Departments: North Korea Bulletin

At the start of the Obama administration’s first

term in 2009, there were many expectations that

US Policy the United States might pursue direct talks with

North Korea in order to break a two decade-

Toward
long standoff over its nuclear program. Presi-
dent Obama promised in his inaugural ad-
dress that he would offer an outstretched hand

North Korea to those who will unclench their fists, making

a public offer to dictatorial states of willing-
ness to abandon adversarial relations.1 Howev-
er, North Korea responded to this offer with a
Scott Snyder multi-stage rocket launch and a nuclear test in
April and May of 2009. These actions meant
that President Obama’s first North Korea-re-
lated policy decisions would be defined by the
need to uphold the international non-prolifer-
ation regime against North Korea’s challenge
and would involve winning international sup-
port for sanctions against North Korea at the
United Nations Security Council. The result-
ing UNSC Resolution 1874 condemned North
Korea’s nuclear and multi-stage rocket tests and
subjected suspected North Korean nuclear-re-
lated shipments to international inspections.

By the time the Obama administration had the

political space to pursue direct dialogue with
North Korea, it had decided on an approach
that Secretary of State Clinton described as
“strategic patience in close consultations with
our six party allies.”2 This emphasis on alliance
coordination has been the first principle of any
Obama administration discussion of policy to-
ward North Korea, and it was greatly aided by
the fact that the Obama and Lee Myung-bak
administrations largely saw eye-to-eye on the
priority and importance of North Korea’s de-
nuclearization. The Obama administration’s

1 “President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” The White

House Blog, January 21, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
inaugural-address
2 “Clinton Calls ‘Exploratory’ Meeting with North Korea ‘Quite
Positive,” Voice of America, December 10, 2009. http://www.
voanews.com/content/clinton-calls-exploratory-meeting-with-
north-korea-quite-positive-78980687/416329.html

January 2013 | SERI Quarterly | 99

US Policy Toward North Korea
The Obama administration
also unveiled a
“rebalancing” policy
toward Asia, popularly
known as the “pivot”
to Asia. This policy
strengthens US political,
economic, and military
participation in and
commitment to Asia.
100 | www.seriquarterly.com
strategy also rested on assumptions that North
Korea’s provocations would lead to damag-
ing self-isolation from its immediate neighbors,
that enhanced efforts by the administration to
engage with North Korea would not result in
requisite political benefits and could expose the
administration to great political risk (i.e., Sec-
retary Gates’s statement that the administra-
tion “would not buy this horse for a third time”
in reference to possible US-DPRK nuclear ne-
gotiations), and that North Korea’s near-term
capacity to further strengthen its nuclear ca-
pabilities was largely under control—since the
decommissioning of North Korea’s 5-mega-
watt graphite moderated reactor had taken the
North’s ability to produce new plutonium for
bombs out of its hands.3
The policy of “strategic patience,” a policy that
suggested that the United States could afford
to wait for North Korea to make its decision to
denuclearize, aligned well with political real-
ity in light of North Korea’s alleged sinking of
a Korean warship and shelling of South Ko-
rea’s Yeonpyeong Island in March and Novem-
ber 2010. But following revelations to Stanford
University scientist Siegfried Hecker that North
Korean efforts to enrich uranium and con-
struct a light water reactor were making steady
progress, the Obama administration held three
rounds of direct talks with North Korean coun-
terparts from July 2011 to February 2012. As
the Obama administration pursued bilateral
negotiations with North Korea, it assiduously
sought to ensure that US-DPRK bilateral nego-
tiations did not open up any misunderstanding
from allies in Seoul or Tokyo. The third round
of US-DPRK bilateral meetings were the first
bilateral contacts held following the death of
Kim Jong-Il and resulted in parallel statements
issued by the United States and DPRK that
3 David Sanger, “U.S. Weighs Intercepting North Korean
Shipments,” New York Times, June 7, 2009. http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/06/08/world/asia/08korea.html?_r=0

came to be known as the ill-fated “Leap Day
Agreement.”4 The United States intended these
statements to bind North Korea from provoca-
tive actions such as nuclear and missile tests and
to secure Pyongyang’s commitment to return to
the path of denuclearization; but they were up-
ended less than three weeks after they were an-
nounced by North Korea’s March 16, 2012, an-
nouncement of its failed April 12, 2012 satellite
launch. Thus, the Obama administration’s first
term policy toward North Korea involved a mix
of elements, including a strong commitment to
coordination among South Korean and Japa-
nese allies, continued adherence to the objec-
tive of North Korea’s denuclearization, efforts
to strengthen counter-proliferation, bolstering
of tailored deterrence against North Korean
conventional provocations, and openness to di-
alogue if and when North Korea shows its will-
ingness to return to the path of denucleariza-
tion.
The Obama administration during its first term
has also undertaken initiatives in its Asia poli-
cy that provide a broader context and sense of
continuity regarding how President Obama sees
the world, and about how he is likely to respond
to crises in his second term. In line with Ameri-
can public preferences expressed in a 2012 study
by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the
Obama administration has shown hesitancy to
pursue unilateral military interventions and has
preferred multilateralist approaches to manag-
ing conflicts while emphasizing a “smart pow-
er” approach that attempts to integrate dip-
lomatic and international development tools
for promoting regional stability with military
tools.5 The Obama administration also unveiled
a “rebalancing” policy toward Asia, popular-
ly known as the “pivot” to Asia. This policy
4 Steven Lee Myers and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work; U.S. to Give Aid,” New York Times, February
29,2012.http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/world/asia/us-says-north-korea-agrees-to-curb-nuclear-work.html?pagewanted=all
5 “Foreign Policy in the New Millenium,” Chicago Council, 2012.http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/files/Surveys/2012/files/Studies_
Publications/POS/Survey2012/2012.aspx
6 Michael Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 38.
Scott Snyder
strengthens US political, economic, and mili-
tary participation in and commitment to Asia,
both through a host of bilateral dialogues with
China that cover a wide range of economic and
strategic issues and through a variety of hedg-
ing measures designed to shape China’s rise,
limit the effects of assertive Chinese policies,
and assure that China’s rise will not result in re-
gional instability. Despite American official
assertions to the contrary, the US rebalancing
policy has stimulated extensive debate among
Chinese analysts regarding whether the policy is
an attempt to contain China.6 This debate pro-
vides a backdrop to consider prospects for Sino-
US cooperation on policy toward North Korea,
and highlights Chinese wariness and strategic
mistrust of US policy intentions.
The complex evolution of the Obama adminis-
tration’s policy toward North Korea during its
first term and the characteristics of President
Obama’s world view together provide a frame-
work for considering what the administration is
likely to do in a second term (keeping in mind
that two additional primary influences on the
formation and direction of US policy toward
North Korea are events and personnel). North
Korea has given an ample illustration of the
power of events to challenge US policy respons-
es, most recently in the successful December 12,
2012 DPRK launch of a three-stage rocket from
its Sohae launch facility. North Korea’s launch
directly violated UN Security Council Resolu-
tions 1695, 1718, and 1874 prohibiting North Ko-
rea from conducting tests of any sort using bal-
listic missile technology. The fact that North
Korea successfully launched an object into
earth orbit, however, strengthened North Ko-
rea’s claim to a right to peaceful uses of space
and challenged the international community
January 2013 | SERI Quarterly | 101
US Policy Toward North Korea
After all, President
Obama himself offered
an “outstretched hand”
to North Korea during a
November 2012 speech at
the University of Yangon
in Myanmar, if North
Korea pursues the path
of denuclearization and
reform.
102 | www.seriquarterly.com
by revealing that the UN resolutions did not
have “teeth.” A week later, the election of Park
Geun-hye as South Korea’s next president com-
pleted the cast of new leaders in Northeast Asia
responsible for maintaining regional stability
during 2013 and beyond, but it is still too early
to know with assurance the major players in the
Park and Obama administrations or to evaluate
either their preferences or their chemistry in the
policy making process.
Maintaining Policy
Coordination During South
Korea’s Leadership Transition
The initial predisposition of the Obama ad-
ministration will be to hold to its stated prefer-
ence for pursuing strong alliance relations with
South Korea, including close coordination of
policy toward North Korea. At first glance,
this task appears to be complicated by the US
push for stronger sanctions against North Ko-
rea following North Korea’s December 12, 2012
satellite test, while Park has pledged to reach
out to North Korea with economic assistance
and the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.7
The push for strong condemnation of North
Korea for its violation of previously existing
UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting
it from conducting rocket launches using bal-
listic missile technology appears to run at cross
purposes with Park’s outreach to North Ko-
rea. But it may be possible for the Lee Myung-
Bak administration to take the point on pursuit
of a strong UN statement, so as to allow Park a
clean start in trying to frame inter-Korean rela-
tions. A more serious North Korean challenge
that would constitute a major setback and test
the region would be a North Korean nuclear
7 Foster Klug, “South Korean president-elect vows deeper
North Korea engagement, but Pyongyang may be wary,” Star
Tribune, December 20, 2012. http://www.startribune.com/
world/184087521.html?refer=y

test scheduled for the first weeks and months of
a newly-established Park administration (and in
the midst of a personnel transition in Washing-
ton).
Aside from North Korean testing of Park as a
new leader of the ROK, another challenge Park
faces in reaching out to the North is that the
success or failure of her initiative lies almost
completely in the hands of the North Koreans,
and the initial impulse of the DPRK in manag-
ing relations with a new South Korean leader
has been to test the parameters and boundar-
ies of the relationship through provocations, de-
mands, or other evaluations of the firmness (or
desperation) of the South Korean counterpart.
Park will need to weather North Korean tests
of her will without compromise while firmly
emphasizing her own terms for managing the
relationship.
As long as Park does not frontload too many
unconditional economic rewards to North Ko-
rea, it is likely that the Obama administration
will offer its support to Park in her effort to es-
tablish dialogue channels necessary to stabilize
the inter-Korean relationship. After all, Presi-
dent Obama himself offered an “outstretched
hand” to North Korea during a November 2012
speech at the University of Yangon in Myan-
mar, if North Korea pursues the path of denu-
clearization and reform.8
Moreover, the Obama administration faces se-
rious political constraints in its own outreach
to the North in the aftermath of North Korea’s
satellite launch, and is under Congressional
pressure to adopt policies that have the poten-
tial for escalating confrontation. For this rea-
son, a South Korean initiative to further test
8 Scott Snyder, “What Message Will Kim Jong-un Take from the Obama Visit to Myanmar,” Asia Unbound, November 19, 2012. http://
blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/11/19/what-message-will-kim-jong-un-take-from-the-obama-visit-to-myanmar/
9 Park Geun-hye, “Trustpolitik and the Making of a New Korea,” November 15, 2012. Available at http://www.piie.com/blogs/
nk/?p=8088.
Scott Snyder
North Korea’s willingness to return to dialogue
and the path of denuclearization would be wel-
come, especially given that a stable inter-Ko-
rean relationship is a prerequisite for any seri-
ous diplomatic effort to integrate North Korea
into the region or otherwise ease regional ten-
sions. A South Korean initiative could receive
the Obama administration’s support while en-
tailing no direct political risk. Moreover, South
Korea’s divided political environment establish-
es an important rationale for supporting South
Korean efforts at détente with the North, since
any harder line policy would likely face serious
domestic opposition without a renewed good
faith South Korean effort to establish inter-Ko-
rean dialogue and peaceful coexistence.
Another feature of Park’s approach to the
North that is likely to appeal to Washington is
the idea of a trilateral US-ROK-China dialogue
on common issues and challenges posed by
North Korea.9 If China were to accept such a
proposal, this dialogue in principle would serve
as a means by which to minimize the possibil-
ity of strategic misunderstanding between the
United States and China that could potentially
stand in the way of eventual Korean reunifica-
tion.
Scenarios for US-ROK
Coordination of Policy
Toward North Korea
Given the remaining uncertainties surrounding
personnel and events that may influence pros-
pects for effective US-ROK policy coordina-
tion toward North Korea, I will conclude by of-
fering three possible scenarios for how things
might develop under the Park and Obama ad-
January 2013 | SERI Quarterly | 103
US Policy Toward North Korea
ministrations, depending on how North Korea
responds to the two leaders.
The stagnation scenario: North Korea contin-
ues to insist that it will not denuclearize and re-
buffs South Korean efforts to establish peaceful
coexistence in inter-Korean relations. Howev-
er, North Korea also does not take advantage
of the situation by pursuing brinkmanship or
some other form of provocation designed to test
and discipline South Korea and the interna-
tional community. Meanwhile, China contin-
ues to independently provide economic support
to North Korea necessary to ensure its political
stability.
The harmonization scenario: After a period of
North Korean testing of Park Geun-hye, the
North makes a decision to stabilize inter-Ko-
rean relations. South Korea takes the lead in
‘trustpolitik’ with North Korea, with support
from the United States. This development leads
to renewed diplomatic engagement of North
Korea, including dialogue between the United
States and North Korea and cooperation with
China. As North Korea abandons its nuclear
program and moves toward engagement and di-
alogue; economic resources flow to North Ko-
rea.
The provocation scenario: North Korea’s dis-
satisfaction with its circumstances leads it to
pursue ever more dramatic and game-changing
provocations.North Korea’s expanded threat
to US interests causes the United States to take
the lead in strategy toward North Korea and at-
tempts to put greater pressure on China to pres-
sure North Korea. Under these circumstances,
North Korea reaches out to South Korea and
accepts Park’s dialogue offers as a safety valve
against international pressure and as a means
by which to try to divide the United States and
South Korea, or alternatively drives inter-Ko-
rean relations into a high state of tensions in an
104 | www.seriquarterly.com
effort to drive all parties back to accommoda-
tion or negotiations.
The range of possible scenarios underscores
some clear lessons that are evident from decades
of efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear devel-
opment and bring the regime into coexistence
with its neighbors. The North Korean regime
thrives on crisis and gains internal support from
crisis situations; for this reason, the regime mo-
bilizes its people in a state of seemingly perpet-
ual crisis. Second, North Korea has a decisive
role in setting the terms and tone of diplomacy
and confrontation in Northeast Asia. This cir-
cumstance has all too often frustrated both US
and South Korean diplomatic efforts. Third,
both the United States and South Korea in-
creasingly find that it is difficult to disaggregate
North Korea-focused diplomacy from attempts
to engage China cooperatively in an effort to
achieve stable outcomes on the Korean penin-
sula. There is a risk that North Korea’s neigh-
bors are playing different games with differing
purposes, and there has thus far been relatively
little common effort among the United States,
South Korea, and China to engage coopera-
tively with North Korea to achieve even limited
goals, many of which might be in the common
interest of all parties concerned.
Keywords
Second Obama term, North Korea policy, Park
Geun-Hye, missile test, pivot to Asia
Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea Studies and director
of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR). Prior to joining CFR, Scott Snyder worked at the
Asia Foundation, and the Pacific Forum CSIS.