The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction

over the non-resident defendants. Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th cr. 1988).
The U.S. Supreme Court in Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-
486 (1985) noted, “We…therefore reject any talismanic jurisdictional formulas; “the
facts of each case must [always] be weighed” in determining whether personal
jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’”.

A Defendant wishing to contest the allegations in the Complaint concerning jurisdiction

mst submit an affidavit n support of his position. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554
So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). In order to establish the facts relating to its lack of contacts
in Florida, Defendant, Georgia-Pacific has submitted the Affidavit of ____, President and
Chief Executive Officer of Georgia-Pacific as Exhibit __. Once a foreign defendant
submits an affidavit to the contrary of Plaintiff’s allegations, as Georgia-Pacific has done,
the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction. Posner
v Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th cir. 1999).

There are two aspects of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant being sued in
Florida. In Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1990) the Court stated:

The determination of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

requires a two-part analysis. First, we consider the jurisdictional question
under the state long-arm statute. If there is a basis for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction under the tate statute, we next determine whether
sufficient minimum contacts exist to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment so that “maintenance of the suit does ot offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Only if both
prongs of the analysis are satisfied, may a federal or state court exercise
persona ljurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.

916 F.2d at 1514. In the case at bar, the specific facts of the case fail to establish
jurisdiction over Georgia-Pacific within the requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute.
Failing to meet the requirements of the statute, the specific facts of the case also dictate
that Georgia-Pacific does not have sufficient contacts with Florida to satisfy the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Failure to meet the requirements of Florida’s Long Arm Statute at the time of distribution
of asbestos

In a case alleging personal injur by exposure to asbestos against a non-resident defendant,

the Florida Supreme Court held that the long-arm statute in effect at the tme of the
manufacture or distribution of the asbestos is the statute that governs. Fibreboard Corp.
v. Kerness, 625 So.2d 457, 458 (_____1993). The Florida Supreme Court further stated
that neither Fla Stat 48.193, nor ts predecessor, Fla. Stat. 48.182, could be applied
retroactively since to do so would violate the requirement of fair notice. Id at 458. In
Kerness, the Plaintiff alleged exposure to asbestos products from 1943-1962. in the
present case, Plainitff, in his Sworn Information Form and the exposure sheets filed wit
hthe OCmpliant, allege exposure to asestos containing products manufactured by
defendanr, Georgia-Pacific, from 1975-1979. Since Plaintiff alleges exposure from
1975-79, it is this version of the long-arm statute that is applicable against Geora-Pacific.
The relevant part of Florida Statute 47.193 (1973) states:
48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state:

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this
subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for
any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following:

(a) Operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business

venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state.

(f) Causes injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an
act or omission by the defendant this state, if, at or about the time of the
injury, either:

1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within

this state which resulted in such injury; or

2. Products, materials, or things processed, services, or manufactured by

the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the
ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use, and the use or consumption
resulted in the injury.

Florida Statute 48.193 (1973) indicates the requirement of connexity. Black’s law
dictionary defines connexity as, “nexus or connection; for purposes of aquiring personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, this referes to the requirement that this coase of
action arise out of the transaction or operation connected wit hor incidental to the
activities of a foreign corporton in the state.” Therefore, appling this statute to the facts
of the current case, Plaintiff would have to show that Defendant, Georgia-Pacific’s,
contact with Florida during 1975-1979 was related t oasbestos containing products, which
were the cause of pLaintiff’s personal injuries.

While Georgia-Pacific has had sporadic sales of its products in Flrida, none of those sales
were for asbestos containing products. Thre is no connexity between Georgia-Pacific’s
minor sales to Florida businesses and Plaintiff’s alleged injury. PLantff’s claim is based
upon asbestos exposure and under the proper Florida long-arm statute, which Fibreboard
v. Kerness dictates to be the statute in effect at the time of the distribution of asbestos-
Fla. Stat. 48.193(1973), there must be some connexity between the Plaintiff’s cause of
action and the foreign defendnat’s actions in the state. There is no connexirty and
therefore, Georgia-Pacific cannot be subject ot he jurisdiction of he LForida Courts,
pursuant to the then applicable long-arm statute.

To satisfy the connexity requirement under the Florida long-arm statute, the cause of
action must have some connection to a specific act committed in Florida. New Lenox
Industries, Inc. v. Fenton, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 893.
Foreign manufacturers of defective office chairs, bulk of which were transported directly
to Florida for resale and distribution by buyer to retailers in Florida and throughout
country, were engaged in continuous and systematic activity in Florida, and thus, were
subject to jurisdiction of Florida courts regardless of whether claims upon which buyer's
liability insurer sued arose from their Florida activity; it was irrelevant where claims
accrued or whether there was any “connexity” between them and Florida. Pafco General
Ins. Co., as Subrogee of World Office Products Mfg. Inc. v. Wah-Wai Furniture Co.,
App. 3 Dist., 701 So.2d 902 (1997).

Where plaintiff was injured while working in Ecuador and allegations of negligence were
all founded upon acts or omissions which occurred in Ecuador, there was not sufficient
connexity between defendant's business activity in Florida and the cause of action to
permit exercise of long-arm jurisdiction under Florida §§ 48.181 and 48.193. Pollard v.
Steel Systems Const. Co., Inc., S.D.Fla.1984, 581 F.Supp. 1551.

Doing business in Florida is not sufficient basis, standing alone, on which to predicate
long-arm jurisdiction, but rather, there must also be some nexus or connection, called
“connexity,” between business that is conducted in Florida and causes of action alleged.
Bloom v. A. H. Pond Co., Inc., S.D.Fla.1981, 519 F.Supp. 1162.

Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in Florida is limited to situations where

cause of action arises from doing of business in Florida or cause of action has some other
connection to a specified act committed in Florida. Bloom v. A. H. Pond Co., Inc.,
S.D.Fla.1981, 519 F.Supp. 1162.

By its terms, long-arm statute provision conferring jurisdiction over nonresident

defendant for “any cause of action arising from the doing of” any of therein enumerated
items, such as conducting business in forum state, requires connexity between the
defendant's activities and the cause of action. Camp Illahee Investors, Inc. v. Blackman,
App. 2 Dist., 870 So.2d 80 (2003). Courts 12(2.15)

Term “arising from” in long-arm statute does not mean proximately caused by; it only
requires direct affiliation, nexus, or substantial connection to exist between basis for
cause of action and the business activity. Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v.
Charman, App. 1 Dist., 635 So.2d 79 (1994). Courts 12(2.15)

Service on out-of-state corporation's registered agent prior to effective date of

amendment to § 48.193 abolishing connexity requirement in certain situations was
nevertheless sufficient to give federal court jurisdiction over corporation without showing
that connection existed between cause of action and corporation's in-state activities;
abolished connexity requirement had not applied to corporations such as defendant,
which had registered agent in state. White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So.2d 886 (1990), answer
to certified question conformed to 923 F.2d 1473. Corporations 668(4)

Amendment of this section eliminating connexity requirement for long-arm jurisdiction

did not apply to cause of action which accrued prior to effective date of the amendment
but which was filed after that date. Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Cornett, App. 1 Dist., 526
So.2d 1064 (1988), review denied 534 So.2d 398. Courts 12(2.1)

Where injury occurs outside Florida, a defendant's business presence within the state does
not in itself satisfy connexity requirement for long-arm jurisdiction under statute prior to
1984 amendment of this section. Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Cornett, App. 1 Dist., 526
So.2d 1064 (1988), review denied 534 So.2d 398. Courts 12(2.25)

Evidence that among foreign corporation's business activities in Florida was sale and
delivery of “trac-gopher” which was involved in accident in another state established
sufficient “connexity” between corporation's business activities in Florida and products
liability action to confer personal jurisdiction over corporation in Florida. Canron Corp.
v. Holt, App. 1 Dist., 444 So.2d 529 (1984). Corporations 665(1)

For purpose of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporation, “connexity” refers to

requirement that cause of action arise out of transaction or operation connected with or
incidental to activities of foreign corporation in state. Kravitz v. Gebrueder Pletscher
Druckgusswaremfabrik, App. 3 Dist., 442 So.2d 985 (1983). Corporations 665(1)

In the absence of any showing of connection between business activities in Florida of

defendant manufacturing company, which was foreign corporation not qualified to do
business within Florida and which sold polyurethane foam to mattress manufacturer in
Alabama which sold the mattresses to sales company in Georgia which in turn sold the
mattresses to county for use in its jail, and cause of action in suits which arose from fire
in county jail started in mattresses, court correctly dismissed manufacturing company as
party defendant. General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., App. 5 Dist.,
388 So.2d 264 (1980). Corporations 665(3)

Federal district court in Florida did not have general personal jurisdiction, under Florida
long-arm statute, over California sales representative of Florida manufacturer of foam
dispensers used with cosmetics, in breach of contract action, based upon alleged agency
relationship between California representative, as principal, and Florida agent; under
circumstances of case, alleged Florida agent was just a customer of California
representative principal. Rexam Airspray, Inc. v. Arminak, S.D.Fla.2007, 471 F.Supp.2d
1292. Federal Courts 76.15; Federal Courts 82
Swedish holding company which did not itself manufacture, distribute or market any
products, was not doing business in Florida, within meaning of that state's long-arm
statute; company had no offices in Florida and had no employees or agents working
there. Air Turbine Technology, Inc. v. Atlas Copco AB, S.D.Fla.2002, 235 F.Supp.2d
1287, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1377. Federal Courts 86

Federal district court sitting in Florida had personal jurisdiction, under Florida long-arm
statute conferring jurisdiction over defendants operating business in state, in suit by
Florida producer of in-flight entertainment systems alleging breach of joint venture
agreement by Washington-based producer of avionics products; representative of
Washington corporation twice entered Florida for negotiations, and corporation made
numerous phone calls and transmitted e-mail messages into Florida. Baker Electronics,
Inc. v. Pentar Systems, Inc., M.D.Fla.2002, 219 F.Supp.2d 1260. Federal Courts 79

Allegations in former employer's unverified complaint, that its out-of-state sales agent
was present within state on three separate occasions to attend business meetings and that
employer regularly provided sales agent with proprietary information, trade secrets and
assistance from its Florida office, would be sufficient, if true, to satisfy this section and
due process and to permit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over sales agent in action
for breach of noncompete clause in employment agreement. Nordmark Presentations, Inc.
v. Harman, App. 2 Dist., 557 So.2d 649 (1990). Constitutional Law 3965(10); Courts
15

Fact that corporation had Florida post office box did not establish that it was engaged in
“substantial and not isolated activity” within state, or that it was “maintaining business
office within state,” for purpose of this section and § 48.081. City Contract Bus Service,
Inc. v. Woody, App. 1 Dist., 515 So.2d 1354 (1987).

In view of fact that defendant supplier did no advertising and had no offices, agents,
employees, representatives, distributors or salesmen in the state, defendant supplier of
webbing material used in hot air balloon in which decedents were riding when they were
killed as result of collision with some electric power lines was not subject to jurisdiction
of state courts under this section. Phoenix Trimming, Inc. v. Mowday, App. 4 Dist., 431
So.2d 198 (1983), petition for review denied 440 So.2d 352. Courts 12(2.25)

Defendant that maintains an agent and/or distributor in state is subject to jurisdiction of

courts of state. Hyco Mfg. Co. v. Rotex Intern. Corp., App. 3 Dist., 355 So.2d 471
(1978). Courts 12(2.15)

Allegations about an out-of-state defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written

communications into Florida may be sufficient to trigger jurisdiction under Florida long-
arm statute's provision for jurisdiction based on commission of tortious act in Florida,
provided that the cause of action arises from those communications; there must be some
“connexity” that exists between the out-of-state communications and the cause of action
such that the cause of action would depend upon proof of either the existence or the
content of any of the communications into Florida. Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v.
Rothstein-Kass, P.A., C.A.11 (Fla.)2005, 421 F.3d 1162. Courts 12(2.25)

There was no “connexity” between Florida activities of defendant corporation and

relationship between plaintiff and defendant, so as to permit assertion of long-arm
personal jurisdiction over defendant based on Florida activities of wholly-owned
subsidiary corporation under this section and § 48.181 prior to 1984 amendments, where
record did not show any connection between the Florida business and plaintiff's action
against defendant for damages suffered when container lashing system supplied by
defendant malfunctioned, even though the subsidiary allegedly sold similar products.
Polski Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transport A/S, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 795 F.2d 968.
Federal Courts 82

Where cause of action was predicated upon plaintiff's exposure to asbestos products, but,
prior to 1969, plaintiff was not exposed to any asbestos products in Florida attributable to
alleged manufacturer and distributor of asbestos products or its predecessor, there was no
connexity between cause of action alleged and pre-1969 activities of alleged
manufacturer or its predecessor within Florida which would subject alleged manufacturer
to in personam jurisdiction for any pre-1969 acts. Hrtica v. Armstrong World Industries,
S.D.Fla.1984, 607 F.Supp. 16. Federal Courts 79

Trial court had personal jurisdiction over nonresident seller of luxury automobile in
action by in-state buyer arising out of seller's alleged intentional misrepresentations as to
the quality, value, and condition of the automobile; buyer alleged the commission of an
in-state tort by seller, and seller could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the
state to answer for the misrepresentations it directed to buyer in an effort to sell the
automobile. Fletcher Jones West Shara, Ltd., LLC v. Rotta, App. 3 Dist., 919 So.2d 685
(2006). Courts 12(2.25)

Foreign ship owner's lawsuit against alien insurer for breach of hull and machinery policy
by denying coverage arose out of a contract to insure property in the state, and, thus,
exercising personal jurisdiction was consistent with the long-arm statute; the vessel was
in Florida ports when the policy was issued and extended, and a direct affiliation thus
existed between the insurer's Florida-related act and the cause of action. Glovegold
Shipping, Ltd. v. Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening, App. 1 Dist., 791 So.2d 4
(2000), rehearing denied, review denied 817 So.2d 851, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 114,
537 U.S. 826, 154 L.Ed.2d 37. Courts 12(2.30)