G.R. No.

182484 June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS

MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF
NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON,respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by
the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC
Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division,
and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed with
the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006
for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly
Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering about
120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of
a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2)
they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms
and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the
private respondents' permission and against the objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a
nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially
claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious.
They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in the private respondents' favor. It found
prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:

"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch
found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the
Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone
wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence
was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and
sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993
through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of
the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical
possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on
January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view
of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them
before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of
their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to
1

vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
Page
 The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff
posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with
bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120
persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo
structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the
proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police
blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown
in their Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.

Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the
property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse
possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence
constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his
Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in
question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of
force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De
Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants'
claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities.

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006
at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p.
135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who
constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006
(Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena
Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143-
'144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property
of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors
away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.

From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but
it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by
the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to
their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the
Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the
premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered
as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006 6."

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then
presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting
of a bond. The writ7 - authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by
respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had
complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private
respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 20078.
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Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order10 a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review 11(under
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of
the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008. 12

It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains
and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance
of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to
the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the
disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition -
bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:

"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the
property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the
defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their
property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their
intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a
resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF
ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN
and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law
penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-
powered weapons.

[…]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the
private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police
authorities owing to their financial and political clout.

35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities
of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are
persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag,
Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T.
Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to
unjustly evict the defendants.13"

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private
respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or
an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be
originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision
was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed
orders.
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OUR RULING
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We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and
in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect
to content and substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify
the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with
the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition,
although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition.
The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed
orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest.
The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA
petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC
orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days 15 from receipt of the assailed
order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88
of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE
TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same
NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is
timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary
period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate
and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the
previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an
administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It
cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this
case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice
to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows.17

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA - G.R. SP No.
02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly
because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a
waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions
and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18

Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time represented
in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:

"x x x

(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy
of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO
VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject
of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)

(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not been
resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

x x x"

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with
significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of
4

their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the
Page

Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to
mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already
undertaken.

At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it
could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same
parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although
made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that
can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth
and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the
Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will
not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed
interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.

To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other
than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is
a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt." 20

Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7)
petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65;
all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal
identification cards with the Notary Public.

In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be
devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically
alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to
or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had
jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of
pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value
of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or
unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession
as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the
ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-
level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the
complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by
certiorari under the present petition.

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-
forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to
wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

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(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if
the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
 (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses
of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."22

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable
from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights
to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted,23that
are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:

"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession,
private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security
guards on 19 April 2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by
a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of
petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the
Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting
incident involving one of the security guards;

(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel
Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties.
If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of
past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie
Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand,
simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two
residential houses was "accidental."

As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected
all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-
6

blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and
Page

arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to
allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the
RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and
then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as
the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.

Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that
would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on
the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable,
the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect,
not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying
the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of
justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.

Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us,
that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed
orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper
remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of
forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based
on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of
law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ
of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The
writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or
when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate
actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of
amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure
for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported
acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security - the personalconcern that the writ is
intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or
on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files kept by the respondent.
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In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
 (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the
report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the
private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to
produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and
likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.
The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than
the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what
the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data is fully in order.

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO,Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and
Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 seeking to set aside the August 17, 20103 and September 6,
20104Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The
RTC had dismissed petitioner’s petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to
regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent
officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the
records follow:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III
(Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete
the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having
a second illegitimate son.5

On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City. 6Sun
and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered
Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment7 to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8 without knowing about the birth of his son.
Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had a son that she
gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the
revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the
baby.9 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate 10declaring Baby
8

Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February
Page

5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang
Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back together. 12

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum13 to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment
which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum
was noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA
testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines. 14

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter15 to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby
Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed
relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the child’s subsequent placement to
prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption
process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over
Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for
her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. 16

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking
to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia
C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.

In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD
utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as
basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal
authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and
parental authority over him.

On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding Judge, the Honorable
Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to
produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file their
verified written return to the writ pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the service of
the writ.

The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on August 2, 2010 praying that the petition be denied for
being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa biological parent’s custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the child, stating that threats
of kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the
hearing to August 5, 2010.

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as representative of the
State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC
acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the arguments
raised during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale
narrowed the issues to be discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations made by the counsels, the
court enjoined the parties to file their respective position papers on the following issues:

1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;

2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer in the petition; and
9

3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be given to his biological mother.
Page
The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on these three main
issues. They may include other related issues they deem essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for
further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.21

In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought before the court and
the petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of him.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby
Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the
Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is
extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors.23

On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24 arguing that since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of
the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits.25 The RTC,
however, deniedChristina’s motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the
wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.26

On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced
separation" between her and Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the
privilege of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son. 28

The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the
proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss
Christina’s argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power
to repeal, alter and modify existing laws29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions
of all adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by
the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and
Moon. She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s
representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother.
Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when
they deprived her of Baby Julian’s custody.30

The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,31 this Court held:

[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the
10

other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction
of a person by a government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
Page

acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned
or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-
Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced
disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as the
term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State ora political
organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.1âwphi1

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian
and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina
obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review
on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo
rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting
custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the
State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right
to avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus
each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with
the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social
norms set by the society in which he lives.
11

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

Page

The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their
habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material,
graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing
into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took
digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay
Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they
readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside
a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, 4but were, in fact, viewable
by any Facebook user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto
Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation,
STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student
Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages,
language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to
the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed
that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference,
including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed
their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises
scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7In it,
Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On
March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the
photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the
students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
12
Page
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation
rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance
ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed
into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard
the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has
been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors
were called "immoral" and were punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their
memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay
of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas
databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been
illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of
habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together
with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following
grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are
engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be
no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the
Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to
13

privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
Page

way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas
Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual
milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information,
and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. 12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not
prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users,
sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing
the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
14

disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Page
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 17 As such, it
is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to
the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of
a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of
the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in
something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that
the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the
nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent
the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e.,
private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the
effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of
technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part
therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to
Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21(2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. 23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each
15

system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said
flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of
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privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that
given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. 25 In the same
vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013,
recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else
it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing
times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the
Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in
OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational
privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members
of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending
on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls,"
the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post
anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one,
some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the
way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com
(Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover
what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend request,"
the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of
the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
"Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and
shares certain information to the latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy
tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v.
W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so
with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information,
these privacy settings are not foolproof."33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility
of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
16

words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
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confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the
opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information.
Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular
post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook
would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many
OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto.35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his or
her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case
the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of
the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile
detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. 38Otherwise,
using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a
chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the
photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it
would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her
private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether the
disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the
images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded
upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them,
this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited
since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of
them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls cladin
brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their
friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of
these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there
the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not
confined to their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the
students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of
them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
17

means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, 43 and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
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the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of
the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself. 45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent
to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the
cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones
of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and
share in any conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends
with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can
no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s
Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting).
As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and
socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been
said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51Thus, it is
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be
said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort
to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs.
In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case
No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to
petitioners’ assertion.
18

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students
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scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in
a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed
the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they
have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only"
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom"
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the
part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a
cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. 55 It is in this regard that
many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part
of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since
they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to
educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and
organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective
programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers
that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged
by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings
and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student
Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware
that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it
permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more
importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the
confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they
desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
19

Razon vs. Tagitis

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
Page

LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R.
GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners vs MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by
ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182498; December 3, 2009

BRION, J.:

FACTS: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB
scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the
following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked
for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for
Tagitis’ return.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later,
or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to
as “petitioners”), with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and
set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an “enforced
disappearance” under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be
involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended
the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts
to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA.
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano
and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution
dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts is indispensable in an amparo
petition?

2. Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for
the court to grant the privilege of the writ?

3. Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced
disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ?

RESOLUTION:

1. NO.
However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5 (c) to
be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details.

In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding,
which addresses a situation of uncertainty. The petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim
exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
20

because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this
type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioner apparently want to read into the
Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights, liberty and
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security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances,
while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component
parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual
or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.

2. YES.
The petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition,
and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then
respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case must show that an
enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity shall not be controlling.

3. NO.

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance. The concept of “enforced disappearance” is neither defined nor penalized in
this jurisdiction.

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts.

Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.

DOCTRINEs: The characteristics of Amparo proceedings, namely of (1) being summary, and (2) the use of substantial
evidence as required level of proof), reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of
an administrative proceeding in addressing Amparo situations.

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.

The concept of “enforced disappearance” is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.
Roxas vs. GMA

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR
OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT
TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT,
PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN,
AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189155; September 7, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of
which she is a member. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions rested in the house of
Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in
civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she
21

was informed that she is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from where she
could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle. She was
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interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was
informed by a person named “RC” that those who tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she
was abducted because her name is included in the “Order of Battle.”

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. Before being
released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper containing an email
address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes. Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family. Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular
phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family,
petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card. Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials
of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who were
behind her abduction and torture. The Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person
acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. The
appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was
behind her abduction. Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the
abduction and torture of petitioner. The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit. Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of
her personal belongings were denied. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the
same fate.

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition?
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground
for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo?
3. Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ

HELD:
1. No, command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate – if not incorrect.
Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a
protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal
or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case,
commanders may be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of
their responsibility, or at least accountability.

2. No, in amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military
involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably
offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators

3. Yes, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of such right. Hence,
until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas,
any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes
farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the
writ of habeas data

Burgos vs. Esperon

22

The directive for the submission of the above-mentioned documents arose from our determination in our June 22, 2010
Page

Resolution that the PNP-CIDG failed to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five
abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with eyewitnesses to the abduction. For this reason, the Court directly
commissioned the CHR to continue the investigation of Jonas’ abduction and the gathering of evidence.

Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a lead – a claim made by Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union
Masses for Democracy and Justice, that the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch was among
the raiders who abducted him and four others, known as the "ERAP FIVE."

This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents embodied in par. III(i) of the fallo of the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution from General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP. Gen. Roa initially
denied this request but eventually complied with the Court’s directive of July 5, 2011 to submit the documents via the
September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion and the June 7, 2013 Compliance. In the same July 5, 2011 Resolution,
the Court made it plain that these documents shall be released exclusively to the Court for its examination to determine
their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.

Pursuant to the Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR submitted its March 20, 2012 Progress Report on its
continuing investigation of Jonas’ abduction. Attached to this Progress Report was Virgilio Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit
stating that: (1) he was one of the victims of the abduction incident on May 22, 2006, otherwise known as the "ERAP
FIVE" incident; (2) as a result of this incident, they filed a case with the Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo
Calderon and other members of the Intelligence Service, AFP (ISAFP) for arbitrary detention, unlawful arrest,
maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats, incriminatory machination and robbery; and (3) the male abductor of Jonas
appearing in the cartographic sketch shown to him by the CHR was among the raiders who abducted him and his four
companions because it resembled the cartographic sketch he described in relation to the ERAP FIVE incident on May
22, 2006.

After reviewing the submissions of both the respondents20 and the CHR21 pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011, August
23, 2011 and October 11, 2011 Resolutions, we resolve to grant the CHR access to these requested documents to
allow them the opportunity to ascertain the true identities of the persons depicted in the cartographic sketches.

At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that attests to the resemblance of one of Jonas’
abductors to the abductors of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes the sought-after missing link that establishes the relevance of
the requested documents to the present case. We note that this lead may help the CHR ascertain the identities of those
depicted in the cartographic sketches as two of Jonas’ abductors (one male and one female) who, to this day, remain
unidentified.

In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested documents, we direct the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court to allow the duly-authorized representatives of the CHR to inspect the requested documents in camera within five
(5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

The documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas, without
copying and without bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court. The inspection of the documents shall be within office hours and for a reasonable period of time sufficient to
allow the CHR to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Eustaquio.

To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, further investigation using the standard of extraordinary
diligence should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue the lead provided by Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of the
ongoing investigation being conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the NBI, on the disappearance of
Jonas.22 In this regard, we direct the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the CHR as the
latter may require, pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.

For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental investigation report to the DOJ, copy furnished the
petitioner, the NBI, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents within sixty
days (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.

B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela

After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the developments of the
case, including the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the
23

present case, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
Page

We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo
has been served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely embodies the Court’s
directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an
individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it directs.24The focus is on procedural
curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The
unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to
achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms "responsibility" and "accountability" signify in an Amparo
case. We said:

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.26

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court outlined above
and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt.
Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found
probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’
disappearance.27

We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already ruled with finality on the entities responsible and
accountable (as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced disappearance of Jonas. In its March
18, 2013 decision, the CA found, by substantial evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis of
Cabintoy’s positive identification that he was one of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to interfere because the
latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the same Decision, the CA also held the AFP and the PNP accountable
for having failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance of
Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following directives to address the enforced disappearance of Jonas:

(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG, to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas
Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those
involved in the ERAP 5 incident;

(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the
Philippines National Police, and their successors, to ensure the continuance of their investigation and
coordination on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought
before the bar of justice;

(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent investigation on the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence required under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo;

(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to extend full assistance to
the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s investigation; and

(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine National Police
and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights to submit a quarterly report to the Court on the results of
their respective investigation.28

We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA decision and the May 23, 2013 CA resolution
denying their motion for partial reconsideration.

Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve
to deny the petitioner’s prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly
discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of
24

the case by the CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the
DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing
Page

investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to
address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy
that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the
investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of
enforced disappearance.

We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby rule on the admissibility or the merits of the newly
discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any investigation by the proper
investigative and prosecutory agencies of the other entities whose identities and participation in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings. Considering that the present case
has already reached the prosecution stage, the petitioner’s motion should have been filed with the proper investigative
and prosecutory agencies of the government.

To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this Resolution and its covered cases to the DOJ for
investigation, for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the proper parties, if
warranted, based on the gathered evidence. For this purpose, we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI
copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within
five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the DOJ, through the NBI, of the disappearance of
Jonas. This DOJ investigation is without prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction
over the investigation of the criminal aspect of this case should the case be determined to be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.29

As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present proceedings shall continue to be undertaken by the
CHR, in close coordination with the NBI, for the completion of the investigation under the terms of our June 22, 2010
Resolution and the additional directives under the present Resolution.

As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.1âwphi1

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with the CA’s final
determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the
commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings
are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.

Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies envisioned by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo has been served and exhausted.

G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER

vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU,
DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A.
AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES
DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order2 dated September 16,
2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The
assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with
25

Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.

Page

Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus
Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus,
damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained
the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted
by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-
ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is
a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to
flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement,
ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the
required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a
small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential
Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do
anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076
or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local
Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents
to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment
protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4)
award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.7

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental
court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution 10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside
from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court
decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of
the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.12

Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues

The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The
other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision
that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government
or appropriate agency.

Ruling of the Court

Jurisdiction and Venue

In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on
SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and
Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide
violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions." 14 Thus, it ruled that its
territorial jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol,
Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as
such authority rests before another co-equal court."15

Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008
and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.

None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and
decide a case, is conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the
person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
26

is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction –
Page
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)

A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court
authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders
and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have
the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. 18 It
also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly
states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Matas20 that –

Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial
Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial
courts or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely
defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21

The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord
convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the
courts.22Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is patently incorrect.

At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil
action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission
occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin. 24 But even
then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived. 25 Moreover, the
action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-
Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the RTC should have done under the
circumstances was to transfer the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher
interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and
speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.

At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different
"green courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of environmental
cases. While the designation and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court
decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.

The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a
distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are
covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition
outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it
outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law
and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31
27

Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
Page
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied,
and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.1âwphi1

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of
the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand,
necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or
omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or
instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another
from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer
is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.32

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently
based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of
the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree
that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree
shall subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
"permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court’s decision."35

The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of
Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.

Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes.36 But the petition filed below
does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the
small-scale mining operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation
and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of
these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of
these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an
exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals
Corporation,37 the Court stated –

Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some
provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge
28

and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract
Page

cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.38(Emphasis supplied in the former and
ours in the latter)

Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As
previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of
judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses
that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be
attached to the petition/complaint.39

Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be
dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It
should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need
to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard."40

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18,
2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED
AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to
the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also
ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy of the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of
this Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.

G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,

vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas
data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and
calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON
ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the
matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.2

By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing,
29

directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July
18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from
Page

unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of
MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice
her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of
due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of
the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on
the alleged threats to her security in this wise:

xxxx

I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and
threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from
unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be
[sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my
transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the
real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me
think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive
one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she
raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.

By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to
provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning
threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by
habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return
containing the following:

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by
petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its
collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from
effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And
by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a
petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7

By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to
30

victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and
security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her
person.
Page
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative
as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters
expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that
"although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her
place of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-
employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.

Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum transferring
respondent’s place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly
prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against
public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not
engaged in such activities.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to
the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not
fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or informationregarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its
intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.13

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and habeas
data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate
concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her
right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes
if they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
31

management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Page
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in
SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).

The Facts

In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr.
Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s
condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital
camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video
(subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video
and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s
head against a wall inside his office and walked away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing
various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise
known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same
to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty,
security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is
warranted.9

Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee
to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the
subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt
thereof.

In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of the digital camera
and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she
filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under
disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his
camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases
she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and
accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from
further reproducing the same.14

The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other
people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and
mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases
she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only
ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other tribunals. 15

Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

32

The Issue Before the Court

Page

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
 The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals,17 which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself.”18

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show
that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 20 In this relation, it bears
pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security
was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video.
While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way
to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such
interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of
possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving
the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas datacases, so
much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the
inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas
Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards
the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her
testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in
the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations
as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and
dismiss the habeas data petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of
the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Arigo vs. Swift 735 SCRA 102
G.R. No. 206510; September 16, 2014 En Banc

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

FACTS: In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine
habitat of which entry and certain human activities are prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine law. The
grounding incident prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.

Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy. As petitioners
argued, they were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from suit between US and PH pursuant to the
VFA terms.
33

Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian violated their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology since these events caused and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from
Page
damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of kalikasan is proper?

RULING: No.

The application and non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of the petition for a
writ of Kalikasan, in the same vein, damages cannot be granted which have resulted from a violation of environmental
laws, the rules allows the recovery of damages, collection of administrative fines in a separate civil suits or charging the
same violation of an environmental law.

As asserted by the respondents (Philippines Officials) that the petition has become moot in the sense that the
salvage operation sought to be enjoined (under rule 7) or restrained had already been accomplished when
petitioners sought recourse from the court, still the respondents is entitled to the relief sought as far as the
directives of the respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structures and marine habitat adversely
affected by the grounding incidents, however the the US and Philippine government both express readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by USS guardian, and the US
government is closely coordinating to assessed the extent of damage and appropriate methods of
rehabilitation, more so, exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the rules.

xxx

The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to
promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.36 The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper
considering that it is the VF A which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters
in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions
such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the
Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:

SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude
the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.

In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions
of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.37

Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:

SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance
of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
34

(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
Page

rehabilitate or restore the environment;

 (c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;

(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the
salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse
from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture
and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the
fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely
coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of
rehabilitation.

Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the
following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute
resolution methods are encouraged by the court

Paje vs. Casino

Petition for Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan
vis-à-vis Special Civil Action for Certiorari

Anent Justice Leonen’s argument that there are other “remedies that can contribute to the protection of communities
and their environment” other than Rule 7 of RPEC, doubtless referring to a Rule 65 petition, allow me to state in
disagreement that there are instances when the act or omission of a public official or employee complained of will
ultimately result in the infringement of the basic right to a healthful and balanced ecology. And said unlawful act or
omission would invariably constitute grave abuse of discretion which, ordinarily, could be addressed by the corrective
hand of certiorari under Rule 65. In those cases, a petition for writ of kalikasan would still be the superior remedy as in
the present controversy, crafted as it were precisely to address and meet head-on such situations. Put a bit differently,
in proceedings involving enforcement or violation of environmental laws, where arbitrariness or caprice is ascribed to a
public official, the sharper weapon to correct the wrong would be a suit for the issuance of the kalikasanwrit.

Prior to the effectivity of the RPEC which, inter alia, introduced the writ of kalikasan, this Court entertained cases
involving attacks on ECCs via a Rule 65 petition5 which exacts the exhaustion of administrative remedies as condition
sine qua non before redress from the courts may be had.

Following the ordinary rules eventually led to several procedural difficulties in the litigation of environmental cases, as
experienced by practitioners, concerned government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental
organizations, corporations, and public-interest groups,6 more particularly with respect to locus standi, fees and
preconditions. These difficulties signalled the pressing need to make accessible a more simple and expeditious relief to
parties seeking the protection not only of their right to life but also the protection of the country’s remaining and rapidly
deteriorating natural resources from further destruction. Hence, the RPEC.With its formulation, the Court sought to
address procedural concerns peculiar to environmental cases,7 taking into consideration the imperative of prompt relief
or protection where the impending damage to the environment is of a grave and serious degree. Thus, the birth of the
writ of kalikasan, an extraordinary remedy especially engineered to deal with environmental damages, or threats
thereof, that transcend political and territorial boundaries.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The advent of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC to be sure brought about significant changes in the procedural rules that apply to
environmental cases. The differences on eight (8) areas between a Rule 65 certiorari petition and Rule 7
kalikasan petition may be stated as follows:

1. Subject matter. Since its subject matter is any “unlawful act or omission,” a Rule 7 kalikasan petition is broad
enough to correct any act taken without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
35

or excess of jurisdiction which is the subject matter of a Rule 65 certiorari petition. Any form of abuse of discretion as
long as it constitutes an unlawful act or omission involving the environment can be subject of a Rule
Page

7 kalikasan petition. A Rule 65 petition, on the other hand, requires the abuse of discretion to be “grave.” Ergo, a
subject matter which ordinarily cannot properly be subject of a certiorari petition can be the subject of a
kalikasanpetition.

2. Who may file. Rule 7 has liberalized the rule on locus standi, such thatavailment of the writ of kalikasan is open to a
broad range of suitors, to include even an entity authorized by law, people’s organization, or any public interest group
accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated or threatened to be violated. Rule 65 allows only the aggrieved person to be the petitioner.

3. Respondent. The respondent in a Rule 65 petition is only the government or its officers, unlike in a kalikasan petition
where the respondent may be a private individual or entity.

4. Exemption from docket fees. The kalikasan petition is exempt from docket fees, unlike in a Rule 65 petition. Rule 7
of RPEC has pared down the usually burdensome litigation expenses.

5. Venue. The certiorari petition can be filed with (a) the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the act was
committed; (b) the Court of Appeals; and (c) the Supreme Court. Given the magnitude of the damage,
the kalikasan petition can be filed directly with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The direct filing of a
kalikasan petition will prune case delay.

6. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. This doctrine generally applies to a certiorari petition, unlike in
a kalikasan petition.

7. Period to file. An aggrieved party has 60 days from notice of judgment or denial of a motion for reconsideration to
file a certiorari petition, while a kalikasan petition isnot subject to such limiting time lines.

8. Discovery measures. In a certiorari petition, discovery measures are not available unlike in a kalikasan petition.
Resort to these measures will abbreviate proceedings.

It is clear as day that a kalikasan petition provides more ample advantages to a suitor than a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari.

Taking into consideration the provisions of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Rule 7 of the RPEC, it should be at
onceapparent that in petitions like the instant petition involving unlawful act or omissioncausing environmental damage
of such a magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces, Rule 7
of the RPEC is the applicable remedy. Thus, the vital, pivotal averment is the illegal act or omission involving
environmental damage of such a dimension that will prejudice a huge number of inhabitants in at least 2 or more cities
and provinces. Without such assertion, then the proper recourse would be a petition under Rule 65, assuming the
presence of the essential requirements for a resort to certiorari. It is, therefore, possible that subject matter of a suit
which ordinarily would fall under Rule 65 is subsumed by the Rule 7 on kalikasan as long as such qualifying averment
of environmental damage is present. I can say without fear of contradiction that a petition for a writ of kalikasan is a
special version of a Rule 65 petition, but restricted in scope but providing a more expeditious, simplified and
inexpensive remedy to the parties.

The Court must not take a myopic view of the case, but must bear in mind that what is on the table is a case which
seeks to avert the occurrence of a disaster whichpossibly could result in a massive environmental damage and
widespread harm to the health of the residents of an area. This is not a simple case of grave abuse of discretion by a
government official which does not pose an environmental threat with serious and far-reaching implications and could
be adequately and timely resolved using ordinary rules of procedure. To reiterate, the Rules on petitions for writ
of kalikasan were specifically crafted for the stated purpose of expediting proceedings where immediacy of action is
called for owing to the gravity and irreparability of the threatened damage. And this is precisely what is being avoided in
the instant case.

Additionally, it must be emphasized that the initial determination of whether a case properly falls under a writ of
kalikasan petition differs from the question of whether the parties were able to substantiate their claim of a possible
adverse effect of the activity to the environment. The former requires only a perfunctoryreview of the allegations in the
petition, without passing on the evidence, while the latter calls for the evaluation and weighing of the parties’ respective
evidence. And it is in the latter instance that Casiño, et al. miserably fell short. By not presenting even a single expert
witness, they were unable to discharge their duty of proving to the Court that the completion and operation of the power
plant would bring about the alleged adverse effects to the health of the residents of Bataan and Zambales and would
cause serious pollution and environmental degradation thereof. Hence, the denial of their petition.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Angelo Reyes et Al.
36

GR No. 180771; 2015-04-21

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FACTS: On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical
Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait. The studies included surface geology,... sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract into
Service contract for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.

JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be
drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected
seascape in 1988,[10] JAPEX... agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes.
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board[12] of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued
Resolution No. 2007-001,[13] wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX,
and... favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.

It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners (collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals"
in who are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around
the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and
as friends who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Petitioner
applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing Service contract for Protesting the adverse ecological
impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent.
They claim... that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the
activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the
destruction of the "payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS (Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards) HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO
FILE THE INSTANT PETITION

Contention of the Petitioner:

The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since
they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit, citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. they also assert their right
to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their
benefit.

Contention of the Oppositor:

Public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural
persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.

HELD: Yes.

Under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to
file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.

To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file
their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and...
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
37

generations yet... unborn.

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Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken
a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in
the name of generations yet... unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a
right that does not even need to be... stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
worth noting here that the Stewards are... joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are... therefore declared to possess
the legal standing to file this petition.

Xxx

Procedural Issues

Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards

The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since
they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their
right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for
their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted
to them in multilateral international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui.42

For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine
Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected
residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in
its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.43

Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark in locus
standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.44

In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical
persons, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-
claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the
defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural
persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.45

As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground that they
are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents argue that the
Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the
decision in this case.46

Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent any proof that former President
Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own.47

The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' petition was not
brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.48
38

The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions before courts of
law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
cited the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton,49wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting
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to the conventional thought on legal standing, opined:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public
outrage, x x x.

Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime
purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on
its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents
proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.

So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for
example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher,
deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or
its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful
relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for
the values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing
is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court
demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates
the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a
representative, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions

Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-
claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the
defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to
be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons
should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real
parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many
environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or
affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a
more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far
as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of
procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.

Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen
suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental
laws:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen
suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed
for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice
39

thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all
affected barangays copies of said order.
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Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.52 (Emphasis
ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
commented:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental
rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental
laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to
minors and generations yet unborn.53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."54

Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission55 held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent, x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken
a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in
the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."56Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.57

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner

Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacañang Palace, Manila
Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is
personally impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and undertaking
under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime
dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and
due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her official relations with public respondents
under the alter ego principle in political law.58cralawlawlibrary
This is incorrect.

Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may
be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she
may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which
can properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a
petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
40

Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their
petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-
Page

petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against
embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention."59

Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her
name is stricken off the title of this case.chanRoblesvirtualLawli

Xxx

Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources in
the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production
should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law
passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.106Since there is no such law specifically allowing
oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be
done in said protected seascape.

In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in these
consolidated petitions.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No.
1586.

West Tower Condominium vs. Phil. Ind, Corp. (on precautionary principle)

Facts:

Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan filed following the leak in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine
Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati City.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety allowance against
leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than twice the current
operating pressure and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5... meters, which is deeper than the US Department of
Transportation standard of 0.9 meters.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the
drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the
condo’s power was shut down.

Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of WestTower shouldered the
expenses of hauling the waste water from its basement, which eventually required the setting up of a treatment plant in
the area to separate fuel from the waste... water.

FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL,... West Tower Condominium Corporation (West
Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West
Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati

City... prayed... that respondents FPIC and its board of directors and officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its
board of directors and officers be directed to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in
the performance of... their functions as a common carrier; (2) continue to check the structural integrity of the whole 117-
kilometer pipeline and to replace the same; (3) make periodic reports on their findings with regard to the 117-kilometer
41

pipeline and their replacement of the same; (4)... rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal
and West Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak became manifest; and (5) to open a special trust
fund to answer for similar and future contingencies in the future. Furthermore, petitioners... pray that respondents be
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prohibited from opening the pipeline and allowing the use thereof until the same has been thoroughly checked and
replaced, and be temporarily restrained from operating the pipeline until the final resolution of the case.

Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents
FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns. The TEPO... enjoined
FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of
the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward
incident that may result from any... leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt
thereof.
FPIC directors

They alleged... that: petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation that the
environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces; and the continued operation of the
pipeline should be allowed in the interest of maintaining... adequate petroleum supply to the public.

Verified Return... claiming that not all requirements for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan are present and there is no
showing that
West Tower Corp. was authorized by all those it claimed to represent.
Issues:

Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether the other
petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to perform or to
desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies; and

Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the environmental
protection order.
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[

He also contends that the majority ordered the repetition of the procedures and tests already conducted on the WOPL
because of the fear and uncertainty on its safeness despite the finding of the DOE in favor of its reopening, taking into
consideration the occurrence of numerous pipeline incidents worldwide. The dissent argues that the precautionary
principle should not be so strictly applied as to unjustifiably deprive the public of the benefits of the activity to be
inhibited, and to unduly create other risks.

The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and academic, that the writ of kalikasan has already served its
function, and that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO may do more harm than good are anchored on the mistaken
premise that the precautionary principle was applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and the FPIC for the
conduct of the various tests anew. The following reasons easily debunk these arguments:

1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case;

2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL's structural integrity and in fact imposes
several conditions for FPIC's compliance;

3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned agencies, proposed the activities to be
conducted preparatory to the reopening of the pipeline; and

4 . There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's structural integrity.

Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary
Principle, provides that "[ w ]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human
activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."
42
Page
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the application
of said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary principle in deciding the issue
on the WOPL's structural integrity.

The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to be
inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty. Here,
however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the
WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials
into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other organisms. As a
matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected
areas is not even questioned by FPIC.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL's compliance with pipeline structure
standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence
presented by the parties on the WOPL's actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and
recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL' s present structure, and not the cited pipeline
incidents as the dissent propounds.

Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of the
operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and timetable, is a
clear and unequivocal message coming from the DOE that the WOPL's soundness for resumption of and continued
commercial operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the
pipeline's actual physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a short-form integrity audit,56that
the factual issue on the WOPL's viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline's structural integrity has
not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court's resolution. Consequently, We cannot say that the
DOE's issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

The dissent is correct in emphasizing that We defer to the findings of fact of administrative agencies considering their
specialized knowledge in their field. And We, as a matter of fact, acceded to the DOE' s conclusions on the necessity of
the conduct of the various activities and tests enumerated in Sec. Petilla's letter to this Court dated August 5, 2014.
Hence, Our directive for the DOE to immediately commence the activities enumerated in said Letter, to determine the
pipeline's reliability, and to order its reopening should the DOE find that such is proper.

The dissent also loses sight of the fact that the petition not only seeks the checking of the WOPL's structural integrity,
but also prays for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the leak, the creation of a special trust fund, the imposition
of liability upon the directors of FPIC, among others. These issues, undoubtedly, are matters that are not addressed by
the DOE certification alone. Furthermore, these are issues that no longer relate to the WOPL' s structure but to its
maintenance and operations, as well as to the residues of the incident. It will, thus, be improper for Us to simply dismiss
the petition on the basis solely of the alleged resolution of only one of several issues, which purportedly renders the
issue on the WOPL' s soundness moot, without disposing of the other issues presented.

Lastly, any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline is
commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive check on its structural integrity
when experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline. Even the DOE, the agency tasked to
oversee the supply and distribution of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this and even recommended the
checking of the patched portions of the pipeline, among others. In this regard, the Court deems it best to take the
necessary safeguards, which are not similar to applying the precautionary principle as previously explained, in order to
prevent a similar incident from happening in the future.

III.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund

Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the
environment. Said proviso pertinently provides:

SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other
43

litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose
Page

subject to the control of the court. (emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of
damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

xxxx

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a
trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably
already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but
a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of
the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on petitioners' prayer for
the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages
is found warranted.

WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 194239 June 16, 2015 Velasco, Jr., J

FACTS

The respondent FPIC owns and operates two piplelines namely: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, 117
kilometers running from Batangas to Pandacan Terminal which transports diesel, gasoline, kerosene and jet fuel; (2)
Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System, 105 kilometer running from Batangas to Sucat Paranaque, transporting bunker fuel.
Both pipelines transport 60% of the petroleum requirement of Manila, Rizal, Laguna and Bulacan. Both pipelines were
designed more than the standard requirements against leakage, which are buried 1.5 meters more that the US
Standards of 0.9 meters.

In May 2010, it was discovered that a leak happened from the WOPL (FPIC initially denied this) in Basement 2 of the
West Tower Condominium (West Tower) which started in a two drums per day to 15-20 drums per day. Unable to
control the leak, West Tower reported the same to the Makati Police District which in turn called the Bureau of Fire
Protection. It was in October 28, 2010 when the UP National Institute of Geological Science which revealed that the
leak came from WOPL which is 86 meters from West Tower. WOPL was closed on October 24, 2010.

On November 15, 2010, West Tower interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of
the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of
the environmental issues involved. In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board of directors
and officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board of directors and officers be directed to: (1) permanently
cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in the performance of their functions as a common
carrier; (2) continue to check the structural integrity of the whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the
same; (3) make periodic reports on their findings with regard to the 117-kilometer pipeline and their
replacement of the same; (4) rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal and West
Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak became manifest; and (5) to open a special trust fund
to answer for similar and future contingencies in the future. Furthermore, petitioners pray that respondents be
prohibited from opening the pipeline and allowing the use thereof until the same has been thoroughly checked and
replaced, and be temporarily restrained from operating the pipeline until the final resolution of the case.

On 19 November 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO. FPIC director in their return alleged (1) the
petitioners has no legal capacity to institute the action; (2) there are no allegation that environmental damage was
caused to two or more cities or provinces; (3) continued operation of the pipeline should be allowed to maintain
44

adequate supply of petroleum; (4) petition contains no allegation that respondents FPIC directors and officers acted in
such a manner as to allow the piercing of the corporate veil. FGC directors on the other hand filed a return that they do
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not operate said pipeline and that as far as they are concerned, they prayed that the writ and TEPO be declared
performed as far as they are concerned.

On 21 June 2011, FPIC reported to the Court their actions to address the structural integrity and the preventive
maintenance measures undertaken. It was also indicated in their report that it was the Department of Energy who
conducted the test of structural integrity which engaged the services of UP-NIGS. Coordination with the DPWH and
MMDA was done with regard to the preventive maintenance measures.

Since the issuance of the writ and TEPO, FPIC ceased operation of both pipelines. On 31 May 2011 upon the
clarification from the DOE the Court answered that only WOPL is covered by the writ/TEPO. This was assailed by the
petitioners in its Omnibus Motion and prayed for oral arguments on the opening of the BOPL. The petitioners in their
Manifestation invoked the precautionary principle and asserted that the possibility of a leak in the BOPL System
leading to catastrophic environmental damage is enough reason to order the closure of its operation. They
likewise alleged that the entities contracted by FPIC to clean and remediate the environment are illegally discharging
waste water, which had not undergone proper treatment, into the Parañaque River. Petitioners, thus, prayed that
respondents be directed to comply with environmental laws in rehabilitating the surroundings affected by the oil leak
and to submit a copy of their work plan and monthly reports on the progress thereof. To these omnibus motions,
respondents were directed to file their respective comments.

On September 28 , 2011 , respondent FPIC filed an Urgent Motion for Leave ( To Undertake "Bangkal Realignment"
Project) 13 in order to reduce stress on the WOPL System. FPIC sought to construct a new realigned segment to
replace the old pipe segment under the Magallanes Interchange, which covers the portion that leaked. Petitioners were
directed to file their comment on FPIC's motion.

To expedite resolution of the case, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CA
1. FPIC to submit appropriate certification from the DOE on the safe commercial operation of BOPL, otherwise its
operation must be enjoined.
2. Denied its motion re: Bangkal Realignment Project
3. CA found that the existence of another possible leak alleged by petitioners was not established. Nonetheless,
to prevent such event, the CA ordered FPIC to: (i) review, adopt and strictly observe appropriate safety and
precautionary measures; (ii) closely monitor the conduct of its maintenance and repair works; and (iii) submit to
the DOE regular monthly reports on the structural integrity and safe commercial operation of the pipeline.
4. As to the merits of the case:
a. People’s organization, NGO and public interest groups who indicated their intention and submitted proof of
juridical personality be allowed to be impleaded as petitioners.
b. FPIC to submit certification from DOE on WOPL’s safe commercial operation.
c. Denied creation of special trust fund.
d. First Gen not liable under the TEPO.

On 30 July 2013, the Court adopted the CA Recommendations and the the WOPL may resume operation after securing
a certification from the DOE that it is safe for commercial operations.

In compliance with the Court's July 30, 2013 Resolution, the DOE Secretary issued on October 25, 2013 a Certification,
27 attesting that the WOPL is safe to resume commercial operations, subject to monitoring or inspection requirements,
and imposing several conditions that FPIC must comply with.

ISSUES
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether the
other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in- interest;
2. Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL's
Commercial Viability
3. Propriety of a special trust fund.
4. Liability of FPIC, FirstGen and their respective boards.

HELD:
1. Yes
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
45

parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the
right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
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the name of the real party-in-interest. In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL
affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the
wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit
owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that
the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest. There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp.
represents the common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the
instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium
corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the
condominium unit owners or users.

The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule
clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.—Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines,
Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc.-San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and
the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their
intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution. This is so considering that the filing of
a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical
persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation. Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the
submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted
on the WOPL.

2.

After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the activities
and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the
resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of
the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate
reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the
other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition
is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.

Lastly, any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline is
commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive check on its structural integrity
when experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline. Even the DOE, the agency tasked to
oversee the supply and distribution of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this and even recommended the
checking of the patched portions of the pipeline, among others. In this regard, the Court deems it best to take the
necessary safeguards, which are not similar to applying the precautionary principle as previously explained, in order to
prevent a similar incident from happening in the future.

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary
Principle, provides that “[w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human
activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.”
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the application
of said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary principle in deciding the issue
on the WOPL’s structural integrity. The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the
human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with
full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the
presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the
spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or
that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to
the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.

3. No
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a
trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the
46

Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably
already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but
a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of
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the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for
the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages
is found warranted.

4. No ruling.
he Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are
not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of
kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15 (e) of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by
petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of
respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire
environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal,
Makati City.

DISSENTING: Leonen
The Writ of Kalikasan has served its functions and, therefore, is functus officio. The leaks have been found and
remedied. The various administrative agencies have identified the next steps that should ensure a viable level of risk
that is sufficiently precautionary. In other words, they have shown that they know what to do to prevent future leaks.
The rest should be left for them to execute.

RAMON JESUS P. PAJE v. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, GR No. 207257, 2015-02-03

Facts:

In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized and established under
Republic Act No. (RA) 7227,[4] and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) expressing their... intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and
affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).

On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired
power plant. In the said MOU, TCC identified 20 hectares of land at Sitio Naglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport
Zone (SBFZ) as... the suitable area for the project and another site of approximately 10 hectares to be used as an ash
pond.[7] TCC intends to lease the property from SBMA for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at $3.50 per square meter,
payable in 10 equal 5-year... installments.

On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-
ECC-69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the
construction, installation, and... operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power
Plant at Sitio Naglatore.

On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula
Energy, Inc. (RP Energy), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with the primary
purpose of building,... owning, and operating power plants in the Philippines, among others. Accordingly, an Addendum
to the said MOU was executed by SBMA and RP Energy.

On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) over a 380,004.456-
square meter parcel of land to be used for building and operating the coal-fired power plant.

On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first amendment) allowing the inclusion of additional
components, among others.

Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC. Instead of constructing a 2x150-
MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now sought to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant. In...
support of its request, RP Energy submitted a Project Description Report (PDR) to the DENR-EMB.

On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC (second amendment).

On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the
establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales.
47

On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing
its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.
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On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. Emerenciana A.
De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rolen C. Paulino, Hon. Eduardo Piano, Hon. James de los Reyes, Hon.
Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. Sarah Lugerna

Lipumano-Garcia, Noraida Velarmino, Bianca Christine Gamboa Espinos, Charo Simons, Gregorio Llorca Magdaraog,
Rubelh Peralta, Alex Corpus Hermoso, Rodolfo Sambajon, Rev. Fr. Gerardo Gregorio P. Jorge, Carlito A. Baloy, Ofelia
D. Pablo, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline

Q. Rodriguez, and John Carlo delos Reyes (Casiño Group) filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against
RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR.[

On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1) issue a Writ of kalikasan; and (2) refer the case to the CA
for hearing and reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.[

On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of kalikasan was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015 and raffled to the
Fifteenth Division of the CA. In the Petition, the Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would
cause... grave environmental damage; that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of
Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo; that the ECC was issued and the LDA entered into...
without the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code (LGC); that the LDA was entered into without securing a prior certification from the National
Commission on Indigenous

Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law);
that Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs is ultra
vires because the

DENR has no authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the absence of a new
EIS;[36] and that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, all amendments to RP Energy's ECC are null and
void.

On October 29, 2012, the CA conducted a preliminary conference wherein the parties, with their respective counsels,
appeared except for Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. Emerencia A. De Jesus, Clemente G.
Bautista, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline Q.

Issue:

WoN the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause
environmental damage

1. Yes. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the
construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated
under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the subject
project will not cause grave environmental damage, through its Environmental Management Plan, which will
ensure that the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standards;
WoN the ECC is invalid for lack of signature of Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr. Aboitiz), as representative of RP Energy, in
the Statement of Accountability of the ECC

2. No. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz in
the ECC’s Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate
court. While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular circumstances of this case
show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for
them to present controverting evidence and arguments on this point, as the issue only arose during the course
of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be
faulted for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had been invalidated
on the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision of the appellate court. The certified true
copy of the ECC, bearing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability portion, was issued by
the DENR-EMB, and remains uncontroverted. It showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed by
Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008. Because the signing was done after the official release of the ECC on
48

December 22, 2008, wenote that the DENR did not strictly follow its rules, which require that the signing of the
Statement of Accountability should be done before the official release of the ECC. However, considering that
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the issue was not adequately argued norwas evidence presented before the appellate court on the
 circumstances at the time of signing, there is insufficient basis to conclude that the procedure adoptedby the
DENR was tainted with bad faith or inexcusable negligence. We remind the DENR, however, to be more
circumspect in following its rules. Thus, we rule that the signature requirement was substantially complied with
pro hac vice.

WoN the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for failure to undergo a new environmental impact
assessment (EIA) because of the utilization of inappropriate EIA documents.

3. No. The appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC were invalid for
failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. It failed to properly
consider the applicable provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual for amendment to ECCs. Our own
examination of the provisions on amendments to ECCs in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, as wellas
the EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an
EPRMP and a PDR for the first and second amendments, respectively. Through these documents, which the
DENR reviewed, a new EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence, absent
sufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality, relative to both the procedure and
substance of the amendment process, we uphold the validity of these amendments;

WoN the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a precondition to the issuance of an
ECC and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the ECC invalid

4. No. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC for failure to comply with Section 59 of the IPRA
Law. The ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its
implementing rules. Hence, there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59 before an ECC may be
issued, and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid certification does not render it
invalid;

WoN the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a precondition to the consummation
of the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) between SBMA and RP Energy and the lack of its prior issuance
rendered the LDA invalid

5. No. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy fo failure to comply
with Section 59 of the IPRA Law. While we find that a CNO should have been secured prior to the
consummation of the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy, considering that this is the first time we lay down
the rule of action appropriate to the application of Section 59, we refrain from invalidating the LDA for reasons
of equity;

WoN compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement) is necessary prior to the implementation of the power plant project

6. No. The appellate court erred when it ruled that compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26, of the
LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to issuance of the subject
ECC. The issuance of an ECC does not, by itself, result inthe implementation of the project. Hence, there is no
necessity to secure prior compliance with the approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement, and the
issuance of the subject ECC without first complying with the aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid.
The appellate court also erred when it ruled that compliance with the aforesaid requirement is necessary prior
to the consummation of the LDA. By virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227, the project is not subject to the
aforesaid requirement and the SBMA’s decision to approve the project prevails over the apparent objections of
the concerned sanggunians. Thus, the LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy suffers from no
infirmity despite the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians;

WoN the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved by the Court
49

7. Yes. The appellate court correctly ruled that the issue as to the validity of the third amendment to the ECC
cannot be resolved in this case because it was not one of the issues set during the preliminary conference,
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and would, thus, violate RP Energy’s right to due process