G.R. No.
148468 January 28, 2003 Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson through the
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-
GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by
petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition
for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash,
and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of
the accused together with former President Joseph E.
Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the
Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit
foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the
purpose of providing educational opportunities for the
poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and
students, and support to research and advance studies of
young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the
Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner
received the donation and turned over the said amount to
the Foundation's treasurer who later deposited it in the
Foundation's account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly
accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts
of engaging in several illegal activities, including its
operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng.
This triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman
of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other
persons. Among such complaints were: Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-
00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed
as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera,
Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph
Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De
Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as
OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated
February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise filed
their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the
Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the
complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution
recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner
and several others be charged with the criminal offense of
plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan several Informations against former
President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of
these Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558,
charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001,
the Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said
case charging Estrada and several co-accused, including
petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for
the provisional release of all the accused, including
petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division which
was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The
amended Information reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001,
in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
PUBLIC OFFICER BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE
OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire
BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less,
THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES
AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through
ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as
follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS
OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00])
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of
Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social
Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES
OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of MORE
OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-
PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the
Ombudsman's Joint Resolution finding probable cause
against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner
likewise filed on said date, this time with the
Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further
Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable
Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct
the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the
Charges against accused Edward Serapio.3
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
the amended Information charging petitioner with plunder
had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 26558
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants
of arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date for
the arrest of petitioner.5 When apprised of said order,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the
same day to Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro
Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp
Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused,
including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June
27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner
filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail
which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For his part,
petitioner's co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on
April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that
he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's Urgent
Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting
of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27,
2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring
that the petition for bail can and should be heard before
petitioner's arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before
the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their
respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of
evidence on petitioner's petition for bail on May 21 to 25,
2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on
petitioner's petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an
urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail
hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner.
The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation
questioning the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioner's) petition
for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001
resetting the hearings on petitioner's petition for bail to
June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the
prosecution's pending motions as well as petitioner's
motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as
possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion.
The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had
already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution
finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-
accused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the
other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the
hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of
cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent
powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner
it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and
speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused
to participate in the said bail hearing considering that
under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall
be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set
by it on June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order
on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to
pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the
hearing to June 26, 2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June
26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash
the amended Information on the grounds that as against
him, the amended Information does not allege a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive
of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does
not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have been
illegally received or collected does not constitute "ill-
gotten wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act
No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of
bribery and illegal gambling.10 By way of riposte, the
prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The
prosecution contended that petitioner's motion to quash
the amended Information was antithetical to his petition
for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and
the hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the
pending incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner.
However, even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve
the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution,
petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition
for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
148468, praying that the Court declare void the
questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby
effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner
likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their
right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for
bail; and, premised on the failure of the People to adduce
strong evidence of petitioner's guilt of plunder, that he be
granted provisional liberty on bail after due
proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed
with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court
resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion to quash the amended
Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said
date a copy of said resolution.12 The motion to fix bail
filed by Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada was also resolved by the
Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the
Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for
reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment.
The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no
provision in the Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayan's
rules granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for
the reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it
and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner
refused to plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not
guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition
for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that
the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding
the fact that material inculpatory allegations of the
amended Information against him do not constitute the
crime of plunder; and that he is charged, under the said
amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with
the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification
of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion
to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116,
assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated 31 May
2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus
Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN
DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S MOTION TO QUASH
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT —
I consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS
AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE
CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information and alleged to have been illegally received or
collected does not constitute 'ill-gotten wealth' as defined
in Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE
OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended
Information, he is charged with plunder only in paragraph
(a) which reads:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph
(a) of the amended Information of a "combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" constituting plunder as
described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither
does the amended Information allege "a pattern of
criminal acts." He avers that his single act of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal
resolution does not constitute the requisite "combination
or series of acts" for plunder. He further claims that the
in furtherance of said resolution turned over to and
received by former President Joseph E. Estrada "on several
occasions" does not cure the defect in the amended
information. Petitioner insists that on the face of the
amended Information he is charged only with bribery or
illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of
the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former President
Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is
not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A.
7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper
judgment. The Information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the
requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in
the Information is to inform an accused of the nature of
the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare for his defense.16 Another purpose is to enable
accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.17 The use
of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts
constituting the offense charged is sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges
that all the accused, including petitioner, connived and
conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to
commit plunder "through any or a combination or a series
of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means." And
in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner
and his co-accused are charged with receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances
money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division),
et al.,19 we held that the word "series" is synonymous
with the clause "on several instances"; it refers to a
repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word
"combination" contemplates the commission of at least
any two different predicate acts in any of the said items.
We ruled that "plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended
information charges accused therein, including petitioner,
with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate
act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law" and that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of
receiving, on several instances, money from illegal
gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of
those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds
with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration
in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of
R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and
the general rule is that matters of evidence need not be
alleged in the Information.21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan22 that the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten
wealth as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of
Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the accused in
paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information conspired
and confederated with former President Estrada to enable
the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including
petitioner, are charged of having conspired and
confabulated together in committing plunder. When two
or more persons conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of
law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of
them.23 Conspirators are one man, they breathe one
breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the
law says that the acts, words and declarations of each,
while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts,
words and declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended
information of bribery and illegal gambling and others. The
Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not
charged with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal
gambling but is charged only with one crime that of
plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the
information charges more than one offense, namely,
bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code),
malversation of public funds or property (Article 217,
Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged
in the information are not charged as separate offenses
but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically
Section 1(d) thereof does not make any express reference
to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080,
as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a
separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts
enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the
combination or series of act are described in their generic
sense. Thus, aside from 'malversation' of public funds, the
law also uses the generic terms 'misappropriation',
'conversion' or 'misuse' of said fund. The fact that the acts
involved may likewise be penalized under other laws is
incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate
acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative
thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as
allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished
under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on
the face of the amended Information that petitioner and
his co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder
and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It
bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute
acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the
petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus
Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY 2001),
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD
TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND
COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW
SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS
AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO."26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold
in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well
as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct
a determination of probable cause; and to direct the
Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges
him. Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had
totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed
grave abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He
further argues that there exists no probable cause to
support an indictment for plunder as against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the
Ombudsman does not even mention him in relation to the
collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in
199828 and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at
the conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
was a money laundering front organization put up by
Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the
latter presented evidence that said Foundation is a bona
fide and legitimate private foundation.29 More
importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not
indicate that he knew that the P200 million he received for
the Foundation came from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder
since: (1) the P200 million he received does not constitute
"ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080;31 (2) there is no evidence linking him to the
collection and receipt of jueteng money;32 (3) there was
no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million
constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for
reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause for
plunder as against him,34 and hence he should be spared
from the inconvenience, burden and expense of a public
trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government
prosecutors is not beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts that
while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence
of probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a
given case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances,
which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2)
for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that he raised proper
grounds for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing
the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman
disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the
charge of plunder and committed errors of law or
irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest.37
He also states that during the joint preliminary
investigations for the various charges against Joseph
Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge
was only one of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he
was not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor
given the opportunity to refute the evidence presented in
relation to the other seven cases, even though the
evidence presented therein were also used against him,
although he was only charged in the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman
found probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime
of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume
jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the same.
They further argue that "a finding of probable cause is
merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual
determination of guilt or innocence of the accused," and
that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his
defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or innocence
may finally be determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
omnibus motion asking for, among others, a
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's joint resolution
did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered
evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which under
Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which a
motion for reconsideration may be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause
to charge petitioner with plunder as a co-conspirator of
Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan42 , the
Court ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine
probable cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is
paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court
said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as
will establish 'probable cause' for filing of information
against the supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are essentially
factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on
the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave
abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for
estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner
is clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments are
anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsman's
appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the
consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where
neither question of fact nor even of law are entertained,
but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned,
we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by respondents which would warrant the
granting of the writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner
failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable
cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the
Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's
motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in
the amended Information. In its Resolution of April 25,
2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the
Ombudsman that probable cause exists against petitioner
and his co-accused for the crime of plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering the
allegations of the Amended Information dated 18 April
2001 charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER
and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support
thereof consisting of the affidavits and sworn statements
and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several
other pieces of documentary evidence, as well as the
respective counter-affidavits of accused former President
Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy"
Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio
dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify
issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada,
Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted
that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in
accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the
Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989); and that all the basic complaints and evidence in
support thereof were served upon all the accused.45 It
was in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan held
that there was no basis for the allegation that accused
therein (including petitioner) were deprived of the right to
seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution
dated April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them
with plunder after the conduct of preliminary investigation
in connection therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's resolution, but failed
to show in his motion that there were newly discovered
evidence, or that the preliminary investigation was tainted
by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only
grounds for which a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
resolution may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a
right conferred by statute.47 The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective and
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information.48 If the lack of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason
can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust
the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be
said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He
was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges against
him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to
determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the person
accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial.49 As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon,
"[a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspect.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officer's finding and determination of probable cause,
since the determination of the existence of probable cause
is the function of the prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that
the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its
findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001
are not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation
was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reinvestigation
since there is nothing to substantiate petitioner's claim
that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was
no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that an
accused shall not be deemed to have waived his right to
ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been
arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence on
the conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the
merits does not apply in the instant case because
petitioner merely prayed for a reinvestigation on the
ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a
preliminary investigation had been conducted by the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended
Information, and that petitioner had participated therein
by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the
Sandiganbayan had already denied his motion for
reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration
thereon prior to his arraignment.54 In sum then, the
petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the
pleadings of the parties, the issues for resolution are: (1)
Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before
hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2)
Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the
amended Information during the pendency of his petition
for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail
of petitioner and those of the other accused in Criminal
Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People
waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the
petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong
evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and
(5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due
process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be
released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10,
2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not
guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists
that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, does
not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct
of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must,
of necessity, be heard immediately.55 Petitioner maintains
that his arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not
necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense
charged, as is evident in his earlier statements insisting on
his innocence during the Senate investigation of the
jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before
the Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be
prejudiced even if it would present all its evidence before
his arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code, a
voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating only if made
prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution,57 and petitioner admitted that he cannot
repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the
bail hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence present
during bail hearings are automatically reproduced during
the trial.58 Petitioner likewise assures the prosecution
that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a
bail bond should he be granted bail.59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail
hearings may be commenced, because it is only upon
arraignment that the issues are joined. The People stress
that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he
file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge,
there would be no more need for him to file said petition.
Moreover, since it is during arraignment that the accused
is first informed of the precise charge against him, he must
be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from
later assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the
ground that he was not properly informed of the charge
against him, especially considering that, under Section 8,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence
presented during such proceedings are considered
automatically reproduced at the trial.60 Likewise, the
arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes
the possibility of an accused's flight from the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had
only if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned.61
The People also contend that the conduct of bail hearings
prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the
undeserved privilege of being appraised of the
prosecution's evidence before he pleads guilty for
purposes of penalty reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10,
2001 and a plea of not guilty had been entered by the
Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the issue
as to whether an arraignment is necessary before the
conduct of bail hearings in petitioner's case moot, the
Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling
precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of
educating the bench and bar.63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The
arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is
allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.64 An
accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a
petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on the
issue of whether an accused must first be arraigned before
he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused
charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No.
7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense
punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua. The accused therein assailed, inter
alia, the trial court's imposition of the condition that he
should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail.
We held therein that "in cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash."66
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be
taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail
should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule
is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him.67 The Court's
pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of
the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for
bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed
against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition
the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would
be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This
would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on
trial except upon a valid complaint or Information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to
bail.68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first
arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an
accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to
arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an
application for bail in a case involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be
heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the
court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail
because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be
granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for
in such a situation, bail would be "authorized" under the
circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner
before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner
may file a motion to quash during the pendency of his
petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to
quash and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may
proceed independently of each other. While he agrees
with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some
instances result in the termination of the criminal
proceedings and in the release of the accused therein,
thus rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he
opines that such is not always the case; hence, an accused
in detention cannot be forced to speculate on the
outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not
to file a petition for bail or to withdraw one that has been
filed.69 He also insists that the grant of a motion to quash
does not automatically result in the discharge of an
accused from detention nor render moot an application
for bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between
an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a
motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release
of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court
as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules
of Court.71 Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty
of a person charged with an offense until his conviction
while at the same time securing his appearance at the
trial.72 As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from
the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of
his arrest or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the Information.74 An
accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a
general rule, before arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily
antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an
accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged
with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an
offense punishable by such penalties but after due
hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong,
does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the
Information charging him with such offense. It must be
conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal
complaint or Information on the ground that the same
does not charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the
petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is
mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for bail of
petitioner and accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in Criminal
Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against
former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings
would negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved
in a summary proceeding since said hearings might be
converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the
prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will
save the court from having to hear the same witnesses and
the parties from presenting the same evidence where it
would allow separate bail hearings for the accused who
are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate in the bail hearings,
the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was made
was in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. It
stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other
than the accused Serapio were to be excused from
participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of
accused Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not
concern them and that they will participate in any hearing
where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if
and when they will already have filed their petitions for
bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they will
participate only during the trial proper itself, then
everybody will be faced with the daunting prospects of
having to go through the process of introducing the same
witness and pieces of evidence two times, three times or
four times, as many times as there are petitions for bail
filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to the
speedy termination of a case. Neither can such procedure
be characterized as an orderly proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan
governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail
filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an
accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case
against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to
conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail
filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of
said petition jointly with the trial against another accused
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere
with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion,
the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but
also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a
speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the
complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal
issues involving petitioner and the other accused. After all,
if this Court may echo the observation of the United States
Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in
his being afforded our historic individual protections,
including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About
them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent
when that fashion has become rampant over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,80
this Court held that in a petition for bail hearing, the court
is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief
and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not
try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be given to the evidence against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial
or on what further evidence may be offered therein. It
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are
not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two
accused will of course avoid duplication of time and effort
of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the
prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for
bail are charged of having conspired in the commission of
the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially
the same evident against them. However, in the cases at
bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of
petitioner with the trial of the case against former
President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter.
For, with the participation of the former president in the
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail, the proceeding
assumes a completely different dimension. The
proceedings will no longer be summary. As against former
President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-
blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail
hearing. Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada can only be charged with conspiracy to commit the
acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended
Information since it is not clear from the latter if the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired
with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten
wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be charged with
having conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-
paragraph (a) by "receiving or collecting, directly or
indirectly, on several instances, money x x x from illegal
gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection
of illegal gambling.81 Thus, with respect to petitioner, all
that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the
evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong
are those related to the alleged receipt or collection of
money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph
(a) of the amended Information. With the joinder of the
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the
former President, the latter will have the right to cross-
examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the
prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in support of
his petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its
evidence, the former President may insist on cross-
examining petitioner and his witnesses. The joinder of the
hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former
President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner
as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the
right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek
relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the
respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy
resolution of an application for bail was succinctly
explained by Cooley in his treatise Constitutional
Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement which
would with reasonable certainty insure the attendance of
the accused to answer the accusation, it would not be
justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the
effect is to subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the
punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has not committed any crime."82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case
No. 26558, is empowered "to proceed with the trial of the
case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case,"83 the
Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering
that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of
former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears
stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its
May 4, 2001 Order the "pre-eminent position and
superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter
of his provisional liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary
delay,"84 only to make a volte face and declare that after
all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial as against former President
Joseph E. Estrada should be held simultaneously. In
ordering that petitioner's petition for bail to be heard
jointly with the trial of the case against his co-accused
former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in
effect allowed further and unnecessary delay in the
resolution thereof to the prejudice of petitioner. In fine
then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail with the trial of the case
against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the
prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by filing
dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and
his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial of
Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of numerous
manifestations and pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.85
They assert that they filed the motion for joint bail hearing
and motion for earlier arraignment around the original
schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 21–25,
2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in
capital offenses.87 In support thereof, they cite Article III,
Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that —
"All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. —
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. — All persons in
custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not
absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional
liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case. However,
as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is
discretionary upon the court.90 Had the rule been
otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an
application for bail by a person charged with a capital
offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. — At the
hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at
the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing
that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a
capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail.
Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged
with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be
conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the
evidence of guilt against an accused is strong.92 The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present
all the evidence it may deem necessary for this purpose.93
When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of
guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to deny the application
for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail becomes a matter of right.94
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of
right at this stage of the proceedings. Petitioner's claim
that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to
prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that
the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon
is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive,
expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be
noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the
hearing dates for petitioner's application for bail but the
same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several
motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be
resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail
hearing was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan
on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due
to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's
application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the
Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also
partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following
list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
• Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1)
leave to file motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2)
conduct a determination of probable cause as would
suggest the issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrant of arrest and other proceedings
pending determination of probable cause;
• Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
• Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation
or Service of Warrant of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail
or For Release on Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
• Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at
Obando, Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
• Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22,
2001, praying for Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside
and bail hearings be set at the earliest possible time;
• Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or
Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
• Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent
Omnibus Motion, dated June 13, 2001, praying that he be
allowed to file a Motion for Reinvestigation; and
• Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95
Motions filed by the prosecution:
• Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8,
2001;96
• Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph
Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated
May 8, 2001;97
• Opposition to the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to Adjust Earlier
Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;98 and
• Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and
Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also
contributed to the aforesaid delay by their filing of the
following motions:
• Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001,
filed by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7080 and praying that the Amended Information
be quashed;
• Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001,
filed by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he be (1)excluded
from the Amended Information for lack of probable cause;
(2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3) be
allowed to post bail;
• Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest,
dated April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that they be placed on house arrest during the
pendency of the case;
• Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest],
dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of the case by the
Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;
• Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) days
within which to respond to the Opposition to Motion to
Quash in view of the holidays and election-related
distractions;
• Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier
Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
• Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial
arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house
arrest;
• Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001
filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
• Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be allowed to be
confined in Tanay;
• Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit" Singson,
filed by Joseph Estrada;
• Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking reconsideration of
denial of requests for house arrest, for detention in Tanay
or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
• Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as
Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001,
filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
• Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the
resolution compelling them to be present at petitioner
Serapio's hearing for bail be reconsidered;
• Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by
Joseph Estrada;
• Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop
Teodoro Bacani favors their house arrest;
• Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to be present at
the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their
right to trial with assessors;
• Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House
Arrest; Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents;
and Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up
Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
• Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, asking for free dates for parties, claiming that
denial of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for
gag order of prosecution witnesses, availing of production,
inspection and copying of documents, requesting for
status of alias case; and
• Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, requesting for permission to attend some
municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in
cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged
with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to
conduct a hearing on said application.101 The rationale for
such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta.
Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. However, the determination
of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court
at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-
examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention
until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his
application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence
against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted
bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is
entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State,
through the prosecution's refusal to present evidence and
by the Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing, has
failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against
him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is
strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution launched
"a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory
moves" to prevent the conduct of bail hearings.
Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioner's
arraignment before the commencement of bail hearings
and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was
only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested
that it would present its evidence as if it is the
presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning that the
bail hearings would be concluded only after the
prosecution presented its entire case upon the accused;
and argued that petitioner's motion to quash and his
petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner
should choose to pursue only one of these two
remedies.104 He further claims that the Sandiganbayan,
through its questioned orders and resolutions postponing
the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail
and to due process of law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the
Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings
which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic
the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since
said orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of
petitioner's right to bail.106 He argues further that the fact
that he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid
process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the
remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his contention,
petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,107 where the Court
held that habeas corpus extends to instances where the
detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.108
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not
proper because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the
amended information which was earlier filed in court,109
the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid,
and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court
which jurisdiction to do so.111 In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for
this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes."112 Thus,
in previous cases, we issued the writ where the
deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law,
had later become invalid,113 and even though the persons
praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of
their liberty.114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that
habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to
issue the same115 applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder
against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in
fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on
April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas corpus
will lie where the deprivation of liberty which was initially
valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent
developments finds no application in the present case
because the hearing on petitioner's application for bail has
yet to commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail cannot be pinned
solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that
matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed.
Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail.117 It
cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not
as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and
the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to
grant bail,118 or has not even exercised said discretion.
The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with
the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.

The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be

unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's
resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner.
The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the
hearing on his application for bail.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:

1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions

are DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED;
and

2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of
the petition, ordering a joint hearing of petitioner's
petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as
against former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE;
the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET
ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil
Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10,
2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of
December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The
petition alleges that both Orders were issued by
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and
the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted
Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against
him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the
request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an
application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued
an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals
be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision
granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity
of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The
Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled
off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr.
For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order denying his application
for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order
dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to
post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s
further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition
that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at
all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor
of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice
and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding;
and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that
all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with
this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor
of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill
of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the
right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a
prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan
Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal
proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction,"
the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara
v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando,
J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from
the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
finds application "only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings
for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing
importance of the individual person in public international
law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global
recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to
human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4)
the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and
the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that
the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable
doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited
only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second
half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts
characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes
against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been
persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant
events show that the individual person is now a valid
subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
international organizations and states gave recognition
and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right
to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of
Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective
deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles
set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land.
In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which
the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among
the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person
to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the
family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in
Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited
to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have
likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this
case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail
pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective
deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that
"To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has
committed the most serious crime known to law;" and
that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some
of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law."
Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to
deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v.
Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign
nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have
been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of
an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in
Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where
the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in
issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that
the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender
of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for
it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis,
tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt
or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation
of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b)
the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition
is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows
the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the
request for extradition;" and that release from provisional
arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should
be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained
for over two (2) years without having been convicted of
any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right
to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him
bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of
bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right
to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should
not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings,
the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and
the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the
potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda
demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under
the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More
so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard

of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor
the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should
be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent

presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is

REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear
and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should
order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant,
vs. Judge ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn
complaint[1] dated January 15, 2003 of Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of Justice,
against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe,[2] then Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The charges are knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that
Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of
prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey
Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William
Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed
Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment,
all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. On March 14, 2001, the
prosecution filed with this Court a petition for change of
venue but was denied in a Resolution dated August 13,
2001.[3] On October 8, 2001, the accused filed a motion
for reconsideration.[4] In the meantime, the proceedings
before respondents court were suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss
invoking as ground the right of the accused to a speedy
trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu
propio issued an Order[5] granting bail to the accused,
fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property
bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel
whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent
judge issued the Order without the accuseds application or
motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for
reconsideration.[6] Instead of acting thereon, respondent
judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further
proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was
patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent
judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment,[7] respondent denied the charges. While
admitting that he issued the Order dated November 5,
2002 granting bail to the accused without any hearing, the
same was premised on the constitutional right of the
accused to a speedy trial. There was delay in the
proceedings due to complainants frequent absences and
failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in
court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The
prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the
accused.[8] He added that the administrative complaint
filed against him is purely harassment. It is not the
appropriate remedy to question his alleged erroneous
Order. Accordingly, and considering his forty (40) years of
government service, he prays that the administrative
complaint be dismissed.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily
retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable
for gross ignorance of the law and recommended that a
fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution[9] dated August 25, 2003, we directed
that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest
whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties submitted the
required manifestations that they are submitting the case
for decision on the basis of the records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,[10] we held
that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases
involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right
or discretion.[11] It must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion,
hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether
or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the
latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong.[12] In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.[13]
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to
the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of
Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing
of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of
guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at
the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify.
Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the
application for bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court
must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the
prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation.
(18a)
In Cortes vs. Catral,[14] we laid down the following rules
outlining the duties of the judge in case an application for
bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing
of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8,
id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19,
id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the
courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based
thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused.[15]
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and
procedure enumerated in Cortes.[16] He did not conduct a
hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus
depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose
objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion
on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and
thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a
summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspects of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate
the grant or denial of bail.[17]
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit
its recommendation on whether or not bail should be
granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the
grant of bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be held
administratively liable for not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,[18] we held that the failure to raise
or the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense
with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an
objection to the granting of bail to the accused will not
justify such grant without hearing. This Court has
uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory
questions from which it may infer the strength of the
evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where
the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask
the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the States evidence or judge the adequacy of
the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judges
opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that
a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the
temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed
no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the
respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the
petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertain from
the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact
contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was
also necessary for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the
amount of the bail, Only after respondent judge had
satisfied himself that these requirements have been met
could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant
bail.
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge
on the alleged absence of objection on the part of the
prosecution to the grant of bail to the accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were
entitled to their right to a speedy trial, hence, he granted
bail without a hearing. He blames the prosecution for the
delay.
Respondents contention is bereft of merit. There is no
indication in the records of the criminal case that the
prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case.
Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the
grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter disregard of
the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been
incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant
with the law and the Rules and maintain professional
competence; and by the very nature of his office, should
be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must
render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to
these standards.
It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with
knowingly rendering unjust judgment, gross ignorance of
the law and partiality. We ruled that in order to be held
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
order, respondent judge must have acted in bad faith, with
malice or in willful disregard of the right of a litigant.[19] A
perusal of the records, specifically the assailed Order,
hardly shows that any of these incidents has been proven.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to
say that to constitute such infraction, it is not enough that
the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. [20]
In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.[21] we categorically held
that good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a
judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. In
Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee,[22] we ruled that a judge may
not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order he renders. For liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge must
not only be erroneous; more important, it must be
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other
similar motive. Complainant, having failed to present
positive evidence to show that respondent judge was so
motivated in granting bail without hearing, can not be held
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to
sustain the same. It is merely based on complainants
speculation. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not
enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove this charge. The only exception to the rule is when
the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice,[23] which
are not present here.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of
Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant of bail. This
administrative offense is considered a less serious charge,
punishable under Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule
140 of the same Rules, thus:
Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
xxx
4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and
circulars;
xxx

Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any

of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other

benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding

P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe,

now retired, is found guilty of violation of Supreme Court
Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused
before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the
judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The
strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure
of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm
to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with
plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix
Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged
Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4
On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively
filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6
praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him. The motions
were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution
filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution
denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail,
on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile
had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was
issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later
on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General
Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post
bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he
was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would
only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first
assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented
its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong
against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of
right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to
fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the
Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application
for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence.
It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him
bail because while he is charged with plunder, "the
maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is
reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors
this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and
on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and
that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be
said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable
by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of
the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already
fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical
condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his
being a flight risk are among the factors that are
considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However,
as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the
amount of bail without an anterior showing that the
evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second
assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014
resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his
petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively
that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively
that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight
risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an
accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the
duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and
cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that
the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua
considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances
– his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for
the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is
already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his
social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s
right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail
hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.18 The presumption
of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process,
and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the
accused from committing additional crimes.[[21] The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill
this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism
to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule
11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. —
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an
offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may
be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill
of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to
bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise,
bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to
conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is
not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1)
upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2)
if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether
or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its
grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court
unless there has been a hearing with notice to the
Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with
notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.
:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this
Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that
a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an
accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a
murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for
it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its
strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis
of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not
one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever
the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned
ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each
individual accused still has to be established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or
heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation
of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and
whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases.
(Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if
the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-
parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present
nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise,
in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor
will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The
course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes
v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing
of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix
Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the
Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail
has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible
penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is only
reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or
absence of mitigating circumstances is also not
consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense
punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty
provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated
in the accused’s favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or
not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite
the crime alleged against him being punishable with
reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the determination,
being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by
the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community
arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it
to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that
the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect
for the legal processes of this country. We also do not
ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had
been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was
granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents
another compelling justification for his admission to bail,
but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the
UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure
levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease
composed of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid
and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications.
(Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat)
documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal
drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p
laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
(Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular
lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in
2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical
conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risk
s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension,
because it could lead to brain or heart complications,
including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease,
because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS,
because they could be triggered by certain circumstances
(like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure)
which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma
or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s
advanced age and ill health required special medical
attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital,
albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended
by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of
that medical facility because of the limitations in the
medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as
follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the
continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine
National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the
continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP
Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot
give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the
accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in
your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis
the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency
situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle
it but probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we
have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health
or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama
v. The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for
certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the
particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance,
and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration
which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of
the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its
discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the
Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is
actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of
pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen
similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
petition for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as
ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari ,
and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as
the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse
Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
whether the petitioner is suffering from active enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
petition for bail; and considering further that the said manner by reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE,
People’s Court has adopted and applied the well- the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the
established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the
in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
(case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August
which the said defendants were released on bail on the 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner
ground that they were ill and their continued confinement Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon
in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the
endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of
that the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.48 being detained for some other lawful cause.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to No pronouncement on costs of suit.
Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended to by SO ORDERED.
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This
will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense
but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in
court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the
trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of
bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of
the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice
– that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49
The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting
the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and
THIRD DIVISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122 custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be required,[1] is the
Petitioner, answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question:
what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not
Present: yet been proven, in the dubious interval, often years long,
between arrest and final adjudication?[2] Bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in
CORONA, J., Chairperson, assuring the accuseds presence at trial.[3]
VELASCO, JR., Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
- v e r s u s - NACHURA, imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to
prison must typically begin serving time immediately
PERALTA and unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.[4] An
accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an
MENDOZA, JJ. appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and
proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied
bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never
owed.[5] Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed,
THE COURT OF APPEALS however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal
includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to
and PEOPLE OF THE efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential
hardships of prison.[6] On the other hand, society has a
PHILIPPINES, compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond
Respondents. Promulgated: reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant
prison time.[7] Other recognized societal interests in the
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the
March 17, 2010 accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the
community from potential danger and the avoidance of
delay in punishment.[8] Under what circumstances an
accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate
x-------------------------------------------- balance between the interests of society and those of the
-------x accused.[9]
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
DECISION punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the
proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should
be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has
been in fact convicted by the trial court.[10]
THE FACTS
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11]
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12]
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk
or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for
bail.[13] It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of
bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-
established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick
pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. It found that
petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of
such gravity that his continued confinement during trial
will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.
x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does
not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be
attended by his personal physician.[14]
For purposes of determining whether petitioners
application for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the
Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners
conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners
case and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of
petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[15]
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of
the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
THE ISSUE
The question presented to the Court is this: in an
application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment
for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice
of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or
his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of
any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court
after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by
an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a
penalty of more than six years imprisonment should
automatically be granted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental
considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
FORBID GRANT OF PETITION
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial by the
Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be
resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy
is proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16]
Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the
fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial
thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less
proven by the prosecution,[17] however, petitioner
actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals
indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply
relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his
application for bail on the ground that the evidence that
he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the
assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion
to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as
this where the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with
the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal.
Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in
judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.[18] Ordinary abuse of discretion is
insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is,
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility.[19] It must be
so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words,
for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise
of discretion.[20]
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for
bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its
judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness
or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever
imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such
implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier,
the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the
exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners
application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable
but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners
claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the
merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the
court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or
not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The
appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless
manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals
erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ
of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.[21] In
this connection, Lee v. People[22] is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that
the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction
over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its
questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law
and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An
interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or
prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To
tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be
the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the
administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.[23] (emphasis supplied)
WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,
RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The
first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in
the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under
probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances
indicating the probability of flight if released on bail;
undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances)
not present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with
erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired
Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in
remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail
to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
xxxxxxxxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec.
5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved,
no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x[24]
(emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another
authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the
other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,
except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail
shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or
deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal
where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate
court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any
application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from
the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must
determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls
within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of
equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either
allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the
second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion
requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on
the determination of the proof of the presence of any of
the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of
bail. This is so because the existence of any of those
circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances
is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction
between the two different situations that are governed by
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead,
petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly
dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending
appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments
reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed
by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the
grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited
discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists.
The implication of this position is that, if any such
circumstance is present, then bail will be denied.
Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court
into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to
determining whether any of the five circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely
filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short,
petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of
the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as
choice.[28] Choice occurs where, between two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of
options), there is more than one possible outcome, with
the selection of the outcome left to the decision
maker.[29] On the other hand, the establishment of a
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.[30]
Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion
and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in
applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory
effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the
Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for
bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise
of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be
allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the
case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of
the applicable law on the matter.[31] In view of the grave
caution required of it, the court should consider whether
or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be
present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is
affirmed.[32] It should also give due regard to any other
pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular
case, such as the record, character and reputation of the
applicant,[33] among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail
pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an
initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but
raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be
determined by the appellate court.[34] In other words, a
threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing
that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for
delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.[35] This must
be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with
frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose
of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending
appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the
very strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts
exercise of discretionary power was sound,[36] specially
since the rules on criminal procedure require that no
judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of
Appeals except for substantial error.[37]
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the
five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating
circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner
applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius[38] rule in
statutory construction. However, the very language of the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea
that the enumeration of the five situations therein was
meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to
the following or other similar circumstances. Hence, under
the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those
listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be
considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail
pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a
way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the
listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail
pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is
more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient
than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed
six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where
the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment
must be made only if any of the five bail-negating
conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where
the penalty imposed does not exceed six years
imprisonment may be denied even without those
conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of
justice that bail pending appeal be more accessible to
those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those
convicted of less serious crimes?
PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY
AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically
alters, the history and evolution of the provisions on bail
pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided
under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of
Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the
Court of First Instance. After judgment by a municipal
judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance,
the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court
of First Instance. After conviction by the Court of First
Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at
the discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the
term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of
the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody
for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted
to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as
Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in
custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as
a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the
term is used in this Rules, is an offense which, under the
law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time
of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished
by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in
Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as
follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused
to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in
custody, shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as
a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a
matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court
since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his
guilt of the offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with
respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial
courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies
concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which
under the law existing at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail is punishable by a
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain
free on his original bail pending the resolution of his
appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant
to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an
offense which under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that
charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set
forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an
offense which under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his
bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in
confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule
abovecited, which are now pending appeal before his
Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the
following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the
accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court of
origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of
the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the
bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the
National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National
Police as the accused shall remain under confinement
pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the
aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be
forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this
Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules
of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail.
(emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought
about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody
shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court,
on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to
continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond
during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole, under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of
the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the
adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as
the term is used in these Rules, is an offense which, under
the law existing at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe
punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
(emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-
94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-
5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an
orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail
pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail
after conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of
First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court)
discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications
for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-
applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for
non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by
reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning,
admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the
action where the charge was not for a capital offense or
was not punished by reclusion perpetua.[39]
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more
stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of
bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No.
12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to
act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain
conditions and in particular situations. More importantly,
it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In
particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a
matter of right before final conviction.[40] Under the
present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed,
pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the
presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial
or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by
the trial court for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is
prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent
standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is more
in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail
pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic
grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a
rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of
the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure
to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach
adopted in the United States where our original
constitutional and procedural provisions on bail
emanated.[41] While this is of course not to be followed
blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail
pending appeal is no different from that in other
democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude
towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored
on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with
respect to extending bail should be exercised not with
laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.[42] In
fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution that
must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting
bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending
Rule 114, Section 5.[43]
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the
underlying principle that bail should be granted only
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and
convicted the presumption of innocence which may be
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be properly
argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more
likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction.[44] (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above
and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of
Appeals[45] (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules
were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal
is a matter of wise discretion.
A FINAL WORD
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being
repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance
of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-
standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong
support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail
and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial
determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal
laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial
court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting
bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our
criminal justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and

decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with
dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION January 30, 2012
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, -------------x
Petitioner,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
- versus -
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review[1]
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing
the Decision[2] dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution[3]
dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision[4]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding
Respondent. petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
G.R. No. 185128
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
[Formerly UDK No. 13980]
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was
Present: engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and
test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police
operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to
PERALTA, serve the search warrant to petitioner.
MENDOZA,
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted
REYES,* and them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were
riding and went directly to petitioner's house and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a
two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the
second floor. When they went upstairs, they met
petitioner's wife and informed her that they will
Promulgated: implement the search warrant. But before they can search
the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner
run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his
house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he
and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits
of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and
closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover.
SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay
tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned
with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado,
and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut
where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing,
but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate
from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance.
Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic
packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result
of which proved positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against
petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information[5]
reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at
about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his
possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline
powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known
as shabu, all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any
competent authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his
counsel, pleaded not guilty.[7] Subsequently, trial on the
merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon,
PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector
Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the
testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del
Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as
follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon,
petitioner was installing the electrical wirings and
airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and
Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was
able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but
he was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a
conversation. He was able to go home around 8:30-9
o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his
wife that police operatives searched his house and found
nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters
away from his house where they found the confiscated
items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a
storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable of the charge against him in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
accused Ruben del Castillo alyas Boy Castillo, GUILTY of
violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and
Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum of Prision
Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline
substance having a total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are
ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but
the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto
and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.[9]
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was
denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with the following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION,
THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE
VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-
24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA
HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID
COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE
PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR
COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS
RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA
HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE
PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE
SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER
ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF POSSESSION AS
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF
THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD
THE SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN
QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE
SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment
dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the following
counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive
Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of
petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs.[11]
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue
the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo
Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no
personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs
during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the
application of the same search warrant. The OSG,
however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing
to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing
evidence to show that Masnayon was conscious of the
falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the
nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is
no longer within the permissible area that may be
searched by the police officers due to the distance and
that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut
as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other
hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only
against government authorities and not to private
individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the
folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the
CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could
not be presumed to be in possession of the same just
because they were found inside the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the
petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated
drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to
and occupied by a particular person, the presumption
arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in
violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is
sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of
petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must
be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4)
the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.[12] According to petitioner, there was no probable
cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.[13] A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by
the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.[14] The judge, in determining probable
cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances
made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid
formula,[15] and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.[16] The existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no
position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.[17] Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.[18] A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must
be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.[19] In the present case,
Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24[20] specifically
designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as
the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were
seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away
from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated
items, having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as
fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of
which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items
seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible
as evidence because the one who discovered them was a
barangay tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure being applicable only against government
authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who
effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance
of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3
Masnayon:
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and
found nothing. A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.

Fiscal Centino:
Q What about you, where were you? Q Was that the only item?

A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano. A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q For how long did the chase take place?

A Just a very few moments.

Q What about the barangay tanod? Q Were you present when those persons found those tin
foil and others inside the electric shop?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to A Yes.[21]
reach him?

A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a Q When the search at the second floor of the house
barangay tanod. yielded negative what did you do?

A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his
shop because he ran from his shop, so we searched his
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod? shop.
A Yes.
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of
petitioner and that the items that were actually seized
were found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was
corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:

Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?

Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod
[did] your driver get?
FISCAL:
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of
Ruben del Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias
Boy, can you still recall what took place?
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo
Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder A We cordoned the area.
sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?

A Two. A Yes.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?

A We waited for the barangay tanod.

Q What happened after that? Q What happened at the shop?

A We searched the house, but we found negative. A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white
folded paper. Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of
Ruben del Castillo's wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her]
face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when
[you] conducted the search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader,
team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran
away from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in
front of his house.
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of
Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything.
The house was clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his
electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his
electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw
that (sic) Ruben run from that store and furthermore the
door was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben
del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
A We were side by side because the shop was very
small.[22]
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop? SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our FISCAL CENTINO:
team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you
mean to say that there were other persons or other A At his residence, the two-storey house.
person that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in
conducting the search at the residence of the accused?
Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of
Ruben del Castillo?
Q What about you? A Negative, no shabu.
A I also followed suit.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.
Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and
I saw him open the folded paper which contained four Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what
shabu deck. was that small house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and
the tanod open the folded paper?
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house
of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut
supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the
nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.[23]
Having been established that the assistance of the
barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who
effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods
therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority
and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether
as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or
by appointment by competent authority, is charged with
the maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision
which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an
agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local
Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the
Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
barangay members, and members of the lupong
tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as
persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated
by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of
public order, protection and security of life and property,
or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced
environment, and any barangay member who comes to
the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of
persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as
well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus,
the search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming
ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found
the confiscated items is considered a private individual,
thus, making the same items admissible in evidence,
petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to
establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs
seized, would still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual
findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique
opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying,[24] unless attended with
arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or
circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the
highest degree of respect on appeal[25] as in the present
case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is
about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every
prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the
following essential elements must be established: (a) the
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the
person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the
said drug is a regulated drug.[26]
In People v. Tira,[27] this Court explained the concept of
possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is
not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes
not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the
accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located,
is shared with another.[28]

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched
or seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient
showing that the property is under appellants control or
possession.[29] The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a
constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the
drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control
over the place where it is found.[30] The records are void
of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut
in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely
presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to
the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being
an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted
a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an
electrician by occupation. As such, conclusion could be
arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical
equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being the
case, he has control of the things found in said
structure.[31]
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership
of the structure where the seized articles were found.
During their direct testimonies, they just said, without
stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of
petitioner.[32] During the direct testimony of SPO1
Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the electrical
shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what
was that small house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house
of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut
supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the
nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.[33]
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon
admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied
what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by
petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical
shop, is that correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he
owns the shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a
mahjong den and at the other side is a structure rented by
a couple.[34]
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in
the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs.[35] With the prosecution's failure
to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control
and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start
with the law's own starting perspective on the status of
the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[36] Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a
moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable
to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.[37]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65[1] filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing
the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions[2] of
the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the
petitioners suspension from public office and (ii) denied
the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
suspension order.
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, G.R. No. 172035
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
BRION,
PEREZ, On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido
and other local officials[3] of Koronadal City, South
- versus - SERENO, and Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)[4] charging the
REYES, JJ. petitioner, among others,[5] with violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy
services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management
of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).[6]
THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the
SANDIGANBAYAN, petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit.
On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the
Respondent. July 4, 2012 petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.[7] In its July 29, 1999
resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------- the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of
-------------x R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4
of the Revised Penal Code.[8]
DECISION
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the
corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.[9]
BRION, J.: The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his
capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his
official functions, committing the offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring
and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting
them to participate in the prequalification of consultants
to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design
and Construction Supervision and Management of the
proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the
publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general
circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from
participating in said prequalification.[10] (Emphases and
underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioners co-
accused,[11] the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On
August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed
suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave
the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his
counter-affidavit with the OSP.[12]
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner
asked[13] the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to
submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of
the extension requested, the petitioner asked[14] the OSP
for an additional thirty-day period to file his counter-
affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted,
the petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day
extension period.[15]
Despite the extension period asked and given, the
petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting
Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner
had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence
(April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.[16]
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the
Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the
petitioner and of the other accused private individuals.[17]
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and
granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On
February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioners motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier termination
of the reinvestigation for the petitioners continuous failure
to submit his counter-affidavit.[18] The petitioner did not
question the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he
pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.[19]
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the
petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the petitioner
filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the obvious and
fatal defect of the [i]nformation in failing to allege that the
giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.[20]
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the
assailed resolution[21] suspending the petitioner
pendente lite
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecutions
Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court hereby
orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position
as City Mayor, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from
any other public position he now holds. His suspension
shall be for a period of ninety (90) days only.[22]
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for
a pre-suspension hearing.[23] The Sandiganbayan denied
his motion,[24] prompting him to file this certiorari
petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite
the failure of the information to allege that the giving of
unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner
was made through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. He alleges that the phrases
evident bad faith and manifest partiality actually refers not
to him, but to his co-accused,[25] rendering the
information fatally defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the
issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v.
Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,[26] he claims that [n]owhere in
the records of the [case] can [one] see any order or
resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended.[27] For the petitioner, the requirement of a
pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the
Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the
defect in the information.
THE OSPS COMMENT
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since
all the elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of R.A.
No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts.
These elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal,
South Cotabato at the time material to the acts
complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith when he invited only his co-accused
private individuals to participate in the prequalification of
consultants for the project instead of publishing it in a
newspaper of general circulation; and
3. The petitioners actions, performed in relation to his
office, gave unwarranted benefits and advantages to his
co-accused.[28]
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead
the Court on the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase
acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality when
the petitioner quoted the relevant portions of the
information in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People,[29] the OSP argues that while no
actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted, the events
preceding the issuance of the suspension order already
satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension
hearing i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the
information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to
preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by
the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation
with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner
was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the
petitioner already moved to quash the information,
although unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to
have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence in
the reinvestigation by the OSP.[30]
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:
1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-
suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order
against the petitioner.
THE COURTS RULING
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed
resolutions.
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him,[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure (Rules)[32] requires, inter alia, that
the information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed
which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the
Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its
attendant circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce
judgment.[33]
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the
crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused
is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular,
whether an information validly charges an offense
depends on whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information shall establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The
raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable
the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[34]
In arguing against the validity of the information, the
petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a person
of common understanding in appreciating the import of
the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality. A reading of the information clearly reveals that
the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality was merely a continuation of the prior allegation
of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused
private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us
believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in
the information[35] when, in his reaction to the OSPs
comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply
the clarity of the phrases position, in relation with the
other averments in the information. Given the supposed
ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase
acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, the
remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a
bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information
which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense
charged.[36]
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this
provision is mandatory,[37] the suspension requires a
prior hearing to determine the validity of the
information[38] filed against him, taking into account the
serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of
an elective public official even before his conviction.[39]
The accused public officials right to challenge the validity
of the information before a suspension order may be
issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the
criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information
against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation
of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code.[40]
In Luciano v. Mariano[41] that the petitioner relied upon,
the Court required, by way of broad guidelines for the
lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension,
that
(c) upon the filing of such information, the trial court
should issue an order with proper notice requiring the
accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing
why he should not be ordered suspended from office
pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act.
Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for
an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a
motion to quash the information or challenges the validity
thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no
longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial
court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for
determining the validity of the information, and thereafter
hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of
suspension should it uphold the validity of the information
or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-
suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused
should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against
him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he
may present a motion to quash the information on any of
the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause
order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension
in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however,
Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to
issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking the
suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been
submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension
hearing is to determine the validity of the information so
that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the
accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the
case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its
validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the
validity of the information by way of a motion to
quash.[42]
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for
the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity of the information or the regularity of the
proceedings against him,[43] Luciano likewise emphasizes
that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its
conduct.[44] With the purpose of a pre-suspension
hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone
cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension
order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court considered the
opposition of the accused (to the prosecutions motion to
suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the
need to actually set the prosecutions motion for hearing.
The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,[46]
where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension
hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations
that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the
numerous pleadings filed for and against them have
achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due
process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the
filing and the consideration by the court of the parties'
pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process
requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses
against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019,
then an accused would have no reason to complain that
no actual hearing was conducted.[47] It is well settled that
to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due
process exists.[48]
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous
Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from
the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the
suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply
to the OSPs Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.[49]
Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioners
continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-
suspension hearing based on the same alleged defect in
the information,[50] which we have found wanting has
legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioners
position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a
strict construction against the State.[51] The suspension
required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if
acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during his suspension.[52]
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
is a mere preventive measure[53] that arises from the
legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended,
he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a
finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused.[54]

Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive

measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety
(90) days,[55] the adequacy of the opportunity to contest
the validity of the information and of the proceedings that
preceded its filing vis--vis the merits of the defenses of the
accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or
presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard
on ones defenses, however unmeritorious it may be,
against the suspension mandated by law equally and
sufficiently serves both the due process right of the
accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension
required by law.

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces

the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public
office is a public trust.[56] In light of the constitutional
principle underlying the imposition of preventive
suspension of a public officer charged under a valid
information and the nature of this suspension, the
petitioners demand for a trial-type hearing in the present
case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than
promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July
28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch
268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with
robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, armed
with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with
one unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent
to gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash
money amounting to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less and
belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.
represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of
said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the said
gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and
PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of
San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on
May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he
withdrew the amount of ₱ 230,000.00 from the
Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries
of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the
bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio
Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista
(Bautista); (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black
bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in
the morning, while they were at the intersection of
Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly
appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag,
nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back,
shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautista’s advice,
he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting
hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and
ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his
gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up,
he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of
San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back
to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear
portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he
was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and
the bag was taken away from him; (m) when barangay
officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other
companions were brought to the police station for
investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to
Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along
Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he
alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and
(p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified
Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastian’s money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-
Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55
in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the
police station and informed him that he saw Lara walking
along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and
Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara,
who Sumulong identified; (d) they then approached Lara
and invited him for questioning; (e) at the police station,
Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively
identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after
being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and
subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the
Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station;
(b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that
took place at the corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues,
Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police
officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving
thereat, one of the police officers who were able to
respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces
of empty shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol;
(e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong,
Atie, Manacob at the police station; and (f) before Bautista
died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital
where the latter was brought after the incident.7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber
who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b)
on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer
trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a
comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the
morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001
and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the
house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and
asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that
he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go
with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went
with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the
policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught
you in your house, if in another place we will kill you" (sic);
(g) he was brought to the police station and not the
barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was
investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told
the police that he was at home when the subject incident
took place, the police challenged him to produce
witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the station,
one of the police officers told them to come back the
following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up holding
a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie,
"Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his
witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he
will be subjected to an inquest.8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his
neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May
31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara
working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to
5:00 in the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister,
Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was working on a
sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery
with homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) as amended by
Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said
accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:
The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong positively
identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted
away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services,
Inc., on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 o’clock in the
morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave.,
Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which
caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As
repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to
prosper, an accused must show he was at some other
place for such a period of time that it was impossible for
him to have been at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA
697). Considering the proximity of the distance between
the place of the incident and the residence of the accused
where he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001,
it is not physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene within the same barangay. The positive
identification of the accused which were categorical and
consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and
denial of the accused whose testimony was not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence (People
versus Aves 420 SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly
attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested
without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify
a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings
including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was
not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a
line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial
investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to
present a witness who actually saw him commit the
alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the
one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money
from him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong
gave to the police was different from the one he gave
during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair
glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the
possibility that it was his unidentified companion who shot
Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it
cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was
attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred
in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any
showing that they were impelled by improper motives in
testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been
given the credence they deserve. While his two (2)
witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by
itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their
credibility.
The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was
supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a
ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction considering its belated invocation. Any
objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should
have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before
the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed
waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is
not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and
based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:
Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In
voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a
plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information
for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is
deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his
arrest. Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone,
appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of his
arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment
or moved to quash the Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from
error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render
void all other proceedings including those leading to the
conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can
the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when
all the facts on record point to their culpability.14
(Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police
line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was violated,
the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford
him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not
part of custodial investigation.
Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial
investigation at the time he was identified in a police line-
up and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold
water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that an
accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a
police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of
custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is when
the accused had been the focus of police attention at the
start of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant
was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses
from a group of persons gathered for the purpose.
However, there was no proof that appellant was
interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was
extracted from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to
appellant’s hollow cry that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact that
during the police line-up, the accusatory process had not
yet commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to
interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it
does not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was
convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness
and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or
admission.15 (Citations omitted)
The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the prosecution’s
failure to present a witness who actually saw him commit
the crime charged as follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of
the prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he
shot the victim and took the money.
Such posture is unpersuasive.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution witness
Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act
was there any other words spoken by this person?
A There was, sir.
Q What did he say?
A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag
and ran away, sir, and I also saw somebody shoot a gun? "Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired
or happened after you stepped down from the Nissan
Q Who was firing the gun? pick-up, that is correct?
A The one who held-up us, sir. A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.
Q By how, do you know his name? Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already
proceeding towards that store to call your office by phone,
A No, sir. that is correct?
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
recognize him?
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan
A Yes, sir. Sentra when you heard this gunfire?
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize A Yes, sir.
him?
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at
A Yes, sir. the back of the vehicle, that is correct?

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.
Q Where were you looking when this person approached
you?
A I was looking at his face, sir.
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that
time.
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money
to him?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to
give the money or the bag so I immediately threw away
the bag at the back seat, sir.
Q And how long approximately was that person standing
by your car window?
Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court
whether indeed the person you saw holding you up at that
time is in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify
him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the
first bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and
black pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara
(sic).
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from
the vehicle and ran away with it, what did the accused do?
(sic)
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.
A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle,
he followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.
Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear,
this alleged holdup(p)er followed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes,
sir.
Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?
A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.
Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the
gun because he was holding the gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx

A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing
money to the back of the vehicle, what did that person
do?
Q Around how many shots according to your recollection
were fired?
A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.
x x x x x x"
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly
sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes
and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness
Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag
containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the
victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the
crime six deformed empty shells.16 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to convince.
Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that
positive identification of the accused, where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the
alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a)
that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility "refers to the distance between the place
where the accused was when the crime transpired and the
place where it was committed, as well as the facility of
access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed
to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the
locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the
felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just
a stone’s throw (about three minutes away) from the
crime scene.17 (Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court
accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to
file their supplemental briefs. Both parties waived their
right to do so, stating that they would adopt the
allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with
the CA.
Issues
The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery with
homicide gives rise to the following issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and
Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara
stood therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised
for the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and
d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as to
exonerate him from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of
arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when
he surrenders to the police or to the court.19 Any
objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An
accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon
entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and
this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may
have attended his arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that
was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial
conducted without error.21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with
counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That
he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of
counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara
inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen
at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting
point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court
previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec.
12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he
is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
starts when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is
not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People
vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs.
Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches
only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed
by the accused during identification in a police line-up
because it is not part of the custodial investigation
process. This is because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the
course of the line-up.23 (Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the
finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial
evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering
that only direct and not circumstantial evidence can
overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of
the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other
and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the
exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict
upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be
convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons
free and denying proper protection to the community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances
established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly
indicate Lara’s guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie,
Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the intersection
of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the
front passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while
pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front
passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him
the bag containing the money; (c) instead of giving the bag
to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated at
the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the
bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of the pick-up;
(e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun
at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista sustained several
gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautista’s blood was on the defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to
crime scene and empty shells were recovered therefrom. disapprove.29
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is
personal property with intent to gain must itself be not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere
established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise
proving the physical act of asportation by the accused be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not
must be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown possible for him to have been physically present at the
that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of
and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be
consummation of the robbery by reason or on the supported by clear and convincing proof.
occasion of the robbery.26 The mere presence of the
accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him. In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the scene of
It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true Lara’s
violence was necessary to realize such intent. claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer
trench on the day of the incident, it is possible that his
In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning
positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at given that the distance between his house and the place
him and demanded that the bag containing the money be where the subject incident took place can be negotiated,
turned over to him. That Lara resorted to violence in order even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put,
to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh
testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order
to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money. In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all
respects.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in
the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July
visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
be biased against the accused, his or her assertions as to 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
the identity of the malefactor should be normally
accepted.27 SO ORDERED.
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate
that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious
motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a
serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court
found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith
and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order
of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness
would falsely testify against the former.28
IV
In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of Lara, the
CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi outright. It is well-
settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which
is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6,
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and
FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the
equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an
individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the
Constitution, with the right of any person "under
investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts
are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk
of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City
station. It having allegedly come to light that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the
PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code
of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained.2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986,
Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading
as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS
WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED
VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO
CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE
1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the
PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the
presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight
Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta
Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of
the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to
questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos'
answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not
indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the
Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been
"misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying
back the money, he had been prevented from doing so,
"perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his
obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on
staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the
next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation
to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should
be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves
Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as
he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned
out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem
that no compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed
against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa
allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from
March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and
during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he
(Ramos) —
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then
and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said
accused ... having been entrusted with and received in
trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and
round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the
express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale,
account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in
possession thereof and instead of complying with his
obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ...
misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the
tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated
demands, ... failed and refused to make good his
obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a
plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL
under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors
made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988,6
which included "the (above mentioned) statement of
accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL
Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as
Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given
on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had
been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to
Plaintiff s Evidence."7 Particularly as regards the peoples'
Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which
appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused
being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to
"for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge
admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the
witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for
whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which
it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in
evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused
Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City
Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch
Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was
reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and
to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a
counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the
handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos,
given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated
in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that
the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said
admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration.
9 It was denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In
justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this
Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,
121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v.
Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA
496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial
investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present
Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation
"cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe
Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense
of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets
issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the
coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact
that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the
investigation was administrative in character could not
operate to except the case "from the ambit of the
constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988
are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and
prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private
prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines.
By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required
Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the
petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from
proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of
Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos),
including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment
in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the
same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also
subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment
on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe
Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The
Solicitor General has made common cause with the
petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course
and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside
respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit
Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor
General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might
have attended the institution of the instant action in the
name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte
of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the
issue — of whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion
for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's
Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has
given a construction that is disputed by the People. The
section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights,
or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a
person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
— set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935
Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the
rights of every suspect "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much
more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The
right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now
embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are
now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded
to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily
or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled
meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."
16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or
not, the right to refue to answer any particular
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the
right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to
refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a
subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the
stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a
particular question is addressed to him, the answer to
which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may
refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional
guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any
affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right
against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows
or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom
that every one is presumed to know the law, that
ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the
very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness
can be expected to know in advance the character or
effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does
not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at
the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats
of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These
rights apply to persons "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes
these rights different from that embodied in the first
sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.

This provision granting explicit rights to persons under
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a
decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law
enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the
suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation
of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting
in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated,
by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." 27 The situation
contemplated has also been more precisely described by
this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation
begins a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned
unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or
police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-
examined" not only by one but as many investigators as
may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every
person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work.
They employ all the methods and means that experience
and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what
may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person
involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial
interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission
of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in
one case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and
before any sort of investigation could be initiated,
declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an
old woman because she was threatening to kill him by
barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a
statement was admissible, compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not
being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights
just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and
(2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons
under preliminary investigation or already charged in court
for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under
preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there
had been would already have been ended at the time of
the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public
prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in
a criminal case already pending in court (or the public
prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his
right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by
the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason
that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor), in
common with all other persons, possesses the right
against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of
Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right
to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the
time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has
other rights in the matter of giving testimony or refusing
to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of
protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of
Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against
himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf;
but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice
or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt
from being a witness against himself' signifies that he
cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the
criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the
accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by
subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He
cannot be required to be a witness either for the
prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In
other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a
civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena,
having only the right to refuse to answer a particular
incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify
altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be
sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law
categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness
shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him."
35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he
may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he
"may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be
cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct
examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on
cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the
ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence
he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him
for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a
criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is
charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of
which he is accused, he may decline to answer that
specific question, on the strength of the right against self-
incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the
1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution
for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he
may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
question on the ground that he might be implicated in that
crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any
particular question which might implicate him for a
different and distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime
and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or
producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the
public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after
having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his liberty in some significant way, and on being
interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to
be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiates the free will; and to have
evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to
him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some crime
other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent
Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the
disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the
same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so
doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought
to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be
cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced
from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and
legal principles involved as to make application of said
thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally
unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His
Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation,
as the term should be properly understood, prior to and
during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under
custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were
of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him
on the first day of the administrative investigation,
February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should
be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked
during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed
against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note
(later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on
February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering
to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was
a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not
be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater
danger x x (of) the violation of the right of any person
against self-incrimination when the investigation is
conducted by the complaining parties, complaining
companies, or complaining employers because being
interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no
propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in
their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their
hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give
statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion,
undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to
draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not
be imposed on any employee by his employer until and
unless the employee has been accorded due process, by
which is meant that the latter must be informed of the
offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails
the making of statements, oral or written, by the
employee under such administrative investigation in his
defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of
counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may,
of course, refuse to submit any statement at the
investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to
do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it
would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the
administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal
action brought against him, because he had not been
accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his
"Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only
in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that
the employee's statements, whether called "position
paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so
that they may be admitted and duly considered by the
investigating officer or committee, in negation or
mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in
certain instances the judge's expressed apprehensions
may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue
pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee
under investigation — or for that matter, on a person
being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly
offended. In such an event, any admission or confession
wrung from the person under interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect
vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the
general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or
coerced statements may not in justice be received against
the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any
evidentiary value at all.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and

setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and
September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in
evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the
trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining
order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio,
is now declared of no further force and effect.
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

Petitioner,

- versus - - versus -

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Respondent.

x-------------------------x x-------------------------x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner, GERARDA H. VILLA,

Petitioner,

- versus -

- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO

ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO,
JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN
MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO
JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO ADRIANO,
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS,
JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, Respondents.
JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN,
G.R. No. 151258
Respondents.

x-------------------------x

FIDELITO DIZON,

PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 1, 2012
G.R. No. 155101
x--------------------------------------------
------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa
the victim in this case on 10 February 1991 led to a very
strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part
to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa,
groups were organized, condemning his senseless and
tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted
Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the
law was to discourage members from making hazing a
requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was
meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation
rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala
prohibita.[4]
Present: Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing
activities in the country.[5] Within a year of his death, six
more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of
Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu;
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of
Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis
BRION, Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and
Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in
Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public
sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of a
hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o
act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law.[7]
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is
viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or
injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law,
judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being
swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly
based on the elements of the offense and the facts
allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as
G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v.
People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v.
Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals
(CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert
Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met
by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at
the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to
Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to
the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed
the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation
rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days.
After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of
their initiation.
 beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for 16. Antonio General (General)
already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started
soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked eating dinner. They then slept at the carport. 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some
of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings.
Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of they thought he was just overacting. When they realized,
two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to
jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the against the following 35 Aquilans:
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. 1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated
with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day 2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
of initiation.
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the In Criminal Case No. C-38340
neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
rough basketball. They were also required to memorize 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured 4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
initiation for the day officially ended. 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-
difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman) 38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the
trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters
that had to be resolved first.[12]
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide,
penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court
rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal
Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set
aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual participation.
Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the
following Decision applied only to the remaining 25
accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino,
Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman,
Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson,
Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato
Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of
the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and
Artemio Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in
the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No.
38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion
on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16]
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003
and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to
Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders
and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right
to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5)
consolidated Petitions were individually brought before
this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises
two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its
Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first,
denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent
proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel
for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on
10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner
Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that
the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on
Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision dated 10 January
2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that
he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial
courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and,
second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA
did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served
as basis of acquittal of the other accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling,
which forfeited Dizons right to present evidence during
trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on
an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no
longer presented separate evidence during trial. According
to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as
waived because he was justified in asking for a
postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted
that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on
an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he
should have likewise been acquitted, like the other
accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional
initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23]
He claims that the additional paddling session was part of
the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that
one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the
initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to
undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling.[24] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of
the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted by
Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys
death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that,
on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries
suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken
individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the
violent death of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was
motivated by ill will. He claims that Lennys father could
not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since
the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work
in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the
parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon.
According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen
parking space were only part of the psychological
initiation. He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-
neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was
not true and that he was just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill
will was negated by his show of concern for Villa after the
initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of
the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked
the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with
Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not
stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through
a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to
petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his
manifestation of compassion and concern for the victims
well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal
of the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution
dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et
al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General,
the CA erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny
died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the
trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found
that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death,
petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally
liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article
provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is
inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA
acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts
finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability
of
all the accused must be based on their individual
participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CAs Decision
dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007
in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition
involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a
separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano,
Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and
Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November
1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused
recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various reasons,
the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of
the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal
case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused
failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She also points out that the
prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original
records and the required evidence were not at its disposal,
but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into
five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to
present evidence constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy
trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set
aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and
adjudicated the liability of each accused according to
individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the
Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of
counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if
the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term
personal penalties refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary
penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32]
including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the
delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable
through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal
extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly
arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the
dates for the reception of evidence for accused-petitioner
Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the
5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated
that it will not entertain any postponement and that all
the accused who have not yet presented their respective
evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with
their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to
present evidence when required shall therefore be
construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused
manifested in open court that his client Antonio General
would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the
counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other
accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this
development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that
the parties should be ready at all times down the line, the
trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next
trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned
dates. The original dates were supposed to start two
weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for
accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the
accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a
Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to
appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would
be ready to present evidence on the dates originally
assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the
Manifestation on the same date and treated the
Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of
the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40]
Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon
to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that
right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived
of due process of law when the trial court forfeited his
right to present evidence. According to him, the
postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have
been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned
trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September
1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He
posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates
assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for
a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates
fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial
court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution itself.[42] Article III,
Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel This constitutional right includes
the right to present evidence in ones defense,[43] as well
as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at
every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan
set the hearing of the defenses presentation of evidence
for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was
cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular
membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and
upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset
for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his
counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very
same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation
of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had
waived his right to present evidence because of his
nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled
hearings. In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of
the Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during
the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to
be present for trial on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995
hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of his
right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may
be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled
with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo
did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his
counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan
imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be
death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to
see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence.
In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned
of the consequences of another failure to attend the
succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the
accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even
forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to
deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence
without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence
on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a
criminal case involving a grave penalty is not assumed and
taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel
is indispensable so that the court could personally conduct
a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis
supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of
petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it
should have considered the excuse of counsel justified,
especially since counsel for another accused General had
made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that
freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate,
the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the
reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its
Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit
one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial
evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial
dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea,
an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be
heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in
the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of
the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we
ruled that where facts have adequately been represented
in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or
irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a
guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment
is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on
record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant
facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we
see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would
substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the
arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition
corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the
matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition
is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court
and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in
the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all
actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites,
and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was
not outside the official activity of the fraternity.[49] He
even argues that Dizon did not request for the extension
and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or
turned over from one judge or justice to another at the
trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court.
Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the
parties. This case has been going on for almost two
decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts
necessary to decide the case have already been
determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been
dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy
trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out
that the accused failed to raise a protest during the
dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they
asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed
the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner
also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and
Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not
be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case
when the original records and the evidence it may require
were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of
Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been
enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial
free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53]
The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is
attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when
a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case
being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the
defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are
factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-
assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a
dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the accused
to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a
consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the
dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of
double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious,
certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not
triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the
order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61]
Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of
jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs
dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their
right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case
would reveal that the following factors contributed to the
slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to
the Court of Appeals and the prosecutions failure to
comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to
secure certified true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the
foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial
of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that
their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this
case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to
the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply
with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the
records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure
the complete records of the case from the Court of
Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said
Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the
court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still,
there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It
is not stated when such order was complied with. It
appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said
records were still not at the disposal of the trial court
because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court
in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused
Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until
August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years,
there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo.
Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and
the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29,
1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case
for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act
upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns
upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final
amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon,
Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they
were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the
case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12
years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the
unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for
close to five years since the arraignment of the accused
amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of
cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the
unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the
criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly,
in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court
held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before
him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court
held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in not quashing the information which was filed six years
after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby
depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of
the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a
decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s
right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in
the records that would show that the subject of this
Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon,
and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our
criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is
charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either
by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be
charged with the same or an identical offense.[69] This
principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non
bis in idem found in the common law of England and
undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the
United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the
fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which
implements this particular constitutional right, provides as
follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from
appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or
to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule
45 of the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking
double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent
court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against
him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the defendants express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and
Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the
appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several
avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of
cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional
purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal,
from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in
the hope of securing a greater penalty.[76] We further
stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
his acquittal.[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may
challenge the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the
imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2)
where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power
under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review
must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law;
an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse
of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive
the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such
an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of
double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari,
which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et
al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser
crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the
Petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in
accordance with law because private complainant and
petitioner were denied due process of law when the public
respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x
b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the
petitioners Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored
evidence when it adopted the theory of individual
responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the
trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the
finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon
and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas
consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine,
reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we
held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to
a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the
facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are
correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for
a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on
double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition
contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity
members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the four fraternity
members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on
double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the
imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91] We
have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be
used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of
those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with
the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused
Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as
a result of the physical punishment heaped on him were
serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the
victim, there can be no precise means to determine the
duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance
required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the
category of the offense and the severity of the penalty
depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the
length of this period must likewise be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same
act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June
26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the
crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical
injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing
People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is
constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the
appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only
slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied
and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v.
Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused should be held
guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA,
because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise
means to determine the duration of the incapacity or
medical attendance required.[95] The reliance on Penesa
was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal
that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight
physical injuries, because the victims injuries neither
caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His
injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a
case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries
and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently
inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight
physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact.
According to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken
during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It
then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that
the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation
rites.[100] Considering that the CA found that the physical
punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in
nature,[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to
limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is
a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the
perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act,
even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once
a person is found to have committed an initial felonious
act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that
results in the death of the victim, courts are required to
automatically apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject
to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing
physical injuries punished under Articles 262 to 266 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is
therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and
abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the
mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the
victim dies should be based on the framework governing
the destruction of the life of a person, punished under
Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365
for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned
provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies
are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other,
in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for
physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as
if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of
Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of
the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical
conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to
all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny.
The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to
suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we
therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No.
154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at
the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction
of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act
under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it
was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability.
It ruled that there could have been no conspiracy since the
neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented
to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The
accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only
for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly,
19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of
them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical
injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were
found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case
wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order
to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm
maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the
case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by
his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go
through physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity.
Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply
to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it
necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying
concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the
nature of physical and psychological initiations widely
known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of
thought.[105] The classical theory posits that a human
person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute
free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts
that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[107]
The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that
humans are rational and calculating beings who guide
their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure
and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if
threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope
of possible gain or advantage in committing the
crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the
free will and moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of
mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent is the predominant
consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the
law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to
exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means
of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the
elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The
first element, freedom, refers to an act done with
deliberation and with power to choose between two
things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns
the ability to determine the morality of human acts, as
well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an
illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or
a determination to do a certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is
described as the state of mind accompanying an act,
especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of
the mind and the resolve with which a person
proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the
act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels
one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of
using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On
the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart
or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the
requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to
malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of
mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus
that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with
deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought.[123]
The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence
of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in
order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it is to
be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by
means of dolo or malice. The phrase coming to an
agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to
cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal
negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional,
the wrong done being simply the result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a
person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill,
the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in
conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony
committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a
felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129]
Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the
existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to
kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
such intent.[132] Furthermore, the victims death must not
have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight,
carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our
society.[135] It is said that, throughout history, hazing in
some form or another has been associated with
organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous
tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be
traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new
students who enrolled in European universities worked as
servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the
concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where
young men recruited into the military were tested with
pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their
loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern
fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to
these values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According
to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a
tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked
to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in
which they seek to attain membership through
hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom
requires a student wishing to join an organization to
receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a
particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually
one to two semesters long.[143] During the program,
neophytes are required to interview and to get to know
the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter
history; to understand the principles of the organization;
to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate
in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and
respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and
its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters
require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve
hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation
rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for admission to an
organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte,
initiate, applicant or any other term by which the
organization may refer to such a person is generally placed
in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced
to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or
activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct
that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger
those who desire membership in the organization.[148]
These acts usually involve physical or psychological
suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing
new. In fact, more than a century ago, our national hero
Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named
Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak
ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of
the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The
Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity
believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well
as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic
Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home
to each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152]
It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a
single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and
resolve.[153] They were made to go through vigorous
trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa
balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to
withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to
endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a final step in the
ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign
membership papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was
transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late
19th century. As can be seen in the following instances,
the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly
similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny
Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy
forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting physical
exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical
damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various
ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional
investigation of hazing at the academy during his second
year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985,
the candidate-victim was injured during the shriners
hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies
for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was
known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It
required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-
foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading
to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to
climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of
the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en
route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers
in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a
ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings
directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.[163] The
victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as
others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and
into the chests of the victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri
State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male
students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The
fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated
physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at
the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles
of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of
a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were
on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the
body; and body slamming, an activity in which active
members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and
dropped them to the ground.[166] The fraternity members
then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of
physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim
went through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa
Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168]
The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch
and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine,
feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings
on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto
walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot
sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5)
doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as
cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated
as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2
a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed
for a couple of hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during
which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran
down a hallway and descended down a flight of
stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the
victim Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the
Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha
Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities,
which included various forms of physical beatings and
torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002,
the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing activities
during the fraternitys initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the
other initiates went through psychological and physical
hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more
than 200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in
Florida sought initiation into the campus chapter of the
Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic
year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity
culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four
nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was
blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and
buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries,
which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately
60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days
of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges
sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night
initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed
out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the
proverbial birth by fire, through which the pledge who has
successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her
worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is
the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process
enables the organization to establish unity among the
pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include
leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close,
almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in
response to hazing in the military.[183] The hazing of
recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent
that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing,
harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois
passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct
whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in
large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless
College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or
criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had
enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187]
Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for
even the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states
with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case
death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor,
except hazing that results in death or great bodily harm,
which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a
sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less
than one year and not more than three years.[191] Indiana
criminal law provides that a person who recklessly,
knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a
person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D
felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by
means of a deadly weapon.[193] As an element of a Class
C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily
injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily
injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is
imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight
(8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A
misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to
the life of the student or prospective member, in which
case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony
provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven
years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state
jail felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail
felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any
term of not more than two years or not less than 180
days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious
bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree
felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-
degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law
provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be
deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof
and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In
Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing
results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or
imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left
with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v.
Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family
resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there
was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until
1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity
initiation rites does not automatically amount to the
absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were
equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a
contextual background or factual premise they are still
criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in
agreement that with the exception of Villareal and Dizon
accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have
the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the
other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the
Decision of the trial court and found that the two accused
had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not
merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its
finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had
apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up
Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space
had been stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal,
the court said that the accused suspected the family of
Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a
hand in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then
ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and
Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil and
criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted
and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal
must and should face the consequence of their acts, that
is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[209]
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of
Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence of animus
interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which
the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it
necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room
and we were briefed as to what to expect during the next
three days and we were told the members of the fraternity
and their batch and we were also told about the fraternity
song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house
and we were made to ride a van and we were brought to
another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be
the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head
down and to link our arms and then the driver of the van
and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left
us inside the van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the
effect, Villa akin ka, Asuncion Patay ka and the people
outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice
and how strong a voice these remarks uttered upon your
arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the
sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being
rocked through and through, what were the voices or
utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka
sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long
did they continue during the rocking of the van which
lasted for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on
hearing voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical
beating] were being inflicted, was there any utterances by
anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were
discouraging, and some were encouraging others who
were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta
atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking us
being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you
heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they
asked us whether matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those
particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were
utterances simultaneously, I could not really pin point who
uttered those words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard
during the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court
what were the utterances that you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon
stepped on my thigh, he would say that and I quote ito,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that
would in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more
serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would
jump on my thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He
was saying to the effect that this guy, his father stole the
parking space of my father, sir. So, thats why he inflicted
more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular
accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was
accusing you of having your family have his brother killed,
what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that
he was just making it up sir. So he said that I knew nothing
of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol
Express, he kept on uttering those words/statements so
that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder
blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular
mentioning that Lenny Villas father stole the parking space
allotted for his father, do you recall who were within
hearing distance when that utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation
so there were different people who heard from time to
time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was
the next accusation against Lenny Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet
Dizon came near to us and when Lenny Villas turn, I heard
him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation
to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas
thighs and sometime he stand up and he kicked his thighs
and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not
right now. You mentioned also that accusations made by
Dizon you or your family had his brother killed, can you
inform this Honorable Court what exactly were the
accusations that were charged against you while inflicting
blows upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me
in particular if I knew that his family who had his brother
killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I
knew that it was just a story that he made up and I said
that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting
blows on me, sir. And another incident was when a talk
was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota
court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was
drinking beer, and he said and I quote: Marquez, Marquez,
ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo
ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did
ever a doctor or a physician came around as promised to
you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez
testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination
Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there was a briefing
that was conducted immediately before your initiation as
regards to what to expect during the initiation, did I hear
you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court
what they told you to expect during the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a
particular place, we would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at,
ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there
would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could
immediately go back to school. All the bruises would be
limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular
school uniforms like long sleeves, it would be covered
actually so we have no thinking that our face would be
slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that
you would have bruises on your body but that will be
covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or
implements that you expect that would create bruises to
your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would
be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that
much of the initiation procedures is psychological in
nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not
consist only of physical initiation, meaning body contact, is
that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called
psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of
things calculated to terrify you, scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made
belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten
you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this
correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was
initiating you, he said or he was supposed to have said
according to you that your family were responsible for the
killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you remember
saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that
statement said to you by Dizon that you did not believe
him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing
you perhaps, the purpose as I have mentioned before,
terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting
the initiation, this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I
think, why he was saying those things was because he
wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only
perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling
this to Villareal, he was hitting me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were]
subjected to the same forms of initiation by all the
initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who
jumped on you or kicked you said something similar as was
told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express
for instance, the masters would run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was
followed by the initiating masters not only on you but also
on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever
forms of initiation was administered by one master, was
also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also
administered by another master on the other neophyte,
this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives
attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were
baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused were
just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill
fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no
element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez;
and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and
Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all
the fraternity members during their initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a
glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the part of the
CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal.
Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it
was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had
the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty
of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according
to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above,
it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa
and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in
the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet
Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told
witness Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay
yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas
thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking
space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we find
that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of
intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of
Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and contextual
premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand
the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the
neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to
psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew
that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated.
They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto,
Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang
ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or
some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the
neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the
formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny
Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father.
According to the Solicitor General, these statements,
including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the
psychological initiation employed by the Aquila
Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of
inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling
make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted
the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity
initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes
admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in
the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate
deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law,
former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we
conveyed during the period of interpellations on why we
included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the
neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte is
made to undergo certain acts which I already described
yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to
test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or
recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the
fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and
putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit,
making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the
fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to
jump outside after making him turn around several times
but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the
inside portion of the building these are the mental or
psychological tests that are resorted to by these
organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts
can result in some mental aberration, that they can even
lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we
want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons
behavior must not be automatically viewed as evidence of
a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it
must be taken within the context of the fraternitys
psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was
not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and
Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would
lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only
confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was
not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up.[218] Even
the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of
Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of
all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but
merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity
initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the
same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused
Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill.
Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of
the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the
fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to
injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an
intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the
Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits
that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired
to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued,
all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts
under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222]
the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with
dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from
the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu
facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical
integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate
and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se
merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence
in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does
not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions
are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the
mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent,
does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused
teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her
students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline.
The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal
liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus:
Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility
[w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done
with criminal intent the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will,
hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the
applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law,
petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused
members of the religious group known as the Missionaries
of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or
treatment plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of
water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest
with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen
knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by
expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing
him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of
the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we
reversed the trial courts finding of liability for murder
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead
ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds
initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the neophytes
were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a
felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People
v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged
by the action, conduct, and external acts of the
accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their
intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method
employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the
body on which the injury was inflicted may be
determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The
Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background
surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The
night before the commencement of the rites, they were
briefed on what to expect. They were told that there
would be physical beatings, that the whole event would
last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On
their first night, they were subjected to traditional
initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express,
Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings
were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and
legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were
made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball.
They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were
once again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When
the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to
another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned
to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes
by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from
those who were designated to inflict physical and
psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their
regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to
help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that their
blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after
every physical activity or round; to serve food and water;
to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them
whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A
few days before the rites, he asked both his parents for
permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father
knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process
and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as
follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and
voluntarily consented to undergo physical initiation and
hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they
voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become
members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the
initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is
of common knowledge that before admission in a
fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage.
Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods
such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the
initiation would involve beatings and other forms of
hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity
to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution
witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that
after a week, you can already play basketball. Prosecution
witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that
the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a
wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he
expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed, there can
be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional
rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent
further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are
constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was
not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of
punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting
physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with
intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom
and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was
proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional rounds on the second night were
held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the
initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the
head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity
members still participated in the rituals, including the
paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition.
Other than the paddle, no other weapon was used to
inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were
predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of
roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned
for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking
care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further
belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who
wished to join the fraternity went through the same
process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that
Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different
treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that
hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.[235]
The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken
into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction
of physical injuries was rooted may also be determined by
Lennys continued participation in the initiation and
consent to the method used even after the first day. The
following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-
Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are
already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it
results in death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may
be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits
sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or
acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making
a new offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons
either composing a sorority, fraternity or any association
from making this requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal
across the land that no group or association can require
the act of physical initiation before a person can become a
member without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the
rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere
organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the
punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered
crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to
discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a
legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or
offenses, because these very same acts are already
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very
telling difference: When a person or group of persons
resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an
organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or
is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific
crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is
homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention
to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of
hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the
act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will
prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they
should really shun this activity called hazing. Because,
initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts
of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr.
President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial
innocent act. That is why there is need to institute this
kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o
ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang
intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay
pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong
nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the
fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan
na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay
kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa
inyo.
have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving xxxxxxxxx
or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a
novel situation where we create the special crime without
having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic
elements of any crime. SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was
a group that initiated and a person died. The charge is
murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law,
would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were anymore?
merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And even the
distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the
intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new
club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present
are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are during hazing x x x
not going to be proven by intent, but just because there
was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First,
would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second,
would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely,
is being criminalized because in the context of what is
happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they
conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to
maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of
inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr.
and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged. President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent
to kill.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to
prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
intended to maim. What is important is the result of the
act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict
the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say,
We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be
initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. [236]
intention to kill or maim. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr.
President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not
have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in
the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have
been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of
homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will
have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate
offenses.
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator
Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy as a
punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina
further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has
no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the
conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be
punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed
by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the
commission of sodomy forced into another individual by
another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be
modified by the phrase without consent for purposes of
this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we
qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to
aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent
will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results
from hazing aggravate the offense with or without
consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority,
or any association for that matter, it can be with or
without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a
person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does
not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens
from the malpractices that attend initiation which may
have been announced with or without physical infliction of
pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there
is announcement that there will be physical hazing or
whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is
duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be
protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a
certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the
parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on
the part of the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position
taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and
Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts
new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private
proclivities of some individuals when they do their acts in
private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of
couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love
in ways that are not considered acceptable by the
mainstream of society. That is not something that the
State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr.
President. Such that the act may even be entered into with
consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may
be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is
passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction
of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the
initiator said, Well, he allowed it upon himself. He
consented to it. So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy
was done with the consent of the victim, then we would
not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a
defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or
suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we
would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will
not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or
psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The
result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries
merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the
defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal
nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only
aggravate the offense if it is committed without consent of
the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law
will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee
amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is
approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to
prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal author of the
Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader
brought out the idea of intent or whether there it is mala
in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment
if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make
this a special law on hazing. We will not include this
anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a
possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the
proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered
to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply
enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special
law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala
prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof
of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical
crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society
considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala
in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents
would not have consented[239] to his participation in
Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing
were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted
through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice)
Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the
people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be
regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct
of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to
the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a
lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an
intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in
favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the
Court is constrained to rule against the trial courts finding
of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa,
there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or
animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases,
considering the contextual background of his death, the
unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting
hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically
mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are
ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal
Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means
of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary
act done without malice, from which an immediate
personal harm, injury or material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence
on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case,
the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the
actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence
comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an
injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack
of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is
negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent
man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to
take precaution against the mischievous results of the act.
Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being
charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and
diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct,
the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is
minor, not much care is required.[249] It is thus possible
that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence
that may be required of an individual, from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of
the person to employ more or less degree of care will
depend upon the circumstances of each particular
case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of
cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic
injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure
refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as
part of the circulatory system due to the lack of
blood.[253] In the present case, the victims heart could no
longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived
of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation
was due to the channeling of the blood supply from the
entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries,
veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm
areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple
hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas
were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these
could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the
victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the
like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood
to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating
blood became so markedly diminished as to produce
death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver,
kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in
the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs,
were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected
to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded that
there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the
victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or
disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas
arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those
areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and
led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be
taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him
by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of
the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked,
elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different
objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were
also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and
slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough
basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny,
saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-
legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the
cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the
latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as
follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your
testimony on various cross examinations of defense
counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on
the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as
Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by themselves would not
cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to
propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of
these injuries marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the
demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to isolate such
injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At
the same manner that as a car would not run minus one
(1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to
interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused
fraternity members were drinking during the initiation
rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity
members were tantamount to recklessness, which made
the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a
duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269]
With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since
the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death
was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly
participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical
injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident
may have been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the
alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal
restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the
initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the
end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members
participated in the reopened initiation rites having in mind
the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of
the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review
in future legislation. We further note that some of the
fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys
initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress,
for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or
unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and employ
appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must
be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted
that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to
avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during
bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up,
because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter,
and because he felt he did not have a choice.[271] Thus,
for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent
under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands
of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to
which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were
reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-
Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused
fraternity members would have all been convicted of the
crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting
the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to
rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The
CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of
physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused
Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by
the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted
without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing
Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification
of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with
respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny
Villa in the amounts of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly
and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also
awarded the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be jointly
and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the
sole fact of death of the victim.[274] In accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CAs award of
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or
compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim, so long as the
claim is supported by tangible documents.[276] Though
we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is
prevented from granting them, since the records are
bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were
incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the
appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim
for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for
the grief suffered on account of the victims death.[278]
This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil
Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased.[279] Thus, we
hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the
amount of ₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101
finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries
is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in
relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are
ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny
Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ₱50,000,
and moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12%
from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting
Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R.
No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.