G.R. No.
154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure
questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which
denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En
Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the
prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be
his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence
over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse
the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have
the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself
of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a
Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that
the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de
oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues
that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last,
petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of
a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the
supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed
a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the
March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to
Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of
the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following
errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ
of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the
writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,
WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO
HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED
TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR
MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS
(MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father,
the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by
the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any
civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In
the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former,
the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while
the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act
as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the
petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without
the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow
from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not
possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the
issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by
the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for
indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally
untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. 9 The basic
rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil
aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene
to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private
prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount
of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted
to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then
migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained
that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as
he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual
dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for
in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members
has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP
Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives
for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no
rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is
voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done
was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its
members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members
from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of
Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of
whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status
and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual
membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims
that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners,
to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and
he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes
of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine
Bar8 - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that
the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble
objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does
not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar
far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the
annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to
stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to
the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is]
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
 But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the
loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit
his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years
already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil
A.......- Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
B.......- Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
C.......- Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil
Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may
be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787,
RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying
the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the
Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and
January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents
signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of
the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No.
11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues
was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of
notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997
the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member
in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who
is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing,
were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the
February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed
to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender
his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple
farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
 Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed
of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he deceased members thereof.
never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment,
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues,
not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for
and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens
vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does
indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food
not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
faith, to the contrary. Esmsc
for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution [6] adopting and approving the report
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended
courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for
Professional Responsibility which provides:
a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
ordering respondents suspension for three months. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows: LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years." shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay
1991." his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas
income taxes as an example." personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated
.... Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent SO ORDERED.
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since
1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he
had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years
and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this
issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP
dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes
in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007 Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational,
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll
RESOLUTION of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
CORONA, J.:
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement.
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the
law. IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
to judicial disciplinary control.14
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship
to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
citizen in May 2004.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law
now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
Thus, this petition.
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission
have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
on:
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of
(b) the payment of professional tax;
the Philippine bar.
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that him of legal developments and
it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as
and promote the public welfare.3
a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful Republic of the Philippines.
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with
breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which
courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4 he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SO ORDERED.
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.6
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan
v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party
litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the
said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court
laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES
Facts:
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount
of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted
to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then
migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained
that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one’s profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as
one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to
stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.
SANTOS, JR. VS. ATTY. LLAMAS, AC 4749
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues. He was also cited in the complaint as not
paying his professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court. It was also an
alleged falsity when he included his “IBP-Rizal 259060” where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner
cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed
and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafa but
was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of
the law.
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060”
but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings
in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he
has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that
as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his
IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.
Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law
and for being a senior citizen.
HELD:
Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.
No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall payannual dues and default thereof for
six months shall warrant suspension ofmembership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall
be aground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable
income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of membership or
association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER

Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship
to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law
in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to
have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.