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ANALYSIS OF RECENT
BLACKOUTS IN PAKISTAN
CAUSED & REMEDIAL
MEASURES
A Syndicate Report Presented To
In Partial Fulfillment
By
Group-VIII
We are greatly thankful to Almighty Allah, The most merciful, Who gave us the
courage and strength to complete this syndicate research work successfully.
We are also greatly thankful to our respected Course Director Mr. Ali Anwer
Buriro and Dy. Course Director Mr. Imran Uddin for their kind guidance and
encouragement throughout the whole activities of Junior Management Course in
soft and well-behaved manner.
In the end we would like to thank our families for their endurance, support, love
and help during the progression of this course. They kept patience during our
absence, supported and fulfilled our social duties in society.
Group-VIII
th
115 Junior Management Course
DEDICATION
Dedicated to our loving families; especially to our parents; whose love,
affection and persistent efforts to keep us going; are the very reasons of our
success today.
Group-VIII
th
115 Junior Management Course
Executive Summary
Presently, Pakistan is facing the acute shortage of Electricity. In addition to this
problem, our National Grid suffered major blackouts due to power system
collapses. Due to such events our country had to bear billion of rupees loss.
In this report we briefly discussed the major power system collapses, chronicle
events, analysis and recommended the remedial measures to avoid such events
in future. There are mainly two strategies to overcome such situation, firstly
short term measures and secondly long term measures. In short term scenario,
black outs are avoided by utilization of intelligent protection schemes. Long
term planning measures are introduced to plan a power system in a reliable and
stable manner by utilizing state of the art power transmission system equipment
like FACTS devices.
This report can be helpful for all those who are keenly interested for carrying
out advanced research in improvement of power system stability. This report
will also serve the reader with ample amount of information about how the
restoration of national grid is carried out in case of total and partial blackouts.
List of Contents
1 Abstract.................................................................................................................................... 2
2 Power System .......................................................................................................................... 3
3 History of Power Sector in Pakistan ........................................................................................ 4
4 Existing Power Structure in Pakistan ...................................................................................... 5
5 Transmission Network............................................................................................................. 7
6 Transmission Network of Pakistan .......................................................................................... 8
7 Introduction to Frequency Control ........................................................................................ 10
7.1 Changing Load ............................................................................................................... 10
7.2 Need for Frequency Control ........................................................................................... 11
8 Critical Elements in the Existing Transmission System ........................................................ 12
9 History of Blackouts in Pakistan ........................................................................................... 13
10 Recent Blackouts in Pakistan ............................................................................................. 15
10.1 System Disturbance of 12-12-2014 ................................................................................ 15
10.2 System Disturbance of 21-12-2014 ................................................................................ 19
10.3 System Disturbance of 08-01-2015 ................................................................................ 21
10.4 System Disturbance of 24-01-2015 ................................................................................ 23
11 Remedial Measures to Avoid Such Events in Future ........................................................ 27
11.1 Cross Trip Scheme at 500kV Guddu Grid Station ......................................................... 27
11.2 Defective Shunt Reactors at 500 kV Guddu, Dadu and Jamshoro Grid Stations .......... 27
11.3 Poor Maintenance of 500 kV Transmission Lines in Guddu-Jamshoro-Dadu Area...... 28
11.4 Wiring Indications / Cross-Trip Scheme Problems at Guddu G/S and TPS Guddu ...... 28
11.5 Installation of Thermal Over Load Protection on ATB-1 and ATB-2: .......................... 29
11.6 Implementation of under frequency relays in DISCO’s................................................. 29
11.7 Cross Trip Schemes ........................................................................................................ 30
11.8 Under Voltage Scheme................................................................................................... 31
11.9 Sequence Event Recorder (SER) & Fault Recorder (FR) .............................................. 31
12 Conclusion & Recommendations ...................................................................................... 32
13 References .......................................................................................................................... 33
1
1 Abstract
2
2 Power System
3
3 History of Power Sector in Pakistan
The demand exceeded supply capability by about 15-25% in the early 1990s,
requiring about 1,500 to 2,000 MW of load shedding during peak hours. There was
a weak link between the electricity price and demand, resulting in high demand.
While on the supply side, the capacity shortage was the inability of the public
budget to meet the high investment required by the power sector for development
of projects. The GOP, in line with its strategic plan of 1992 decided restructuring
the entire power sector in the country [6] [7].
4
In order to eliminate power shortage in minimum time, an Energy Task Force in
1993 was constituted by GOP to devise a comprehensive policy to revive the
energy sector [8]. On the recommendations of the Energy Task Force, the GOP in
March 1994 announced a "Package of Incentives for Private Sector Power
Generation Projects and Policy Framework" to introduce a large scale private
sector investment in power development [8] [9].
On December 16, 1997, issue of the Gazette of Pakistan proclaimed the enactment
of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power
Act, 1997, which had be-come effective on 13 December 1997, known as NEPRA
act [10]. Thus National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) has been
created to regulate the electric power sector of Pakistan, introduce sound
commercial principals and ensure transparency in the power sector.
The WAPDA act was amended in December 1998, which allowed the creation of
Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO), and unbundling of WAPDA’s Power
Wing into: eight distribution companies (formed from existing area boards);
four generating companies (comprising 11 of WAPDA’s thermal generating
plants); and National Transmission and Dispatch Company Limited (NTDCL) [2].
More recently out of eight distribution companies Hyderabad electric supply
company (HESCO) is divided to from two companies Sukkur Electric Power
Company (SEPCO) and HESCO, while PESCO is under process of bifurcation to
form Tribal Electric Supply Company (TESCO).
5
and are interconnected through 220 KV double circuit transmission lines and can
supply power to each other.
Now Pakistan's power system is divided into three main categories which includes
power generation, WAPDA (Hydro generation), GENCO’s (Thermal generation),
and IPP’s (Independent Power Producers consisting of thermal and nuclear
generation). Transmission is controlled by NTDCL & KESC, whereas distribution
is controlled by power distribution companies i.e. 10 DISCO’s and KESC.
Distribution companies (DISCOs) and KESC are supplied with electricity to meet
their demand by two transmissions companies (NTDCL and KESC).
6
Fig-1.3 Existing Electric Power Generation Sources in Pakistan
5 Transmission Network
7
6 Transmission Network of Pakistan
NTDC operates and maintains thirteen 500 KV and thirty six 220 KV Grid
Stations, over 5000 km of 500 KV transmission line and 7500 km of 220 KV
transmissions line in Pakistan. Transmission system of Pakistan is one of the few
largest synchronized systems in the world, expanding from Karachi in South to
Peshawar in north.
Highest operating voltage in the country for transmission system is 500 kV.
NTDCL operates and maintains primary transmission system of Pakistan at 500 kV
and 220 kV. While the secondary transmission system operated at 132 kV and 66
kV is owned and maintained by different distribution companies in the country.
Secondary transmission system consists of more than 900 132 kV grid stations and
24000 km of transmission lines.
8
Fig-1.4 Existing Transmission in Pakistan
9
7 Introduction to Frequency Control
7.1 Changing Load
Loads within the power system are constantly changing. Each time a residential
customer starts an electric clothes dryer or an industrial customer ignites a furnace,
the power system load changes. This is why the task of matching generation to
load is difficult, the target is always moving. An exact match between generation
and load is only achieved for a short period of time. Loads change constantly,
always creating another imbalance between the generation supply and the system
load.
10
7.2 Need for Frequency Control
In the early days of power systems, very basic control systems were used to match
generation to load. A plant operator may have used a simple hand adjusted dial
control to increase or decrease generator output until the output matched the load.
As power systems have grown and customer expectations of power system
performance have increased, the equipment used to match generation to load has
also grown in complexity. Complex control systems have been developed to
achieve the desired match between generation and load.
11
8 Critical Elements in the Existing Transmission System
Pakistan Transmission System is one of the largest interconnected power systems
of the world. One of the major problem associated with interconnected system is
that during loaded conditions tripping of any equipment will cause the load to shift
on the remaining equipment. Such situation sometimes leads to cascaded tripping.
One of the very important node in the Pakistan’s Transmission System is
500/220kV Guddu Grid Station. This Grid Station interconnects three parts of the
country. Details are as under:
12
All the three regions can be operated separately provided that load generation
balance for each region can be achieved. Unfortunately in Pakistan Generation is
concentrated in the North and South of the country whereas load center is in the
center of the country.
13
Table-1.1 Major Breakdown in Pakistan Since 2000
SR. DATE & TYPE REASON RESTORATION
NO. TIME TIME
1 24-01-2015 Major Tripping of 220kV Uch-I - Sibbi cct # 2 From Peshawar to
at due to sabotage activity. Auto Karachi at 08:10Hrs
23:53Hrs Transformers at Guddu tripped on (Duration 8Hrs and
overloading causing low frequency 17mnts)
3 21-12-2014 Partial 500kV Guddu - Dadu cct # 1 & 2 went From Dadu to
at under fault due to heavy fog in Guddu & Karachi at
03:33Hrs Dadu area. Souther part (Dadu - Hub - 14:20Hrs
Kelectric) went under due to low (Duration 10Hrs
frequency. 47Mnts)
4 12-12-2014 Partial Tripping of Auto Transformers at Guddu due From Peshawar to
at to overloading caused splitting of Northern and Guddu at 20:34
12:50 Hrs Southern part. (Duration 7Hrs and
Northarn part (Guddu to Peshawar) went under 44Mnts)
dark due to low frequency
6 24-09-2006 Major 500kV Barotha - Lahore cct was under From Peshawar to
at approved shut down Karachi at 00:05Hrs
13:45Hrs 500kV Barotha - Gatti cct II tripped on 3-phase (Duration 10Hrs and
fault 500kV Barotha - Gatti cct I tripped on 20Mnts)
overloading
Rawat 500/220kV Autos tripped on Over
loading, resulting in Low Frequency in
Southern part and High Frequency in Northern
Part
7 31-08-2001 Major Due to Storm 500kV Tarbela - Rewat cct From Peshawar to
at tripped. As a result 500kV Tarbela - Gatti ccts Karachi at 13:28Hrs
00:54 Hrs # 1 & 2 and 500/220kV Autos at Tarbela (Duration 12Hrs and
tripped on overloading resulting in total system 34mnts)
collapse.
14
8 04-02-2000 Partial 500kV Guddu - Multan cct # 3 tripped during From Peshawar to
at rain due to damage of its surge arrestor. Heavy Guddu at 18:44Hrs
12:26Hrs jerk observed, resulting in cascaded tripping (Duration 6Hrs
which caused system splitting in Northern & 18Mnts)
Southern part. Northern part (Guddu to
Peshawar) went under dark due to low
frequency.
500/220kV (450MVA) T/F T-1 & T-2 at 500kV Guddu grid station
transferring 400MW each from 220kV Guddu power station to 500kV
Guddu grid station tripped on over current. (500/220kV T/F T-3 was under
shutdown for annual maintenance and protection testing)
15
i. 500kV Dadu – Jamshoro – Hubco – NKI – K-electric. (South
Island)
ii. 220kV Guddu – Shikarpur – UCH2 – UCH1 – Sibbi –
Quetta.(Guddu- Baluchistan Island)
NPCC took immediate measures to save the south system and Guddu-
Baluchistan Island from further damage by maintaining voltage and
frequency of these systems in permissible limits.
Following events were later learnt to have occurred at Guddu power plants
without coordination of Guddu control rooms with NPCC control room,
which contributed to overloading of 500/220kV Auto Transformers at
500kV Guddu grid station.
Guddu747
16
Note: Since Guddu 747 is located on 500kV system, activities at Guddu 747 did
not have impact on the system or 500/220kV Auto Transformers at Guddu.
Analysis
After installation of a number of gas based power plants in Guddu & Baluchistan
area, gas generation is concentrated in this area with the following capacities:
220kV Side
TPS Guddu 400MW
UCH-I 550MW
UCH-II 395MW
Engro 213MW
Foundation 180MW
Liberty Power 200MW
HCPC 129MW
Total 2067MW
500kV Side
Guddu 747 700MW
Total 2767MW
However this area has inadequate transmission capacities for UCH-I & UCH-II
along with 500/220kV auto transformer constraints at Guddu. UCH II (395MW)
commissioned on 04th April 2014, has further increased the transmission and
transformer constraints. (NTDC had made interim arrangement to use the UCH-II
generation without N-I contingency)
17
Before commissioning of UCH-II power plant NPCC highlighted the dispersal
problems of UCH-II including non availability of N-I contingency on 220kV
transmission lines and 500/220kV auto transformers at Guddu. On the other hand
cheap gas generation has to be used in the prevailing situation of generation
shortfall, fuel shortage, high prices of FO/HSD generation, serious audit and other
observations on use of expensive generation.
It is worth noting that by operating UCH-II power plant (@ EPP of Rs.3.9918 per
KWH) a saving of Rs. 51.0 billion has been made which would have been
otherwise spent on generating same amount of energy from most expensive
RFO/HSD based power plants.
The generation of above stated plants after local consumption of average 300MW
in SEPCO & 400MW in QESCO is transferred from 220kV system to 500kV main
system through 500/220kV Auto Transformers of Guddu, 500kV grid station.
18
current, resulting in generation shortfall of 1100MW in the North system causing
its frequency to depress down to 47.7Hz (which did not recover by under
frequency protection installed on 11kV feeders in DISCOs) resulting in cascaded
trippings in north system.
500kV Guddu – Dadu cct # 2 tripped from Guddu end and auto reclosed
from Dadu end at 03:33Hrs
- Guddu end Indication: Distance Protection, R, Y, B – Phases
- Dadu end Indication: Distance Protection, Y, B, - Phases
NPCC instructed Guddu and Dadu staff to take the indications and reset the
relays for restoration. Meanwhile 2nd 500kV line Guddu – Dadu cct # 1
tripped as under:
19
With this tripping South system consisting of (Dadu – Jamshoro – NKI – Hubco –
K-Electric) went under dark. Parameters of North system were controlled to save it
from any damage.
Analysis
Heavy fog in Guddu – Dadu area caused the flashover of disc insulators and
tripping of 500kV Guddu – Dadu cct # 2. While the indications were being
collected by grid station staff and relays were being reset, the other 500kV circuit
(500kV Guddu – Dadu cct # 1) also tripped and south system consisting of Dadu –
Jamshoro – NKI – K-Electric could not survive in isolation, and tripped due to fall
of its frequency.
Due to lean demand period the system voltages were on higher side. NPCC
depressed the voltages from all the generation resources (despite non availability of
three shunt reactor at Dadu). However due to dense fog both 500kV links between
Guddu and Dadu tripped one by one on three phase fault.
During tripping, the 500kV Circuit Breakers (B3Q1 & B3Q3) of Guddu – Dadu cct
# 1 at Dadu end also got damaged which could be the possible cause of tripping of
this line which isolated the South system from North. The south system which was
drawing 300MW from Guddu, got disturbed due to depression of its frequency.
20
10.3 System Disturbance of 08-01-2015
Event
500kV Guddu – Guddu747 cct tripped from Guddu end only at 04:12Hrs
- Guddu end Indication: R, Y, B,- Phase Short Circuit
Guddu747 kept on feeding 630MW to the system through 500kV Guddu 747 –
Multan Transmission line. The system parameters were kept under observation.
Meanwhile at 05:15Hrs (450MVA) T/F T-1, T-2 & T-3 at 500kV Guddu grid
station along with 500kV Guddu – D.G Khan – Multan circuit at Guddu tripped as
under:-
21
500/220kV T/F T-2 tripped from HV side at 05:15Hrs
- Indications: Neutral Ground, Over Current
500kV Guddu – D.G. Khan – Multan cct tripped from Guddu end only at
05:15Hrs
- Guddu end Indication: Over Voltage
As a result of these trippings North system (Guddu – Peshawar) went under dark
due to severe frequency depression caused by a short fall of 700MW. In southern
part following two Islands were created and kept on feeding the Sindh and
Baluchistan areas.
NPCC took immediate measures to save the south island and Guddu-Baluchistan
Island from further tripping by maintaining voltage and frequency of these
systems/islands in permissible limits and continuous monitoring of the parameters.
22
Analysis
System voltages were reduced by from all power plants (Non availability of three
shunt reactors at 500kV Dadu generally enhance the voltage problem).
During this tripping lightening arrestor of auto transformer T-1 (Guddu) at 500kV
side also damaged which could also be the possible cause of simultaneous
trippings at 500kV Guddu Grid Station.
23
220kV UCH1 – Sibbi cct # 2 tripped at 23:53Hrs due to bomb blast on
three towers.
The affected line (220kV UCH I – Sibbi cct # 2) was supplying 160MW to
Baluchistan. (Two lines 220kV UCH-I – Sibbi cct # 1 and 220kV Guddu – Sibbi
cct were already out due to previous bomb blast on 13-01-2015)
At the time of tripping 500/220kV T/F T-1, T-2 & T-3 at 500kV Guddu grid
station were transferring 338MW each from 220kV side to 500kV main system.
Due to outage of 220 KV UCH- Sibbi cct # 02, the power flow of 160MW was
suddenly diverted from Baluchistan side to the three 500/220kV auto T/F T-1, T-2
and T-3 at Guddu and load on each auto transformer became 392MW. These
transformers tripped as under:
With this sudden happening 500/220kV auto T/F T-1 at Guddu tripped from
220kV side along with circuit breaker failure indication on D16Q2. 220kV
Bus Bar # 2 at Guddu power house also tripped at the same time. 220kV
Guddu – Sibbi line also got de-energize because D16Q1 of Guddu was
under fault.
iii. 220kV T.M. Khan – Kotri – FFC Wind (Lower Sind Island)
feeding Hyderabad
iv. 220kV Guddu – Shikarpur – UCH1 – UCH2 (Upper Sind Island)
feeding SEPCO and Multan area.
NPCC took necessary measures to save both islands from any further damage
by maintaining their voltage and frequency within permissible limits and
monitoring of other critical parameters.
Analysis
Two circuits 220kV Guddu - Sibbi cct & 220kV UCH-I – Sibbi cct # I connecting
Baluchistan side with Guddu were already out since 13-01-2015 due to bomb
blasting of three 220kV towers. After this outage a portion of 220kV UCH-I –
Sibbi cct # I & 220kV Guddu – Sibbi cct was jumpered together on 18-01-2015 by
NTDC to utilize generation of UCH-II power plant.
At the time of incident only one 220kV link i.e. UCH-I – Sibbi cct # 2 was
available for Baluchistan side which was partially feeding Sibbi and Quetta area
(Remaining Baluchistan was being fed from 220kV Khuzdar & 220kV Loralai
Grid Stations). 500/220 kV Auto transformers T-1, T-2, T-3 at Guddu were
operating at 338MW (86% Load) each with UCH-I running at 569MW and UCH-
II running at 366MW.
25
At 23:53Hrs the single 220kV Uch-I – Sibbi cct # 2 was bomb blasted causing
abrupt diversion of flow from Baluchistan side to 500/220kV auto transformers
and load on each of these transformers became 392MW (96 %) but 500/220 kV
auto transformers T-1 tripped along with breaker failure indication on D16Q2
breaker on 220kV side of Auto Transformer T-1 causing it to trip from LV side.
As a result auto transformer T-2 & T-3 tripped on over current, causing deficiency
of 1175MW on the main network which was being fed by 500/220kV transformers
and thus frequency of main power network was suddenly depressed which could
not recover by the under frequency protection installed at 11kV system of DISCOs
resulting in cascaded tripping on the main power system.
Bomb blasting of 220kV Uch-I – Sibbi cct # 2 suddenly diverted the power flow
from Baluchistan side to 220kV Uch-I – Guddu cct, and this extra power was then
fed to 500/220kV auto transformers T-1, T-2, T-3 at Guddu load on which
increased to 392MW each (96%) but without overloading of these transformers.
However one transformer T-1 tripped from LV side along with breaker failure and
bus bar protection. Remaining 500/220kV two transformers T-2 & T-3 then tripped
on over current. Tripping of 500/220kV auto transformers created a deficiency of
1175MW on the main network suddenly depressing its frequency which could not
recover and resulted in cascaded tripping.
26
11 Remedial Measures to Avoid Such Events in Future
Following remedial measures are being taken to avoid any further system
disturbance/collapse:
11.2 Defective Shunt Reactors at 500 kV Guddu, Dadu and Jamshoro Grid
Stations
In the absence of Shunt Reactors, the receiving end voltage increases as
compared to the sending end due to capacitance of the line (Ferranti effect).
So, in order to reclose the line, NPCC staff have to reduce the voltage at
Guddu (Generating end), which is also a cause of system instability. The
defective shunt reactors should be replaced with new ones. As per field
information, following shunt reactors are defective:
27
11.3 Poor Maintenance of 500 kV Transmission Lines in Guddu-Jamshoro-
Dadu Area
a) No proper means of cleaning insulators before start of foggy weather
are available with GSO (Hyderabad) NTDC, which leads the tripping
of lines and grid stations during foggy conditions.
b) As per enquiry report of Cause of Damage to towers of 500 kV
transmission line Dadu – Jamshoro-I and Jamshoro-Dadu line-2 on
17-04-2014 :
i. Due to shortage of braces, the amplitude of tower vibrations
increases abnormally which develops air cracks/ corrosion of
steel in tower members and stubs resulting in the weakness of
towers. So, the maintenance crew should replace the
stolen/missing braces.
28
11.5 Installation of Thermal Over Load Protection on ATB-1 and ATB-2:
No thermal over load protection was available on 450MVA Auto T/F Bank-
1 & Auto T/F Bank-2.In the absence of Thermal O/L protection T/F’s were
not loaded properly keeping in view the thermal over heating characteristic
curve. Two nos Thermal O/L relays have been allocated for Auto T/F banks
T-1 & T-2 on dated 30.01.2015.
29
Table-1.3 Under Frequency Load Shedding Scheme
30
Cross-trip schemes at Tarbella, Barotha are in working condition. Remaining
schemes are not working which needs to be modified. Similarly, the remaining
cross –trip schemes and new cross trip schemes for 500 kV grid stations and power
houses will be established & implemented.
31
12 Conclusion & Recommendations
Analysis of the recent blackouts reveal that improper maintenance of
transmission system, defective shunt reactors in the south region, non
functioning of under frequency relays, cross trip schemes and lack of
coordination between relevant departments led to such disaster. It is also
worth mentioning here that there is no redundant link in the south of the
country. Only two 500kV transmission lines connect south region with rest
of the country. It is therefore recommended that new redundant links should
be constructed between Guddu & Dadu.
32
13 References
[1] http://www.ntdc.com.pk/WapdaPowerHistory.php (Accessed in Sep, 2015)
[2] "Report: An Overview of Electricity Sector in Pakistan", Islamabad
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2011.
[3] http://www.kesc.com.pk/en/article/ourcompany/whoweare-1.html (Accessed
in Sep, 2015)
[4] http://www.wapda.gov.pk/htmls/auth-index.html (Accessed in May, 2013)
[5] A. Malik, " Power crisis in Pakistan: A crisis in governance," Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 2012
[6] http://www.pmic.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
1706&Itemid=612 (Accessed in Sep, 2015)
33