Structural Design Narrative

DESIGN AND SUPERVISION CONSULTANCY FOR ARMAMENT

STORAGE FACILITIES (DC-NAD)

FOR PROJECT SEABIRD PHASE IIA AT

NAVAL BASE KARWAR

DESIGN NARRATIVE

(STRUCTURAL)

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Document Information

PROJECT NAME: Project Seabird Phase IIA DC-NAD

Document Name and

Structural Design Narrative SS7004-PSB-DC03-HYD-RPT-5010
Number:

Approval by DC-03

VERIFICATION NAME DATE SIGNATURE

PREPARED: SSIDC Team 16.04.2018

CHECKED: S.V.S. Jagadeesh 17.04.2018

VERIFIED: S.V.S. Jagadeesh 19.04.2018

APPROVED: S. Satyanarayana 20.04.2018

REVISION DATE APPROVED DESCRIPTION

0 20-04-2018 S. Satyanarayana Draft Submission

Approval by PMC/HQPSB
Date Approval by PMC Approval by HQPSB

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................................ 3

1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 4

2 CRITICAL STRUCTURES (Explosive storage buildings) ....................................................................... 9

3 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................... 12

4 BLAST RESISTANT REINFORCED CONCRETE DESIGN ................................................................ 13

5 BUILDINGS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY EXPLOSIVES ............................................................... 20

6 CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXPLOSIVE EVENT ................................................................................. 20

7 PROTECTION AGAINST PROPAGATION .......................................................................................... 22

8 HAZARDS TO PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................ 23

9 TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES ................................................................................................ 25

10 GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF

EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES ............................................................................................................................... 26

11 SPECIFIC CONSTRUCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................. 28

12 QUANTITY DISTANCES ...................................................................................................................... 32

13 THE BLAST WAVE PHENOMENA....................................................................................................... 37

14 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................... 43

15 NAD, MTP, CFA and NAI BUILDINGS AT SITE-E ............................................................................... 44

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1 INTRODUCTION
As part of Project Seabird Phase IIA at Karwar, Indian Navy proposes to augment the facilities in Site-E.
The scope of this package is to provide all the required services in completing the work packages
associated with Naval Armament Depot (NAD), Missile Technical Position (MTP) and Naval Armament
Inspectorate (NAI) at Site E.

Brief description of the works is involved is presented below:

1.1 Naval Armament Depot:

The facilities under NAD are planned in two distinct zones, based on the nature of the operations, functions
and activities being carried out.

1.1.1 Explosive Zone

Explosive Zone to receive, store and maintain various explosives categorized under different classes of
hazard divisions in different magazines such as Igloos, Double Bunker Magazines (DBM) and Above
Ground Magazines (AGM). The magazines are separated from the store/ maintenance houses of
armament by a statutory Outside Safety Quantity Distance (OSQD). The safety distances are specified as
per STECs. Only explosive magazines have been envisaged to be within this sensitive zone, maintaining
the Inside Quantity Distance (IQD) between them depending on Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) of the
explosives stored inside.

The facilities which shall be constructed in the Explosive Zone are:

(i). Magazine – 400 T (Box Type LRC Igloo)/ Igloo

(ii). Magazine – 600 LT (Box Type LRC Igloo)/ DBM

(iii). Magazine – 120 LT (Box Type LRC Igloo)/ AGM

(iv). Torpedo, ammunition, missile/ mine workshops and testing facilities.

(v). Waiting positions.

(vi). Demolition Ground with Proof House and Broken Seal Room.

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1.1.2 Non-Explosive Zone

Non-Explosive Zone to store and maintain non-explosives items. The non-explosive zone has been located
beyond the sterile zone of explosives. This area will comprise of the following:

(i). Storage sheds for non-explosive items.

(ii). Storage of Petroleum, Oil, & Lubricants (POL)/ chemical, armory small arms.

(iii). Garage for MT vehicles

(iv). Other facilities not planned to be sited in explosive zone

1.2 Missile Technical Position:

The MTP shall have the following additional facilities:

(a) Administrative Area: The administrative area includes the augmentation of the existing
Administration block to include facilities including the NAI Room, Training Centre, Library / Information
Centre, Gym/ Sports facility on top of the existing building, car/ scooter parking shed and a Lunch room.
(b) Logistic Area: This area gives adequate logistic support for maintenance, testing and repairs of
various missiles, associated electronic test equipment, specialist and other dedicated transport etc.

The following facilities are planned in the logistic area:

(i). Spare Parts and Tools Assembly Store (SPTA).

(ii). Electronic Lab.

(iii). Transport pool for dedicated transport.

(iv). Parking shed for specialist vehicles.

(v). Battery Storage Shed.

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1.3 Specific Design Requirements: NAI

Naval Armament Inspectorate: The NAI Facility is proposed to be created in the vicinity to NAD and MTP,
so as to provide inspection coverage to armament activities at these two establishments. NAI setup would
essentially require infrastructure, test/ proof facilities and man power in aid of technical professional
activities like calibration, environmental testing, proof and static firing of rocket motors and missile
components.

1. Rocket Motor Static Firing Facility (RMSFF)

(a). Test Bed

Test bed with various associated control &monitoring facilities (widely spread) - 500m

Process Inside Quantity Distances (PIQD) from NAD, NAI (Technical & Admin Complex), MTP.

(b). Guard Room Security Check Post

(c). Watch Towers 4 Nos. Type 1A

(d). Perimeter Fencing Chain link fencing.

(e). Equipment Wide range of Test Equipment/ special equipment / tools for various labs.

1.4 Common Facility Area: CFA

Common Facilities Area (CFA) at Site E was developed as part of Project Seabird Phase I, in one common
located area to avoid the duplication of facilities in NAD & MTP. Substantial augmentation of the CFA is
planned in terms of modification of existing buildings and creation of new infrastructure for increased
requirement of NAD, MTP and NAI. Though, the development is being done at CFA, the buildings shall
have different administrative and operational controls by respective units.

The detailed scope of CFA is as follows:

1.4.1 NAD Facilities

(a). Torpedo Preparation Workshop: 03 Nos. 1000 (m2) - A/C with 03 T EOT cum HOT crane

(b). Shed - (Torpedo stores): 03 Nos. Each 1200 (m2) Each with 600 (m2) A/C area

(c). Non Explosive Store Shed: 03 Nos. Each 1000 (m2)

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(d). Armament Workshop: 1 Nos., 864 (m2)

(e). Hard Stand: 1 Nos., 100 (m2)

(f). Fuel Dispensing Area: 1 Nos., 600 (m2)

(g). Shed (Washing): 1 No. 100 (m2)

(h). Strong Room: 1 No. 100 (m2) Adjacent to Small Arms Workshop

(i). Sub Fire Station: 1 No. 200 (m2)

(j). Container Shed: 1 No. 250 (m2)

(k). Training cell: 1 No. 100 (m2) with 4 No Classrooms and library

(l). Armour store shed: 1 No. 200 (m2) This facility has been co-located with Small
Arms Workshop.

1.4.2 MTP Facilities

(a). Fuel Dispensing Block: 450 (m2) conjoined with Fuel Dispensing Station

(b). Fuel Dispensing Area: 600 (m2) Hard standing area conjoined with Fuel
Dispensing Station

(c). Air Compressor Station: 1 No.- 6m x 12m x 6m Ht. (72 (m2)

(d). Fuel Dispensing Station: 1 in No.

1.4.3 NAI Facilities

(a). Admin Building Complex, to accommodate: G+2 Building (40.7 x 13.8 m) including office furniture &
office Equipment for a complete facility.

(b). Technical Complex, to accommodate: G+1 Building (40.7 x 13.8 m) for laboratories & associated
offices including office furniture & office Equipment for a
complete facility.

(c). Perimeter Chain Link Fencing with access gate

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1.5 Utilities and Services Infrastructure

(a) Power / Electrical

(b) Fire Services
(c) Potable Water
(d) Sewerage
(e) Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP)
(f) Treated Sewage/ Recycled Water
(g) Low Pressure Compressed Air (LPCA)
(h) Positive Pressure and Clean Rooms
(i) Storm Water Drainage
(j) Rainwater Harvesting
(k) Building Services and Utilities
(l) Access Roads
(m) SCADA Systems
(n) Standardization
(o) Landscaping
(p) Sustainability measures

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2 CRITICAL STRUCTURES (Explosive storage buildings)

“Critical Structures” are defined as those structure which:

(a) Directly support mission critical and primary function of the Base, or
(b) Are of a technical nature, from a civil engineering perspective, as to require specialized design,
efforts and specialized engineering expertise beyond what would be considered routine or prevalent in the
engineering/design industry.

The selected critical structures for NAD, MTP, NAI and CFA can include:

 Magazine – 400 T (Box Type LRC Igloo)/ Igloo

 Magazine – 600 LT (Box Type LRC Igloo)/ DBM
 Magazine – 120 LT (Box Type LRC Igloo)/ AGM

2.1 STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT OF CRITICAL STRUCTURES

2.1.1 Building No. 326/1 to 326/3: 3 number. Igloo type Magazines –

 NEQ : 50,000 kg (HD 1.1)

 Length : 20.8m (Internal)
 Width : 16.5m (Internal)
 Height : 8m (Soffit of Beam)
 Walls : RCC walls
 Roof : RCC Beams and Slab
 Foundation : RCC Raft
 Crane : EOT (5T)
 Loading Platform : At front side 1200mm above Road Level
 Earth Cover : Covered by Traverse on all three sides, except front side, minimum
width of traverse 1500mm at top and side slopes of 1(V) to 1.5 (H)
Height of Traverse up to top of Roof slab. Earth cover over roof
slab is 600mm.
 Front Head Wall covering the front side and side slopes of traverse.
 Front VIFT on the other side of road with height up to top of roof slab and length to cover 10 degrees
on either side of the front door openings.
 Designed as LRC Igloo. Designed as an “acceptor” to with stand the Blast Pressure in case of
accidental explosion in the adjacent ESH.

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 The Front Doors are designed as Blast Doors to withstand a pressure of 7 bar.

2.1.2 Magazine – 327/1 to 327/5: 5 No. Double Bunker magazines-

 NEQ : 1,36,000 kg (HD 1.1)

 Length : 26.65m
 Width : 22.4m
 Height : 8m (Soffit of Beam)
 Walls : RCC walls
 Roof : RCC Beams and Slab
 Foundation : RCC Raft
 Crane : EOT (10T)
 Loading Platform : At front side 1200mm above Road Level
 Earth Cover : Covered by Traverse on all four sides, minimum width of traverse
1500mm at top and side slopes of 1(V) to 1.5 (H).
Height of Traverse up to top of Roof slab.
Earth cover over roof slab is 600mm.
 Approaches through tunnels in the traverse at 45 degrees at the front corners.
 Designed as LRC Igloo. Designed as an “acceptor” to with stand the Blast Pressure in case of
accidental explosion in the adjacent ESH.
 The Front Doors are designed as Blast Doors to withstand a pressure of 7 bar.

2.1.3 Building No. 328/1 to 328/4: 4 No. Above Ground Magazines (1.2 HD)

 NEQ : 1,36,000 kg (HD 1.2)

 Length : 15.1m
 Width : 6.0m
 Height : 7.5m (Soffit of Beam)
 Type of Building : RCC Framed Structure
 Walls : Brick walls
 Roof : RCC Beams and Slab
 Foundation : RCC Strip Footings
 Crane : EOT (1T)

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 Traverse
: VIFT on all four sides, minimum width of traverse 1500mm at top
and side slopes of 1(V) to 1.2 (H)
Minimum gap of 1500mm on three side and sufficient width
of approach of vehicles on the front side.
Height of Traverse 5.0m above the floor level.

 Approach Road on the front side.

 The Front Doors are steel doors as per STEC.

2.1.4 Building No. 328/5 to 328/7: 3 No. Above Ground Magazines (1.3 HD)

 NEQ : 1,36,000 kg (HD 1.3)

 Length : 15.1m
 Width : 6.0m
 Height : 7.5m (Soffit of Beam)
 Type of Building : RCC Framed Structure
 Walls : Brick walls
 Roof : RCC Beams and Slab
 Foundation : RCC Strip Footings
 Crane : EOT (1T)
 Traverse : VIFT on all four sides, minimum width of traverse 1500mm at top
and side slopes of 1(V) to 1.2 (H)
Minimum gap of 1500mm on three side and sufficient width of
approach of vehicles on the front side.
Height of Traverse 5.0m above floor level.

 Approach Road on the front side.

 The Front Doors are steel doors as per STEC.

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3 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Structural elements must develop an internal resistance sufficient to maintain all motion within the limits of
deflection prescribed for the particular design. The load capacity of the member depends on the peak
strength developed by the specific member and on the ability of the member to sustain its resistance for a
specific though relatively short period of time.

To obtain the response of a linear elastic system, it is convenient to consider the concept of the dynamic
load factor. This factor is defined as the ratio of the maximum dynamic deflection to the deflection which
would have resulted from the static application of the peak load P, which is used in specifying the load-time
variation. Thus, the dynamic load factor (DLF) is given by:

DLF = Xm /Xs

where

Xs = static deflection or, in other words, the displacement produced in the system when the peak load is
applied statically.

Xm = maximum dynamic deflection

For a linear elastic system subjected to a simplified dynamic load, the maximum response is defined by the
dynamic load factor, DLF and maximum response time, tm. The dynamic load factor and time ratio tm/T are
plotted versus the time ratio T/TN for a triangular load, rectangular load, step load with finite rise time (Tr),
triangular load with rise time, and sinusoidal pulse.

In many structural problems only, the maximum value of the DLF is of interest. For the most prevalent load
case, namely, the triangular load as well as the rectangular and step load with rise time, the maximum value
of the DLF is 2. This immediately indicates that all maximum displacements, forces, and stresses due to the
dynamic load are twice the value that would be obtained from a static analysis for the maximum load P.

The maximum plastic response of an elasto-plastic system subjected to a blast load is defined by the
maximum deflection, Xm it attains and the time, tm it takes to reach this deflection. The blast load is defined
by its peak value P and duration T while the singe-degree-of-freedom system is defined by its ultimate
resistance ru, elastic deflection XE and natural period TN. A non-dimensional response chart is constructed
by plotting the ductility ratio Xm/XE and the time ratio tm/T as a function of ru/P and T/TN.

From the maximum deflection Xm, the rotation is calculated which should be limited to 2 degrees.

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4 BLAST RESISTANT REINFORCED CONCRETE DESIGN

4.1 MODES OF STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOR.

The response of a concrete element can be expressed in terms of two modes of

structural behavior; ductile and brittle. In the ductile mode of response, the element may attain large
inelastic deflections without complete collapse, while, in the brittle mode, partial failure or total collapse of
the element occurs. The selected behavior of an element for a particular design is governed by: (1) the
magnitude and duration of the blast output, (2) the occurrence of primary fragments, and (3) the function of
the protective structure, i.e., shelter or barrier depending upon the protection level required.

4.2 STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOR OF REINFORCED CONCRETE.

When a reinforced concrete element is dynamically loaded, the element deflects until such time that: (1) the
strain energy of the element is developed sufficiently to balance the kinetic energy produced by the blast
load and the element comes to rest, or (2) fragmentation of the concrete occurs resulting in either partial or
total collapse of the element. The maximum deflection attainable is a function of the span of the element,
the depth of the element, and the type, amount, and details of the reinforcement used in a particular design.

When the element is first loaded, the resistance ideally increases linearly with deflection until yielding of the
reinforcement is first initiated. As the element continues to deflect, all the reinforcing steel yields and the
resistance is

constant with increasing deflection. Within this yield range at a deflection corresponding to 2 degrees
support rotation, the compression concrete crushes. For elements without shear reinforcement, this
crushing of the concrete results in failure of the element. For elements with shear reinforcement (single leg
stirrups or lacing) which properly tie the flexural reinforcement, the crushing of the concrete results in a
slight loss of capacity since the compressive force is transferred to the compression reinforcement.

As the element is further deflected, the reinforcement enters into its strain hardening region, and the
resistance increases with increasing deflection. Single leg stirrups will restrain the compression
reinforcement for a short time into its strain hardening region. At six (6) degrees support rotation, the
element loses its structural integrity and fails. On the other hand, lacing through its truss action will restrain
the reinforcement through its entire strain hardening region until tension failure of the reinforcement occurs
at 12 degrees support rotation.

Sufficient shear capacity must be afforded by the concrete alone or in combination with shear reinforcement
in order to develop the flexural capacity of an element. An abrupt shear failure can occur at any time during
the flexural response if the flexural capacity exceeds the shear capacity of the element.

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4.3 Ductile Mode of Behavior in the Far Design Range.

ln the far design range, the distribution of the applied blast load is fairly uniform, and the deflections required
to absorb the loading are comparatively small. Conventionally reinforced (i.e., non-laced) concrete elements
with comparatively minor changes to standard reinforcing details are perfectly adequate to resist such loads.
While laced reinforcement could be used, it would be extremely uneconomical to do so.

4.4 PROCEDURE FOR STRUCTURAL DESIGN

Input

Concrete Grade (fck)

Steel Grade (fy)

Blast Load (Pso)

Time of duration (T)

Allowable rotation ()

Dynamic Increase Factors (DIF)

Span of slab (L)

Width of section (B)

Depth of section (assumed – likely to change depending on results) (D)

Percentage of steel (assumed – likely to change depending on results) (p)

Calculations

Calculate the moment capacity of the slab (Mu)

Calculate the ultimate resistance of the slab (ru)

Calculate stiffness of slab (Ke)

Calculate Equivalent elastic deflection (Xe)

Calculate Natural period of slab (Tn)

Calculate the ratio (T/Tn)

Calculate Peak dynamic Loading (P)

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Calculate the ratio (ru/P)

From the chart below calculate (Xm/Xe) for corresponding values of (T/Tn) and (ru/P)

Calculate maximum deflection due to Dynamic Loading (Xm)

Calculate the support rotation of the slab from the relation;

Tan () = (Xm)/(0.5*L)

If  <= permissible rotation the design is safe in deflection

Check for Shear

Calculate Nominal shear Stress (vu)

Calculate web shear capacity (vc)

If vu >= vc Shear reinforcement is not required

Otherwise calculate shear reinforcement from the relation:

Av = Required area of single leg stirrups = (Vu-Vc)*b*s/0.85f'ds

Otherwise Laced reinforcement may be designed as detailed below.

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4.5 DESIGN OF LACED ELEMENTS

The detonation of an explosive charge close to a barrier produces a non-uniform, high intensity blast load
which acts on the barrier for a comparatively short period of time. The concept of lacing reinforcement has
been developed for use in protective structures subjected to such loads. Lacing maintains the structural
integrity of a barrier and permits it to attain large plastic deflections. Extremely high-pressure concentrations
are caused by close-in detonations. These concentrations can produce local (punching) failure of an
element. However, with the use of lacing, the high shears produced in the vicinity of these pressure
concentrations are transferred to other areas of the element where the applied blast loads are less severe.
In effect, the lacing tends to spread out the effects of the non-uniformity of the loading and permits the use
of an average blast load over the entire surface area of the element. In addition, lacing is required in those
elements where large deflections are desirable. In these cases, the lacing not only resists the high shears
produced but also maintains the integrity of the severely cracked concrete between the tension and
compression reinforcement during the latter stages of deflection.

A laced element may be designed for limited deflections (less than 6 degrees support rotation), large
deflections (up to 12 degrees support rotation) or controlled post-failure fragments depending upon the
protection requirements of the receiver system. The stresses developed in the reinforcement is a function of
the deflection attained by the element. The type of cross-section which determines the ultimate moment
capacity of the reinforced section is also a function of the deflection but, more importantly, is a function of
the elements brittle mode response. High intensity blast pressures cause direct spalling during the initial
phase of an element's response. Therefore, a Type III cross-section will usually be available to provide
moment capacity as well as the available mass to resist motion.

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5 BUILDINGS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY EXPLOSIVES

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 Most Potential Explosion Sites

(PES) are a potential hazard to personnel, other explosives facilities, and other buildings that are in the
vicinity. This chapter gives guidance on the mandatory requirements for the design of buildings containing
explosives such that:

(1) At a PES, initiation of, and/or damage to, the contents of adjacent explosive facilities can be prevented
by intercepting high velocity fragments and debris and reducing blast and thermal effects.

(2) At an Exposed Site (ES), initiation of, and/or damage to the contents can be prevented and injury to
personnel minimized by structural resistance to blast, thermal effects, high velocity fragments and debris,
and lobbed items. Ground shock is normally only a problem close in or associated with shared earth cover.

(3) In Process Buildings, personnel can be reasonably protected from the effects of a nearby explosive
event, as well as from the potential hazards from the explosives being processed at an adjacent work
station.

5.1.2 QDs
Correct building design, construction and sitting is essential in order to make effective use of the Quantity
Distances (QDs) given in Chapter 12. It is also important to note that an ES such as an igloo, built to
withstand a large external explosive event, may prove to be a serious hazard when subjected to an internal
accidental explosion. Additionally, PES of light construction will generate a low building debris hazard to
personnel outside, but, as an ES, will offer little protection to personnel inside from building debris from a
nearby PES event.

6 CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXPLOSIVE EVENT

6.1 Hazards to be Protected Against

6.1.1 The hazards that stored explosives

That require to be protected against to avoid propagation/initiation are:

(1) Blast: The air blast from an explosion involving HD 1.1 is in the form of a pressure increase or shock
front which expands radially from the center of the explosion at supersonic velocity. When this shock front
impinges on a rigid object such as a building, a higher pressure is produced due to reflection of the wave.
As the wave expands from the explosion, it decays in strength, lengthens in duration and decreases in

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velocity. In addition to the shock wave for each pressure range, a particle or wind velocity is produced by
the shock front that causes a dynamic pressure on objects in its path. In the free field, these pressures are
functions of the air density and particle velocity.

(2) Ground Shock: When an explosion of HD 1.1 occurs at or near the ground surface, shock loading
results from the energy that is imparted to the ground surface. Some of this energy is transmitted through
the air to form air-induced ground shock, and some through the ground as direct-induced ground shock. Air-
induced ground shock occurs when the air blast shock wave strikes the ground surface and sends a stress
impulse into the underlying medium. Direct-induced ground shock results from the explosives energy being
transmitted directly through the ground. The net ground shock experienced is a combination of the two. The
relative magnitude and motion sequence are functions of the medium (soil type and air) through which the
shock travels, at the distance from the point of detonation. Usually, the effects of ground shock are small
compared with air blast. However, for some explosions particularly those sub-surface, this may not be the
case.

(3) Fire and Thermal Radiation: Detonation of explosives results in the production of a fireball. Normally,

for explosives of HD 1.1, the radiation from the short-lived flame is of negligible hazard in comparison with
blast and fragment effects. Explosives of HD 1.3 differ from detonating explosives of HD 1.1, in that, unless
heavily confined, their reaction does not result in the generation of high-pressure gases. The energy per unit
mass of HD 1.3 explosives is comparable with that of a detonating explosive, but whereas the energy of a
detonating explosive is released within a few milliseconds, that from an unconfined propellant is released
over a period measured in seconds. This energy is released in the form of an intense flame and may cause
hazard by the direct impingement of the flame and by thermal radiation.

(4) Debris and Fragments: These may be:

(i) Primary fragments from the casings of explosive articles. Typically, they may have velocities of up to
-1
3000 ms and weigh from 1 g to 500 g. Such fragments can kill or injure personnel and initiate adjacent
explosives if of sufficient energy.

(ii) Secondary debris from packaging and structural materials, including earth from traverses or cover,
arising from the break-up of the PES. These have much lower velocity than primary fragments, typically
-1 -1
from 10 ms to 500 ms but could kill or injure personnel and even initiate adjacent explosives if of sufficient
energy. Debris projection is not constant but shows a marked directional effect. Less debris is projected
from the corners of a structure, increasing to a maximum normal to each face of the structure. This is
repeated on all sides of the structure irrespective of whether a traverse is present; this effect should be
considered when siting ES relative to PES.

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(iii) Secondary debris from material thrown from the crater formed by an explosive event. This has no
directional effects and normally has a low velocity but could present an impact hazard to personnel and may
even initiate adjacent explosives if of sufficient energy.

 The sensitivity to blast over-pressure, structural motion, fire and impact by fragments differs
markedly with the type of explosives stored. Except where extremely high over-pressures occur, most
explosives are insensitive to the effect of blast over-pressure. However, blast over-pressure and structural
motion could cause translation of explosives which may result in impact and subsequent initiation.
 Generally, attack by primary fragments is considered to be the main cause of initiation of explosives
at an ES, although explosive substances or light cased explosive articles could be initiated by debris or
spalling.
 The extent of the hazard to explosives at an ES will therefore depend on the ability of the ES
structure to resist blast loading without extensive deformation, and generally, without fragment penetration.
 The primary design objective must be to prevent destruction or collapse of the structure and to
introduce measures to prevent spalling from the internal faces.

7 PROTECTION AGAINST PROPAGATION

7.1 Introduction

 The protection of explosives at an ES from the effects of an explosion is achieved by the provision
of adequate separation distances between facilities, and the use of buildings designed to protect the
contents from the hazardous output of the explosion. The separation distance is required to
attenuate the effects of the blast, fragments and heat radiation to a level which will make the
construction of a protective structure at the ES feasible and cost effective
 To provide maximum protection, structures at an ES should be either strong enough to withstand
the output of the explosion, or light enough so that collapse and any debris formed will not initiate
the contents. Buildings should preferably be able to resist the blast loading without extensive

deformation and fragmentation penetration.

7.2 HD 1.1

 The protection against propagation of explosives in open stacks is achieved by the provision of
adequate Quantity Distances (QDs) between facilities, and by the use of effective traverses. The
QDs are intended to attenuate the effects of blast, fragments and radiated heat to levels at which
propagation should not occur.
 Traverses intercept high velocity fragments and either arrest them or reduce their velocity to levels
below which propagation should not occur. When subjected to blast loading, a traverse must

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remain substantially intact for a sufficient length of time to enable the interception of fragments to
be achieved.

7.3 HD 1.2

 By their nature explosives of HD 1.2 will not sustain propagation. Therefore, normal construction
materials such as concrete, brick and earth-covered structures will be satisfactory for the
construction of storehouses for HD 1.2. However timber and lightweight steel doors are not

resistant to projection effects and should not normally be used.

7.4 HD 1.3

 The thermal radiation from the fireball produced by explosives in HD 1.3 can communicate the fire
to another facility and the explosives within. High winds will deflect the upper parts of a fireball
away from the seat of the fire, perhaps moving it closer to an ES. Additionally, weak points in a
PES structure may cause jetting of the fireball.
 Normal construction materials such as concrete and brick, and earth-covered structures can be
assumed to be impervious to thermal radiation and flame impingement from fires involving HD 1.3.
However, timber and lightweight steel doors are not resistant to the effects of fire and should not
normally be used.

7.5 HD 1.4

Any secure, weather-proof structure may be used to store explosives of HD 1.4.

8 HAZARDS TO PERSONNEL

8.1 Blast

Human tolerance to blast is relatively high, and the degree of injury will be proportional to the amount of
over-pressure sustained. The orientation of a person and the shape of the shock front are significant factors
in determining the injuries sustained. The release of air bubbles from disrupted alveoli of the lungs into the
vascular system probably accounts for most fatalities. The rupture of eardrums and injury to the body due to
translation are also likely to be sustained.

8.2 Fragments

Fragments and debris are considered potentially lethal if their energy at impact is 80 joules or more.
Generally, it is expected that, at the Inhabited Building Distance the density of such lethal fragments will not
2
exceed 1 per 56m on the ground surface.

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 Structural Design Narrative

8.3 Injuries – HD 1.1

Table 1 gives an indication of the blast pressures at which personnel injury levels will occur.

TABLE 1 INDICATION OF BLAST PRESSURE AT WHICH INJURY WILL OCCUR

Serial No Injury Level Maximum Blast Pressure Kpa

1 Eardrum Rupture 35

Threshold 100

50% Rupture

2 Lung Damage 70

Threshold 250

50% Lethality

3 Body Translation 100-150

Threshold of Lethality 400-750

50% Lethality

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 Structural Design Narrative

9 TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES

9.1 Introduction

The design and construction of all explosives buildings shall be in accordance with all current regulations,
Standards and Codes of Practice.

 Light Structure
 Medium-Walled Building
 Heavy-Walled Building
 Earth Covered Buildings
 Igloo
 Open Bay or Site (Traversed or Untraversed)
 Process Building

9.2 Igloo
An igloo is an explosives storehouse with earth cover. The structure and doors have been specifically
designed to resist blast and high velocity fragments so that the contents will not be initiated or seriously
damaged at the required IMD. The supporting structure for the earth cover can be constructed of corrugated
steel and RC but is normally an RC box structure.
As an ES, this type of building behaves similarly to an earth covered building with the additional advantage
of having been designed to resist the blast loading and therefore giving stored explosives complete
protection from initiation at reduced IMD. The doors and headwall do not normally require a traverse
providing they have been designed to resist the blast loading and high velocity fragment penetration. As a
PES, an igloo attracts reduced QDs due to attenuation of the blast by the earth cover. In order to gain the
most efficient land usage where more than one igloo is used, igloos should be orientated side-by-side with
the headwalls on a common line. Where more than one row of igloos is used, the front walls in one row
should face the rear of the other igloos in the second row.

9.3 Process Building

A Process Building (PB) is a building or site in which explosives are manufactured or worked upon. This
includes such facilities as missile test rooms, preparation buildings, explosives workshops and DPA
laboratories. ‘Work’ includes all maintenance and preparation procedures.

As an ES, this type of building must either be designed to survive and protect workers from an explosion at
a PES or have a relatively large separation distance from other PES in order to give protection to personnel
rather than just to protect against initiation of the explosives contained within.

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 Structural Design Narrative

As a PES, a PB is classified according to its construction and the QDs determined using the total quantity of
explosive that may be present at any one time unless effectively unitised. Due to the close proximity of
explosives to workers within a PES, it may not be possible (other than for small quantities of explosives) to
provide protection, and fatalities would be expected.

10 GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONAL

REQUIREMENTS OF EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES

10.1 General

Explosives facilities are to be constructed so as to provide a specified level of protection against the hazards
of accidental explosive events in another facility. The type of structure provided will depend on the
protection level required and/or the type and quantity of explosives stored. Confinement of an explosion
within a ‘strong’ structure would have a marked effect on the structure and hazards produced when
compared with an unconfined event in a ‘weak’ (frangible) structure.

The structural form of the facility will be dictated by the blast loading acting on the structure. Additionally,
fragment/debris distribution will determine whether the roof and walls are reinforced and/or whether
protection provided by means of an approved traverse is required. In general, buildings at an ES subjected
to high blast loadings should be constructed of reinforced concrete and be earth covered. For PES with
smaller quantities (up to approximately 1000kg HD1.1) the earth cover may be omitted.

Facilities are to be designed so that they are easy to keep clean and dirt and dust are minimized. Adequate
access to the facility should be provided to enable movement of the explosives contents. Where possible,
fixtures and fittings are to be positioned so that they cannot be fouled by MHE or by other equipment.
Where this is not possible, fixtures and fittings are to be suitably protected.

There is to be sufficient space on all four sides of an explosives stack for inspection of the contents. An
appropriate gangway is to be provided between stacks and the wall of an explosives storehouse. This
gangway should be permanently marked on the floor as a sterile area using yellow hatched markings.

All explosives storehouses should be designed and equipped such that the inside temperature neither falls
o o
below 5 C, nor rises above 25 C. If the stipulated temperature conditions cannot be sustained, artificial
heating/air conditioning to an approved standard is to be installed.

The surrounding site must be free of flammable materials and undergrowth shall be kept close cropped to
the ground. Grass shall be kept very short up to 9m from PES. Shrubs, which do not present an undue fire
hazard, are permitted inside this distance. The rest of the site must be kept in such a condition so as not to
present an undue fire risk.

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 Structural Design Narrative

10.2 Design Fundamentals for Protective Buildings

Where facilities are required to provide protection to personnel (e.g. Process Buildings and/or other
occupied buildings at IQD) the buildings must be designed to resist blast loadings and perforation by
projections. The following shall apply:

 Design considerations shall be based on a 90% confidence level

 Deflections of main supporting structural elements shall be limited to 20 support rotations or
deflections of span/60. If mild-steel spall plates of adequate thickness are fixed to the internal face
of RC surfaces to retain back-face spalling, maximum support rotation of 4° or deflections of
span/30 may be adopted.
 High velocity spalling of RC elements or members is not permitted or is to be prevented by the use
of spall plates. Low velocity spalling may be accepted provided that it can be adequately
demonstrated that it will not be unreasonably injurious to personnel.

 The glazing hazard shall be no more than Low Hazard.

10.3 Pressure Release

The design of structures to fully contain the blast and fragments due to an internal explosive event is only
practicable when very low quantities (typically ≤10 kg) of explosives of HD 1.1, or larger quantities (typically
≤50 kg) of HD 1.3 are stored. Structures designed to store explosives of HD 1.3, or small quantities
(typically ≤100 kg) of HD 1.1, can be designed to survive with limited damage by incorporating a frangible
wall/panel to reduce the magnitude and duration of the internal blast parameters that will occur when this
type of explosives is initiated.

10.4 Rocket and Missile Storage Facilities

Unless tests have been conducted to prove otherwise, all rockets and missiles are to be regarded as self-
propulsive. Facilities used for the storage of rockets or missiles that are in a propulsive state are to have
walls thick enough to prevent their perforation in the event of accidental initiation. Alternatively, the
rockets/missiles are to be adequately secured to the structure.

As an alternative to designing a structure to resist the rocket motor thrust, a vertically faced traverse,
located as close to the building as possible, should be provided. This traverse must be thick enough to
prevent perforation by the rockets. The traverse length and height must subtend an angle of 10 degrees
from the door aperture.

The most suitable type of structure for storage of propulsive rockets is an igloo, with the rockets positioned
so as to point towards the rear or sidewalls. Unless the missiles face the door, no door traverse is required.

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 Structural Design Narrative

Rockets in a non-propulsive state should be stored in structures suitable for the quantity and HD of the
explosives present.

10.5 Storage of HD 1.1 Shaped Charge Warheads

Investigations have indicated that shaped charge warheads will generate a shaped charge if they are
caused to initiate, even in a fire. The jet thus formed will be significantly less efficient than the designed
effect but will still be capable of penetrating the walls of any storage structure. To mitigate these effects, the
warheads should be pointed towards earth backed walls.

10.6 Construction to Give Protection Against Projectiles

Explosives buildings should be constructed to give protection against perforation by debris, low velocity
fragments and lobbed munitions. This is achieved by providing appropriate separation distances and the
minimum construction thicknesses listed below:

(1) Roof - 150mm in-situ reinforced concrete slab

(2) Walls - 150mm in-situ reinforced concrete or 215mm nominal solid brickwork

(3) Doors - 16mm mild steel or equivalent

To give protection against high velocity fragments, a traverse or earth cover should preferably be provided.
However, if this is not possible, the following material thicknesses will generally be sufficient to prevent
initiation of the explosives at an ES:

(1) Walls - 450mm in-situ reinforced concrete or 680mm nominal solid brickwork

(2) Doors - 50mm mild steel or equivalent

(3) Traverse - 2400mm of earth

11 SPECIFIC CONSTRUCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

11.1 Structural Reinforced Concrete

The lowest grade of concrete permitted for use in construction of explosives facilities is M40 with a nominal
maximum aggregate size of 20 mm

For conventional structures used as explosives buildings, the normal reinforcement requirements in IS:456
apply. Where there is a design requirement to consider dynamic loads, the following will also apply:

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 Structural Design Narrative

(1) The arrangement and quantity of reinforcement shall ensure satisfactory performance of RC elements
subject to plastic deformation under blast loading. The requirements are significantly different and more
onerous than is necessary for conventional structures.

(2) Main and Secondary Reinforcement shall be Hot-Rolled High-Yield deformed steel bars of grade Fe
500-D conforming to IS:1786-2008.

(3) Shear Reinforcement shall be High-Yield deformed steel bars of grade Fe500-D conforming to IS: 1786-
2008.

(4) Cold worked high yield reinforcing bars shall not be used in explosives structures because of the high
strain rates and large deformations expected.

(5) Minimum reinforcement quantities for blast resistant structures shall be:

(i) 0.32% HY main bars each face

(ii) 0.2% HY secondary bars each face

(iii) 0.1% HY links for designed compression reinforcement

(iv) 0.04% HY links for nominal compression reinforcement.

(6) Reinforcement shall be arranged so as to minimize laps where practical. Where laps in the main tension
bars are necessary they shall be 72 diameters long to allow for the reduced bond strength in cracked
concrete. Reinforcement shall have full development lengths at slab/wall and wall/wall junctions.

(7) Regardless of the Section Type (as defined by UFC3-340-02) to be adopted, blast links shall be
provided to enclose all layers of main and secondary steel in order to better contain the core concrete,
improve dynamic response, increase shear capacity and limit the size of back face spall fragments. Links
shall be “U” shaped, staggered and at maximum spacing of 300mm.

(8) Reinforcement shall generally utilize moderate sized bars (up to 25mm) at close centers in preference to
large bars at large centers in order to better contain the core concrete, to improve dynamic response and to
limit the size of back face spall fragments.

(9) Main and secondary reinforcement shall be provided equally in both faces of RC elements subject to
blast loading in order to allow for reverse loading and rebound forces. Additionally, in all structures, whether
dynamically loaded or not, the crossovers of reinforcement in all RC elements are to be wire tied at every
intersection.

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 Structural Design Narrative

11.2 Doors

Door construction will vary according to the required degree of protection to stocks from fragments and
whether a door traverse is present. Door materials shall comply with the requirements. Locks shall comply
with the requirements of JSP 440.

11.3 Ventilation and Air Conditioning

PES should be kept as dry and temperate as possible. To assist in the reduction of condensation they
should be provided with natural ventilation and, in some cases, dehumidification equipment. To optimize the
life of stored explosives it is desirable to limit the humidity and temperature in a storehouse or process
building. The ideal conditions are:

(1) The relative humidity should be maintained between 50 & 60%. Humidity levels higher than this may
lead to deterioration of the explosives and lower levels may give rise to problems with static electricity for
some types of stocks.

(2) The temperature should generally be maintained between 5 and 25 degrees Celsius. Temperatures
higher than this could cause damage to constituent ingredients. Further advice on temperatures for Process
Buildings is provided

11.4 Dust Extraction Systems

In certain Process Buildings where explosives are exposed, it may be necessary to install an explosives
dust extraction system. DIO are to be consulted, through the appropriate IE, regarding designs, which may
incorporate flame arrestors or barriers to propagation, prior to inclusion in the building

11.5 Lighting and Other Electrical Installations

Lighting and other electrical installations are to be suitable for the Category of the PES and comply with the
requirements.

11.6 Building Services

Services to Process Buildings, such as compressed air or vacuum facilities and associated plant, water
supplies/drainage for washing/toilet purposes, etc., may be provided in Process Buildings to local
requirements. All pipelines or conduits carrying services are to be colour coded to show the nature of their
contents and bonded at the entry and exit to/from the building or compartment. This colour coding is to be at
the building entrance and at such other points as are necessary to avoid confusion.

11.7 Lightning Protection System (LPS)

Generally, an LPS is required for all PES.

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 Structural Design Narrative

11.8 Bonding of Metal

All metal used in the construction of a PES, including the reinforcement in RC structures, is to be effectively
bonded to the lightning protection system (see Chapter 10).

11.9 Precautions against Static Electricity

Adequate precautions must be taken to prevent the accumulation of static electrical charges. Normal
precautions against static electricity are provided by earthing and bonding all anti-static and conducting
materials and all plant and equipment.

11.10 Earthing Requirements

When a specific earthing requirement is stipulated by an equipment PT, PES are to be fitted with a
continuous copper earthing strip around the internal walls at a height of 1 m. This earthing strip is to be
bonded to the lightning protection system.

11.11 Conducting and Anti-Static Floors or Mats

The floors of any Process Building in which maintenance procedures are carried out on explosive stores
requiring maximum anti-static precautions, or on an Electro-Explosive Device (EED) or store containing an

EED, are to be of the conducting or anti-static type.

11.12 Lifting Appliances

PES intended to contain heavy or bulk stores are either to be provided with an approved overhead hand
operated or electric crane, or the construction of the PES is such that it will allow for the use of mobile
handling, lifting and stacking equipment. Where lifting appliances are installed they shall comply with, in
addition to any explosives safety considerations, the current edition of the Lifting Operations and Lifting
Equipment Regulations (LOLER).

11.13 Security

In addition to the requirements of this chapter, the storage of ACTO explosives (see Definitions) is to
comply with the requirements of JSP 440.

11.14 Fire Protection Measures

Fire protection measures for each explosives facility shall be agreed with the Fire Focal Point (FFP). For
new facilities, the requirements shall be drawn up and agreed with the FFP as part of the Statement of
Requirement (SOR) during Stage 1 of the procurement process.

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 Structural Design Narrative

12 QUANTITY DISTANCES

12.1 Introduction

The QD are based on trials, some wartime bombing damage data and data from some accidental
explosions in different countries, including UK. However, QD are subject to uncertainty owing to the
variability of explosions and the uncertainty of the available data.

QD are generated by distance functions subject, in certain cases, to fixed minimum distances. QD are
applied to all Potential Explosion Sites (PES) and are fundamentally dependent upon the Hazard Division
(HD) of the explosives being stored (except for HD 1.4, which has fixed minimum distances instead of QD).
The types of QD are as follows:

a) Inside Quantity Distance (IQD). There are two types of IQD:

 Inter-magazine Distance (IMD).
 Process Building Distance (PBD).
(b) Outside Quantity Distance (OQD). There are three types of OQD:
 Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD).
 Inhabited Building Distance (IBD).
 Vulnerable Building Distance (VBD).

The QD for a particular HD may be dependent on one or more of the following factors:

(1) The NEQ at the PES and the type, sensitiveness and packaging of the explosives at the ES.

(2) The type, use, method of construction and orientation of both the PES and the ES.

(3) The presence of effective traverses.

(4) The degree of protection required at the PES and ES.

(5) The adequacy of evacuation arrangements.

(6) The HD sub-division for storage.

In general, the provision of stronger buildings allows the use of smaller QD for a given degree of protection
or achieves a better standard of protection at a given distance, especially in the case of ES near a PES
containing explosives of HD 1.1. However, stronger buildings are more likely to increase OQDs in certain
circumstances as their heavier structure can produce large, long-range fragments in the event of an
explosion within.

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 Structural Design Narrative

12.2 INSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES

IQD are the minimum distances to be observed between PES and ES that contain explosives, and between
PES and Process Buildings.

12.2.1 Inter-Magazine Distances

IMD are the minimum distances to be observed between individual PES and ES that contain explosives and
are designed to provide specified degrees of protection to explosives at an ES. Primarily, these distances
are intended to prevent direct propagation expected at each ES for each HD. An explosion at a PES may
lead indirectly to explosions at an ES due to secondary fires, but this situation is more likely at the lowest
degree of protection, detailed below.

12.2.2 Process Building Distances

PBD are the minimum distances to be observed either between PES and Process Buildings, or between
Process Buildings. They are intended to give a reasonable degree of immunity to personnel within a
Process Building from the effects of a nearby explosion. Light structured Process Buildings are likely to be
damaged if not completely destroyed.

PBD also provide a high degree of protection against immediate or subsequent propagation of explosion in
the Process Building. PBD are generally intended for situations where personnel are regularly employed in
the preparation or processing of explosives.

12.3 OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES

OQD are the minimum distances to be observed between PES and ES such as public roads, railways, civil
airport facilities, inhabited

buildings and other buildings/areas, whether they be inside or outside the explosives area, which are used
by the general public and/or MOD personnel. In certain circumstances, minimum fragment distances are
applied.

12.3.1 Public Traffic Route Distances

PTRD are the minimum distances to be observed between PES and routes used by the general public,
which are generically referred to as Public Traffic Routes. These include:

(1) Roads.

(2) Railways.

(3) Waterways, including rivers, canals and lakes.

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 Structural Design Narrative

12.3.2 Inhabited Building Distances

IBD are the minimum distances to be observed between PES and buildings or sites where members of the
general public or personnel not involved in explosives handling either work, live or congregate. The
distances are intended to prevent serious structural damage to traditional types (i.e. 230 mm solid brick or
equivalent) of inhabited buildings or caravans, and any consequential death or serious injury to their
occupants. Persons in the open would not suffer direct injury from the effects of blast and radiant heat at
these distances.

12.4 QUANTITY DISTANCES FOR HD 1.1

12.4.1 Inter-Magazine Distances

Levels of protection are as follows:

(1) Significance of Fires at ES Fires involving HD 1.1 should not be fought after the initial stages. The
U

probability of fires spreading to other ES increases as the chosen level of protection is decreased. This
factor must therefore be considered when choosing the level of protection.

(2) Levels of Protection: The igloo design affords extremely good protection to its contents. Weaker
.

buildings and open stacks would not be expected to give such good protection although concrete structures
are considered to be superior generally to brick from an exposed site point of view. The level of protection
depends on the vulnerability or robustness of the explosives stored at an ES and the type of traversing
used. The following paragraphs describe the three levels of protection.

The levels of protection at an ES given by the various IMD are as follows:

(a) Virtually Complete Protection: Gives virtually complete protection against practically instantaneous
propagation of an explosion by ground shock, blast, flame and high velocity projections. This level of
protection is primarily used when both the PES and the ES are earth-covered structures.

(b) High Degree of Protection: Gives a high degree of protection against practically instantaneous
propagation of an explosion by ground shock, blast, flame and high velocity projections.

(c) Limited Degree of Protection: Gives only a limited degree of protection against practically instantaneous
propagation of an explosion by ground shock, blast, flame and high velocity projections.

12.4.2 Process Building Distances for HD 1.1

For HD 1.1, the standard Process Building Distance (PBD) should be the D10 distances. At this distance,
the major effects to be considered are:

(1) The peak side-on overpressure, which is anticipated to be no greater than 21 kPa.

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 Structural Design Narrative

(2) Debris, which would be a very significant effect, though difficult to accurately predict. The smaller PBD
(D9A), valid below 4000 kg, will still provide a reasonable degree of protection for persons within a process
building at the exposed site.

12.4.3 Public Traffic Route Distances for HD 1.1

PTRD are subject to minimum distances to provide some protection against projections.

(1) Roads:

(a) High Density Usage - If more than 5000 vehicles use the road in any average 24 hour period, the D13
distance is to be used, subject to applicable minimum distance quoted in QD tables.

(b) Medium Density Usage - If less than 5000 vehicles but more than 1000 vehicles use the road in any
average 24 hour period, the D11 distance is to be used, subject to applicable minimum distance quoted in
QD tables.

(c) Low Density Usage - If less than 1000 vehicles but more than 20 vehicles use the road in any average
24 hour period, then half the IBD (i.e. ½ D12) is to be used, but with no applicable minimum distance.

(d) Very Low Density Usage – If less than 20 vehicles use the road in any average 24 hour period no QD
separation is required.

(2) Railways:

(a) PTRD for railways is similarly dependent on traffic density. The passenger density may be determined
from the published normal Week day service timetable (i.e. not Bank Holidays etc.) and is to be based on
the assumption that each scheduled train carries 50% of its maximum seated passenger capacity.

(b) High Density Usage - For all rail lines where the passenger traffic density exceeds 5000 passengers in
any average 24 hour period, the D13 distance is to be used, subject to applicable minimum distance quoted
in QD tables.

(c) Medium Density Usage - For railway lines where the passenger traffic density exceeds 1000 passengers
but does not exceed 5000 passengers in any average 24 hour period, the D11 distance is to be used,
subject to applicable minimum distance quoted in QD tables.

(d) Low Density Usage - For railway lines where the passenger traffic does not exceed 1000 passengers in
any average 24 hour period, then half the IBD (i.e. ½ D12) is to be used, but with no applicable minimum
distance.

(3) Waterways (Including Rivers, Canals and Lakes):

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 Structural Design Narrative

(a) High Density Usage - For waterways where the average number of persons using it in any average 24
hour period exceeds 1800, the D13 distance is to be used, subject to applicable minimum distance quoted
in QD tables.

(b) Medium Density Usage - For waterways where the average number of persons using it an any average
24 hour period is more than 400, but less than 1800, the D11 distance is to be used, subject to applicable
minimum distance quoted in QD tables.

(c) Low Density Usage - For waterways where the average numbers of persons using it in any average 24
hour period is less than 400, the PTRD is to be calculated as half the appropriate IBD, but with no
applicable minimum distance.

(d) Very Low Density Usage – If less than 20 persons use the waterway in any average 24 hour period no
QD separation is required.

(4) Public Rights of Way/Recreational Facilities:

(a) High Density Usage - For a Public Right of Way/Recreational Facilities where the average number of
persons using it is greater than 900 in any average 24 hour period, the D13 distance is to be used, subject
to applicable minimum distance quoted in QD tables.

(b) Medium Density Usage - For a Public Right of Way / Recreational Facilities where the average number
of persons using it is less than 900, but greater than 200, in any average 24 hour period, the D11 distance is
to be used, subject to applicable minimum distance quoted in QD tables.

(c) Low Density Usage - For Public Rights of Way/ Recreational Facilities where the average number of
persons using it is less than 200, but greater than 20, in any average 24 hour period, the PTRD is to be
calculated as half the IBD (i.e. ½ D12), but with no applicable minimum distance.

(d) Very Low-Density Usage - For Public Rights of Way/Recreational Facilities where the average number of
persons using it is less than 20 in any 24 hour period no QD separation is required.

12.5 Inhabited Building Distances for HD1.1

The distances for HD 1.1 are based on a tolerable level of damage expected from a peak side-on
overpressure of 5kPa. The distances are not sufficiently large to either prevent superficial damage to
buildings which are largely of glass construction or to avoid injuries to their occupants by flying glass. The
debris produced from an accidental explosion of HD 1.1 explosives would not be expected to exceed one
lethal fragment, having an energy in excess of 80 Joules, per 56m 2 at this distance.

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 Structural Design Narrative

A 400m minimum Inhabited Building distance is required to protect against structural debris from igloos,
other earth covered structures or untraversed buildings. For heavily built up areas consideration should be
given to using a minimum distance of 400m.

13 THE BLAST WAVE PHENOMENA

Infinite Atmosphere: Almost immediately after the detonation occurs, the expansion of hot gases initiates a
pressure wave in the surrounding air as roughly represented in the following figure.

Free-Air Burst Blast Environment

The pressure wave moves with the velocity of sound and since this velocity increases with the temperature
and pressure of the air through which the wave is moving, the inner part of the wave moves more rapidly
and gradually over takes the outer part as shown in the above figure (b).

The pressure wave front thus gets steeper and steeper and within a very short time the pressure change
becomes abrupt forming a shock front as indicated in the above figure (c).

Overpressure during early stage of shock formation

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 Structural Design Narrative

Variation of Over pressure with time at a given location

Finite Height Burst: If the bomb is detonated at a height h above the surface of the earth, the shock front will
have the general configuration indicated in the following figure.

Shock front before striking the ground

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 Structural Design Narrative

A short time later the radius of the shock front becomes greater than and a portion of the shock front
impinges on the earth's surface and is reflected back, forming the reflected shock front as illustrated in the
following figure.

Shock front reflection at ground surface α less than 45deg +/-

The region on the earth's surface within which α is less than 45 degrees, and no Mach stem is present is
called the Region of Regular Reflection, while the region for which a is greater than 45 degrees and a Mach
stem is present is called the Region of Mach Reflection.

If the ground surface above the buried structure is located in the region of regular reflection, the air blast
wave will intersect the ground at an acute angle which is assumed to be zero. On the other hand, if the
ground surface above the structure is located in the Mach reflection region, the air blast wave travels
parallel to the surface of the ground, and the induced ground pressure wave is assumed to behave is shown
the figure below.

Pressure-Time variation for Air Burst

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Structural Design Narrative

Surface Burst Environment

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 Structural Design Narrative

Idealized Pressure Time Variation

LOADING ON BURIED STRUCTURES

Ground pressure wave induced by air blast wave in the region of Mach reflection

When the buried structure is located in either the region of regular or Mach reflection, the local overpressure
on the roof is approximately equal to the overpressure of the air blast wave on the earth's surface PS since
apparently no appreciable reflection occurs on the surfaces of the buried structure. The lateral overpressure

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 Structural Design Narrative

on the vertical sides of a buried structure are considerably less than the pressure applied at the top surface
of the soil depending on the type of soil and the height of the water table. For design purposes it is
recommended that the lateral over pressure on the vertical surfaces of buried structures be taken as KPs,
where K can be evaluated as follows:

K = 0.25 for dry and cohesion less soils

K = 0.50 for medium cohesive soils

K = 0.75 for soft cohesive soils

K = 1.0 below water table

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 Structural Design Narrative

14 REFERENCES
Design for Blast resistance

IS : 4991 Criteria for Blast Resistance Design for Explosions

above Ground

IS : 6922 Criteria for Safety and Design of Structures subjected

to Underground Blasts

UFC 3-340-02 (Formerly TM 5-1300) Structures to resist the effects of

Accidental Explosions

STEC Pamphlets 1 Quantity Distance Regulations for Military Explosives

STEC Pamphlets 2 Classified List of Military Explosives for Transport and

Storage

STEC Pamphlets 3 Construction of Buildings and Traverses for Military

Explosives

STEC Pamphlets 21 Design and Construction Manual for Blast Resistant

Structures Using Laced Reinforced Concrete

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 Structural Design Narrative

15 NAD, MTP, CFA and NAI BUILDINGS AT SITE-E

15.1 Introduction:

Building 419 - Strong Room is a part of project SEABIRD Phase-IIA at Karwar. This building will be a part of
CFA facilities. Following is the design analysis in accordance with clause 4.7.8.11 of RFP-DC-NAD.

15.2 Building description:

The proposed construction is intended for the development of NAD, MTP, CFA and NAI Buildings. The
proposed structures are being planned as reinforced concrete framed structures with 200mm thick Concrete
blocks walls and steel structures with galvalume sheeting as roofing and cladding, with RCC foundations for
covered garage and vehicle shed. Architectural plans of the proposed building are being prepared. The
building will be divided (wherever necessary) to accommodate expansion joints based on structural
requirement.

15.3 Structural Modeling

Limit state design is adopted for RCC framed structure, structural steel (super structure) and foundations
(sub structure). The building structure is modeled using the software package “STAAD-Pro” as a space
frame structure with a grid of columns in the vertical direction, interconnected with beams in horizontal
directions at all floor levels. The nodes (the junction points of beams and columns) are treated as rigid
joints. The bottom end nodes of the columns, resting on footings are treated as fixed supports. The
plinth/grade beams provided at the podium level in addition to beams at floor levels increases the stiffness
of the structure as a whole. For the present PT beams are modeled as RCC beams to cater for the frame
action. The difference in weight caused due to these fictitious beams is taken into account by applying self-
weights of the beams in upward direction. To ensure efficient structural action, for certain beams end
moments are released near joints. The analysis and design of PT beams is done separately using one of
the software packages “ADAPT/CEDCUS/FAGUS/STATIK” as appropriate.

15.3.1 Design Loads

 Primary Loads:
 Dead loads ( as per IS 875 (part-I)-1987)
 Self-weight of different materials used in the construction is considered as given under:
 RCC members (Slabs, beams and columns) : 25.0 kN/m³
 Soil : 18.0 kN/m³
 Water : 10.0 kN/m³
 Floor finishes (50mm thk.) : 1.2 kN/m²
 Roof finishes (avg. 100mm thk.) : 2.4 kN/m²
 Built-in partitions : 1.0 kN/m²

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 Structural Design Narrative

Dead loads per unit area (for covered garage and vehicle shed) :

Roof sheeting including dust load :0.5kN/m2

 Imposed loads (as per IS 875 (Part – II) – 1987) as per occupancy:
 Room : 2.5 kN/m²
 Store Room : 5 kN/m²
 Cafeterias and Dining room : 3.0 kN/m²
 Stair case : 4.0 kN/m²
 Passages, lobbies &corridors : 4.0 kN/m²
 Toilet &bath rooms : 2.0 kN/m²
 Conference Room : 4.0 kN/m²
 Service : 5.0 kN/m²
 Roof with access : 1.5 kN/m²
 Roof without access : 0.75 kN/m²

 Wind loads (as per IS 875 (Part – III) – 2015)

The wind pressure based on the geographical and structural parameters is calculated as
follows:
The basic wind speed is 39 m/s for Karwar.

 Probability factor (k1) : 1.06 (Considering mean probable design life of the
structure as 100 years)
 Terrain factor (k2) : 1.05 (Considering Category 2 and building height
10 to 15m)
 Topography factor (k3) : 1.00
 Importance factor for : 1.00
cyclonic region (k4)
 Design wind speed (Vz) : 42.2 m/s
 Design wind pressure : 0.6 x Vz x Vz = 1.07 kN/sqm = 1.1 kN/sqm
(Adopted)
 Earthquake loads (as per IS 1893 (part – I) – 2016)

The seismic coefficients based on the geographical and structural parameters are considered
as follows:
 Seismic zone : Zone III
 Zone factor : 0.16
 Importance factor : 1.0

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 Response reduction factor : 5.0

 Soil type : II (Medium Type)
 Damping ratio : 5%

15.3.2 Design Life

Design life of structures, excluding replaceable materials is assumed to be 100 years, with proper
maintenance.

15.4 Application of the loads on the model

 The dead loads of all reinforced concrete frame members and steel members which are modeled
will be given as self-weight of the members. All the dead load of roof including cladding are applied
as load per square area. All the dead load of floors including weight of floor slabs are applied as
load per square area and in turn will be applied as distributed floor loads onto the supporting beams
as per clause 24.5 of IS 456: 2000. All wall loads are applied as uniformly distributed member loads
per unit length onto the supporting beams.
 All the live loads on floors and roof are applied as load per square meter of area. But they are
calculated and applied in conformity with clause 7.3.3 of IS: 1893.
 The wind pressure calculated as stated above is applied as uniformly distributed load per unit length
on the columns.
 The seismic weight is calculated as joint load obtained by applying pin-joint at beam-column
junctions at all levels for dead load and part of live load as applicable as per IS : 1893 – 2016 (part
1). The seismic analysis is carried out by in built program of STAAD PRO.

15.5 Load Combinations

The structural members will be analyzed and designed taking into consideration the probability of various
service loads acting together during the construction stage and after occupation. As per Clause 18.2.1 of IS
456: 2000, the limit state method of design will be followed for the design of all the structural members, as
per this method, the design loads will be arrived at using partial safety factors for various load combinations
as per Table 18 to IS 456: 2000.
The steel structure is analyzed and designed taking into consideration the probability of various service
loads acting together during the erection stage. As per IS 800: 2007, the limit state method of design is
followed for the design of all the structural members, as per this method, the design loads will be arrived at
using partial safety factors for various load combinations as per IS 800: 2007.

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Load Limit State of Collapse Limit State of Serviceability

Combination DL IL WL EL DL IL WL EL
DL + IL 1.5 1.5 - - 1.0 1.0 - -
DL+WL 1.5 - 1.5 - 1.0 - 1.0 -
Dl + EL 1.5 - - 1.5 1.0 - - 1.0
DL+WL 0.9 - 1.5 -
Dl + EL 0.9 - - 1.5
DL + IL +WL 1.2 1.2 1.2 - 1.0 0.8 0.8 -
DL + IL + El 1.2 1.2 - 1.2 1.0 0.8 - 0.8

15.6 Materials specifications

Grade of Concrete:

All RCC members : M35

All PT members : M40

Reinforcement Steel : Fe500

Structural Steel : 250Mpa (Yield Strength)

Cement : OPC 43 grade

The buildings are designed for a fire rating of one hour. Accordingly, nominal cover to all reinforcements
including links are considered vide table 16A of IS 456-2000. Increase in permissible stresses of materials is
adopted as per clause 6.3.5.1 of IS: 1893.

Footings : 50 mm
Columns / Pedestals : 40 mm
Beams : 25 mm
Floor and Roof slabs : 20 and 30 mm
Retaining walls : 35 mm
Water retaining walls : 35 mm
Lift pits/shear walls : 35 mm
From durability consideration, moderate exposure condition is assumed.

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Expansion joints are provided in adherence to clause 27 of IS: 456-2000. Storey drift limitations and
separation between adjacent units near expansion joints are kept strictly in adherence to clauses 7.11.1 and
7.11.3 respectively of IS:1893-2016(part-1). All parts of structural elements projecting as cantilevers are
designed as per 7.12.2 of IS: 1893-2016(part-1). Within the building, integral connections between various
structural parts are verified as per 7.12.4 of IS: 1893-2016(part-1).

15.7 Structural Analysis

The buildings are modeled as 3D framed structures, where beams and columns are principal load carrying
members. The wall panels rest directly on the beams as member loads. The self-weight and the imposed
loads coming onto the slab panels is transferred to the supporting beam members as per the yield line
pattern of slabs. The 3D space frame structure is analyzed with the help of STAAD-PRO package using
response spectrum method, corresponding to zone-III seismic classification. Here, the design value of the
horizontal acceleration spectrum value for the portion of structure below ground is taken according to clause
6.4.4 of IS: 1893. The package uses the Direct Element Method of linear structural analysis. In this method,
the element stiffness matrices and element load matrices are generated, once the material properties,
sectional properties, geometric information and the loadings are given. From these matrices, the global
stiffness matrix and global load matrices are assembled on which boundary conditions imposed as per
requirement. The advanced solver of the package then inverts the stiffness matrix and obtains the nodal
displacements. Thereafter, all other quantities of interest like member end actions, BMD/SFD diagrams, and
support reactions are all evaluated by the package. This information is used in the design of the beam and
column elements. The support reactions are used in the design of footings.

15.8 Design of Structural members

All structural elements, but for the liquid retaining structures, are designed using limit state method of RCC.
Liquid retaining structures are however designed using the working stress method RCC, considering un-
cracked sections.

The member forces and support reactions as arrived through the analysis are utilized in the design of
structural members as per IS 456-2000. As per this method, the structure will be designed for all possible
limit states of collapse and serviceability criterions. RC detailing is furnished considering the safety of the
structure. The design detailing is furnished as per the provisions of SP 34.

For the design of steel structural members, the member forces and support reactions as arrived through the
analysis are utilized in the design as per IS 800: 2007. All designs will be carried out using the limit state
method of design.

Footings: Footings are designed for support reactions of all un-factored loads for corresponding partial
factors of safety for fixed condition. In-house programs developed using MS Excel, are used for the

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structural design of footings. Anchoring of footings into rock shall be considered, if rock-strata are
encountered under the foundations.

Columns: STAAD-PRO furnishes the structural design of columns for the most critical load combination for
each column in each storey. The structural design output for the columns are grouped according to their
size and further sub-grouped according to the area of steel.

Beams: STAAD-PRO furnishes the structural design of beams too for the most critical load combination for
each span in each floor. The structural design output for the beams is grouped according to span, cross
section and support conditions.

Slabs: Slabs are designed as One-way/Two-way (Direct Design Method) as per the coefficients given in IS-
456: 2000 for DL+LL. In-house programs developed using MS Excel are used for their design.

15.9 List of national codes used in the structural Design:

The relevant Indian standard codes, as given below, are followed for structural design.

S.No Code Description

1 IS: 875 (Part-1)-1987 Code of practice for Design Loads (Other than
Earthquake) for buildings and Structures – Unit
Weights of Buildings Materials and Stored
Materials.

2 IS: 875 (Part-2)-1987 Code of practice for Design Loads (Other than
Earthquake) for buildings and Structures – Imposed
loads.

3 IS: 875 (Part-3)-2015 Code of practice for Design Loads (Other than
Earthquake) for buildings and Structures – Wind
loads.

4 IS: 875 (Part-5)-1987 Code of practice for Design Loads (Other than
Earthquake) for buildings and Structures – Special
loads and Load Combinations.

5 IS: 456-2000 Code of Practice for Plain and Reinforced Concrete

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6 IS: 800-2007 General Construction in Steel- Code of Practice

7 IS:1786-2008 Specification for High Strength Deformed Steel

Bars and Wires for concrete Reinforcement.

8 IS:2062-1999 Steel for General structural purposes –

Specification.

9 IS:1904-1986 Code of Practice for design and construction of

foundation in soils general requirement.

10 SP 34 Hand Book on concrete reinforcement and

detailing.

11 SP 16 : 1980 Design Aids for Reinforced Concrete to IS 456-

2000

12 IS:1893 (Part-1) - 2016 Criteria for Earthquake resistant design of

structures.

13 IS:4326-1976 Code of practice for earthquake resistant design

and construction of buildings.

14 IS:13920 – 1993/1998 Ductile detailing of reinforced concrete structures

subjected to seismic forces – code of practice.

15 IS:3370 (part-2) 2009 Code of practice for concrete structures for the
storage of liquids.

16 IS:1343-2012 Code of practice for Pre-stressed Concrete

15.10 Soil parameters

1. Type of foundation : Isolated

2. Depth of foundation : 1.5 m/ 3m below from existing ground level

3. Allowable bearing pressures : As per soil investigation report done by DBM Geotechnics
Constructions PVT.LTD

For Site-E the net allowable bearing capacity of 25 T/m2 at 1.5 m depth and 29 T/m 2 at 3m depth shall be
adopted for Isolated/Raft footings, resting on hard strata for foundation widths greater than 3.0 m.

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