01 Petitioner v.

Respondent
G.R. No. 193340 (11 January 2017)
Jardeleza, J. / Tita K

Subject Matter: Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over parties

Summary:
Private respondents filed a complaint against the Municipality of Tangkal to recover the possession and ownership of a
parcel of land. The municipality filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since a municipality is not a
Muslim. However, the Sharia District Court ruled that since the municipality’s mayor is a Muslim, the municipality is also
a Muslim, and since both parties are Muslim, the said case is under the its jurisdiction. The SC nonetheless ruled
otherwise. It ruled that the Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private respondents’
complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear from the complaint that
the real party-defendant was the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari’a District Court should have simply applied the basic
doctrine of separate juridical personality and motu proprio dismissed the case.

Doctrines:
 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real parties-in-interest as those who stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit.
 The person represented is deemed the real party-in-interest; the representative remains to be a third
party to the action.
Parties:
Petitioner THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE
HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District
Court, 4th Judicial District, Marawi City, and
Respondents
HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN DIMNANG B.
ALOMPO
Facts:
Private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with the Shari’a District Court of
Marawi City (Shari’a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 ha. located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao
del Norte.
They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the
Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to “borrow” the land to pave the way for the construction of the
municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of
Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert
to Macalabo.
Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land within the agreed
period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to them as successors-in-
interest of Macalabo.
The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot
be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of
land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.
Shari’a District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal’s motion to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of
Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case “is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has
original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts.” Moreover, the filing of a motion to dismiss is a
disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts.
 Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to us via petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for
a temporary restraining order (TRO).
Arguments:
Private respondents argue that :
a. under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts, a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the district court is a prohibited pleading. Likewise, the Municpality of
Tangkal’s motion to dismiss is disallowed by the rules.
b. since both the plaintiffs below and the mayor of defendant municipality are Muslims, the Shari’a District Court
has jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner argue that :

a. it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it
should have been filed in the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.

Issue/s:

1. WON the Shari’a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by
Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim. (NO)
2. WON the filing of motion to dismiss can be allowed. (YES)

Ratio:

No – the Shari’a District Court of Marawi City has no jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by
Muslim individuals against a municipality. The Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide
private respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear
from the complaint that the real party-defendant was the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari’a District Court should
have simply applied the basic doctrine of separate juridical personality and motu proprio dismissed the case.

 Shari’a district courts have jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
specifically in Article 1431. it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a district courts original
1 Art. 143. Original jurisdiction.—
(1) The Shari’a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this Code;

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrator or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property;

(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI
of Book Two of this Code;

(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations;
and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:

(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and

(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to
Muslims.

 jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The
Shari’a district courts’ jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e.,
municipal trial courts and regional trial courts.
 There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over matters ordinarily
cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one
party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.
o No disagreement that private respondents, as plaintiffs below, are Muslims.

Sub-issue: WON the municipality is a Muslim. (NO)

 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real parties-in-interest as those who stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit.
o Tthe parties who will be directly benefited or injured are the private respondents, as real party-
plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal, as the real party-defendant.
o Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local
government of Tangkal.
 When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not — and neither does he
become — a real party-in-interest. The person represented is deemed the real party-in-interest; the
representative remains to be a third party to the action.
o Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the
jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims.
o
 A municipality is a juridical person, an artificial being with “no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no
thoughts, no desires.”
 Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises
powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing
the inhabitants of its territory.
o As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes
and in ways that have primarily secular effects— consistent with the non-establishment clause.
o Hence, even if it is assumed that juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the
Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less exercising,
any religion, including Islam.
o A municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice mayor,
sanggunian, and other officers composing it.
o Hence, Shari’a District Court erred in attributing the religious affiliation of the mayor to the
municipality.
o
Yes – the filing of motion to dismiss can be allowed.

 Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this
procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of
the complaint.
 Indeed, when it is apparent from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is
duty- bound to dismiss the case regardless of whether the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
 As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. As exceptions, however,
the defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of
 jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter, or when the denial of the motion to
dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
o The Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is patent on the face of the
complaint, and therefore, should have been dismissed outright.

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Shari’a District Court of Marawi City in Civil Case No.
201-09 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 201-09 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.