Technologies to counter aviation security

threats
Cite as: AIP Conference Proceedings 1898, 050002 (2017); https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5009231
Published Online: 15 November 2017

Steve Karoly

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 Technologies to Counter Aviation Security Threats

Steve Karoly
Acting Assistant Administrator
Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis
Transportation Security Administration
701 S. 12th Street
Arlington, VA 20598, USA

Abstract. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) makes TSA responsible for security in all
modes of transportation, and requires that TSA assess threats to transportation, enforce security-related
regulations and requirements, and ensure the adequacy of security measures at airports and other
transportation facilities. Today, TSA faces a significant challenge and must address a wide range of
commercial, military grade, and homemade explosives and these can be presented in an infinite number of
configurations and from multiple vectors. TSA screens 2 million passengers and crew, and screens almost 5
million carry-on items and 1.2 million checked bags daily. As TSA explores new technologies for improving
efficiency and security, those on the forefront of research and development can help identify unique and
advanced methods to combat terrorism. Research and Development (R&D) drives the development of future
technology investments that can address an evolving adversary and aviation threat. The goal is to rethink the
aviation security regime in its entirety, and rather than focusing security at particular points in the enterprise,
distribute security from the time a reservation is made to the time a passenger boards the aircraft. The
ultimate objective is to reengineer aviation security from top to bottom with a continued focus on increasing
security throughout the system.

INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress created TSA just two months after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. The Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) makes TSA responsible for security in all modes of transportation, and
requires that TSA assess threats to transportation, enforce security-related regulations and requirements, and ensure
the adequacy of security measures at airports and other transportation facilities. TSA’s scope includes commercial
and general aviation; mass transit systems; freight and passenger rail; highways, pipelines, and ports. While TSA
continues to evolve and mature, the underlying rationale for its existence is as compelling today as it was a decade
and a half ago.
Recent world events are a vivid reminder of the challenging, dynamic threat environment TSA operates in, with
a diffuse and dispersed enemy that masterfully manipulates communications and media to inspire attacks. Credible
intelligence indicates that terrorist groups will continue to develop plans that target transportation. In 2016, terrorist
groups carried out more than 200 attacks on transportation assets worldwide. Although this represents a decrease in
the number of overall transportation attacks since 2015, attacks on aviation and freight rail increased. TSA’s mission
to protect the security of the nation’s transportation system remains a national imperative.
Sadly, there are very recent reminders of terrorist attacks against aviation: the destruction of MetroJet Flight
9268 attributed to ISIL in October 2015, and the attack on Daallo Airlines Flight 159 in February 2016 attributed to
al Shabaab. In both attacks, the devices were allegedly concealed to circumvent security measures. In addition, Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), another terror group that has attacked aviation in the past, has specifically
mentioned aviation and TSA in recent issues of their recurring English language publication “Inspire.”
More recently, we have witnessed destruction in the softer targets of the public area of airports. This was true in
the Brussels airport bombing in February 2016 and the attack on Ataturk Airport in Istanbul in June 2016. It is prima
facie evidence of evolving tactics by terrorists to strike vulnerable areas in spectacular fashion. Securing commercial

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aviation and protecting the traveling public from threats, including hijacking, smuggling of weapons or explosives
on board aircraft, and ground-based attacks, are key TSA and DHS priorities.
Terrorists are creative in how they make and control bombs and take full advantage of the openness of Western
democracies to strike at civilian targets; they are not shy. Terrorists today routinely broadcast their desire to attack
aviation and aviation infrastructure in social media and other propaganda outlets. One only needs to read AQAP’s
“Inspire” magazine to see the level of understanding these terrorist groups have of aviation security measures.
It isn’t just their ability to communicate that has significantly changed. Thanks to the internet and the ease with
which information and knowledge can be shared, today’s terrorists can readily share technical knowledge and
inspire would-be terrorists.
Fifteen years ago, certification standards for explosives detection systems included a few chemicals, all of which
were commercial and military grade explosives. Liquid explosives were just beginning to present a threat, and
Homemade Explosives (HME) were not stock and trade.
Today, TSA faces a significant challenge and must address a wide range of commercial, military grade, and
homemade explosives and these can be presented in an infinite number of configurations and from multiple vectors.
As the enemy is willing to continue to take extreme measures for their attacks, person-borne improvised explosive
devices (PBIEDs) are becoming more frequent and more dangerous. These explosives can be well disguised. While
TSA has been successful in catching many PBIED explosives, more commonly known are the cases that succeed in
threatening our global security, particularly for aviation. The shoe bomber in 2001, the underwear bomber in 2009,
the suicide vests worn by the attackers in Paris and Brussels and in Istanbul’s airport are examples.
Most recently, a Somali man boarded a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. Twenty minutes
after the flight took off, his unassuming carry-on bag detonated, blowing a hole in the side of the plane. The bomber
was killed, and two others were injured, but if the aircraft had reached cruising altitude, the bomb could have ignited
the plane’s fuel tank and caused a second, potentially catastrophic blast.
The groups who threaten the transportation system are ruthless and remorseless, but not inevitable, and definitely
not invincible.

FIGURE 1. Timeline of key aviation security events and responses.

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
Before going into the ways the threat can be overcome, it is important to understand TSA’s operational
challenge. TSA, uniquely in the federal government, is a retail public-facing operation and, for most Americans, is

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the face of the federal government. After all, TSA screens millions of travelers every day. It is responsible for
securing the United States transportation network, and its mission extends to every corner of the United States and
its territories, from Puerto Rico to the Pacific Islands and at airports around the world with flights to the U.S.
While TSA works with partners in the public and private sectors to address roadways, railroad tracks, bridges,
tunnels, ports and millions of miles of pipeline, its presence is most notable at 440 federal airports. Commercial
aviation is vital to our economy. In 2012, commercial aviation generated $1.5 trillion in economic activity,
accounting for 5.4 percent of U.S. GDP.
In today’s aviation environment, on a daily basis, TSA screens 2 million passengers and crew, up to 2.5 million
in summer months and screens almost 5 million carry-on items and 1.2 million checked bags. All these people and
bags go on 22,000 commercial flights operated by 200 U.S. and foreign air carriers and approximately 2,000 flights
arrive in the U.S. from international locations. With 233 foreign passenger and cargo air carriers servicing the
United States, as well as the 120 U.S. passenger and cargo air carriers with international operations, TSA must
maintain a steady presence overseas, accomplished through airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs.
The sheer breadth and scope of the aviation operating environment coupled with the dynamic, persistent threat,
present significant national security challenges. These, in turn, demand highly effective security measures.

THE TSA APPROACH FOR OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

TSA’s security measures begin with vetting travelers against the government watch lists to ensure passengers,
accessible property, and checked baggage are screened at the appropriate level. With more information about the
traveling public, security measures can be more tailored to the specific individual. TSA is partnering with industry to
expand Department of Homeland Security Trusted Traveler Programs, such as TSA Pre✓® and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection’s Global Entry program. These programs benefit security and increase checkpoint efficiency.
People can be screened through TSA Pre✓® lanes at a rate of about 240 per hour, compared to standard lanes that
can only move about 140-150 travelers per hour.
Since its start in December 2013, over 5 million travelers have enrolled in TSA Pre✓®. Enrollments have
increased over time, with approximately 275,000 enrolled in May 2016 versus 91,000 in May 2015. TSA Pre✓®
also has a security impact. Large queues are an attractive target. Shorter wait times means shorter queues, and
therefore less attractive targets for attacks. Across the nation, wait times in TSA Pre✓® lanes average less than 5
minutes.
While TSA Pre✓® lanes have helped to limit queue lengths, TSA has still had some serious issues with security
lines. These problems are often the result of a culmination of three significant factors. First, and most importantly,
TSA refocused on security by ending programs that allowed passengers without prescreening to go through
expedited security. Secondly, traveler volume has increased in recent years, and as an indicator of the American
economy, this is a good thing. Finally, TSA staffing has been on steady decline for a very long time.
To address these challenges in summer 2016, TSA made some significant changes in how it conducts daily
operations:

• Attention is focused on seven critical airports that account for 25 percent of originating travelers. By
ensuring passengers stayed on schedule at these airports, ripple effects across the system could be
avoided (Seven airports: JFK, EWR, ATL, ORD, MIA, DFW, LAX).
• A national Airport Operations Center (AOC) was established. From this command center, TSA
monitors checkpoint trends at airports in real-time and helps those in the field to address issues as or
before they arise.
• Additional canine teams were deployed to screen passengers at security checkpoints. After passenger
screening canines have screened passengers, they can be sent through the faster-moving TSA Pre✓®
lanes and not have to remove belts, shoes, laptops that allow lines to move more quickly.

Following increasingly long lines in summer 2016, these efforts were successful and TSA plans to continue to
work along this path to keep up with anticipated volume growth of more than 4 percent compared to summer 2016.
This means that from Memorial Day to Labor Day, TSA may screen more than 228 million passengers and crew. To
prepare for the high passenger volume TSA is adding additional staff and canine teams. By July 2017, TSA will
have approximately 3,175 additional frontline staffing full time employees compared to July 2016, and
approximately 70 additional canine teams.

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 TSA is also working to improve coordination with Federal Security Directors (FSD) at critical, high-volume
airports to ensure necessary resources are in place. In coordination with FSDs, and the airport and airline
community, the AOC continues to monitor operations at critical airports on an hourly basis and deploy resources in
real time. Additionally, TSA continues to collaborate with vendors and airlines to open more automated screening
lanes and other innovative technologies. These lanes are designed to improve efficiency at the checkpoint, and the
TSA Innovation Task Force is continuing to seek out and identify emerging technologies that can improve security,
passenger experience, and efficiency.
While TSA Pre✓® is a step in the right direction for improving both security effectiveness and operational
efficiency, there are also many levels of security that protect us against threats. One of these layers, and one that
most of the public will be familiar with, is made of the technologies in airports that screen passengers, carry-on
baggage, and checked baggage.

CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES

Since TSA’s creation, there have been many changes in the screening technologies over time. Additional threats
have evolved over the years, and we’ve had to rely on our technologies to mitigate these additional threats. One of
the first technologies deployed was the walk through metal detector. Since then, TSA has moved to the Advanced
Imaging Technology, or AIT, machines that detect more than metallic threats. This change was a major step forward
in closing gaps for passenger-based threats. As the name implies, metal detectors only detect metal.

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)

FIGURE 2. Illustration of an AIT machine.

The AIT machines deployed by TSA use non-ionizing electromagnetic radiation similar to that used by wireless
data transmitters to detect objects concealed on a passenger’s body without physical contact. The AIT systems are
considered to be “Active” millimeter wave and operate within the frequency range of 24 – 30 gigahertz.
As the passenger steps into the AIT machine and stands still, transmitters produce millimeter waves that are
either absorbed, scattered, or reflected as they pass through clothing, bounce off the person’s skin and any potential
threats—then return to the receivers. The AIT applies the necessary algorithms to the reflected MMW signals to
determine the location of possible anomalies on the body. If it detects an anomaly, a bounding box indicates its
location on a generic human image. When the system identifies an anomaly, an operator is required to step in and
resolve the alarm with a pat-down. The total processing time for this system, from the start of the scan to the
automatic decision, is less than six seconds.
In the future, AIT will continue to be a key component to passenger screening. Adaptable algorithms provide us
with the flexibility to enhance security without replacing an entire machine. The next generation of AIT will offer
enhanced image resolution by using wide band antennas to assist advanced automated threat recognition (ATR)
detection algorithms. Additionally, we will focus on 3-D reconstruction algorithms to address threats concealed in
obscured body locations.

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 Advanced Technology X-ray (AT-2)
In addition to passenger screening, TSA is required to screen all personal items that board an aircraft, both carry-
on and checked bags. Advanced Technology-2, or AT-2, systems are the primary technology for screening carry-on
items.
The AT-2 systems are equipped with multiple fixed X-ray sources that are set at the same potential—currently,
around 140 kilovolts (kV). Electromagnetic radiation, or photons, from these X-ray sources penetrate the carry-on
items in the tunnel and the intensity is reduced through attenuation, which includes absorption, refraction, and
scattering. Detectors on the opposite side of the tunnel measure the level of attenuation. Detection algorithms can
then identify specific threat objects based on a trained library that measures attenuation for these threat objects.

FIGURE 3. Illustration of AT X-ray machines.

TSA-qualified ATs are dual energy systems, which means that the system takes measurements at both high and
low level energy levels to characterize the effective atomic number of the objects in the carry-on items. Because the
energy from the X-ray source is constant, the AT performs the dual energy measurement using filters and rows of
low/high energy detectors. Different materials, including threat objects, will appear in a certain color to the operator
to help identify threats. Threat object discrimination has continued to improve through R&D efforts, but comes at a
cost of maintaining throughput efficiency and minimizing false alarm rates throughout the system.

Explosives Trace Detection (ETD)

In order to differentiate between benign substances and threats, we utilize secondary screening. Secondary
screening is most often performed with Explosives Trace Detection, or ETD, machines.

FIGURE 4. Example ETD machines.

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 TSA ETDs use a technology called Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) to detect nanograms of explosive particles.
This technique separates and identifies ionized molecules based on their mobility in the IMS.
When a person or bag goes through secondary screening, a TSA officer will collect samples using a swab, then
insert the sample into what is called a desorber. The desorber applies heat to the sample, thereby releasing and
converting the harvested explosive materials into a gas form. The gas stream then passes through a region of
energetic electrons, which ionize the explosive molecules. These ionized molecules then enter the IMS drift tube,
where the time required for them to traverse the chamber and reach a collector plate is measured to determine if
explosive materials are present. If the particles are positively charged, they are exposed to a collector plate with a
negative electric potential. If the particles are negatively charged, they are exposed to a collector plate with a
positively charged electric potential. Some ETDs employ multiple IMS chambers to accommodate both charges, but
newer systems have dual polarity IMS chambers that can rapidly switch between the two. The time it takes these
particles to reach the collector depends on the particle’s molecular weight and mobility through the drift tube, and
this information helps the TSA officer determine if the material in question poses a threat. TSA is exploring
upgrades to ETDs in the future that use mass spectrometry, which provides significantly better selectivity than
traditional IMS solutions.

Explosives Detection System (EDS)

FIGURE 5. Example of an EDS.

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) are used by TSA to screen checked baggage. EDS use computed
tomography (CT) technology to screen checked baggage that has been dropped at the check-in counter before it is
loaded onto the plane. CT machines use many X-ray images to produce cross-sectional tomographic images of the
bag inside. CT machines use X-ray sources, similar to an AT; but unlike an AT, the CT’s X-ray sources rotate
around the object across from the sensors. Following each rotation, the object moves forward along the x-ray belt for
the next rotational X-ray image scan. Once the whole object has been imaged with the X-ray, the CT reformats the
volume of data in various planes and even produces a 3-D representation of the object in the X-ray tunnel.
This data can be used to measure the physical properties (i.e. density, atomic number) of the bag’s contents and
compare those properties to known explosive threat materials. Compared to an AT, CT offers better material
discrimination. TSA is currently exploring the use of CT technology at the checkpoint so that passengers won’t be
required to remove liquids or electronics from their carry-on bags.

Additional Discriminators
When TSA screens a passenger or his or her baggage, the officers are looking for prohibited items and
improvised threat signatures from homemade explosives. Homemade explosives present a challenge for screening
because unlike most commercial, and particularly unlike military explosives, they are not manufactured materials
with strict quality control and they can have highly variable properties.
To screen for these explosives more effectively, TSA is developing additional capabilities that discriminate
between benign objects and potential threats. Broad based detection of improvised explosives threats will benefit
from sufficient spatial resolution to enable accurate material characterization, sufficient independent discriminating
measurements and, enhanced resolution processes.
TSA is also working with partners to develop advanced algorithms that can upgrade AT and CT machines. These
algorithms use, for example, differential phase contrast, X-ray diffraction, and deep learning to discriminate between
threats and benign objects.

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 Differential Phase Contrast (DPC)
Differential Phase Contrast (DPC) enables more in depth determination of the material properties inside a 3-D
object to determine whether an object is benign. This kind of imaging provides three signatures: absorption, which is
currently used by CT, phase, and dark field or scatter.
DPC provides the screener with additional information to discriminate between threats and benign objects,
thereby reducing false alarms and making the screening process more efficient. TSA’s goal is to partner with
academia and industry to develop reliable, cost-effective system components (both hardware and algorithms) that
allow for enhanced baggage scanners with DPC.

X-ray Diffraction (XRD)

X-ray Diffraction (XRD) relies on the dual wave/particle nature of X-rays to obtain information about the
structure of crystalline materials of an object. XRD tomography differentiates threat substances that have very
similar properties to benign substances, reducing false alarm rates and providing additional discriminators to
determine whether an item contains explosive compounds. Any time we reduce the false alarm rate, we can increase
throughput at airport checkpoints.

Deep Learning

Deep learning offers a way to automatically screen for prohibited items including explosives, firearms, sharp
objects, etc. Deep (or machine) learning uses advanced algorithms that pair shape identification with material
properties such as Zeff (effective atomic number) and density measurements, then compares that against a very large
library of scanned items. This results in either a “bad” or “good” outcome, with a “bad” outcome indicating that
there may be a prohibited item in the individual’s bag. As the library expands, the algorithm is able to learn and
moves us towards completely automatic identification of weapons, explosives, and prohibited items.

AN EYE TO THE FUTURE

As TSA explores new technologies for improving efficiency and security of the aviation security space, those on
the forefront of research and development can help identify unique and advanced methods to combat terrorism.
R&D drives the development of future technology investments that can address an evolving adversary and aviation
threat. TSA and its international partners actively exchange information to align R&D priorities and use resources in
the most efficient manner possible and continues to tap into the vast reservoir of industry and academia expertise
and pursue these public/private partnerships with other airports and airlines to install more automated screening
lanes at checkpoints across the U.S.
Eventually, the goal is to rethink the aviation security regime in its entirety, and rather than focusing security at
particular points in the enterprise, distributing security from the time a reservation is made to the time a passenger
boards the aircraft. As passengers get closer and closer to the aircraft, security measures get more and more
stringent.
TSA is striving for a more open, secure, and interoperable architecture that will increase automation and
integration. This involves designing a true “systems of systems” approach, optimizing open technology platforms to
encourage agile capability upgrades, and integrating real-time risk information and data sharing. Such an
architecture will allow TSA to continually realign capabilities to maximize effectiveness across the entire aviation
security spectrum. The ultimate objective is to reengineer aviation security from top to bottom with a continued
focus on increasing security throughout the system.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank Dr. Eric Houser, Division Director, and Dominic Bianchini, Deputy Division
Director, Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis, Mission Analysis Division for their assistance and
advice.

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