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Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 134 ( 2016 ) 40 – 47 9th

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect

Procedia Engineering 134 ( 2016 ) 40 – 47

ScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 134 ( 2016 ) 40 – 47 9th International Scientific Conference Transbaltica 2015

9th International Scientific Conference Transbaltica 2015

A New Approach to the Identification of Rail Risk at Level Crossing

Eva Nedeliaková a *, Jana Sekulová a , Ivan Nedeliak b

a University of Žilina, Univerzitná 1, 01026 Žilina, Slovakia b Railway company Cargo Slovakia, a.s. Hviezdoslavova 31, 01002 Žilina, Slovakia

Abstract

The safety of level crossings represents current worldwide issue. Research team from The University of Žilina in the Slovak Republic during the cooperation with experts from railway undertakings dealt with this topic through creating new methodology for level crossings monitoring. This article deals with safety on selected level crossings in the Slovak Republic which were monitored under extensive research. It contains partial results of research, which is focused on impact of risks, non-compliance with safety rules and critical places on users of transport services. Quantity of the accidents and incidents at level crossings is alarming. Contribution appeals to the necessity of implementation of measures that lead to increased safety due to elimination of incidents and accidents. The article provides new view on issue on the relevant sections. The goal is to point out the new approach of complex monitoring of the cause of the accident at level crossings. Scientific research characterised in this article is focused on creating innovative electronic program for monitoring the risk utilizing new calculations for level crossing lock indicators affecting the railway transport safety. This electronic program could be used within level crossings with various kinds of security.

© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license

© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of Transbaltica 2015.

Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of Transbaltica 2015

Keywords: rail safety; accidents and incidents; locking time; level crossing security equipment.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: eva.nedeliakova@fpedas.uniza.sk

1877-7058 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of Transbaltica 2015

doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2016.01.036

Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

1. Introduction

41

Distinction of all the risks, which may arise at level crossing plays a vital role in this enormously actual problem. Correct identification of all risks affects the safety of railway transport in a significant way (Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2008). The risk of formation of accident at level crossing is an occurrence probability function of a specific event and its consequences (Bartošová et al. 2008: 5). In a worldwide measure, scientific researches document at the intersection of rail and road infrastructure 400 deaths at average in European Union and 300 deaths at average in the USA every year. That’s why the research of transport system at level crossings in Slovak Republic requires very high attention. Slovak Republic within a worldwide survey is in the top 15 countries in which occurred the most serious accidents at level crossings (VEGA

1/0188/13).

Up to now realised studies, which were handled with the cooperation of infrastructure manager of Slovak Republic and carriers, often provided too general information without a more systematic view of the actual intersection of the rail and road infrastructure and without purposeful measure suggestions on eliminating the risks. Approach characterised in this article complements mentioned studies, but also brings innovative view on the solved problem.

2. Realisation of scientific research

Scientific research realised with the cooperation of the University of Žilina, ŽSR infrastructure manager, railway carriers of railway company Cargo Slovakia, a.s. and Slovak railway company, a.s., Czestochova University of Technology Poland, focused on finding the level of obeying the safety at level crossings, was divided into several phases. The first phase of the research was a suggestion of electronic program for risk identification at level crossings.

Within this phase there was also realised a pre-research – preparation activities which consisted in personal observation of events at level crossings for one week before the main research during workdays from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., collecting data about the intensity of rail and road transport and about the activities of crossing safety devices into author defined schemes In this phase, there were monitored further generally valid safety principles at level crossing:

1. Train approaching a level crossing must be noticably and on time signalised to every participant of the road transport,

2. Every participant of the road transport must in the surroundings and the level crossing adapt his behaviour so

he won’t threaten smooth and safe traffic on the track. Preparation activities secured the needed information for modifying the author suggested monitoring schemes, thus eliminating the flaws of the research and securing the needed precision of data. The second phase of the research was extensive personal monitoring of level crossings and data capture about the events at crossings into the designed monitoring images. This phase also includes the use of new formulae for calculations of the traced markers. This phase was realised in the first half of 2013 at workdays from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. There were monitored 35 crossings on 2 routes n.114 Žilina–Rajec and n.106 Žilina–Čadca. There is only a part of the research in this article, part which studies in detail the safety at single-line level crossing PZS 2Z in km 1.028, which is located in the city of Žilina on route n.114 Žilina–Rajec and events, which occurred on the crossing. These data were processed by the authors created electronic program. Examples of resulting data processed by the program are listed in the Figure 1 and Figure 2. Output graphs were obtained via execution of detailed analysis, which were derived from mathematical and statistical methods. These clearly processed graphs are included in the Figures 3, 4 and 5. In the analysis, authors spread in detail individual measured snapshot times and the amount of monitored items and events from which were set partial results. These partial results were calculated via newly designed mathematical formulae for calculating the average time of individual processes and their standard deviation (Slovak Republic, Government of SR, STN P 34 2651, 1999). For the expansiveness of the research using the originally author created formulae were selected the most important. Selected partial results are included, compared and graphically depicted in Figures 4 and 5.

42

Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47 Fig. 1. Screenshot of resulting data

Fig. 1. Screenshot of resulting data about the traffic intensity at level crossing processed by the program.

intensity at level crossing processed by the program. Fig. 2. Screenshot of resulting data on the

Fig. 2. Screenshot of resulting data on the incidents’ at level crossing processed by the program.

incidents’ at level crossing processed by the program. Fig. 3. Graphical depiction of measured crossing average

Fig. 3. Graphical depiction of measured crossing average locking times by train at a monitored level crossing.

Closing time of single-line level crossing with convergent and divergent segments:

T

UP

= T

SVZ

+ T

SZ

+ T

PRICH

+ T

OBS

+ T

PP

+ T

OZ

.

Time necessary for closing the single-line level crossing:

T

NUP

= T

SVZ

+ T

SZ

+ T

OBS

+ T

OZ

,

(1)

(2)

Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

43

where: T SVZ – activation time of the warning sign; T SZ – barrier closing time; T PRICH – the arrival time of the train head; T OBS – time occupancy crossings by train; T PP – time after passage of the train; T OZ – barrier opening time; T NUP – time necessary for closing the level crossing.

U P – time necessary for closing the level crossing. Fig. 4. Graphical comparison of crossing

U P – time necessary for closing the level crossing. Fig. 4. Graphical comparison of crossing

U P – time necessary for closing the level crossing. Fig. 4. Graphical comparison of crossing

U P – time necessary for closing the level crossing. Fig. 4. Graphical comparison of crossing

Fig. 4. Graphical comparison of crossing average lock times until the arrival of the train head and after passage of the train in even and odd direction.

Fig. 5. The average number of road vehicles waiting at the locked level crossing.

Activation time of the warning sign to the barrier closing time:

T

SVZ

= t

SVZ

t

ZSZ

,

(3)

where: t SVZ – activation time of the warning sign; t ZSZ – time of the start of closing the barrier after the activation of the warning sign. Average time of the activation of the warning sign to the barrier closing time:

T

SVZ

p

=

n

i = 1

(

t

SVZ

i

t

ZSZ

i

)

n SVZ

,

(4)

where:

warning sign; n SVZ – number of activations of the warning sign. Standard deviation of the activation time of the warning sign to the barrier closing time:

t

SVZ

i

– time of the i-th activation of the warning sign;

t

ZSZ

– barrier closing time for the i-th activation of the
i

n ( ) 2 ∑ ( t − t ) − T SVZ ZSZ SVZ
n
(
) 2
(
t
t
)
T
SVZ
ZSZ
SVZ
i
i
p
i = 1
=
,
σ SVZ
n SVZ
where:
t SVZ
– i-th activation time of the warning sign;
i
t ZSZ

T

SVZ

p

– average activation time of the warning sign;

n

(5)

– barrier closing time for i-th activation of the warning
i

sign;

The comparison of the average time of events at crossing safety device is depicted in Figure 3. Level crossing average locking times were monitored and standard deviation was calculated. Average times chronologically based on their mutual linkage are depicted in Figure 3.

SVZ

– number of activations of the warning sign.

44

Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

For searching possible activity improvement reserves of crossing safety devices in the context of time, authors focused on three largest average times from the total duration of warning calculated from measured values, graphically depicted in figure 3, and the average activation time of the warning sign, (20 seconds), lock time of the arrival time of the train head (32.35 seconds) and lock time of the passage of the train (12.41 seconds).

3. Optimisation of the longest selected studied times at level crossing with convergent and divergent segments

without taking into account the direct influence of speed of a train

Activation time of the warning sign is defined by the condition – train coming to a level crossing must be from the side of the railway transport noticeably and on time sig signalised to every participant of traffic. That’s why this time cannot be lowered. It forms a value of time by which the longest and the slowest vehicle leaves the level crossing (the longest – 22 metres, the slowest – 5 km.h 1 ). (Nedeliaková et al. 2012: 49). This time can be marked as the shortest converging time. For calculations were used Formulas 6, 7 and 8, where comparison of crossing average lock time values of arriving of train head to after passage of the train in even and odd direction is graphically documented in Figure 4. Level crossing lock time till the arrival of the train head and after passage of the train

T

PPP

= T

PRICH

+ T

PP

,

(6)

where: T PRICH – level crossing locking time till the arrival of train head; T PP – level crossing locking time after passage of the train. Average crossing locking time till the arrival of train head and after the train end passing

T PPP

p

=

n

i = 1

[

(

t

KSZ

i

t

PZVL

i

)

+

(

t

PKVL

i

t

ZOZ

i

)

]

n

,

(7)

where: t KSZ – time of the end of closing the barriers before arrival of the i-th train head; t PZVL – time of the passage of

the i-th train head;

the passage of i-th train; n – number of trains. Standard deviation of the crossing locking time till the arrival of the train head and after the passage of train end

– time of the start of opening barriers after
i

t

PKVL

i

– time of the passage of the i-th train end;

t

ZOZ

∑ n ([ ] ) 2 ( t − t ) + ( t −
∑ n ([
]
) 2
(
t
t
)
+
(
t
t
)
T
KSZ
PZVL
PKVL
ZOZ
PPP
i
i
i
i
p
i = 1
=
,
(8)
σ PPP
n
where:
t KSZ
– time of the end of closing the barriers for i-th train;
i
t PZVL
– time of the passage of the i-th train head;
i
i – time of the passage of the i-th train end;
t PKVL
t ZOZ
– time of the start of opening the barriers after the passage of
i

i-th train;

number of trains.

T PPP

p

– average crossing lock time till the arrival of train head and after the passage of train end; n

4. Determination of the indicators intensity of road transport

Active and passive safety elements monitored at given level crossings, together with their technical and technological parameters stated in the risk identification methods, were for the complexity of the research complemented by the intensity markers of road transport based on Formulas 9, 10 and 11. Average number of road vehicles waiting during the lock of level crossing:

Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

P

p

=

n

=

1

i

p

i

n

,

(9)

45

where: p i – number of road vehicles waiting during the i-th lock of level crossing; n – number of level crossing locks. Standard deviation of the number of road vehicles waiting during the lock of level crossing:

σ

p

=

n ∑ ( ) 2 p − P i p i = 1 , n
n
∑ (
)
2
p
− P
i
p
i = 1
,
n

(10)

where: p i – number of road vehicles waiting during the i-th lock of level crossing; P p – average number of road vehicles waiting during the lock of level crossing; n – number of level crossing locks. The average number of road vehicles waiting at the locked level crossing was monitored in even and odd direction, data is documented in Figure 5. The intensity of road transport at level crossing was also determined by the average number of road vehicles which passed the monitored level crossing at workdays from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. based on the Formula (11) which is graphically depicted in Figure 6. A fragment of a wide observation of number of vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians is shown in Figure 7.

of vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians is shown in Figure 7. Fig. 6. Graphical comparison of the

of vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians is shown in Figure 7. Fig. 6. Graphical comparison of the

Fig. 6. Graphical comparison of the average number of road traffic that passed through the monitored level crossing in even and odd direction from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.

Fig. 7. Fragment of the average intensity of road traffic.

46

PVC

p

=

n

1

i =

pVC

i

n pd

,

Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

(11)

where: pVC i – the number of road vehicles passed through monitored level crossing on i-th workday from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.; n pd – the number of workdays during which was the level crossing monitored. Basic goal of the railway transport security management is to eliminate the occurrence of human failure concerning safety due which the risk of the occurrence of an unwanted situation is reduced. For the scientific research to be complete, all incidents at level crossings were monitored.

5. Suggestions of obligatory measures for increasing the safety resulted from research results

New approach towards the risk identification at level crossings lies in creating an electronic program of risk identification at level crossings in accordance with complex observation of active and passive safety elements. For the needs of the research, there were suggested new formulae for calculating average duration of particular processes and their standard deviations. The research was supplemented by observation of the intensity of traffic. Based on the correct identification of all risks we can derived conclusions for the needed measures for their elimination and increase of safety. For practical

service were suggested three basic fields of measures for increasing the safety concerning technical modifications of level crossing, informativeness of public and co-financing the maintenance and reconstruction of level crossings by railway and road transport. (Nedeliaková et al. 2012: 87) Authors show only a fragment of suggestions, because they are aimed for particular level crossing. Authors consider observing each level crossing particularly and in specific conditions of crossing infrastructure as a major fact. For example technical modifications of level crossing mentioned as an example of observation in article concerning following aspects:

1. Modification of divergent segment in odd direction to Žilina for decreasing the value of average excess lock time of the level crossing by train which represents disproportionate high value graphically depicted in figure 4.

2. Through level crossing passes from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. on average a total of 949 pedestrians a day. Thus was suggested to build a pavement alongside the road together with warning crossing security device with barriers particularly for pedestrians. Pedestrians can move more safely on a road preferentially for them and they don’t cross railway track near level crossing or road for road vehicles.

3. Were suggested during research found average daily intensity from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. a total of 3775 vehicles, installing camera system for monitoring incidents at level crossing connected to police.

4. Modernisation of reflex materials on current crossing security devices for traffic at night and during winter, when is visibility decreased.

5. Extending of barriers, so that pedestrians can’t cross when the level crossing is closed.

6. Building of a grade-separated crossing of communications is the most expensive economic solution but the

most acceptable concerning safety. Measures concerning informativeness of public contain informativeness about safety measures of behaviour at level crossings and their surroundings, execution of basic enlightenment about the risks and possible consequences at level crossings (Nedeliaková, Dolinayová and Nedeliak 2012: 38). Enlightenment can be executed to wide public through media, but as well as personally to traffic participants at level crossing by placing information tables which would contain information about the possible risks and their consequences (Nedeliak, Kendra 2009: 4). A law on the obligatory driver courses focused on the safety, risks and consequences of breaking the rules at level crossings should be created, especially, for bus and truck drivers (Poliaková et al. 2012: 254).

Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

6. Conclusions

47

In worldwide studies, including the Slovak Republic is nowadays extensive space devoted to the issue of safety at level crossings. Methodologies currently used by the infrastructure manager of Slovak Republic disregard some aspects of risks formation which lead to creating space for accident and incidents. These deficiencies can be eliminated by using innovative methods, which was characterized in a contribution and highlights a new view on the said issue. The authors proposed the implementation of the above methodology in the regulations of managers of infrastructures in accordance with the principles of interoperability. The innovative character of scientific research characterized by the authors of this contribution consists in determining the effective tool for increasing security which is supported by methods of calculating the average crossing locking time, influencing on the safety of railway operations. The results of the research showed that these times can influence reactions of pedestrians and drivers road vehicles of negative way. Therefore is threatened the basic idea of safety management, which monitors the effect of a human factor to the rise of accidents. Current technologies used in practice not used fully kinetic component of the train, which clearly affects the crossing locking time, as shown by the results of research. By removing the waiting time occurs to reduce the potential risks at level crossings. The substantial fact is the finding that every single rail crossing is located in specific conditions, and therefore is necessary to monitor each one separately. Clear benefit of research for the practical operation is detection of emerging risks at level crossings, which are created by the interaction of technical, technological and human factors. For these risks were based on research determined the practical arrangements that focus on prevention, technical adjustments level crossings and introduction of new technologies into the operation of transport simultaneously. Nowadays the new methodology is verified in real conditions of railway operations in cooperation with foreign experts. (Slovak Republic, Railways of Slovak Republic, Ž1, 2005). Authors of the contribution simultaneously point to the necessity of a wider debate so serious problem, such as the threat of accident and incidents at level crossings. The proposed method is simple, applicable in the conditions of any track section operated by different infrastructure managers.

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