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Southern California

International Review
Volume 9, Number 1 • Spring 2019
Southern California International Review
scir.org

Staff
Editor-in-Chief:
Anna Lipscomb

Editors:
Loleï Brenot
Connor Chapkis
Alina Mehdi
Breana Stanski
Sagar Tiwari

The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual print


and online journal of interdisciplinary scholarship in the field of interna-
tional studies generously funded by the School of International Relations
at the University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would
like to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.
Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between
theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues.
SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates
with valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.

Copyright © 2019 Southern California International Review.


All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form without the express written consent of the Southern California International
Review.

Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily
represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.

ISSN: 1545-2611
We dedicate this edition of the SCIR to public servants and diplomats
across the world who work tirelessy to promote peace and prosperity in
the face of political crossfire and uncertainty.
Contents

1. An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 11
International Criminal Court
Aisha Hamdulay

2. Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 26


What explains the public support for the harmonization of European welfare
systems in post-communist countries?
Paul Barbarin Nicolier

3. A Decade of Insurgency 44
Orienting the Kashmire Insurgency of the 1990s at Five Levels of Conflict
Elena Ortiz

4. The Europeanization of European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic 64


Relations
Alexandra S. Marksteiner

5. Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan 80


A Journal Review of the Role of Japanese Conglomerate Fisheries in the
Growing Bluefin Overfishing Crisis
Kayleigh Svensson
Editor’s Note:

Dear Reader,

It is with great pleasure that I introduce to you the seventeenth edition of the Southern
California International Review (SCIR). This semester’s issue continues our mission of
providing a platform for undergraduate scholars of international affairs to deliver their work
to a larger, global audience.

We were incredibly fortunate to have dozens of submissions for this issue. Our editors spent
staunch hours examining undergraduate research from all across the country and throughout
the world. Of the many impressive submissions, the following five were outstanding for their
original ideas and fresh perspectives on globalization topics. As you read this journal, you
will understand why.

In the creation of this issue, the SCIR is extremely appreciative of the support of the University
of Southern California’s School of International Relations, Director Patrick James, Associate
Director Linda Cole, and the rest of the faculty and staff that give us the guidance we need to
steadily grow. I also extend our thanks to Ms. Robin Friedheim for her generous scholarship
that provides the foundation upon which our endeavor thrives.

As new global forces and challenges continue to shape national and international discourses,
it is imperative that world leaders maintain their commitments to transparency and unity.
This is a theme that resonates throughout the articles in this edition. The first article in
this issue takes a look at the tensions between the African Union and the International
Criminal Court. The next article seeks to explain public support for the harmonization
of European welfare systems in post-communist countries. Another article analyzes the
Kashmir insurgency of the 1990s at five levels of conflict. The fourth article examines
the Europeanization of European defense and explores its implications on the future of
transatlantic relations. The final article brings to light the role of Japanese conglomerate
fisheries in aggravating the bluefin tuna overfishing crisis.

I would like to thank you, the reader, since without you, we are nothing. Remember, the
content of this journal is just one part of a much larger dialogue.

Please read, ponder, explore and enjoy.

Warm regards,
Anna Lipscomb
Editor-in-Chief
An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the
African Union and the International Criminal Court
Aisha Hamdulay

Tensions between the African Union (AU) and the International Criminal Court (ICC)
erupted with claims that the ICC is biased against Africa following the arrest of Sudanese
President Al-Bashir. This paper analyzes these tensions: firstly, by looking at the relationship
between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); secondly, by exploring
the implications of the non-universality of the Rome Statute; and lastly, by examining the
case dynamics of the ICC. It takes a look at how cases have been referred to the court as well
as the roles of the Prosecutor and the UNSC, finding that there is an inherent Afrocentric
focus in the workings of the court. It then further explores how this impacts peacebuilding
and the conflict between peace and justice in relation to Africa and the ICC. In conclusion,
suggestions on how to move forward and resolve the tensions are provided.

Introduction
The Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC),
represented a new dawn in the field of international criminal justice, which was widely
welcomed by African states. It was adopted in July 1998 and enforced in July 2002, after 60
states ratified it. Currently, 123 states are party to the Rome Statute; 33 of which are Afri-
can, representing the largest regional grouping of states.1 Although there was initially great
support from African states towards the ICC, tensions formed once the ICC went into
practice. With the high number of African cases taken on by the court, claims of the ICC
being “Afrocentric” began to surface. However, it was the warrant of arrest issued upon
President Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan which revealed the strong tensions between the ICC
and the African Union (AU), the regional body of African states.2
This paper analyzes the sources of tension between the ICC and the AU. It argues
that the main source of tension stems from the claim that the ICC has been biased in its
prosecution of African leaders and ultimately is used as a tool to advance a pro-Western
and neo-colonial agenda.
To analyze the strain between the AU and the ICC, the paper begins by provid-

1  Gwen P. Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President
Omar Al Bashir," Fordham International Law Journal 34 (2010): 1584.
2  Lutz Oette, "Peace and Justice, or Neither?: The Repercussions of the Al-Bashir Case for International Criminal Justice in
Africa and Beyond," Journal of International Criminal Justice 8, no. 2 (2010): 345.

Aisha hamdulay is a class of 2018 "Justice and Transformation" Honors student from the
Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. She has an undergraduate
degree in International Relations and Environmental & Geographical Science, also from the
University of Cape Town.
12 Aisha Hamdulay

ing context behind the buildup of tensions which erupted following the issuing of the
arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir. After this analysis, the dynamics of the UNSC-ICC
relationship are briefly discussed, followed by an examination of the non-universality of
the Rome Statute. It will then examine claims that the ICC is biased against African states
and leaders by studying case statistics from the ICC, proving that a bias does exist. It will
then demonstrate that the prioritization of justice over peace by the ICC has further led to
tension, lastly providing suggestions on how to relieve these tensions.

Context
In 2002, the Rome Statute successfully received the required 60 ratifications that
allowed it to enter into force.3 From the onset, there was broad support from African states
towards the establishment of the ICC. 33 out of 123 states currently signed on to the Rome
Statute are African, representing the largest regional grouping of states within the ICC As-
sembly of State Parties.4
The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was a significant factor influencing
African states’ support of the court, after which many African states felt strongly about the
need for a body to prosecute international war crimes in the attempt to deter such atrocities
from occuring again. Furthermore, they acknowledged the need for such a body, particu-
larly in consideration of states in which the domestic legal systems were too incompetent to
deal with international war crimes.5
The initial faith that African states had in the court was shaken when powerful
states such as Russia and China resisted signing the Rome Statute. Although not signing
would essentially exclude them from jurisdiction, it would still afford them power with-
in the court due to their permanent membership status on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC).6 African states thus raised objections about how this caused power to
be focused on weaker and middle level states in the international community; however,
no tangible action was taken to counter this.7 This reveals that there were already existing,
underlying tensions present from the onset, significant to broader tensions related to the
advancement of Western and neocolonial agendas.
As mentioned earlier, these issues only came to light properly following the first
warrant of arrest for a head of state, issued to President Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan in 2009.
This sparked a great uproar from African states, accusing the ICC of being biased against
3  Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms,” 1588.
4  Ibid., 1589.
5  Tim Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship?” Cape Town: Institute
of Justice and Reconciliation (2013): 7.
6  Ibid., 2.
7  Rowland J.V. Cole, “Africa's relationship with the international criminal court: More political than legal," Melbourne Journal
of International Law 14 (2013): 688.

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An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 13
International Criminal Court
African states and leaders while ignoring similar cases elsewhere.8 The Al-Bashir situation
and the issues which it brought to light will now be examined in further detail.

The Arrest of Al-Bashir


In 2009, the UNSC referred the conflict situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC, in
order to prosecute war criminals involved in the conflict.9 The application passed through
the Office of the Prosecutor speedily, satisfying grounds for prosecution. This resulted in
a warrant of arrest issued upon Al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity.10
However, since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the government of Sudan argued
that the ICC had no grounds to prosecute Al-Bashir and stated that it would not comply
with the warrant of arrest.11 Sudan had the support of the AU, as the AU felt that the arrest
would disrupt peace processes. Following the warrant of arrest, the AU directed its member
states to withhold cooperation with the ICC, meaning that should Al-Bashir enter their ter-
ritory, they would not arrest him.12
As Cole explains, the AU Peace and Security Council then requested the UNSC to
exercise its powers under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which states that:

“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under


this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.”13

In summation, the AU Peace and Security Council requested the UNSC to use its powers to
defer the arrest, on the basis that it would disrupt the ongoing process for peace in Sudan.
The fear was that this would possibly causing an eruption of conflict as Al-Bashir was a key
party in the relationship between armed militia and political parties.14
Between 2009 and 2011, the AU request was ignored by the UNSC, which initiated
great tension between the two parties.15 In 2010, a second warrant of arrest was issued by
8  Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms,” 1592.
9  Ibid., 1590.
10  Cole, “Africa's relationship with the international criminal court,” 685.
11  Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms,” 1593.
12  Ibid., 1594.
13  UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), Article 16, 17 July 1998, ac-
cessed March 28, 2019, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html.
14  Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court,” 3.
15  Charles C. Jalloh, Dapo Akande, and Max du Plessis, "Assessing The African Union Concerns About Ar-
ticle 16 Of The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court," African Journal Of Legal Studies 4, no. 1 (2011): 2,
doi:10.1163/170873811x563947.

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14 Aisha Hamdulay

the ICC, implying to the AU that their calls would not be heeded.
Additionally in 2011, the ICC Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo initiated proceedings
against Kenyan leaders in its post-election violence before allowing for the option of domes-
tic legal proceedings.16 These heightened tensions propagated the AU in 2012 to formally
command all its member states not to abide by the ICC instructions to arrest Al-Bashir, or
otherwise risk sanctions being imposed.17 The AU was making a bold statement by showing
the ICC that it would not stand for neo-colonial regimes exploiting Africa once again.
It is necessary to know the manner and sequence in which things played out in
order to understand why the AU took such a bold stance. Currently, the AU command still
stands, despite a number of countries having withdrawn from the Rome Statute and ten-
sions still very much present.18 This paper will demonstrate that many of the causes of this
tension are revealing of pre-existing patterns concerning Western domination and subtle
reinforcements of neo-colonialism.

The ICC and UNSC Relationship


A main source of tension has been the uneasy relationship between the ICC and
the UNSC. With the inception of the ICC, the United Nations may be viewed as following
a broad “separation of powers” structure. While the UN General Assembly served as the
legislature or “parliament” of the world, the United Nations Security Council can be seen
as the “Executive” branch, and the ICC as the “judiciary.”19 There are two conditions which
pose fundamental problems to this structure; they impact the independence of the courts
and wield unbalanced power dynamics which allow for neo-colonial and Western agendas
to be advanced. The first condition is veto function of the permanent members and the
second condition includes some powers afforded to the UNSC, which influence the juris-
diction of and decisions made by the ICC.
The veto power of the 5 permanent members (USA, Russia, China, France and
the UK) allows for the agendas of those countries to be prioritized due to the incontest-
able power which a veto vote holds.20 Three out of five permanent members are traditional
Western powers, thus allowing for a neo-colonial and Western agenda to be advanced.
In line with its mandate to maintain international peace and security, the powers
of the UNSC additionally include investigation, recommendation of actions and formula-

16  Cole, “Africa's relationship with the international criminal court,” 683.
17  Jalloh, Akande, and du Plessis, "Assessing The African Union Concerns About Article 16 Of The Rome Statute Of The
International Criminal Court," 5.
18 Ibid.
19  Leslie Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority,” Law and Contemporary Problems 79
(2016): 279.
20  Ian Johnstone, “Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument,” European Journal of International Law
14, no. 3 (2003): 437-480.

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An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 15
International Criminal Court
tion of plans concerning disputes worldwide, and authorization of military action.21 In line
with this, Article 16 of the Rome Statute gives the UNSC power to refer cases to the ICC,
as well to defer them, stalling such a prosecution for 12 months.22 Resolution 1422 was
additionally passed by the UNSC, which states that a deferral could be renewed every 12
months. As Oette explains, this directly undermines the authority of the ICC, as it should
ideally be the only body deciding when a case should or should not be deferred. The powers
of the UNSC thus interferes with the separation of powers system, impacting judicial au-
thority of the ICC and resulting in an unfair bias towards African states in the cases referred
to the ICC by UNSC, which will be examined further later.

The Non-Universality of the Rome Statute and Exclusion of UNSC Permanent


Members from the ICC
From the onset, there was resistance from powerful states in the West and super-
powers in the international community to become part of the Rome Statute. This wielded
unfair concentrations of power on weaker and middle level powers in the international
system. Additionally, this raised concerns around the non-universality of the court and
the ability of superpowers in the international system to be exempt from prosecution for
international criminal acts.23
The United States signed then unsigned the Rome Statute, while Russia and
China did not sign at all. African states voiced their concerns and objections to the exclu-
sion of these powers from the court, especially because of the seats the powers hold as per-
manent members on the UNSC and subsequent influence over the ICC in various ways.24
It is problematic that the US, Russia, and China have influence over ICC matters without
having ratified the Rome Statute. However, Russia and China maintained that they were
not bound to signing the Statute, as they did not want their sovereignty impacted.25 These
issues were the beginning of many reservations which African states had about the ICC
being used as a tool for political expediency by Western powers. This would marginalize
African states once again because of their exclusion from the structural power within the
UNSC, a fear which later proved to be true.
This conclusion leads us to the claims that the courts have an Afrocentric focus,
while conveniently ignoring many non-African situations which additionally require
equally binding jurisdiction.

21  United Nations, “United Nations Security Council," accessed April 13, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.
shtml.
22  Oette, "Peace and Justice, or Neither?” 352.
23  Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court.”
24  Charles C. Jalloh, “Regionalizing International Criminal Law?” International Criminal Law Review 9, no. 3 (2009): 446.
25  Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority.”

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16 Aisha Hamdulay

Analyzing Claims of an Afrocentric Focus: Examining Case and Situation


Dynamics of the ICC
The ICC has been accused of mainly pursuing cases from African states because
they are politically and economically weaker, and have less chances of creating funding
or political problems for the court.26 This is mainly because they do not hold structural or
relational power in the court system. As Murithi states, cases are not pursued on the noble
basis of justice, but rather, on the basis of political expediency, which in turn allows for an
anti-African, pro-Western agenda to be advanced.27
While it is clear that there has been an Afrocentric focus in terms of the cases
taken on by the ICC, there is a need to critically examine this claim to discover whether a
true bias does exist. Seeing as it represents the largest regional grouping, one could argue
that an “Afrocentric” focus is nothing out of the ordinary—if it represents the largest
regional grouping, then it should not be a surprise that the majority of cases are African.
While this is a fair statement, there are multiple factors to consider when analyzing this
issue. In order to do this, case statistics from the ICC will be utilized to see how true the
claims of bias on the part of the ICC is.
Table 1, sourced from real-time statistics on the ICC’s website, shows the total
cases taken on by the ICC from its inception, indicating which ones are African and
through which method they reached the courts. The total number of cases amounts to
38 (however, four are noted as not having passed the preliminary examination stage). By
analyzing this, one can better decipher whether claims of bias hold true.
Of the total 38 cases, 71% (27) of these are African. It is thus clear that there is a
largely Afrocentric focus within the court. However, in determining whether the ICC has
a bias, the number of these cases that have been self-referred, have been initiated by the
Prosecutor, and/or have been referred by the UNSC must be examined.

Preliminary Under Pre- Trial Appeal Reparations Closed Revisions


examination investigation trial
No. of African 3/13 10/11 N/A 4/4 2/2 3/3 5/5 N/A
state cases
African cases: 1/3 5/10 2/4 0 3/3 2/5
Referred by
state
African cases: 0 2/10 1/4 0 0 1/5
Referred by
UNSC

26  Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority,” 277.
27  Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court,” 2.

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An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 17
International Criminal Court
African cases: 2/3 3/10 1/4 2/2 0 2/5
Initiated by
Prosecutor
Non-African 2 0 0 0 0 0
cases referred
by state
Non-African 0 0 0 0 0 0
cases referred
by UNSC
Non-African 8 1/11 0 0 0 0
cases initiated
by prosecutor
Table 1: Table showing the total number of cases/situations at the ICC in each stage, and how they reached the
courts. Retrieved from ICC, 2018.28,29,30

Self-Referrals
A self-referral shows a certain level of trust in the court. The very first cases that
the ICC took on were 3 self-referrals, all from African states.31 Furthermore, out of the
27 African situations at the court, 48% (13) of these were self-referred cases.32 This is just
under half of the total number of African cases at the court. Thus, in examining the cases
under the court’s jurisdiction as a whole, it would be unfair to say that the ICC has been
completely biased against Africa if 34% of the total cases, from preliminary stage to closed
case, have been self-referred by African states. If one removes the cases under Preliminary
Examination from the case count, bringing it down to 25, then 24 out of 25 are those
cases are African, and, to reiterate, 12 of 25 cases have been self-referred by African states.
Clearly, great initiative has been shown by African states themselves towards prosecution
by the ICC.
However, while it is true that roughly 34% of the total cases taken on by the court
were self-referred by African states, indicating a great level of trust and support in the
court, this still does not determine whether the ICC is biased against African cases or not.
The lack of non-African states initiating self-referrals does not mean that the claim of the
large number of self-referrals by African states can be used to counter the argument that

28  International Criminal Court, "Preliminary examinations," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/pe.aspx.
29  International Criminal Court, "Situations under Investigation," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situ-
ation.aspx.
30  International Criminal Court, "Cases," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.
31  Jalloh, Akande, and du Plessis, "Assessing The African Union Concerns About Article 16 Of The Rome Statute Of The
International Criminal Court."
32  International Criminal Court, "Cases," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.

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18 Aisha Hamdulay

the courts are biased.


Furthermore, upon a situation’s referral, it must pass through the Office of the
Prosecutor first, through a Preliminary Examination, to determine whether it falls within
ICC jurisdiction.33 Thus, the question is raised as to why so many of the non-African
cases have remained in the Preliminary Examination stage for so long, while permanent,
self-referred African cases move out of it so quickly. To cite examples, Colombia has been
in the Preliminary Examination stage since 2004, Iraq since 2006, and Venezuela since
2006, all of which are non-African states. Thus, from this point of view, even though there
is a great amount of self-referrals from African states, there is still is an inherent bias
against African states. 34 This is seen through self-referred African situations being pushed
through the Preliminary Examination stage much quicker than non-African states. Some
non-African states cases remain there for more than a decade, essentially making them
“temporarily permanent.”35

Cases Initiated by the Prosecutor


Since its inception, 10 of the total 19 cases initiated by the Office of the Prosecu-
tor have been African.36 With the vast number of criminal related conflicts happening all
around the world, one can question why there is an urgency to prosecute African cases
when there are other, more urgent situations to prosecute as well. This points towards a
bias being present.
The court has had two Prosecutors since its creation. The first was Moreno Oc-
ampo, whose term ended in 2012, and who has had a big influence in the allegations of a
bias against African states. He has been accused multiple times for having a pro-Western
agenda and of being clearly selective in which cases he chose to allow to pass through the
Preliminary Examination stage to submit to the Pre-Trial Chambers. When he conducted
Preliminary Examinations in non-African countries such as Afghanistan, Korea, and
Georgia, he never pursued the cases past that stage, which led to accusations that he initi-
ated them as a front to combat the accusations of having a pro-Western agenda.37
Ocampo ignored important criminal situations such as Gaza and Sri Lanka be-
cause they were seen as “politically sensitive.”38 Yet, he ignored calls for sensitivity to peace
operations in situations like Sudan and Kenya. His double standards for different regions
of the world prove bias.

33  International Criminal Court. "Preliminary examinations."


34 Ibid.
35  Cole, “Africa's relationship with the international criminal court,” 678.
36  International Criminal Court, "Cases."
37  Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court,” 5.
38  Ibid., 5.

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An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 19
International Criminal Court
Ocampo also initiated investigations in Kenya regarding post-election disorder
and disruption, wherein over 1000 people died, ignoring the principle of complementar-
ity, which states that the ICC may only initiate proceedings if the state is unwilling to do
so. The Kenyan government accordingly protested the proceedings heavily.39 Key politi-
cians launched a campaign to try to delegitimize the ICC, framing it as a tool for Western
neocolonialism. As Vinjamuri explains, the fact that Ocampo ignored the principle of
complementarity in Kenya can be seen as acting in bad faith due to his bias and pro-West-
ern agenda.40
The indictment of Al-Bashir thus came with a backdrop of previous accusa-
tions that the ICC, and more notably, the Office of the Prosecuter (OTP), has been biased
against African leaders. Ocampo’s hastiness in issuing a warrant of arrest for Al Bashir, as
well as ignoring calls for sensitivity to peace-building, confirm this further.

Appointment of the Second Prosecutor


Fatou Bensouda was then appointed in 2012, succeeding Ocampo. She is the
former Minister of Justice of Gambia and was a key part of Ocampo’s team.41 Even though
under her jurisdiction there was a considerable increase in the number of non-African
states which were investigated, between 2014 and 2017, she determined three of the four
non-African state investigations in the preliminary examination stage as not meeting
statutory requirements to proceed.42 It cannot be by chance that of the minimal non-Af-
rican cases taken up by the court, three non-African cases are considered to have insuf-
ficient grounds for prosecution, while all African cases are passed through speedily. This
strengthens the argument that a bias is present.
Under Bensouda, non-African cases have also remained in Preliminary Exami-
nation stage, having been there for a long time following on from Ocampo, while other
African cases have moved through the process much more quickly. To cite examples,
under her watch Columbia has remained there since 2004 and Iraq since 2006.43
Thus, the OTP is an important factor which influences tensions because of the
power they hold in allowing cases to go forward. It is clear that the OTP—and more so
Moreno and Ocampo—had biases in their prosecution of African cases, which entrenched
claims of the ICC being used to advance a pro-Western and anti-African agenda.

39  Chandra Lekha Sriram and Stephen Brown, "Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and Impact,"
International Criminal Law Review 12, no. 2 (2012): 17.
40  Vinjamuri, "The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority."
41  International Criminal Court, “Ms Fatou Bensouda,” accessed March 29, 2019, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/who-s-
who/Pages/Fatou-Bensouda.aspx.
42  International Criminal Court, "Preliminary examinations."
43 Ibid.

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20 Aisha Hamdulay

Referrals Made by the UNSC


The UNSC has been mandated to maintain peace and security on an internation-
al level, and has the power to approve peace-building commissions for conflicts around
the world.44 Of the referrals made by the UNSC, four out of the four have been African
cases.45 There have been a number of non-African violent conflicts happening around the
world in the last decade, such as those in Syria, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Mexican drug
war, the Burma genocide.46 However, none of them have been referred to the ICC by the
UNSC, or initiated by the Prosecutor. Therefore, the focus on referring only African con-
flicts clearly demonstrates a bias towards African states, further advancing the agendas of
the superpowers who hold permanent membership seats on the UNSC.

Impacts on Peacebuilding: Conflict between Politics and Law, and Peace and
Justice
The relationship between politics and the judicial authority of the courts is an-
other driver of tension. The ICC prioritizes legal justice, while the AU prioritizes peace or,
perhaps, politics.47
The case of Uganda in 2005 demonstrates this, when President Museveni referred
the conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army and his government to the ICC. Here, he
used the ICC to avoid messy prosecution of his own government officials in the conflict.
In 2006, Museveni participated in peace talks with the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA). Because he felt they were becoming constructive, he then feared that arrest war-
rants from the ICC would hinder progress made in the peace talks and provoke the LRA.
This subsequently led to him urging the ICC to drop charges. However, the ICC rejected
the request, as the ICC and UNSC did with the AU’s request to defer Al-Bashir’s arrest.
This angered Museveni and he challenged and criticized the ICC thereafter.48
In this case, Museveni prioritized peace. One can assume that he would never
institute legal proceedings on his own until he felt it would not impact peace processes,
due to the aftermath it might have on the conflict. Even so, eventual legal proceedings of
rebel groups within a peaceful state could cause peace to be disrupted again. This is often
the case with many of the other African conflicts under the jurisdiction of the ICC as well.
However, from a legal justice point of view, the ICC would view it as the state

44  United Nations, "Peace And Security," Un.org, accessed 2019, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/peace-and-
security/.
45  International Criminal Court, "Cases."
46  "Global Conflict Tracker Council on Foreign Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 9, 2018.
47  Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority,” 285.
48  Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, "The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lords Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern
Uganda," Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 1 (2006): 179-87.

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An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 21
International Criminal Court
being unwilling to implement legal justice, which then gives the ICC the right to do so
as well, according to the principle of complementarity. This is where the ICC and the AU
differ from each other: The ICC prioritizes legal justice over political peace, while the AU
and its member states do the opposite. There is a lack of understanding that the two have
an interdependent relationship, more so from the side of the ICC. This has contributed
to tensions due to the impact that prioritization of legal justice by the ICC has had on
peacebuilding in Africa, and their failure to prioritize and heed sensitive peace calls from
African states.

Conclusion and Recommendations


As demonstrated, tension between the AU and ICC erupted when the ICC issued
a warrant of arrest for President Al Bashir. In breaking down the sources of that tension,
one of the main contributors stems from the claims of the ICC having a bias towards the
prosecution and pursuit of African cases. The claims of bias are true, and such the ICC
bias is part of a bigger agenda aiming to advance a neo-colonial, anti-African, and pro-
Western agenda. The powers of the UNSC, in line with the veto function of its permanent
members, further advance this claim because the UNSC undermines the independence
and authority of the ICC allowing for a greater power imbalance. By analyzing case statis-
tics, we see that there is a clear bias in pursuing African cases at the hands of the Prosecu-
tor, as well as the UNSC, as the majority of cases initiated by the OTP and referred by the
UNSC have been African. Another source of tension has been the failure of the ICC and
the UNSC to prioritize peace over justice, as called for by the AU and African states. Until
there is proof that there is no longer a bias and neocolonial agenda pres
ent, tensions between the AU and the ICC will be difficult to mediate.
In moving forward, there are a few suggestions to be made. The ICC and the AU
first need to engage in constructive dialogue. There is a need for both parties to under-
stand and engage the relationship between and the interdependence of peace and justice.
As Murithi suggests, there is additionally a need for the ICC to appoint a political advisor,
which will assist in bridging the gap between peace and justice, and advising the court
about when and why peace should be prioritised over justice, and vice versa.49 Then, in or-
der for the ICC to gain the trust of the AU once more, the ICC needs to critically address
the claims of bias being made about them, and commit to being more fair in the cases they
choose to prosecute. In doing so, the ICC must make an effort to reach out to the AU in
order to repair the relationship.
Regarding the UNSC, an internal method of balancing power is necessary in
order for African states to be fairly represented. Ideally, a representative state from each

49  Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court.”

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


22 Aisha Hamdulay

continent should, at the very least, have a permanent seat to counter the great power
imbalance. It would be valuable for a commission to be formed under one of the offices
of the United Nations to review and analyze the relationship between the UNSC and ICC
and the allegations of a Pro-Western agenda being advanced. This commission should al-
low for make recommendations to be made based on its findings.
If the current imbalance of power is not addressed within the UNSC, then the
neo-colonial and pro-Western agenda will prevail, never allowing for an African state to
ever counter this system of bias. As they have with the ICC, African states must continue
to stand their ground and stand together, or risk continuing to be taken advantage of by
structural power.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 23
International Criminal Court
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An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 25
International Criminal Court

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


Between Europeanization and Self-Interest
What explains the public support for the harmonization of European
welfare systems in post-communist countries?

Paul Barbarin Nicolier

In 2017, the European Commission released the Special Eurobarometer 467 Future of Europe
Report, which focused on social issues. When asked about the harmonization of European
welfare policies, Central and Eastern European populations were among the most supportive.
With the fall of communism and the 2004, 2007, and 2013 enlargements of the European
Union (EU), Central and Eastern European countries experienced a profound restructuring
of their welfare states. However, few prior academic studies have examined the evolution of
welfare attitudes in these countries, particularly in relation to the idea of a European welfare
system. In order to to explain the stronger support for the harmonization of welfare policies
in post-communist countries, this paper examines the support for Europeanization and the
desire for economic utilitarianism. I use a probit model to test these hypotheses and conclude
that both support for the European Union and economic self-interest positively influence the
support for the harmonization of European welfare policies in post-communist countries.

Introduction
Against the emergence of populist parties, a pro-European voice has arisen, call-
ing for the reinforcement of a “Social Europe,” which, according to Habermas, is the only
way to ensure the perpetuation of the supranational institution.1 From the 2017 Special
Eurobarometer Report, we observe that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
are the ones most in favour of the harmonization of welfare systems. In this paper, CEE
countries will refer to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, all of which are members of the European
Union. In order to explain this public support for the harmonization of welfare states in
post-communist countries, I develop two hypotheses. Based on the idea of Europeaniza-
tion, my first argument is that the more citizens favor the European Union, the more they
will tend to support harmonization. Based on the ideas of self-interest and utilitarian-
ism, my second argument is that individuals support harmonization because they seek
economic benefits. I find that both attitudes towards the European Union and economic
self-interest positively influence the support for harmonization of European welfare poli-

1  Jürgen Habermas, “Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis,” Roadmap to a Social Europe 4 (2013): 4-14.

Paul Barbarin nicolier is a final year undergraduate student in the dual degree pro-
gram between University College London and Sciences Po Paris. He is pursuing a major in
International Relations.
Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 27

cies in post-communist countries.


2. Literature Review
Moving Towards a Social Europe?
The idea of a Social Europe is not new. In 1988, Jacques Delors, the president of
the European Commission, called for an economically competitive and socially cooperative
Europe.2 Under this concept lies a major transformation of welfare structures that was initi-
ated by European integration. This idea of the free movement of individuals, workers, and
capital eroded national social boundaries and justified the development of social policies at
the European level, producing what Ferrera calls “semi-sovereignties.”3
In consideration of the historical development of national welfare states, a com-
mon or harmonized social policy could, in theory, reinforce a European identity in member
states.4 In practice, however, a European welfare state is unlikely to emerge considering the
democratic deficit, the limited fiscal capacity, and the diversity in welfare state regimes and
preferences.5 6 Studying the possible trajectories of a European welfare system, Leibfried
argues that a joint-sovereignty could be pursued, but that a social policy with “variable
geometries” is most likely to develop given the heterogeneity of the Union.7 Nowadays, Eu-
ropean social policy materializes in two ways. First, it may emerge indirectly as a result of
deepened integration. European regulations constrain national public spending and welfare
states, as in the case of the European Monetary Union, which requires fiscal discipline.8 Sec-
ond, a more active social policy may emerge at the European level. For example, the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC) encourages convergence and co-operation in European
social policies.9

Post-Communist Countries and Social Europe


Following the fall of communism, CEE countries transformed into market econo-
2  “'1992: The Social Dimension': Address by President Delors at the Trades Union Congress - Bournemouth, 8 September
1988,” European Commision.
3  Maurizio Ferrera, “European integration and national social citizenship: Changing boundaries, new structuring?” Compara-
tive Political Studies 36, no. 6 (2003): 647.
4  Herbert Obinger, Stephan Leibfried and Francis G. Castles, “Bypasses to a social Europe? Lessons from federal experience,”
Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 3 (2005): 545–571.
5  Obinger, Leibfried, and Castles, “Bypasses to a social Europe?” 545-571.
6  Fritz W. Schaprf, “The European Social Model : Coping with the challenges of Diversity,” Journal of Common Market Studies
40, no. 4 (2002): 645-670.
7  Stephan Leibfried, “The Social Dimension of the European Union: En Route To Positively Joint Sovereignty?” Journal of
European Social Policy 4, no. 4 (1994): 250.
8  Stephan Leibfried, “Social Policy Left to the Judges and the Markets?” in Policy-Making in the European Union, 7th ed., eds.
Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack and Alasdair R. Young (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 263-292.
9  Gerda Falkner, “European Union,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, eds. Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried,
Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 292-305.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


28 Paul Barbarin Nicolier

mies under the influence of international financial institutions.10 According to Deacon, this
evolution induced a social cost of rising unemployment and mortality rates.11 The European
Union did little to address this trend, as economic development and integration were pri-
oritized over social considerations.12
Considering the evolution of the welfare state in post-communist countries, Ce-
rami denotes a hybrid character:

“The re-enforcement of Bismarckian-oriented policies as heritage of the


Austro-Hungarian empire, the maintenance of egalitarian and universal
aspirations as fostered during the communist period, coupled with the in-
troduction of market-friendly welfare provisions as main social policy logic
of the post-communist environment.”13

Moreover, Lendvai describes the existence of a variety of CEE welfare states, refut-
ing the common view of CEE countries as uniform.14 She identifies three post-communist
welfare regimes: neoliberal, incongruous, and social corporativist.
The 2004, 2007, and 2013 enlargements of the European Union brought CEE
countries at the heart of the discussion of Social Europe. However, academic opinions tend
to diverge on the question of the Europeanization of post-communist welfare states. On one
hand, Draxler and Van Vliet argue that a convergence did not occur, as levels of generos-
ity and social policies firmly differ.15 On the other hand, Cerami suggests that European
ideas, interests, and institutions pervaded CEE social policies. For example, he emphasizes
the role of the OMC as an informal tool for convergence.16 The enlargement has also been
viewed as a threat to the idea of a Social Europe. Vaughan-Whitehead argues that adverse
social developments may hinder the European Social Model, particularly through the non-

10  Zsuzsa Ferge, “A Central European Perspective on the Social Quality of Europe,” in The Social Quality of Europe, eds. Wolf-
gang Beck, Laurent van der Maesen, and Alan Walker (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 165-182.
11  Bob Deacon, “Eastern European welfare states: The impact of the politics of globalization,” Journal of European Social Policy
10, no. 2 (May 2000): 148
12  Noémie Lendvai, “The Weakest Link? EU Accession and Enlargement: Dialoguing EU and Post-Communist Social Policy,”
Journal of European Social Policy 14, no.3 (August 2004): 319–333.
13  Alfio Cerami, “Mechanisms of Institutional Change in Central and Eastern European Welfare State Restructuring,” in
Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Alfio Cerami and
Pieter Vanhuysse (Basingstoke: Plagrave MacMillan, 2009), 51.
14  Noémie Lendvai, “Variety of Post-communist welfare: Europeanisation and emerging welfare regimes in the New EU Mem-
ber States,” Paper for the RC-19 Montreal (August 2009): 1-30.
15  Juraj Draxler and Olaf Van Vliet, “European Social Model: No convergence from the East,” Journal of European Integration
32, no.1 (January 2010) 115–135.
16  Alfio Cerami, “Europeanisation and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Européanisation. D'Ouest en Est, eds.
François Bafoil and Tim Beichelt (Paris: Logiques Politiques, L'Harmattan, 2008), 137-168.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 29

respect of the acquis-communautaires and practices of social dumping.17 He concludes that


EU enlargement should have put a stronger emphasis on securing social requirements in
post-communist countries.

Theory
In 2017, the European Commission published a Special Eurobarometer on the fu-
ture of Europe, including a question on the harmonization of national welfare systems. The
results in Figure 1 demonstrate general support by the European public; nonetheless, there
is a clear dominance of post-communist countries among the populations most in favor of
this harmonization. In this paper, I will examine the rationale behind the public support for
a harmonization of European welfare states in post-communist countries and compare it
with other European member states.

Figure 1: Percentage of support for the harmonization of welfare systems


Notes: Light Grey = Post-Communist Country; Dark Grey = Other European Countries
Source: European Commission Eurobarometer

Existing research on individual welfare attitudes provides an initial point of ex-


planation. Svallorfs argues that public attitudes are of interest because they do not evolve
as rapidly as national policies and can therefore illustrate discrepancies between political
elites and the public.18 In CEE countries, the abrupt socio-economic transition has not been
associated with an evolution of welfare attitudes. For example, the post-communist pub-
lic remained strongly supportive of equality principles, while being more critical towards

17  Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, EU Enlargement versus Social Europe? The Uncertain Future of the European Social Model
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub, 2003).
18  Stefan Svallfors, “Public Attitudes,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, eds Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried,
Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 241-251.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


30 Paul Barbarin Nicolier

their current welfare state than other European populations.19 In this sense, a harmonized
welfare state could result in more generous European welfare states. Furthermore, previous
literature on post-communist welfare states and Europeanization tends to focus on national
policies, omitting personal attitudes. The development of a European sentiment at the in-
dividual level may help explain the support for harmonising welfare states. For if European
ideas influenced CEE states, they can also shape individual preferences.20
This study focuses on the attitudes of post-communist countries because academic
research on CEE countries and Europeanization often differentiates these states from the
rest of the European Union as a cluster group located in a “periphery position.”21 In this
paper, I identify motivations for harmonization specifically for CEE countries and test them
at the European level to highlight differences. Another reason for studying post-commu-
nist attitudes is that it fills in a gap in the growing literature on attitudes towards Social
Europe. Previous research by Mau did not include these countries in his analysis, while
Baute, Meuleman, Abts, and Swyngedouw chose to examine the Belgian National Elec-
tion Study.22,23 Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer included Poland in their evaluation, but
mentioned the lack of European-level data.24 Additionally, none of these analyses identified
reasons for the support of harmonization specific to post-communist countries.
Previous discussions on Europeanization and CEE welfare states have been limited
to the national level. I expand on existing research by arguing that individuals’ perceptions
of the EU help explain support for harmonization. Mau found that in the EU15, the Euro-
pean identity had a positive influence on the support for a common social policy.25 In order
to determine if his argument holds true for post-communist populations, I re-use Sánchez-
Cuenca’s study of individual preferences for European integration, in which he argues that
citizens with a positive image of the EU and a negative opinion of their national institutions
would support integration.26 In line with this argument, Roosma, Gelissen, and Oorschot
demonstrate that Eastern Europeans are particularly critical towards their national welfare

19  Femke Roosma, John Gelissen, and Wim Oorschot, “The Multidimensionality of Welfare State Attitudes: A European
Cross-National Study,” Social Indicators Research 113, no.1 (2013): 235–255.
20  Cerami, “Europeanisation”, 137-168.
21  Draxler and Van Vliet, “European Social Model,” 131.
22  Steffen Mau, “Democratic demand for a social Europe? Preferences of the European citizenry,” International Journal of Social
Welfare 14, no. 2 (2005): 76–85.
23  Baute, Meuleman, Abts, and Swyngedouw, “Measuring Attitudes,” 353-378.
24  Jürgen Gerhards, Holger Lengfeld, and Julia Häuberer, “Do European citizens support the idea of a European welfare state?
Evidence from a comparative survey conducted in three EU member states,” International Sociology 31, no. 6 (November 2016):
677-700.
25  Mau, “Democratic demand,” 76-85.
26  Igancio Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Political Basis of Support for European Integration,” European Union Politics 1, no. 2 (June
2000): 147-171.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 31

states.27 In this sense, I argue that individuals from post-communist countries with a posi-
tive image of the EU are more likely to support a harmonization of European social policies.
This is expressed in my first hypothesis:

H1: Individuals with a greater support for the European Union will be more
supportive of a harmonization of welfare systems.

My second theory situates itself at the intersection of individual attitudes towards


the welfare state and European Union enlargement. Margalit argues that economic self-
interest plays a major role in explaining social preferences.28 McLaren asserts that egocen-
tric utilitarianism, which assumes that individuals’ positions are influenced by the potential
costs and benefits of a project, is key to individual support for European integration.29 Since
individuals are interested in maximizing their economic gains, their decision to support
harmonization relies on cost-benefit calculations. Returning to the concepts of European-
ization, convergence, and periphery of post-communist countries in the European Union,
we observe a trend of movement towards the West through an alignment of social policies
with older and wealthier member states. I argue that individuals benefit from the harmo-
nization of welfare systems, as they perceive that their standards of living could increase.
Harmonization may imply an alignment of post-communist welfare systems with the most
developed and generous ones in the Union, such as the continental or Scandinavian welfare
regimes. This means that populations from poorer European countries with less-developed
welfare systems, such as those in post-communist states, can gain access to more generous
systems, which can increase their standards of living through redistribution. Furthermore,
Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer argue that wealthier European populations oppose a har-
monization because additional transfers would raise their financial burdens.30 In this case,
we can apply the corollary, as post-communist citizens might see transfers trickle down to
their country. This is expressed in my second hypothesis:

H2: Individuals who believe that the European Union improves their stan-
dards of living will be more supportive of the harmonization of European wel-
fare states.

27  Roosma, Gelissen, Oorschot, “Multidimensionality,” 235-255.


28  Yotam M. Margalit, “Explaining social policy preferences: Evidence from the great recession,” American Political Science
Review 107, no.1 (February 2013): 80–103.
29  Lauren M. McLaren, Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 31.
30  Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer, “Do European citizens?” 681.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


32 Paul Barbarin Nicolier

Data, Measurement, and Method


Data
My data source is the Special Eurobarometer 467 (EB88.1) published by the Eu-
ropean Commission in November 2017.31 This survey provides cross-national measures of
individual attitudes towards social issues in the European Union. The fieldwork was com-
pleted in the 28 member countries of the European Union. My research question focuses
on the 11 post-communist states: Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Croatia (HR), Es-
tonia (EE), Hungary (HG), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slo-
vakia (SK), and Slovenia (SL). However, in order to identify differences between citizens of
post-communist and other countries, responses from the other European Union countries
will also be examined. With the exception of Cyprus (N=501), Luxembourg (N=504), and
Malta (N=497), all country samples have approximately one thousand respondents. The
total sample features 27,881 respondents. I retrieved country variables (GDP per capita and
Social Expenditures) from Eurostat datasets.

Dependent Variable
My dependent variable is the individual level of support for the harmonization
of social welfare systems. It is measured by answers to the Eurobarometer QC11 question:
“To what extent would you be in favor of or opposed to the harmonization of social welfare
systems within the European Union?” I re-coded the results with 1 for “In favour” and 0 for
“Against” or “Don’t know.”

Independent Variables
My first independent variable is the individual level of support for the European
Union, which I will measure with question D78 of the Eurobarometer: “In general, does the
EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very nega-
tive image.” The results were re-coded as 1 for very positive and fairly positive responses,
and 0 for others. My second independent variable is the perception that the standards of
living within the European Union are increasing. I measure it with the QC1T.1 question
of the Eurobarometer studying responses for Standard of Living of EU Citizens as the first
or second main asset of the European Union. The values are 1 for mentioned and 0 for not
mentioned.

Control Variables
Research on welfare attitudes demonstrates the influence of sociodemographic
31  European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 467: The future of Europe – Social Issues, Directorate-General for Communi-
cation (November 2017).

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 33

characteristics.32 Therefore, I include gender, sex, age, and employment as individual con-
trol variables. Following the work of Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer on the influence
of welfare spending on the preference for European social policy, I use social expenditures
(percentage of GDP) as well as GDP per capita as country control variables.33

Method
I will start with a brief descriptive analysis using a scatterplot based on national
means, hoping to discover correlations between my independent variables and support for
harmonization at the European level. I will then study the relationship between dependent
and independent variables at the individual level, in order to test my hypotheses. Consider-
ing the dichotomous aspect of my dependent variable, I will run a probit regression model
which is suited to binary outcomes. The model that I will be using is:

f(Harmonisation) = β0+ β1ImageEUi + β2Standardoflivingi + γSociodemographici +


γCountrycharacteristicsi + εi

I ran this model three times: first, at the post-communist level; second, for non-
post-communist populations; and third, at the European level to see if I can identify dif-
ferences between these groups. For feasibility reasons, I decided not to utilize a multi-level
analysis, although I use both individual and country variables. Following Steele’s argument,
I take into consideration that the p-values might be too small and the standard errors un-
derestimated, which could impact predictors at the group level (country characteristics).34

Results
Descriptive Analysis
Analyzing countries’ mean scores for the image of the EU and the support for
harmonization, I find that the results from Figure 1 appear to contradict my first hypothesis
as there is no clear pattern of correlation between the image of the EU and the support for
harmonization. Observing the regression line, it even seems that support for harmoniza-
tion declines in countries where the European Union is seen more positively.
In Figure 3, we can observe a positive relationship between the perception that
standards of living are the main asset of the European Union and the support for a harmo-
nization. Interestingly, post-communist countries tend to be concentrated in the upper-
32  Femke Roosma, Wim Oorschot, and John Gelissen, “The Achilles’ heel of welfare state legitimacy: perceptions of overuse
and underuse of social benefits in Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 23, no.2 (April 2015): 1-20.
33  Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer, “Do European citizens?” 677-700.
34  Fiona Steele, “Module 5: Introduction to Multilevel Modelling Concepts,” LEMMA (Learnin Environment for Multilevel
Methodology and Applications) (Centre for Multilevel Modelling, University of Bristol, 2008).

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


34 Paul Barbarin Nicolier

right region, while western member states (except Luxembourg and Belgium) are found in
the bottom left corner. Therefore, this plot shows that a stronger perception of the EU as
increasing the standard of living correlates with greater support for harmonization in CEE
countries relative to other European nations.
Although these plots offer an introductory overview, we cannot draw any compre-
hensive conclusions at this point, as other variables might influence the relationship. Next,
I will test my hypotheses at the individual level to observe what motivates citizens from
post-communist countries to be more supportive of harmonization.

Figure 2: Scatter plots illustrating the relationship between the image


of the EU and the support for harmonization

Figure 3: Scatter illustrating the relationship between the standard of


living variable and the support for harmonization.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 35

Probit Model Results


I evaluate the determinants of the support for the harmonization of welfare sys-
tems at the individual level. My analysis is organized into three columns in Table 1. The
first and second columns differ in their populations: the former studies the attitudes to-
wards harmonization in post-communist countries, while the latter shows the results for
non-post-communist populations. The third column takes into consideration the entire
European population interviewed. I added a dummy control variable for post-communist
countries.
First, at the level of post-communist countries (Column 1) (N= 11,274), the image
of the EU is statistically significant (p=0.000) and positive (β=0.558). This confirms my first
hypothesis (H1) based on the positive relationship between the image of the EU and the
support for harmonization. This means that in CEE countries, individuals with a positive
perception of the European Union are more supportive of the harmonization. The Standard
of living variable is also significant (p=0.000) and positive (β=0.189). In this sense, indi-
viduals in post-communist countries who consider the standard of living as the main asset
of the EU tend to be more supportive of the harmonization of welfare systems. This result
supports my second hypothesis (H2). Looking at the effect of control variables, we find
that age, left-wing affiliation, unemployment, GDP per capita, and social expenditures are
statistically significant. Surprisingly, the positive sign for social expenditures goes against
Gerhard, Lengfeld, and Häubereret’s conclusion that countries with higher levels of social
spending are less supportive of the harmonization.35 One explanation may be that varia-
tions in welfare expenditures across CEE countries were not considered in their analysis.
However, it is important to exercise caution when evaluating variables at the group level, as
explained in the method section.
Next, I consider the results from non-post-communist countries (Column 2) to
identify potential differences in the determinants behind the individual support for the
harmonization. The Standard of living (β=0.209; p=0.000) and Image of the EU (β=0.562;
p=0.000) variables are both statistically significant and positive. Therefore, we can conclude
that there is no major difference between the two groups, as the independent variables have
a similar influence on the support for harmonization. However, the sign of the social expen-
ditures variable is negative and therefore different from the column 1.
At the European level (Column 3) (N=27,881), both the Image of the EU and the
Standard of living variables are positive and statistically significant. It is interesting to note
that the post-communist country dummy variable is positive and statistically significant.
This confirms the idea that individuals from post-communist countries are more support-
ive of the harmonization than citizens of non-post-communist countries.

35  Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer, “Do European citizens?” 677-700.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


36 Paul Barbarin Nicolier

Similar to Rehm, I faced a major obstacle in evaluating the strength of my inde-


pendent variables, which could differ between the three groups.36 This issue came from the
probit model whose estimates correspond to an increase in the z-score, not the dependent

36  Philipp Rehm, “Risks and redistribution: An individual-level analysis,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no.7 (July 2009):
855-881.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 37

variable.37 One way of interpreting the coefficients of a probit model is to study the marginal
effects on the probability of an event.38 Therefore, in order to provide more explicit results,
I evaluated the marginal effects using the mfx package in R.39 The analysis was run for all
variables, but I only included the results for my two independent variables (Table 2) to im-
prove the legibility.

Based on Fernihough’s interpretation, in column one, a one-unit increase in the


standard of living variable leads to an increase in the probability of supporting the harmo-
nization by 5.3%.40 We can compare the marginal effects between the three groups of coun-
tries to find they are all statistically significant. Although the marginal effects of Standard of
living and Image of the EU are slightly stronger in second and third columns, we can argue
that there is no major difference of effect size across the groups. Finally, we can also see
that the Image of the EU variable has a stronger marginal effect than the Standard of living
variable. Therefore, having a positive image of the EU will have a stronger influence on the
probability of supporting harmonization.

Discussion
In this study, I aimed to explain the support for the harmonization of European
welfare states in post-communist countries through two hypotheses: the degree of sup-
port of the European Union and the perception that the EU improves standards of living.
Both were confirmed by the preceding analysis. Therefore, my results align with existing

37  Timothy M. Hagle, “Probit Analysis,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods, eds. Michael S. Lewis-
Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim F. Liao (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004).
38  Tim F. Liao, Interpreting Probability Models Logit, Probit, and Other Generalized Linear Models, Sage University Papers
Series. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no. 07-101 (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994), 23.
39  I also tested the margins package in R which showed similar results for Average Marginal Effects.
40  Alan Fernihough, Simple Logit and Probit Marginal Effects in R, no. 201122 (2011).

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


38 Paul Barbarin Nicolier

research on the individual attitudes and support for a social Europe.41 Focusing on indi-
vidual attitudes rather than national policies, this analysis provides a new way of studying
the relationship between Social Europe and post-communist countries. The support for the
harmonization in CEE countries may be viewed as an initial point of reflection for deepen-
ing the integration of these populations into the EU, although the perspective of a harmo-
nization seems unlikely.
Another conclusion builds on the small difference in results when comparing
post-communist populations to other European ones (Columns 2 and 3). In this sense,
we can argue that the image of the EU and economic self-interest are also determinants of
support for the harmonization of welfare states in non-post-communist countries. These
results are of interest if we return to the idea that CEE nations are different from other
European states. In the case of support for harmonization, we should stress the similarities
of these two groups rather than their differences. This could lead to a new approach in the
study of post-communist countries and European welfare states.
My analysis suffers from a number of limitations. First, the values of the pseudo
R-squared are relatively small for the 3 groups. In order to improve the fit of my model, the
model can be extended to other variables which might influence the support for harmoni-
zation, such as the socioeconomic status of individuals or the perceived benefit of the EU as
an independent variable, which would take into account how the individuals’ experiences
in the EU influence their support for harmonization. Secondly, I could have selected more
precise variables to account for the differences across CEE states by using existing typolo-
gies of post-communist welfare regimes. This poses an interesting point for future research
topics aiming to deconstruct the idea of a uniform group. In fact, we can identify varia-
tions in the support for harmonization of welfare policies across post-communist countries
and within them, which creates an interesting opportunity to study the reasons behind the
variation among and within CEE countries.

Conclusion
Considering the peripheral position of CEE countries in academic research on
European welfare states, this essay sought to explain the stronger preference for a harmo-
nized European welfare system among post-communist nations and identify motivations
specific to CEE populations which might explain their support. One explanation for this
preference is a positive vision toward the European Union. Another explanation is utilitar-
ian theory. The two hypotheses in this paper were tested with a probit model and the results
proved to be positive and significant in both cases. In addition, it is important to highlight
that the differences in results between the different groups studied (post-communist and
41  Mau, “Democratic Demand,” 76-85.

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Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 39

non-post-communist countries) appeared relatively weak, which calls into question the re-
current categorization of post-communist countries and populations as separate from other
European nations. In this sense, this paper invites further academic research on the rela-
tionship between CEE welfare systems and the European Union. Although the perspective
of a European welfare system does not appear as a priority in the contemporary agenda of
the supranational organization at present, its broad support, especially in post-communist
countries, provides insight into an alternative route to the current crisis of the European
Union.

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40 Paul Barbarin Nicolier

Appendix
A.1 National Means of Dependent and Independent Variables
Country Harmonization Image of the EU Standard of Living
Belgium 74% 42% 32%
Bulgaria 83% 58% 36%
Czech Republic 61% 25% 29%
Denmark 48% 46% 16%
Germany 53% 57% 18%
Estonia 74% 47% 27%
Ireland 61% 65% 31%
Greece 77% 31% 15%
Spain 76% 37% 24%
France 58% 40% 16%
Croatia 88% 35% 43%
Italy 69% 35% 13%
Cyprus 83% 40% 22%
Latvia 81% 44% 46%
Lithuania 68% 49% 43%
Luxembourg 70% 60% 27%
Hungary 86% 41% 25%
Malta 59% 49% 34%
Netherlands 60% 51% 20%
Austria 60% 39% 29%
Poland 74% 53% 36%
Portugal 78% 56% 23%
Romania 80% 46% 34%
Slovenia 80% 42% 33%
Slovakia 77% 38% 29%
Finland 55% 38% 18%
Sweden 55% 45% 8%
United Kingdom 47% 38% 23%
Source: Special Eurobarometer 467

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Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 41

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Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


A Decade of Insurgency
Orienting the Kashmir Insurgency of the 1990s at Five Levels of Conflict

Elena Ortiz

The Kashmir insurgency of 1989-1999 is characterized by its multitude of moving


parts and dynamism. It is a product of combustive interactions between numerous
individuals, organizations, governments, and global currents. All of these steered
the direction of conflict during different periods and to different ends. This period of
multidimensionality cannot be localized nor reduced to a linear understanding of
the conflict. It requires a broader latitude and depth of consideration that fully en-
compasses not only the many moving parts, but also the ways in which they interact-
ed with one another to produce this decade-long insurgency. This paper attempts to
reconcile this myriad of variables by examining the conflict from five different levels
of analysis. These five levels are as follows: the Kashmiri crusade for self-determi-
nation against India, the rivalries between Islamist and secular insurgents, the fight
between Pakistani-endorsed militants and Kashmiri secessionists, the ongoing Kash-
mir dispute between India and Pakistan, and the rise of global jihad. The framework
that this paper creates begins at the lowest level of conflict (the grassroots Kashmiri
crusade against India) and gradually expands to the most panoptic vantage point
(global jihad). This paper synthesizes and reconciles changes in leadership, global
contexts, and historical animosities across a decade of deeply scarring conflict.

Introduction
The Kashmiri insurgency of 1989-1999 exemplifies one of the darkest and most com-
plex conflicts in South Asian history. Decades of simmering betrayal, injustice, and neglect
erupted into a conflict that involved the Indian government, the Pakistani government, and
external actors in the region, while indiscriminately entangling all levels of Kashmiri society.
The Kashmiri decade of insurgency can be characterized at five different levels of analysis:
the Kashmiri crusade for self-determination against India, the rivalries between Islamist
and secular insurgents, the fight between Pakistani-endorsed militants and Kashmiri seces-
sionists, the ongoing Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, and the rise of global
jihad.1 The insurgency was defined by how these various sub-conflicts interacted with one
another. Thus, although varying in scale and objective, all five levels of conflict must be

1  The scope of this paper is limited to the insurgency that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. This is because, although vio-
lence in Kashmir continued beyond 1999, the nature of the conflict had drastically changed by the 2000s. The attacks on the Red
Fort in 2000 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001 symbolize a clear shift in the nature of conflict that must be examined separately.

Elena ortiz is a sophomore at Georgetown Uniersity's Walsh School of Foreign Service


majoring in International Politics & Security with a minor in Diplomatic Studies.
A Decade of Insurgency 45

considered in relation to one another. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework
that reconciles these coexisting and interacting dynamics in order to understand how the
path of insurgency was forged. To do so, I will first outline the general context and chronol-
ogy of the insurgency as well as examine the key players that dominated the decade. I will
then analyze each layer of conflict and evaluate its role relative to the greater scope of the
overarching insurgency. This piece will incorporate Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, and foreign
sources in order to provide a comprehensive blueprint for the nature of the conflict.

Context and Chronology


The Kashmiri insurgency was an indigenously-driven, large-scale social response to
both ultimate and proximate causes. In an ultimate sense, Kashmiri unrest was the sum
of enduring marginalization under the weight of Indo-Pakistani power politics, begin-
ning with partition in 1947. Pakistan was established under the leadership of Mohammed
Ali Jinnah who, despite India’s assertion of secularism, advocated for a distinct nation for
Muslims. The region of Kashmir challenged this two-nation theory by being a Hindu-ruled
but Muslim-majority territory. After multiple wars, crises, and failed attempts at resolu-
tion, both India and Pakistan claim Kashmir as rightfully theirs. Kashmir thus became the
geographical symptom of a larger power rivalry, whose weight has silenced the rights and
desires of Kashmiri people. The recognition of their unique identity has been cast aside,
manifesting into a deeply-rooted sense of betrayal that bred the ultimate and necessary cir-
cumstances for insurgency.
The specific timing and proximate causes of the insurgency in 1989 are attributed to
political decomposition in Kashmir. This narrative begins in 1982 with the death of Sheikh
Abdullah, who had led a relatively peaceful era in Kashmir since 1975. His legacy is de-
fined by economic stability and reaffirmation of the distinct Kashmiri identity, producing
a period of stability.2 In 1975, he achieved an agreement with then Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi to nominally reduce India’s authority in Kashmir to matters of “defense, for-
eign affairs, and communications,” leaving other affairs to the Kashmiri National Congress.3
Farooq Abdullah, the son of Sheikh Abdullah, assumed power in 1982 and proved to lack
the political fluency of his father. Growing up in Britain, he was disconnected from the
Kashmiri azadi, or freedom movement, and unique history.4 Although the Sheikh was an
avid supporter of the distinct Kashmiri identity, he was never one to bluntly challenge nor
provoke Delhi.5 Farooq was not so subtle. After assuming power, he began encouraging
2  Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (I.B. Tauris & Co, 1996), 222.
3  Iffat Malik, Sadaf Abdullah, and Farzana Noshab, Jihad in the modern era: image and reality (Institute of Strategic Studies,
2001), 8, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1295853717_87667588.pdf.
4 Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 221.
5  Ibid., 225.

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46 Elena Ortiz

Indian states such as Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Karnataka to seek independence from
India alongside Kashmir. Indira Gandhi, furious by Farooq’s quest to alienate certain states
from India, exploited his naivety by pursuing a campaign to reassert India’s position in
Kashmir. She employed propaganda tools such as portraying Farooq as being “soft” on
Pakistan and as a supporter of Sikh separatism.6 This gave her enough ammunition to oust
him from power in June of 1984 under Operation New Star.7 Gandhi installed G.M. Shah as
the new Chief Minister of Kashmir. This seizure of power by India triggered local outcry in
Kashmir. Protests and social turbulence escalated in 1986, when G.M. Shah was dismissed
for not being able to maintain control of the rising animosity.8 Jagmohan Singh, the Indian
governor of Kashmir at the time, assumed exclusive power of the territory in an attempt to
regain control. Muslims in Kashmir felt particularly alienated by his policies, and therefore
persevered in their strikes and protests against Indian power.9 In 1989, the rumored disap-
pearance of the Prophet’s hair from Srinagar reinforced the deep mistrust and resentment
from Kashmiri Muslims towards India, who they believed had stolen the sacred artifact.10
Rajiv Gandhi, the new Prime Minister of India after Indira’s assassination in 1984, reinstated
Farooq Abdullah as Chief Minister of a coalition between the Indian Congress and the
Kashmiri National Congress. To Kashmiris, Farooq was a traitor for surrendering to the co-
alition and demonstrating that Kashmir’s future was shackled to India’s agenda.11 Kashmiri
demands for self-determination and freedom grew increasingly louder. As they abandoned
their loyalty to the National Congress, a power vacuum was created. This rapidly building
pressure set the stage for insurgency. Although India denies election rigging, Delhi nonethe-
less rigged the provincial elections of 1987 in order to prevent the locally-popular and anti-
Indian Muslim United Front from obtaining government seats.12, 13 Scholar Robert Wirsing
notes that unrigged elections in Kashmiri history are the exception, meaning that the 1987
elections were not the main cause of the rise of separatism.14 The azadi movement had al-

6  Ibid., 226.
7  Ibid., 227.
8  Ibid., 229.
9  Ibid., 230.
10  Paula Newberg, Double Betrayal: Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1995), 22.
11 Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 230.
12  Human Rights in Kashmir (The International Commission of Jurists, 1995), 111, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/up-
loads/1995/01/India-human-righst-in-Kashmir-fact-finding-mission-report-1995-eng.pdf.
13  Rekha Chowdhary, "India's Response to the Kashmir Insurgency," in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia, ed.
Moeed Yusof (United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 46.
14  Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution (St. Martin's Press,
1994), 115.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


A Decade of Insurgency 47

ready existed in Kashmir for decades, just not on a large, organized scale.15 The political
disturbances of the 1980s were significant in popularizing and expanding secessionist senti-
ments by mobilizing the populace. Thus, it is important to distinguish the elections of 1987
as the tipping point and combustion of ultimate causes rooted in a history of injustice, rather
than the sole cause.
After the fraudulent election results came out, thousands of Kashmiris took to the
streets in protest of Delhi’s suffocating power, demanding their right to self-determination.
By 1989, the locally-produced movement had attracted militant organizations that trans-
formed the disturbances into a full-force insurgency. In response, India unleashed a violent
campaign of terror, consisting of mass rape, torture, and destruction, in attempt to suppress
the turbulence. Kashmiris countered the campaign with resilience and an unwavering de-
termination for freedom.16 This locally-driven azadi movement characterized the first half of
the insurgency, at which point external actors took the reins and exploited the circumstances
in the name of greater objectives. This paper will orient these transitions and fluctuations
in relation to the key players involved and their impact on the conflict’s overall nature and
direction.

Key Players
Throughout the decade, over thirty known militant groups were actively involved in
the conflict.17 Each varied in ideology, affiliation, size, and objective, but were united by a
common opposition to India’s military presence in Kashmir.18 Individual organizations fre-
quently factionalized or changed alliances, creating a dense and abstruse matrix of militant
groups in and around Kashmir. The organizations outlined below are not an exhaustive list
of those involved, but represent the key players that steered the insurgency throughout the
decade.

The Muslim United Front (MUF)


The Muslim United Front was a conglomerate of religious groups established in 1986 to
contest the upcoming elections of 1987.19 It was the first group to attempt to fill the vacuum
created by the collapsing political system by presenting the first real challenge to the Indian-
controlled National Congress.20 MUF expected to win ten seats in the 1987 election, but only
15  Fahmida Ashraf, "Jammu and Kashmir Dispute: Examining Various Proposals for Its Resolution," Institute for Strategic
Studies Islamabad (September 2, 2002).
16  Human Rights in Kashmir, 62.
17  Prakash Singh, "An Indian Perspective II," in Kashmir: Revolving Regional Conflict, ed. Robert G. Wirsing (Karikeya
Publications, 1996), 104.
18  Malik, Abdullah, and Noshab, Jihad in the modern era, 10.
19 Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 230.
20  Ibid., 230.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


48 Elena Ortiz

won four— a discrepancy blamed on Indian rigging.21 The party was held together in spirit
of a common goal: to resist Indian control by restoring Islamic unity in Kashmir. However,
the various organizations that comprised the MUF believed in different ultimate objectives
and ranged from being moderate to extreme Islamists. When the party lost momentum after
the 1987 elections, the MUF factionalized into its individual organizations, bidding farewell
to a united, Islamic political movement. The MUF represents a political attempt at Islamic
solidarity in response to India. It was critical during the dawn of the insurgency, evident
by the way it empowered and legitimized the Islamic organizations which it consisted of.
However, it did not endure as a driving force throughout the decade.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI)
Jamaat-e-Islami was established in 1941 under Syed Abul Ala-Maududi as the largest
Islamic political party in Pakistan. Its objective in Kashmir was to create a nizam-e-mustafa
(an Islamic-based political system) that reinforced the Muslim identity of Kashmir.22 It di-
rected its mission through a top-down strategy, aiming to Islamize all of Kashmiri society,
beginning with the elites and then advancing to the middle and lower classes. JeI was the
central leader of the Muslim United Front, aiming to institutionalize its socio political vision.
It also worked towards the ultimate objective of uniting Kashmir with Pakistan. Jamaat-i-
Tulba and Hizb-ul Mujahideen, the armed factions of JeI, conducted military action on the
ground in Kashmir.23 However, JeI struggled to achieve widespread support due to its aus-
tere brand of Islam, which was incongruent with local Islamic practices as well as with the
azadi freedom movement.24 Other organizations, such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF), thus gained greater popular appeal in the early stages of insurgency due to
their emphasis on the unique, national identity of Kashmir.

The Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)


Although the Muslim United Front was the first to formally organize against Indian op-
pression, the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front was the dominant voice of unrest among
Kashmiris. It considered itself to be a “vanguard organization” of the Kashmiri people, ad-
vocating for complete secession of Kashmir from both Indian and Pakistani control.25 It
was a secular organization that understood Kashmir as a unique source of identity and

21  Ibid., 231.


22  Sumit Ganguly, "The Islamic Dimensions of the Kashmir Insurgency," in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?, ed. Chris-
topher Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books, 2002), 187.
23 Ibid.
24  Paul Staniland, "Azad and Jihad: Trajectories of Insurgency in Kashmir," in Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent
Cohesion and Collapse (Cornell University Press, 2014), 67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh16w.8.
25  Ibid., 59.

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A Decade of Insurgency 49

nationhood that superseded any specific religious affinity. Javed Ahmad Mir, Chief of the
JKLF forces in Kashmir, called the organization a group of “democrats” who believed in the
“coexistence of different religious groups” in Kashmir.26 Its reinforcement of this identity
immensely appealed local communities, enabling it to mobilize Kashmiris through mass
demonstrations, strikes, and violence. JKLF believed an aggressive strategy was the only
means toward freedom from Indian oppression.27 Under the leadership of Amanullah Khan,
the group was conceived in 1964 and attempted to generate several militant and secessionist
uprisings throughout the 1970s; however, it failed to generate significant momentum.28 The
failure throughout the seventies and success in 1989 speaks to the importance of circum-
stances. The vacuum created by the political crash of 1987 engendered an optimal climate
for nationalism to rise and thrive; JKLF became the vector for this nationalism. Its greatest
downfall, however, was a lack of structure. The size of the JKLF swelled during the first few
years of the insurgency, but ultimately the socially-reliant organization lacked the political
institutions and cohesiveness to endure.29 Its collapse by 1994 coincided with the rise of
Islamic organizations that were better established, better supported, and more consolidated
through the advocacy of religious unity.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
The rise of the Islamist Hizb-ul-Mujahideen correlated with the decline of the secularist
JKLF around the mid-nineties. It was established in 1989 as a militant wing of JeI in Kashmir
under the leadership of Sheikh Abdul Basit, and depended on support from young, educated
Kashmiri men.30 Its base expanded throughout the insurgency as it adopted various smaller
organizations into its own, such as the integration of Tehrik-e-Jihad-e-Islami in 1991.31 It
inherited its social base from the Jamaaties consisting of both urban and rural support, the
latter being a demographic that the JKLF struggled to recruit.32 The central goal of the or-
ganization was for Kashmir to ultimately join Pakistan in the name of Islamic solidarity. It
received sponsorship from the Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), further consolidat-
ing its strength as an organization.33

26  Edward A. Gargan, "Behind Its Mountain Walls, Kashmir Wages Vicious War,” The New York Times, October 28, 1991,
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/28/world/behind-its-mountain-walls-kashmir-wages-vicious-war.html.
27 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 18.
28  Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 68.
29  Ibid., 69.
30  Sumit Ganguly, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Routledge, 2003), 59, ProQuest Ebook Central.
31  Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 85.
32  Ibid., 80.
33  Balraj Puri, "Kashmir’s Journey: From Insurgency to Militancy to Terrorism," Asian Affairs 27 (October 28, 2013): 80, http://
asian-affairs.com/Resources/BP5pages.pdf.

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50 Elena Ortiz

Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA)
By the mid-1990s, the local, Kashmiri-driven roots of the insurgency began to give way
to foreign-based jihad groups that capitalized on the region’s potential to become part of a
global jihad movement. Harkat-ul-Ansar, established in 1993, was a major player during this
transition of the insurgency. Receiving strong support from Pakistan, it fought for a merger
between Kashmir and Pakistan.34 The group’s legacy is built around Pan-Islamist ideology
in Kashmir, a vision it violently sought through conducting several attacks against Hindu
establishments, most notably against Nand Rishi’s Holy Shrine in 1995.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
Lashkar-e-Taiba was another internationally-sponsored jihadist and fundamentalist
group that participated in the Kashmir insurgency. Supported and funded primarily by
Pakistan, the group had its roots in Afghanistan, reflecting the globalized jihad that Kashmir
became entangled in through the latter part of the insurgent decade.

Five Levels of Conflict


Level One: The Kashmiri Crusade for Self-determination Against India
The initial outbreak of social unrest that launched the insurgency was a response to
political injustice and brutal violence inflicted on Kashmiri people at the hands of Indian
soldiers. The Indian government, led by Rajiv Gandhi, sent the Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF) and Border Security Forces (BSF) to quell the mass riots and demonstrations fol-
lowing the 1987 elections. These forces, peaking at 400,000 in 1995, employed belligerent
and repressive methods, including indiscriminate killings, torture, destruction of holy sites,
and rape against Kashmiri people through the early 1990s.35,36 India even went so far as to
remove all medical records from local hospitals dated after 1989 in order to hide the evi-
dence of such violence.37 Further, the International Commission of Jurists estimates that
by 1991, approximately 15,000 Kashmiris were detained by India without trial.38 The 1990
Armed Forces Special Powers Act, declared under the newly-appointed Indian Governor of
Kashmir Girish Chandra Saxena, legalized these forms of abuse.39 The extreme aggression
of the Indian strategy can be contextualized within the rising Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a

34 Ganguly, The Kashmir Question, 58.


35 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 25.
36 Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 250.
37  Human Rights in Kashmir, 61.
38  Ibid., 60.
39  Miraj U-Din Munshi, "A Kashmiri Perspective I," in Kashmir: Revolving Regional Conflict, ed. Robert G. Wirsing (Kartikeya
Publications, 1996), 38.

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A Decade of Insurgency 51

Hindu-nationalist political organization within India that exploited the Kashmir conflict as
a “war cry” through its anti-Muslim rhetoric and action.40 BJP’s influence in Delhi presented
a barrier to compromise, especially with the Muslim population in Kashmir.
The Indian campaign of terror in Kashmir was miscalculated and counterproduc-
tive. Governor Saxena admitted excessive violence to The New York Times in 1990, but still
claimed they were only violent in instances of “severe provocation.”41 The Indian strategy
was centered on the belief that Kashmiris were Indians who had “gone astray” and could be
worn down with force. India misperceived the insurgency as a cause, rather than a symp-
tom, of political unrest.42 This misconception and underestimation of the Kashmiri iden-
tity, and their uncompromising fight for self-determination, led to the failure of the Indian
campaign. India even offered elections in exchange for Kashmiri acceptance of “territorial
integrity.”43 This reinforces the view that India catastrophically failed to listen to and under-
stand the source of Kashmir outrage, which gravitated around self-determination above all
else. Furthermore, neither the CRPF nor the BSF were adequately trained in handling the in-
surgency. They spoke only a language of violence and lacked knowledge of the conflict’s ori-
gins as well as local culture.44 As Indian-ordered violence prevailed, popular demonstrations
and riots only grew, with thousands of Kashmiris taking to the streets in violent protest.
By July of 1990, over 80% of the Kashmiri population was on strike against Indian troops,
highlighting the unanimity and mass solidarity of the Kashmiri movement.45 Feeding off of
this popular legitimization of violence, the size of and support for insurgent groups began
to swell. Repression bred the rise of nationalism by radically alienating Kashmiris from the
Indian state. Nationalist insurgent groups, such as the JKLF, filled this expanding vacuum
starved of legitimate authority. The JKLF attracted supporters from the Student Liberation
Front and the Kashmir Mujahideen Liberation front, who both consisted of disillusioned
and frustrated Kashmiri youth.46 The 1990 Armed Forces Special Powers Act, complimented
by India’s violent campaign of terror, legitimized the rise of these militant groups. Indeed,
the JKLF became the face of this movement through its strong advocacy for an indepen-
dent and autonomous Kashmir. It became the platform for Kashmiri voices that had been
silenced by decades of physical Indian repression and political neglect.

40  Gargan, "Behind Its Mountain Walls, Kashmir Wages Vicious War.”
41  Barbara Crossette, "Srinagar Journal; In Kashmir's Enchanted Valley, War Breaks Spell," The New York Times, October 5,
1990, www.nytimes.com/1990/10/05/world/srinagar-journal-in-kashmir-s-enchanted-valley-war-breaks-spell.html.
42  David P. Fidler and Sumit Ganguly, India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (London: Routledge, 2009), 81.
43  Ibid., 83.
44  Ibid., 79.
45 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 39.
46  Sumit Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir," Foreign Affairs Magazine, January 28, 2009, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
asia/1990-12-01/avoiding-war-kashmir.

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52 Elena Ortiz

At this level of analysis, the essence of conflict exists between Indian troops and local
Kashmiri people, represented primarily through the nationalist JKLF. The nationalist move-
ment, however, was a highly decentralized social complex that struggled to sustain itself
without the insurance of institutional backing. The group gradually splintered into other
groups, such as the Students Liberation Front and Al-Umar Mujahideen, further decel-
erating the nationalists’ momentum.47 As the insurgency endured into the mid-1990s, the
Kashmiri response, originally united against Indian troops, began to polarize into secession-
ists on one side and Islamists in favor of joining Pakistan on the other. This added a new
dimension to the insurgency, which will be discussed under conflict level two. The conflict
between nationalism and Indian repression was critical in mobilizing the Kashmiri people
and launching the insurgency. Although this conflict did not endure as the dominant front
throughout the whole insurgency, it set the stage for a long-term conflict that consumed
the decade.
By 1996, the conflict between India and the insurgents reached a stalemate in which
India was unable to militarily defeat its adversaries.48 Although India blamed this on
Pakistan’s propaganda and material support being sent to the insurgents, a military response
was a miscalculated strategy in the first place.49 The decentralized, locally-produced nature
of the insurgency meant that it could not be precisely targeted and eliminated. Despite
the decline in scale of India’s violent counterinsurgency strategy, Delhi continued to exert
pressure and control over the region. For example, in the late 1990s, The New York Times
reported India preventing Kashmiri separatists from leaving Kashmir and continuing other
repressive methods that inhibited the daily lives and freedoms of local Kashmiris.50

Level Two: Rivalries Between Insurgent Groups


Although the original insurgency was not based in Islam, the circumstances of social
unrest and absence of legitimate authority engendered a climate ripe for Islamic extrem-
ism. Despite initially being united against a common Indian enemy, an internal conflict
in Kashmir developed between competing visions of nationalism, ranging from secular,
to Kashmiri, to Islamic.51 In 1981, 94.96% of the valley population was Muslim, creating
an overwhelming Muslim majority in the area.52 The oppression by Indian soldiers and the

47  Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 82.


48  Sumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay," International Security
21, no. 2 (1996): 77, www.jstor.org/stable/2539071.
49  Ibid., 78
50  Celia W. Dugger, "Kashmir Separatists Stopped By India on Way to the U.N.," The New York Times, September 24, 1999,
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/24/world/kashmir-separatists-stopped-by-india-on-way-to-the-un.html.
51  Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency,” 91.
52 Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 125.

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A Decade of Insurgency 53

favorable Muslim demographics facilitated the transformation of the insurgency into an


Islamic-based movement. Kashmiri Muslims mobilized in a specific jihad against Indian
oppression.53 This religiously-motivated current often clashed with the nationalist tide;
the largest rivalry developed between the JKLF and HuM, who both sought to represent
the forefront of the resistance. The two organizations initially attempted to unite against a
common Indian enemy, but this fragile alliance never sustained and instead deteriorated
into a competition for power.54 In 1993, for example, the JKLF accused HuM of murdering
Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru, a surgeon and JKLF-follower.55 This rivalry corrupted the organic
freedom movement, redirecting energy against one another, instead of toward a shared
Indian enemy. Additionally, this competition provided India with an advantage of facing
a weaker, fragmented resistance. HuM ultimately triumphed in the competition, outper-
forming the JKLF in political organization and capitalizing on the nationalist struggle to
sustain itself. By the mid-1990s, the secularist nationalism of Kashmiri self-determination
was overtaken by Islamic organizations. However, internal rivalries also plagued the Islamist
insurgent organizations, which were split between supporting and opposing the accession
of Kashmir into Pakistan, as will be further explored in conflict three.
The All Parties Hurriyat Conference of 1993 was the final attempt at uniting the
insurgent groups against a common Indian enemy. Chaired by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the
conference included 26 organizations (including both the JKLF and HuM), loosely con-
nected by the belief that India’s violent tactics and claim to Kashmir were illegitimate and
unjust.56 However, the collection of insurgents diverged in their ultimate objectives and ide-
ologies. The coexistence of secularist, Islamist, secessionist, and pro-Pakistani accessionist
groups made it difficult for the conference to agree on action and consolidate into a formi-
dable front against India. The weakness of this Conference is a case study in internal and
ideological divisions. Despite genuine attempts at cooperation, diverging objectives over-
powered the small surface area of common ground. As these differences amplified through-
out the decade, the Conference lost traction and diluted into an allegiance by name only.57

Level Three: Pakistan’s Fight Against Kashmiri Secessionists


As Islamist organizations began to dominate the scene of the insurgency, schisms
within these religiously-driven organizations also formed. On one side were Islamist seces-
sionist organizations advocating for Kashmir’s self-determination, while on the other side
were Islamist organizations in favor of uniting Kashmir and Pakistan. Pakistan began to
53  Malik, Abdullah, and Noshab, Jihad in the modern era, 7.
54 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 35.
55  Human Rights in Kashmir, 36.
56  Chowdhary, "India's Response to the Kashmir Insurgency," 49.
57 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 35.

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54 Elena Ortiz

streamline aid in the form of weapons, training, and sanctuary to the latter branch of or-
ganizations in order to reinforce the resistance against an autonomous Kashmir.58 Pakistan
was tremendously invested in Kashmir due to the historically-rooted belief that Kashmir
is a fundamental part of Pakistani identity and territory. However, Kashmiri-scholar Vijay
K. Sazawal highlights that despite this belief, Pakistan still fails to recognize that Kashmiris
have their own, unique and independent heritage.59
Before the rise of Islamist organizations, Pakistan supported the JKLF movement
against Indian oppression. Like India, however, Pakistan ultimately worked to curb the azadi
secessionist movement.60 In the early 1990s, Pakistan abandoned its support of the JKLF and
allied with HuM, whose pledges to unite Kashmir and Pakistan were more congruent with
Islamabad’s interests. Pakistan denied providing any form of aid, despite the overwhelming
evidence that it did provide military assistance to insurgent groups.61 Pakistan’s influx of aid
to pro-accession Islamist groups contributed to the decline of nationalists groups, whose
relative power proved unable to compete. The main beneficiaries of Pakistani aid were Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Harkat-ul-Ansar.62 Some organizations, such as JeI,
allied with Pakistan under a true ideological commitment to accession under Pan-Islamist
identity. Others, such as HuM, emphasized the distinctness of the Kashmiri identity and
were not originally pro-accession but joined Pakistan’s sphere in order to gain access to its
resources and support.63 A 1992 confrontation between Pakistan and secessionists is sym-
bolic of this phase of conflict. In February 1992, Pakistani troops and riot police opened fire
against unarmed Kashmiri separatists near the Pakistani border.64 This paroxysm of violence
highlights Pakistan’s commitment to containing separatist activity and energy. Pakistan’s
crusade against Kashmiri separatists has been demonstrated through both first-hand vio-
lence and by empowering pro-Pakistani insurgent groups on the ground. As Miraj-u-Din
Munshi, a scholar from the University of Kashmir, points out, Pakistan’s involvement nei-
ther detracts from nor negates the indigenously Kashmiri genesis of the insurgency.65 The
contribution that Pakistan made to the conflict was one of endurance. It was essential in the
insurgency’s persistence once the initial stand-off between nationalists and Indian troops

58  Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 87.


59  Vijay K. Sazawal, "A Kashmiri Perspective II," in Kashmir: Revolving Regional Conflict, ed. Robert G. Wirsing (Kashmir:
Revolving Regional Conflict, 1996), 55.
60  Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 122.
61  Human Rights in Kashmir, 33.
62 Ganguly, The Kashmir Question, 58.
63  U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: Appendix C -- Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2004), 147, https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/31947.pdf.
64 Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 123.
65  Ibid., 41.

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A Decade of Insurgency 55

was relegated into the conflict’s periphery. Pakistan’s generous aid and support to its selected
militant groups made them significantly harder to suppress and contributed to their promo-
tion to the forefront of the insurgency, overtaking the organic nationalism of groups like the
JKLF.66
These first three levels of conflict examine the insurgency from a ground level by exam-
ining the various stakeholders involved. The first major takeaway is that the insurgency was
organically Kashmiri. In its earliest days, the conflict was defined as a response of Kashmiris
to political instability and violent repression at the hands of India. It was the moment in
which the building pressure from Kashmir’s history of exploitation finally triggered a mobi-
lized reponse. India was the match that ignited this response, Pakistan provided persistence
of the conflict, and Islamists leeched off of unstable circumstances to advance their cause.
Although the latitude of conflict expanded, Kashmiris still remained in the eye of their own
storm in their fight for self-determination.
Secondly, these first three levels of conflict elucidate the countless moving parts of the
insurgency. The constellation of militant groups was in constant flux. Ideologically, insur-
gent groups varied between secular, Islamist, secessionist, and pro-union with Pakistan.
Organizationally, groups that shared any one of these ideologies frequently factionized into
splinter groups, as evident by the formations of the JKLF, MUF, and HuM. The result of this
was a competitive network of individual groups contending for dominance. As militant
groups began to challenge each other, India lost the spotlight as the single enemy of the
insurgency. Pakistan added yet another layer of conflict with its own campaign against se-
cessionists via supporting Islamist organizations in favor of union. Paul Staniland, a scholar
from the University of Chicago, accurately captures the nebulus nature of this network: a
“hazy universe” of various groups.67 This all illustrates a deeply entrenched conflict that
transcends any one of these layers. Each level of conflict was symbiotically related to the
others and contributed to the shifts in dominance of each one, according to different peri-
ods of insurgency. The collapse of political order culminating in the 1987 elections caused
severe repercussions in the Kashmiri social sphere, contributing to the rise of nationalism.
Islamic extremists also capitalized on this societal turbulence and strategically exploited the
institutional weaknesses of the JKLF and nationalist platform by manipulating it into an op-
portunity to advance the Islamist agenda of jihad against India. As Islamist groups began to
separate into those against or for Pakistan, Islamabad began channeling resources into the
latter as a means to ensure its endurance. The interconnectedness is vividly clear. In order
to complete this story of conflict, two final rungs must be added: the ongoing Indo-Pakistani
rivalry that bled into the insurgency and the role of rising global jihad.

66  Fidler and Ganguly, India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, 87.
67  Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 61.

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56 Elena Ortiz

Level Four: Kashmir and the Ongoing Indo-Pakistani Rivalry


From a more macroscopic vantage point, the Kashmir insurgency became caught in the
crossfires of Indo-Pakistani regional power politics. Neither Pakistan nor India would allow
Kashmir to be ceded to the other. From the Indian standpoint, Kashmir had been legally
ceded to India by the Maharaja in 1947. Annexation of Kashmir would also prove India’s
success as a secular nation, fueling India’s uncompromising claim to the region since parti-
tion.68 Furthermore, the domestic context of the rising BJP nationalist party in India threat-
ened India’s secularism, amplifying their desperation for Kashmir.69 Pakistan, whose funda-
mental identity was formed as a homeland for Muslims, also strongly claimed Kashmir as
their own. In February 1995, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto described Kashmir as
“the jugular vein of Pakistan.”70 Since partition, India and Pakistan had engaged in multiple
conflicts and standoffs over Kashmir; most notably, the Brass Stacks crisis of 1987 that took
place just before insurgency and almost led to war between the two sides. The crisis and
brinkmanship of Brass Stacks indicates the high levels of tension that festered between India
and Pakistan at the time of insurgency. The violent demonstrations demanding Kashmiri
self-determinations that broke out in 1989 were thus further problematic for both coun-
tries. As both powers began to pour resources into actively resisting the JKLF-pioneered
nationalist movement, the appeal of nationalism and self-determination grew. Both India
and Pakistan’s resentment towards Kashmir independence became an added source of at-
traction to the nationalist platform.71 Conflict level three touched on Pakistan’s involvement
in the insurgency in order to prevent an independent Kashmir by supporting the movement
to unite Kashmir and Pakistan. However, this involvement cannot be fully understood with-
out understanding Pakistan’s position relative to that of India’s. Pakistan got involved both
to support Kashmiri Muslims and to weaken Indian force being exerted in Kashmir. From
the Indian perspective, Pakistan was waging a proxy war against India through supporting
Islamist militants.72 Assuming this view, Pakistan got involved as an excuse to undermine
India’s global reputation by draining Indian military resources and demoralizing its army.73
However, Pakistani involvement can also be viewed as a defensive response rather than an
offensive one. From a Pakistani position, India’s attempt to politically monopolize Kashmir
through the 1986 agreement between Farooq Abdullah and Indian Congress, as well as
the 1987 fraudulent elections, was evidence that India was striving to establish permanent

68  Sazawal, "A Kashmiri Perspective II," 56.


69  Human Rights in Kashmir, 155.
70 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 45.
71 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 34.
72  Chowdhary, "India's Response to the Kashmir Insurgency," 50.
73 Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 121.

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A Decade of Insurgency 57

control in Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan’s involvement was a response to Indian political and
territorial aggression rather than an offensive proxy war.
However, although Pakistani involvement may have initially been in response to Indian
action, Pakistan adopted a more proactive and offensive objective of annexing Kashmir, sub-
stantiated by their shift in alliance from the pro-independence JKLF to HuM and other mili-
tant Islamists. The latter group of organizations became instruments for Pakistan’s objectives
in Kashmir and were compensated with generous streams of financial and weapons-based
support.74 The problem with both the Indian and Pakistani perspectives is that they are en-
tirely positioned in relation to one another. They viewed the conflict not as the organically
Kashmiri movement that it was, but as an excuse to ignite their own power-driven rivalry.
Both refused freedom to Kashmir due to the sacrifice it would bring to the balance of rela-
tive power. Kashmiris became pawns caught in this crossfire, as the original essence of their
movement was crushed under the silencing weight of Indo-Pakistani power politics.
In 1996, Kashmiri elections were attempted again, supposedly under fairer standards
than last time.75 Regardless, turnout only amounted to 40% due to threats from militant
groups preventing citizens from voting.76 As a result, the Kashmiri National Congress came
to power. Originally a purely Kashmiri party, it ultimately allied with the Indian Congress
in 1986 under Farooq Abdullah. Therefore, these elections saw India infiltrating Kashmir’s
political sphere by representing a political party in the region. In response, Pakistan reignit-
ed anti-Indian insurgent activity, creating a spike in violence around the elections.77 Again,
Pakistan was acting in response to India instead of the organic instability on the ground.
Indian counterinsurgency to this violence became more politically-driven than militarily-
driven, as it initially was during the first stages of the popular insurgency.
By the mid-1990s, as India and Pakistan continued to compete against each other
for Kashmiri control, the original azadi movement of local communities lost its voice. It
became clear that that the political future of Kashmir would be a prisoner to the national
interests of India and Pakistan. The absence of self-determination that initially inspired the
Kashmir insurgency was just the same following their revolt. This lack of progress reflects
how larger forces exploited the region’s vulnerability and crushed the organic Kashmiri
movement.

74  Khalid Mahmood and Moeed Yusof, "Peace Process with India: A Pakistani Perspective," in Peace Process with India: A Paki-
stani Perspective (United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 80.
75  Fidler and Ganguly, India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, 81.
76  Ibid., 81.
77  Ibid., 82.

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58 Elena Ortiz

Level Five: Global Jihad


The rise of Islamist organizations in Kashmir, largely due to Pakistan’s support, coin-
cided with the rise of a global jihadi current. By the mid-1990s, jihadist strength had con-
solidated in Israel/Palestine, Iran, Afghanistan, and through transnational terrorist groups
such as Al-Qaeda.
The strength of Islamist organizations in Kashmir created a natural nesting ground for
jihadist groups from outside Kashmir to further their agenda of social Islamization. The
local jihad against Indian oppression was transformed into a global one by the influx of
external organizations. The Kashmir insurgency coincided with the Soviet withdrawal in
Afghanistan in 1990, unleashing the rise of a number of extremist organizations.78 In 1996,
the same year as the later Kashmiri elections, the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan.
Under Taliban leadership, jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), Al-Faran,
Harakat-ul-Jihad, and other Afghan-sponsored groups established themselves in Kashmir
as Mehmaan Mujahideen or “guest militants.”79 They sought to capitalize on the Islamist
base that was already present in Kashmir and integrate it into a globalized movement of
Islamization. Due to its vulnerability, Kashmir was perceived as an easy target for jihadist
groups; the ability of jihadists to wrestle Kashmir from Indian hands would also boost the
credibility and reputation of the global movement.80 These groups, similar to the militants
on the ground, viewed themselves not as terrorists but as freedom fighters in the name of
Islam.81 Their goal of Islamizing Kashmir manifested into a brutal wave of ethnic cleans-
ing against Kashmiri Hindus and Pandits. During the mid-1990s, approximately 140,000
Hindus had fled the valley due to mass violence, rape, and destruction inflicted within and
against their communities.82 Much of this violence was conducted at the hands of groups
such as Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Tehreek-e-Jihad-e-Islami, who received aid
and support from Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. Hezb-i-Islami, an Afghan based jihadist
organization led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, seized the opportunity to join the insurgency
by collaborating closely with Pakistan's ISI as a means of joint-resistance against India, for
whom they harbored a deep antagonism.83 This highlights the increasingly globalized nature
of the insurgency, as organizations such as Hezb-i-Islami pursued an agenda in Kashmir in
order to realize an objective that was unrelated to the region. Other Afghan-based organiza-
tions, such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami, targeted Western travelers in Kashmir, channeling
their deeply-rooted resentment against the West and its involvement in Afghanistan and the

78  Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency,” 103.


79  Ganguly, "The Islamic Dimensions of the Kashmir Insurgency," 182.
80  Singh, "An Indian Perspective II," 106.
81 Ibid.
82 Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 245.
83  Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir."

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A Decade of Insurgency 59

Middle East during the Cold War.84 Although the domestic Islamist groups, such as HuM,
had already succeeded in hindering the strength of the secular, nationalist insurgents, the
influx of jihadist groups solidified their overpowerment. They fed off of the existing support
for domestic extremists and translated it into a more radical and global objective for Islam.
Kashmir was thus swept into the current, worldwide struggle of jihad.
As the insurgency went on, Kashmir became increasingly less controlled by the
Kashmiri people, although they were responsible for the initial movement. The azadi cause
for freedom and justice against Indian oppression became diluted as external interests cor-
rupted and exploited the social turbulence of the region. Pakistan leveraged the conflict
as a means to pursue the historic objective of annexing Kashmir, while global jihadist or-
ganizations seized the opportunity to integrate Kashmir into an even broader context. By
the end of the 1990s, the indigenous cause was powerless. Kashmiris did not welcome the
jihadist capitalization of the movement, whose ideals were not congruent with local beliefs.
85
The Kashmiri ability to reclaim their movement was crippled. Not only did hundreds of
thousands of Kashmiris leave the valley, but local power became bound to Islamist militant
organizations affiliated primarily with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Conclusion
The decade of Kashmiri insurgency was defined by its dynamism. The first level of con-
flict between Kashmiri people and Indian troops was the most organic and foundational
layer. It represented the combustion of ultimate and proximate causes that triggered a vio-
lent grassroots response demanding Kashmiri self-determination. However, as the insur-
gency continued into the 1990s, the movement diverged from its secular, nationalist nature
through the introduction of an Islamic current. The second level of conflict is defined by
the rivalries that were born between militant groups as a greater number of actors were
added to the mix. This represented a major turn in the insurgency away from the united,
local movement against Indian oppression. Although this antagonism still existed from both
militant categories, fighting was now split and broken down between each other and the
greater Indian enemy. The third level of conflict between secessionists and militants in favor
of joining Pakistan expanded the distance between the reality of the conflict and its origins.
This layer is closely related to conflict level four, which contextualizes the insurgency within
the historic Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan misperceived the
conflict as an attack against each other instead of the organic, grassroots freedom movement
produced within Kashmir. These larger power politics further corrupted the original move-
ment. The fifth, final layer to the insurgency was the injection of global jihad. The timing of

84  United States, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 146.


85  Ganguly, "The Islamic Dimensions of the Kashmir Insurgency," 186.

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60 Elena Ortiz

the Kashmiri uprising coincided with the rise of international jihadist groups, hailing pri-
marily from Afghanistan, which exploited the Islamic sentiments and social vulnerability
of Kashmir as a prime candidate for extremist success.
The boundaries of each level of conflict are porous and permeate into one another. As
this paper has shown, each layer has a cascading effect on the overarching insurgency by
impacting the developments of other levels of conflict. Further, the coexistence of these five
layers prevented resolution, as each pursued objectives that contradicted those of the others.
The presence of over thirty different groups and actors, each with their own strengths and
weaknesses, prevented any sense of reliable alliances or unity. Today, conflict in Kashmir
endures. The organic, indigenously-produced popular uprising against India that drove
the conflict’s eruption has now completely surrendered its voice to the agendas of external
actors, recycling Kashmir’s role as a pawn in greater power politics.

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A Decade of Insurgency 61

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world/srinagar-journal-in-kashmir-s-enchanted-valley-war-breaks-spell.html.
Dugger, Celia W. "Kashmir Separatists Stopped By India on Way to the U.N." The
New York Times, September 24, 1999. https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/24/
world/kashmir-separatists-stopped-by-india-on-way-to-the-un.html.
Fidler, David P., and Sumit Ganguly. India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned.
London: Routledge, 2009.
Ganguly, Sumit. "Avoiding War in Kashmir." Foreign Affairs Magazine, January 28,
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Ganguly, Sumit. "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and
Institutional Decay." International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 76-107. www.jstor.
org/stable/2539071.
Ganguly, Sumit. "The Islamic Dimensions of the Kashmir Insurgency." In Pakistan:
Nationalism without a Nation?, edited by Christopher Jaffrelot, 179-95. Lon-
don: Zed Books, 2002.
Ganguly, Sumit. The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect. London: Rout-
ledge, 2003. ProQuest Ebook Central.
Gargan, Edward A. "Behind Its Mountain Walls, Kashmir Wages Vicious War."
The New York Times, October 28, 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/28/
world/behind-its-mountain-walls-kashmir-wages-vicious-war.html.
Human Rights in Kashmir. The International Commission of Jurists, 1995. https://
www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/1995/01/India-human-righst-in-Kashmir-
fact-finding-mission-report-1995-eng.pdf.
Malik, Iffat, Sadaf Abdullah, and Farzana Noshab. Jihad in the modern era: image
and reality. Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001. http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/1295853717_87667588.pdf.

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Mahmood, Khalid, and Moeed Yusof. "Peace Process with India: A Pakistani Per-
spective." In Peace Process with India: A Pakistani Perspective, 77-107. United
States Institute of Peace, 2014.
Munshi, Miraj U-Din. "A Kashmiri Perspective I." In Kashmir: Revolving Regional
Conflict, edited by Robert G. Wirsing, 34-54. Kartikeya Publications, 1996.
Newberg, Paula. Double Betrayal: Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1995.
"Pakistan: ICJ Pressured on Kashmir Report." The International Commission of
Jurists. June 22, 1994. Accessed October 22, 2018. Pakistan: ICJ Pressured on
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Puri, Balraj. "Kashmir’s Journey: From Insurgency to Militancy to Terrorism."
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BP5pages.pdf.
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flict, edited by Robert G. Wirsing, 54-72. Kashmir: Revolving Regional Con-
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Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in the Crossfire. I.B. Tauris & Co, 1996.
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A Decade of Insurgency 63

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


The Europeanization of European Defense and the
Future of Transatlantic Relations
Alexandra S. Marksteiner

With lingering uncertainty regarding U.S. support for NATO and the terms surrounding
Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, the remaining EU-27 are taking steps to forge
a closer defense union. In 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel endorsed the concept of a
European army, thereby siding with her French counterpart Emmanuel Macron. Some aca-
demics believe that such sentiment marks the beginning of the Europeanization of European
defense and security. This paper explores three questions: What is the ‘Europeanization of
defense’? What might it mean for the future of transatlanticism? Should defense integration
at the European level be considered a panacea or peril for transatlantic partnership? This
paper argues that recently launched initiatives, such as the Permanent Structured Coopera-
tion and the European Defense Fund, are stepping stones rather than evidence for tangible
EU defense integration. However, that is not to suggest that European defense and security
are not being Europeanized. There has been a discernible change in rhetoric which, in turn,
reflects a shift in strategic thinking. Whether the Europeanization of European security and
defense will widen or close the transatlantic rift depends on how it is designed and executed.
Closer cooperation at the European level can give rise to smarter investment in defense, and
thus contribute to fairer burden-sharing. At the same time, Europeanizing defense could lead
to its duplication and fragmentation.

Introduction
In November 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made headlines when she
sided with French President Emmanuel Macron and called for the creation of an EU army.
In her address to the European Parliament, she declared that “Europeans must take [their]
destiny in [their] own hands” and, one day, establish a European army.1 Merkel’s endorse-
ment was certainly not the first of its kind; the French supported a collective army as early
as the 1950s through the infamous Pleven Plan.2 Yet, never before had a German chancel-
lor from the Christian Democratic Union, a deeply transatlanticist party, echoed French
demands for a pan-European army. Though Merkel emphasized that this plan would not

1  Maïa de la Baume and David M. Herszenhorn, “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for EU Army to Complement NATO,”
Politico EU, November 13, 2018.
2  Léo-Paul Jacob, “The Birth of a European Defense? A European Force,” NATO Association of Canada, July 11, 2017, http://
natoassociation.ca/the-birth-of-a-european-defence-part-ii-a-european-army/.

Alexandra S. Marksteiner is a senior at Johns Hopkins University, double majoring in


International Studies and Political Science with a minor in Environmental Studies.
The Europeanization of European Defense and the Future of 65
Transatlantic Relations
be realized until the distant future and that a European army would serve as a comple-
ment, not a replacement, to NATO, her statement nonetheless indicates a shift in strategic
thinking.3
Some academics such as Jolyon Howorth, a Visiting Professor of Public Policy
at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, believe that we are witnessing
the cusp of what they refer to as the “Europeanization” of European security and defense.4
Managing the threats on the continent’s eastern and southern flanks is becoming less of a
transatlanticist concern and more of a broader European one. Macron’s and Merkel’s calls
for an EU army is simply the latest manifestation of this overarching trend.
At a time of growing disenchantment with transatlanticism, it is important to
understand how the Europeanization of European security and defense may affect transat-
lantic relations. Should defense integration at the European level be considered a panacea
or peril for the transatlantic partnership? Will the strengthening of European defense have
a fragmenting or unifying effect on Europe’s relationship with the United States? In turn,
what does this mean for security and defense within and beyond the European continent?
These questions form the backbone of this paper. The paper will begin by defining Eu-
ropeanization and outlining how this concept applies to European security and defense.
Subsequently, it will ask whether European security and defense are genuinely being Eu-
ropeanized. The latter half of the paper will discuss the implications of European defense
integration for the transatlantic partnership, drawing both on original argumentation and
a comprehensive literature review. The conclusion will offer recommendations as to how a
Europeanized defense and security structure can be reconciled with NATO.
After thorough analysis, this paper will argue that recently launched initiatives,
such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defense Fund, are
merely stepping stones rather than direct proof of tangible EU defense integration. How-
ever, that is not to suggest that European defense and security are not being Europeanized.
It is not only the adoption of new policies but, more importantly, the change in rhetoric
that marks this shift in strategic thinking. Whether the Europeanization of European se-
curity and defense will widen or close the transatlantic rift depends on how it is designed
and executed. The devil is in the details. Integration at the European level can give rise to
more and smarter investment in defense, thereby contributing to fairer burden-sharing. At
the same time, Europeanizing defense can lead to duplication and fragmentation.

Defining Europeanization
The term “Europeanization” was first coined by Robert Ladrech in 1994, who

3  Katrin Bennhold and Steven Erlanger, “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for a European Army ‘One Day,’” The New York
Times, November 13, 2018.
4  Jolyon Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Brussels (2017), 1.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


66 Alexandra S. Marksteiner

conceptualized it as the reorientation of national policy-making and domestic structures


to align with political and economic dynamics put forth by the European Community.5
It is the “nation-specific adaptation to cross-national, European inputs.”6 Ladrech viewed
Europeanization as an incremental, bottom-up process. In 2000, Claudio Radaelli turned
Ladrech’s definition on its head, advocating for a top-down approach instead. He argued
that Europeanization refers to “processes of construction, diffusion and institutionaliza-
tion of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing
things,’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the mak-
ing of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities,
political structures and public policies.”7 According to Radaelli, Europeanization started in
Brussels and then spread to other national capitals of EU member states.
However, Ladrech and Radaelli’s contrasting viewpoints do not justly define
current discourse. The Europeanization of defense and security is a joint effort between
European leaders, among the most vocal are President Macron and EU functionaries such
as Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission.8 Hence, the process
cannot be categorized as entirely top-down or bottom-up, for it resembles a feedback loop
rather than a one-way street. European heads of state and their cabinets shape preferences
and put forth proposals, which are then fleshed out and executed by EU technocrats in
Brussels, in turn advancing Europeanization and the discourse surrounding it.
In this paper, the Europeanization of security and defense shall be defined as the
development and integration of defense capabilities at the European level in order to gain
strategic autonomy and counter threats both within and beyond the continent. There is
no clear starting point; the process can be driven either by Brussels or individual member
states. Furthermore, it is important to note that the Europeanization of security and de-
fense is not uniform across the Union. Some countries do not wish to partake in defense
integration. As a result, most of the recent initiatives, such as PESCO and the European
Intervention Initiative (EI2), operate on an opt-in basis. According to Ladrech, there is an
“adaptation to cross-national, European inputs,” but it is not all-encompassing.9 Lastly, the
Europeanization of European defense and security is by no means synonymous with the
renunciation of NATO nor the transatlantic partnership. In fact, Howorth advocates for a
Europeanized NATO, as the Europeanization of defense and continued support for NATO

5  Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,” Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1994): 69.
6  Ibid., pg. 84.
7  Claudio Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change,” European Integration Online
Papers (EIOP) 4, no. 8 (2000): 3.
8  Andrew Sparrow, “Jean-Claude Juncker Calls for EU Army,” The Guardian, March 08, 2015.
9  Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions,” 69.

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The Europeanization of European Defense and the Future of 67
Transatlantic Relations
are not mutually exclusive.10

Europeanizing European Defense and Security


Several academics have claimed that we are currently witnessing the beginning
of the Europeanization of European security and defense. Among them is Petros Violakis,
Director of Research at KEDISA, who goes so far as to assert that “substantial Europe-
anization has already taken place.”11 Whether the process is really that far along is debat-
able; despite this discourse, most scholars in the field seem to acknowledge that a shift in
strategic thinking is underway. In a 2017 article, Howorth wrote: “The EU Global Strategy
was correct to throw down the challenge of strategic autonomy. There is a clear dynamic
across the member states to take it up.”12 Daniel Keohane of ETH Zürich makes a similar
observation, noting that “there is an increasing awareness among EU government that
they need to fend for themselves.”13 This, according to Thierry Tardy of the EU Institute
for Security Studies, has driven European leaders “towards a more central EU defense
policy.”14
President Trump’s ambivalence towards NATO and the emergence of threats
on Europe’s eastern and southern flanks have instilled a sense of urgency in the minds of
European leaders. However, the question remains as to whether these conditions have led
to any substantive change amounting to the Europeanization of European defense and se-
curity. Scholars speak of four major recently passed “breakthroughs” that may indicate so:
the inauguration of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the establishment
of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), President Macron’s European
Intervention Initiative, and the European Defense Fund.15

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)


Out of these four developments, PESCO is regarded as the most momentous. The
idea was first introduced in the Lisbon Treaty and subsequently put into action in 2017.
The European External Action Service describes it as a “treaty-based framework and pro-

10  Jolyon Howorth, "Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence rela-
tions?," Journal of European Integration 40, no. 5 (2018): 534.
11  Petros Violakis, Europeanization and the Transformation of EU Security Policy: Post-Cold War Developments Security and
Defense Policy (Oxford: Routledge, 2018): 4.
12  Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” op. cit., pg. 20.
13  Daniel Keohane, “Policy Brief: EU Military Cooperation and National Defense,” The German Marshall Fund of the United
States, January 15, 2018, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/eu-military-cooperation-and-national-defense.

14  Thierry Tardy, “Does European Defense Really Matter? Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Common Security and Defense
Policy,” European Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2017): 119.
15  Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” 5.

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68 Alexandra S. Marksteiner

cess to deepen defense cooperation among EU member states who are capable and willing
to do so.”16 Through PESCO, various projects facilitate the joint development of defense
capabilities. At the time of writing, 25 out of the 28 EU member states have acceded to
PESCO, signing on to a list of 20 binding commitments and 17 projects.17

Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)


The MPCC is a joint command center located in Brussels. It was originally
envisioned as an operational headquarters (OHQ), but the European Council was forced
to put its plans on hold due to protest by the UK Ministry of Defense.18 After the Brexit
referendum in June 2016, the project was revived, and then passed in March 2017.19 The
MPCC does not yet resemble a full-fledged OHQ; some have even dismissed it as a “mere
call center.”20 However, on the 19th of November 2018, EU defense ministers agreed to ex-
tend the MPCC’s mandate to include executive operations involving up to 2,500 troops.21
Once realized, this will put an end to the practice of choosing an ad hoc OHQ for each
new EU mission –be it the Northwood Headquarters near London or the NATO Allied
Command Operations in Mons, Belgium.

European Intervention Initiative


The European Intervention Initiative (EI2) is the newest and perhaps the most
ambitious of the four developments. The EI2 was first proposed by French President Ma-
cron in 2017 and implemented in 2018.22 It is a “flexible, non-binding forum of European
participating states.”23 Its ultimate objective is “to develop a shared strategic culture” and
promote closer interaction between European militaries on intelligence sharing, scenario
planning, and support operations.24 The EI2 exists outside of both the NATO and EU

16  European External Action Service, “Fact Sheet: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO),” EEAS Fact Sheets, last modi-
fied in November 2018, accessed on November 21, 2018, https://cdn5-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/ farfuture/wM5QZfo-
VgVbC4zSzD-u--4o8E9TqYoThT3aNfAC6TQA/ mtime:1542983709/sites/eeas/files/pesco_ factsheet_november_2018_en_0.pdf
17 Ibid.
18  Daniela Vincenti, “EU Takes First Steps Towards Military HQ,” EURACTIV, March 6, 2017
19 Ibid.
20  Henry Samuel and Peter Foster, “New EU Army Headquarters Branded Little More Than a Call Center,” The Telegraph, May
20, 2017.
21  European External Action Service, “Fact Sheet: The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC),” EEAS Factsheets,
last modified in November 2018, accessed on November 21, 2018, https://cdn4-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec. europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/aGK-
F41zrLDLuNeg8csm24scxmjEwj4JBvrRbaLeaY4M/mtime:1542656575/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf.
22  Staff, “President Macron’s Initiative for Europe: A Sovereign, United, Democratic Europe,” Diplomatie, last modified on
September 26, 2017, accessed on November 22, 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-union/
events/article/president-macron-s-initiative-for-europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-europe.
23  Defense Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United King-
dom, “Letter of Intent Concerning the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2),” June 25, 2018.
24 Ibid.

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The Europeanization of European Defense and the Future of 69
Transatlantic Relations
frameworks, which fuels concerns that it may undermine both organizations.25 At the time
of writing, the EI2 comprises the armed forces of ten EU member states.26

European Defense Fund


In 2017, the European Defense Fund was launched to ramp up investment in the
research, development, and procurement of defense systems.27 It was created under the
banner of coordination and cooperation. In its press release, the Commission pledged to
promote collaborative research and the joint development of systems through the Fund.28
After 2020, the European Defense Fund will provide €1.5 billion each year.29 However, de-
spite the media acclaim, the numbers are not as impressive as they appear. Though seem-
ingly sizeable, this sum is rather modest compared to the €220 billion spent on defense by
the EU-28.30
While these initiatives boast a high level of ambition and ingenuity, they are not
the game-changers they are made out to be. They cannot be considered proof of genuine
defense integration. According to Howorth, “The initiatives are helpful and creative, but
they will not, in and of themselves, change anything fundamental.”31 Europe still has a long
way to go before it can claim to have forged a unified defense policy.32 Since most of these
initiatives allow for flexible levels of commitment, conferring decision-making power to
the individual member state, they serve as little more than stepping stones. However, they
form an institutional foundation for future integration.
The Europeanization of European defense and security is not as evident in
tangible policies as it is in the rhetoric adopted by European leaders. The most recent
example is President Macron’s and Chancellor Merkel’s endorsement of a pan-European
army. While it is not uncommon for a French president to come out in favor of European
defense integration and emancipation from the United States, Macron’s remarks are sig-
nificant due to the fact that they are inspired not by ideology or doctrine, but by a sense of
pragmatism.33

25  Lewis Sanders “Germany Cautious as France Leads European Defense Initiative,” Deutsche Welle, November 08, 2018.
26  Staff, “Finland Wants to Join French-led EI2,” Daily Finland, August 25, 2018.
27  European Commission Press Office, “Press Release: A European Defense Fund,” European Commission Press Release Data-
base, last modified on June 07, 2017, accessed on November 21, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30  Staff, “How Much Is Spent on Defense in the EU?” Eurostat: Your Key to European Statistics, last modified on May
18, 2018, accessed on November 22, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180518-
1?inheritRedirect=true.
31  Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” 7.
32  Howorth, “Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation,” 528.
33  Staff, “Seibert: Merkel hat als eine überzeugste Transatlantikerin gesprochen,” N-TV, May 29, 2017, https://www.n-tv.de/
ticker/Merkel-hat-als-eine-ueberzeugte-Transatlantikerin-gesprochen-article19864538.html

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70 Alexandra S. Marksteiner

The fact that Merkel, a “deeply convinced transatlanticist,” voiced support for
Macron’s plan came as a shock to many.34 Some reports described it as a manifestation
of Merkel’s “pivot to Europe.”35 Merkel first indicated that she no longer saw the United
States as a reliable partner in May 2017, when she declared the “times in which we could
completely depend on other [to be], to a certain extent, over.”36 President Trump’s apathy
towards NATO, continued criticism of the European Union, and perceived disrespect for
transatlantic values has compelled European nations to plan for U.S. withdrawal from the
continent.37 Concerns over U.S. disengagement appear to be the main driver of the Euro-
peanization of defense and security.
This process is also discernible in the emergence of new, radical ideas in the field
of European defense. Lingering uncertainty over U.S. commitment to NATO has raised
questions as to the future of the NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement.38 This inspired a se-
lect few academics and policymakers, such as German MP Kiesewetter and former Polish
Prime Minister Kaczynski, to advocate for the acquisition of a European nuclear deterrent.
39,40
Other examples of such arrangements include an attempt to create an EU intelligence
agency and the rhetoric surrounding a European defense union.41,42
The phenomenon of Europeanization can even be found in official doctrines. The
EU Global Strategy, for example, declares that “as Europeans, we must take greater respon-
sibility for our security. […] An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is
important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond
its borders.”43 The inclusion of the phrase “strategic autonomy” is particularly telling,
given that it was taboo to use the term in official documents until recently. Furthermore,
Germany’s most recent White Paper echoes the call for European defense integration by
advocating for the Europeanization of defense procurement.44

34 Ibid.
35  Lewis Sanders, “How the World Reacted to Merkel’s Pivot to Europe,” Deutsche Welle, May 29, 2017.
36  Annett Meiritz, Anna Reimann and Severin Weiland, “A Transatlantic Turning Point: What Was Merkel Thinking?” Der
Spiegel, May 29, 2017.
37  Daniel Keohane, “Make Europe Defend Again?”, Carnegie Europe, November 18, 2016, http://carnegieeurope. eu/strategi-
ceurope/66199.
38  Alexandra Marksteiner, “Alternative Futures: Rethinking the European Nuclear Posture,” New Atlanticist, July 18, 2017.
39  Andrea Shalal, “German Lawmaker Says Europe Must Consider Own Nuclear Deterrence Plan,” Reuters, November 16,
2016.
40  Konrad Schuller, “Interview mit PiS Chef Kaczynski,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 7, 2017.
41  Philip Kaleta, “Germany Rejects Creating European Intelligence Agency,” Politico EU, May 10, 2017.
42  Roderich Kiesewetter, “Toward a European Defense Union,” Carnegie Europe, April 29, 2016, https://carnegieeurope.eu/
strategiceurope/63489.
43  European External Action Service, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe | A Global Strategy for the Euro-
pean Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,” 2016, 19.
44  Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, “2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of
the Bundeswehr,” 49, 129.

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The Europeanization of European Defense and the Future of 71
Transatlantic Relations
Defense and security in Europe are indeed being Europeanized, both in substan-
tive and, even more so, in rhetorical terms. The process of Europeanization may still be in
its infancy, but it is continuing and accelerating.

Panacea or Peril?
The presidency of Donald Trump has strained transatlantic relations, to say the
least. Some journalists have even gone so far as to publish eulogies for the transatlantic
partnership.45 While it may be premature to declare the transatlantic alliance as deceased,
it is undeniable that transatlanticism is wavering. U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Iran nuclear deal, the imposition of tariffs by the
United States on EU imports, and President Trump’s countless diplomatic blunders have
caused European allies to grow resentful and disenchanted.
That is not to suggest that the United States and Europe have not had to grapple
with major disagreements in the past. For instance, Germany’s and France’s refusal to
support the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 showcases this. Deep-rooted differences in
strategic thinking underlie the recent estrangement.46 In the words of political scientist
Robert Kagan: “Americans are from Mars; Europeans are from Venus.”47
However, something about this episode of divergence seems different: the very
basis and necessity of the transatlantic alliance is being called into question and the trans-
atlantic rift appears wider than ever before. In this context, it is worth discussing how the
Europeanization of European defense and security might affect transatlantic relations. Is it
a panacea or is it perilous? Is it an opportunity or a threat?

Literature Review
The scholarly community has yet to reach a consensus on the issue. Some, such
as Sven Biscop, believe that defense integration and strategic autonomy are the answers to
Europe’s metaphorical prayers.48 Europeanization would not only bolster EU security but
also strengthen the transatlantic partnership.49 Others, such as Luke Coffey, are convinced
that defense integration on the European level will do more harm than good.50 The follow-
ing section will further explore the existing literature on the topic and shed light on the

45  James Taub, “RIP the Transatlantic Alliance, 1945-2018,” Foreign Policy, May 11, 2018.
46  Kristian L. Nielsen, “Continued Drift But Without the Acrimony: US-European Relations Under Barack Obama,” Journal of
Transatlantic Studies 11, no. 1 (2013): 83-108.
47  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003): 3.
48  Sven Biscop, “Letting Europe Go Its Own Way: The Case for Strategic Autonomy,” Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2018.
49 Ibid.
50  Luke Coffey, “EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Relations and Europe’s Security,” The Heritage
Foundation, June 6, 2013.

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72 Alexandra S. Marksteiner

debate therein.
In a backgrounder published by the Heritage Foundation, Coffey argues that
defense integration, in the form of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),
will undermine NATO, weaken the transatlantic partnership, and threaten European
security.51 Assuming continued integration, NATO would be relegated to a second-tier
priority; resources would be directed away from it, as the six non-allied EU member
states (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden) would likely veto the use of
EU assets in NATO operations.52,53 With a defense arrangement of its own, EU-NATO
cooperation may become increasingly difficult since the United States may be decoupled
from Europe and may lose influence regarding European security matters.54 However, if
left to fend for itself, the European Union might not be able to guarantee the security of its
citizens. Bureaucratic inertia in Brussels could seriously dampen the EU’s military effec-
tiveness.55 Coffey concludes by urging the United States to oppose EU defense integration
and the CSDP.56 However, Coffey’s arguments contain flaws. In addition to being overly
deterministic, he asserts that “each Euro spent on the CSDP is one less that can be spent
on NATO,” approaching organizational interaction as though it were a zero-sum game.57
This argument fails to acknowledge that the Europeanization of defense and security can
be designed in such a way as to harmonize with NATO doctrines and operations.
In his article on the CSDP, Thierry Tardy makes a similar, albeit more nuanced,
argument. He states that the “European Union might not be the most appropriate instru-
ment of the defense of Europe.”58 To support his claim, Tardy points to persisting diver-
gences in strategic cultures and institutional preferences across the EU member states.59
On the spectrum of opinions, Howorth occupies the center. In order to stabi-
lize its neighborhood and become a major player in the realm of international security,
Europe must become strategically autonomous.60 This means it must develop its capacities
in all areas and end its dependency on the United States.61 Nevertheless, it is imperative
not to have two security entities in the same space.62 Competition and rivalry would be

51  Ibid., pg. 1.


52  Ibid., pg. 1, 6.
53  Ibid., pg. 3.
54  Ibid., pg. 1.
55  Ibid., pg. 1.
56  Ibid., pg. 15.
57  Ibid., pg. 6.
58  Tardy, “Does European Defense Really Matter?” 135.
59  Ibid., pg. 119.
60  Howorth, “Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation,” 534.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.

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The Europeanization of European Defense and the Future of 73
Transatlantic Relations
inevitable, which is why Howorth advocates for the Europeanization of NATO, involving
the incremental conferral of command from the United States to Europe.63 The transition
period can be thought of as an apprenticeship in leadership.64
Tomáš Valášek, former Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to
NATO and current Director of Carnegie Europe, comes to a similar conclusion. He
confirms the widely-held suspicion that the United States has grown disillusioned with
European security and NATO.65 Hence, Europe must plan for a scenario in which The
United States disengages from NATO entirely. Europe has “the right to explore a backup
to NATO.”66 Yet, that does not necessarily mean withdrawing from or relegating NATO.
Europe would be best advised to couple its defense assets to NATO but in such a way that
a successful military operation does not hinge on U.S. involvement.67
On the far end of the spectrum is Sven Biscop of the Egmont Royal Institute for
International Relations, who portrays European defense integration as the answer to the
long-standing U.S. demand for more burden-sharing within NATO and as a salvation
for transatlantic relations.68 PESCO and other integrative initiatives enable the European
allies to pool resources and procure strategic enablers (e.g. precision-guided munitions,
surveillance systems etc.).69 This would allow Europe to invest more in defense, project
more military force, and gain strategic autonomy.70 By becoming an equal partner, Europe
would, in turn, be able to “push back against US policies that go against European interest
and against US interests as well.”71

The Devil Lies in the Details


Ultimately, as to whether the Europeanization of European defense and secu-
rity will lead either to the rectification or fragmentation of transatlantic relations entirely
depends on how it is configured and executed. For one, in order to achieve defense
integration and gain strategic autonomy, Europe will inevitably have to increase its defense
expenditure and invest in the development and procurement of high-value capabilities.
This would ease US concerns over burden-sharing and forge a more “co-equal alliance.”72

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65  Tomáš Valášek, “A New Transatlantic Security Bargain,” Carnegie Europe, May 23, 2017, http://carnegieeurope.
eu/2017/05/23/new-transatlantic-security-bargain-pub-70050.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68  Biscop, “Letting Europe Go Its Own Way.”
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72  Howorth, “Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation.”

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74 Alexandra S. Marksteiner

Europe would be able to bring crisis management, soft power competencies, and high-
intensity combat capabilities to the table. The European Union could become a champion
of the comprehensive approach to defense and security.
In this context, the importance of interoperability among the EUMS and with
NATO is emphasized. EU member states should view defense integration as a way to fill
gaps within NATO and procure capabilities that are too expensive for individual countries
to procure. Duplication must be avoided at all costs, unless it is to provide the operational
structure to support missions that correspond solely with the security interests of the Eu-
ropean Union, not with those of the United States. Managing the influx of migrants from
the MENA region and securing the Union’s external borders would fall into this category,
but deterring hybrid threats emanating from Russia and countering terrorism would not.
However, no matter how genuine the transatlanticist ambitions of European lead-
ers are or how tightly the integrative initiatives are aligned with NATO, the Europeaniza-
tion of defense and security will shift the priorities of European governments. To side with
Howorth, two equal security entities cannot inhabit the same space. If Macron’s European
Intervention Initiative were to succeed and produce a common strategic culture, it may
contradict NATO doctrine in one aspect or another, which could lead to the fragmenta-
tion of the alliance.
The end of U.S. primacy and the emergence of a powerful, unified actor—namely,
the European Union—may have a similar effect. If both the United States and Europe
have the ability to launch and command operations unilaterally, identifying threats that
jeopardize the interests of NATO, as opposed to those of the United States or European
Union individually, would become increasingly difficult, as common threat perception is a
prerequisite for coalition fighting.
Perhaps the most perilous side effect of the European quest for strategic autono-
my is the image that it conveys. NATO’s deterrence policy is centered around the threat of
U.S. involvement and the nuclear-sharing arrangement. By publicly advocating strategic
emancipation from the United States, European leaders are implying that the United States
can no longer be counted on. This creates a perception, be it real or imagined, of a split
alliance. NATO’s adversaries may be led to believe that an attack on a NATO ally would
not necessarily precipitate American intervention, thereby lowering the costs of taking the
offensive. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin is in favor of a European army,
perhaps because of its potential to widen the transatlantic rift.73

Conclusion
European actors are currently grappling with a set of dichotomous objectives.

73  Staff, “Natural That Europe Should Want an Army, Says Russia’s Putin,” Reuters, November 11, 2018.

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The Europeanization of European Defense and the Future of 75
Transatlantic Relations
On the one hand, Europe must take more responsibility for its own defense and become
strategically autonomous. On the other hand, it must preserve the NATO alliance and
prevent further fragmentation – not only to guarantee its own security, but to conserve
transatlanticism as NATO is the cornerstone of the transatlantic partnership. It is not
merely a military alliance; it is a forum for dialogue and exchange between North America
and Europe that must be protected.
Planners in Brussels and other European capitals must now find a way to recon-
cile these two sets of goals. Continued commitment to NATO and the Europeanization of
European defense and security are by no means exclusive. Yet, it is a difficult balance to
strike. Europe would be best advised to advance Europeanization of defense and security
quietly, while crafting a declarative policy demonstrative of unity within the transatlantic
alliance. For example, European leaders might postpone major Europeanizing measures
(e.g. the transferral of the position of SACEUR to a European general, the drafting of a
pan-European military strategy document) until the United States has elected a president
who is more supportive of NATO. Furthermore, Europe must prioritize interoperability,
both within the European Union and with NATO, and the prevention of duplication. Only
when NATO doctrines and institutions are inadequate or ill-suited should Europe draw
up new ones.74 Lastly, the purpose of the Europeanized defense and security structure
must be clearly defined and have as little overlap with that of NATO as possible. Dividing
responsibilities may help the transatlantic community avoid clashes.

74  Alice Pannier, “Macron’s European Intervention Initiative: More Questions Than Answer,” European Leadership Network,
November 23, 2017.

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76 Alexandra S. Marksteiner

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Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan
A Journal Review of the Role of Japanese Conglomerate Fisheries in the
Growing Bluefin Overfishing Crisis

Kayleigh Svensson
Countless fishery studies have made it evident that developing fisheries are quickly depleting
the ocean of its limited resources. Tuna is particularly vulnerable to powerful fisheries—spe-
cifically the Atlantic and Pacific bluefin tuna. This high-priced species is exploited primarily
by Japan’s commercial fisheries to feed their country, in addition to those around the rest of
the world. In this review, I have compiled the data and results from several fishery studies,
as well as from a number of bluefin stock assessment reports and fishery trends such as from
the International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific
Ocean (ISC), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Such reports uncover the abusive practices
of Japanese conglomerate seafood distributors. Japan’s destructive bluefin trade, including
their trend of noncompliance with catch quota guidelines, demonstrates their manifest role in
the decline of this important Marine Migratory Species. The fate of bluefin tuna rests in the
hands of Japan’s decision makers.

An Oceanwide Fisheries Crisis


In 1883, T. H. Huxley said that “probably all the great sea fisheries [...] are
inexhaustible: that is to say that nothing we do seriously affects the number of fish. And
any attempt to regulate these fisheries seems [...] to be useless.”1 Most, if not all, research
on fisheries disproves Huxley’s statement, though the issue of marine exploitation was
not brought to the public eye until 2006, when Worm et al. published their controver-
sial meta-analysis on marine ecosystem stability.2 The study’s controversy came from a
regression plot of marine taxa populations that, when extrapolated to 100%, forecasted a
global fisheries collapse in 2048 (See Figure 1).3 This particular prediction, which seemed
to be a side note in the journal, overtook the press. Several notable reports followed its

1  John Shepherd, “Oceans of Truth,” Nature News, August 28, 1997.


2  Boris Worm et al., “Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services,” Science, November 3, 2006.
3 Ibid.

Kayleigh Svensson is a junior studying Biological Sciences at Wellesley College. Supported


by the dissertation program at Operation Wallacea, she will be doing her senior thesis on the
ways in which coral reef degradation induces behavioral changes in obligate corallivore fish
in Southeast Sulaesi, Indonesia.
Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan 81

publication, including reviews by both National Geographic and The New York Times.4,5
Fortunately, the virality of this (potential) impending fisheries collapse set some gears into
motion, including a push for more research centers, wildlife refuges, and Marine Protect-
ed Areas (MPAs) in several of the most heavily fished waters.6

Figure 1: Regression extrapolation showing the projected global collapse of marine taxa in 2048.
(Figure 3A from Worm et al. 2006).7

1.1 – The Marine Migratory Species


The Marine Migratory Species (MMS), named for their wide migration patterns,
is the most threatened group of fish in the ocean. As such, far better fishery restrictions
are necessary for the species populations to recover from the intense damage fisheries
have done.8 MMS are difficult to protect, because their travels take them through the
waters of many national boundary lines, as well as through several Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction (ABNJ). Location-based fishery restrictions cannot provide any protection to
a species if it migrates into any ABNJ.9 Additionally, fish stocks that travel long distances
have a much higher chance of coming into contact with commercial drift nets10 and purse

4  John Roach, “Seafood May Be Gone by 2048, Study Says,” National Geographic, November 2, 2006, https://www.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/animals/2006/11/seafood-biodiversity/.
5  Cornelia Dean, "Study Sees ‘Global Collapse’ of Fish Species," The New York Times, November 3, 2006, https://www.nytimes.
com/2006/11/03/science/03fish.html.
6  Worm, "Impacts of Biodiversity Loss," 2006.
7 Ibid.
8  Andre M. Boustany, Robyn Matteson, Michael Castleton, Charles Farwell, and Barbara A. Block, "Movements of pacific
bluefin tuna (Thunnus orientalis) in the Eastern North Pacific revealed with archival tags," Progress in Oceanography 86, no. 1-2
(2010): 94-104.
9 Ibid.
10  Refers to a mass fishing technique (illegal in most countries) that trails a large non-anchored gill-net for miles to trap fish.

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82 Kayleigh Svensson

seine vessels.11 This explains why MMS population sizes seem to be exceedingly pliant
to fishing technology advancements aimed to maximize catch efficiency.12 Today, 48%
of MMS are categorized as either Threatened, Near Threatened, or Data Deficient. From
1954 to 2006, the global MMS population declined by over 60%.13,14

1.2 – The Fate of Bluefin


While bluefin tuna is a remarkable species, it is indeed among the most threat-
ened of the MMS. To better understand how and why their migration induces their
vulnerability, Boustany et al. tagged and tracked 253 Pacific bluefin tuna from 2002 to
2005.15 In three years, they obtained 38,012 geo-points displaying the seasonal migration
of bluefin spanning over 8,000 km, giving them one of the widest-ranged migrations of
all MMS species.16,17 The tuna travel between the California coastline of North America
and the Sea of Japan, which takes them through several ABNJ.18 This large distribution
increases the likelihood that they will encounter fishing pressures that lead to a decline in
stock size; over the course of one migration, it is not uncommon for the same school of
bluefin to be fished several times, in various locations.19
A mature bluefin can grow as long as 4 meters in length, weigh up to 700 kilo-
grams, and live for over 30 years.20 Nowadays, the odds are slim that a bluefin will make
it halfway to that stage in life.21 The ISC reported a significant increase in Age-0 blue-
fin catches since 1990—Figure 2 shows a 19% increase in Age-0 mortalities, and a 35%
decrease in mortalities Age-7 and above. This means that fewer bluefin are making it past

11 Danielle Hall, "Smithsonian Ocean," Ocean Portal | Smithsonian, May 09, 2018.
12 Ibid.
13  Ben Lascelles, Giuseppe Notarbartolo Di Sciara, Tundi Agardy, Annabelle Cuttelod, Sara Eckert, Lyle Glowka, Erich Hoyt
et al., "Migratory marine species: their status, threats and conservation management needs," Aquatic Conservation: Marine and
Freshwater Ecosystems 24, no. S2 (2014): 111-127.
14  Maria José Juan-Jordá, Iago Mosqueira, Andrew B. Cooper, Juan Freire, and Nicholas K. Dulvy, "Global population trajec-
tories of tunas and their relatives," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 51 (2011): 20650-20655, doi:10.1073/
pnas.1107743108.
15  Boustany et al., “Movements of pacific bluefin tuna,” 2010.
16  Itaru Ohta, and Harumi Yamada, "Formation of a Pacific Bluefin Tuna Fishing Ground on Their Spawning Grounds around
the Ryukyu Islands: Implication of a Relationship with Mesoscale Eddies," Biology and Ecology of Bluefin Tuna, 2015, 123-36,
doi:10.1201/b18714-10.
17  Boustany et al., “Movements of pacific bluefin tuna.” 2010.
18 Ibid.
19  “Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna 2014,” ISC, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/
fish/Atlantic_bluefin_tuna/pdfs/PBF_2014_Exec_Summary_4_04-17.pdf.
20  Analia Murias, "Maximum Bluefin Tuna Length and Weight Set," FIS - Suppliers - Company Details, June 24, 2013,https://
www.fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=&monthyear=&day=&id=61731&ndb=1&df=0.
21  ISC, "Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna 2014.”

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Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan 83

their first spawning season before ending up on a dinner plate.22,23

Figure 2: The age-specific yearly mean of mortalities from 2002-2011 (dashed), 2007-2009
(solid black line) and 2009-2011 (gray line) for the Pacific bluefin tuna (figure 7 from the 2014
ISC stock assessment report).24

In 2011, Juan-Jordá et al. evaluated the exploitation status of 26 tuna populations,


and found a steep increase in tuna mortality: Globally, approximately 12.5% of the tuna
population is caught each year.25 This study indicates that if a marine population drops be-
low 25% of its un-fished size,26 the decline cannot be attributed to a natural flux; any Catch
Per Unit Effort (CPUE) reduction over this amount is considered a collapse and is due to
fishery exploitation.27 Six years later, the ISC reported that the bluefin stock has declined
98.4% from its un-fished size, a clear sign that bluefin are being fished to extinction.28

The Japanese Fishing Industry


Nonetheless, T. H. Huxley’s belief that the ocean’s resources are impervious to
human activity still seems to reside in the minds of countless fishing industry managers.
This is particularly evident by the unsustainable behaviors of Japanese commercial bluefin
fisheries.

22 Ibid
23  Shuhei Uematsu, Current Situation of Pacific Bluefin Tuna and Stock Management, Tokyo: World Wildlife Fund (WFF), July
2014.
24  ISC, “Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna 2014.”
25  Juan-Jorda et al., "Global Population Trajectories."
26  Refers to the estimated historical biomass of a marine population before fishing commenced.
27 Ibid.
28  "Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus Orientalis) in the Pacific Ocean in 2018,” ISC, last modified July 24,
2018, http://isc.fra.go.jp/pdf/ISC18/ISC_18_ANNEX_14_Pacific_Bluefin_Tuna_Stock_Assessment_2018_FINAL.pdf.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 9 No. 1


84 Kayleigh Svensson

If we consider how innovative and efficient the Japanese fisheries have become
in satisfying the high demand for this species, the 98.4% drop in bluefin stock reported
by the ISC is not surprising.29 The coastal waters of Japan’s Ryukyu islands, spanning a
mere 200 miles, are major spawning grounds for bluefin that contribute to over 70% of
the species’ recruitment.30,31 In 2015, it was revealed that over 90% of Japanese industry
catches comes from these coastal waters.32 The fishing industries take advantage of the
spawning behaviors of bluefin, leading to an increase in juvenile catch.33 Indeed, in the
waters around the Ryukyu islands, bluefin tuna rise to the surface to spawn between the
months of May and July.34 Because of their increased vulnerability, scientists encourage
strict regulations of Japanese fisheries when the fish spawn.35 However, almost all fisheries
remain open; in fact, most industries increase their fishery efforts during the spawn peri-
od.36 Some even use illegal spotter planes to locate the fish during spawn and migration,
and guide purse seine vessels to high density areas.37 In addition, Japanese vessels illegally
deploy long range drift-nets, some being over 90 km long.38 Given that the high spawn
waters of the Ryukyu islands span a mere 322 km, this is an unsustainable practice.39

2.1 – Japan’s History with Bluefin


With 343 inhabitants per km2 packed within 29,751 km of coastline, surrounded
by some of the world’s richest fishing waters, it makes sense why Japan has become such
a powerful fishing nation both economically and culturally.40 The country eats an average
of 7.5 billion tons of seafood each year (56.9 kg per capita) and leads the world in bluefin
consumption with over 80% of the yearly catch.41,42 And yet, their appetite for bluefin is
newfound: the same bluefin that now dominates Japan’s economy was once considered

29 Ibid.
30  Ohta and Yamada, “Pacific Bluefin Tuna Fishing Ground.”
31  U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The Japanese Fishing Industry: Prospects and Problems, approved for release May 15, 2000,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01098A000500030001-8.pdf.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34  Boustany, “Movements of pacific bluefin tuna.”
35 Ibid
36  Carl Safina, "Regulators Are Pushing Bluefin Tuna to the Brink," Yale E360, December 8, 2008, https://e360.yale.edu/
features/regulators_are_pushing_bluefin_tuna_to_the_brink.
37  David K. Loomis et al., “An Analysis of Spotter Plane Use in the ABT Fishery,” National Marine Fisheries Service Highly
Migratory Species Division, May 4, 1999.
38  S. LaBudde, Stripmining the Seas. A Global Perspective on Drift Net Fisheries, Honolulu: Earthtrust, 1989.
39 Ibid.
40  Nick Peck, "The Fishing Industry and the Environment in Japan," Academia.edu - Share Research, 2015.
41  Karim Zarrouki, "Sector Trend Analysis–Fish Products in Japan," Global Analysis Report, 2017.
42  Justin McCurry, "Japan to Exceed Bluefin Tuna Quota amid Warnings of Commercial Extinction," The Guardian, April 24,
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/24/japan-criticised-exceed-bluefin-tuna-fishing-quota

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Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan 85

undesirable.43 In the mid 1900s, few bluefin fishermen existed, as members of the low-
est classes were often times the only tuna buyers. Until the late 1940s, most of the tuna
caught (usually as bycatch) was allocated to Japanese cat food.44 However, there was a
significant increase in bluefin catch in 1949. It seems that it was not until after WWII
and the increase of Western influence, presence, and culture in Japan that the Japa-
nese developed a taste for this fish.45,46 Today, Japan prioritizes the bluefin trade. The
country uses over 200,000 fishing vessels—which in total value at over $14 billion — to
maximize the catch needed to meet the country’s growing demand for the fish. This
is especially in consideration of Japan’s rapidly aging population. Studies have shown
that older populations cultivate a higher demand for healthy foods.47 By 2020, it is
anticipated that 30% of Japan will be over 65 years of age, which would make them the
country with the oldest population.48 This does not bode well for bluefin tuna, as the
fish is advertised as a powerhouse of vitamins and antioxidants.49,50

2.2 – Mitsubishi’s Bluefin Enterprise


Among all oceanic trade species in Japan’s trade, bluefin tuna provides the
most financial gain.51 In terms of commercial value, four members of the Thunnus
genus— bluefin, bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack— account for nearly 30% of the global
seafood trade, or about $42 billion a year.52 On average in Japan, one slice of bluefin
toro can value as much as 2820 yen ($25 USD).53 The most extreme display of bluefin
worth recently occurred at a fish market auction in Tokyo, in which a sushi restaurant
owner bought a 612 lb (278kg) bluefin tuna for $3.1 million (333.6 million yen).54 It
is these numbers that drive Mitsubishi to freeze and stockpile as much of the fish as
possible, to sell at an inflated price once the species reaches economical extinction.55
43  Trevor Corson, The Story of Sushi: An Unlikely Saga of Raw Fish and Rice, New York: Harper Collins, 2009.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46  ISC, "Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus Orientalis) in the Pacific Ocean in 2018.”
47  Jeffrey Hays, "Commercial Fishing In Japan: Fishing Industry, Fish Farms And Fishermen," Facts and Details, 2009.
48  "Japan Population 2018," Total Population by Country 2018, December 7, 2018.
49 Ibid.
50  Asim Maqbool, Birgitta Strandvik, and Virginia A. Stallings, "The skinny on tuna fat: health implications," Public health
nutrition 14, no. 11 (2011): 2049-2054.
51 Ibid.
52  Takashi Sekiyama, "An Examination of International Relations Regarding Pacific Bluefin Tuna—With an Implication
from the Whaling Issue," Journal of Environmental Protection 08, no. 13 (2017): 1595-604, doi:10.4236/jep.2017.813098.
53  "Can Tuna Prices Predict Japan's GDP Growth?" The Economist, January 10, 2017.
54  Alaa Elassar, "Massive Tuna Nets $3.1 Million at Japan Auction," CNN, January 6, 2019, https://www.cnn.
com/2019/01/05/asia/giant-tuna-sets-record-at-japan-auction/index.html.
55  The End of the Line, DVD, directed by Rupert Murray, United Kingdom, 2009.

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86 Kayleigh Svensson

Charles Clover, a British environmental journalist, reported that this conglomerate dis-
creetly stores over 20,000 tons of bluefin each year for post-extinction trade.56 During one
of the few occasions in which the corporation was confronted for their unsustainable ac-
tions, Mitsubishi denied its role in the species decline, arguing that the CPUE reductions
documented within its fishing waters were merely natural ecosystem fluxes.57 Juan-Jordá
et. al.’s earlier-mentioned finding directly negates Mitsubishi’s argument, as a CPU decline
of this scale is rarely a natural flux.58,59 It seems to be only a matter of time before Japan’s
continued exploitation of tuna leads to extinction. If this extinction occurs, Mitsubishi
will eventually run out of frozen fish, at which point Japan might enter an economic tail-
spin.60

2.3 – Fishery Restrictions and Management


In a joint effort to curb this kind of fishery exploitation in the Pacific, the West-
ern and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC) have attempted to manage the stocks of MMS in the Pacific
by setting fishing regulations for the members of their commissions.61,62 As advised by
the Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (OFP), the
WCPFC and the IATTC allocate an annual catch allowance for each MMS. The OFP rec-
ommends quotas for each country based on its stock, resource utilisation assessments, and
extensive calculations. The quota assigned to each country is an amount that will suffi-
ciently feed the populations of each country, while also allowing for a sustainable resource
yield.63
In 2004, the sustainable bluefin quota for Japan was set to a catch of no more
than 30,000 tons.64 However, the bluefin industry evaded this quota without major reper-
cussions, catching 61,000 tons of bluefin that year. At the time, this accounted for a third
of the entire bluefin population.65
Japan’s heavy dependence on bluefin within the nation’s “food culture” explains

56 Ibid
57 Ibid
58 Ibid
59  Juan-Jorda et al., "Global Population Trajectories."
60  "Can Tuna Prices Predict Japan's GDP Growth?"
61  "Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)," WCPFC Harvest Strategy and Reference Points | WCPFC,
https://www.wcpfc.int/.
62  "The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)." The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC).
https://www.iattc.org/homeeng.htm.
63  Thomas K. Wilderbuer and Chang Ik Zhang, "Evaluation of the Population Dynamics and Yield Characteristics of Alaska
Plaice, Pleuronectes Quadrituberculatus, in the Eastern Bering Sea," NeuroImage, May 07, 1999.
64  The End of the Line.
65 Ibid.

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Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan 87

why Japan opposes some Western initiatives for nature conservation; the Japanese govern-
ment strongly lobbied against a proposed international ban on bluefin during a delegate
sushi dinner with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
in March 2010.66 Japan’s representatives must have been compelling, because CITES voted
to deny all proposed bans on the bluefin fishing trade.67 Scientists and conservationists
worry that without strict regulations or strong quota enforcement, several MMS species
such as the bluefin will go extinct.68

2.4 – Modeling Fishery Reform with Simulation-Based Research


Among the scientists to take action following the CITES decision was Takashi
Ishida, from the Chiba University Graduate School of Horticulture in Japan. Ishida hoped
to prove his hypothesis that a prohibition on the bluefin trade would only have a minor
influence on overall seafood prices, meaning that a trade ban would have little impact on
Japan’s economy as a whole.69 In 2015, Ishida published his simulation-based study illus-
trating the financial impact that the proposed bluefin regulation could potentially have on
three other economically important (and less threatened) tuna species: albacore, bigeye,
and yellowfin.70 For his simulation, Ishida used a Vector Autoregressive Distributed Lag

Figure 3: VARDL progression simulating the economical implications that a ban on blue-
fin would have on albacore, bigeye and yellowfin tuna (Figure 2 from Ishida et al. 2015).71

66  Neal Lineback and Mandy Lineback Gritzner,"Geography in the News: Bluefin Tuna Decline – National Geographic Blog,"
National Geographic Blog, November 15, 2013, https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2013/11/15/geography-in-the-news-bluefin-
tuna-decline/.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69  Takashi Ishida, "The Impact of Regulating Bluefin Tuna Exports on the Japanese Tuna Market," Journal of Food Research 4,
no. 4 (2015): 103, doi:10.5539/jfr.v4n4p103.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.

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88 Kayleigh Svensson

(VARDL) model. He merged a few tuna datasets into a matrix that he manipulated with
various regulatory parameters, in order to find the interspecies relationship between fluxes
in supply and price.72 As shown in the Figure 3, Ishida found statistically significant results
proving that the bluefin tuna market is not linked to the markets of the other tuna species.
This therefore nullifies Japan’s argument that regulating the bluefin trade would impact the
export economy of the other three tuna species.73
Another fisheries simulation study by Costello et al. in 2016 aggregates the
output data of 4,713 fisheries using a simulation-based matrix (similar to Ishida’s VARDL
model) known as the Pella-Tomlinson growth model.74,75 As shown in Figure 4, the study
predicts both the short and long term effects of three fishing policies— Business As Usual
(BAU),76 Fishing to Maximise Supply Yield (FMSY),77 and Rights-Based Fishery Man-
agement (RBFM)78— on fluxes in catch rate, population, and biomass.79 The simulation
shows a continued fishery divergence and collapse under BAU, and a slow rate population
recovery under FMSY.80 The RBFM policy, however, was proven to be extremely effective,

Figure 4: A comparison of three proposed fishery policies extrapolated to 2025, showing an


increase of 2 MMT in catch and $31 billion in fisheries profit with the RBFM policy.81
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74  Christopher Costello, Daniel Ovando, Tyler Clavelle, C. Kent Strauss, Ray Hilborn, Michael C. Melnychuk, Trevor A.
Branch et al., "Global fishery prospects under contrasting management regimes," Proceedings of the national academy of sciences
113, no. 18 (2016): 5125-5129.
75  Christopher Costello, "Aggregating Pella-Tomlinson Fisheries," RPubs - Introduction to Statistical Learning - Chap2 Solu-
tions, May 27, 2016, http://rpubs.com/costello/184256.
76  Refers to status quo management commonly used for statistical projections.
77  Refers to Fishing to Maximize Supply Yield (a proposed method that prioritizes catch count)
78  Refers to Rights-Based Fishery Management (a proposed method that prioritizes the economy)
79  Costello et al., “Global fishery prospects.”
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid

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Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan 89

allowing for both species recovery and a high fishery profit.82 The study’s projection indi-
cates that with appropriate reform efforts, species recovery could be seen within 10 years.83

Moving Forward: Possible Methods of Reform for Species Recovery


Finding a seafood alternative to bluefin is essential to the recovery of this species
stock, or society will be forced to find one once the species has gone extinct. Though an
economic stretch, lionfish are a potential candidate simply given their large population
size.84 Since their introduction to the coast of Florida in the 1980s, lionfish have become
a major threat to the native species throughout the Atlantic.85 Research indicates that this
outbreak has led to a steep biomass and CPUE decline in native fish populations.86 NOAA
and Oceana are two conservation organisations that push to integrate lionfish into the
common fishery trade, for this would significantly curb their populations.87,88 Although
a market-replacement of bluefin with lionfish will not happen overnight, this swap is not
impossible, as the very same bluefin tuna that now dominates the seafood trade was con-
sidered practically unpalatable by the majority of the Japanese population a mere century
ago.89
In order to save the species, it is crucial that illegal fishing ends and catch man-
agement measures are strictly enforced by the IATTC and the WCPFC. Increased usage of
sound scientific research during political conferences would be exceedingly worthwhile,
especially when negotiating environmental regulations, such as banning the trade of
bluefin. Such research would include simulations similar to those by Ishida and Costello,
which show that if CITES were to implement a strict management regime on the bluefin
trade, it would have only a minor impact on the Japan’s tuna market as a whole. This is
a sensible adjustment when compared to the immense financial (and environmental)

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84  D. Ransom Hardison, William C. Holland, H. Taiana Darius, Mireille Chinain, Patricia A. Tester, Damian Shea, Alex K.
Bogdanoff, James A. Morris, Harold A. Flores Quintana, Christopher R. Loeffler, Dayne Buddo, and R. Wayne Litaker, "Investiga-
tion of Ciguatoxins in Invasive Lionfish from the Greater Caribbean Region: Implications for Fishery Development," Plos One 13,
no. 6 (2018), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0198358.
85  Hardison et al., “Investigation of Ciguatoxins.”
86 Ibid.
87  U.S. Department of Commerce and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Filleting the Lion," NOAA's
National Ocean Service, June 10, 2010, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/weeklynews/june10/eatlionfish.html.
88  Amy McDermott, "Invasive Lionfish Are Delicious - but Is It Safe to Eat Them?" Oceana, June 21, 2017, https://oceana.org/
blog/invasive-lionfish-are-delicious-—-it-safe-eat-them-6.
89  Trevor Corson, The Story of Sushi.

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90 Kayleigh Svensson

destruction that the impending bluefin fisheries collapse poses.90,91,92 The Japanese fishing
industry should not have been able to exceed their bluefin catch allowance to the extent
that they had in 2004.93 Japan’s continued evasiveness of these quotas is inexcusable, and is
arguably the major inhibitor of bluefin recovery today.94 Further exchange and discussion
of research on this topic encourage greater transparency and media attention on the blue-
fin fisheries industry, bringing to light the extent to which the irresponsible commercial
activities of certain parties threaten the existence of this remarkable species.

90  Costello, “Global fishery prospects.”


91  Ishida, "Regulating Bluefin Tuna Exports."
92  "Can Tuna Prices Predict Japan's GDP Growth?"
93  The End of the Line.
94  McCurry, "Japan to Exceed Bluefin Tuna Quota."

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Fishery Exploitation of Bluefin Tuna in Japan 91
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