th of the month Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its
following the month of remittance of publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted
the foreign exchange payment for
the import or the month of payment
to the domestic producers in the
case of locally produced crude.
Payment after the specified date
shall be subject to a surcharge of
fifteen percent (15%) of the amount,
if paid within thirty (30) days from the
due date plus two percent (2%) per
month if paid after thirty
10
days. (Emphasis supplied.)
On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another
letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its
additional underpayment to the OPSF of the
foreign exchange risk fee in the amount
of P10,139,526.56 for the period April 1991 to
October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the
amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed
thereon.
In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to
the OEA, respondent justified that its
calculations for the transactions in question
were based on a valid interpretation of MOF
Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and MOE
Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.12
On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA
in full the principal amount of its underpayment, Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85
totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the
surcharges.13
In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of
the respondent that the latter is required to pay the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No.
the OPSF a total amount of P18,535,531.40 for 96-H-6574 and ruled that MOF Circular 1-85,
surcharges on the late payment of foreign
exchange risk charges for the period
December 1989 to October 1991.
reiterated its demand for respondent to settle
warned that it would proceed against the
respondent’s Irrevocable Standby Letter of
Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.
On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal before the Office of the President. The dispositive of the appellate court’s Decision:21
Office of the President affirmed the conclusion
of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15
admitted that the implementation of MOF
that respondent failed to adduce evidence of
lack of compliance with such requirements.
The aforementioned Decision reads:16
Given the foregoing, the DOE’s
implementation of MOF Circular 1-85
by imposing surcharges on Pilipinas
Shell is only proper. Like this Office, On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the
the DOE is bound to presume the
validity of that administrative
regulation.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision of the
Department of Energy, contained in
its letters dated 15 March 1996 and
11 July 1996, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the
Office of the President, which was denied on
28 November 2003.17
Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals wherein it presented Certifications
dated 9 February 200418and 11 February
200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF
respectively, have not been filed before said
office.
as amended, was ineffective for failure to
comply with the requirement to file with ONAR.
It decreed that even if the said circular was
issued by then Acting Minister of Finance
Alfredo de Roda, Jr. long before the
Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of
Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules
already in force on the date of the effectivity of
the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed
within three months from the date of effectivity
of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons.20According to the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated August 19, 2003 and the
Resolution dated November 28,
2003 of the Office of the President,
are hereby REVERSED.
ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of
surcharges upon petitioner is hereby
declared without legal basis.
present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
wherein the following issues were raised:22
I Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert
THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY
MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF)
CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN
AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987
HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book
FROM A LEGISLATIVE VII thereof specifically providing that:
ENACTMENT, MOF CIRCULAR NO.
1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED
Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file
INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT
with the University of the Philippines
ENACTMENT OF A LAW
Law Center three (3) certified copies
REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF
of every rule adopted by it. Rules in
THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE
force on the date of effectivity of
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL
this Code which are not filed
REGISTER
within three (3) months from the
date shall not thereafter be the
II basis of any sanction against any
party or persons.
ASSUMING THAT THE
REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 (2) The records officer of the agency,
IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT or his equivalent functionary, shall
WAIVED ITS OBJECTION ON THE carry out the requirements of this
BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION section under pain of disciplinary
WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT action.
REQUIRED BY PETITIONER.
(3) A permanent register of all rules
This petition is without merit. shall be kept by the issuing agency
and shall be open to public
inspection. (Emphasis provided.)
As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v.
Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes, Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the
including administrative rules that are intended MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of
to enforce or implement existing laws, attain those issuances which should be published
binding force and effect, to wit: before it becomes effective since it is intended
to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The
said circular should also comply with the
We hold therefore that all statutes,
requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter
including those of local application
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
and private laws, shall be published
– filing with the ONAR in the University of the
as a condition for their effectivity,
Philippines Law Center – for rules that are
which shall begin fifteen days after
already in force at the time the Administrative
publication unless a different
Code of 1987 became effective. These
effectivity date is fixed by the
requirements of publication and filing were put
legislature.
in place as safeguards against abuses on the
part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the
Covered by this rule are presidential constitutional right to due process and to
decrees and executive orders information on matters of public concern and,
promulgated by the President in the therefore, require strict compliance.
exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly
In the present case, the Certifications dated 11
delegated by the legislature or, at
February 200425 and 9 February 200426 issued
present, directly conferred by the
by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85
Constitution. Administrative rules
and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-
and regulations must also be
94, have not been filed before said office.
published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law
respondent’s allegation that neither of the
pursuant also to a valid
aforementioned circulars were published in the
delegation. (Emphasis provided.)
Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the
requirements of publication and filing of
administrative issuances renders MOF Circular
No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.
In National Association of Electricity
Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory
Board,27 this Court emphasized that both the
requirements of publication and filing of
administrative issuances intended to enforce
existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity
of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it
specified several instances wherein this Court
declared administrative issuances, which failed
to observe the proper requirements, to have no
force and effect:
Nowhere from the above narration
does it show that the GRAM
Implementing Rules was published in
the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Significantly, the effectivity clauses of
both the GRAM and ICERA
Implementing Rules uniformly
provide that they "shall take effect
immediately." These clauses made
no mention of their publication in
either the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Moreover, per the Certification dated
January 11, 2006 of the Office of the
National Administrative Register
(ONAR), the said implementing rules
and regulations were not likewise
filed with the said office in
contravention of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Applying the doctrine enunciated
in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has
previously declared as having no
force and effect the following
administrative issuances: (1) Rules
and Regulations issued by the Joint
Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor
and Employment Accreditation
Committee regarding the
accreditation of hospitals, medical
clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of
Instruction No. 1416 ordering the
suspension of payments due and
payable by distressed copper mining
companies to the national
government; (3) Memorandum
Circulars issued by the Philippine
Overseas Employment
Administration regulating the
recruitment of domestic helpers to
Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the
Philippine International Trading
Corporation regulating applications
for importation from the People’s
Republic of China; (5) Corporation
Compensation Circular No. 10
issued by the Department of Budget
and Management discontinuing the
payment of other allowances and
fringe benefits to government
officials and employees; and (6)
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2
Series of 1983 which provided for the
schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private
employment agencies or authority
holders.
In all these cited cases, the
administrative issuances questioned
therein were uniformly struck down
as they were not published or filed
with the National Administrative
Register. On the other hand,
in Republic v. Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc, the
Court declared that the 1993
Revised Rules of the National
Telecommunications Commission
had not become effective despite the
fact that it was filed with the National
Administrative Register because the
same had not been published at the
time. The Court emphasized therein
that "publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua
non before statutes, rules or
regulations can take effect."
Petitioner’s argument that respondent waived
the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-
85, as amended, when it paid in full the
principal amount of underpayment
totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious. MOF
Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes
surcharges, while respondents’ underpayment
is based on MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12
April 1985.
Petitioner also insists that the registration of and regulations to implement the executive
MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the
ONAR is no longer necessary since the
respondent knew of its existence, despite its
non-registration. This argument is seriously
flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict
compliance with the requirements of
publication cannot be annulled by a mere
allegation that parties were notified of the
existence of the implementing rules concerned.
Hence, also in National Association of
Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy
Regulatory Board, this Court pronounced:
In this case, the GRAM
Implementing Rules must be
declared ineffective as the same was
never published or filed with the
National Administrative Register. To
show that there was compliance with
the publication requirement,
respondents MERALCO and the
ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that
parties, particularly the distribution
utilities and consumer groups, were
duly notified of the public
consultation on the ERC’s proposed
implementing rules. These parties
participated in the said public
consultation and even submitted
their comments thereon.
However, the fact that the parties
participated in the public
consultation and submitted their
respective comments is not
compliance with the fundamental
rule that the GRAM Implementing
Rules, or any administrative rules
whose purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law, must be
published in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general
circulation. The requirement of
publication of implementing rules of
statutes is mandatory and may not
be dispensed with altogether even if,
as in this case, there was public
consultation and submission by the
parties of their
comments.28 (Emphasis provided.)
Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No.
1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the
subsequent enactment of Executive Order No. yield possession of the land in their favor, with
137, which reiterates the power of then Minister all the improvements thereon and free from any
of Finance to promulgate the necessary rules
order. Such contention is irrelevant in the
present case since the power of the Minister of annum from the date of the decision; and
Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the
not under dispute. The issue rather in the
Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his
administrative issuance for non-compliance
with the requisite publication and filing with the
ONAR. And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, may be unimpeachable in
substance, the due process requirements of
publication and filing cannot be disregarded.
Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive
Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85,
as amended from the aforementioned
requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant
Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No
cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE,
SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-
petitioner from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which modified that rendered by the
court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case
No. 1504 of said court and held: that the
contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and
without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents,
then appellants, are the owners of the disputed
land, with its improvements, in common
ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez,
hence, they are entitled to the possession
thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should
lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and
severally pay to the defendant-petitioner the
sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per
cross-complaint relative to the value of the
improvements claimed by the defendant-
petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered
the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel
certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in
lieu thereof another certificate of title in favor of
the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother
Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in
equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances
except those expressly provided by law,
without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The respondents, children and heirs of the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the
aforesaid civil case to the end that they recover
from the petitioner the possession of the land
and its improvements granted by way of
homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent
No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with
certificate of title No. 325 issued by the
registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931
in her favor, under section 122 of Act No. 496,
which land was surveyed and identified in the
cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province
of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the petitioner
pay to them the sum of P650 being the
approximate value of the fruits which he
received from the land; that the petitioner sign
all the necessary documents to transfer the
land and its possession to the respondents;
that he petitioner be restrained, during the
pendency of the case, from conveying or
encumbering the land and its improvements;
that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel
certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu
thereof another in favor of the respondents,
and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the
material allegations of the complaint and by
way of special defense alleged that he was in
possession of the land and that he was
receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a
mortgage contract, entered into between him
and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May
16, 1932, which was duly ratified by a notary
public; and in counterclaim asked that the
respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with
12 per cent interest per annum which the
deceased owed him and that, should the
respondents be declared to have a better right
to the possession of the land, that they be
sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as
value of all the improvements which he
introduced upon the land.lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life,
and the petitioner executed the following public
deed:
"This agreement, made and entered into this
16th day of May, 1932, by and between
Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age,
widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L.,
hereinafter called the party of the first part, and
Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married
to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312
Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L., hereinafter called
party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties
hereto hereby covenant and agree to
and with each other as follows:
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first
part is the absolute registered owner
of a parcel of land in the barrio of
Alngan, municipality of Limay,
Province of Bataan, her title thereto
being evidenced by homestead
certificate of title No. 325 issued by
the Bureau of Lands on June 11,
1931, said land being lot No. 285 of
the Limay Cadastre, General Land
Registration Office Cadastral Record
No. 1054, bounded and described as
follows:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394,
N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3,
thence N. 66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S.
5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to
point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º 53'
W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point
"7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of
beginning, "Containing an area of 6.7540
hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4
and 5, stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of
Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by
property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the
East, by Road; on the South, by Alangan River
and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz;
and on the West, by property claimed by Jose
del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E.
"Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22,
Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by
Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July
8, 1927 and approved on February 25, 1931.
ARTICLE II. That the improvements
on the above described land consist
of the following:
Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing:
one hundred ten (110) hills of
bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and
six (6) boñga trees.
ARTICLE III. That the assessed
value of the land is P940 and the
assessed value of the improvements
is P860, as evidenced by tax
declaration No. 3531 of the
municipality of Limay, Bataan.
ARTICLE IV. That for and in
consideration of the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine
currency, paid by the party of second
part to the party of the first part,
receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, the party of the first
part hereby encumbers and
hypothecates, by way of mortgage,
only the improvements described in
Articles II and III hereof, of which
improvements the party of the first
part is the absolute owner.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of
said mortgage is such that if the
party of the first part shall well and
truly pay, or cause to paid to the
party of the second part, his heirs,
assigns, or executors, on or before
the 16th day of November, 1936, or
four and one-half (4½) years after
date of the execution of this
instrument, the aforesaid sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) with
interest at 12 per cent per annum,
then said mortgage shall be and
become null and void; otherwise the
same shall be and shall remain in full
force and effect, and subject to
foreclosure in the manner and form
provided by law for the amount due
thereunder, with costs and also
attorney's fees in the event of such
foreclosure.lawphil.net
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the
first part shall pay all taxes and
assessments which are or may
become due on the above described
land and improvements during the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.
term of this agreement. BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) Before me this day personally
days after date of execution of this appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without
agreement, the party of the first part cedula by reason of her sex, to me
shall file a motion before the Court of known and known to me to be the
First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. person who signed the foregoing
I., requesting cancellation of instrument, and acknowledged to me
Homestead Certificate of Title No. that she executed the same as her
325 referred to in Article I hereof and free and voluntary act and deed.
the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a
certificate of title under the provisions
I hereby certify that this instrument
of Land Registration Act No. 496, as
consists of three (3) pages including
amended by Act 3901.
this page of the acknowledgment
and that each page thereof is signed
ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if by the parties to the instrument and
upon the expiration of the period of the witnesses in their presence and
time (4½) years stipulated in this in the presence of each other, and
mortgage, the mortgagor should fail that the land treated in this
to redeem this mortgage, she would instrument consists of only one
execute a deed of absolute sale of parcel.
the property herein described for the
same amount as this mortgage,
In witness whereof I have hereunto
including all unpaid interests at the
set my hand and affixed my notarial
rate of 12 per cent per annum, in
seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.
favor of the mortgagee.
(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the
Notary Public
contemplated motion under Article
VII hereof is not approved by the
Court, the foregoing contract of sale My commission expires December 31, 1933.
shall automatically become null and
void, and the mortgage stipulated
under Article IV and V shall remain in
full force and effect.
Doc. No. 178
Page 36 of my register
In testimony whereof, the parties Book No. IV
hereto have hereunto set their hands
the day and year first herein before
written. One year after the execution of the aforequoted
deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that
Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG stipulated interests as well as the tax on the
land and its improvements. For this reason,
she and the petitioner entered into another
(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the
latter the possession of the land on condition
Signed in the presence of: that the latter would not collect the interest on
the loan, would attend to the payment of the
land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land,
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
and would introduce improvements thereon. By
virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ. entered upon the possession of the land,
gathered the products thereof, did not collect
the interest on the loan, introduced
improvements upon the land valued at P5,000,
according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax
declaration was transferred in his name and on
March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land
was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1"
the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion
and so held that the contract entered into by
and between the parties, set out in the said
public deed, was one of absolute purchase and
sale of the land and its improvements. And
upon this ruling it held null and void and without
legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the
subsequent verbal contract entered into
between the parties, ordering, however, the
respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and
severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest
at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the
decision. In this first assignment of error the
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an
absolute deed of sale of the land and its
improvements and that it is void and without
any legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of
contracts is to the effect that the intention of the
contracting parties should always prevail
because their will has the force of law between
them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code
consecrates this rule and provides, that if the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall
be followed; and if the words appear to be
contrary to the evident intention of the
contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.
The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be
interpreted in accordance with these rules. As
the terms thereof are clear and leave no room
for doubt, it should be interpreted according to
the literal meaning of its clauses. The words
used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1
clearly show that they intended to enter into the
principal contract of loan in the amount of
P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum,
and into the accessory contract of mortgage of
the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead, the parties having moreover,
agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in
the deed. In other words, the parties entered
into a contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as
homestead, to secure the payment of the
indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated
interest thereon. In clause V the parties
stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay,
within four and a half years, or until November inseparable from the principal units or institutions, or legally they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. possessor in bad faith when he knows that
16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in obligation, and is a condition, constituted banking corporations, 2874, as amended. there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
which event the mortgage would not have any juridically speaking, of that the nullity lands acquired under the free patent acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the of which it would also occasion. or homestead provisions shall not be
In the third assignment of error the petitioner
tax on the land and its improvements, during (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil subject to encumbrance or alienation
insists that his testimony, as to the verbal Borrowing the language of Article 433, the
the existence of the mortgage, should be paid Code, Volume 8, p. 575.) from the date of the approval of the
agreement entered into between him and question to be answered is whether the
by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was application and for a term of five
Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been petitioner should be deemed a possessor in
covenanted that within thirty days from the date years from and after the date of
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the good faith because he was unaware of any
of the contract, the owner of the land would file issuance of the patent or grant, nor
law, as condensed in the following words: fourth and last assignment of error the same flaw in his title or in the manner of its
a motion in the Court of First Instance of shall they become liable to the
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be
Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be satisfaction of any debt contracted
erred in holding that he acted in bad faith in noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote
cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be Where an agreement founded on a prior to the expiration of said period;
taking possession of the land and in taking of the rule. From the facts found established by
issued under the provisions of the Land legal consideration contains several but the improvements or crops on
advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce
Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act promises, or a promise to do several the land may be mortgaged or
denial of his right to be reimbursed for the nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a
No. 3901; in clause VIII the parties agreed that things, and a part only of the things pledged to qualified persons,
value of the improvements introduced by him. flaw in his title or in the manner of its
should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the to be done are illegal, the promises associations, or corporations.
acquisition, aside from the prohibition
mortgage within the stipulated period of four which can be separated, or the
contained in section 116. This being the case,
years and a half, she would execute an promise, so far as it can be We have seen that subsequent to the
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the question is whether good faith may be
absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the separated, from the illegality, may be execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties
the parties agreed that should Emiliana premised upon ignorance of the laws.
mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount valid. The rule is that a lawful entered into another verbal contract whereby
Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within Manresa, commenting on article 434 in
of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; promise made for a lawful the petitioner was authorized to take
the stipulated period of four and a half years, connection with the preceding article, sustains
and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case consideration is not invalid merely possession of the land, to receive the fruits
by paying the loan together with interest, she the affirmative. He says:
the motion to be presented under clause VII because an unlawful promise was thereof and to introduce improvements
would execute in favor of the petitioner an
should be disapproved by the Court of First made at the same time and for the thereon, provided that he would renounce the
absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000,
Instance of Bataan, the contract of sale would same consideration, and this rule payment of stipulated interest and he would "We do not believe that in real life there are not
including the interest stipulated and owing. The
automatically become void and the mortgage applies, although the invalidity is due assume payment of the land tax. The many cases of good faith founded upon an
stipulation was verbally modified by the same
would subsist in all its force. to violation of a statutory provision, possession by the petitioner and his receipt of error of law. When the acquisition appears in a
parties after the expiration of one year, in the
unless the statute expressly or by the fruits of the land, considered as integral public document, the capacity of the parties
sense that the petitioner would take possession
necessary implication declares the elements of the contract of antichresis, are has already been passed upon by competent
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of the land and would benefit by the fruits
entire contract void. . . . (13 C. J., illegal and void agreements because, as authority, and even established by appeals
of contracts, not less important than those thereof on condition that he would condone the
par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. already stated, the contract of antichresis is a taken from final judgments and administrative
indicated, is to the effect that the terms, payment of interest upon the loan and he
R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 lien and such is expressly prohibited by section remedies against the qualification of registrars,
clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals would attend to the payment of the land tax.
Law ed., 451; U.S. v. Mora, 97 U.S., 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The Court of and the possibility of error is remote under
and public order should be separated from the These pacts made by the parties independently
413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private
valid and legal contract and when such were calculated to alter the mortgage a
Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. faith in taking possession of the land because documents and even verbal agreements far
separation can be made because they are contract clearly entered into, converting the
937; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. he knew that the contract he made with exceed public documents in number, and while
independent of the valid contract which latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article
175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth
expresses the will of the contracting parties. 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of
10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed., 448; Borland sale and, further, that the latter could not sell is that even we who are called upon to know
Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the antichresis, being a real encumbrance
v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western the land because it is prohibited by section and apply it fall into error not infrequently.
Civil Code and stating the rule of separation burdening the land, is illegal and void because
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. 116. The Civil Code does not expressly define However, a clear, manifest, and truly
just mentioned, gives his views as follows: it is legal and valid.
Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which
Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.) provides that "Every person who is unaware of undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and
On the supposition that the various The foregoing considerations bring us to the any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its different thing is possible and excusable error
pacts, clauses or conditions are conclusion that the first assignment of error is acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be arising from complex legal principles and from
Addressing ourselves now to the contract
valid, no difficulty is presented; but well-founded and that error was committed in deemed a possessor in good faith"; and the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1,
should they be void, the question is holding that the contract entered into between provides further, that "Possessors aware of
we stated that the principal contract is that of
as to what extent they may produce the parties was one of absolute sale of the land such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith".
loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the But even ignorance of the law may
the nullity of the principal obligation. and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null Article 1950 of the same Code, covered by
improvements upon the land acquired as a be based upon an error of fact, or
Under the view that such features of and void. In the second assignment of error the Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership
homestead. There is no question that the first better still, ignorance of a fact is
the obligation are added to it and do petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals and other real rights, provides, in turn, that
of these contract is valid as it is not against the possible as to the capacity to
not go to its essence, a criterion erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the "Good faith on the part of the possessor
law. The second, or the mortgage of the transmit and as to the intervention of
based upon the stability of juridical Public Land Act because he entered into the consists in his belief that the person from
improvements, is expressly authorized by certain persons, compliance with
relations should tend to consider the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague whom he received the thing was the owner of
section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by certain formalities and appreciation
nullity as confined to the clause or and not specific. If it attempts to show that the the same, and could transmit the title thereto."
section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading: of certain acts, and an error of law is
pact suffering therefrom, except in said document is valid in its entirety, it is not We do not have before us a case of
possible in the interpretation of
case where the latter, by an well-founded because we have already said prescription of ownership, hence, the last
doubtful doctrines. (Manresa,
established connection or by SEC. 116. Except in favor of the that certain pacts thereof are illegal because article is not squarely in point. In resume, it
Commentaries on the Spanish Civil
manifest intention of the parties, is Government or any of its branches, may be stated that a person is deemed a
 Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and
102.)
According to this author, gross and inexcusable
ignorance of law may not be the basis of good
faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may
be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is
not conversant with the laws because he is not
a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-
grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land.
In taking possession thereof and in consenting
to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly
as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a
lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion
that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and
may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
We do not give much importance to the change
of the tax declaration, which consisted in
making the petitioner appear as the owner of
the land, because such an act may only be
considered as a sequel to the change of
possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the
petitioner, to about which we have stated that
the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible
and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the
petitioner acted in good faith in taking
possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith
within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil
Code and having introduced the improvements
upon the land as such, the provisions of article
361 of the same Code are applicable;
wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have
the improvements and plants upon
indemnifying the petitioner the value thereof
which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the
trial court; or the respondents may elect to
compel the petitioner to have the land by
paying its market value to be fixed by the court
of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or
that the petitioner be compelled to pay them
the sum of P650, being the approximate value land where the improvements or plants are
of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the found, by paying them its market value to be
land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court denying the claim or parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to
indemnity for damages, being of the same
opinion as the trial court that the respondents
may elect to compel the petitioner to have the
land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court that the respondents
have not established such damages. Under the
verbal contract between the petitioner and the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the
latter's lifetime, the former would take
possession of the land and would receive the
fruits of the mortgaged improvements on
condition that he would no longer collect the
stipulated interest and that he would attend to
the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at
bottom, is tantamount to the stipulation that the
petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of
the land to the payment of stipulated interest
on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another
of the elements characterizing the contract of
antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code.
It was not possible for the parties to stipulate
further that the value of the fruits be also
applied to the payment of the capital, because
the truth was that nothing remained after
paying the interest at 12% per annum. This
interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120
per annum, whereas the market value of the
fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached
said amount in view of the fact that the
assessed value of said improvements was,
according to the decision, P860. To this should
be added the fact that, under the verbal
agreement, from the value of the fruits had to
be taken a certain amount to pay the annual
land tax. We mention these data here to show
that the petitioner is also not bound to render
an accounting of the value of the fruits of the
mortgaged improvements for the reason stated
that said value hardly covers the interest
earned by the secured indebtednes.
For all the foregoing considerations, the
appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby
adjudge: (1) that the contract of mortgage of
the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid
and binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis
agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real
incumbrance which burdens the land and, as
such, is a null and without effect; (3) that the
petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that
the respondents may elect to have the
improvements introduced by the petitioner by
to compel the petitioner to buy and have the
filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the
the possession of the land and to enjoy the
mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the
respondents may redeem the mortgage of the
improvements by paying to the petitioner within
three months the amount of P1,000, without
interest, as that stipulated is set off by the
value of the fruits of the mortgaged
improvements which petitioner received, and in
default thereof the petitioner may ask for the
public sale of said improvements for the
purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the
payment of his said credit. Without special
pronouncement as to the costs in all instances.
So ordered.
Diaz, J., concur.
G.R. No. 154213 August 23, 2012
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME
LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
EST ANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE
PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES,
HENRY CASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA,
ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BA TTUNG,
GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS,
VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL MARCIAL,
CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN,
.JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES,
ROMEO MANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and
SALESTINO SUSA, Respondents.
*PEREZ
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On appeal is the decision the Court of Appeals Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
(CA) promulgated on December 21, 2001
affirming the resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring itself within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing
to be without appellate jurisdiction to review the of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) involving
petitioners’ complaint for disciplinary action
against respondents.1
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT
Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and
manned and operated by petitioner Agemar
Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents were
still on board the vessel, they experienced
delays in the payment of their wages and in the
remittance of allotments, and were not paid for On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the
extra work and extra overtime work. They complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners
complained about the vessel’s inadequate received the order of dismissal on July 24,
equipment, and about the failure of the 1996.2
petitioners to heed their repeated requests for
the improvement of their working conditions.
Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book VII of the
On December 19, 1993, when MT Seadance
1991 POEA Rules, petitioners filed a partial
docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to
appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still
discharge oil, representatives of the
maintaining that respondents should be
International Transport Federation (ITF)
administratively sanctioned for their conduct
boarded the vessel and found the wages of the
while they were on board MT Seadance.
respondents to be below the prevailing rates.
The ensuing negotiations between the ITF and
the vessel owner on the increase in On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed
respondents’ wages resulted in the payment by petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction,3 thus:
the vessel owner of wage differentials and the
immediate repatriation of respondents to the
We dismiss the partial appeal.
Philippines.
The Commission has no jurisdiction to review
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the
cases decided by the POEA Administrator
petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated
involving disciplinary actions. Under the
respondents a complaint for disciplinary action
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
based on breach of discipline and for the
1995, the Labor Arbiter shall have jurisdiction
reimbursement of the wage increases in the
over money claims involving employer-
Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of
employee relationship (sec. 10, R.A. 8042).
the POEA.
Said law does not provide that appeals from
decisions arising from complaint for disciplinary
During the pendency of the administrative action rest in the Commission.
complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant appeal
1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10
from the Order of May 23, 1996 is hereby
of Republic Act No. 8042 vested original and
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims
arising out of employer-employee relationships
involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor SO ORDERED.
Arbiters, to wit:
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for
Section 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their
any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor motion. They received the denial on July 8,
1997.4
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
Petitioners then commenced in this Court a
special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus. Citing St. Martin Funeral Homes v.
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
National Labor Relations
any law or contract involving Filipino workers
Commission,5 however, the Court referred the
for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of petition to the CA on November 25, 1998.
damages.
Petitioners contended in their petition that:
The jurisdiction over such claims was
previously exercised by the POEA under the THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 DISCRETION AND/OR GRAVELY ERRED IN
POEA Rules). DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ APPEAL AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
PETITIONERS’ APPEAL DESPITE BEING
EMPOWERED TO DO SO UNDER THE LAW.6 Contract workers, including seamen, against
On December 21, 2001, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari and mandamus, holding
that the inclusion and deletion of overseas
contract workers from the POEA
blacklist/watchlist were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the
NLRC, and that the NLRC had no appellate
jurisdiction to review the matter, viz:
Section 10 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, provides that:
"Money Claims – Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
xxxx
Likewise, the Rules and Regulations
implementing RA 8042 reiterate the jurisdiction
of POEA, thus:
"Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. – The
POEA shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide:
a) All cases, which are administrative in
character, involving or arising out of violations DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against
of rules and regulations relating to licensing
and registration of recruitment and employment
agencies or entities; and
b) Disciplinary action cases and other special
cases, which are administrative in character,
involving employers, principals, contracting
partners and Filipino migrant workers."
Further, Sections 6 and 7 Rule VII, Book VII of
the POEA Rules & Regulations (1991) provide: WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC HAS
"Sec. 6. Disqualification of Contract Workers.
whom have been imposed or with pending
obligations imposed upon them through an
order, decision or resolution shall be included
in the POEA Blacklist Workers shall be
disqualified from overseas employment unless
properly cleared by the Administration or until
their suspension is served or lifted.
Sec. 7. Delisting of the Contract Worker’s
Name from the POEA Watchlist. The name of
an overseas worker may be excluded, deleted
and removed from the POEA Watchlist only
after disposition of the case by the
Administration."
Thus, it can be concluded from the afore-
quoted law and rules that, public respondent
has no jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases
decided by the POEA involving contract
workers. Clearly, the matter of inclusion and
deletion of overseas contract workers in the
POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of thePOEA’s decision in the disciplinary action
public respondent. Nor has the latter appellate
jurisdiction to review the findings of the POEA
involving such cases.
xxx
In fine, we find and so hold, that, no grave
abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
public respondent when it issued the assailed
Decision and Order, dated March 21, 1997 and
June 13, 1997, respectively, dismissing
petitioners’ appeal from the decision of the
POEA.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not
impressed with merit, the same is hereby
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. 7
Issue
Petitioners still appeal, submitting to the Court
the sole issue of:
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ON APPEAL
CASES DECIDED BY THE POEA ON
MATTERS PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
They contend that both the CA and the NLRC
had no basis to rule that the NLRC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal only
because Republic Act No. 8042 had not
provided for its retroactive application.
Respondents counter that the appeal should
have been filed with the Secretary of Labor
who had exclusive jurisdiction to review cases
involving administrative matters decided by the
POEA.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
Petitioners’ adamant insistence that the NLRC
should have appellate authority over the
because their complaint against respondents
was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although
Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10,
transferred the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims
involving overseas Filipino workers from the
POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not
remove from the POEA the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
disciplinary action cases and other special
cases administrative in character involving
such workers. The obvious intent of Republic
Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus its
efforts in resolving all administrative matters
affecting and involving such workers. This
intent was even expressly recognized in
the Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on Refers to the adjective law which prescribes
February 29, 1996, viz:
Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. – The
POEA shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide:
(a) all cases, which are administrative in
character, involving or arising out of violations
or rules and regulations relating to licensing
and registration of recruitment and employment vested rights in rules of procedure.
agencies or entities; and
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special
cases, which are administrative in character,
involving employers, principals, contracting
partners and Filipino migrant workers.
Section 29. Venue – The cases mentioned in
Section 28(a) of this Rule, may be filed with the
POEA Adjudication Office or the DOLE/POEA
regional office of the place where the
complainant applied or was recruited, at the
option of the complainant. The office with which
the complaint was first filed shall take
cognizance of the case.
Disciplinary action cases and other special
cases, as mentioned in the preceding Section, prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right
shall be filed with the POEA Adjudication
Office.
It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had
no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision
of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving
overseas contract workers.
Petitioners’ position that Republic Act No. 8042 upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point
should not be applied retroactively to the
review of the POEA’s decision dismissing their the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and
complaint against respondents has no support the courts by which the appeal is to be
in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws
are prospective in application unless the
contrary is expressly provided,8 or unless the
law is procedural or curative in nature,9 there is granted by law or statute.14
no serious question about the retroactive
applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the
appeal of the POEA’s decision on petitioners’
disciplinary action against respondents. In a
way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural
law due to its providing or omitting guidelines
on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De supervision and control under Section 38(1),
Los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat, when it –
10
rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice.
Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general
rule against the retroactive operation of statues
― they may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners’
complaint by virtue of the case being then still
pending or undetermined at the time of the
law’s passage, there being no vested rights in
rules of procedure.11 They could not validly
insist that the reckoning period to ascertain
which law or rule should apply was the time
when the disciplinary complaint was originally
filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic
Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules and
regulations were already in effect when
petitioners took their appeal. A statute that
eliminates the right to appeal and considers the
judgment rendered final and unappealable only
destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to
prosecute an appeal that has been perfected
to appeal has already vested and cannot be
impaired.12 Conversely and by analogy, an
appeal that is perfected when a new statute
affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect
should comply with the provisions of the new
law, unless otherwise provided by the new law.
Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded
that the right to appeal from a decision is a
privilege established by positive laws, which,
out the cases in which it is proper to present
proceeded with and resolved.13 This is why we
consistently hold that the right to appeal is
statutory in character, and is available only if
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the
appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of
cases decided by the POEA, the appellate
jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of
Labor in accordance with his power of
Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Section 38. Definition of Administrative
Relationship. – Unless otherwise expressly
stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be
categorized and defined as follows:
Supervision and Control. – Supervision and
control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by
law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission
of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information
determine priorities in the execution of plans charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with
and programs. Unless a different meaning is a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal
explicitly provided in the specific law governing Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo
the relationship of particular agencies, the word Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
"control" shall encompass supervision and
control as defined in this paragraph. xxx.
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
POEA Rules and Regulations specifically make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply
provides, as follows: on account or for value Landbank Check No.
0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to
cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said
Section 1. Jurisdiction. – The Secretary shall
accused well knowing that at the time of issue
have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or
act on appeals or petition for review of
credit with the drawee bank for payment of
disciplinary action cases decided by the
such check in full upon its presentment, which
Administration.
check when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
have appealed the adverse decision of the for Account Closed and despite receipt of
POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to
the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being correct pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or
on its conclusions, committed no error in to make arrangement for full payment of the
upholding the NLRC. same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision
promulgated on December 21, 2001 by the CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Court of Appeals; and ORDERthe petitioners to
pay the costs of suit.
More than three years later, or on August 3,
2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in
SO ORDERED. the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the
collection of the principal amount of
₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as
Civil Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners, complaint the following:
vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF
xxx
APPEALS, Respondent.
2. Sometime in December 1996
DECISION
defendant employing fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation encashed a
BERSAMIN, J.: check dated December 26, 1996 in
the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the
plaintiff assuring the latter that the
There is no independent civil action to recover
check is duly funded and that he had
the civil liability arising from the issuance of an
an existing account with the Land
unfunded check prohibited and punished under
Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
of the said check is hereto attached
as Annex "A";
Antecedents
3. However, when said check was
presented for payment the same was
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City
dishonored on the ground that the
Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan
account of the defendant with the
Land Bank of the Philippines has
been closed contrary to his
representation that he has an
existing account with the said bank
and that the said check was duly
funded and will be honored when
presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the
defendant for him to make good the
payment of the value of the check,
xerox copy of the letter of demand is
hereto attached as Annex "B", but
despite such demand defendant
refused and continues to refuse to
comply with plaintiff’s valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the
defendant to comply with the
plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff has
been compelled to retain the
services of counsel for which he
agreed to pay as reasonable
attorney’s fees the amount of
₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of
₱2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF
PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously
alleged has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the obligation upon which While the instant case is civil in nature and
this action is brought and that there character as contradistinguished from the said
is no sufficient security for the claims
sought in this action which fraud
consist in the misrepresentation by
the defendant that he has an existing criminal complaint against defendant arising
account and sufficient funds to cover from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa
the check when in fact his account
was already closed at the time he
issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient
cause of action and this action is one
which falls under Section 1, sub-
paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines and the amount due the
plaintiff is as much as the sum for
which the plaintiff seeks the writ of
preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able
to post a bond conditioned upon the
payment of damages should it be
finally found out that the plaintiff is
not entitled to the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment.3
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City
issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which
was implemented on August 17, 2000 through
the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of
Simon.4
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages,5 pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a
consequence of the pendency of another
action between the instant parties for the same
cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed
thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the
instant action is dismissable under Section 1,
(e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
xxx
xxx
Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis
of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s
Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged
dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon presentment
for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank
Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996
in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly
issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the
accused in said case, a photocopy of the
Criminal information filed by the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules,
that, "when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended
party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s
urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which
defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint is the alleged pendency of
another action between the same
parties for the same cause,
contending among others that the
pendency of Criminal Case No.
275381-CR entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon"
renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends
that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the filing of
the criminal action, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action
which the plaintiff does not contest;
however, it is the submission of the
plaintiff that an implied reservation of
the right to file a civil action has
already been made, first, by the fact
that the information for violation of
B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No.
2753841 does not at all make any
allegation of damages suffered by
the plaintiff nor is there any claim for
recovery of damages; on top of this
the plaintiff as private complainant in
the criminal case, during the
presentation of the prosecution
evidence was not represented at all
by a private prosecutor such that no
evidence has been adduced by the
prosecution on the criminal case to
prove damages; all of these we
respectfully submit demonstrate an
effective implied reservation of the
right of the plaintiff to file a separate
civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3
sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which
mandates that after a criminal action
has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action; however, the
defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that
under Section 2, Rule 111 which
provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency
of criminal case provided the right is
reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of
evidence.
In as much as the case is one that
falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines as it is based on
fraud, this action therefore may be
prosecuted independently of the
criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to
state that even without any
reservation at all of the right to file a
separate civil action still the plaintiff
is authorized to file this instant case
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce
an obligation which the defendant
owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the
negotiable instruments law. The
plaintiff in this case sued the
defendant to enforce his liability as
drawer in favor of the plaintiff as
payee of the check. Assuming the
allegation of the defendant of the
alleged circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check, still when he
delivered the check payable to
bearer to that certain Pedro
Domingo, as it was payable to cash,
the same may be negotiated by
delivery by who ever was the bearer
of the check and such negotiation
was valid and effective against the
drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the
allegations of the defendant
regarding the circumstances relative
to the issuance of the check it would
be entirely impossible for the plaintiff
to have been aware that such check
was intended only for a definite
person and was not negotiable
considering that the said check was
payable to bearer and was not even
crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be
prosecuted separate and apart from
the criminal case without a
reservation is a civil action arising
from the criminal offense charged.
However, in this instant case since
the liability of the defendant are
imposed and the rights of the plaintiff
are created by the negotiable
instruments law, even without any
reservation at all this instant action
may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of
plaintiff’s complaint the application
for damages against the bond is
totally without any legal support and
perforce should be dismissed
outright.6
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City
granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff’s attachment
bond for damages,7 dismissing the complaint of
Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the
court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss
and the application to charge plaintiff’s bond for
damages.
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least
such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2)
cases should be such that the judgment, which
may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint
denominated as "Sum of Money" and the
criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would
readily show that the parties are not only
identical but also the cause of action being
asserted, which is the recovery of the value of pendency of criminal case provided the right is
Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of reserved as required in the preceding section.
₱336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases,
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts, are
identical.
Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied
waiver of his right to pursue this civil case
owing to the fact that there was no allegation of
damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there
was no private prosecutor during the
presentation of prosecution evidence is
unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint
or criminal Information is filed, even without
any allegation of damages and the intention to
prove and claim them, the offended party has
the right to prove and claim for them, unless a
waiver or reservation is made or unless in the
meantime, the offended party has instituted a
separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of
the said provision conveys that the waiver
which includes indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages arising under
Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must
be both clear and express. And this must be
logically so as the primordial objective of the
Rule is to prevent the offended party from
recovering damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff
did not waive or made a reservation as to his
right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal
case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
defendant herein. To the considered view of
this court, the filing of the instant complaint for
sum of money is indeed legally barred. The
right to institute a separate civil action shall be SO ORDERED.
made before the prosecution starts to present
its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to Chan’s motion for reconsideration
make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments
submission that the herein case for sum of
money is one based on fraud and hence falling submissions, and which submissions this court The offended party may prove the civil liability
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior
reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the SO ORDERED.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence."
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court
resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on
the ground of "litis pendentia";
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of
Attachment issued by this court on
August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the
amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of
the defendant for the damages
sustained by the latter by virtue of
the implementation of the writ of
attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this
Court to RESTORE with utmost
dispatch to the defendant’s physical On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its
possession the vehicle seized from
him on August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the
defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by
way of attorney’s fees.
8
was denied
on December 20, 2000, viz:
appear to be a mere repetition of his previous
have already passed upon; and taking into
account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi
in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the
plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff
therein expressly made a reservation to file a
separate civil action, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of
Chan’s complaint, disposing:9
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review,10 challenging the propriety of the
dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia.
In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan
was guilty of bad faith and malice in
prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a
manner that caused him (Simon) utter
embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and
that the dismissal of the civil case because of
the valid ground of litis pendentia based on
Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure was warranted.
assailed decision,12 overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2)
classes of injuries. The first is the social injury
produced by the criminal act which is sought to
be repaired through the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, and the second is the
personal injury caused to the victim of the
crime which injury is sought to be compensated
through indemnity which is also civil in nature.
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable."
of an accused arising from the commission of
the offense in the criminal case since the civil
action is either deemed instituted with the
criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil omission charged in the criminal action.
action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institute the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced,
the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
However, with respect to civil actions for
recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, Code, may proceed independently even if there
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the was no reservation as to its filing."
same act or omission, the rule has been
changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs.
Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that
only the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to While it may be true that the changes in the
the criminal action. Speaking through Justice
Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the made to apply to the case at bench, since
right to file the independent civil action under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver
referred to refers only to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include
recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately
without a reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In
no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure pertaining to independent civil
actions which became effective on December
1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect
to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an
independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against
respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is
similar with the instant suit. The complaint was criminal case did not preclude the filing of his
also brought on allegation of fraud under Article separate civil action.
33 of the Civil Code and committed by the
respondent in the issuance of the check which
later bounced. It was filed before the trial court,
despite the pendency of the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 against the respondent.
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
pertaining to independent civil action became
effective on December 1, 2000, the same may
be given retroactive application and may be
procedural rules may be given retroactive
application. There are no vested rights in the
rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error,
favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the
complaint filed by petitioner is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further Jr.,17 holding:
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s
motion for reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners
submit that the CA erroneously premised its
decision on the assessment that the civil case
was an independent civil action under Articles
32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the
CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees
Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez14 stretched the
meaning and intent of the ruling, and was
contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was
a simple collection suit for a sum of money,
precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.15
In his comment,16 Chan counters that the
petition for review should be denied because
the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal;
that his cause of action, being based on fraud,
was an independent civil action; and that the
appearance of a private prosecutor in the
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil
action to recover the amount of the unfunded
check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A leave the offended party unable to recover
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based
on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of
whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give
rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo,
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a
special law so provides, indemnification of the
offended party may be had on account of the
damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to
pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of a crime
(Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44,
citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil
692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or
criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party, and also to civil action for the restitution
of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses (United States v.
Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus
be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to
receive the payment of money for which the
worthless check was issued. Having been
caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment
of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to
leave the offended private party defrauded and
empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of
the offender, giving her only the remedy, which
in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of
having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may
even the face value of the check due her,
thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at
the expense of the payee. The protection which
the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be
brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to
recover the value of a bouncing check issued
in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective
December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. - (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than
actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall
be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.18
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately
and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of
both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. – In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of
Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August
3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is
it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to, or arise from, procedural
laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to
apply to cases pending at the time of their
promulgation, considering that no party to an
action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure,20 except that in criminal cases, the
changes do not retroactively apply if they
permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence
to convict than what is required at the time of
the commission of the offenses, because such
retroactivity would be unconstitutional for
being ex post factounder the Constitution.21
Moreover, the application of the rule would not
be precluded by the violation of any assumed
vested right, because the new rule was
adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97
that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the following rules
and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in
the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which
penalizes the making or drawing and issuance
of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed or
recognized.22
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid
joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based upon the amount of
the check involved which shall be
considered as the actual damages
claimed, in accordance with the
schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and
Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court as last amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94
effective August 1, 1994. Where the
offended party further seeks to
enforce against the accused civil
liability by way of liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, he shall pay the
corresponding filing fees therefor
based on the amounts thereof as
alleged either in the complaint or
information. If not so alleged but any
of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the amount of
such fees shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has
heretofore been filed separately and
trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of subsequently awarded by the court, the filing disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits
both actions shall proceed in fees based on the amount awarded shall must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may
accordance with the pertinent constitute a first lien on the judgment. be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before
procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of the trial court, resort to a separate action to
Rule 111 governing the proceedings recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In
Where the civil action has been filed separately
in the actions as thus consolidated. view of this special rule governing actions for
and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code
may be consolidated with the criminal action
cited by the trial court will not apply to the case
4. This Circular shall be published in upon application with the court trying the latter
at bar.24
two (2) newspapers of general case. If the application is granted, the trial of
circulation and shall take effect on both actions shall proceed in accordance with
November 1, 1997. section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit
of the civil and criminal actions.1avvphi1 Association v. Velez25 to give due course to the
civil action of Chan independently and
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were
separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was
amply explained in Hyatt Industrial The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular
unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved
Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states
a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with
Electrix Corporation,23 thus: that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
this case, which is a prosecution for a violation
shall be deemed to include the corresponding
of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the
civil action. It also requires the complainant to
xxx issuance of a bouncing check may result in two
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
separate and distinct crimes of estafa and
of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees
violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the
We agree with the ruling of the Court of are required for criminal cases, but because of
recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these
Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
two distinct crimes are different and non-
for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the
interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also payment of docket fees upon the filing of the offended party may opt to reserve his right to
impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule complaint. This rule was enacted to help
file a separate civil action, or may institute an
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. independent action based on fraud pursuant to
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as
Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of
to include the corresponding civil action. The charged in criminal cases for actual damages,
violations of BP 22, however, the Court has
reservation to file a separate civil action is no the payee uses the intimidating effect of a
adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or
longer needed. The Rules provide: criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
institution of a separate civil action to claim the
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is
civil liability arising from the issuance of the
not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil bouncing check upon the reasons delineated
civil action in the criminal case is expected to
actions. — significantly lower the number of cases filed
in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation,
supra.
before the courts for collection based on
(a) x x x dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to
of instituting two separate cases, one for recover the amount of the check involved in the
(b) The criminal action for violation of criminal and another for civil, only a single suit prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed be independently maintained under both
deemed to include the corresponding that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the
civil action. No reservation to file
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the
such civil action separately shall be
The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations
allowed.
separate civil action, which means that one can of fraud and deceit.
no longer file a separate civil case after the
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
B
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full instance when separate proceedings are
the filing fees based on the amount of the allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of
check involved, which shall be considered as the criminal case. Even then, the Rules Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
the actual damages claimed. Where the encourage the consolidation of the civil and
complaint or information also seeks to recover criminal cases. We have previously observed on the ground of litis pendentia
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or that a separate civil action for the purpose of
exemplary damages, the offended party shall recovering the amount of the dishonored
pay additional filing fees based on the amounts checks would only prove to be costly, Did the pendency of the civil action in the
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so burdensome and time-consuming for both MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal
alleged but any of these damages are parties and would further delay the final Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case
No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the
ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked
as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary, namely: (a)
there must be identity of parties or at least such
as represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) there must be identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment that
may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first
two requisites, the possibility of the existence
of the third becomes nil.28
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and
Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows
that all the elements of litis pendentia are
attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil
action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381
and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and obtained judgment in his favor in the municipal
Simon, are the same. Secondly, the
information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and
the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both
alleged that Simon had issued Landbank
Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00
payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the
rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as
well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought vacated, and to pay the costs of the suit.
were founded, were identical in all respects.
And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one
case would necessarily bar the other by res
judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering
twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay
City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00
on the ground of litis pendentia through its
decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the
RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the
MeTC.
Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on
certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set
aside the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the
decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay
City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-332 June 18, 1947
ALEJANDRO R. SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CATALINA DE ALVAREZ, CARLOS
TANSECO, and MANUEL
ALVAREZ, defendants-appellants.
Quesada and Barbin for appellants.
Ruperto C. Martin for appellee.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alejandro R. Santos, plaintiff-appellee herein,
filed a suit in ejectment for the premises
designated as No. 22, Altura Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, occupied since September 1942 by
defendants-appellants, Catalina de Alvarez,
Carlos Tanseco, and Manuel Alvarez. Santos
court of Manila, which was affirmed on appeal
to the Court of First Instance. This appeal is
now from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance wherein defendants Alvarez, et al. are
ordered to vacate the premises, to pay the
plaintiff back rent from April 1, 1945, at the rate
of P35 a month up to the time the premises are
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 66, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 689, provides:
In a suit for ejection or for the
collection of rents due and payable
by virtue of a contract of lease of
buildings destined solely for dwelling,
not being a room or rooms of an
hotel, and lots, the fact that the rents
are unjust and unreasonable shall
constitute a valid defense. Except as
provided in section twelve of this Act,
no lessee or occupant shall be
ejected in cases other than for willful
and deliberate non-payment of rents
or when the lessor has to occupy the
building leased. (Emphasis ours.)
Under this provision, a lessee cannot be
ejected even for non-payment of rents, where
such non-payment is not willful and deliberate
and the lessor does not need the property for
himself and the lessee has never subleased it
without authority. In other words, a lessee who
is unable to pay on time the agreed rents
because of poverty or of any other
circumstance beyond his control cannot, under
the present law, be ejected from the leased
property, if the other two circumstances are not
present. The purpose of the law is evidently to
relieve the present situation arising from the
scarcity of housing facilities by protecting
particularly the thousands of impoverished
people who in the war of liberation lost their
houses together with almost all their
belongings and found shelter in houses owned
by others. By the very nature of its purpose,
this measure of social justice which temporary
in character (four years), is applicable to all
lessees or occupants at the time the law was
passed, regardless of the dates of their
contracts. Manifestly the law seeks to relieve
an existing condition affecting the life and
happiness of the people, a condition that is not
less important because of its age. Indeed, a
poor lessee does not cease to be poor
because his contract bears an earlier date than
that of the law. It is expressly ordained by said
law that "no lessee or occupant shall be
ejected in cases other than for willful and
deliberate non-payment of rents," a negative
and all-inclusive expression which is
mandatory and embraces within its protection
all lessees and occupants without distinction at
the time the law was passed. The only
exceptions to the rule as above indicated are
(1) when the lessee or occupant subleased the
property without the consent of the lessor; (2)
when there has been willful and deliberate non-
payment of rents; or (3) when the lessor has to
occupy the building leased. Under the facts of
the instant case, the first and second
exceptions cannot be invoked. As regards the
third, the lessor, according to his testimony
reiterated in his brief, wishes to secure the
premises for his two sons or near relatives. But
the exception applies only when the lessor
"has to occupy the building leased." It does not
apply when the lessor needs the building for
others. In other words, the need contemplated
by law is only the lessor's need. His sons or
near relatives are not the lessors. The sons
should live with their father if they are minors,
and if they are of age they are no longer
dependents of their father. The near relatives
have no standing in the lease, hence their need
cannot be considered.
Moreover, there is the defendant's allegation
that plaintiff has other properties which he has
been leasing to others rather than to his two
sons and near relatives, which allegation is not
denied and is indirectly admitted in appellee's
brief.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the
lower court is affirmed in so far as it fixes the
monthly rent for the premises in question at
P35, and reversed in so far as it orders
defendants-appellants to vacate said premises
and to pay the costs. Plaintiff-appellee will pay
the costs of this suits.
Pablo, Bengzon, Hontiveros, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex
prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a
prospective, not retroactive, effect.1 However,
penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not
a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive
effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and
exception to the exception on effectivity of
laws.
Ang batas ay tumitingin sa
hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan.
Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng
bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay
pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi
pusakal na kriminal.
We apply the exception rather than the rule in
this petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming
with modification that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner
liable for illegal possession of a firearm.
The Facts
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2
Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal
Investigation Division, Central Police District
Command, received a dispatch order2 from the
desk officer.3 The order directed him and three
(3) other policemen to serve a warrant of
arrest4 issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador
against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in
a case for kidnapping with ransom.5
After a briefing, the team conducted the
necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking
his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and
Bulacan.6 Eventually, the team proceeded to
the Integrated National Police (INP) Central
Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw
petitioner as he was about to board a
tricycle.7 SPO2 Disuanco and his team
approached petitioner.8 They put him under
arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights,
and bodily searched him.9 Found tucked in his
waist10 was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial
Number 5231511 with five (5) live ammunition.12
Petitioner was then brought to the police
station for questioning.13
A verification of the subject firearm at the
Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp
Crame revealed that it was not issued to
petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia
Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.14 Epifanio
Deriquito, the records verifier, presented a
certification15 to that effect signed by Edwin C.
Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms
and Explosive Division.16
Petitioner was then charged with illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,17 as
amended. The Information read:
That on or about the 10th day of July,
1996, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused without any
authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his/her possession and
under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms"
revolver bearing Serial No. 52315
with five (5) live ammo. without first
having secured the necessary
 license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 15,
1996.
(Sgd.)
GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP
Assistant City Prosecutor18
With the assistance of his counsel de parte,
Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on October 9,
1996.19 Trial on the merits ensued.
SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the
prosecution in the manner stated above.
Upon the other hand, the defense version was Memorandum Receipt dated July 1,
supplied by the combined testimonies of
petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3
Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he
was fast asleep in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana
20
Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He adjacent to where petitioner was arrested,
was roused from his slumber when four (4)
heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the policemen suddenly entered his room as he
room.21 They trained their guns at him22 and
pulled him out of the room. They then tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet.23 The
raiding team went back inside and searched
and ransacked the room.24 SPO2 Disuanco
25
stood guard outside with him. Moments later,
an operative came out of the room and
exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa
26
loob!"
Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that "we forcibly brought petitioner out of his
are authorized to shoot you because there’s a room.42 While a policeman remained near the
shoot to kill order against you, so if you are
planning do so something, do it right
27
now." He was also told that there was a
standing warrant for his arrest.28 However, he
was not shown any proof when he asked for
it.29 Neither was the raiding group armed with a
valid search warrant.30
According to petitioner, the search done in the On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner Petitioner raises the following issues for Our
boarding house was illegal. The gun seized
from him was duly licensed and covered by
necessary permits. He was, however, unable to
present the documentation relative to the
firearm because it was confiscated by the
police. Petitioner further lamented that when he
was incarcerated, he was not allowed to
engage the services of a counsel. Neither was
he allowed to see or talk to his family.31
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe
to grind against him. While still with the
Narcotics Command, he turned down a request
of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-
related investigation involving friends of the
said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise
subject of a complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later
on appointed as the head of the unit that
32
conducted the search in his boarding house.
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command
testified that he issued to petitioner a
199333 covering the subject firearm and its
ammunition. This was upon the verbal
instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3
Timbol identified his signature34 on the said
35
receipt.
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room
testified that on July 10, 1996, two (2)
was preparing for school.36 They grabbed his
37
shoulder and led him out. During all those
times, a gun was poked at him.38 He was
asked where petitioner was staying. Fearing for
his life, he pointed to petitioner’s room. 39
Four (4) policemen then entered the
40
room. He witnessed how they pointed a gun
at petitioner, who was clad only in his
underwear.41 He also witnessed how they
faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went
back inside the room.43 They began searching
the whole place. They forcibly opened his
locker,44 which yielded the subject firearm.45
RTC and CA Dispositions
guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866 as amended by Republic Act
No. 8294 and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period
or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
as minimum to 6 years as maximum
and to pay the fine in the amount of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).
The gun subject of this case is
hereby ordered confiscated in favor
of the government. Let the same be
put in trust in the hands of the Chief
of the PNP.
SO ORDERED.46
47
Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion
48
was denied on August 27, 1998. He appealed
to the CA.
On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed
with modification the RTC disposition. The fallo
of the CA decision reads:
Verily, the penalty imposed by the
trial court upon the accused-
appellant is modified to 4 years and
2 months as minimum up to 6
years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, with the
foregoing MODIFICATION as to the the fact that the accused who possessed or
penalty, the decision appealed from owned the same does not have the
is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.49
His motion for reconsideration50 having been
denied through a Resolution dated August 3,
2004,51 petitioner resorted to the present
petition under Rule 45.
Issues
As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess
consideration: the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification
of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial
No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
Division at Camp Crame revealed that the
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It
ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
was registered in the name of a certain Raul
THE CONVICTION OF
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.57 As
PETITIONER DESPITE THE
proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed
ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND
by Roque, the chief records officer of the same
REASONABLE DOUBT.
office.58
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
The Court on several occasions ruled
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
that either the testimony of a representative of,
ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN
or a certification from, the Philippine National
SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF
Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office
THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY
attesting that a person is not a licensee of any
AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
firearm would suffice to prove beyond
EVIDENCE OBTAINED
THEREFROM DESPITE THE
reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms.59 The
OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT
prosecution more than complied when it
THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE
presented both.
POISONOUS TREE.
The certification is outside the scope of the
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
hearsay rule.
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY The general rule is that a witness can testify
AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING only to those facts which he knows of his
THE ISSUANCE OF THE personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) from his own perception.60 Otherwise, the
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH testimony is objectionable for being hearsay.61
PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF THE
CRIME CHARGE
On this score, the certification from the
(SIC).52 (Underscoring supplied)
Firearms and Explosives Division is an
exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule
Our Ruling 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
In illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of Sec. 44. Entries in official records. –
proving the twin elements of (1) the existence Entries in official records made in the
of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) performance of his official duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by
a person in the performance of a
corresponding license for it.53 duty specifically enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
The prosecution was able to discharge its
burden.
It may be true that the contents of said
certification are only prima facie evidence of
The existence of the subject firearm and its
the facts stated there. However, the failure of
ammunition was established through the
petitioner to present controverting evidence
testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.54 Defense
makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the
witness Yuson also identified the firearm.55 Its
presumption stands.
existence was likewise admitted by no less
than petitioner himself.56
Petitioner, however, raises several points
which he says entitles him to no less than an
acquittal.
The assessment of credibility of witnesses
lies with the trial court.
First, petitioner says that the seizure of the
subject firearm was invalid. The search was
conducted after his arrest and after he was
taken out of the room he was occupying.62
This contention deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner’s version of the manner and place of
his arrest goes into the factual findings made
by the trial court and its calibration of the
credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put
by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People v.
Rivera:63
x x x the manner of assigning values
to declarations of witnesses on the
witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial
judge who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses
and assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not
reflected on record. The demeanor of
the person on the stand can draw the
line between fact and fancy or evince
if the witness is telling the truth or
lying through his teeth. We have
consistently ruled that when the
question arises as to which of the
conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense is
worthy of belief, the assessment of
the trial courts are generally viewed
as correct and entitled to great
weight. Furthermore, in an appeal,
where the culpability or innocence of
the accused depends on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the
veracity of their testimonies, findings
of the trial court are given the highest
degree of respect if not
finality.64 (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court found the prosecution version
worthy of credence and belief. We find no Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm
compelling reason not to accept its observation and ammunition should have been excluded as
on this score. evidence because they were not formally
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a
ranking police officer who not only claims to be
highly decorated,65 but have effected a number
of successful arrests66 as well. Common sense
would dictate that he must necessarily be
authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with
the Office of the Solicitor General that framing
up petitioner would have been a very risky
proposition. Had the arresting officers really
intended to cause the damnation of petitioner
by framing him up, they could have easily
"planted" a more incriminating evidence rather
than a gun. That would have made their
nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there
indeed was one.
The pieces of evidence show that petitioner
is not legally authorized to possess the
subject firearm and its five (5) ammunition.
Second, petitioner insists that he is legally
authorized to possess the subject firearm and
its ammunition on the basis of the
Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the
PNP Narcotics Command.67
Although petitioner is correct in his submission
that public officers like policemen are accorded
presumption of regularity in the performance of
their official duties,68 it is only a presumption; it
may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the
presumption when it proved that the issuance
to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was
anything but regular.
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the
Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on
the verbal instruction of his immediate superior,
Col. Moreno.69 However, a reading of Timbol’s
testimony on cross-examination70 would reveal
that there was an unusual facility by which said
receipt was issued to petitioner. Its issuance
utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic
constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner
under questionable circumstances.
Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as
evidence is not fatal provided there is
competent testimony as to its existence.
offered by the prosecution71 in violation of
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.72
We note that petitioner contradicted himself
when he argued for the validity of the
Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time,
for the exclusion in evidence of the subject
firearm and its ammunition. Petitioner’s act
may result to an absurd situation where the
Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while
the subject firearm and its ammunition which
are supposedly covered by the Memorandum
Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would
have made the Memorandum Receipt useless.
In any case, petitioner’s contention has no leg
to stand on.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject
firearm73 and its five (5) live ammunition74 were
offered in evidence by the prosecution.75 Even
assuming arguendo that they were not offered,
petitioner’s stance must still fail. The existence
of an unlicensed firearm may be established by
testimony, even without its presentation at trial.
In People v. Orehuela,76 the non-presentation
of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of
the accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case
of People v. Malinao.77
As previously stated, the existence of the
subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition
were established through the testimony of
78
SPO2 Disuanco. Yuson also identified said
firearm.79 Petitioner even admitted its
existence.80
We hasten to add that there may also be
conviction where an unlicensed firearm is
presented during trial but through inadvertence, Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" appellate courts. Nonetheless, the exercise of
negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if of the offender, "but founded on the very
it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long
as there is competent testimony as to its
existence.
Penal and civil liabilities
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under
the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended. It provides that "[t]he
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed period84 from reclusion temporal in its
upon any person who shall unlawfully maximum period to reclusion perpetua85 under
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or P.D. No. 1866.
possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
used or intended to be used in the manufacture
Law, prision correccional maximum which
of any firearm or ammunition."
ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing penalty and will form the maximum term of the
law at the time petitioner committed the offense indeterminate sentence. The minimum term
on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 shall be one degree lower, which is prision
amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, correccional in its medium period (two [2]
81
1997, during the pendency of the case with years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four
the trial court. The present law now states: [4] years and two [2] months).86 Hence, the
penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture,
prision correccional medium, as minimum term,
Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
to six (6) years of prision correccional
Possession of Firearms or
maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance
Ammunition or Instruments Used or
with the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Court of
Intended to be Used in the
Appeals87 and Barredo v. Vinarao.88
Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live
and a fine of not less than Fifteen ammunition, their proper disposition should be
Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal
imposed upon any person who shall Code89 which provides, among others, that the
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime
acquire, dispose, or possess any shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
low-powered firearm, such as rimfire government.
handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, part of
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery,
Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in
tool or instrument used or intended
full.
to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition: Provided,
That no other crime was committed. SO ORDERED.
(Underscoring supplied)
Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the
As a general rule, penal laws should not have trial courts considering that conflicting claims in
retroactive application, lest they acquire the an application for a provisional writ more often
character of an ex post facto law.82 An than not involve and require a factual
exception to this rule, however, is when the law determination that is not the function of the
is advantageous to the accused. According to 19
such discretion must be sound, that is, the
issuance of the writ, though discretionary,
principles on which the right of the State to should be upon the grounds and in the manner
punish and the commination of the penalty are provided by law.20 When that is done, the
based, and regards it not as an exception
exercise of sound discretion by the issuing
based on political considerations, but as a rule court in injunctive matters must not be
83
founded on principles of strict justice." interfered with except when there is manifest
abuse.21
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is
imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still Moreover, judges dealing with applications for
advantageous to the accused, considering that the injunctive relief ought to be wary of
the imprisonment is lowered to prision improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs
correccional in its maximum or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the
merits without or before trial. Granting an
application for the relief in disregard of that
tendency is judicially impermissible,22 for it is
never the function of a TRO or preliminary
injunction to determine the merits of a
case,23 or to decide controverted facts.24 It is
but a preventive remedy whose only mission is
to prevent threatened wrong,25 further
injury,26 and irreparable harm27 or
injustice28 until the rights of the parties can be
settled. Judges should thus look at such relief
only as a means to protect the ability of their
courts to render a meaningful
decision.29 Foremost in their minds should be to
guard against a change of circumstances that
will hamper or prevent the granting of proper
reliefs after a trial on the merits.30 It is well
worth remembering that the writ of preliminary
injunction should issue only to prevent the
threatened continuous and irremediable injury
to the applicant before the claim can be justly
and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.31
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp.
decision to the lower courts for their guidance. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional Trial Court Leonardo who acted as witnesses.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987 ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO
BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-
HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON.
FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
II, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-55000 July 23, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO
BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR N.
BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG,
FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE
BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES,
AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR., heirs-
appellants,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-
appellee.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-62895 July 23, 1987
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As presiding
Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court,
Branch XV, Region VII, RICARDO V. REYES,
as Administrator of the Estate of Vito
Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R,
NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L.
ANTIGUA, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal
No. L-63818 July 23, 1987
DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V.
REYES, as Administrator of the Intestate
of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE
FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as Presiding
Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, as a formal party, and
RUIZ and NUMERIANO
ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE probate court disallowing the probate of the will
COURT, JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, and
PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-65995 July 23, 1987
PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA
BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO, and
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS,
Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Regional
Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES,
Administrator of the Estate of VITO
BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: no opposition filed against said Quirino Borromeo and
petition.
These cases before us all stem from SP. Julian Borromeo
PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of First 2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana
Instance of Cebu. Borromeo also filed a petition for
2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13,
declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose
1952, without any issue, and all his brothers
Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo
G.R. No. 41171 and sisters predeceased him.
filed an opposition to this petition.
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose
resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, leaving the following children:
Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de
in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years,
Castro, Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes
without forced heirs but leaving extensive
Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on
properties in the province of Cebu.
Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Oct. 16, 1939
Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Patricia Morre, filed a petition for
b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on
Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for declaration of heirs and
Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the
the probate of a one page document as the last determination of shares. The petition
death of Vito Borromeo. He was
will and testament left by the said deceased, was opposed by the heirs of Jose
married to Remedios Cuenco
devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Cosme Borromeo.
Borromeo, who died on March 28,
1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose
and undivided shares, and designating
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Cuenco Borromeo one of the
Junquera as executor thereof. The case was
Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo, petitioners herein.
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
Hermenegilda Borromeo
The document, drafted in Spanish, was
Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo,
allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still
and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a
deceased in the presence of Cornelio alive.
claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo,
Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto
Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana
Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos 4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo,
Borromeo represented by Jose died ahead of him and left an only daughter,
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. Talam filed oppositions to this claim. Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950
On May 28, 1960, after due trial, the probate leaving the following children:
court held that the document presented as the
When the aforementioned petitions and claims
will of the deceased was a forgery.
were heard jointly, the following facts were a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
established:
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the
b. Ramon Ocampo
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan,
was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito
husband and wife (the latter having
Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. v. Crispin c. Lourdes Ocampo
predeceased the former), were survived by
Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656).
their eight (8) children, namely,
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
The testate proceedings was converted into an
Jose Ma. Borromeo
intestate proceedings. Several parties came
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla
before the court filing claims or petitions
alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate Cosme Borromeo (deceased), survived by claimant
estate of Vito Borromeo. Jose Barcenilla, Jr.
Pantaleon Borromeo
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito
The following petitions or claims were filed:
Borromeo, died before the war and left the
Vito Borromeo following children:
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of
Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme
Paulo Borromeo a. Marcial Borromeo
Borromeo filed a petition for
declaration of heirs and
determination of heirship. There was Anecita Borromeo
 b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan.
18, 1965,survived by his wife,
Remedios Alfonso, and his only
daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam
c. Asuncion Borromeo
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in
1948.
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in
1944.
f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in
1925.
The last three died leaving no issue.
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito
Borromeo, died before the war and left the
following children:
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on
December 29, 1949
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on
Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following
children:
aa. Federico Borromeo
bb. Marisol Borromeo
(Maria B. Putong, Rec. p.
85)
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
dd. Jose Borromeo
ee. Consuelo Borromeo
ff. Pilar Borromeo
gg. Salud Borromeo
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo
Herrera
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in
July, 1948
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on
Aug. 6, 1946
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on
Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his
children:
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega the deceased in the way and manner they are
bb. Luz Borromeo
cc. Hermenegilda
Borromeo Nonnenkamp
dd. Rosario Borromeo
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art.
972 of the Civil Code, issued an order
declaring the following, to the exclusion of all
others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased
Vito Borromeo:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
3. Vitaliana Borromeo
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
5. Salud Borromeo
6. Asuncion Borromeo
7. Marcial Borromeo
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam,
and
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
The court also ordered that the assets of the
intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be
divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed
in equal and equitable shares among the 9
abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs,
with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera,
signed an agreement of partition of the
properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo
which was approved by the trial court, in its
order of August 15, 1969. In this same order,
the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty
Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of
divided and partitioned in the said Agreement
of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the
market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate
shall be segregated. All attorney's fees shall be
taken and paid from this segregated portion.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato
Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir
under the forged will, filed a motion before the
trial court praying that he be declared as one of
the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the
deceased and that in the declaration of heirs
made by the trial court, he was omitted, in
disregard of the law making him a forced heir
entitled to receive a legitime like all other
forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate
child, he stated that he was entitled to a
legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo
was already barred by the order of the court
dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons
named therein as the legal heirs of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed
the motion on June 25, 1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for
reconsideration. In the memorandum he
submitted to support his motion for
reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims properties of the estate it partakes of the nature
for his claim to a portion of the estate. He as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of
Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967,
supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria 1969), the approval of the agreement of
B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V.
Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo,
Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo,
Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and
Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the
nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their
shares in the disputed estate. The motion was
opposed on the ground that the trial court, Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from
acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to having been cancelled and revoked on June
take cognizance of the claim; that respondent 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato
Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without
the waiver agreement; that the waiver force and effect because there can be no
agreement is void as it was executed before effective waiver of hereditary rights before
the declaration of heirs; that the same is void there has been a valid acceptance of the
having been executed before the distribution of inheritance the heirs intend to transfer.
the estate and before the acceptance of the Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to
inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance
inexistent for lack of subject matter. valid, the person must be certain of the death
of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his
right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the
her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
trial court concluding that the five declared
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their
heirs who signed the waiver agreement
rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view,
assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato
according to the petitioner, is also supported by
Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared
Article 1057 of the same Code which directs
the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their
Borromeo.
acceptance or repudiation within thirty days
after the court has issued an order for the
A motion for reconsideration of this order was distribution of the estate.
denied on July 7, 1975.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other
hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to
Civil Code there is no need for a person to be
annul and set aside the trial court's order dated
December 24, 1974, declaring respondent first declared as heir before he can accept or
repudiate an inheritance. What is required is
Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate
of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order, that he must first be certain of the death of the
denying the motion for reconsideration. person from whom he is to inherit and that he
must be certain of his right to the inheritance.
He points out that at the time of the signing of
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of
signatories to the waiver document were
respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead
not a money claim against the decedent but a as well as of their rights to the inheritance as
claim for properties, real and personal, which
shown in the waiver document itself.
constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the
decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived
their rights in his favor. The claim of the private With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the
respondent under the waiver agreement, trial court to pass upon the validity of the
according to the petitioner, may be likened to waiver of hereditary rights, respondent
that of a creditor of the heirs which is improper. Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or
He alleges that the claim of the private renunciation of hereditary rights took place
respondent under the waiver agreement was after the court assumed jurisdiction over the
of a partition of the properties of the estate
there had been a declaration of heirs (April 10, needing approval of the court because it was
1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, executed in the course of the proceedings. lie
further maintains that the probate court loses
partition and an order directing the jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment
administrator to partition the estate (August 15, of all the debts of the estate and the remaining
1969), when in a mere memorandum, the estate is distributed to those entitled to the
existence of the waiver agreement was brought same.
out.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of
It is further argued by the petitioner that the hereditary rights is that "the properties included
document entitled " waiver of Hereditary in an existing inheritance cannot be considered
as belonging to third persons with respect to
the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the
personality of the former. Nor do such
properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right to
succession from the moment of the death of
the deceased, by principle established in article "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant
657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed the
deceased by the mere fact of death. More or
less, time may elapse from the moment of the
death of the deceased until the heirs enter into offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to
possession of the hereditary property, but the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the
moment of the death, in accordance with article
989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested,
although conditioned upon the adjudication of
the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio
v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41
Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive
their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and
to partition the estate was issued only in 1969. assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements
are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2)
the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3)
an intention to relinquish such right. (People v.
Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120).
The intention to waive a right or advantage
must be shown clearly and convincingly, and
when the only proof of intention rests in what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of an intent to,
voluntarily relinquish the particular right or
advantage that no other reasonable
explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J.,
311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil.,
151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the
signatories to the waiver document did not
have the clear and convincing intention to
relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27,
1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo
filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein
they submitted a proposal for the amicable
settlement of the case. In that Compliance,
they proposed to concede to all the eight (8)
intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties,
personal and real, including all cash and sums
of money in the hands of the Special
Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not
contested or claimed by them in any action
then pending in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and
concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In
this document, the respondent recognizes and
concedes that the petitioner, like the other
signatories to the waiver document, is an heir
of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to
share in the estate. This shows that the
to be what the respondent now purports it to
be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would
not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the
concede to them parts of the estate of the
deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the
majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement on how the estate they inherited
shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition
was approved by the trial court on August 15,
1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner,
among others, signed a document entitled
and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B.
Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as
an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased
Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for
said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the
same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in
the aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn
executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of
the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of
assignment. The stated consideration was
P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of
Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was
signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia
Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while
Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on
March 24, 1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we
hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It
must be noted that in Special Proceedings No.
916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of
the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal,
this Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498.
Subsequently, several parties came before the
lower court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the
trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying
the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers in handling the settlement
of the estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order
of the trial court dated December 24, 1974, is
hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55000
This case was originally an appeal to the Court
of Appeals from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December
24, 1974, declaring the waiver document
earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The
appellate court certified this case to this Court
as the questions raised are all of law.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the and of his right to the inheritance. At the time of
waiver agreement but they also question the
jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and
decide the action filed by claimant Fortunato
Borromeo.
The appellants argue that when the waiver of
hereditary right was executed on July 31, 1967,
Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet
possess or own any hereditary right in the
intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading
because said hereditary right was only
acquired and owned by them on April 10, 1969, appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, the
when the estate was ordered distributed.
They further argue that in contemplation of law, notice and setting the same for hearing on
there is no such contract of waiver of hereditary September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers
right in the present case because there was no
object, which is hereditary right, that could be
the subject matter of said waiver, and,
therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was
not only null and void ab initio but was
inexistent.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the
appellants contend that without any formal
pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato
Borromeo for the approval of the waiver
agreement and without notice to the parties
concerned, two things which are necessary so
that the lower court would be vested with
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the
validity of said waiver agreement, nevertheless, As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed
the lower court set the hearing on September
25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite
pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the
appealed order of December 24, 1974, which
approved the validity of the waiver agreement.
The appellants contend that this constitutes an
error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that
by waiving their hereditary rights in favor of
Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the
waiver document tacitly and irrevocably
accepted the inheritance and by virtue of the
same act, they lost their rights because the
rights from that moment on became vested in
Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under
Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need
for a person to be declared as heir first before
he can accept or repudiate an inheritance.
What is required is that he is certain of the
death of the person from whom he is to inherit,
the signing of the waiver document on July 31,
1967, the signatories to the waiver document
were certain that Vito Borromeo was already
dead and they were also certain of their right to
the inheritance as shown by the waiver
document itself.
On the allegation of the appellants that the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the
lower court issued an order specifically calling
on all oppositors to the waiver document to
submit their comments within ten days from
that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the
inheritance involves no question of title to
property and, therefore, the probate court can
decide the question.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues
raised in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants in this
case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito
Borromeo are contesting the validity of the trial
court's order dated December 24, 1974,
declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of
the estate of Vito Borromeo under the waiver
agreement.
waiver of hereditary rights can not be validated.
The essential elements of a waiver, especially
the clear and convincing intention to relinquish
hereditary rights, are not found in this case.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable
settlement conceding to all the eight (8)
intestate heirs various properties in
consideration for the heirs giving to the
respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was
filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967,
some of the heirs had allegedly already waived
or sold their hereditary rights to the respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be
distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of
assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and
the subsequent cancellation of the deed of
assignment and deed of reconveyance all
argue against the purported waiver of
hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have
already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial
court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the waiver agreement because the
trial court's jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers in handling the settlement
of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET
ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by
Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, representative of some
of the heirs-distributees, praying for the
immediate closure of Special Proceeding No.
916-R. A similar motion dated May 29, 1979
was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions
were grounded on the fact that there was
nothing more to be done after the payment of
all the obligations of the estate since the order
of partition and distribution had long become
final.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P.
Burgos failed or refused to resolve the
aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco
Borromeo-filed a petition for mandamus before
the Court of Appeals to compel the respondent
judge to terminate and close Special
Proceedings No. 916-R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent
judge was due to pending motions to compel
the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an
inventory of the real properties of the estate
and an accounting of the cash in his hands,
pending claims for attorney's fees, and that
mandamus will not lie to compel the
performance of a discretionary function, the
appellate court denied the petition on May 14,
1982. The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the
respondent judge on the motion filed on April
28, 1972 for the closure of the administration
proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of
the motion for inventory and accounting
because the latter motion was filed only on
March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then
Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent
judge to decide or resolve a case or matter
within three months from the date of its
submission.
The respondents contend that the motion to
close the administration had already been
resolved when the respondent judge cancelled
all settings of all incidents previously set in his
court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant
to the resolution and restraining order issued
by the Court of Appeals enjoining him to
maintain status quo on the case.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and
30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception an inventory of real properties of the estate and
of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement to render an accounting of cash and bank
of partition of the properties of the deceased
Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial properties.
court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this
same order, the trial court ordered the
administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to
partition the properties of the deceased in the
way and manner they are divided and
partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition
and further ordered that 40% of the market
value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be
segregated and reserved for attorney's fees.
According to the manifestation of Judge
Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197,
Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally
distributed to the nine (9) declared heirs the
properties due to the following circumstances:
1. The court's determination of the
market value of the estate in order to
segregate the 40% reserved for
attorney's fees;
2. The order of December 24, 1974,
declaring Fortunato Borromeo as
beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate
because of the waiver agreement
signed by the heirs representing the
5/9 group which is still pending
resolution by this Court (G.R. No.
4117 1);
3. The refusal of administrator Jose
Cuenco Borromeo to render his
accounting; and
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for
1/2 of the estate causing annotations
of notices of lis pendens on the
different titles of the properties of the
estate.
Since there are still real properties of the estate
that were not vet distributed to some of the
declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of
heirs due to the pending resolution of the
waiver agreement, this Court in its resolution of
June 15, 1983, required the judge of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to
expedite the determination of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co-
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit
deposits realized from rents of several
The matter of attorney's fees shall be
discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000,
setting aside the Order of the trial
court dated December 24, 1974;
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the
petition for review seeking to modify
the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from further
hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito
Borromeo and ordering the remand
of the case to the Executive,Judge of
the Regional trial Court of Cebu for
re-raffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the
petition to restrain the respondents
from further acting on any and all
incidents in Special proceedings No.
916-11 because of the affirmation of
the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818.
the trial court may now terminate and close
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real
properties of the estate and an accounting of
the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as
co-administrator of the estate, if he has not vet
done so, as required by this Court in its
Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be
effected with all deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco
Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo filed a motion
for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch 11, presided over by Judge
Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from
further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-
R. 'The movants alleged, among others, the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
6. To keep the agitation to sell
moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion
for the production of the certificates
of title and to deposit the same with
the Branch Clerk of Court,
presumably for the ready inspection
of interested buyers. Said motion
was granted by the Hon. Court in its
order of October 2, 1978 which,
however, became the subject of
various motions for reconsideration
from heirs-distributees who
contended that as owners they
cannot be deprived of their titles for
the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty,
Antigua. In view of the motions for
reconsideration, Atty Antigua
ultimately withdraw his motions for
production of titles.
7. The incident concerning the
production of titles triggered another
incident involving Atty. Raul H.
Sesbreno who was then the counsel
of herein movants Petra O.
Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In
connection with said incident, Atty.
Sesbreno filed a pleading which the
tion. presiding, Judge Considered
direct contempt because among
others, Atty. Sesbreno insinuated
that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands
to receive "fat commission" from the
sale of the entire property. Indeed,
Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in
danger of being declared in contempt
of court with the dim prospect of
suspension from the practice of his
profession. But obviously to extricate
himself from the prospect of
contempt and suspension. Atty.
Sesbreno chose rapproachment and
ultimately joined forces with Atty.
Antigua, et al., who, together,
continued to harass administrator
xxx xxx xxx
9. The herein movants are informed
and so they allege, that a brother of
the Hon. Presiding Judge is married
to a sister of Atty. Domingo L.
Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war
bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who
are agitating for the sale of the entire
estate or to buy out the individual
heirs, on the one hand, and the
herein movants, on the other, who
are not willing to sell their distributive
shares under the terms and
conditions presently proposed. In this
tug of war, a pattern of harassment
has become apparent against the
herein movants, especially Jose
Cuenco Borromeo. Among the
harassments employed by Atty
Antigua et al. are the pending
motions for the removal of
administrator Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, the subpoena duces
tecum issued to the bank which
seeks to invade into the privacy of
the personal account of Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, and the other matters
mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof.
More harassment motions are
expected until the herein movants
shall finally yield to the proposed
sale. In such a situation, the herein
movants beg for an entirely
independent and impartial judge to
pass upon the merits of said
incidents.
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge
continue to sit and take cognizance
of this proceeding, including the
incidents above-mentioned, he is
liable to be misunderstood as being
biased in favor of Atty Antigua, et al.
and prejudiced against the herein
movants. Incidents which may create
this impression need not be
enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41,
Rollo)
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge
Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the
private respondents filed a petition for certiorari
and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction
before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents
alleged, among others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
16. With all due respect, petitioners
regret the necessity of having to
state herein that respondent Hon.
Francisco P. Burgos has shown
undue interest in pursing the sale
initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua,
et al. Significantly, a brother of
respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos is married to a sister of Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua.
17. Evidence the proposed sale of
the entire properties of the estate
cannot be legally done without the
conformity of the heirs-distributees
because the certificates of title are
already registered in their names
Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to
sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos urged the heirs-distributees
to sell the entire property based on
the rationale that proceeds thereof
deposited in the bank will earn
interest more than the present
income of the so called estate. Most
of the heirs-distributees, however.
have been petitioner timid to say
their piece. Only the 4/9 group of
heirs led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo
have had the courage to stand up
and refuse the proposal to sell
clearly favored by respondent Hon.
Francisco P. Burgos.
xxx xxx xxx
20. Petitioners will refrain from
discussing herein the merits of the
shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L.
Antigua as well as other incidents
now pending in the court below
which smack of harassment against
the herein petitioners. For,
regardless of the merits of said
incidents, petitioners respectfully
contend that it is highly improper for
respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos to continue to preside over
Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the
following circumstances:
(a) He has shown undue
interest in the sale of the
properties as initiated by Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua whose
sister is married to a brother of
respondent.
(b) The proposed sale cannot
be legally done without the
conformity of the heirs-
distributees, and petitioners
have openly refused the sale, to
the great disappointment of
respondent.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty.
Antigua and similar incidents
are clearly intended to harass
and embarrass administrator
Jose Cuenco Borromeo in order
to pressure him into acceding to
the proposed sale.
(d) Respondent has shown bias
and prejudice against
petitioners by failing to resolve
the claim for attorney's fees
filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo
and the late Crispin Borromeo.
Similar claims by the other
lawyers were resolved by
respondent after petitioners
refused the proposed sale. (pp.
41-43, Rollo)
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court
rendered its decision granting the petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further
cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
The court also ordered the transmission of the
records of the case to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-
raffling.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision
was denied by the appellate court on April 11,
1983. Hence, the present petition for review
seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from further hearing the case of
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders
the remand of the case to the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-
raffling.
The principal issue in this case has become
moot and academic because Judge Francisco
P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu sometime before the latest
reorganization of the judiciary. However, we
decide the petition on its merits for the
guidance of the judge to whom this case will be
reassigned and others concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose
Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed. They
contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown
unusual interest in the proposed sale of the
entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the
buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this
disinterest is shown by the judge's order of
March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the
estate at P15,000,000.00. They add that he
only ordered the administrator to sell so much Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the
of the properties of the estate to pay the
attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To
them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would
have been unreasonable because his orders
against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo,
as administrator, to give an accounting and
inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the
appellate court. They claim that the respondent
court, should also have taken judicial notice of
the resolution of this Court directing the said
judge to "expedite the settlement and
adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232.
And finally, they state that the disqualification
of judge Burgos would delay further the closing
of the administration proceeding as he is the
only judge who is conversant with the 47
volumes of the records of the case.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show
that he had been harassed. countered that
Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as
co-administrator of the estate on October 11,
1972, yet Borromeo was singled out to make
an accounting of what t he was supposed to
have received as rentals for the land upon
which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from
January, 1977 to February 1982, inclusive,
without mentioning the withholding tax for the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order to bolster
the agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo L.
Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio
Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from
February 26 to 28, 1979. During the
conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered
to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees
presumably to cover up the projected sale
initiated by Atty. Antigua.
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the
conferences, a motion was filed by petitioner
Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco
Borromeo be required to file an inventory when
he has already filed one to account for cash, a It was further argued by the private
report on which the administrators had already
rendered: and to appear and be examined
under oath in a proceeding conducted by
Judge Burgos lt was also prayed that
subpoena duces tecum be issued for the
appearance of the Manager of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., bringing all
the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco
Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the
appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda
Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee
Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with the
filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty.
issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the
Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored.
Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial
of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another judge must be avoided at all costs. In the case
subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco
Borromeo.
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court
issued a subpoena duces tecum to the
Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for
the City of Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the
Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco
Borromeo.
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty
Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs
of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause
with Atty Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner
Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief
of the administrator.
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a
request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco
Borromeo to bring and produce all the owners"
copies of the titles in the court presided order
by Judge Burgos.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court
issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding
Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and
produce the titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on
June 7, 1979 but on June 14, 1979, before the
date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an
order denying the private respondents' motion
for reconsideration and the motion to quash the
subpoena.1avvphi1
respondents that if ,judge Francisco P. Burgos Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the
is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp.
Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a miscarriage the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should
of justice Because for the past twelve years, he be DENIED for the decision is not only valid but
had not done anything towards the closure of
the estate proceedings except to sell the
properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated
by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million G.R. No. 65995
pesos while the Intestate Court had already
evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
The allegations of the private respondents in
their motion for inhibition, more specifically, the
insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire
estate at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of
of Bautista v. Rebeuno (81 SCRA 535), this
Court stated:
... The Judge must maintain and
preserve the trust and faith of the
parties litigants. He must hold
himself above reproach and
suspicion. At the very first sign of
lack of faith and trust to his actions,
whether well grounded or not, the
Judge has no other alternative but
inhibit himself from the case. A judge
may not be legally Prohibited from
sitting in a litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will
induce doubt to his honest actuations
and probity in favor or of either partly
or incite such state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's
faith in the Courts of Justice is not
impaired, "The better course for the
Judge under such circumstances is
to disqualify himself "That way he
avoids being misunderstood, his
reputation for probity and objectivity
is preserve ed. what is more
important, the Ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up
to.
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private
respondents is based on sound reasons. As
Earlier stated, however, the petition for review
seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from further hearing the Intestate
remand of the case to the Executive Judge of
the issue itself has become moot and
academic.
The petitioners seek to restrain the
respondents from further acting on any and all
incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R
during the pendency of this petition and No.
63818. They also pray that all acts of the
respondents related to the said special
proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the
respondent Judge was disqualified by the
appellate court be declared null and void and
without force and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge
has set for hearing all incidents in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion
from the heirs-distributees to the estate, of the
distributed properties already titled in their
names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the
pending inhibition case elevated before this
Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present
status of Special Proceeding No. 916-R
requires only the appraisal of the attorney's
fees of the lawyers-claimants who were
individually hired by their respective heirs-
clients, so their attorney's fees should be
legally charged against their respective clients
and not against the estate.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain
that the petition is a dilatory one and barred
by res judicata because this Court on July 8,
1981, in G.R. No. 54232 directed the
respondent Judge to expedite the settlement
and liquidation of the decedent's estate. They
claim that this resolution, which was already
final and executory, was in effect reversed and
nullified by the Intermediate Appellate Court in
its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 — when it
granted the petition for certiorari and or
prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from taking further cognizance of
Special Proceedings No. 916R as well as
ordering the transmission of the records of the
case to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on
March 1, 1983, which was appealed to this
Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R.
No. 63818).
We agree with the petitioners' contention that
attorney's fees are not the obligation of the
estate but of the individual heirs who
individually hired their respective lawyers. The
portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15,
1969, segregating the exhorbitantly excessive
amount of 40% of the market value of the
estate from which attorney's fees shall be
taken and paid should be deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No.
63818, we grant the petition.
WHEREFORE, —
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of
the respondent judge dated
December 24, 1974, declaring the
respondent entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of the late Vito Borromeo and
the order dated July 7, 1975, denying
the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the
aforementioned order are hereby
SET ASIDE for being NULL and
VOID;
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of
the trial court declaring the waiver
document valid is hereby SET
ASIDE;
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The issue in the
decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court disqualifying and
ordering the inhibition of Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from further
hearing Special Proceedings No.
916-R is declared moot and
academic. The judge who has taken
over the sala of retired Judge
Francisco P. Burgos shall
immediately conduct hearings with a
view to terminating the proceedings.
In the event that the successor-judge
is likewise disqualified, the order of
the Intermediate Appellate Court
directing the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-
raffle the case shall be implemented:
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. 'The issue
seeking to restrain Judge Francisco
P. Burgos from further acting in G.R.
No. 63818 is MOOT and
ACADEMIC:
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court
is hereby ordered to speedily
terminate the close Special
Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to
the submission of an inventory of the
real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the cash and bank
deposits by the petitioner-
administrator of the estate as
required by this Court in its
Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and
x-----------------------x
(6) The portion of the Order of
August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of
the market value of the estate from
which attorney's fees shall be taken
and paid should be, as it is hereby
DELETED. The lawyers should
collect from the heirs-distributees
who individually hired them,
attorney's fees according to the
nature of the services rendered but
in amounts which should not exceed
more than 20% of the market value
of the property the latter acquired
from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO
LIM, Jr., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO
JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL
MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II,
MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, Jr., and
ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa – the victim in this case – on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to
put an end to hazing.1 Due in large part to the
brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
Villa, groups were organized, condemning his
senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a
special law, which became effective in 1995,
that would criminalize hazing.2 The intent of the
law was to discourage members from making
hazing a requirement for joining their sorority,
fraternity, organization, or
association.3 Moreover, the law was meant to
counteract the exculpatory implications of
"consent" and "initial innocent act" in the
conduct of initiation rites by making the mere
act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.4
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not
discourage hazing activities in the
country.5 Within a year of his death, six more
cases of hazing-related deaths emerged –
those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University
of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San
Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng
Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza
of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine
Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the
University of the Philippines in Baguio City.6
Although courts must not remain indifferent to
public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they
are still bound to observe a fundamental
principle in our criminal justice system – "[N]o
act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so
by law."7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
Even if an act is viewed by a large section of
the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot
be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of
the law, judges are called upon to set aside
emotion, to resist being swayed by strong
public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on
the elements of the offense and the facts
allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases
docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v.
People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People),
and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v.
Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court
of Appeals (CA)8 and the trial court,9 are as
follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law
students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join
the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs"
Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy,
Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes
were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo
Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they
went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to
expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings,
and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three
days. After their "briefing," they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they
had already received threats and insults from
the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes
alighted from the van and walked towards the
pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of
the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them.
The neophytes were then subjected to
traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."
These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express,"
which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor
with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked,
jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in
which the neophytes were held at the back of
their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to
neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their
arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two
Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During
this time, the neophytes were also
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9
February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. Whenever they would give a wrong
answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs.
Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The
neophytes were subjected to the same manner
of hazing that they endured on the first day of
initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the
day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni
fraternity members10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the
rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical
pain. Lenny received several paddle blows,
one of which was so strong it sent him
sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard
him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in
breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had
to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport.
Again, the initiation for the day was officially
ended, and the neophytes started eating
dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were
suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and
Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they
realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him.
They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm.
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans
rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide
was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman) Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11 On
the other hand, the trial against the remaining
16. Antonio General (General) nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340
was held in abeyance due to certain matters
that had to be resolved first.12
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo
(Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion
(Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered
judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
holding the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide,
penalized with reclusion temporal under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code.13 A few weeks
after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on
29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-
38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.14
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No.
15520)15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual
participation. Accused De Leon had by then
passed away, so the following Decision applied
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-
appellants – Victorino, Sabban,
Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De
Guzman, Santos, General, Flores,
Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez,
Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – The Petition raises two reversible errors
were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants –
Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, and
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
were found guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died
to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of ₱
30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants –
Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal –
were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱
50,000 and to pay the additional
amount of ₱ 1,000,000 by way of
moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation
of his right to speedy trial.16 Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and
2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October
2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
9015318 reversed the trial court’s Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.19
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five
(5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision
dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520
– first, denial of due process; and, second,
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.20
While the Petition was pending before this
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that
the subject matter of the Petition previously
filed by petitioner does not survive the death of
the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 – Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA’s
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R.
No. 15520.21 Petitioner sets forth two main
issues – first, that he was denied due process
when the CA sustained the trial court’s
forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and,
second, that he was deprived of due process
when the CA did not apply to him the same
"ratio decidendi that served as basis of
acquittal of the other accused."22
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a
ruling, which forfeited Dizon’s right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected
Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date
since a co-accused, Antonio General, no
longer presented separate evidence during
trial. According to Dizon, his right should not
have been considered as waived because he
was justified in asking for a postponement. He
argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any
of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he
was ready to present evidence on the original
pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier
hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner
contends that he should have likewise been
acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts
were also part of the traditional initiation rites
and were not tainted by evil motives.23 He
claims that the additional paddling session was
part of the official activity of the fraternity. He
also points out that one of the neophytes
admitted that the chairperson of the initiation
rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to
undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal
proceeded to do the paddling…."24 Further,
petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor ruling of the trial court should have been
General that "the individual blows inflicted by
Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in
Lenny’s death." The Solicitor General
25
purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr.
Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by
Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken
individually, but if taken collectively, the result
is the violent death of the victim."26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA
that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that
Lenny’s father could not have stolen the
parking space of Dizon’s father, since the latter Petitioner also argues that the rule on double
did not have a car, and their fathers did not
work in the same place or office. Revenge for
the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his
utterances regarding a stolen parking space
were only part of the "psychological initiation." the criminal liability of all the accused must be
He then cites the testimony of Lenny’s co-
neophyte – witness Marquez – who admitted
knowing "it was not true and that he was just
making it up…."27
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged
motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon
alludes to the testimony of one of the
neophytes, who mentioned that the former had the CA’s Decision dated 25 October 2006 and
kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to
switch places with Lenny to prevent the latter’s
chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a
sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
According to petitioner, his alleged ill
motivation is contradicted by his manifestation
of compassion and concern for the victim’s
well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 – People v. Court of Appeals Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks
the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August
2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4
(Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.28 According to the Solicitor General,
the CA erred in holding that there could have
been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as
hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the
upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was
conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny.
Since the injuries led to the victim’s death,
petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are
criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised
29
Penal Code. The said article provides:
"Criminal liability shall be incurred… [b]y any
person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended."
jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave
excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial
court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that
based on their individual participation in the
commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 – Villa v.
Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of
Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P.
Nos. 89060 and 90153.30 The Petition involves
the dismissal of the criminal charge filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial
court ordered a separate trial for accused
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil,
Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and
commence after proceedings against the 26
other accused in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8
November 1993, the trial court found the 26
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a
result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-
38340 involving the nine other co-accused
recommenced on 29 November 1993. For
"various reasons," the initial trial of the case did
not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost
12 years after the arraignment of the nine
accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the
criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to
assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She also points out
that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the
delay, as the original records and the required
evidence were not at its disposal, but were still
in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we
group into five.
Issues
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner
Dizon’s right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of the right of
the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it
set aside the finding of conspiracy by In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court
the trial court and adjudicated the set the dates for the reception of evidence for
liability of each accused according to accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and
individual participation; 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of
October 1993.35 The Order likewise stated that
"it will not entertain any postponement and that
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of
all the accused who have not yet presented
homicide; and
their respective evidence should be ready at all
times down the line, with their evidence on all
5. Whether the CA committed grave said dates. Failure on their part to present
abuse of discretion when it evidence when required shall therefore be
pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, construed as waiver to present evidence."36
and Bantug guilty only of slight
physical injuries.
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for
another accused manifested in open court that
Discussion his client – Antonio General – would no longer
present separate evidence. Instead, the
counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
of the other accused who had already
testified.37 Because of this development and
G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People pursuant to the trial court’s Order that the
parties "should be ready at all times down the
line," the trial court expected Dizon to present
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and
evidence on the next trial date – 25 August
while the Petition was pending resolution, this
1993 – instead of his originally assigned dates.
Court took note of counsel for petitioner’s
The original dates were supposed to start two
Notice of Death of Party.
weeks later, or on 8 September
1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal able to present evidence on the accelerated
Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is date. To address the situation, counsel filed a
totally extinguished by the death of the convict. Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he
In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary had to appear in a previously scheduled case,
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies and that he would be ready to present
prior to final judgment. The term "personal evidence on the dates originally assigned to his
penalties" refers to the service of personal or clients.39 The trial court denied the
imprisonment penalties,31while the term Manifestation on the same date and treated the
"pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to Constancia as a motion for postponement, in
fines and costs,32 including civil liability violation of the three-day-notice rule under the
40
predicated on the criminal offense complained Rules of Court. Consequently, the trial court
33
of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil ruled that the failure of Dizon to present
liability based on a source of obligation other evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.41
than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he
civil action.34 was deprived of due process of law when the
trial court forfeited his right to present
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner evidence. According to him, the postponement
Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have
both personal and pecuniary penalties, been considered justified, since his original
including his civil liability directly arising from pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to
the delict complained of. Consequently, his start until 8 September 1993, when he was
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal scheduled to present evidence. He posits that
case against him deemed closed and he was ready to present evidence on the dates
assigned to him. He also points out that he did
terminated.
not ask for a resetting of any of the said
hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed
by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the
trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of
presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating
the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.42 Article III, Section 14(2) thereof,
provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused … shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel…" This constitutional right
includes the right to present evidence in one’s
defense,43 as well as the right to be present
and defend oneself in person at every stage of
the proceedings.44
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the
Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the
defense’s presentation of evidence for 21, 22
and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing
was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in the
regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan’s
Second Division and upon the agreement of
the parties. The hearing was reset for the next
day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his
counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan,
on the very same day, issued an Order
directing the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of hisAugust 1993 as a waiver of his right to present even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the
surety bond. The Order further declared that he evidence. On the contrary, it should have
had waived his right to present evidence
because of his nonappearance at "yesterday’s
and today’s scheduled hearings." In ruling
against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c),
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo’s
non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial
was merely a waiver of his right to be present
for trial on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates…
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22
June 1995 hearing should not have been
deemed as a waiver of his right to present
evidence. While constitutional rights may be
waived, such waiver must be clear and must be work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish
the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive case to the trial court.47 In People v. Bodoso,
in person or even through his counsel the right we ruled that where facts have adequately
to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan
imposed the waiver due to the agreement of
the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's prejudiced either the prosecution or the
counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty
may be death, as in the present case, the court
is called upon to see to it that the accused is
personally made aware of the consequences of
a waiver of the right to present evidence. In
fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply
warned of the consequences of another failure
to attend the succeeding hearings. The court
must first explain to the accused personally in
clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not
even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply
went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right
to present evidence without even allowing
Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22
June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present
evidence in a criminal case involving a grave
penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The
presence of the accused and his counsel is
indispensable so that the court could
personally conduct a searching inquiry into the
waiver x x x.46 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the
failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
considered the excuse of counsel justified,
especially since counsel for another accused – injustice on the parties. This case has been
General – had made a last-minute adoption of going on for almost two decades. Its resolution discussed, however, where the dismissal of the 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the
testimonial evidence that freed up the
succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five
hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it
really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the
most it could have done was to forfeit one out
of the five days set for Dizon’s testimonial
evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-
assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident
guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the
been represented in a criminal case, and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has
defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the
rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be
upheld if the judgment is supported beyond may require were not at its disposal as these prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.48 were in the Court of Appeals."51 the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
We do not see any material inadequacy in the The right of the accused to a speedy trial has
relevant facts on record to resolve the case at been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, xxx xxx xxx
bar. Neither can we see any "procedural Article III of the 1987 Constitution.52 This right
unfairness or irregularity" that would requires that there be a trial free from
While we are prepared to concede that some of
substantially prejudice either the prosecution or vexatious, capricious or oppressive
the foregoing factors that contributed to the
the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the
delay of the trial of the petitioners are
fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon proceeding is attended with unjustified
justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right
in his Petition corroborate the material facts postponements of trial, or when a long period
to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this
relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he of time is allowed to elapse without the case
case x x x.
is really contesting in his Petition is the being tried and for no cause or justifiable
application of the law to the facts by the trial motive.54 In determining the right of the
court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits accused to speedy trial, courts should do more xxx xxx xxx
direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa than a mathematical computation of the
by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of the number of postponements of the scheduled
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court
petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and hearings of the case.55 The conduct of both the
[was] due to the fact that the records of the
that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites prosecution and the defense must be
case were elevated to the Court of Appeals,
was not outside the official activity of the weighed.56 Also to be considered are factors
fraternity."49 He even argues that "Dizon did not and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the
such as the length of delay, the assertion or
order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
request for the extension and he participated non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice
certified true copies of the same. What is
only after the activity was sanctioned."50 wrought upon the defendant.57
glaring from the records is the fact that as early
as September 21, 1995, the court a quo
For one reason or another, the case has been We have consistently ruled in a long line of already issued an Order requiring the
passed or turned over from one judge or justice cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to prosecution, through the Department of
to another – at the trial court, at the CA, and the right of the accused to speedy trial is Justice, to secure the complete records of the
tantamount to acquittal.58 As a consequence, case from the Court of Appeals. The
case for the reception of the evidence of an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal prosecution did not comply with the said Order
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further would amount to a violation of the principle of as in fact, the same directive was repeated by
double jeopardy.59 As we have previously the court a quo in an Order dated December
is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary case is capricious, certiorari lies.60 The rule on part of the prosecution. It is not stated when
to decide the case have already been double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition such order was complied with. It appears,
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal however, that even until August 5, 2002, the
instead of the correctness thereof.61 Rather, said records were still not at the disposal of the
grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of trial court because the lack of it was made the
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v.
jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents basis of the said court in granting the motion to
Escalona) 62
double jeopardy from attaching. dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the xxx xxx xxx
CA’s dismissal of the case against accused
not have been dismissed, since they failed to
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
assert their right to speedy trial within a It is likewise noticeable that from December 27,
basis of the violation of their right to speedy
reasonable period of time. She points out that 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of
trial. The court held thus:
the accused failed to raise a protest during the almost seven years, there was no action at all
dormancy of the criminal case against them, on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
and that they asserted their right only after the An examination of the procedural history of this pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the
trial court had dismissed the case against their case would reveal that the following factors petitioners, the latest of which was on January
co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also contributed to the slow progress of the 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Saruca’s
emphasizes that the trial court denied the proceedings in the case below: motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, which the court did not act upon, the case
Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it remained dormant for a considerable length of
xxx xxx xxx
found that "the prosecution could not be faulted time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
for the delay in the movement of this case precisely the kind of delay that the constitution
when the original records and the evidence it 5) The fact that the records of the case were frowns upon x x x.63(Emphasis supplied)
elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992,
the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion,
and De Vera.64 On 29 November 1993, they
were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial identical offense.69This principle is founded
trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after
arraignment.66
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v.
Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or
inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five
years since the arraignment of the accused
amounts to an unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases – a clear violation of the
right of the accused to a speedy disposition of Article III – Bill of Rights
cases.67 Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the
unreasonableness of the delay in the
disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs.
Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving
the criminal complaints to be violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court
held that the delay of almost six years
disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act
promptly on complaints before him; and in
Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court jeopardy. — When an accused has been
held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in not quashing the information
which was filed six years after the initiatory
complaint was filed and thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of information or other formal charge sufficient in due process;78 (2) where there is a finding of
the case. So it must be in the instant case,
where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman
has dragged on for a decade
already.68 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the
ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial
was violated. Since there is nothing in the
records that would show that the subject of this
Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this
ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the
pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates following: (a) there is a valid complaint or
that when a person is charged with an offense,
and the case is terminated – either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused – the accused
cannot again be charged with the same or an
upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.70 It is embodied in the civil law
maxim non bis in idem found in the common
law of England and undoubtedly in every
system of jurisprudence.71 It found expression
in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the
United States, and in our own Constitution as
one of the fundamental rights of the
citizen,72 viz:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court,
which implements this particular constitutional of his acquittal."77
right, provides as follows:73
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal that grave abuse of discretion cannot be
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him penalty on the latter in the following recognized misappreciated the facts and the
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
form and substance to sustain a conviction and mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a grave certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant to the rule on
after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse
state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
imposed either through a regular appeal under duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law
under Rule 45 of the same Rules.74 The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the
information; (b) it is filed before a competent
court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge;
and (d) the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case against him or her was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendant’s express consent.75
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of
Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is misappreciation of facts and evidence.
immediately final and a reexamination of the
merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the because private complainant and petitioner
same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine were denied due process of law when the
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to
wear out the accused by a multitude of cases
with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State,
following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.86 The
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a
greater penalty."76 We further stressed that "an Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing.87
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held
of the accused or the imposition of a lower
exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and correctible by an appeal or a petition for review
prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of
80
abuse of discretion.
The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial
power under Rule 65 to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion We, however, modify the assailed judgment as
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the the four fraternity members convicted of slight
government.81 Here, the party asking for the
review must show the presence of a whimsical
or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a
point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
83
court of its very power to dispense justice. In
such an event, the accused cannot be
considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition
for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1)
the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the
conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime
of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
According to the Petition, "the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law
public respondent completely ignored the a)
Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioner’s
Comment x x x."85 Allegedly, the CA ignored
evidence when it adopted the theory of
individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply
Solicitor General also assails the finding that
the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon
and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we
reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the
probative value of the evidence presented by
attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
evidence.89 Mere errors of judgment are
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by
an application for a writ of
double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny
the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19
acquitted fraternity members.
regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug –
physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that
the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
when the state seeks the imposition of a higher
penalty against the accused.91 We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be
used to correct an abusive judgment upon a
clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.92 The present case is one of
those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical
injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug,
the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear
that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds
inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the
injuries sustained by the victim as a result of
the physical punishment heaped on him were
serious in nature. However, by reason of the
death of the victim, there can be no precise
means to determine the duration of the
incapacity or the medical attendance required.
To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime
where the category of the offense and the
severity of the penalty depend on the period of
illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in much the same manner as
the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-
G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when
proof of the said period is absent, the crime
committed should be deemed only as slight
physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA,
59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil.
398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule
that the injuries inflicted by the appellants,
Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only
slight and not serious, in nature.93 (Emphasis
supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in
People v. Penesa94 in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight
physical injuries. According to the CA, because
of "the death of the victim, there can be no
precise means to determine the duration of the
incapacity or medical attendance
required."95 The reliance on Penesa was utterly
misplaced. A review of that case would reveal
that the accused therein was guilty merely of
slight physical injuries, because the victim’s
injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor
required medical attendance.96Furthermore, he
did not die.97 His injuries were not even
serious.98 Since Penesa involved a case in
which the victim allegedly suffered physical
injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the
CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion
that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly
contradicts its own findings of fact. According
to the court, the four accused "were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment
undertaken during such initiation rites on the
person of Villa."99 It then adopted the NBI
medico-legal officer’s findings that the
antecedent cause of Lenny Villa’s death was
the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered
from the initiation rites.100 Considering that the
CA found that the "physical punishment
heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in
nature,"101 it was patently erroneous for the
court to limit the criminal liability to slight
physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates
that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is
different from that intended. Thus, once a
person is found to have committed an initial
felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of
physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically
apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and
not subject to discretion.
The CA’s application of the legal framework
governing physical injuries – punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and
Article 365 for culpable felonies – is therefore
tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and
abusive exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally
imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing
the destruction of the life of a person, punished
under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional
felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies,
and not under the aforementioned provisions.
We emphasize that these two types of felonies criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
are distinct from and legally inconsistent with
each other, in that the accused cannot be held upon, to gain advantage over, to harm
criminally liable for physical injuries when
actual death occurs.102
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal
and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa –
is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From
proof that the death of the victim was the
cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he
suffered,103 the only logical conclusion is that
criminal responsibility should redound to all
those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries as on the nature of physical and psychological proceeding from an evil heart or but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his initiations widely known as hazing. purpose.122 With these elements taken negligence – the act must be qualified as
body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. together, the requirement of intent in intentional reckless or simple negligence or imprudence
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a resulting in homicide.134
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or vicious and malevolent state of mind
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the otherwise, intentional felony requires the
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to classical school of thought.105 The classical existence of dolus malus – that the act or
the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give theory posits that a human person is omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with The notion of hazing is not a recent
due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954. essentially a moral creature with an absolute deliberate evil intent," and "with malice development in our society.135 It is said that,
free will to choose between good and evil.106 It aforethought."123 The maxim is actus non facit throughout history, hazing in some form or
asserts that one should only be adjudged or reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not another has been associated with
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
held accountable for wrongful acts so long as committed if the mind of the person performing organizations ranging from military groups to
free will appears unimpaired.107 The basic the act complained of is innocent.124 As is indigenous tribes.136 Some say that elements of
According to the trial court, although hazing postulate of the classical penal system is that required of the other elements of a felony, the hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages,
was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the humans are rational and calculating beings existence of malicious intent must be proven during which new students who enrolled in
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa who guide their actions with reference to the beyond reasonable doubt.125 European universities worked as servants for
was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles principles of pleasure and pain.108 They refrain upperclassmen.137 It is believed that the
263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in from criminal acts if threatened with concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is
ruling against the accused, the court a quo punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of Greece,138 where young men recruited into the
necessary in order for conspiracy to attach.
found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the possible gain or advantage in committing the military were tested with pain or challenged to
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code – which
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity crime.109 Here, criminal liability is thus based on demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to
provides that "conspiracy exists when two or
members were guilty of homicide, as it was the the free will and moral blame of the prepare the recruits for battle.139 Modern
more persons come to an agreement
direct, natural and logical consequence of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea – defined as a fraternities and sororities espouse some
concerning the commission of a felony and
physical injuries they had intentionally guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or connection to these values of ancient Greek
decide to commit it" – is to be interpreted to
inflicted.104 criminal intent – is the predominant civilization.140 According to a scholar, this
refer only to felonies committed by means of
consideration.111 Thus, it is not enough to do concept lends historical legitimacy to a
dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an
what the law prohibits.112 In order for an "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective
The CA modified the trial court’s finding of agreement" connotes the existence of a
intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that members are asked to prove their worthiness
criminal liability. It ruled that there could have prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an
the act be committed by means of dolo or and loyalty to the organization in which they
been no conspiracy since the neophytes, element present only in intentional felonies. In
"malice."113 seek to attain membership through hazing.141
including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the
to the conduct of hazing during their initiation injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the
rites. The accused fraternity members, The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea wrong done being simply the result of an act Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity
therefore, were liable only for the involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, performed without malice or criminal system, custom requires a student wishing to
consequences of their individual acts. and intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers design.126 Here, a person performs an initial join an organization to receive an invitation in
Accordingly, 19 of the accused – Victorino et to an act done with deliberation and with power lawful deed; however, due to negligence, order to be a neophyte for a particular
al. – were acquitted; 4 of them – Tecson et al. to choose between two things.115 The second imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, chapter.142 The neophyte period is usually one
– were found guilty of slight physical injuries; element, intelligence, concerns the ability to the deed results in a wrongful act.127 Verily, a to two semesters long.143 During the "program,"
and the remaining 2 – Dizon and Villareal – determine the morality of human acts, as well deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is neophytes are required to interview and to get
were found guilty of homicide. as the capacity to distinguish between a licit a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with to know the active members of the chapter; to
and an illicit act.116 The last element, intent, the idea of a felony committed by means of learn chapter history; to understand the
involves an aim or a determination to do a culpa.128 principles of the organization; to maintain a
The issue at hand does not concern a typical
certain act.117 specified grade point average; to participate in
the organization’s activities; and to show
commits a felony in order to take revenge The presence of an initial malicious intent to
dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes,
The element of intent – on which this Court commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
the organization, and its active and alumni
maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. shall focus – is described as the state of mind establishing the commission of the intentional
members.144 Some chapters require the
Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation accompanying an act, especially a forbidden felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the
initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing
in which a man – driven by his own desire to act.118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and felony of homicide requires the existence of
acts during the entire neophyte stage.145
join a society of men – pledged to go through the resolve with which a person proceeds.119 It malice or dolo130 immediately before or
physically and psychologically strenuous does not refer to mere will, for the latter simultaneously with the infliction of
admission rituals, just so he could enter the pertains to the act, while intent concerns the injuries.131 Intent to kill – or animus interficendi Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an
fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our result of the act.120 While motive is the "moving – cannot and should not be inferred, unless initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite
criminal laws apply to such situation absent the power" that impels one to action for a definite there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such for admission to an organization.146 In hazing,
Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to result, intent is the "purpose" of using a intent.132 Furthermore, the victim’s death must the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate,"
make a brief exposition on the underlying particular means to produce the result.121 On not have been the product of accident, natural "applicant" – or any other term by which the
concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well the other hand, the term "felonious" means, cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an organization may refer to such a person – is
inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or act executed without malice or criminal intent – generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating
situations, like being forced to do menial, silly,
foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.147 It
encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.148 These acts usually involve
physical or psychological suffering or injury.149
The concept of initiation rites in the country is
nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago,
our national hero – Andres Bonifacio –
organized a secret society named
Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan
ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most
Venerable Association of the Sons and
Daughters of the Nation).150 The Katipunan, or
KKK, started as a small confraternity believed
to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as
well as by confraternities or sodalities approved onto the neophyte paratroopers’ chests.163 The
by the Catholic Church.151 The Katipunan’s
ideology was brought home to each member
through the society’s initiation ritual.152 It is said
that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit
by a single point of illumination, and were
asked a series of questions to determine
their fitness, loyalty, courage, and
resolve.153 They were made to go through
vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang
lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon."154 It would
seem that they were also made to withstand
the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi"
and to endure a "matalas na punyal."155 As a
final step in the ritual, the neophyte
Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.156
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system
was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be
seen in the following instances, the manner of fraternity members then put the pledges
hazing in the United States was jarringly similar through a seven-station circle of physical
to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on
Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point
Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes Auburn University in Alabama. The hazing
resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch
or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways and jump into it after it had been filled with
157
to humiliate themselves. In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a
congressional investigation of hazing at the
academy during his second year at West
158
Point.
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville,
decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was
injured during the shriner’s hazing event, which
was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
membership.159 The ritual involved what was
known as the "mattress-rotating barrel
trick."160 It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board
onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel,
over which the candidate was required to
climb.161Members of Hejaz would stand on
each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-
paddle candidates en route to the barrel.162
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine
paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, torture, psychological coercion and
were seen performing a ceremony in which
they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly
victims were shown writhing and crying out in
pain as others pounded the spiked medals
through the shirts and into the chests of the
victims.164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the
Southeast Missouri State University chapter of
Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter
into a pledgeship program.165 The fraternity
members subjected the pledges to repeated
physical abuse including repeated, open-hand
strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and
buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a
heavy book and a cookie sheet while the
pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and
"body slamming," an activity in which active
members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in
the air and dropped them to the ground.166 The
167
abuse.
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the
pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the
168
water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit;
(2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3)
being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or
into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a
mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter,
beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for
the fraternity and its members, such as
cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being
designated as driver, and running errands; (6)
appearing regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings,"
during which the pledges would be hazed for a
couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet,"
during which the pledges were pushed, kicked,
and hit as they ran down a hallway and
descended down a flight of stairs.169
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided
in 1999, the victim – Sylvester Lloyd – was
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University
chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.170 He
participated in initiation activities, which
included various forms of physical beatings and
embarrassment.171
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity,
decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered
injuries from hazing activities during the
fraternity’s initiation rites.172 Kenner and the
other initiates went through psychological and
physical hazing, including being paddled on the
buttocks for more than 200 times.173
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones – a university
student in Florida – sought initiation into the
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi
Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic
year.174 The pledge’s efforts to join the fraternity
culminated in a series of initiation rituals
conducted in four nights. Jones, together with
other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally
harassed, and caned on his face and
buttocks.175 In these rituals described as
"preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings,
he received approximately 60 canings on his
buttocks.176 During the last two days of the
hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The pledges
sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the
four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other
candidates passed out.179
The purported raison d’être behind hazing
practices is the proverbial "birth by fire,"
through which the pledge who has successfully
withstood the hazing proves his or her
worth.180 Some organizations even believe that
hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said
that this process enables the organization to
establish unity among the pledges and, hence,
reinforces and ensures the future of the
organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining
include leadership opportunities; improved
academic performance; higher self-esteem;
professional networking opportunities; and the prospective member, in which case it becomes
esprit d’corp associated with close, almost filial, a Class C felony.196 A Class C felony provides
friendship and common cause.182 for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven
years.197
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of
another is a state jail felony.198 An individual
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished
1874 in response to hazing in the
by confinement in a state jail for any term of not
military.183 The hazing of recruits and plebes in
more than two years or not less than 180
the armed services was so prevalent that
days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in
Congress prohibited all forms of military
serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a
184
hazing, harmful or not. It was not until 1901
third-degree felony.200 A person who has been
that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing
convicted of a third-degree felony may be
law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one
sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to
sustains an injury to his [or her] person
exceed five years.201 West Virginia law provides
therefrom."185
that if the act of hazing would otherwise be
deemed a felony, the hazer may be found
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided
due in large part to the efforts of the Committee therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a
to Halt Useless College Killings and other Class G felony if hazing results in the death of
similar organizations, that states increasingly another.203 A Class G felony carries a fine not
began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to
criminalizing hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six exceed 10 years, or both.204
states had enacted criminal or civil statutes
proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing
the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and
were left with limited remedies, as there was no
carry relatively light consequences for even the
hazing statute.205 This situation was exemplified
most severe situations.188 Only a few states
in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,
with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a
wherein Barry Ballou’s family resorted to a civil
felony in case death or great bodily harm
action for wrongful death, since there was no
occurs. 189
anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until
1994.206
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A
misdemeanor, except hazing that results in
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4
190 kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
felony. In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less
than one year and not more than three The presence of an ex ante situation – in this
years.191 Indiana criminal law provides that a case, fraternity initiation rites – does not
person who recklessly, knowingly, or automatically amount to the absence of
intentionally performs hazing that results in malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven
serious bodily injury to a person commits beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192 were equipped with a guilty mind – whether or
not there is a contextual background or factual
premise – they are still criminally liable for
The offense becomes a Class C felony if
193 intentional felony.
committed by means of a deadly weapon. As
an element of a Class C felony – criminal
recklessness – resulting in serious bodily The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor
injury, death falls under the category of General are all in agreement that – with the
"serious bodily injury."194 A person who exception of Villareal and Dizon – accused
commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not
fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) have the animus interficendi or intent to kill
years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no
195
years. Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a longer disturb this finding.
Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a
substantial risk to the life of the student or
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, had his brother killed," can you inform this
modified the Decision of the trial court and bow our head down and to link our arms and voices that you heard? he kept on uttering those words/statements so Honorable Court what exactly were the
found that the two accused had the animus then the driver of the van and other members that it would in turn justify him and to give me accusations that were charged against you
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside harder blows, sir. while inflicting blows upon you in particular?
Witness One particular utterance always said
merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It the van, sir.
was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan,
justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by
kayang-kaya pa niyan." xxx xxx xxx Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me,
holding that he had apparently been motivated
xxx xxx xxx he told me in particular if I knew that his family
by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept
who had his brother killed, and he said that his
repeating that his father’s parking space had Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in
brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was
been stolen by the victim’s father.207 As to Witness We heard voices shouted outside the uttered those particular words that you quote? particular mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father
just a story that he made up and I said that I
Villareal, the court said that the accused van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion stole the parking space allotted for his father,
knew nothing about it and he continued
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, Patay ka" and the people outside pound the do you recall who were within hearing distance
Witness I cannot particularly point to because inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident
one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in van, rock the van, sir. when that utterance was made?
there were utterances simultaneously, I could was when a talk was being given, Dizon was
the death of Villareal’s brother.208 The CA then
not really pin point who uttered those words, on another part of the pelota court and I was
ruled as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone sir. Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking
of voice and how strong a voice these remarks that utterance, sir. beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez,
The two had their own axes to grind against uttered upon your arrival? Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan,
Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they xxx xxx xxx ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa
acted with evil and criminal intent. The xxx xxx xxx aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir.
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could
evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you
for the death of Villa, feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express? Witness There were different times made this Atty. Tadiar What else?
appellants Dizon and Villarealmust and should accusation so there were different people who
face the consequence of their acts, that is, to xxx xxx xxx heard from time to time, sir.
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
be held liable for the crime of Witness That’s all, sir.
homicide.209 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February
was being rocked through and through, what
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion. Honorable Court what were the utterances that
were the voices or utterances that you heard? 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came
you remember? Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court around as promised to you earlier?
when was the next accusation against Lenny
The appellate court relied mainly on the Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," Villa’s father was made?
Witness For example, one person
testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir. Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied)
the existence of animus interficendi. For a full particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh,
appreciation of the context in which the he would say that and I quote "ito, yung Witness When we were line up against the
supposed utterances were made, the Court Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido
deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant how long did they continue during the rocking that would in turn sort of justifying him in Lenny Villa’s turn, I heard him uttered those Marquez testified thus:
portions of witness Marquez’s testimony: of the van which lasted for 5 minutes? inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead statements, sir.
of just walking, he would jump on my thighs
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct
and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was
Witness We were brought up into [Michael x x x x x x x x x Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that
saying to the effect that "this guy, his father
Musngi’s] room and we were briefed as to what accusation to Lenny Villa’s father? there was a briefing that was conducted
stole the parking space of my father," sir. So,
immediately before your initiation as regards to
to expect during the next three days and we Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still that’s why he inflicted more pain on Villa and what to expect during the initiation, did I hear
were told the members of the fraternity and kept on hearing voices, sir. that went on, sir. Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny you right?
their batch and we were also told about the Villa.
fraternity song, sir.
xxx xxx xxx Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which
Witness Yes, sir.
particular accused? Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
physical beating] were being inflicted, was Witness Boyet Dizon, sir. Witness There were slaps and he knelt on
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael there any utterances by anybody? Lenny Villa’s thighs and sometime he stand up
Musngi’s] house and we were made to ride a and he kicked his thighs and sometimes Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson
van and we were brought to another place in Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that
jumped at it, sir. Victorino.
Kalookan City which I later found to be the Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some particular time was accusing you of having your
place of Mariano Almeda, sir. were discouraging, and some were family have his brother killed, what was your
encouraging others who were pounding and response? xxx xxx xxx Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the
beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, Honorable Court what they told you to expect
xxx xxx xxx actually some of them enjoyed looking us being during the initiation?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day
pounded, sir.
true and that he was just making it up sir. So but not right now. You mentioned also that
he said that I knew nothing of that incident. accusations made by Dizon "you or your family
Witness They told us at the time we would be
brought to a particular place, we would be
mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be
mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the
likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand
that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that
we could immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and legs,
sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms
like long sleeves, it would be covered actually
so we have no thinking that our face would be
slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that
beforehand that you would have bruises on
your body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical
contact or implements that you expect that
would create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that
there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr.
Marquez that much of the initiation procedures
is psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is the fraternity members during their initiation
did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-
called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you
believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare
you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating
masters made belief situation intended to, I
repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into
perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr.
Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that
your family were responsible for the killing of that was followed by the initiating masters not
his brother who was an NPA, do you remember only on you but also on the other neophytes?
saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with
that statement said to you by Dizon that you
did not believe him because that is not true,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only
psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I
have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and
you or frightening you into quitting the initiation,
this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main
reason, I think, why he was saying those things
was because he wanted to inflict injury.
your only perception, correct? rites."214
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he We agree with the Solicitor General.
was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that
you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said
that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the
others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr.
Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the
Bicol Express for instance, the masters would
run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say
that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also
administered by one master on a neophyte,
was also administered by another master on
the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the
Villareal were "baseless,"213 since the
statements of the accused were "just part of
the psychological initiation calculated to instill
fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here
is no element of truth in it as testified by
Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh
words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are
part of ‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez
reveals a glaring mistake of substantial
proportion on the part of the CA – it mistook the
utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such
inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially
because it was the CA’s primary basis for
finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny
Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the
intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquez’s testimony,
as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered
both "accusations" against Villa and Marquez;
Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the
specific threats referred to by the CA. It was
"Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez’s]
thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid
ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa’s
thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole which I already described yesterday, like
the parking space of my father." With the
testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no
basis for concluding the existence of intent to
kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on
the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to
fully appreciate and understand the testimony
of witness Marquez. At the outset, the
neophytes were briefed that they would be
subjected to psychological pressure in order to
scare them. They knew that they would be
mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard
fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto,"
"Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion,
gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang
ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other
215
words to that effect. While beating the
neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the
death of the former’s purported NPA brother,
and then blamed Lenny Villa’s father for
stealing the parking space of Dizon’s father.
According to the Solicitor General, these
statements, including those of the accused
Dizon, were all part of the psychological
initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s
way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at
the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories,
so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes
harder blows, all in the context of fraternity
initiation and role playing. Even one of the
neophytes admitted that the accusations were
untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not
unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during
the Senate deliberations on the then proposed
Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as
follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that
we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase
"or psychological pain and suffering."
xxx xxx xxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted
upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit
or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts
playing the Russian roulette extensively to test
the readiness and the willingness of the
neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be
a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar
organization or playing and putting a noose on
the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the
fourth floor of the building facing outside,
asking him to jump outside after making him
turn around several times but the reality is that
he will be made to jump towards the inside
portion of the building – these are the mental or
psychological tests that are resorted to by
these organizations, sororities or fraternities.
The doctors who appeared during the public
hearing testified that such acts can result in
some mental aberration, that they can even
lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is
what we want to prevent.217 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt,
Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil
motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be
taken within the context of the fraternity’s
psychological initiation. This Court points out
that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any
familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizon’s threats. The
testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte, Marquez,
only confirmed this view. According to
Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that
[Dizon] was just making it up…."218 Even the
trial court did not give weight to the utterances
of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he
cumulative acts of all the accused were not
directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict
physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation
rites x x x."219 The Solicitor General shares the
same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of
accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article her students behind her legs and thighs as a
249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of form of discipline. The student suffered lesions
the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt liability for slight physical injuries, this Court
of such intent.220 Instead, we adopt and
reinstate the finding of the trial court in part,
insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity
members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa.221
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious
intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable
doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that
there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Our Lady of Fatima – under the guise of a
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial
court, the Solicitor General then posits that
since all of the accused fraternity members
conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny
Villa and death ensued, all of them should be
liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the
felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
222
Revised Penal Code, the employment of
physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the
existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there
must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious
as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of
certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical
injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of method employed, the kind of weapon used,
freedom and intelligence in an intentional
felony. The commission of the act does not, in
itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions
are.223
Thus, we have ruled in a number of
instances224 that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make
a person automatically liable for an intentional
felony. In Bagajo v. People,225 the accused
and bruises from the corporal punishment. In
reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal
stated thus: "Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility … [w]e are
persuaded that she did not do what she had
done with criminal intent … the means she
actually used was moderate and that she was
not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any
malevolent intent." Considering the applicable
laws, we then ruled that "as a matter of law,
petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for
her act of whipping her pupil." In People v.
Carmen,226 the accused members of the
religious group known as the Missionaries of
"ritual or treatment" – plunged the head of the
victim into a barrel of water, banged his head
against a bench, pounded his chest with fists,
and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen
knife, in order to cure him of "nervous
breakdown" by expelling through those means
the bad spirits possessing him. The collective
acts of the group caused the death of the
victim. Since malicious intent was not proven,
we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability
for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code and instead ruled that the accused
should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the
accused’s initial acts of inflicting physical pain
on the neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act
punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof.
intent must be judged by the action, conduct,
and external acts of the accused.227 What
persons do is the best index of their
intention.228 We have also ruled that the
and the parts of the body on which the injury
was inflicted may be determinative of the intent
of the perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background
surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation
rites. The night before the commencement of
the rites, they were briefed on what to expect.
They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for
three days, and that they could quit anytime.
On their first night, they were subjected to
"traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian
Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the
"Auxies’ Privilege Round." The beatings were
predominantly directed at the neophytes’ arms
and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation,
they were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required
to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were
once again subjected to "traditional" initiation
rituals. When the rituals were officially
reopened on the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to
another "traditional" ritual – paddling by the
fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries
were assigned to the neophytes. The
auxiliaries protected the neophytes by
functioning as human barriers and shielding
them from those who were designated to inflict
physical and psychological pain on the
initiates.230 It was their regular duty to stop foul
or excessive physical blows; to help the
neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that
their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest
interval after every physical activity or "round";
to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach
the initiates; and to give them whatever they
needed.
These rituals were performed with Lenny’s
consent.231 A few days before the "rites," he
asked both his parents for permission to join
the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that
Lenny would go through an initiation process
and would be gone for three days.233 The CA
found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes
willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can be roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which
gleaned from the narration of facts, they were assigned for the specific purpose of
voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to lending assistance to and taking care of the
become members of the Aquila Legis neophytes during the initiation rites, further
Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were belied the presence of malicious intent. All
given briefings on what to expect. It is of those who wished to join the fraternity went
common knowledge that before admission in a through the same process of "traditional"
fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was
passage. Thus, they were made aware that specifically targeted or given a different
traditional methods such as mocking, treatment. We stress that Congress itself
psychological tests and physical punishment recognized that hazing is uniquely different
would take place. They knew that the initiation from common crimes.235 The totality of the
would involve beatings and other forms of circumstances must therefore be taken into
hazing. They were also told of their right and consideration.
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to.
In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified
The underlying context and motive in which the
that accused Tecson told him that "after a
infliction of physical injuries was rooted may
week, you can already play basketball."
also be determined by Lenny’s continued
Prosecution witness Marquez for his part,
participation in the initiation and consent to the
admitted that he knew that the initiates would
method used even after the first day. The
be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden
following discussion of the framers of the 1995
paddle would be used to hit them and that he
Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
expected bruises on his arms and legs….
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation
without consenting neophytes.234 (Emphasis Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not
supplied) all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
Even after going through Aquila’s grueling
traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
continued his participation and finished the
second day of initiation.
Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present
and it results in death, the charge would be
Based on the foregoing contextual background, murder or homicide.
and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
the specific animus iniuriandi was not present
in this case. Even if the specific acts of
punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death,
of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying physical injuries.
the elements of freedom and intelligence in the
felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all
that was proven was that the acts were done Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who
pursuant to tradition. Although the additional commits sexual abuse does so it can be
"rounds" on the second night were held upon penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the
initiations were officially reopened with the
consent of the head of the initiation rites; and Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
the accused fraternity members still
participated in the rituals, including the Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for
paddling, which were performed pursuant to making a new offense under this definition of
tradition. Other than the paddle, no other the crime of hazing?
"weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny.
The targeted body parts were predominantly
the legs and the arms. The designation of
Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group
of persons either composing a sorority,
fraternity or any association from making this
requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr.
President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a
strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical
initiation before a person can become a
member without being held criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the
rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not
punishing a mere organization, he is not
seeking the punishment of an initiation into a
club or organization, he is seeking the
punishment of certain acts that resulted in
death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are
already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we
would like to discourage hazing, abusive
hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for
invoking two or more charges or offenses,
because these very same acts are already
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is
a very telling difference: When a person or
group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an
organization, the intent to commit a wrong is
not visible or is not present, Mr. President.
Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is
homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then
the intention to commit a wrong has to be
proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis,
what is important is the result from the act of
hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is
what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this
activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider
having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts
of lasciviousness are even committed initially,
Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-
called initial innocent act. That is why there is necessity to prove that the masters intended to resulting from hazing as necessary to be
need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po kill or the masters intended to maim. What is
ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay
magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay physical pain can easily escape responsibility
pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na
namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang
intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, We do not have any intention to kill or maim."
kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay
after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin
natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa
inyo."
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr.
President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I
am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent
that resulted in the death, that resulted in the
serious physical injuries, that resulted in the
acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We
do not have to prove the willful intent of the
accused in proving or establishing the crime of Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is
hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation
where we create the special crime without
having to go into the intent, which is one of the
basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the
intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor
admits that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a
new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What no need to prove intent to kill.
are punishable are the acts that lead to the
result. But if these results are not going to be
proven by intent, but just because there was
hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing,
precisely, is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the sororities
and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no
one will admit that their intention is to maim or
to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact
of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a
criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no
important is the result of the act of hazing.
Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the consent.
and say, "We did not have the intention to kill.
This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as by the phrase "without consent" for purposes of
well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et
cetera, where the prosecution will have a
difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming
there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is:
Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not
anymore?
present during hazing x x x
Senator Guingona. The persons are present.
First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution
have to prove intent to kill or not?
Senator Lina. No more. As to the second
question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is
Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.
Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should
not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon
and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the
Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this
Representation has no objection to the
inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions
punished. However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or without
To make it clearer, what is being punished here
is the commission of sodomy forced into
another individual by another individual. I
move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified
this section.
Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if
we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is
only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it
is done without consent will change a lot of
concepts here. Because the results from
hazing aggravate the offense with or without
consent. In fact, when a person joins a
fraternity, sorority, or any association for that
matter, it can be with or without the consent of
the intended victim. The fact that a person joins
a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not
negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the
citizens from the malpractices that attend
initiation which may have been announced with
or without physical infliction of pain or injury,
Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is
announcement that there will be physical
hazing or whether there is none, and therefore,
the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is
of no moment. What is important is that there is
an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even
has to be protected from himself if he joins a
fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the
State, the individual, or the parents of the
victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was
consent on the part of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the
position taken by the distinguished Gentleman
from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that
society sometimes adopts new mores,
traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into
the private proclivities of some individuals
when they do their acts in private as we do not
take a peek into the private rooms of couples.
They can do their thing if they want to make
love in ways that are not considered
acceptable by the mainstream of society. That
is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with
hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may
even be entered into with consent. It is not only
sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done
with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is
passed, that does not make the act of hazing
not punishable because the neophyte accepted
the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical
injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed
it upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we
allow that reasoning that sodomy was done
with the consent of the victim, then we would
not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will
always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as
part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing
that we would want to prohibit. That the
defense of consent will not apply because the
very act of inflicting physical pain or
psychological suffering is, by itself, a
punishable act. The result of the act of hazing,
like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But
the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy
can only aggravate the offense if it is
committed without consent of the victim, then
the whole foundation of this proposed law will
collapse.
Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Thank you very much.
The President. Is there any objection to the
committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.237
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the
state’s burden to prove intent, Senator Lina,
the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala degrees of precaution or diligence that may be
Leader brought out the idea of intent or
whether there it is mala in seor mala prohibita. background of his death, the unique nature of
There can be a radical amendment if that is the hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we
can just make this a special law on hazing. We
will not include this anymore under the Revised
Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not
foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.238(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict
between the proposed law and the core
principle of mala in se adhered to under the
Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply lack of skill.
enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon
the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma
faced by Congress is further proof of how the
nature of hazing – unique as against typical
crimes – cast a cloud of doubt on whether
society considered the act as an inherently
wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is
safe to presume that Lenny’s parents would not
have consented239 to his participation in Aquila
Fraternity’s initiation rites if the practice of
hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we
noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our
nation’s very recent history, the people have
spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of … hazing, [an] act[] previously
considered harmless by custom, as
criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a
simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing – or
the conduct of initiation rites through physical
and/or psychological suffering – has not been
traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-
Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna
in the law; hazing was not clearly considered
an intentional felony. And when there is doubt
on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must
be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio
pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of
law, the Court is constrained to rule against the
trial court’s finding of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent to inflict physical
in se cases, considering the contextual
The accused fraternity members guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not
automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means
of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of because it was deprived of its requisite blood
a voluntary act done without malice, from which and oxygen.254 The deprivation was due to the
an immediate personal harm, injury or material "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire
damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on the part of arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries – to the
the person committing it.241 In this case, the
danger is visible and consciously appreciated
by the actor.242In contrast, simple imprudence
or negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material
damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of
foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm
is not immediate, and the danger is not openly to those areas caused the blood to gradually
visible. 244
245
The test for determining whether or not a
person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of
the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about
to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution against the
mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so
246
constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to
avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required
varies with the degree of the danger
involved.247 If, on account of a certain line of
conduct, the danger of causing harm to another
person is great, the individual who chooses to
follow that particular course of conduct is
bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the
danger is minor, not much care is required.249 It
is thus possible that there are countless
required of an individual, "from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant
effort."250 The duty of the person to employ
more or less degree of care will depend upon
the circumstances of each particular case.251
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of
Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer,
Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
multiple traumatic injuries.252The officer
explained that cardiac failure refers to the
failure of the heart to work as a pump and as
part of the circulatory system due to the lack of
blood.253 In the present case, the victim’s heart
could no longer work as a pumping organ,
circulatory system – including the heart,
thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus
causing the formation of multiple hematomas
or blood clots.255 The multiple hematomas were
wide, thick, and deep,256 indicating that these
could have resulted mainly from injuries
sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee
blows, paddles, or the like.257 Repeated blows
ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating
blood became so markedly diminished as to
produce death. 258 The officer also found that
the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines,
and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as
well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were
pale due to the lack of blood, which was
redirected to the thighs and forearms.259 It was
concluded that there was nothing in the heart
that would indicate that the victim suffered from
a previous cardiac arrest or disease.260
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in
Lenny Villa’s arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss those who directly participated in and
of blood from his vital organs and led to his contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
eventual death. These hematomas must be
taken in the light of the hazing activities
It appears from the aforementioned facts that
performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity.
the incident may have been prevented, or at
According to the testimonies of the co-
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila
neophytes of Lenny, they were punched,
Fraternity – accused Dizon and Villareal –
kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit
restrained themselves from insisting on
with different objects on their arms, legs, and
reopening the initiation rites. Although this point
thighs.261 They were also "paddled" at the back
did not matter in the end, as records would
of their thighs or legs;262 and slapped on their
show that the other fraternity members
faces.263 They were made to play rough
participated in the reopened initiation rites –
basketball.264 Witness Marquez testified on
having in mind the concept of "seniority" in
Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa
fraternities – the implication of the presence of
spine."265 The NBI medico-legal officer
explained that the death of the victim was the
alumni should be seen as a point of review in
future legislation. We further note that some of
cumulative effect of the multiple injuries
the fraternity members were intoxicated during
suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of
Lenny’s initiation rites. In this light, the Court
the testimony is as follows:
submits to Congress, for legislative
consideration, the amendment of the Anti-
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication
your testimony on various cross examinations and the presence of non-resident or alumni
of defense counsels that the injuries that you fraternity members during hazing as
have enumerated on the body of the deceased aggravating circumstances that would increase
Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" the applicable penalties.
to "G-14" individually by themselves would not
cause the death of the victim. The question I
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly –
am going to propound to you is what is the
or unwittingly –impose the misery of hazing
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked
and employ appalling rituals in the name of
from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
brotherhood. There must be a better way to
establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that
Witness All together nothing in concert to he joined the fraternity to have more friends
cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not and to avail himself of the benefits it offered,
fair for us to isolate such injuries here because such as tips during bar
we are talking of the whole body. At the same examinations.270 Another initiate did not give
manner that as a car would not run minus one up, because he feared being looked down
(1) wheel. No, the more humane in human upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did
not have a choice.271 Thus, for Lenny Villa and
approach is to interpret all those injuries in
whole and not in part. 267
the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving
consent under the circumstances, they left their
There is also evidence to show that some of
fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
the accused fraternity members were drinking
268 Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were
during the initiation rites.
entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Consequently, the collective acts of the
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of
fraternity members were tantamount to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall
recklessness, which made the resulting death
cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law
remembered that organizations owe to their
been in effect then, these five accused
initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury
fraternity members would have all been
in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by
rule that the accused are guilty of reckless
reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since
imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the
there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing
NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s
when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
according to existing laws at the time of his
suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all
death. The CA found that the prosecution failed
to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et
al.’s individual participation in the infliction of CA’s award of moral damages in the amount of
physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.273 As to
accused Villareal, his criminal liability was
totally extinguished by the fact of his death,
pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be
interpreted without prejudice to the applicability Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug,
of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases.
Furthermore, the modification of criminal
liability from slight physical injuries to reckless set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon,
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply
only with respect to accused Almeda, Ama,
Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs indeterminate prison term of four (4) months
of Lenny Villa in the amounts of ₱ 50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱ 1,000,000 as
moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid correccional, as maximum. In addition,
by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to
the amount of ₱ 30,000 as indemnity to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.1âwphi1
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically
awarded for the sole fact of death of the
274
victim. In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CA’s award of The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954,
indemnity in the amount of ₱ 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or
compensatory damages, including expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the
victim, so long as the claim is supported by
tangible documents.276 Though we are
prepared to award actual damages, the Court
is prevented from granting them, since the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that
actual expenses were incurred or proven
during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the
Solicitor General does not interpose any claim
277
for actual damages.
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral
damages for the grief suffered on account of
the victim’s death.278 This penalty is pursuant to
Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the "spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for SO ORDERED.
mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased."279 Thus, we hereby we affirm the
₱ 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. CORPUS
No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon
guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA
aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in
G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano
Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and THORNTON, respondent.
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
defined and penalized under Article 365 in
relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of ₱ 50,000, and moral
damages in the amount of ₱ 1,000,000, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the
rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this The dispositive portion2 read:
Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.
acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed.
The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057
& 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant
to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against
Artemio Villareal deemed closed and
TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible
consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication
and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase freedom to go out with her friends. In fact,
the applicable penalties.
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in
JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth
Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing
the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance.
WHEREFORE, the Court
DISMISSES the petition for habeas
corpus on the grounds that: a) this
Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition; and b)
the petition is not sufficient in
substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a
Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in
the Catholic Evangelical Church at United
Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later,
respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they
named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew
restless and bored as a plain housewife. She
wanted to return to her old job as a "guest
relations officer" in a nightclub, with the
whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the
househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her
irresponsibility but she continued her carefree
ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left
the family home with her daughter Sequiera
without notifying her husband. She told the
servants that she was bringing Sequiera to
Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan
Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the designated Family Court in Makati City but
this was dismissed, presumably because of the
allegation that the child was in Basilan.
Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter.
However, he did not find them there and the
barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan,
issued a certification3 that respondent was no
longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold
of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing
calls from different places such as Cavite,
Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas
corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court
of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA
8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus
whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This conferment of
jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1,
RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding
the jurisdiction of this Court. This
jurisdiction finds its procedural
expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known
as Family Courts Act was enacted. It
provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of
Family Court. – The Family
Courts shall have
exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:
xxx xxx x
xx
b. Petition for
guardianship,
custody of
children, habeas
corpus in
relation to the
latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369
impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA
7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this
Court to issue writ of habeas corpus
in custody of minor cases is
concerned? The simple answer is,
yes, it did, because there is no other
meaning of the word "exclusive" than
to constitute the Family Court as the
sole court which can issue said writ.
If a court other than the Family Court
also possesses the same
competence, then the jurisdiction of
the former is not exclusive but
concurrent – and such an
interpretation is contrary to the
simple and clear wording of RA
8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this
Court assumes jurisdiction over a
petition for habeas corpus involving
custody of minors, a respondent can
easily evade the service of a writ of
habeas corpus on him or her by just
moving out of the region over which
the Regional Trial Court issuing the
writ has territorial jurisdiction. That
may be so but then jurisdiction is
conferred by law. In the absence of a
law conferring such jurisdiction in this
Court, it cannot exercise it even if it
is demanded by expediency or
necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or
unwise law is not within the authority
of this Court – or any court for that
 matter – to determine. The
enactment of a law on jurisdiction is
within the exclusive domain of the
legislature. When there is a
perceived defect in the law, the
remedy is not to be sought form the
courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out
that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue
moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the
Supreme Court,4Court of Appeals, or with any
of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance
of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369
impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since,
by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended it to be the sole court which can issue
writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the
word "exclusive" apparently cannot be
construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because
it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse
in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts
of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from
family courts whose writs are enforceable only
in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus,
if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family
Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the
Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997,
the avowed policy of the State is to
"protect the rights and promote the
welfare of children." The creation of
the Family Court is geared towards
addressing three major issues
regarding children’s welfare cases,
as expressed by the legislators
during the deliberations for the law.
The legislative intent behind giving
Family Courts exclusive and original
jurisdiction over such cases was to
avoid further clogging of regular
court dockets, ensure greater
sensitivity and specialization in view
of the nature of the case and the
parties, as well as to guarantee that
the privacy of the children party to
the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and
best interests of the child. We rule therefore
that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving
the custody of minors. Again, to quote the
Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to
exercise jurisdiction over the petition
for habeas corpus involving a minor
child whose whereabouts are
uncertain and transient will not result
in one of the situations that the
legislature seeks to avoid. First, the
welfare of the child is paramount.
Second, the ex parte nature of
habeas corpus proceedings will not
result in disruption of the child’s
privacy and emotional well-being;
whereas to deprive the appellate
court of jurisdiction will result in the
evil sought to be avoided by the
legislature: the child’s welfare and
well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court
construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction.
As correctly cited by the Solicitor General,
in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the
heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident
were allowed to file suit in the regular courts
even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over
such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor
General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of
action different from the case at bar.
it supports petitioner’s submission
that the word "exclusive" in the
Family Courts Act of 1997 may not
connote automatic foreclosure of the
jurisdiction of other courts over
habeas corpus cases involving
minors. In the same manner that the
remedies in the Floresca case were
selective, the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals and Family Court in the
case at bar is concurrent. The Family
Court can issue writs of habeas
corpus enforceable only within its
territorial jurisdiction. On the other
hand, in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the
writ cannot be determined with
certainty, the Court of Appeals can
issue the same writ enforceable
throughout the Philippines, as
provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, or
any member thereof, on any day and
at any time, or by the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof in
the instances authorized by law, and
if so granted it shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines, and
may be made returnable before the
court or any member thereof, or
before a Court of First Instance, or
any judge thereof for hearing and
decision on the merits. It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance,
or a judge thereof, on any day and at
any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his
judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive"
regular courts for damages, this Court, in the leqibus est optimus
same Floresca case, said that it was merely interpretendi, i.e., every statute must
applying and giving effect to the constitutional be so interpreted and brought into
guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and accord with other laws as to form a
1973 Constitutions and implemented by the uniform system of jurisprudence. The
Civil Code. It also applied the well-established fundament is that the legislature
rule that what is controlling is the spirit and should be presumed to have known
intent, not the letter, of the law: the existing laws on the subject and
not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law
against any implied repeal, and all
sacrifices the human being. The
efforts should be exerted in order to
spirit of the law insures man’s
harmonize and give effect to all laws
survival and ennobles him. In the
on the subject."9
words of Shakespeare, "the letter of
the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest
intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
xxx xxx xxx
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of
habeas corpus relating to the custody of
It is therefore patent that giving effect minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
to the social justice guarantees of the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129
Constitution, as implemented by the are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369
provisions of the New Civil Code, is does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the
not an exercise of the power of law- Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas
making, but is rendering obedience corpus in cases involving the custody of
to the mandates of the fundamental minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must
law and the implementing legislation be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ―
aforementioned. that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to minors is at issue.
be incapable of being used in more than one
sense. Sometimes, what the legislature
actually had in mind is not accurately reflected In any case, whatever uncertainty there was
in the language of a statute, and its literal has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No.
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors
to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.7 In the and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and provides that:
negate the policy "to protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children"8 under the
Section 20. Petition for writ of
Constitution and the United Nations
habeas corpus.- A verified petition
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
for a writ of habeas corpus involving
mandate must prevail over legal technicalities
custody of minors shall be filed with
and serve as the guiding principle in construing
the Family Court. The writ shall be
the provisions of RA 8369.
enforceable within its judicial region
to which the Family Court belongs.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory
construction that implied repeals are not
xxx xxx xxx
favored:
The petition may likewise be filed
The two laws must be absolutely
with the Supreme Court, Court of
incompatible, and a clear finding
Appeals, or with any of its members
thereof must surface, before the
and, if so granted, the writ shall be
inference of implied repeal may be
enforceable anywhere in the
drawn. The rule is expressed in the
Philippines. The writ may be made
maxim, interpretare et concordare
returnable to a Family Court or to
 any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where (JBC), Respondent.
the minor may be found for hearing
and decision on the merits.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
(Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in
habeas corpus cases where the custody of
minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to
search for the child all over the country
is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy
which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground
for dismissing the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to
"search for the child all over the
country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable
obstacle, since such a task is no
more different from or difficult than
the duty of the peace officer in
effecting a warrant of arrest, since
the latter is likewise enforceable
anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas
corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15,
ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO
APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY,
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.;
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S
LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO;
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-
DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented
by its Immediate Past President, ATTY.
ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in
his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of
the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L.
BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN
(BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION
FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-
MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND
GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY
GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA
NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG
SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN
(ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD
RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR
ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK
TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL
UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES;
COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE
PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE
ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN
MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP)
CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA
GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN
TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA
QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA
ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA
GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA
KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA.
ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and
GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR.;Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP
Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY.
ROLAND B. INTING (IBPGovernor-Eastern
Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER
EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its
decision, holding:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for
certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No.
191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and
the petition for mandamus in G.R.
No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for
prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and
G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit;
and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-
2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the
Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings
for the nomination of candidates
to fill the vacancy to be created
by the compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of
nominees for the position of
Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent
President the short list of
nominees for the position of
Chief Justice on or before May
17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings
for the nomination of candidates
to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the
President the short list of
nominees corresponding
thereto in accordance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No.
191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B.
Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar
Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.);
Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera;
Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN,
et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial
Lawyers Organization of the Philippines
(WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L.
Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P.
Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion
for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was
allowed.
We summarize the arguments and
submissions of the various motions for
reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled
upon or addressed the issue of
whether or not the power to
designate the Chief Justice belonged
to the Supreme Court en banc.
2. The Mendoza petition should have
been dismissed, because it sought a
mere declaratory judgment and did
not involve a justiciable controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should
participate in the next deliberations.
The mere fact that the Chief Justice
sits as ex officio head of the JBC
should not prevail over the more
compelling state interest for him to
participate as a Member of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15,
Article VII does not lead to an
interpretation that exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban
on midnight appointments.
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the
ban, the Court has made distinctions
and has created exemptions when
none exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments
is placed in Article VII, not in Article
VIII, because it limits an executive,
not a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission is
superfluous, and is powerless to vary
the terms of the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much
credit to the position taken by Justice
Regalado. Thereby, the Court has
raised the Constitution to the level of
a venerated text whose intent can
only be divined by its framers as to
be outside the realm of
understanding by the sovereign
people that ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be
reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and
lawyers, have the clear legal
standing to question the illegal
composition of the JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Court’s strained interpretation
of the Constitution violates the basic
principle that the Court should not
formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than what is required by the
precise facts of the case.
2. Considering that Section 15,
Article VII is clear and
straightforward, the only duty of the
Court is to apply it. The provision
expressly and clearly provides a
general limitation on the appointing
power of the President in prohibiting
the appointment of any person to any
position in the Government without
any qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in
unilaterally ignoring the constitutional
safeguard against midnight
appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two
constitutional safeguards:- the
prohibition against midnight
appointments, and the creation of the
JBC. It is not within the authority of
the Court to prefer one over the
other, for the Court’s duty is to apply
the safeguards as they are, not as
the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to
apply the basic principles of statutory
construction in interpreting the
Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying
heavily on the title, chapter or section
headings, despite precedents on
statutory construction holding that
such headings carried very little
weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a
general rule on midnight
appointments, and the only
exception is that on temporary
appointments to executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing
the JBC to resume the proceedings
for the nomination of the candidates
to fill the vacancy to be created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno with a view to
submitting the list of nominees for
Chief Justice to President Arroyo on
or before May 17, 2010. The
Constitution grants the Court only the
power of supervision over the JBC;
hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC
what to do, how to do it, or when to
do it, especially in the absence of a
real and justiciable case assailing
any specific action or inaction of the
JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in
rendering an advisory opinion and
has indulged in speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on
appointments being already in effect,
the Court’s directing the JBC to
comply with the decision constitutes
a culpable violation of the
Constitution and the commission of
an election offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the
basis of a secondary authority a
doctrine unanimously formulated by
the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the
most senior Justice to act as Chief
Justice whenever the incumbent is
indisposed. Thus, the appointment of
the successor Chief Justice is not
urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban
on midnight appointments is to arrest
any attempt to prolong the outgoing
President’s powers by means of
proxies. The attempt of the
incumbent President to appoint the
next Chief Justice is undeniably
intended to perpetuate her power
beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous,
Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution applies to appointments
to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent
reason exists to warrant the reversal
of the Valenzuela pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution provides for presidential
appointments to the Constitutional
Commissions and the JBC with the
consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Its phrase "other
officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution" is
enough proof that the limitation on
the appointing power of the
President extends to appointments to
the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14,
Section 15, and Section 16 of Article
VII apply to all presidential
appointments in the Executive and
Judicial Branches of the
Government.
3. There is no evidence that the
framers of the Constitution abhorred
the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in
all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy
that warrants the Court’s exercise of
judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section
15, Article VII applies to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Court and to other appointments to
the Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not
justify the removal of the safeguard
under Section 15 of Article VII
against midnight appointments in the
Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Court’s exclusion of
appointments to the Judiciary from
the Constitutional ban on midnight
appointments is based on an
interpretation beyond the plain and
unequivocal language of the
Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight
appointments is to cover
appointments in both the Executive
and Judicial Departments. The
application of the principle of verba
legis (ordinary meaning) would have
obviated dwelling on the organization
and arrangement of the provisions of
the Constitution. If there is any
ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII,
the intent behind the provision, which
is to prevent political partisanship in
all branches of the Government,
should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a
contorted and strained interpretation
based on compartmentalization and
physical arrangement, especially
considering that the Constitution
must be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to
the personal interpretation of the
framers of the Constitution should
yield to the plain and unequivocal
language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for
reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is
reasonable and in accord with the
Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the
petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC,
because the petition did not present
a justiciable controversy. The issues
it raised were not yet ripe for
adjudication, considering that the
office of the Chief Justice was not yet
vacant and that the JBC itself has yet
to decide whether or not to submit a
list of nominees to the President.
2. The collective wisdom of
Valenzuela Court is more important
and compelling than the opinion of
Justice Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII
is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article
VIII, the Court has violated the
principle of ut magis valeat quam
pereat (which mandates that the
Constitution should be interpreted as
a whole, such that any conflicting
provisions are to be harmonized as
to fully give effect to all). There is no
conflict between the provisions; they
complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the
Constitution’s titles, chapters,
sections, and draftsmanship carry
little weight in statutory construction.
The clear and plain language of
Section 15, Article VII precludes
interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not
present an actual case or
controversy. The clash of legal rights
and interests in the present case are
merely anticipated. Even if it is
anticipated with certainty, no actual
vacancy in the position of the Chief
Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article
VII does not apply to a vacancy in
the Court and the Judiciary runs in
conflict with long standing principles
and doctrines of statutory
construction. The provision admits
only one exception, temporary
appointments in the Executive
Department. Thus, the Court should
not distinguish, because the law itself
makes no distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously
reversed. The framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the ban
on midnight appointments to cover
the members of the Judiciary.
Hence, giving more weight to the
opinion of Justice Regalado to
reverse the en banc decision in
Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not
incompatible with Section 4(1),
Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to
fill any vacancy lasts until August 15,
2010, or a month and a half after the
end of the ban. The next President
has roughly the same time of 45
days as the incumbent President
(i.e., 44 days) within which to
scrutinize and study the
qualifications of the next Chief
Justice. Thus, the JBC has more
than enough opportunity to examine
the nominees without haste and
political uncertainty.1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in
place, the 90-day period under
Section 4(1), Article VIII is
suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC
to submit the list of nominees on or
before May 17, 2010. The directive
to the JBC sanctions a culpable
violation of the Constitution and
constitutes an election offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for
the appointment of a Chief Justice,
because the Court sits en banc, even
when it acts as the sole judge of all
contests relative to the election,
returns and qualifications of the
President and Vice-President.
Fourteen other Members of the Court
can validly comprise the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction
in ordering the JBC to submit the list
of nominees for Chief Justice to the
President on or before May 17, 2010,
and to continue its proceedings for
the nomination of the candidates,
because it granted a relief not prayed
for; imposed on the JBC a deadline
not provided by law or the
Constitution; exercised control
instead of mere supervision over the
JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to
reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article
VII, the Court has ignored the basic
principle of statutory construction to
the effect that the literal meaning of
the law must be applied when it is
clear and unambiguous; and that we
should not distinguish where the law
does not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the
next Chief Justice, considering that
the Judiciary Act of 1948 already
provides that the power and duties of
the office devolve on the most senior
Associate Justice in case of a
vacancy in the office of the Chief
Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15,
Article VII, being clear and
unequivocal, needs no interpretation
2. The Constitution must be
construed in its entirety, not by resort
to the organization and arrangement
of its provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is
irrelevant, because Section 15,
Article VII and the pertinent records
of the Constitutional Commission are
clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering
the JBC to submit the list of
nominees to the President by May
17, 2010 at the latest, because no
specific law requires the JBC to
submit the list of nominees even
before the vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the
only exemption from the ban on
midnight appointments is the
temporary appointment to an
executive position. The limitation is in
keeping with the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution to place a
restriction on the power of the
outgoing Chief Executive to make
appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the
next Chief Justice from the ban on
midnight appointments makes the
appointee beholden to the outgoing
Chief Executive, and compromises
the independence of the Chief
Justice by having the outgoing
President be continually influential.
3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela
without stating the sufficient reason
violates the principle of stare decisis.
Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not
distinguish as to the type of
appointments an outgoing President
is prohibited from making within the
prescribed period. Plain textual
reading and the records of the
Constitutional Commission support
the view that the ban on midnight
appointments extends to judicial
appointments.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the
Court involves oversight. The
subordinate subject to oversight
must first act not in accord with
prescribed rules before the act can 3. Section 15, Article VII does not
be redone to conform to the apply to the Judiciary.
prescribed rules.
4. The principles of constitutional
3. The Court erred in granting the construction favor the exemption of
petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, the Judiciary from the ban on
because the petition did not present midnight appointments.1awph!1
a justiciable controversy.
5. The Court has the duty to consider
Pimentel and resolve all issues raised by the
parties as well as other related
matters.
1. Any constitutional interpretative
changes must be reasonable,
rational, and conformable to the JBC
general intent of the Constitution as
a limitation to the powers of
1. The consolidated petitions should
Government and as a bastion for the
have been dismissed for prematurity,
protection of the rights of the people.
because the JBC has not yet
Thus, in harmonizing seemingly
decided at the time the petitions
conflicting provisions of the
were filed whether the incumbent
Constitution, the interpretation
President has the power to appoint
should always be one that protects
the new Chief Justice, and because
the citizenry from an ever expanding
the JBC, having yet to interview the
grant of authority to its
candidates, has not submitted a
representatives.
short list to the President.
2. The decision expands the
2. The statement in the decision that
constitutional powers of the
there is a doubt on whether a JBC
President in a manner totally
short list is necessary for the
repugnant to republican
President to appoint a Chief Justice
constitutional democracy, and is
should be struck down as bereft of
tantamount to a judicial amendment
constitutional and legal basis. The
of the Constitution without proper
statement undermines the
authority.
independence of the JBC.
Comments
3. The JBC will abide by the final
decision of the Court, but in accord
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and with its constitutional mandate and
the JBC separately represent in their its implementing rules and
respective comments, thus: regulations.
OSG For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza
(A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment
even if the OSG and the JBC were the only
1. The JBC may be compelled to
ones the Court has required to do so. He states
submit to the President a short list of
that the motions for reconsideration were
its nominees for the position of Chief
directed at the administrative matter he initiated
Justice.
and which the Court resolved. His comment
asserts:
2. The incumbent President has the
power to appoint the next Chief
1. The grounds of the motions for
Justice.
reconsideration were already
resolved by the decision and the
separate opinion.
 2. The administrative matter he
brought invoked the Court’s power of
supervision over the JBC as
provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution, as distinguished
from the Court’s adjudicatory power
under Section 1, Article VIII. In the
former, the requisites for judicial
review are not required, which was
why Valenzuela was docketed as an
administrative matter. Considering
that the JBC itself has yet to take a
position on when to submit the short
list to the proper appointing authority,
it has effectively solicited the
exercise by the Court of its power of
supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-
Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article
VIII is to amend the Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission
quoted in the dissent of Justice
Carpio Morales, as well as in some
of the motions for reconsideration do
not refer to either Section 15, Article
VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to The Court, as the highest court of the land,
Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism). may be guided but is not controlled by
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for
lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby
raised and argued, not being new, have all
been resolved by the decision of March 17,
2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some
matters only for the purpose of clarification and
emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the
principle of stare decisis is controlling, and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in
disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin
maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e.,
to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle
things that are settled. It simply means that a
principle underlying the decision in one case is
deemed of imperative authority, controlling the
decisions of like cases in the same court and in
lower courts within the same jurisdiction,
unless and until the decision in question is
reversed or overruled by a court of competent
authority. The decisions relied upon as
precedents are commonly those of appellate
courts, because the decisions of the trial courts
may be appealed to higher courts and for that
reason are probably not the best evidence of
the rules of law laid down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority
as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called
bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the
decisions of the higher courts bind the lower
courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority
do not bind each other. The one highest court
does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best
lights.4
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a
new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines,
after re-examination, to call for a
rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is
strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the
United Kingdom, where judges make law as
binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is
not a common-law system; hence, judicial
precedents are not always strictly and rigidly
followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier
decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and
justification are relevant, and the court in the
latter case accepts such reasoning and
justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of
convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela
ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or
reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if
not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, The movants gravely err in their posture, and
devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem are themselves apparently contravening their
to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself
recognizes the innate authority of the Court en construction.
banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or
principle of law laid down in any decision For one, the movants, disregarding the point in order to suit the purposes of any
rendered en banc or in division.7 absence from Section 15, Article VII of the quarter.
express extension of the ban on appointments
to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to
Second: Some intervenors are grossly Final Word
the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis.
misleading the public by their insistence that
That is self-contradiction at its worst.
the Constitutional Commission extended to the
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments
attendant to the controversy we are resolving
during the period stated in Section 15, Article Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating
that because all the Members of the present
VII. willingness to read into Section 4(1) and
Court were appointed by the incumbent
Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express
President, a majority of them are now granting
applicability of the ban under Section 15,
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice to her the authority to appoint the successor of
Article VII during the period provided therein,
Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the the retiring Chief Justice.
despite the silence of said provisions thereon.
Constitutional Commission did not concern
Yet, construction cannot supply the omission,
either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1),
for doing so would generally constitute an The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a
encroachment upon the field of the
provision on nepotism. The records of the
Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section
Constitutional Commission show that The Members of the Court vote on the sole
4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are,
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had basis of their conscience and the merits of the
given that their meaning is clear and explicit,
proposed to include judges and justices related issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds
and no words can be interpolated in
to the President within the fourth civil degree of from malice and condescension. Neither the
them.9Interpolation of words is unnecessary,
consanguinity or affinity among the persons outgoing President nor the present Members of
because the law is more than likely to fail to
whom the President might not appoint during the Court had arranged the current situation to
express the legislative intent with the
his or her tenure. In the end, however, happen and to evolve as it has. None of the
interpolation. In other words, the addition of
Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the Members of the Court could have prevented
new words may alter the thought intended to
proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, the Members composing the Court when she
be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of
Article VII "(t)o avoid any further assumed the Presidency about a decade ago
8 the law is clear and sensible, either with or
complication," such that the final version of the from retiring during her prolonged term and
without the omitted word or words, interpolation
second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII tenure, for their retirements were mandatory.
is improper, because the primary source of the
even completely omits any reference to the Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty
legislative intent is in the language of the law
Judiciary, to wit: under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies
itself.10
created by such inexorable retirements within
90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty
Section 13. xxx
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has she must comply with. So must we ours who
fittingly observed: are tasked by the Constitution to settle the
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or controversy.
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
Had the framers intended to extend the
President shall not during his tenure be
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII ACCORDINGLY, the motions for
appointed as Members of the Constitutional
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme reconsideration are denied with finality.
Commissions, or the Office of the
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of SO ORDERED.
of the provisions. They would have easily and
bureaus or offices, including government-
surely written the prohibition made explicit in
owned or controlled corporations and their
Section 15, Article VII as being equally G.R. No. 199310 February 19, 2014
subsidiaries.
applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
Last: The movants take the majority to task for likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the vs.
holding that Section 15, Article VII does not
prohibition against the President or Acting REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented
apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They
by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
aver that the Court either ignored or refused to President making appointments within two
apply many principles of statutory construction. months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s or Acting DECISION
President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
REYES, J.:
avowed reliance on the principles of statutory
We cannot permit the meaning of the
Constitution to be stretched to any unintended
Before this Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated
May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration
Case No. N-11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises,
Inc. (respondent), filed an application4 with the
RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two
parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig
Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square
meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the
Order5 finding the respondent’s application for Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both
registration sufficient in form and substance
and setting it for initial hearing on February 21,
2002. The scheduled initial hearing was later
reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice of Initial
Hearing was published in the Official Gazette,
April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages
1631-16337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of
People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a
conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077,
as well as in a conspicuous place on the
bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro
9 possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who
Manila.
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the
case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of
general default except LLDA, which was given 1989.
15 days to submit its comment/opposition to
the respondent’s application for registration.10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its
Opposition11 to the respondent’s application for evidenced by the certifications issued by the
registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. On the
other hand, the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its
12
Opposition, alleging that the respondent
failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the
subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s
application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses:
Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate
secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of
the respondent and the one authorized by it to
file the application for registration with the RTC;
Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of
the subject properties since 1957; and
Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a
geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to
conduct a topographic survey of the subject
properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the
testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga
(Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A.
geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s the then Department of National Defense-
witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the said parcels of land long
before June 12, 1945. The respondent
purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from
Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
(Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject
properties were originally owned and
cultivated and planted different kinds of crops
in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired actual topographic survey of the subject
farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime properties he conducted upon the request of
sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and
Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above measuring the elevations of the subject
the same were purchased by the respondent in 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed
The respondent likewise alleged that the
subject properties are within the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, as
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent,
inter alia, presented the following documents:
(1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28,
1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in
favor of the respondent;13 (2) survey plans of
the subject properties;14 (3) technical
descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4)
Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax
declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for
2002;17 and (6) certifications dated December
17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno
(Calamno), Senior Forest Management
Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the
respondent’s application for registration should
be denied since the subject parcels of land are
not part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain; it pointed out that
pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. to prove that the subject properties form part of
485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the the alienable and disposable lands of the public
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are
public lands which form part of the bed of the
said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the
oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the
evaluation of the subject properties, based on
the topographic map of Taguig, which was
prepared using an aerial survey conducted by
Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out
that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area
verification of the subject properties on
September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga
confirmed that the elevations of the subject
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr.
Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the
the respondent, the elevations of the subject
that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging
from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot
No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a
Decision,20 which granted the respondent’s
application for registration of title to the subject
properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment [benchmark] or reference point, said witness
is rendered confirming the title of the applicant
Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a
parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945
square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot
3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig,
Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the determined the elevation of the portion of the
Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and
Swo-00-001769 respectively and ordering their reference point in determining the elevation of
registration under the Property Registration
Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises
Incorporated.
SO ORDERED. 21
The RTC found that the respondent was able
domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of
the subject properties are very much higher
than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m
and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
elevation of the subject properties is below
12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely
based on the topographic map that was
prepared using an aerial survey on March 2,
1966; that nobody was presented to prove that
an aerial survey was indeed conducted on
March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data
for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a
parcel of land does not always remain the
same; that the elevations of the subject
properties may have already changed since
1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from
which the topographic map used by LLDA was
based, was conducted. The RTC likewise
faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in
properties, pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the
subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s
witness merely compared their elevation to the
elevation of the particular portion of the lake
dike which he used as his [benchmark] or
reference point in determining the elevation of
the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said
portion of the lake dike that was then under the
construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79
meters and after finding that the elevation of
the subject lots are lower than the said
suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the
elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was
based on hearsay as said witness admitted
that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who
lake dike which he used as the [benchmark] or
the subject lots and that he has no personal
knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz
determined the elevation of the said
[benchmark] or reference point and he only
learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from
the information he got from FF Cruz.22
Even supposing that the elevations of the
subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m,
the RTC opined that the same could not be
considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of
R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to
those areas that can be covered by the lake
water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the
RTC averred, only those parcels of land that
are adjacent to and near the shoreline of
Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those
that are already far from it, which could not be
reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed
out that the subject properties are more than a
kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna
Lake; that they are dry and waterless even
when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its
maximum level. The RTC likewise found that
the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject properties as early
as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision
dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the
assailed Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision
dated May 16, 2007. The CA found that the
respondent was able to establish that the
subject properties are part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; that the
same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is
sufficient to warrant registration of the subject
lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr.
Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual
area verification of the subject lots, ably proved
that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot
No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its
highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot,
it was found [out] that the elevation of the
lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6
meters and the elevation of its highest portion
is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than
the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as
provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of
R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for
registration, appellant relies merely on the
Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966,
prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which
allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land
are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water]
of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered
through aerial photography over the area of
Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However,
nobody testified on the due execution and
authenticity of the said document. As regards
the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr.
Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of
land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the
same can be considered inaccurate aside from
being hearsay considering his admission that
his findings were based merely on the
evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x
x x.24 (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the
respondent was able to present certifications
issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject incontrovertible evidence, that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, which
was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA
further ruled that the respondent was able to
prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and,
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject properties 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the
prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted
the application for registration filed by the
respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts
erred in granting the respondent’s application
for registration since the subject properties do
not form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. The petitioner
insists that the elevations of the subject
properties are below the reglementary level of
12.50 m and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of
R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed
of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties
are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is
a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this
Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-
standing policy of this Court that the findings of
facts of the RTC which were adopted and
affirmed by the CA are generally deemed
conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier
of facts and will not disturb the factual findings
of the lower courts unless there are substantial
reasons for doing so.25
That the subject properties are not part of the
bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not
necessarily mean that they already form part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. It is still incumbent upon the
respondent to prove, with well-nigh
properties are indeed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. While
deference is due to the lower courts’ finding
that the elevations of the subject properties are
hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna
Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No.
respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement
to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable."26
The respondent filed its application for
registration of title to the subject properties
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 152927, which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete records. These facts must be established to
titles to public land acquired under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or Respondent failed to do so because the
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N.
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and third, that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this
case. To prove that the subject property forms Environment and Natural Resources Office
part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the respondent presented Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the
two certifications30 issued by Calamno, DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part Secretary had approved the land classification
of the alienable and disposable lands of the and released the land as alienable and
public domain "under Project No. 27-B of disposable, and that it is within the approved
Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, area per verification through survey by the
approved on January 3, 1968." CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary
However, the said certifications presented by
and certified as true copy by the legal
the respondent are insufficient to prove that the
custodian of the official records. These facts
subject properties are alienable and
must be established by the applicant to prove
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v.
that the land is alienable and disposable.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,31 the Court clarified
that, in addition to the certification issued by
the proper government agency that a parcel of Here, Roche did not present evidence that the
land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land she applied for has been classified as
land registration must prove that the DENR alienable or disposable land of the public
Secretary had approved the land classification domain. She submitted only the survey map
and released the land of public domain as and technical description of the land which
alienable and disposable. They must present a bears no information regarding the land’s
copy of the original classification approved by classification. She did not bother to establish
the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy the status of the land by any certification from
by the legal custodian of the records. Thus: the appropriate government agency. Thus, it
cannot be said that she complied with all
requisites for registration of title under Section
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or
14(1) of P.D. 1529.34 (Citations omitted and
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
emphasis ours)
disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released The DENR certifications that were presented
the land of the public domain as alienable and by the respondent in support of its application
disposable, and that the land subject of the for registration are thus not sufficient to prove
application for registration falls within the that the subject properties are indeed classified
approved area per verification through survey by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the disposable. It is still imperative for the
applicant for land registration must present a respondent to present a copy of the original
copy of the original classification approved by classification approved by the DENR
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true Secretary, which must be certified by the legal
copy by the legal custodian of the official custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly,
the lower courts erred in granting the
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. application for registration in spite of the failure
of the respondent to prove by well-nigh
certifications presented by respondent do not, incontrovertible evidence that the subject
by themselves, prove that the land is alienable properties are alienable and disposable.
and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was
promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be
Properties, viz: applied prospectively, asserting that decisions
of this Court form part of the law of the land
and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code,
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant
laws shall have no retroactive effect. The
bears the burden of proving the status of the
respondent points out that its application for
land. In this connection, the Court has held that
registration of title to the subject properties was
he must present a certificate of land
filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the
classification status issued by the Community
Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N.
Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present
(CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and
a copy of the original classification covering the
subject properties approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified by the legal custodian
thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims,
would not warrant the denial of its application
for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s
application for registration was filed and
granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in
T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that
case may be applied to the present case; it is
not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of
laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is
elementary that the interpretation of a law by
this Court constitutes part of that law from the
date it was originally passed, since this Court’s The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-
construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted law carried into effect.35 "Such
judicial doctrine does not amount to the
passage of a new law, but consists merely of a incontrovertible evidence of possession and
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing
one."36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was
applied by the Court in subsequent cases
notwithstanding that the applications for
registration were filed and granted by the lower
courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for
registration of the subject properties therein
was filed on October 22, 2004 and was granted
by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in
Republic v. Jaralve,38 the application for
registration of the subject property therein was
filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by
the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the
foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the
applications for registration were filed and
granted by the trial courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this Court
applied the pronouncements in T.A.N.
Properties and denied the applications for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the
applicants therein failed to present a copy of
the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the
Court finds that the respondent failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, the subject properties or to the volume of the
continuous, exclusive, and notorious produce harvested from the crops supposedly
possession and occupation of the subject planted thereon.
properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession and occupation of the
subject properties since 1943, the respondent
presented the testimony of Cerquena.
Cerquena testified that the subject properties
were originally owned by Jaime who
supposedly possessed and cultivated the same
since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold
the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares
who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent
in 1989.
serving assertions of the possession and
occupation of the subject properties by the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest;
they do not constitute the well-nigh
occupation of the subject properties required
by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed,
other than the testimony of Cerquena, the
respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the
possession and occupation by it and its
predecessors-in-interest of the subject
properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate
the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the
land subject of the application. Applicants for
land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of possession.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would actually exercise over his own
property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
cultivated the subject properties, by planting
different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft
of any specificity as to the nature of such
cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that
they have been indeed in possession and
occupation of the subject properties in the
manner required by law. There was no showing
as to the number of crops that are planted in
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
have indeed planted crops on the subject
properties, it does not necessarily follow that
the subject properties have been possessed
and occupied by them in the manner
contemplated by law. The supposed planting of
crops in the subject properties may only have
amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is
not the possession and occupation required by
law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the
land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the
state. The possession of public land, however
long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the state,
unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years."40
Further, the Court notes that the tax
declarations over the subject properties
presented by the respondent were only for
2002. The respondent failed to explain why,
despite its claim that it acquired the subject
properties as early as 1989, and that its
predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 1943,
it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation. "While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership."41 That the subject properties were
declared for taxation purposes only in 2002
gives rise to the presumption that the
respondent claimed ownership or possession
of the subject properties starting that year.
Likewise, no improvement or plantings were
declared or noted in the said tax declarations.
This fact belies the claim that the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to
Cerquena's testimony, have been in
possession and occupation of the subject
properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and that
it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's
application for registration should be
denied.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision dated
May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration
Case No. N-11465 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of
Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration
Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the
crime involving a young girl of about 12 years
old who had been allegedly raped and who
later died because of a foreign object left inside
her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the
crime of rape with homicide under an
information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day
of October, 1986 in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with lewd
design and with intent to kill one
Rosario Baluyot, a woman under
twelve (12) years of age, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of
said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a
foreign object into the vaginal canal
of said Rosario Baluyot which
caused her death shortly thereafter,
to the damage and prejudice of her
relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not
Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on
the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the
prosecutor presented the following witnesses,
namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y
Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio
Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong
Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva
Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr.
Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul
Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia
Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna
Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18)
Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd
Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City
Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon
Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe
Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in
evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the
testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father
Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4)
Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6)
Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower
court based its finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt are summarized in its
decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on
October 10, 1986 about midnight,
accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter
brought a boy and girl namely:
Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot
inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel
along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo
City. These two (2) children were
chosen from among a bunch of
street children. Once inside the hotel
room accused told them to take a
bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan",
was the first to take a bath and when
he came out Rosario Baluyot went to
the bathroom to do the same. While
Rosario Baluyot was inside the
bathroom, accused Ritter took out
some pictures depicting dressed up
young boys, and put them on top of
the table. Other things which were
taken out and placed on top of a
table were three (3) other objects
which he described as like that of a
vicks inhaler. One of these objects
the accused played with his hands
and placed it on his palms. The color
of which is grayish blue which turned
out later to be the foreign object
which was inserted inside the vagina
of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects
were later established to be anti-
nasal inhalers against pollution
purchased by the accused in
Bangkok when he went there as a
tourist. While Rosario was in the
bathroom, accused told Ramirez to
lay down on bed, and so did the
accused. He then started
masturbating the young boy and also
guided the boy's hand for him to be
masturbated, so that they
masturbated each other, while they
were both naked, and he gave
Jessie Ramirez an erection. When
Rosario Baluyot came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove
her clothes by accused and to join
him in bed. The accused then placed
himself between the two (2) children
and accused started fingering
Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already
sleepy, but Rosario touched him to
call his attention. He looked, and he
saw accused placing his penis
against the vagina of Rosario and
that he was trying to penetrate the
vagina but it would not fit. After what
he saw, Ramirez did not anymore
bother to look because he was
sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused,
whom the juveniles described as an
"American, paid Ramirez alias"Egan"
P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He
then left them in the hotel. After the
American left, they went downstairs,
and Rosario told Egan that the
American inserted something in her
vagina. But they could not do
anything anymore, because the
American had already left, and
neither did they report the matter to
the police. Sometime the following
day, Jessie saw Rosario and he
asked her whether the object was
already removed from her body and
Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie
Ramirez claimed that on the evening
of that same date, he saw Rosario
and she was complaining of pain in
her vagina and when Egan asked
her, she said that the foreign object
was not yet removed. Then there
was another occasion wherein
Jessie was summoned and when he
came he saw Rosario writhing in
pain and when he tried to talk to
Rosario she scolded him with
defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he
did not see Rosario anymore
because he already went home to
his aunt's house who resided at
Barrio Barretto and resumed his
studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara,
a defense witness, while garbage
scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate
of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario
at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy
Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled
by people because Rosario's skirt
was bloodied and she was
unconscious and foul smelling. Since
nobody helped Rosario, he took pity
on her condition and brought her to
the Olongapo City General Hospital
in an unconscious condition, via
jeepney. He went to the Information
desk and he was the one who gave
the personal circumstances of
Rosario as to her name, age, her
residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower
Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara
signed as "guardian" of Rosario,
while Rosario was already in the
emergency room. Although Gaspar
Alcantara denied that he did not
know the name of Rosario Baluyot
when he brought her to the hospital,
this is belied by the testimony of the
Information clerk Lorna Limos, who
was then on duty. Limos testified that
it was Alcantara who supplied the
personal circumstances of Rosario.
The Court gives more credence to
the testimony of Miss Limos as
against Gaspar Alcantara who
became a defense witness, for the
reason that through his own
testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed
that even prior to May 14, 1987, he
had already known Rosario Baluyot
for more than one (1) year, because
he has seen the said girl go to the
house of his twin brother, Melchor
Alcantara, who is his immediate
neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl
by the name of "Nora" who was then
in the custody of his brother. His
brother Melchor was also living with
their mother, brother and sister-in-
law and their two (2) children in his
house. Rosario as per Gaspar's
testimony even stays for one week or
a few days at his brother's house
when she visits Nora. So the Court
can safely assume that of all the
more than one (1) year that he had
regularly seen Rosario at his
brother's house, he must have
already did come to know the name
of Rosario Baluyot including her age.
In his testimony in Court he stated
that he even asked Rosario for
movie and softdrinks money which
can safely be concluded that he
knows her very well. It is against
normal behavior especially to a
Filipino who have a characteristic of
curiosity not to have found out the
real name of the girl he claims to
know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined
at the Olongapo City General
Hospital, nobody was attending to
her since she is a street child, having
stowed away from the custody of her
grandmother. Three (3) good
samaritans who belong to religious
and civic organizations, in the
persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel
and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their
missions in the hospital chanced
upon Rosario Baluyot who was all
alone with no relatives attending to
her and after finding out that she was
only 12 years old decided to help
her. After a short interview with
Rosario, regarding her name and
age only because she clamped up
about her residence and her
relatives, they decided to help her by
providing her the medicine she
needed during her confinement in
readiness for an operation. It was Fe
Israel who was able to get the name
and age of Rosario Baluyot from
Rosario Baluyot herself when she
saw her for the first time. For Fe
Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot
was an important factor because
their program assisted only indigent
patients from infants up to 13 years
old.
Rosario's first ailment at the
Olongapo City General Hospital was
loose bowel movement and vomiting,
which was first suspected as gastro-
enteritis, but which came out later as
symptoms of peritonitis due to a
massive infection in the abdominal
cavity. Subsequently, on May 17,
1987, after she was examined by the
physicians at the hospital, it was
found out that there was a foreign
object lodged in her vaginal canal
and she had vaginal discharge
tinged with blood and foul smelling
odor emanating from her body. One
of the doctors who attended to her
was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr.
Barcinal tried to extract the foreign
object by means of a forceps, but
several attempts proved futile
because said object was deeply
embedded in the vaginal canal and
was covered by tissues. Her
abdomen was enlarged, tender and
distended, symptoms of peritonitis.
The patient was feverish and
incoherent when she was scheduled
for operation on May 19, 1987, after
the first attempt for an operation on
May 17 was aborted allegedly
because the consent of Dr. Reino
Rosete, the hospital director was not
obtained. The surgeon who operated
on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He
testified that Rosario had to be
operated even in that condition in
order to save her life. Her condition
was guarded. This was corroborated
by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist
during Rosario's operation. It was in
the evening of May 19 at about 7:00
p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her
abdomen by making a 5 inch incision
on her stomach. He found out that
the fallopian tubes were congested
with pus and so with the peritonieum,
and the pelvic cavity, and patches of
pus in the liver, although the
gallbladder and kidney appeared to
have septicemia, poisoning of the
blood. The peritonitis and septicemia
were traced to have been caused
through infection by the foreign
object which has been lodged in the
intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The
foreign object which was already
agreed upon by both parties that it is
a portion of a sexual vibrator was
extracted from the vagina of Rosario
while under anesthesia. Said object
was coated with tissues, pus and
blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the
assisting surgical nurse for
safekeeping and gave instructions to
release it to the authorized person.
This object was shown by the nurse
to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete
considered the operation successful
and the patient was alive when he
left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz
stayed with said patient in the ward
for about 30 minutes and thereafter
he left. The following day, Rosario
got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz
who pronounced her death at 2:00 to
2:15 in the afternoon of May 20,
1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was
prepared under the direction of Dr.
Cruz which was indicated therein
that the cause of death was cardio-
respiratory arrest, secondary to
septicemia caused by the foreign
object lodged in the intra uteral
vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by
nurse Obedina, then placed it in a
transparent small jar and labelled
"Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera
asked the nurse for the foreign
object, and it was given to her under
proper receipt. Herrera then showed
the same to the persons who helped
financially Rosario's case, and
afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva
Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in
custody of the said object until Mr.
Salonga came and asked her for the
object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis.
Palencia and a companion went to
Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in
locating the relatives of Rosario.
They were able to trace Rosario's
grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos
Turla, and informed her that her
granddaughter was already dead
and lying in state at St. Martin
Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there
with her son, who shouldered all the
burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr.
Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her
residence at Sta. Rita and asked her
if she was interested in filing a case
against the person who caused the
death of her granddaughter. Of
course she agreed. Hence, she was
brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to
file the same.
After the case was filed against the
herein accused, Atty. Edmundo
Legaspi with his messenger came to
her house and told her that the
accused was willing to settle the
case, but that accused Ritter had
only P15,000.00. The old woman did
not accept it because she knows that
the accused is liable to pay damages
anyway. After that, she received a
letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to
get a lawyer for her case. By this
time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have
the case settled once and for all
giving the reason that she can no
longer bear the situation, sent her
nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty.
Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and
told her that she will be paid at the
office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not
clear in the records, she went with
her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and
Roberto Sundiam, an assistant
barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and
while they were there, she saw Ritter
arrive at the law office. Ritter and
Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near
the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter
left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told
Rosario's grandmother that they are
willing to settle for P20,000.00, but
that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so
she received the money with the
understanding that there was a
balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was
made to sign a statement, and she
was asked to change the age of her
granddaughter Rosario. With the
document prepared, she and the
lawyer's messenger went to the
Fiscal's office to have it subscribed,
and was subscribed before an
assistant city fiscal. But the balance
of P5,000.00 was not paid, because
later on Atty. Legaspi became the
OIC of Olongapo City and he could
no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi,
during one of the hearings before the
Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino
Victoria, as criminal investigator of
Station "A", was directed by Col.
Daos, Station Commander of the
Olongapo Police Department to
make a follow up of the case of
Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand,
since the suspect who inserted the
foreign object inside Rosario's
vagina was said to be an American,
the NISRA Subic Naval Base also
conducted its investigation headed
by criminal investigator Agent
Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with
the local police and with Sister Eva
Palencia, since Rosario was a street
child at Magsaysay Drive, they
rounded up about 43 street children
and from some of them they learned
that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie
Ramirez with an American at the
MGM Hotel when the foreign object
was inserted in her vagina. After
finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked
him about Rosario Baluyot. They
found out that indeed he was with
Rosario Baluyot sometime before
Christmas of 1986 with an American,
who brought them to the said hotel.
Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the
U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and
took his statement. Then he was
brought to Mr. Edward Lee
Bungarner, a cartographer, and out
of the description supplied by
Ramirez, a composite drawing was
photocopied and copies thereof were
distributed to the local police and to
the sentries at the gate of the U.S.
Naval Base. Some American
servicemen who had resemblance to
the composite drawing were
photographed and these were shown
to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was
negative. Aside from the physical
description by Ramirez about the
appearance of the suspect, he also
described him as having the
mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that
foreign homo-sexuals frequented
Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the
so-called American may be
European or Australian national, the
team composed of Agent Salonga,
Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria
and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie
Ramirez and Michael Johnson,
another juvenile, proceeded to
Manila. They first went to the Manila
NISRA Office, and thereafter
checked in a hotel. That was on
September 23, 1987. On the first
night, they went to Luneta Park
where foreign homo-sexuals were
said to be frequenting, but the result
was negative. Then on September
25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they
were standing at the corner of A.
Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a
male caucasian who looked like a
homo-sexual stopped by admiringly
infront of the two (2) juveniles,
Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie
Ramirez then reported to Mr.
Salonga that this foreigner had a
similarity with the American suspect,
so the two minors were instructed to
follow the foreigner and to strike a
conversation. They did, and when
they returned, Jessie Ramirez told
them that indeed the said foreigner
was the one who brought him and
Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel.
Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this
foreigner had no beard while the one
previously described by Ramirez had
a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them
that maybe he have just shaved it
off. The said caucasian then entered
a bar, and after several minutes he
came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon
his signal with his thumbs up, as a
signal to confirm that the said
foreigner is the suspect, arrested
Ritter and brought him to the Manila
Western Police District. It could be
mentioned at this stage that in this
operation they were accompanied by
two (2) policemen from the Western
Police District. The foreigner was
hand cuffed and was told that he was
a suspect for Rape with Homicide.
After the arrest, they first went to the
pension house of the suspect in
Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder
bag which contained his personal
belongings, and from there they
brought him to the Western Police
Department. At the said police
headquarters, they were allowed a
permissive search by the foreigner of
his clutch bag and his small shoulder
bag and confiscated his passport,
I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of
dollars and travellers checks
amounting about $1,500.00 and
about P100.00, all duly receipted for.
From the passport they learned that
the suspect's name was Heinrich
Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national.
During the questioning of Hitter,
Salonga and his team already left the
headquarters and went to their hotel,
because at this time Jessie Ramirez
was already shaking with fear after
he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the
accused to Olongapo and was
detained at the Olongapo City Jail.
The case for Rape with Homicide
was filed against him at the City
Fiscal of Olongapo. At the
preliminary investigation, accused
was assisted by his own counsel.
The private complainant was Maria
Burgos Turla because it was she
who had custody of Rosario Baluyot
after her mother Anita Burgos died
on January 12, 1982, and their father
Policarpio Baluyot had left them
under her custody. When this case
was filed, the father's whereabouts
was unknown, and he only appeared
when the trial of this case before the
Court was already in progress. And
upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own
admission, he only learned about the
death of his daughter Rosario
Baluyot from the newspaper, long
after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the
case by claiming that there could be
no crime of Rape with Homicide
because the suspect was described
as an American while Ritter is an
Austrian. Also advanced by the
defense is that, it is a case of
mistaken identity. That Rosario
Baluyot was at the time of the
commission of the offense, already
more than 13 years old, she having
been born on December 26, 1973 as
per baptismal certificate, wherein it
appears that Rosario Baluyot was
baptized on December 25, 1974 and
was born on December 26, 1973 as
testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva
of St. James Parish Church who
issued the Baptismal Certificate,
having custody and possession of
the book of baptism for the year
1975, but admitted that he had no
personal knowledge about the
matters or entries entered therein.
Likewise, the defense's stand is that
the accused cannot be liable for
Homicide because a vibrator is not a
weapon of death but it is a thing for
the purpose of giving sexual
pleasure, and that the death of
Rosario Baluyot was due to the
incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the
surgeon and Director of the
Olongapo City General Hospital, who
operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its
decision. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the Court holds,
that the prosecution has established
the GUILT of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of
Rape with Homicide as defined and
penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences HEINRICH STEFAN
RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00)
Philippine Currency, and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by
way of attorney's fees to the private
prosecutors and to pay the costs.
(Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the
following assigned errors allegedly committed
by the court:
I this case is the age of the victim—whether or
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS
COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10,
1986 AND THAT IT WAS
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO
COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS
THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD
WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
WAS COMMITTED AND IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO AND NOT
REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S of birth (Decision, p. 54).
EVIDENCE AND IN NOT
UPHOLDING THAT OF THE
DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified
ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this
Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if
the guilt of the accused has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to
exert the most painstaking effort to examine
the records in the light of the arguments of both The father likewise testified that as far as he
parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that could remember, Rosario was born on
the appellant indeed committed the criminal act December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27,
(See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73
[1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court
of the crime of rape with homicide of a young
girl who died after the rape because of a
foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator,
left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in
not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12)
years old at the time the alleged incident
happened on October 10, 1986. The age is
important in determining whether or not there
was statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code defines the third type of rape as
having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12
years of age, in which case force, intimidation,
deprivation of reason or unconscious state do
not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12
years old when she was sexually abused by
the accused and, therefore, rape was
committed inspite of the absence of force or
intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great
weight on the testimonies of the victim's
grandmother and father who testified that she
was born on December 22, 1975. These oral
declarations were admitted pursuant to then
Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court
where, in the absence of a birth certificate, the
act or declaration about pedigree may be
received in evidence on any notable fact in the
life of a member of the family. Since birth is a
matter of pedigree within the rule which permits
the admission of hearsay evidence, oral
declarations are therefore admissible as proof
that she remembered Rosario's birth date
because her brother died in Pampanga and her
daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the
only one who failed to attend the funeral
because the latter has just given birth allegedly
to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
1988) and he was certain that Rosario was
more than one (1) year old when she was
baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their
testimony is supported by the clinical record
and the death certificate indicating that she
was 12 years old when she was admitted at the
Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment.
The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged
guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's
clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a
social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot
also testified that she was told by Rosario that
she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted
this as adequate evidence of the truth.
Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal
witness in this case declared that he was born
on September 5, 1973 and that he was older
than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was
13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been
less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55) controversy arose. The other witnesses who
The trial court concluded that the oral
declarations of the grandmother and father
supported by other independent evidence such
as the clinical record, death certificate and the
testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez,
rendered the baptismal certificate presented by
the defense without any probative or
evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to
Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the
application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130
(now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989
Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this
Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead It is however, equally true that human memory No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term
or outside of the Philippines or
unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree
is in question must be related to the
declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be
made before the controversy
occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the she was baptized.
declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must as a
general rule be shown by evidence The other witnesses are not at all competent to
other than such act or declaration. testify on the victim's age, nor was there any
basis shown to establish their competence for
the purpose. The clinical records were based
These requirements were not satisfied by the
on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information
evidence for the prosecution nor do the
given when he brought the victim to the
declarations fall within the purview of the rule.
hospital. Alcantara came to know her only
about a year before her death. He had
The victim's grandmother and father whose absolutely no knowledge about the
declarations regarding Rosario's age were circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death
admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the certificate relied upon by the trial court was
Philippines and able to testify as they both did merely based on the clinical records. It is even
testify in court. Their declarations were made at less reliable as a record of birth.
the trial which is certainly not before the
All the evidence presented by the prosecution
testified on Rosario's age are not members of
showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12
the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's
years old at the time of the alleged incident are
relatives must be weighed according to their
not adequate to establish the exact date of
own personal knowledge of what happened
birth, much less offset a documentary record
and not as hearsay evidence on matters of
showing a different date.
family history.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's
At this point, we find the evidence regarding
baptismal certificate which the trial court
Rosario's age of doubtful value.
rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As
against the oral declarations made by
The trial court justified the admissibility of the interested witnesses establishing Rosario's age
grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on
laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 record is more convincing and worthy of belief.
[1903]) where the Court accepted the (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
testimony of the mother that her daughter was 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
14 years old and 4 months old. The mother
stated that she knew the age because the child
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
was born about the time of the cholera
testificandum, issued by the lower court to the
epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but
St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr.
came from one who had direct knowledge of
Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest
the child's birth.
testified and stated that he is the head of said
parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register
for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No.
on dates or days is frail and unless the day is
an extraordinary or unusual one for the 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the
witness, there is no reasonable assurance of name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on
its correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, December 25, 1974, and born on December
632 [1953]) 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and
Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales.
Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor
With respect to the grandmother's testimony,
with Olongapo City as her address.
the date of the brother's death or funeral was
never established, which indicates that the day
was rather insignificant to be remembered. The In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of
father's declaration is likewise not entirely appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
reliable. His testimony in court does not at all
show that he had direct knowledge of his
xxx xxx xxx
daughter's birth. He was certain though that
she was more than one (1) year old at the time
In our jurisprudence, this Court has
been more definite in its
pronouncements on the value of
 baptismal certificates. It thus ruled
that while baptismal and marriage
certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only
to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein
specified—but not the veracity of the
status or declarations made therein
with respect to his kinsfolk and/or
citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945,
Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case
of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23
SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held
that a baptismal certificate is
conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered, in conformity with the
rites of the Catholic Church by the
priest who baptized the child, but it
does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements
contained in the certificate that
concern the relationship of the
person baptized. Such declarations
and statements, in order that their
truth may be admitted, must
indispensably be shown by proof
recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the
Registry Book may be considered as entries
made in the course of business under Section was less than 12 years old at the time of the
43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the
hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by
the church are one of its transactions in the
exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded
in a book of the church during the course of its Since Rosario was not established to have
business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] been under 12 years of age at the time of the
Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented
by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was
baptized on December 25, 1974 may be
admitted in evidence as proof of baptism.
Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified otherwise unconscious in accordance with
that he had in his possession a baptismal
certificate different from the one presented in
court. However, no other baptismal record was We agree with the defense that there was no
ever presented to prove a date different from
that brought by the official custodian. Since the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself
baptismal certificate states that Rosario was
baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore she appears to have consented to the act as
highly improbable that Rosario could have
been born on December 22, 1975. She could
not have been baptized before she was born.
Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it environmental circumstances coupled with the
puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was
born in 1975. With the father's assertion that
Rosario was more than one (1) year old when
she was baptized, we are then more inclined to inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life
agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated
in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA
425 [1989]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was
presented because her birth had
allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate, coupled by her
mother's testimony, was sufficient to
establish that Mary Rose was below
twelve years old when she was
violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody
could corroborate the date on a more reliable
document as to Rosario's birth which could
serve as sufficient proof that she was born on
December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more
than 12 years old at the time of the alleged
incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense vagina. Neither could he identify the object
to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof
lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario
alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape.
The prosecution failed in this respect.
alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to
prove that the usual elements of rape were
present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation
or that she was deprived of reason or
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
proof of such facts. On the contrary, the
to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact,
she was paid P300.00 the next morning while
her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid
P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The
testimonies and evidence presented in court
clearly give the impression that Rosario
Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute
may have forced her to submit to sex at such a
young age but the circumstances do not come
under the purview of force or intimidation
needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the
prosecution failed to refute, no rape was
committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that
the death of the victim was a consequence of
the insertion of the foreign object into the
victim's vagina by the appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for
the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina
which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on
circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying
interpretations and are not enough to justify
conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not
actually see the object inserted in Rosario's
(Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same
object which the appellant was holding at that
time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police
investigator on September 4, 1987, he
answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng
kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang
napansin na inilabas ng kano sa
kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon
man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-
dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at
napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa
kanyang bag na parang vicks
inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy
habang nasa otel kami at
pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa
lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang
bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng
Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada
at ang takip nito ay may habang
dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay
bilog na patulis at may tabang mga
kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko
napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng
bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan
ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang
larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang
larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa
akin kung makikilala mo ang mga
bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may
kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng
Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na
bagay sa larawan ay katulad na
katulad noong takip ng bagay na
inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang
bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay
asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay
kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2;
Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was
merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant
does not deny having possessed at that time.
He was certain that the object was white.
(T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself.
He said that it was grayish in color with color
blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang
blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The
inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts
doubt as to the veracity of the statements
made especially when he answered on
additional cross-examination that the reason
why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the
same object being held by Ritter was because
it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6,
1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about
the sexual vibrator because he did not actually
see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation
made by Rosario the next morning that the
foreigner inserted something inside her vagina.
The trial court admitted such statement as part
of the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept
such statement as part of res gestae, the trial
court focused the test of admissibility on the
lapse of time between the event and the
utterance. For the average 13 years old, the
insertion of a mechanical device or anything for
that matter into the vagina of a young girl is
undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie,
however, there must be more evidence to show
that the statement, given after a night's sleep
had intervened, was given instinctively
because the event was so startling Res
gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130,
Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant
did insert something inside Rosario's vagina,
the evidence is still not adequate to impute the
death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able
to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We
quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct
examination that later on Rosario
even categorically admitted to you
that she was already able to remove
the object allegedly inserted inside
her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this
Honorable Court the exact words
used by Rosario Baluyot later on
when you met her when you asked
her and when she told you that she
was already able to remove that
object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she
told me that. I asked her, "Was it
already removed?" And she
answered, "Yes, it was removed."
But the same night, she again
complained of pain of her stomach.
She sent one of her friends to call for
me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy
 was uttering defamatory words
against me as she was groaning in
pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the
day following the day after both children were
invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p.
73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be
groaning in pain so we can just imagine the
distress she was undergoing at this point in
time. If the device inserted by the appellant
caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how
she was able to endure the pain and discomfort
until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the
alleged incident. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA
429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis'
testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a
witness for the defense is considered an expert
witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate
of the State University in 1940, a degree of
Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949,
and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology
University. He was awarded Post Graduate
Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a
graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East
Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in
Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became
Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and
became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to
1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer
on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and
Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal
Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati
Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU
Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for
43 years. He has attended no less than 13
conferences abroad. He is the author of the
textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and
"Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive
legal and medical background, his testimony is
too authoritative to ignore. We quote the
pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go
over this object marked as Exh. "C-
2" which object was described as a
part of a sexual vibrator battery
operated. Now, given this kind of
object, would you kindly tell us what
would be the probable effect upon a
12 years old girl when it is inserted
into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be
considered a foreign body placed
into a human being and as such be
considered a foreign object. As a
foreign object, the tendency of the
body may be: No. 1—expel the
foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency
of the body is to react to that foreign
body. One of the reactions that
maybe manifested by the person
wherein such foreign body is
concerned is to cover the foreign
body with human tissue, in a way to
avoid its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation
thereby producing certain manifest
symptoms and changes in the area
where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms
manifestation might not only be
localized but may be felt all over the
body, we call it systemic reaction.
Now, considering the fact that this
foreign body as shown to me is
already not complete, this shows
exposure of its different parts for the
body to react. If there is mechanism
to cause the foreign body to vibrate,
there must be some sort of power
from within and that power must be a
dry cell battery. [The] composition of
the battery are, manganese dioxide
ammonium, salts, water and any
substance that will cause current
flow. All of these substances are
irritants including areas of the
container and as such, the primary
reaction of the body is to cause
irritation on the tissues, thereby
inflammatory changes develop and
in all likelihood, aside from those
inflammatory changes would be a
supervening infection in a way that
the whole generative organ of the
woman will suffer from diseased
process causing her the systemic
reaction like fever, swelling of the
area, and other systemic symptoms.
. . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October
19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long
would it take, Doctor before any
reaction such as an infection would
set in, how many days after the
insertion of this object in the vagina
of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me,
considering that one of the ends is
exposed, in a way that vaginal
secretion has more chance to get in,
well, liberation of this irritant
chemicals would be enhanced and
therefore in a shorter period of time,
there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would
you say would that follow after the
insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at
the NBI, insertion of any foreign body probabilities which are less likely than those
in the vaginal canal usually
developed within, a period of two (2)
weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was
allegedly raped, and a sexual
vibrator was inserted in her vagina
on October 10, 1986 and she was
operated on, on May 19, 1987 the
following year, so it took more than 7
months before this was extracted,
would you say that it will take that
long before any adverse infection
could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes
will develop in a shorter time. (TSN.,
Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long
would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal
experience, hair pins, cottonballs and
even this lipstick of women
usually, there are only about two (2) The vibrator end was further subjected to a
weeks time that the patient suffer macro-photographic examination on the open
some abnormal symptoms. end portion which revealed the following:
Q Now, considering that this is a Result of Examination
bigger object to the object that you
mentioned, this object has a shorter
Macro-photographic examination on
time?
the open end portion of specimen #1
shows the following inscription:
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct.
19. 1988, p. 20)
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14
PAT (Exhibit "MM")
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no
hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein
From the above results, the subject object is
infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign
certainly not considered as inert and based on
body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time
Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that
frame is not more than 10 months, and this
infection should set in much earlier.
case is still within the said time frame."
Considering also that the object was inserted
inside the vagina which is part of the
A more generous time interval may be allowed generative organ of a woman, an organ which
in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is is lined with a very thin layer of membrane with
facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is
evidence against him cannot be based on more susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34,
October 19, 1988)
probabilities which favor him.
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more
It should be clarified that the time frame probable under the circumstances of the case.
depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged We see no reason why his opinions qualified
inside the body. An examination of the object by training and experience should not be
gave the following results: controlling and binding upon the Court in the
determination of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469
(1) Color: Blue
[1988]).
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches. Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense
Composition: Showed the general also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot
characteristics of a styrene- on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the
butadiene plastic. Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN
clearance to the patient prior to operation.
(T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
(2) The specimen can be electrically
operated by means of a battery as
per certification dated 01 June 1988, Q And how many times did you
signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, examine this patient Rosario Baluyot
Shipboard Electrical Systems on that day?
Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop
51, Subic (see attached certification).
A I examined her twice on that day.
(3) No comparative examination was
Q The first time that you examined
made on specimen #1 and vibrator
her, what is the result of your
depicted in the catalog because no
findings, if any?
actual physical dimensions and/or
mechanical characteristics were
shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL") A My first examination, I examined
the patient inside the delivery room.
The patient was brought to the
delivery room wheel-chaired then
from the wheel chair, the patient was
ambigatory (sic). She was able to
walk from the door to the examining
table. On examination, the patient is
conscious, she was fairly nourished,
fairly developed, she had fever, she
was uncooperative at that time and
examination deals more on the
abdomen which shows slightly
distended abdomen with muscle
guarding with tenderness all over,
with maximum tenderness over the
hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5,
September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second
examination to the patient, what was
your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I
repeated the internal examination
wherein I placed my index finger and
middle finger inside the vagina of the
patient and was able to palpate a
hard object. After which, I made a
speculum examination wherein I was
able to visualize the inner portion of
the vaginal canal, there I saw
purulent foul smelling, blood tints,
discharge in the vaginal canal and a
foreign body invaded on the posterior
part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez
about my findings and he asked me
to try to remove the said foreign
object by the use of forceps which I
tried to do so also but I failed to
extract the same.
Q All this time that you were
examining the patient Rosario
Baluyot both in the first and second
instance, Rosario Baluyot was
conscious and were you able to talk
to her when you were examining
her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a to by different witnesses that she was still able
foreign object lodge inside her
vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that
"GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT
SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this
Negro who used her and who
inserted and placed the foreign
object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said
he used me three (3) months ago
from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred
the patient to the ward, what
happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is
already scheduled on operation on
that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the
patient would undergo surgery after
that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis
supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals
testimony considering Rosario's condition at
that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that
she would be striking a normal conversation
with the doctors and would be sitting on the
examination table since Gaspar Alcantara
stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to
the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing
in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to
still be conscious and ambulant at that time
because there were several instances testified
to talk prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and
a member of the Olongapo Catholic
Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that
as a member of this group she visits indigent
children in the hospital every Saturday and
after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which
was May 17, she was still able to talk to
Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates
helped Rosario go to the comfort room to
urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense
is another para social worker who worked at
Pope John 23rd Community Center under
Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital
visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the
month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child
who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583,
on the cement floor and when she asked why
592 [1986]), we explained that:
she was seated there, she was told that it was
too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for
about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-
13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought
Rosario to the hospital actually testified that
she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September
14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on
her so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p.
12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that
Rosario was still conscious and could still
answer questions asked of her although she
was complaining of stomach pains.
Unfortunately, the medical attention given to
her failed to halt the aggravation of her
condition. The operation on May 19 was too
late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in
layman's language is blood poisoning, and
peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the
abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object
or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina
of the victim. This led to the infection from the
uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the
peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the was responsible for the vibrator left inside the
rationale of Article 4 of the RPC victim's vagina which caused her death seven
(7) months after its insertion. What the
prosecution managed to establish were mere
He who is the cause of the cause is
circumstances which were not sufficient to
the cause of the evil caused.
overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. While circumstantial evidence may
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must suffice to support a conviction it is imperative,
first follow the rule as stated in the case though, that the following requisites should
of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate concur:
Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
(a) There is more than one
The rule is that the death of the circumstance;
victim must be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of
(b) The facts from which the
the wounds inflicted upon him by the
inferences are derived are proven;
accused. And since we are dealing
and
with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a (c) The combination of all the
rational mind beyond reasonable circumstances is such as to produce
doubt. (Emphasis supplied) a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised
Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that
"before conviction can be had upon
xxx xxx xxx
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain
The basic principle in every criminal which leads to one fair and reasonable
prosecution is that accusation is not conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the
synonymous with guilt. The accused exclusion of all others, as the author of the
is presumed innocent until the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942];
contrary is proved by the Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude
prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it every reasonable hypothesis of innocence
fails utterly, even if the defense is (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420,
weak or, indeed, even if there is no 433 [1987]). In this case the circumstantial
defense at all. The defendant faces evidence presented by the prosecution does
the full panoply of state authority with not conclusively point to the liability of the
all "The People of the Philippines" appellant for the crime charged. (People v.
arrayed against him. In a manner of Tolentino, supra)
speaking, he goes to bat with all the
bases loaded. The odds are heavily
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the
against him. It is important, therefore,
plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death
to equalize the positions of the
exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most
prosecution and the defense by
street children encounter as they sell their
presuming the innocence of the
bodies in order to survive. At an age when
accused until the state is able to
innocence and youthful joys should
refute the presumption by proof of
preponderate in their lives, they experience life
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At.
in its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead
p. 592)
of nothing more than gentle disappointments
occupying their young minds, they daily cope
The evidence for the accused maybe with tragedies that even adults should never be
numerically less as against the number of made to carry.
witnesses and preponderance of evidence
presented by the prosecution but there is no
direct and convincing proof that the accused
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to
seemingly set back the efforts of Government
to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a
means of galvanizing the nation to care for its
street children. It would have meant a lot to
social workers and prosecutors alike if one
pedophile-killer could be brought to justice so
that his example would arouse public concern,
sufficient for the formulation and
implementation of meaningful remedies.
However, we cannot convict on anything less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal
justice system are as much, if not more so, for
the perverts and outcasts of society as they are
for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an
unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction
that the accused did commit the offense has
not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the
factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario
Baluyot's baptism creates
reasonable doubt about her being
less than 12 years old when the
carnal knowledge took place. If the
evidence for the prosecution is to be
believed, she was not yet born on
the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being
under 12 years of age is not
satisfactory, the prosecution has to
prove force, intimidation, or
deprivation of reason in order to
convict for rape. There is no such
proof. In fact, the evidence shows a
willingness to submit to the sexual
act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of
Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the
vagina of Rosario was Jessie
Ramirez. This witness did not see
Ritter insert the vibrator. The
morning after the insertion, he was
only told by Rosario about it. Two
days later, he allegedly met Rosario
who informed him that she was able
to remove the object. And yet,
Ramirez testified that on the night of
that second encounter, he saw
Rosario groaning because of pain in
her stomach. She was even hurling
invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not
only hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to
expert medical testimony, for a
foreign object with active properties
to cause pain, discomfort, and
serious infection only after seven
months inside a young girl's vaginal
canal. Infection would have set in
much earlier. Jessie Ramirez
recalled that the incident happened
in December of 1986. (TSN.,
January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The
evidence, however shows that the
appellant was not here in the
Philippines that December. As per
the Commission on Immigration
Arrival and Departure Report,
Heinrich Ritter arrived in the
Philippines on October 7, 1986 and
left on October 12, 1986. He never
returned until September 23, 1987
(Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The
incident could have happened only in
October, but then it would have been
highly improbable for the sexual
vibrator to stay inside the vagina for
seven (7) months with the kind of
serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to
Rosario during her hospital
confinement testified that she told
him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya
ang naglagay nito." The accused is
not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was
mentioned about Rosario's activities after the
hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's
testimony indicating that she was "used" by a
"Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in
the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate
profession, there is always the possibility that
she could have allowed herself to be violated
by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where
a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her
vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months
after the incident in reporting the alleged crime
renders the evidence for the prosecution
insufficient to establish appellant's guilty
connection with the requisite moral certainty.
(SeePeople v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156
[1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out
the possibility that the appellant could have
inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's
vagina. This object may have caused her
death. It is possible that the appellant could be
the guilty person. However, the Court cannot
base an affirmance of conviction upon mere
possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are
not evidence and therefore should not be taken
against the accused. (People v.
Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every
circumstance favorable to the accused should
be duly taken into account. This rule applies
even to hardened criminals or those whose
bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized
society. The evidence against the accused
must survive the test of reason. The strongest
suspicion must not be allowed to sway
judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the case
of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this
Court, it has emphasized the rule
that reasonable doubt in criminal
cases must be resolved in favor of
the accused. The requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt calls
for moral certainty of guilt. It has
been defined as meaning such proof
"to the satisfaction of the court,
keeping in mind the presumption of
innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that
which it is given to support. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a
probability, even though strong, that
the fact charged is more likely to be
true than the contrary. It must
establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable and moral certainty—a
certainty that convinces and satisfies
the reason and the conscience of
those who are to act upon it.
(Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary,
1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v.
Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are
circumstances which prevent our being morally
certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is,
therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore
the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie
Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986
at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we
are convinced that he comes to this country not Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that
to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or the appellant is also free from civil liability
indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to
satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony
by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant
who picked him and Rosario from among the
children and invited them to the hotel; and that
in the hotel he was shown pictures of young
boys like him and the two masturbated each
other, such actuations clearly show that the
appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in
Ermita, he was sizing up young children. Dr.
Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled
Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual
perversion wherein a person has the
compulsive desire to have sexual
intercourse with a child of either sex.
Children of various ages participate
in sexual activities, like fellatio,
cunnilingus, fondling with sex
organs, or anal sexual intercourse.
Usually committed by a homosexual
between a man and a boy the latter
being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide
and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by
itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive
to public morals and violative of the declared
policy of the state to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being
of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago,
162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles,
especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in
our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to
believe that the appellant committed acts
injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to
the public good and domestic tranquility of the
people. The state has expressly committed
itself to defend the right of children to
assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . .
(Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has
abused Filipino children, enticing them with
money. The appellant should be expelled from
the country.
which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled
doctrine is that a person while not criminally
liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate
what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in
a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action
for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code).
The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of
Article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission,
has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
The old rule that the
acquittal of the accused in
a criminal case also
releases him from civil
liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It
has given rise to
numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was
due to a reasonable doubt
in the mind of the court as
to the guilt of the accused.
The reasoning followed is
that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense,
when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded.
This is one of those
causes where confused
thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and
to determine the logical
result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from
each other. One affects
the social order and the
other, private rights. One is
for the punishment or
correction of the offender
while the other is for the
reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved
party. The two
responsibilities are so
different from each other
that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil
Code reads thus: "There
may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising
from a crime; but the
public action for the
imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby
be extinguished." It is just
and proper that, for the
purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the
offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
But for the purpose of
indemnifying the
complaining party, why
should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion
or violation of every private
right to be proved only by
a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of
the aggrieved person any
less private because the
wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal
law?
For these reasons, the
Commission recommends
the adoption of the reform
under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in
our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of
injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part
of the innumerable
persons injured or
wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights
from her grandmother's
house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to
succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. children and the evils committed against them.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who
have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety
and moral shock by her sudden and
incredulous death as reflected in the records of
the case. Though we are acquitting the
appellant for the crime of rape with homicide,
we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is
innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and
the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight
case for conviction which saved him, not that
the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As
earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did
insert the vibrator whose end was left inside
Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator
may have caused her death. True, we cannot
convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil SO ORDERED.
liability does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the
payment of indemnity on the facts found in the G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary ALONZO, petitioners,
to morals, good customs, public order or public vs.
policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier
mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino
children, enticing them with money. We can not
overstress the responsibility for proper
behavior of all adults in the Philippines,
including the appellant towards young children.
The sexual exploitation committed by the
appellant should not and can not be condoned.
Thus, considering the circumstances of the
case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of CRUZ, J.:
Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of
criminal laws which will adequately protect
street children from exploitation by pedophiles,
pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or
guardians who profit from the sale of young
bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and
other related offenses were never intended for
the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking
advantage of rampant poverty among the
forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper
and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length
with this serious social problem but pedophiles
like the appellant will continue to enter the
Philippines and foreign publications catering to
them will continue to advertise the availability
of Filipino street children unless the
Government acts and acts soon. We have to
commands us to do so. We, however, express
the Court's concern about the problem of street
Something must be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED
on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant
is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by
way of moral and exemplary damages to the
heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed
to institute proper deportation proceedings
against the appellant and to immediately expel
him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the
country.
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
The question is sometimes asked, in serious
inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are
a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply
the law even if it is unjust or do we administer
justice even against the law? Thus queried, we
do not equivocate. The answer is that we do
neither because we are a court both of law and
of justice. We apply the law with justice for that
is our mission and purpose in the scheme of
our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro
indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
'the name of their deceased parents under
OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino
Padua, transferred his undivided share of the
herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by
way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April
22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her
own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro
Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with
a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-
concrete house on a part of the enclosed
area.4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of
the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint
was dismissed when it appeared that he was
an American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977,
however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed
her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption claimed by her brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint,
now on the ground that the right had lapsed,
not having been exercised within thirty days
from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964.
Although there was no written notice, it was
held that actual knowledge of the sales by the
co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the
co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other
co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the
same lot, which consisted of only 604 square
meters, including the portions sold to the
petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold
her portion, was staying in the same house
with her sister Tecla, who later claimed
redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners
and the private respondents were close friends
and neighbors whose children went to school
together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs
were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the area
occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the
circumstances just narrated, it was impossible
for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by
the petitioners had been purchased by them
from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant
was the erection thereon of the permanent
semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son,
which was done without objection on her part
or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is
the correct interpretation and application of the
pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough,
by both the petitioners and the private
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil
Code, providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of
the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of
the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided
they do so within the
period of one month from
the time they were notified
in writing of the sale by the
vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent
court ** declared that the notice required by the
said article was written notice and that actual
notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing
the same case of De Conejero v. Court of
Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed
the need for written notice although no
particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the
co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
property subject to redemption would satisfy
the requirement for written notice. "So long,
therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner)
is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty
days for redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the
Court, speaking through the same learned
jurist, emphasized that the written notice
should be given by the vendor and not the
vendees, conformably to a similar requirement
under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of
legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be
exercised except within
thirty days from the notice
in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by
the vendors, as the case
may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice As judges, we are not automatons. We do not
thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of
co-owners excludes that of
the adjoining owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine
legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the first sale and fourteen years after the second
a particular method of giving notice, and that
notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court
held that notice given by the vendees and not
the vendor would not toll the running of the 30- it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we
day period.
The petition before us appears to be an
illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard
cases make bad laws" as the petitioners
obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the
vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one
conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption
had not begun to run, much less expired in
1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a
law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and
we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may
be done even as the law is obeyed.
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond
them." 13 While we admittedly may not
legislate, we nevertheless have the power to
will of the legislature. While we may not
read into the law a purpose that is not there,
we nevertheless have the right to read out of
defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the
spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law
maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the
letter of a statute
determines its
construction, hence, a
statute must be read In the face of the established facts, we cannot It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-
according to its spirit or accept the private respondents' pretense that heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who
intent. For what is within they were unaware of the sales made by their were not among them, should enclose a
the spirit is within the letter brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a
but although it is not within requiring written proof of such notice, we would house of strong materials. This definitely was
the letter thereof, and that be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere
which is within the letter of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of
but not within the spirit is exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation,
not within the statute. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
Stated differently, a thing the redemptioners are duly notified. We are inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were
which is within the intent of satisfied that in this case the other brothers and readily available. It took all of thirteen years
the lawmaker is as much sisters were actually informed, although not in before one of them chose to claim the right of
within the statute as if writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, redemption, but then it was already too late.
within the letter; and a and that such notice was sufficient.
thing which is within the
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion
letter of the statute is not
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption today, we are deviating from the strict letter of
within the statute unless
begin? the law, which the respondent court
within the intent of the
understandably applied pursuant to existing
lawmakers. 14
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as
While we do not here declare that this period
it had no competence to reverse the doctrines
started from the dates of such sales in 1963
In requiring written notice, laid down by this Court in the above-cited
and 1964, we do say that sometime between
Article 1088 seeks to cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
those years and 1976, when the first complaint
ensure that the stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the
for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs
redemptioner is properly De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are
were actually informed of the sale and that
notified of the sale and to doing simply is adopting an exception to the
thereafter the 30-day period started running
indicate the date of such general rule, in view of the peculiar
and ultimately expired. This could have
notice as the starting time circumstances of this case.
happened any time during the interval of
of the 30-day period of
thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made
redemption. Considering
a move to redeem the properties sold. By The co-heirs in this case were undeniably
the shortness of the
1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed informed of the sales although no notice in
period, it is really
her complaint, the right of redemption had writing was given them. And there is no doubt
necessary, as a general
already been extinguished because the period either that the 30-day period began and ended
rule, to pinpoint the precise
for its exercise had already expired. during the 14 years between the sales in
date it is supposed to
question and the filing of the complaint for
begin, to obviate any
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs
problem of alleged delays, The following doctrine is also worth noting:
exercising their right of redemption. These are
sometimes consisting of
the justifications for this exception.
only a day or two.
While the general rule is,
that to charge a party with
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian
The instant case presents no such problem laches in the assertion of
defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
because the right of redemption was invoked an alleged right it is
wish to render every one his due." 16 That
not days but years after the sales were made in essential that he should
wish continues to motivate this Court when it
1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by have knowledge of the
assesses the facts and the law in every case
Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the facts upon which he bases
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
his claim, yet if the
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners circumstances were such
the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
extends to more than a decade, assuming of as should have induced
way that will render justice, presuming that it
course that there was a valid notice that tolled inquiry, and the means of
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin
the running of the period of redemption. ascertaining the truth were
with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So
readily available upon
we have done in this case.
inquiry, but the party
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law
neglects to make it, he will
requires the notice to be written, would such
be chargeable with laches, WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The
notice be necessary in this case? Assuming
the same as if he had decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
there was a valid notice although it was not in
known the facts. 15 and that of the trial court is reinstated, without
writing. would there be any question that the
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
30-day period for redemption had expired long
ordered.
before the complaint was filed in 1977?
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN
ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-
appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are
undisputed by either party in this case. They
are —
That on the 11th day of September,
1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de
Martinez, was riding in a carromata
on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city
of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand
side of the street as she was going,
when a delivery wagon belonging to
the defendant used for the purpose
of transportation of fodder by the
defendant, and to which was
attached a pair of horses, came
along the street in the opposite
direction to that the in which said
plaintiff was proceeding, and that
thereupon the driver of the said
plaintiff's carromata, observing that
the delivery wagon of the defendant
was coming at great speed, crowded
close to the sidewalk on the left-hand
side of the street and stopped, in
order to give defendant's delivery
wagon an opportunity to pass by, but
that instead of passing by the
defendant's wagon and horses ran
into the carromata occupied by said
plaintiff with her child and overturned
it, severely wounding said plaintiff by
making a serious cut upon her head,
and also injuring the carromata itself
and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the
defendant presented evidence to the
effect that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time
the accident occurred, was a good
servant and was considered a safe
and reliable cochero; that the
delivery wagon had sent to deliver
some forage at Paco Livery Stable
on Calle Herran, and that for the
purpose of delivery thereof the
cochero driving the team as
defendant's employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front
end of the delivery wagon and then
went back inside of the wagon for the
purpose of unloading the forage to
be delivered; that while unloading the
forage and in the act of carrying
some of it out, another vehicle drove
by, the driver of which cracked a
whip and made some other noises,
which frightened the horses attached
to the delivery wagon and they ran
away, and the driver was thrown
from the inside of the wagon out
through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses;
that the horses then ran up and on
which street they came into collision
with the carromata in which the
plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez,
was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle
on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the
defendant guilty of negligence and gave
judgment against him for P442.50, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum
from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the
costs of the action. The case is before us on an
appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the
Philippine Islands except that embodied in the
Civil Code. The provisions of that code
pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another is, under the last paragraph of the above
when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage
so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by
preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, While the law relating to negligence in this
but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or
incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who
live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages the same here, generally speaking, as
caused by minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their
authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an
establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages
caused by the employees in the
service of the branches in which the It appears from the undisputed evidence that
latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when five or six months; that he had been in the
it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damages should have condition in which they were left on the day of
been caused by the official to whom the accident; that they had never run away up
properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article
shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts
and trades are liable for the
damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under
their custody.
The liability referred to in this article
shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the
damage.
Passing the question whether or not an
employer who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team and a trusty and capable driver
provisions, liable for the negligence of such
driver in handling the team, we are of the
opinion that the judgment must be reversed
upon the ground that the evidence does not
disclose that the cochero was negligent.
jurisdiction may possibly be some what
different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a
question we do not now discuss, the rules
under which the fact of negligence is
determined are, nevertheless, generally the
same. That is to say, while the law designating
the person responsible for a negligent act may
not be the same here as in many jurisdictions,
the law determining what is a negligent act is
elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4
December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June,
1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March,
1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23
June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12
June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3
June, 1901.)
the horses which caused the damage were
gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven
one of the horses several years and the other
habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the
to that time and there had been, therefore, no
accident due to such practice; that to leave the
horses and assist in unloading the
merchandise in the manner described on the
day of the accident was the custom of all
cochero who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by
the cochero of the defendant on the day in
question, which custom was sanctioned by
their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant
was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case,
either under Spanish or American
jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422;
Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590;
Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J.
L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80
N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P.
Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while
removing the goods into the house,
and, if every person who suffered a
cart to remain in the street while he
took goods out of it was obliged to
employ another to look after the
horses, it would be impossible for the
business of the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14
Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the
plaintiff, or those in charged of his
horse, at the time of the injury, is that
which would be exercised by a
person of ordinary care and
prudence under like circumstances.
It can not be said that the fact of
leaving the horse unhitched is in
itself negligence. Whether it is
negligence to leave a horse
unhitched must be depend upon the
disposition of the horse; whether he
was under the observation and
control of some person all the time,
and many other circumstances; and
is a question to be determined by the
jury from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L.,
255), it was held that it was error on the part of
the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not
negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle
horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise
unattended on the side of a public highways
while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading
goods on the wagon." The said court closed its
opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could
have fully justified the jury in finding
that the horse was quite and gentle,
and that the driver was upon the
sidewalk loading goods on the
wagon, at time of the alleged injury,
and that the horse had been used for
years in that way without accident.
The refusal of the trial court to
charge as requested left the jury free
to find was verdict against the
defendant, although the jury was
convinced that these facts were
proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105
Mass., 342), it was held:
 That evidence that a servant, whom
traders employed to deliver goods,
upon stopping with his horse and
wagon to deliver a parcel at a house
from fifty to a hundred rods from a
railroad crossing, left the horse
unfastened for four or five minutes
while he was in the house, knowing
that it was not afraid of cars, and
having used it for three or four
months without ever hitching it or
knowing it to start, is not conclusive,
as a matter of law, of a want of due
care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be
negligence in the respect in question, is to
exercise reasonable care and prudence.
Where reasonable care is employed in doing
an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to
produce damage to others, there will be no
liability, although damage in fact ensues.
(Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489;
Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524;
Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson
Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y.,
34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63;
Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal.,
257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the
horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the
performance of which has not proved
destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so
long a time that they have ripened into custom,
can not be held to be themselves unreasonable
or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they
have been permitted by society is that they
beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-
alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries
result from the most ordinary acts of life. But
such are not their natural or customary results.
To hold that, because such an act once
resulted in accident or injury, the actor is
necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes
successfully invoked in such a case, does not
in any sense militate against the reasoning
presented. That maxim at most only creates
aprima facie case, and that only in the absence
of proof of the circumstances under which the
act complained of was performed. It is
something invoked in favor of the plaintiff
before defendant's case showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the
injury occurred, the creative reason for the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is
demonstrated by the case of Inland and
Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S.,
551), where the court said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the
instruction in question, as applied to
the case before the jury, was that if
the steamboat, on a calm day and in
smooth water, was thrown with such
force against a wharf properly built,
as to tear up some of the planks of
the flooring, this would be prima
facie evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendant's agent in
making the landing, unless upon the
whole evidence in the case
this prima facie evidence was
rebutted. As such damage to a wharf
is not ordinarily done by a steamboat
under control of her officers and
carefully managed by them,
evidence that such damage was
done in this case was prima
facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient
evidence of negligence on their part,
and the jury might properly be so
instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the
plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the
runway and the accident resulting therefrom,
but also the conditions under which the
runaway occurred. Those conditions showing
of themselves that the defendant's cochero
was not negligent in the management of the
horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if
any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business
proof that it is the universal practice of
merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of respondent suffered losses amounting to
that being delivered at the time of the injury, in ₱71,879,228 that year.6
the manner in which that was then being
delivered; and that it is the universal practice to
leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. This is the suffered losses, it was not liable for income
custom in all cities. It has not been productive
of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself quarterly corporate income tax and remitted
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced creditable withholding tax from real estate
for years without objection. Ought the public
now, through the courts, without prior objection ₱26,318,398.32. Therefore, respondent was
or notice, to be permitted to reverse the
practice of decades and thereby make culpable
and guilty one who had every reason and
assurance to believe that he was acting under
the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces,
the custom of a people? We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special
finding as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official
capacity as Revenue District Officer of
Revenue District No. 049
(Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,
INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to
set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution
denying reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of
respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax
respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to
petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V.
Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he
explained that the increase in the cost of labor
and materials and difficulty in obtaining
financing for projects and collecting receivables
caused the real estate industry to
was good during the first quarter of 1997,
According to Yap, because respondent
taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its
sales to the BIR in the total amount of
8 Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, the NIRC should be strictly applied against
entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to
Santos required respondent to submit sunrise.
additional documents to support its
claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was
If the months are designated by their name,
not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed
they shall be computed by the number of days
a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax
which they respectively have.
Appeals (CTA).
In computing a period, the first day shall be
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the
excluded, and the last included. (emphasis
petition as it was filed beyond the two-year
supplied)
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for
tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section
229 of the National Internal Revenue Code Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year
(NIRC): prescriptive period under Section 229 of the
NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was
equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or
was a leap year, respondent's petition, which
Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding
was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its
shall be maintained in any court for the
final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
recovery of any national internal revenue tax
reglementary period.15
hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without Respondent moved for reconsideration but it
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the
excessively or in any manner wrongfully CA.17
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set
such suit or proceeding may be maintained,
aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that
whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has
Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish
been paid under protest or duress.
between a regular year and a leap year.
According to the CA:
In any case, no such suit or proceeding
shall be filed after the expiration of two (2)
The rule that a year has 365 days applies,
years from the date of payment of the tax or
notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is
penalty regardless of any supervening
a leap year.19
cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a claim In other words, even if the year 2000 was a
therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the leap year, the periods covered by April 15,
face of the return upon which payment was 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to
made, such payment appears clearly to have April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365
been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied) days each or a total of 730 days. A statute
which is clear and explicit shall be neither
interpreted nor construed.20
The CTA found that respondent filed its final
adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its
right to claim a refund or credit commenced on Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it
that date.13 was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in
Code which states: the nature of an exemption, should be strictly
construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of
respondent inasmuch as it has been
days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five consistently held that the prescriptive period
(for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits)
days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
begins to run on the day claimants file their
final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim
should have been filed on or before April 13, the provisions of a more recent law cannot be expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her,
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14,before
1998 the marriage, indicate that the couple
2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the reasonably reconciled with the previous 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc.
time respondent filed its final adjusted return. one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and were deeply in love. Together with a friend,
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
of the Administrative Code of 1987 states: Arturo V. Parcero. Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-
between, they had planned out their marital
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed 3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
future whereby Pacita would be the governess
its petition for review in the CTA within the two- Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, No costs.
of their first-born; they started saving money in
year prescriptive period provided in Section decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or 4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret
229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code
SO ORDERED. marriage, their engagement was broken;
is not. are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. 5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love
6th calendar month September 15,
G.R. No. L-19671 1998 to October
November 29, 1965 14, 1998
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his
is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted express repealing clause because it fails to return, and they reconciled. This time they
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
return.24 But how should the two-year identify or designate the laws to be PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, planned to get married and then elope. To
prescriptive period be computed? abolished.32 Thus, the provision above 8th calendar month vs.
November 15, 1998 to December 14,facilitate
1998 the elopement, Vicenta had brought
only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants- some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code
with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1 9th calendar month appellees.
December 15, 1998 to January 14,in1999
St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
provides that when the law speaks of a year, it
is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An 10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-
In National Marketing Corporation v. implied repeal must have been clearly and appellant. Although planned for the midnight following
Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to unmistakably intended by the legislature. The 11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14,their
1999 marriage, the elopement did not, however,
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular test is whether the subsequent law materialize because when Vicente went back
year or a leap year.26 encompasses entirely the subject matter of the 12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14,to1999
her classes after the marriage, her mother,
former law and they cannot be logically or REYES, J.B.L., J.: who got wind of the intended nuptials, was
reasonably reconciled.33 Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14,already
1999 waiting for her at the college. Vicenta
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the
Direct appeal, on1999
factualtoand legal questions, was taken home where she admitted that she
Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. 14th calendar month May 15, June 14, 1999
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section from the judgment of the Court of First Instance had already married Pastor. Mamerto and
of Cebu, in its Civil CasetoNo. R-4177, denying Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor
provides: 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative 15th calendar month June 15, 1999 July 14,never
1999 asked for the hand of Vicente, and were
Code of 1987 deal with the same subject the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, disgusted because of the great scandal that the
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be
matter — the computation of legal periods. 16th calendar month July for
15,legal
1999separation
to and one million14, 1999
August clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol.
Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to pesos in damages against his wife and
understood to be twelve calendar parents-in-law, III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap 17th calendar month August 15,the1999defendants-appellees,
to September 14,Escaño
1999 spouses sought priestly advice. Father
year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed
to a specific calendar month in which case it "Escaño," respectively. 2 Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar 18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14,what1999he believed to be an invalid marriage,
shall be computed according to the number of
months. Needless to state, under the from the standpoint of the Church, due to the
days the specific month contains; "day", to a
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of 19th calendar month TheOctober 15, 1999by the
facts, supported to evidence November
of record,14,lack
1999
day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from of authority from the Archbishop or the
days is irrelevant. are the following: parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14,celebrate
1999 the marriage. The recelebration did
There obviously exists a manifest not take place, because on 26 February 1948
A calendar month is "a month designated in the 21st calendar month Missing her late afternoon
December 15, 1999 to classes on 24
January 14,Mamerto
2000 Escaño was handed by a maid,
incompatibility in the manner of computing February 1948 in the University of San Carlos,
calendar without regard to the number of days whose name he claims he does not remember,
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Cebu City, where she was
it may contain."28 It is the "period of time 22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to then enrolled as a 14, 2000
February a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, second year student of commerce, Vicenta
running from the beginning of a certain college students and disclosing an amorous
we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do
numbered day up to, but not including, the 23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14,relationship
2000 between Pastor Tenchavez and
the Administrative Code of 1987, being the and socially prominent Filipino family of
corresponding numbered day of the next Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her
more recent law, governs the computation of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
month, and if there is not a sufficient number of 24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. father, and thereafter would not agree to a new
days in the next month, then up to and exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
We therefore hold that respondent's petition marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in
including the last day of that month."29 To Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-
(filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter,
illustrate, one calendar month from December Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the army officer and of undistinguished stock,
day of the 24th calendar month from the day Vicenta continued living with her parents while
31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the without the knowledge of her parents, before a
respondent filed its final adjusted return. Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter
January 31, 2008; one calendar month from two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the
Hence, it was filed within the reglementary of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still
January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 time respondent filed its final adjusted house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
period. solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as
until February 29, 2008.30 return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 marriage was the culmination of a previous
endearing as her previous letters when their
calendar months, computed as follows: love affair and was duly registered with the
love was aflame.
Accordingly, the petition is local civil register.
A law may be repealed expressly (by a
hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to
categorical declaration that the law is revoked
the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to
and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a
changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it.
She fondly accepted her being called a
"jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh.
"1-Escaño"), but her letters became less
frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948
the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh.
"2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu
society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition,
drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to
annul her marriage. She did not sign the
petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her
husband, she applied for a passport, indicating
in her application that she was single, that her
purpose was to study, and she was domiciled
in Cebu City, and that she intended to return
after two years. The application was approved,
and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on
the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental
in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a
petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D").
On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an
American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She
now lives with him in California, and, by him,
has begotten children. She acquired American That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated
the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended
on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño,
her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband,
and alienating her affections, and against the competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that charges to have been in conspiracy with
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta
claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband,
Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal
separation, but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to
the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to
the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial
court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation;
in not holding defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant
parents Mamerto Escano and the
heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and
requiring him to pay the damages to
the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
denying the relief sought by the
plaintiff.
appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were
validly married to each other, from the
standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established
by the record before us. Both parties were then
above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when
which was performed by a Catholic priest
(army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
said priest was not duly authorized under civil
law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical
authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is
irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of
the separation of Church and State but also
because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature
(which was the marriage law in force at the
time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites.
Essential requisites for marriage are
the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis
supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer
was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage
civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section
27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with
formal requirements. No marriage
shall be declared invalid because of
the absence of one or several of the
formal requirements of this Act if,
when it was performed, the spouses
or one of them believed in good faith
that the person who solemnized the
marriage was actually empowered to
do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage
(and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved
(Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the
authority of the solemnizing priest arose only
after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents
consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of
Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment
and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was
valid and binding.
she contracted the marriage she was under the
undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention,
and assuming that Vicenta's consent was
vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such order, policy and good customs, shall
vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, not be rendered ineffective by laws
but merely voidable, and the marriage or judgments promulgated, or by
remained valid until annulled by a competent determinations or conventions
civil court. This was never done, and agreed upon in a foreign country.
admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis was
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this
dismissed for non-prosecution.
jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees
would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and
It is equally clear from the record that the valid scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and citizens, to the detriment of those members of
Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and our polity whose means do not permit them to
undissolved under Philippine law, sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce outside the Philippines.
that the wife sought and obtained on 21
October 1950 from the Second Judicial District
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that
Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
character." At the time the divorce decree was
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot
issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was
4 be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code
because the mere appearance of a non-
of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction
in force at the time, expressly provided:
where the court originally had none (Area vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
Laws relating to family rights and
duties or to the status, condition and
From the preceding facts and considerations,
legal capacity of persons are binding
there flows as a necessary consequence that
upon the citizens of the Philippines,
in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and
even though living abroad.
second marriage are not entitled to recognition
as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
use that term, to further emphasize its of consortium and her desertion of her husband
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to constitute in law a wrong caused through her
the preceding legislation that admitted absolute fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art.
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, immorality against the husband constitute,
Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1). Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
could be a patent violation of the declared
public policy of the state, specially in view of
the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward
Code that prescribes the following: effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are
in accord with the previous doctrines and
rulings of this court on the subject, particularly
Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
those that were rendered under our laws prior
their acts or property, and those
to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act
which have for their object public
2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter
of legal history, our statutes did not recognize
divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710
became effective; and the present Civil Code of
the Philippines, in disregarding absolute
divorces, in effect merely reverted to the
policies on the subject prevailing before Act
2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil
Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these,
the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855,
The appellant's first assignment of error is,
is of particular interest. Said this Court in that
therefore, sustained.
case:
As the divorce granted by the French
Court must be ignored, it results that
the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona
Castro, celebrated in London in
1905, could not legalize their
relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband
and wife in Switzerland until her
death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very
children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be
rejected. The right to inherit is limited
to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are
wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941
of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates
born of adulterous relations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
of the children, begotten from Vicenta's
marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, upon advice that the previous one was
are not involved in the case at bar,
the Gmur case is authority for the proposition
that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but
and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort
of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in induce their daughter to assent to the
Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial
court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous
situations where the status of a person
(whether divorced or not) would depend on the
territory where the question arises. Anomalies
of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and
the answer to them was given in Barretto vs.
Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce
laws in the Philippine Islands are well
known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the
Courts to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to
say that such laws are too strict or
too liberal. (p. 72)
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that
his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his
wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the
affections of their daughter and influenced her
conduct toward her husband are not supported
by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity
toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture
and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's
own letters written before this suit was begun
(Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App.,
pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for "misjudging
them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused
by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride,"
"effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was
admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove
that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as
good manners and breeding demanded. Even
after learning of the clandestine marriage, and
despite their shock at such unexpected event,
the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged
conformity with the canons of their religion
canonically defective. If no recelebration of the
marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That
the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or
recelebration but respected her decision, or
that they abided by her resolve, does not
constitute in law an alienation of affections.
Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents
sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not
wish their daughter to live in penury even if
they did not concur in her decision to divorce
Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of
Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her
subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted
independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask
that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in
so doing, certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice
or unworthy motives, which have not been
shown, good faith being always presumed until
the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents,
Guardians or Kin. — The law
distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the
marital affairs of his child and the
absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However,
such distinction between the liability
of parents and that of strangers is
only in regard to what will justify
interference. A parent isliable for
alienation of affections resulting from
his own malicious conduct, as where
he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse,
but he is not liable unless he acts
maliciously, without justification and
from unworthy motives. He is not
liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his
child's marital relations in the interest
of his child as he sees it, the
marriage of his child not terminating
his right and liberty to interest himself
in, and be extremely solicitous for,
his child's welfare and happiness,
even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of
the spouses or the obtaining of a
divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice
or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been
held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith
take his child into his home and
afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or
does not maliciously entice or cause
him or her to stay away, from his or
her spouse. This rule has more
frequently been applied in the case
of advice given to a married Summing up, the Court rules:
daughter, but it is equally applicable
in the case of advice given to a son.
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens, sought and decreed after the
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in
discrimination and with having exerted efforts this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
and pressured her to seek annulment and contracted with another party by the divorced
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
While this suit may not have been impelled by
actual malice, the charges were certainly
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and
reckless in the face of the proven facts and
her co-habitation with a person other than the
circumstances. Court actions are not
lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of
established for parties to give vent to their
legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
prejudices or spleen.
(3) That the desertion and securing of an
In the assessment of the moral damages
invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles
recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez
the other to recover damages;
from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to
take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in (4) That an action for alienation of affections
damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated against the parents of one consort does not lie
in secret, and its failure was not characterized in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy
by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's motives on their part.
part; (b) that the parties never lived together;
and (c) that there is evidence that appellant
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is
had originally agreed to the annulment of the
hereby modified as follows;
marriage, although such a promise was legally
invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88,
Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor
remarry under our law, this fact is a Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
consequence of the indissoluble character of separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
the union that appellant entered into voluntarily
and with open eyes rather than of her divorce
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta
and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys'
only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees;
fees.
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded
pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the
to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño,
Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine
P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys'
that the same are excessive. While the filing of
fees.
this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety,
the same could in no way have seriously Neither party to recover costs.
injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced
them, lawsuits having become a common
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,
occurrence in present society. What is
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and
important, and has been correctly established
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
in the decision of the court below, is that said
defendants were not guilty of any improper
conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This
G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012
Court, therefore, reduces the damages
awarded to P5,000 only.
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, but which collects
royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue
here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45,1 petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc.
(TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, prays that the
Resolution2 dated 21 November 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be
declared void and the case be remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings. In the assailed
Resolution, the RTC dismissed
petitioner’s Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award3 against respondent Philippine
Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines,4 on the ground that petitioner
lacked legal capacity to sue.5
The Antecedents
On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka
(hereinafter referred to as the "licensor"), co-
patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619,
Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and
Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 (collectively
referred to as the "Yamaoka Patent"),6 and five
(5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel
Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc.,
Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz
Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford
(collectively referred to as the
"sponsors"/"licensees")7 entered into a
The parties likewise executed a Supplemental
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),8 pertinent
Memorandum of Agreement10 dated 15
provisions of which read:
January 2003 and an Agreement to Amend
Memorandum of Agreement11 dated 14 July
1. Background and objectives. The 2003.
Licensor, co-owner of U.S.Patent No.
5,484,619, Philippine Patent No.
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the
31138, and Indonesian Patent No.
petition, the licensees, including respondent
ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an
Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and
alliance with Sponsors for purposes
correspondingly reneged on their
of enforcing his three
obligations.12 Petitioner submitted the dispute
aforementioned patents, granting
licenses under those patents, and
collecting royalties.
The Sponsors wish to be licensed
under the aforementioned patents in
order to practice the processes
claimed in those patents in the
United States, the Philippines, and
Indonesia, enforce those patents and
collect royalties in conjunction with
Licensor.
xxx
4. Establishment of Tuna
Processors, Inc. The parties hereto
agree to the establishment of Tuna
Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a
corporation established in the State
of California, in order to implement
the objectives of this Agreement.
5. Bank account. TPI shall open
and maintain bank accounts in the
United States, which will be used
exclusively to deposit funds that it
will collect and to disburse cash it will
be obligated to spend in connection
with the implementation of this
Agreement.
6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be
owned by the Sponsors and
Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned
one share of TPI for the purpose of
being elected as member of the
board of directors. The remaining
shares of TPI shall be held by the
Sponsors according to their
respective equity shares. 9
xxx
for arbitration before the International Centre
for Dispute Resolution in the State of
California, United States and won the case
against respondent.13 Pertinent portions of the
award read:
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of
transmittal of this Award to the Parties,
pursuant to the terms of this award, the total
sum to be paid by RESPONDENT
KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum
of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX
DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
(A) For breach of the MOA by not
paying past due
assessments, RESPONDENT
KINGFORD shall
pay CLAIMANT the total sum
of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY NINE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
AND FIFTY FIVE DOLLARS AND
NINETY CENTS
($229,355.90) which is 20%
of MOA assessments since
September 1, 2005[;]
(B) For breach of the MOA in failing
to cooperate with CLAIMANT TPI in
fulfilling the objectives of the MOA,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall
pay CLAIMANT the total sum
of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY
14
CENTS ($271,490.20)[;] and
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM
ACT and infringement of
the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall
pay CLAIMANT the total sum
of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND may be sued or proceeded against before
NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx
xxx15
To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 the court a quo dismissed the petition. Thus:
October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City.
The petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided acknowledges that it "is a foreign corporation
by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.
At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a
Motion to Dismiss.16 After the court denied the
motion for lack of merit,17respondent sought for
the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for
the reconsideration of the order denying the
motion.18 Judge Alameda inhibited himself
notwithstanding "[t]he unfounded allegations
and unsubstantiated assertions in the
motion."19 Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61,
to which the case was re-raffled, in turn,
granted respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on
the ground that the petitioner lacked legal
capacity to sue in the Philippines.20
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing
its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.
Issue
The core issue in this case is whether or not
the court a quo was correct in so dismissing
the petition on the ground of petitioner’s lack of
legal capacity to sue.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Corporation Code of the
Philippines expressly provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a
license. - No foreign corporation transacting
business in the Philippines without a license, or
its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative
agency of the Philippines; but such corporation [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on Law. It is for this reason that TPI has brought
any valid cause of action recognized under
Philippine laws.
It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that dispute resolution may be defeated by
Herein plaintiff TPI’s "Petition, etc."
established in the State of California" and "was of the Corporation Code of the Philippines on
given the exclusive right to license or
sublicense the Yamaoka Patent" and "was
assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said
patent and collect corresponding royalties" in
the Philippines. TPI likewise admits that it does
not have a license to do business in the
Philippines.
There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this
Court that TPI has been doing business in the
Philippines, but sans a license to do so issued
by the concerned government agency of the
Republic of the Philippines, when it collected
royalties from "five (5) Philippine tuna
processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood
Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy
Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods,
Inc. and respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc."
This being the real situation, TPI cannot be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any
action, suit or proceedings in any court or
administrative agency of the Philippines." A
priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the plaintiff
TPI should be dismissed for it does not have
the legal personality to sue in the Philippines.21
The petitioner counters, however, that it is
entitled to seek for the recognition and
enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral
award in accordance with Republic Act No.
9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004),22 the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted
during the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration in 1958
(New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (Model Law),23 as none of these
specifically requires that the party seeking for
the enforcement should have legal capacity to
sue. It anchors its argument on the following:
In the present case, enforcement has been
effectively refused on a ground not found in the
of 2004], New York Convention, or Model
this matter before this most Honorable Court,
as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the
Philippines’ international obligations and State
policy to strengthen arbitration as a means of
misplaced technical considerations not found in
the relevant laws.24
Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions
one hand, and the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004, the New York
Convention and the Model Law on the other?
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to
discuss the nature and applicability of
the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a
general law, viz-a-viz other special laws. Thus,
in Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,25 this Court rejected In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution
the application of the Corporation Code and
applied the New Central Bank Act. It
ratiocinated:
Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the
Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier
case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:
"The Corporation Code, however, is a general
law applying to all types of corporations, while
the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically
banks and other financial institutions, including
the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As
between a general and special law, the latter
shall prevail – generalia specialibus non
derogant." (Emphasis supplied)26
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita,
Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council,27 this Court held:
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the
general law providing for the formation,
organization and regulation of private
corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is
the special law on agrarian reform. As between
a general and special law, the latter shall
prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant.28
Following the same principle, the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in
this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to
Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines
and to Establish the Office for Alternative
Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes
- would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to
actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the
party to make their own arrangements to
resolve their disputes."29 It specifically provides
exclusive grounds available to the party
opposing an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award.30
Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Article V
Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the
instant petition, we do not see the need to
1. Recognition and enforcement of
discuss compliance with international
the award may be refused, at the
obligations under the New York
request of the party against whom it
Convention and the Model Law. After all, both
is invoked, only if that party furnishes
already form part of the law.
to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is
sought, proof that:
Act of 2004 incorporated the New York
Convention in the Act by specifically providing:
(a) The parties to the
agreement referred to in
SEC. 42. Application of the New York article II were, under the
Convention. - The New York Convention shall law applicable to them,
govern the recognition and enforcement of under some incapacity, or
arbitral awards covered by the said the said agreement is not
Convention. valid under the law to
which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any
xxx
indication thereon, under
the law of the country
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral where the award was
Award. - A party to a foreign arbitration made; or
proceeding may oppose an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
(b) The party against
award in accordance with the procedural rules
whom the award is
to be promulgated by the Supreme Court only
invoked was not given
on those grounds enumerated under Article V
proper notice of the
of the New York Convention. Any other ground
appointment of the
raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial
arbitrator or of the
court.
arbitration proceedings or
was otherwise unable to
It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit: present his case; or
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on (c) The award deals with a
International Commercial difference not
Arbitration. International commercial arbitration contemplated by or not
shall be governed by the Model Law on falling within the terms of
International Commercial Arbitration (the the submission to
"Model Law") adopted by the United Nations arbitration, or it contains
Commission on International Trade Law on decisions on matters
June 21, 1985 xxx." beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration,
provided that, if the
Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to
decisions on matters
do business in the Philippines have legal
submitted to arbitration
capacity to sue under the provisions of
can be separated from
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? those not so submitted,
We answer in the affirmative.
that part of the award
which contains decisions
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution on matters submitted to
Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in arbitration may be
recognized and enforced;
an application for recognition and enforcement
of the arbitral award may raise only those or
grounds that were enumerated under Article V
of the New York Convention, to wit:
(d) The composition of the where "the place of arbitration is in the
arbitral authority or the Philippines,"33 it is specifically required that a
arbitral procedure was not petition "to determine any question concerning
in accordance with the the existence, validity and enforceability of
agreement of the parties, such arbitration agreement"34 available to the
or, failing such agreement, parties before the commencement of arbitration
was not in accordance with and/or a petition for "judicial relief from the
the law of the country ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary
where the arbitration took question upholding or declining its
place; or jurisdiction"35 after arbitration has already
commenced should state "[t]he facts showing
that the persons named as petitioner or
(e) The award has not yet
respondent have legal capacity to sue or be
become binding on the
sued."36
parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in
country in which, or under the enforecement of a foreign arbitral award,
the law of which, that we deny availment by the losing party of the
award was made. rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed
to do business in the Philippines from
maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party
2. Recognition and enforcement of
enters into a contract containing a foreign
an arbitral award may also be
arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact
refused if the competent authority in
submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound
the country where recognition and
by the contract, by the arbitration and by the
enforcement is sought finds that:
result of arbitration, conceding thereby the
capacity of the other party to enter into the
contract, participate in the arbitration and
(a) The subject matter of
cause the implementation of the result.
the difference is not
Although not on all fours with the instant case,
capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of also worthy to consider is the
that country; or
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth
(b) The recognition or P. Romero in her Dissenting Opinion in Asset
Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,37 to wit:
enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the
public policy of that
xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of
country.
settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and
judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds mechanism can simply be ignored by an
touched on the capacity to sue of the party aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed,
seeking the recognition and enforcement of the voluntarily and actively participated in the
award. arbitration proceedings from the very
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of
mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.38
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of
Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution,31 which was promulgated by the Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a
Supreme Court, likewise support this position. foreign arbitral award should be respected not
because it is favored over domestic laws and
procedures, but because Republic Act No.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that
9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law
"[a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition
question.
the court to recognize and enforce a foreign
arbitral award." The contents of such petition
are enumerated in Rule 13.5.32 Capacity to sue Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of
is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local argument, that the court a quo correctly
observed that the Model Law, not the New
arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances
York Convention, governs the subject arbitral
award,39 petitioner may still seek recognition
and enforcement of the award in Philippine
court, since the Model Law prescribes
substantially identical exclusive grounds for
refusing recognition or enforcement.40
Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although
not licensed to do business in the Philippines,
may seek recognition and enforcement of the
foreign arbitral award in accordance with the
provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution guide the bench and the bar, but if only to
Act of 2004.
II
The remaining arguments of respondent
Kingford are likewise unmeritorious.
First. There is no need to consider
respondent’s contention that petitioner TPI
improperly raised a question of fact when it
posited that its act of entering into a MOA
should not be considered "doing business" in
the Philippines for the purpose of determining
capacity to sue. We reiterate that the foreign
corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines
is not material insofar as the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is
concerned.
Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for being sought.
not filing a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Resolution dated 21 November
2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and
again, ruled that the prior filing of a motion for
reconsideration is not required
in certiorari under Rule 45.41
Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to
observe the principle of hierarchy of courts,
which, under ordinary circumstances, warrants
the outright dismissal of the case,42 we opt to
relax the rules following the pronouncement
43
in Chua v. Ang, to wit:
[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of
hierarchy of courts] generally applies to cases
involving conflicting factual allegations. Cases
which depend on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before us as we
are not triers of facts.44 A strict application of
this rule may be excused when the reason
behind the rule is not present in a case, as in
the present case, where the issues are not
factual but purely legal.1âwphi1 In these types forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Makati
of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so City, Branch 61.48
that we merely abbreviate the review process if
we, because of the unique circumstances of a
All considered, petitioner TPI, although a
case, choose to hear and decide the legal
foreign corporation not licensed to do business
issues outright.45
in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone,
precluded from filing the Petition for
Moreover, the novelty and the paramount Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
importance of the issue herein raised should be Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine
46
seriously considered. Surely, there is a need court.
to take cognizance of the case not only to
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21
strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute
November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
resolution, and uphold the policy of the State
Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings
embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution
No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET
Act of 2004, to wit:
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61
for further proceedings.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to actively
SO ORDERED.
promote party autonomy in the resolution of
disputes or the freedom of the party to make
their own arrangements to resolve their
disputes. Towards this end, the State shall
encourage and actively promote the use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an
important means to achieve speedy and
impartial justice and declog court dockets. xxx
Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and
enforceability of the foreign arbitral award, we
leave its determination to the court a
quo where its recognition and enforcement is
Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed
to furnish the court of origin a copy of the
motion for time to file petition for review
on certiorari before the petition was filed with
this Court.47 We, however, find petitioner’s reply
in order. Thus:
26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in
petitioner TPI’s "Motion for Time to File a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45" is a typographical error. As correctly
pointed out by respondent Kingford, the order
sought to be assailed originated from Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.
27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61, a copy of
petitioner TPI’s motion was received by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
67. On 8 January 2009, the motion was