Jose B. Sarmiento vs.

Employees’ Compensation Commission & Government Service Insurance System (National Power Corporation)

May 11, 1988 GR No. L-65680

Gutierrez, Jr.,J.

Facts

The late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the
time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. The deceased’s illness was a cancer known as “differential
squarrous cell carcinoma”, and sought treatment in various hospitals. And on August 12, 1981,she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest
due to parotid carcinoma, and she was 20 years old. Believing that the deceased’s fatal illness having been contracted during her
employment was service-connected, Jose B. Sarmiento filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS,
through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that the illness of Flordeliza was not caused by employment and
employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent’s decision of denial, Jose Sarmiento wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting that
the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees’ Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules
on Employees’ Compensation. The respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS’ decision, it found that the deceased’s death is not
compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial
growth.

Issue

Whether or not the deceased’s illness under PD 626, compensable?

Held

Under PD 626, a compensable illness means illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees’ Compensation
Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions.
BELARMINO V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 185 SCRA 304 GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS

Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education Culture and Sports assigned at the Burucan Elementary School
in Dimasalang, Masbate for11 years. On January 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and
fell on the classroom floor. She complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps but she continued reporting for work because there
was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home .Her abdominal pain
persisted even after delivery .When she was brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from septicemia
post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina .After she was discharged from the hospital, she died three days thereafter .The GSIS
denied the claim on the ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of death is an occupational disease and neither was there any
showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, latter
also denied the claim affirming the denial of the claim by GSIS.

ISSUE

Whether of not the cause death of Mrs. Belarmino is not work-related and therefore not compensable.

HELD

NO. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her
employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury
as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy
with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of
postpartum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the

proximate cause

That set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease
supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in
the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the
result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary
injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent
abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable.
HINOGUIN V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 172 SCRA 350 FELICIANO, J.

FACTS

.Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin was a sergeant in “A” company, 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division .The headquarters of the 14th Infantry
Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija..On August 1, 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog sought
permission from Capt. Frankie Besas, to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. Capt. Besas orally granted them permission to go
to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them considering that Aritao was regarded as “a critical place.”.The three soldiers went to
Dft. Alibuyog’s home for a meal and some drinks. At around 7:00 PM, the soldiers headed back to the headquarters. They boarded a tricycle,
Hinoguin and Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the tricycle driver. When they reached
the poblacion, Alibuyog dismounted from the tricycle. Not noticing that his rifle’s safety lever was on “semi-automatic,” he accidentally
touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin in the left lower abdomen. Sgt. Hinoguin died a few days
after the incident.8.In the investigation conducted by the 14th Infantry Battalion, it was found that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely
accidental in nature and that he died in the lineof duty. The Life of Duty Board of Officers recommended that all benefits due the legal
dependents of the late Sgt. Hinoguin be given.9.However, when the father of the deceased made a claim from GSIS, the same was denied
on the ground that the deceased was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his
death. This denial was confirmed by the ECC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the death of Sgt. Hinoguin compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.

HELD

YES. The amended Implementing Rules provides in part as follows: SEC. 1.

Conditions to Entitlement

– (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied: The
employee had been duly reported to the System; He died as a result of injury or sickness; and The System has been duly notified of his
death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before
the employer is duly reported for coverage of the System. Art. 167 (k) of the Labor Code defines

Grounds –

(a) For the injury and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following grounds:(1)The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be.(2)The employee must have been performing his official functions; and(3)If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the employer.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE,

FACTS:

Private respondent Felonila Alegre’s deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National
Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.On December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity
of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said
complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty.SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the
latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. On account of her
husband’s death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, denied the claim on the ground that at the time
of SPO2 Alegre’s death, he was performing a personal activity which was notwork-connected which was later on affirmed by the Employees’
Compensation Commission(ECC. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when it reversed the ECC’s
decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre’s death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Hence; GSIS filed a petition for review on
certiorari to the Supreme Court; reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre’s death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is,
that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SPO2 Alegre’s death is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.

HELD:

Taking together existing jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that
the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and(c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not
difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre
was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature
proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. That he may be called upon at any time to render
police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion
arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In
fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as
applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines
rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths.
CELERINO VALERIANO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM,

G.R. No. 136200 June 8, 2000

The Facts:

Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985,
petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed
to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around 9:30PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding
in figured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the
strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was
brought to several hospitals for treatment. On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the Government
Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result
from the nature of his work .Under the present compensation law, injury and the resulting disability or death is compensable if the injury
resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It means that the injury or death must be sustained while the
employee is in the performance of his official duty; that the injury is sustained at the place where his work requires him to be; and if the
injury is sustained elsewhere, that the employee is executing an order for the employer. The aforementioned conditions are found wanting
in the instant case. The accident that the appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time and place of work. Neither was
appellant performing his official duties as a fireman at the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant where
he and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and] in the course of his
employment

The Issues:

WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED.

HELD:

Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability
sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the
time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or
incidental thereto .Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a fire truck driver was related to the injuries he
had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function — having dinner with some friends — is
clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an
act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate
court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968

FACTS:

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way
home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO
road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown
as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez,
another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot
where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right
side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record .According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's
death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applyingthe "proximity rule;"
and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

ISSUE:

Whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment.

RULING:

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simplystated, is that "in the absence of special
circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's
compensationacts."

This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where theemployee is proceeding to or from his work on the
premises of his employer; (2) where theemployee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of theexclusive
or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, whileon his way to or from his place of employment or at
his home, or during his employment, withsome duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as
anincident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.
ALANO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988

FACTS:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza
Jaycee inSan Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her
instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed
the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same
date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions
prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the
records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p.12)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of Dedicacion de Vera can be compensable.

HELD:

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts
it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the
school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. As to the Government
Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early
as the case of La O v.Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111
SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that
the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the
Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects
of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of ImplementingRules)."
SALVADOR LAZO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 78617June 18, 1990

FACTS:

Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of
duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who wasto relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered
overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to
take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger
jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono
Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July
1986.For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied
by the GSIS for the reason that —It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00P.M. on
June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking
permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of bringing home a sack of riceand
that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident
that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1It was held that the condition for compensability
had not been satisfied. Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the
accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter. Hence, the
present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of
employment?

HELD:

We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place
of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may
be saidto have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the
truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it
does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.' And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock &Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that'(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while
passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to

283

or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect
a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened
while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING vs ILLESCAS

FACTS:

Esmeraldo C. Illescas entered into a Contract of Employment with petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. Under the contract,
respondent was employed as Third Officer of M/V Shinrei for a period of nine months. After respondent passed the pre-employment
medical examination, he boarded the vessel and started performing his job.

when respondent had been on board the vessel, the captain and the chief officer ordered respondent to carry 25 fire hydrant caps from
the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps. The next day, while carrying a heavy basketful of fire hydrant
caps, respondent felt a sudden snap on his back. He immediately informed the ship captain about his condition, and he was advised to take
pain relievers. As the pain was initially tolerable, he continued with his work. After a few days, the pain became severe, and respondent
had difficulty walking.

Respondent was brought to a clinic in Japan and was diagnosed to be suffering from lumbago and sprain. The doctor advised Illescas avoid
lifting heavy objects and get further examination and treatment if the symptoms persisted

Despite the lighter work assigned to respondent, he continued to experience excruciating pain, until a doctor declared that respondent
was unfit to work, and recommended that respondent return home for further management.

petitioners received a letter from Illescas’ counsel, demanding the payment of disability benefit.

ISSUE: WhetherIllescas can claim payment for benefit due to accident

RULING:

Where the injury resulted from the performance ofa duty, like carrying heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, it cannot be said tobe the
result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, orfortuitous event—it is common knowledge that carrying heavy objects
cancause back injury.—The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondentwas not an accident, but an injury sustained by respondent
from carrying theheavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability.The injury cannot be said to be the result of an
accident, that is, an unlookedfor mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted fromthe performance of a duty.
Although respondent may not have expected theinjury, yet, it is common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can causeback injury, as
what happened in this case. Hence, the injury cannot beviewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with theterm
“accident” as defined above