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PALLASIGUE, Mary Jobeth E.

NEW ERA UNIVERSITY


College of Law
Human Rights Syllabus

References: 1987 Constitution, Cases, Special laws, Human Rights Law, Human Rights by Rene Sarmiento

INTRODUCTION
Human Rights law – branch of public law that deals with the body of laws, rules, procedures, and institutions designed
to respect, promote and protect human rights and the national, regional and international levels.

UN Charter
It reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of the nations large and small to promote social programs and better standards of life in larger freedom

CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS


Definition – It is the aggregate of privileges, claim, benefits, entitlements and moral guarantees that pertain to man
because of his humanity system of values or elements which are inherent to human dignity.
Why does human have rights? Human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is a person, a whole,
master of itself and of its acts and which consequently is not merely a reason to an end but an end which must be
treated as such connection between a human person and his possession of his rights. Any human society if it is to be
well ordered and productive must lay down as a foundation the principle that ever human being is a person, and that his
nature is endowed with intelligence and full will. By virtue of this he has rights and duties flowing directly and
simultaneously from his very nature legal and moral entitlements that have evolved as a basis for constructing how
state power is used and particularly to limit its use against the rights of citizens.
Kinds/ Generation of Rights Karl Vask’s division follows the French Revolutions slogans – Liberty Equality
Fraternity:
1st Gen of Civil and Political Rights aka 1st gen of liberty rights individual rights against the state and are partly seen as
negative due to the development of democratic society serves as the protection of the individuals form arbitrary
exercise of police power, such as:
 right to life, liberty and security of person
 right against torture
 right to equal protection against discrimination
 right against arbitrary arrest and detention
 right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal
 right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
 right to privacy, freedom of opinion and expression

2nd Gen of Economic, Social and Cultural rights also known as 2nd generation of equality rights. People realized that
possession of first generation of liberty rights would be valueless without the enjoyment if economic, social and
cultural rights. It struggles against Comlonialism, Socialism and encyclicals of the Pope.
 right to work
 right to social security
 right to form and to join trade unions
 right to education

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 right to rest and leisure
 right to health
 right to shelter
3rd Gen Solidarity or Collective rights aka 3rd generation of solidarity rights, benefits individuals, groups and people,
realization will need global cooperation based on international solidarity, such as:
 right to peace
 right to development
 environmental rights
 right of self determination
 right to food
 rights of women
 rights of children
 right to humanitarian disaster relief
 right to water

Principles
 Universality—rights belong to and are to be enjoyed by all human beings without distinction of any kind, such as
race, color, sex or language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property , birth or other
stature. Human right belongs to everyone wherever they are because they are human beings endowed with dignity.
Internationally recognized human rights are the basic core minimum to be observed everywhere without regional
differences. Human right belongs to everyone, everywhere by virtue of being human. No one, no group, no place in
the world should be denied the enjoyment of human rights

 Indivisibility and Interdependence—The first generation of liberty rights and second generation of equality rights
are inter related and are co equal in importance forms an indivisible whole and only if these rights are guaranteed
that an individual can live decently and in dignity international community must treat human rights in equal
manner, same footing and same emphasis. We cannot enjoy civil and political rights unless we enjoy economic,
cultural and social rights. We must enjoy economic cultural and social rights (equality) to be able to enjoy civil and
political rights (liberty).
Characteristics
 Inherent—The rights are the birthright of all human beings
exists independently of the will of either individual human being or group not obtained and granted through any
human action or intervention. When one is born, he carries with them these rights, they cannot be detached from
him.
 Inalienable—No person can deprive any person these rights and no person can repudiate these rights by himself.
The rights cannot be subject of the commerce of man.

 Universal—The rights belong to every human being no matter what he or she is like. The promotion and protection
are the duty of all states, regardless of cultural, economic or political systems.

Stages
 Idealization—The notions about human rights have started in the realm of ideas that reflect a consciousness against
oppression, dehumanization or inadequate performance by the state.

 Positivization—The support for the ideas become strong stage is set to incorporate them in o some legal
instrument, whether domestic or international law.

 Realization—The last stage where these rights are enjoyed by citizens of the state by transformation of the social
economic and political order.

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3 Obligations of Stage Parties to International Covenants
 Respect - Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights indicates that the negative
character of civil and political rights commands State Parties to refrain from restricting the exercise of these rights
where such is not expressly allowed.

Ex. Act 7 of ICCPR – prohibits torture in absolute terms under all circumstances, or the provisions which prohibit only
arbitrary interference; Art 6(1) right to life; Art 17 right to privacy; provisions which authorize the state parties to
impose restrictions political freedoms in Art. 18 – 22
 Ensure – Article 2(1) positive character of civil and political rights and economic social and cultural rights. The
state parties must be proactive to enable individuals to enjoy their rights. The obligation to adopt executive, judicial
and legislative measures to provide an effective remedy to victims of human rights violators under safeguard
certain rights by means of procedural guarantees and legal institutions

 Protect – In preventing private individuals, groups or entities from interfering with the individuals civil and
political rights. The horizontal efforts (application of human rights between individuals or other private subjects)
depend on the wording of such rights. Examples of provisions which apply on the horizontal level:

 prohibition of slavery
 prohibition of advocacy of racial hatred
 right to protection of law - need to take positive means to protect children, family and rights to life liberty and
equality

I. Human Rights Attributes and State Responsibility

 1987 Constitution, Article II, Sections 2, 14, 16, 18, and 22

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.

SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.

SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework
of national unity and development.

 1987 Constitution, Article III (Bill of Rights)

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
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SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

SECTION 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

SECTION 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

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SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

SECTION 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.

SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

SECTION 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.

SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

SECTION 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

SECTION 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

 1987 Constitution, Article XIII

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.

SECTION 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

Labor

SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
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It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall
regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

SECTION 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and
other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program,
and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial,
production, marketing, and other support services.

SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands. The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and
other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from
their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to
promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments
used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.

Urban Land Reform and Housing

SECTION 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the public sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlements areas. It shall also promote
adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the
rights of small property owners.

SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance
with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without
adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.

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Health

SECTION 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

SECTION 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health manpower development and research, responsive to the country’s health needs and problems.

SECTION 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for rehabilitation, self-development and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Women

SECTION 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them
to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

Role and Rights of People’s Organizations

SECTION 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means. People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the
public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.

SECTION 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

Human Rights

SECTION 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.

(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and
disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to
exercise its present functions and powers.

(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;

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(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well
as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

SECTION 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.

 1987 Constitution, Article XIV, Sections 5 and 17

SECTION 5. (1) The State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and conditions and shall encourage local
planning in the development of educational policies and programs.

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.

(4) The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement. Non-teaching academic and non-
academic personnel shall enjoy the protection of the State.

(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.

SECTION 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve
and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans
and policies.

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a. People v. Andre Marti GR 81561 January 18, 1991

FACTS: On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to
the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending
the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of
the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took
several grams of the contents thereof.

NBI: Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his
office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila.

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the
top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were
found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering
tops as certified by the forensic chemist. Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The RTC convicted the appellants.

ISSUE: Whether the objects obtained are admissible as evidence against appellants.

RULUNG: NO. This Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective
search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to
the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so
obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of
State authorities. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should
not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search.

b. Velasquez –Rodriguez vs Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human rights, July 29, 1988

FACTS: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted the instant case to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights on April 24, 1986. It originated in a petition (No. 7920) against the State of Honduras, which the Secretariat of
the Commission. On September 12, 1981, Mr. Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, a student at the National Autonomous
University of Honduras is involved in activities that the State considers dangerous to national security. Between 4:30 and
5:00 pm, several heavily armed men in civilian clothes, driving a white Ford vehicle without license plates, kidnap Mr.
Velásquez Rodríguez from a parking lot in downtown Tegucigalpa. He was taken to an armed forces station located in Barrio
El Manchén of Tegucigalpa, where he is detained by members of the National Office of Investigations and the Honduran
Armed Forces, who accuse him of political crimes, and subject him to harsh interrogation and torture. He is moved to the
First Infantry Battalion, an armed forces command area, near Tegucigalpa.
The police and security forces deny that he was ever detained there. Between 1981 and 1984, approximately 150 people
disappear in Honduras. These disappearances all follow a similar pattern: the victims are kidnapped by force from public

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places in broad daylight by armed men in civilian clothes and disguises. It is common knowledge that the kidnappings are
carried out by military personnel or the police, or persons acting under government orders.
The victims are usually persons whom the authorities consider to be dangerous to State security, and who have been under
surveillance for long periods of time. Military and police officials either deny these disappearances or claim that they are
incapable of preventing or investigating them, unable to punish those responsible, or powerless to help locate the victims or
their remains. Police and security forces denied involvement and the courts would not hear the family’s case. The Honduras
government, which was a military dictatorship at the time, refused to cooperate with the Commission when the family filed a
petition. The Inter-American Convention does not expressly prohibit forced disappearances. However, the practice is a
violation of several articles of the Convention:
1. Article 1 – duty to guarantee rights;
2. Article 4 – right to life (clandestine execution without trial, clandestine burial);
3. Art 5 – right to personal integrity (prolonged isolation and imprisonment; incommunicado detention);
4. Art 7 – right to personal liberty (arbitrary deprivation of liberty; infringement of the right to be taken before a judge to
review the legality of arrest).

Forced disappearances also constitute a violation of something more than individual articles because it shows a crass
abandonment of the principle of human dignity and the values of the Inter-American system and the Convention.

ISSUES:
(1) Can the disappearance be the responsibility of the State even if committed by private persons; if so, in what
circumstances?
(2) Burden and standard of proof in disappearance cases;
(3) Compensation/redress in disappearance cases;
(4) Exhaustion of local remedies.

RULING:

(1) The Court found government agents responsible directly for the abduction of Mr Velasquez. But, it said that even if the
government was not directly liable, it would still be liable for the violations found because of its breach of Article 1.1. If
the kidnapping had been carried out by private persons, the government would be liable because:
a) Art 1.1 requires state parties to “ensure” rights guaranteed by the Convention;
b) “ensure” means that the State is required to organize its “government apparatus” and all structures through which public
power is exercised to ensure free and full enjoyment of human rights;
c) The State must prevent, investigate and punish and violation of those rights; and, if possible, attempt to restore violated
rights and provide compensation;
d) An act violating human rights which is not directly imputable to a State initially will lead to State responsibility not
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent or to respond to the violation;
e) The duty to investigate is not a duty to achieve results, but rather to “seriously investigate.”
(2) Burden and standard of proof: The initial burden will fall upon the Commission to show an “official practice of
disappearances” carried out or tolerated by the government and that in the instant case the disappearance can be linked to
that practice. The burden will then shift to the government, in that it will be up to the State to show what happened to the
disappeared person, and that it was not related to any such official practice.
(3) The reversal of the burden is justified because: the State “cannot rely on the defense that the complainant has failed to
present evidence when it cannot be obtained without State co-operation”; and the State controls the means to verify acts
occurring within its territory.

(4) Compensation/redress: In the instant case, no redress to the victim can be made and his rights cannot be restored or
compensation paid; But the Court can still order that the consequences of the breach be remedied and just compensation
paid to the next-of-kin of the victim.

(5) Exhaustion of local remedies: The government submitted a brief prepared by the Honduran Bar Association identifying
legal remedies available in cases of disappearance of persons (ie. Appeal, cassation, criminal complaint, habeas corpus).
It alleged that the Applicants have not exhausted them.

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Commission: the remedies identified were ineffective. Three writs of habeas corpus had been filed by the family of the
victim, and they achieved nothing. There was a widespread practice of intimidation of judges and lawyers, and of police
ignoring judicial decisions. If the State alleges non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, it must show remedies that could have
been utilized and the opposing party must either show that it exhausted them. The Court held that if a remedy is ineffective, it
needs not be exhausted. The legal remedies identified were available only in theory, rather than in practice, because the
imprisonment was clandestine and formal requirements made them inapplicable in practice; authorities against whom they
were brought simply ignored them; and the attorneys and judges were threatened by the authorities. Remedies must be more
than mere formalities before they are required to be exhausted. The case contributed to the end of the systematic practice of
disappearances; challenged the pervasive culture of impunity and deniability; and was the first case in an international
tribunal to declare the practice of forced disappearances illegal.

c. Nicaragua v United States of America, International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986

FACTS: The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986) is a public international law case decided by
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the United States and awarded
reparations to Nicaragua. Nicaragua charged that the United States, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing,
supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in and against
Nicaragua, had violated its treaty obligations to Nicaragua under: Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter; Articles 18 and
20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States; Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States; Article
I, Third, of the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife.
That the United States had breached international law by violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua by armed attacks against
Nicaragua by air, land and sea; incursions into Nicaraguan territorial waters; aerial trespass into Nicaraguan airspace; efforts
by direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of Nicaragua; using force and the threat of force
against Nicaragua; intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua; infringing upon the freedom of the high seas and
interrupting peaceful maritime commerce; killing, wounding and kidnapping citizens of Nicaragua. Nicaragua demanded that
all such actions cease and that the United States had an obligation to pay reparations to the government for damage to their
people, property, and economy. It is noteworthy that the United States, the defaulting party, was the only member that put
forward arguments against the validity of the judgment of the court, arguing that it passed a decision that it "had neither the
jurisdiction nor the competence to render." Members that sided with the United States in opposing Nicaragua's claims did not
challenge the court's jurisdiction, its findings, or the substantive merits of the case.
RULING: The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the
Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua's harbors. The United States refused to participate in the proceedings after
the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The U.S. also blocked enforcement of the
judgment by the United Nations Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any
compensation. Nicaragua, under the later, post-FSLN government of Violeta Chamorro, withdrew the complaint from the
court in September 1992 following a repeal of the law which had required the country to seek compensation. The Court
found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force
against another State", "not to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime
commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956."

1. Decides that in adjudicating the dispute brought before it by the Application filed by the Republic of Nicaragua on
9 April 1984, the Court is required to apply the "multilateral treaty reservation" contained in proviso (c) to the
declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court by the
Government of the United States of America deposited on 26 August 1946;
2. Rejects the justification of collective self-defense maintained by the United States of America in connection with
the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua the subject of this case;
3. Decides that the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra
forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international
law not to intervene in the affairs of another State;
4. Decides that the United States of America, by certain attacks on Nicaraguan territory in 1983–1984, namely attacks
on Puerto Sandino on 13 September and 14 October 1983, an attack on Corinto on 10 October 1983; an attack on
Potosi Naval Base on 4/5 January 1984, an attack on San Juan del Sur on 7 March 1984; attacks on patrol boats at
Puerto Sandino on 28 and 30 March 1984; and an attack on San Juan del Norte on 9 April 1984; and further by

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those acts of intervention referred to in subparagraph (3) hereof which involve the use of force, has acted, against
the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against
another State;
5. Decides that the United States of America, by directing or authorizing over Rights of Nicaraguan territory, and by
the acts imputable to the United States referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, has acted, against the Republic of
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to violate the sovereignty of
another State;
6. Decides that, by laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the first
months of 1984, the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its
obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its
affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce;
7. Decides that, by the acts referred to in subparagraph (6) hereof the United States of America has acted, against the
Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua signed at Managua on 21 January
1956;
8. Decides that the United States of America, by failing to make known the existence and location of the mines laid by
it, referred to in subparagraph (6) hereof, has acted in breach of its obligations under customary international law in
this respect;
9. Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled 'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra
de guerrillas', and disseminating it to contra forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to
general principles of humanitarian law; but does not find a basis for concluding that any such acts which may have
been committed are imputable to the United States of America as acts of the United States of America;
10. Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4)
hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has committed acts calculated
to deprive of its object and purpose the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed
at Managua on 21 January 1956;
11. Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4)
hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has acted in breach of its
obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at
Managua on 21 January 1956;
12. Decides that the United States of America is under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as
may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations;
13. Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua
for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under customary international law enumerated
above;
14. Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua
for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
15. Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, will be settled by the
Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case;
16. Recalls to both Parties their obligation to seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with
international law.

d. Oposa v Factoran GR 101063, July 30, 1993

FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed
as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR).
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn
and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted
in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. Defendant, on the other
hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question.

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The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

CAUSE OF ACTION: Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses
on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II
of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among
many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that
right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted. After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

POLITICAL ISSUE: Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE: The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights. Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. The instant petition, being impressed
with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

e. The Writ of Kalikasan, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC Rule 7

A Writ of Kalikasan is a legal remedy under Philippine law that provides protection of one's Constitutional right to a healthy
environment, as outlined in Section 16, Article II of the Philippine Constitution. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the
following requisites must concur:

1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;

2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and

3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
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It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be violated.

f. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)

FACTS: Gen. Yamashita (Petitioner) was Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese
Army in the Philippine Islands during World War 2. -On September 3, 1945, Petitioner surrendered to and became a prisoner
of war of the United States Army Forces in Baguio, Philippine Islands. -On September 25, 1945, by the order of Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of the US Army Forces, Western Pacific, Petitioner Yamashita was charged with the
violation on the Law of War and committing monstrous crimes against the American and Filipino peoples. -Trial was held
before a military commission of five army officers and was later found guilty and sentenced to death. -Petitioner then filed
for Habeas Corpus and a prohibition against Lt. Gen. William Styer. -Petitioner is praying for a reinstatement from a
confinement as a war criminal back to a prisoner of war status.

Petitioner’s Arguments: 1) Lack of Jurisdiction of the Military Commission; 2) That the Philippines is not an occupied
territory and thus the military commission cannot exercise jurisdiction; 3) Spain, the “Protecting Power” of Japan has not yet
been given notice of trial contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention; 4) That there was no charge against
petitioners of an offense against the laws of war; 5) That the Military Commission denied petitioner of a fair trial.

RULING: The Supreme Court of the Philippines denied the petition and ruled that the commission was validly constituted. -
the order creating the commission for the trial of petitioner was authorized by military command, and was in complete
conformity to the Act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals for the trial of offenses against the law of war
committed by enemy combatants. - “We cannot say that there is no authority to convene a commission after hostilities have
ended to try violations of the law of war committed before their cessation, at least until peace has been officially recognized
by treaty or proclamation of the political branch of the Government. In fact, in most instances, the practical administration of
the system of military justice under the law of war would fail if such authority were thought to end with the cessation of
hostilities. For only after their cessation could the greater number of offenders and the principal ones be apprehended and
subjected to trial.” The Court also ruled that ‘while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of
America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the
members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United
States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines, and he . . . thereby violated the laws of war." -there
were numerous evidences to prove that “"a deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part of the
civilian population of Batangas Province, and to devastate and destroy public, private, and religious property therein, as a
result of which more than 25,000 men, women and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were brutally mistreated
and killed, without cause or trial, and entire settlements were devastated and destroyed wantonly and without military
necessity." -in International law, these are recognized as violations on the law of war. -while it was not alleged, that:
Petitioner did commit these acts directly by himself, as a commanding officer he should have “to control the operations of the
members of his command by "permitting them to commit" the extensive and widespread atrocities specified. The question,
then, is whether the law of war imposes”. This is supported by the Hague Convention. The Geneva Convention’s stipulation
that the detaining power must notify first the protecting power applies only to persons on judicial proceedings while still a
prisoner of war. In the present case, he no longer is such. Hence, petition denied.

g. Kuroda v Jalandoni , GR No. L- 2662, March 26, 1949

FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during Second World War. He was charged before a military commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war”. The said
military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of the Philippines.
Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His arguments, were as follows:
(1) Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our
local laws.
(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore,
he is charged with “crime” not based on law, national or international
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(3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not qualified to practice law in
Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our
national sovereignty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 68 had violated the provisions of our constitutional law
RULING: No. Executive Order 68 has not violated the provision of our constitutional law. The tribunal has jurisdiction to
try Kuroda. This executive order is in accordance with Article 2 Sec 3, of Constitution. It is in accordance with generally
accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing,
waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a
signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan). Furthermore, the Phil.
Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of
court but the provision of this special law. Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try
petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not
a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law.
In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Conventions. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
II. Jurisprudence-Application, Enforcement, and Monitoring

a. Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, L-4254 (September 26, 1951)


FACTS: The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a
secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in the Philippines. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a
Japanese spy by US Army Counter Intelligence Corps. The People's Court ordered his release but the Deportation Board
taking his case found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country and must referred the matter
to the immigration authorities. After corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared that
Mejoff entered the Philippine illegally and therefore must be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The
petitioner was then under custody. After repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid
Prison at Muntinlupa where he has been confined up to the present time. Two years had elapsed but the Government has not
found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country although it should be said in fairness to the deportation
authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation.
RULING: The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally accepted principle of
international law. It should be applied also to illegal aliens like Mejoff so that it would be a violation of the said international
law to detain him for an unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him. Considering that
the Government desires to expel the alien and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is
making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of the presumption, assurances
were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of Mejoff. The petitioner
can be released if there is a record shown that the deportee is being imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for
deportation or unless the Government admit that it cannot deport him or he is being held for too long a period our courts will
not interfere. Article 2 of the Philippine Constitution states that, "The Philippines renounces war as instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. The protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens
but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
b. Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675 (April 19, 2007)
FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a
final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition
for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent. The
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petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at
any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said
assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.
RULING: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. On
the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty. In this
case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675
April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only
in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance
of the individual person in public international; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
c. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213947 (August 18, 2015)
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued,
leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender. Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard
by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his
advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not
a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where
the evidence of guilt is strong.
RULING:
1. YES. Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion: Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or

16
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable. Exception: Unless he
is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court. Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the
trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of
the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case. Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment,
or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail: The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to
the international community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail
of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion: Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It
acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow
petitioner to post bail.

d. Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of Phil. vs. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 173034 (October 9, 2007)
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of
the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to
give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR
was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law.

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ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating
the RIRR
RULING: The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No.
2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the
respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them
through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or customary
international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. “Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of
general or customary international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the
(ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS
are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions,
although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states
and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both
manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the
provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.
e. Simon, Jr. vs. CHR, G.R. No. 100150 (January 5, 1994)
FACTS: In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners), in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the QC Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor and was sent and
received by the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated).
In said Notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA.
Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the PRs were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the “People’s Park.” On July 12 1990, the group, led by their President RoqueFerno, filed a letter-
complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter
addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the demolition. On July 23 1990, the CHR issued an order,
directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North Edsa pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission” and ordered said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On Aug. 1,
1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200k in favor of PRs to
purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission’s supervision and again directed the petitioners to “desist
from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.”
On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss (MD)filed by the petitioners before the CHR questioned CHR’s jurisdiction. It was
stated that the CHR’s authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated not such rights but privilege to engage in business.” On Sept. 25 1990,
in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia despite the “order to desist.” Also, petitioners’ MD was denied. It opined “it was not the intention of the
Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it should be
considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of
all persons within the PH.”
ISSUE: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the “order to desist” against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.’s stalls, and to
cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR order.

RULING: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights
to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations; such areas
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as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and
public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus
seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within
the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land
which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City
which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining herein, the Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
Contempt powers: The CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its
authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose
the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to
cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order)
herein, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
f. Carino vs. CHR, G.R. No. 96681 ( December 2, 1991)
FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public
authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to
work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and
temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for
suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the
entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the
striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent
teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases
filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders.
Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they
should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil
and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
RULING: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate: The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint

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of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of
said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending
such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”: "Investigate," commonly understood means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe
into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, and obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, and settle. In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in
the exercise of judicial authority.
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not
the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)
whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained
of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly
be imposed for said acts or omissions. These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the CSC.
g. Export Processing Zone authority vs. CHR, G.R. No. 101476 (1992), Justice Padilla’s dissenting opinion
PADILLA, J., dissenting: I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in "Hon. Isidro Cariño, Et. Al. v.
Commission on Human Rights, Et Al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it is my considered view that the
CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution).
If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of
case involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human
rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist
orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such
cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional commissions, — which are not
courts of law — under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings (investigation).

h. Province of North Cotabato vs. Republic, G.R. No. 183591 (2008)

FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a
TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

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2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation
under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with
the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art
III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors
of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship
with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution
to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,

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however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an
expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of
the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would
still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to
the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could
do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically
defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of

22
the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of
a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

i. Ang Tibay Case

FACTS: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to
temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to
systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is
guilty of unjust labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly
favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court of Industrial
Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the
Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there
are documents that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That these documents, which NLU have now
attached as exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.

ISSUE: Whether the union was denied due process by CIR.

RULING: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions
are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that
are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR
may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of
an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the
motion for a new trial was granted and the entire record of this case is remanded to the CIR.

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j. People vs. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987 (1935)

FACTS: Cayat was a native from Baguio, Benguet, Mt. Province who was found guilty of violation of Sections 2 and 3 of
Act 1639: It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent
spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in
section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any
provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the
possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six
months, in the discretion of the court.

ISSUES:

1. If said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws;


2. If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

RULING:

1. Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable:
a. must rest on substantial distinctions;
b. must be germane to the purposes of the law;
c. must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage” but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term
'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the
hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some
members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all
measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to
equality in that enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality
before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise
their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them
with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-
Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their
standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment.
It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class.
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an
argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

2. Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth
and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with
the rights of an individual. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to eventually hasten
their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers.

24
k. Beltran vs. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, 13361, and 139147 (2005)

FACTS: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled
“Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System.” It was revealed that of the blood units collected in
1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood
banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks ; showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources
of blood. It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times
more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis,
Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in
the country. One of the provisions of the said act was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from its
effectivity. Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail
the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative
power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a
standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the
two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks
pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: WHETHER SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

RULING: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was
left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of
detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several
measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has
sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its
provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.

The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall
be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply
and demand and public safety.” This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may
effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make
laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

l. Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, (1989)

FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the
Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin
the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.

25
RULING: Yes According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same
article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.

m. Malcampo-Sin vs. Sin, G.R. No. 137590 (2001)

FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in
September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its
trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than
having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the
proceedings.

RULING: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as
the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the
case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

n. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-9637 (1957)

FACTS: In the course of its ministry, the Philippine agency of American Bible Society (a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,
religious,
missionary corporation) has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines.
The acting City Treasurer of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since
November 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance
No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364. The society paid such under protest and filed suit
questioning the legality of the ordinances under which the fees are being collected.
26
ISSUES: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are constitutional and valid

RULING: Yes, they are constitutional. The ordinances do not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying out a
scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as part of his religious system. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff society. The ordinance is inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. Even if religious groups and the press are not altogether free from the burdens
of the government, the act of distributing and selling bibles is purely religious and does not fall under Section 27e of the Tax
Code (CA 466). The fact that the price of bibles, etc. is a little higher than actual cost of the same does not necessarily mean
it is already engaged in business for profit. Thus, the Ordinances are not applicable to the Society.

o. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 (1995)


FACTS: These are motions seeking reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing the petitions filed in for
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The
motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these cases. On June 27, 1995 the matter
was submitted for resolution with the alleged violation of freedom of the press and religious liberty. It is contended by the
petitioner that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

a. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty.

The petitioner’s claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of
its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the
State. The Court held that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what
the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press
for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication, and
R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving printing,
publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment
and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored
treatment. The Court have carefully examined this argument, but it was unable to find a differential treatment of the press by
the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its
transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal
of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other
transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the
scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege
withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.

There is a reasonable basis for the classification and different treatment between print media and broadcast media.—Nor is
impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its
transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a
reasonable basis for the classification.

The Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of
religious materials by a religious organization.—What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that
the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing
and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience.

27
p. People vs. Doriquez, G.R. No. L-24444-45, (1968)
FACTS: The appellant Romeo Doriquez, on August 28, 1964, was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation before
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, by virtue of an information which recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about April 22, 1964, in the municipality of Batad, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named defendant, with deliberate intent of bringing Attorney Sixto Demaisip into discredit, disrepute
and public contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter in a loud voice and in the
presence of many persons against the said Attorney Demaisip the following insulting and defamatory words and expressions,
to wit: ‘Tonto ka nga klase sang tao, quin pierde mo ang asunto ko, nagastohan ako sing linibo sang ulihi nag pabakal ikaw
kay Purita; pasuguiron ka P30.00 lang ang nabayad ko pero linibo ang gasto ko,’ which, translated into English runs as
follows: ‘You are a foolish class of person, you had to lose my case, I spent thousands of pesos and later you allowed
yourself to be sold to Purita; you had been telling people that I paid you only P30.00 when I spent thousand of pesos for my
case,’ and other similar words of import."cralaw virtua1aw library

Six days later, or on September 3, 1964, the same Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm,
committed, in the language of the information, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about April 22, 1964, in the municipality of Batad, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the said accused, armed with a revolver and without intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously discharge twice said revolver at one Attorney Sixto Demaisip."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. On December 3, 1964 he moved to dismiss both
informations, claiming that (1) the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation in virtue of
Republic Act 3828 which enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction of city and municipal courts; and (2) the institution of
the criminal action for discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy f or he had already been in jeopardy once in the
municipal court of Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of alarm
and scandal, allegedly based on the self-same facts relied upon by Fiscal Simeon A. Barranco in support of the aforesaid
information for discharge of firearm.

In its order of March 8, 1965 the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied by the trial court in its order of March 20, 1965. From these two orders, the present appeal was interposed.

It is our view, in the first instance, that the appeal is premature.

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the
progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of an appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the
other."cralaw virtua1aw library

Construing the aforequoted section, this Court has repeatedly and uniformly held that a judgment or order may be appealed
only when it is final — in the sense that it completely disposes of the cause and definitively adjudicates the respective rights
of the parties, leaving thereafter no substantial proceeding to be had in connection with the case except the proper execution
of the judgment or order; and that, conversely, an interlocutory order or judgment is not appealable for it does not decide the
action with finality and leaves substantial proceedings still to be had. 1 It is an elementary rule of adjective law that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, hence not appealable, because it "does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally
dispose of the contentions of the parties." 2 An order, for example, rejecting a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
3 is interlocutory because after such denial proceedings of substance are still to be had by the trial court, such as hearing of
the case on the merits and rendition of final judgment.

The latest unequivocal restatement of the rule that interlocutory orders are not appealable was made in Ramos v. Ardant
Trading Corporation. 4 Concluding that the appeal therein was premature, Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion emphasized
that "the orders denying defendant’s motion for dismissal and its subsequent motion for reconsideration are interlocutory in
nature, and hence, not appealable until after the rendition of judgment on the merits. Defendant’s appeal contravenes the
explicit provisions of Rule 41, Section 2, of the Rules of Court . . . which, moreover, incorporates a well-established rule of
practice and procedure, constituting one of the main tenets of our remedial law." In order to stress its disapproval of appeals
from interlocutory orders, this Court, in the aforementioned case, assessed treble costs against the appellant therein, jointly
and severally, with its counsel.
28
The rationale underlying the rule that an interlocutory order is not appealable is, basically, the avoidance of "multiplicity of
appeals in a single case." If every interlocutory order or judgment may be appealed, and the appeal stays the progress of the
action, there could arise countless appeals in a single case, and the magnitude and extent of the delay in the final disposition
thereof will be such that, conceivably, in a number of instances, the parties may not survive the case. 5 This Court has
consistently frowned upon — and has firmly stricken down — piece-meal appeals, "because it [piece- meal appeal] delays
the speedy disposition of the case, and is often resorted to as a means of draining the resources of the poorer party and of
compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion, even if its demands should be conformable to reason and justice." 6

Two alternative remedies were forthwith available to Doriquez after the denial of his motion for reconsideration, namely, (1)
proceed immediately to trial on the merits and interpose as integral part of his defense the grounds stated in his motion to
dismiss, and, in the event of an adverse decision, appeal to the proper Court for resolution of all pertinent issues, including
those he has posed in the present appeal; (2) interpose a petition for certiorari to enable this Court to dispose, on the merits,
the issues raised herein, anchoring said petition on the twin grounds that (a) the court a quo acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the offense of grave oral defamation, and (b) the trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of firearm in the face of his avowal that the said
indictment places him in peril of a second jeopardy. This latter action should of course be availed of with candor and absolute
absence of deviousness, with no intention (howsoever disguised) of causing undue delay.

Because, however, all the cogent issues are now before us, we will treat the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari. This
positive and pragmatic approach will definitively resolve the contentions of Doriquez and thus dissipate any and all
speculation on the part of all concerned as to the correctness of their respective positions.

1. Doriquez maintains that the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, not the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, has original exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation which, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, reasoning that the exclusive original
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts has been enlarged by Republic Act 3828 to include offenses for which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine.

The appellant is in error.

The rule is now beyond all area of dispute that in view of the latest amendment to Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948
and also taking into account the unaltered provisions of Section 44(f) of the same Act, the zone of concurrent jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts and courts of first instance has been considerably widened. This jurisdictional parity embraces all
offenses for which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months but not exceeding three years (or
six years with respect to city courts and municipal courts in the capitals of provinces and sub- provinces vis-a-vis the courts
of first instance), or a fine of more than two hundred pesos but not exceeding three thousand pesos (or six thousand pesos in
the proper cases), or both such imprisonment and fine. This confluence of jurisdiction was first clearly etched in Esperat v.
Avila, et al, 7 and the rule in that case was affirmed in Le Hua Sia v. Reyes 8 and Andico v. Roan, Et. Al. 9

In Esperat v. Avila, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes delineated with specificity the respective jurisdictional boundaries of the various
trial courts. Said Mr. Justice Reyes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The fallacy in petitioner’s argument lies in his failure to consider Section 44(f) of the same Judiciary Act of 1948, in
conjunction with its Section 87(c). Note that notwithstanding the various amendments received by Section 87, Section 44(f)
remained unaltered, thereby indicating the intention of the legislators to retain the original jurisdiction of the court of first
instance in certain cases. The fact that the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts was enlarged in virtue of the amendment
of Section 87(c), cannot be taken as a repeal or withdrawal of the jurisdiction conferred on the court of first instance. Not
only is implied repeal disfavored by the law, but also, it is a cardinal principle that a statute must be so construed as to
harmonize all apparent conflicts, and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

"Actually, there is nothing irreconcilable between Sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act.

"As therein provided, the court of first instance was given original jurisdiction over cases where the penalty prescribed by law
is imprisonment for more than 6 months or fine of more than P200.00; the justices of the peace and municipal or city courts
of chartered cities, over cases where the penalty is imprisonment for not more than 3 years, and fine of not more than
P3,000.00. In other words, where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for more than 6 months, but not exceeding 3 years,

29
or fine of more than P200.00 but not exceeding P3,000.00 the justice of the peace or municipal court only has concurrent
(and not exclusive) original jurisdiction with the court of first instance. And, it may be stated that this concurrent jurisdiction
between the inferior courts and the court of first instance was not provided for the first time in Republic Act No. 3828. Under
Republic Act 2613, crimes the penalties for which do not exceed 3 years, or fine of not more than P3,000.00, were
specifically placed within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, concurrent with the court of first
instance.

"It follows, therefore, that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts is confined only
to cases where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for 6 months or less, or fine of P200.00 or less, whereas, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the court of first instance covers cases where the penalty is incarceration for more than 3 years (or 6
years in the case of city courts and municipal courts in provincial capitals), or fine of more than P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 in
proper cases), or both such imprisonment and fine. Between these exclusive jurisdictions has a zone where the jurisdiction is
concurrent. This is the proper construction to be placed on the provisions involved herein, regardless of what may have been
the prior rulings on the matter."cralaw virtua1aw library

The offense of grave oral defamation which carries a maximum penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period (or
incarceration not exceeding 2 years and 4 months) falls within the above-described zone of concurrent jurisdiction.
Consequently, the court a quo did not err in assuming jurisdiction.

2. Doriquez likewise contends that the filing of the information for discharge of firearm has placed him in peril of double
jeopardy as he had previously been charged with the offense of alarm and scandal in a complaint filed in the municipal court
of Batad, Iloilo, upon the same facts which constitute the basis of the indictment for discharge of firearm. The said complaint,
which was allegedly dismissed without his consent, recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about 12:00 p.m., April 21, 1964, at the gate in front of the Municipal Building, Poblacion, Batad, Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate intent to cause alarm in the public, discharge his License Revolver caliber .22 SN-
368383 one on the ground and one into the air within the town limits and without any justifiable purpose thus causing alarm
upon the general public."cralaw virtua1aw library

This plea of Doriquez is obviously untenable.

For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things, that there is "identity of offenses," so
that, in the language of Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, his "conviction or acquittal . . . or the dismissal of
the case (without his express consent) shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is
not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted that
every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the
less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light
felony.

Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under Article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the information for
discharge of firearm instituted under Article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose
from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in
law. Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony — alarm and scandal is an offense against public order
while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former crime is the
discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a
firearm against or at a certain person without intent to kill.

The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law
howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. 10

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense 11 or identical
offense. 12 A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of
the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. 13 Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles
of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although

30
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other. 14

In the case at bar, granting that the two indictments arose from the same act — a contention traversed by the State — they
describe and constitute, nevertheless, essentially different felonies having fundamentally diverse indispensable elements.
Hence, there can be no such "identity of offenses" as would support the suggestion that double jeopardy has ensued. The trial
judge, therefore, did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of firearm.

In sum, we hold that the instant appeal is premature, and that — even if it were treated as a petition for certiorari — the
contentions and arguments of the appellant cannot be accorded credit.
q. Romualdez Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976 (1995)
r. Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265 (1995)
s. Sanchez vs. People, G.R. No. 179090 (2009)
t. Araneta vs. People, G.R. No. 174205
u. The Philippine is a state party to all (except for one, Convention on the Protection against Enforced
Disappearance) core human rights treaties

III. Rights of Special Groups

b. Children
c. Women
d. Migrant Workers
e. Disabled (senior, pwd)
f. Criminals

31

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