The Political Impact of Technical Expertise

Author(s): Dorothy Nelkin

Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Feb., 1975), pp. 35-54
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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 SocialStudiesofScience,5 (1975),35-54

The PoliticalImpactof
TechnicalExpertise
Dorothy Nelkin

Technologies ofspeedandpower- airports, powergenerating facilities,

highways,dams - are oftena focus of bitteropposition.As these
technologiesbecome increasinglycontroversial, scientists,whose
expertise formsthebasisoftechnical decisions,findthemselvesinvolved
in publicdisputes.This 'public'roleof sciencehas generated concern
bothwithintheprofession and beyond;fora scientist'sinvolvement in
controversial issuesmay violatethe normsof scientific research,but
have considerableimpacton the politicalprocess.As scientistsare
calledupon to addressa widerrangeofcontroversial policyquestions,l
'problemsof politicalchoice [may] becomeburiedin debateamong
expertsoverhighlytechnical alternatives'.2
This paperwill discusssome of the implications of the increasing
involvement of scientistsin controversial areas.Whatis the role of
expertsin publicdisputes?How are theyusedby variouspartiesto a
controversy, and how do scientistsbehaveonceinvolved? Finally,what
is theirimpacton thepoliticaldynamics ofsuchdisputes?

Author's address: Department of Urban Planning and Development,Cornell

University,
614 ClarkHall, Ithaca, New York 14850, USA.
1 See discussion of the increaseddemands for expert decision-makingin
Garry Brewer,Politicians, Bureaucratsand the Consultant (New York: Basic
Books, 1973). Also, Dean Schooler, Jr.,(in Science, Scientistsand Public Policy
[London and New York: The Free Press, 1971]) suggeststhat in the past,
scientificinfluencehas concentratedin governmententrepreneurial areas such as
space exploration,or in policy areas defined in termsof national security.The
participationand influenceof scientistshas traditionallybeen ratherminimalin
policy areas withredistributive implications,e.g. social policy,transportation,
and
other issues subject to social conflictand competingpolitical interests.As the
public seeks technical solutions to social problems,and as scientiststhemselves
become engagedin controversial public issues,thispatternis changing.
2 Harvey Brooks, 'ScientificConcepts and CulturalChange',Daedalus, 94
(Winter1965), 68.
35

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36 DorothyNelkin

THE ROLE OF EXPERTS

Scientists playan ambivalent

rolein controversial
policyareas.They
are bothindispensibleand suspect.Theirtechnical
knowledge is widely
regardedas a sourceofpower.
The capacity of science to authorizeand certifyfactsand picturesof reality
[is] a potentsource of politicalinfluence.3

Yet expertsare resentedand feared.Whilethe relianceon expertsis

growing, we see a revivalof Jacksonian hostilitytowardexpertise, and
of thebeliefthatcommonsenseis an adequatesubstitute fortechnical
knowledge.4
The authorityof expertiserestson assumptions about scientific
rationality;interpretations and predictionsmade by scientistsare
judged to be rationalbecause they are based on 'objective' data
gatheredthroughrationalprocedures, and evaluatedby thescientific
community througha rigorouscontrolprocess.Science,therefore, is
widelyregarded as a meansby whichto de-politicize publicissues.The
increasinguse of expertiseis often associatedwith the 'end of
ideology';politics,it is claimed,willbecomelessimportant as scientists
areableto defineconstraints andproviderationalpolicychoices.5
Policy makersfindthat it is efficient and comfortable to define
decisionsas technical ratherthanpolitical.Technicaldecisionsaremade
by defining objectives, consideringavailableknowledge,and analyzing
the most effectiveways of reachingthese objectives.Debate over
technicalalternatives neednot weighconflicting butonlythe
interests,
relativeeffectiveness of variousapproachesforresolving an immediate
problem.Thus, scientificknowledgeis used as a 'rational'basis for
substantive planning,and as a meansof defending the legitimacy of
specificdecisions.Indeed, the viabilityof bureaucracies dependso

3 Yaron Ezrahi, 'The Political Resources of American Science', Science

Studies, 1 (1971), 121. See also Don K. Price, Governmentand Science (New
York: New York University Press,1954).
4 For a discussionof thehistoricaltraditionof resentment of experts-inthe
United States see RichardHofstadter,Anti-intellectualism
in AmericanLife (New
York: Knopf, 1962).
5 See Robert Lane, 'The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a
Knowledgeable Society', American Sociological Review, 31 (October 1966),
649-62, and Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
1960).

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PoliticalImpactof TechnicalExpertise 37

muchon the controland monopolyof knowledgein a specificarea,

that this may become a dominantobjective.6Recent technological
disputes,however,suggestthataccessto knowledge has
and expertise
itselfbecomea sourceof conflict, as variousgroupsrealizeitsgrowing
implications forpoliticalchoice.
The past decade has been remarkablefor the developmentof
'advocacypolitics';7consumeradvocates,planningadvocates,health
care advocatesand environmental advocateshave mobilizedaround
diverseissues. Key slogansare 'accountability', and
'participation',
'demystification'. These groups share common concernswith the
'misuseof expertise', the'politicaluse' of scientistsand professionals,
and theimplications of expertdecisionmakingforpublicaction.Table
1 presents somestatements oftheseconcerns byvariousgroups:radical
scientistswho have organizedto develop 'science for the people';
consumeradvocatesconcerned withcorporate advocacy
accountability;
plannerswho assistcommunities in expressing theirlocal needs;and
environmentalists and health professionalswho demand
'demystification of medicine'.
Their criticismreflectsa dilemma.The complexityof public
decisionsseemsto requirehighlyspecializedand esotericknowledge,
and thosewho controlthisknowledgehave considerable power.Yet
democraticideologysuggeststhat people mustbe able to influence
policydecisionsthataffecttheirlives.This dilemmahas provokeda
numberof proposalsforbetterdistribution of technicalinformation;
expertise,it is argued,is a politicalresourceand mustbe availableto
communities as well as to corporations, utilitiesor developers.8The

6
See discussionin Michel Crozier,The Stalled Society (New York: Viking
Press, 1973), Chapter3. A vividexample of the'importanceof this tendencyto
monopolize knowledge occurred duringthe 'energycrisis' with the realization
that the large oil companies had nearlyexclusiveknowledgeon the state of oil
reserves.
7 I am using this term to describe a phenomenon that Orion White and
Gideon Sjoberg call 'mobilization politics', in 'The EmergingNew Politics in
America',M. D. Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (eds.), Politics in the Post Welfare
State (New York: Columbia University Press,1972), 23.
8 Note forexample the systemof 'scientificadvocacy' proposedby JohnW.
Gofmanand ArthurR. Tamplin,Poisoned Power (Emmaus,Penn.: Rodale Press,
1971). A similarsystemis suggestedby Donald Geesaman and Dean Abrahamson
in 'Forensic Science - A Proposal', Science and Public Affairs(Bulletinof the
Atomic Scientists),29 (March 1973), 17. Thomas Reiner has proposed a system
of communitytechnical servicesin 'The Planner as a Value Technician: Two
Classes of Utopian Constructsand Their Impact on Planning',in H. Wentworth

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38 DorothyNelkin

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 Impact of TechnicalExpertise
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40 DorothyNelkin

increasingimportanceof technicalinformation has also prompted

analysesof the behaviourof scientists as theyare divertedto applied
andcontroversial work.
For example, Allan Mazur suggeststhat the political (i.e.
contextofcontroversies
non-scientific) crucially theactivities
affects of
the way theypresenttheirfindings,
scientists, and thustheirultimate
influenceon decisions.Despite normsof politicalneutrality, claims
Mazur,scientistsbehavejust like anyoneelse when theyengagein
disputes;theirviewspolarizeand as a resultthe value of scientific
advice becomes questionable.Thus, disputesamong expertsmay
become a major source of confusionforpolicymakersand forthe
public.9 Guy Benveniste, focusingon the use of scientists
by policy
makers,suggeststhat 'technical'decisionsare basicallymade on
politicalor economicgrounds.Expertiseis soughtas a means of
supporting particular policyprogrammes; theselectionofdataandtheir
interpretationare thusrelatedto policygoals.'0 Similarly, Kingand
Melansonarguethatwhenknowledge is employedin theresolution of
publicproblems, it is shaped,manipulated, andfrequentlydistorted by
thedynamics ofthepolicyarena.11
These analysesemphasizethepoliticization Detailsof
of expertise.
two recentdisputesin which'experts'were used by both project
developersand critics provide an opportunityto develop these
arguments, and thento exploretheimpactof expertson thepolitical
process.One of the disputesconcernsthe sitingof an 830 megawatt
nuclearpowerplanton CayugaLake inupstateNewYork;theotheris
the proposedconstruction of a new runwayat Logan International
Airportin EastBoston,Massachusetts.
The powerplantsitingcontroversy beganin June1967, whenthe
New York State Electric and Gas Company (NYSE&G) first

Eldridge (ed.), TamingMegalopolis, 1 (New York: Anchor Books, 1967). Based

on systemssimilar to legal advocacy and expert witness in the courts, such
proposals are intendedto make technicaladvice morewidelyavailableto citizens'
groups - usually throughprovisionof public funds to underwritethe cost of
expertise.
9 Allan Mazur, 'Disputes Between Experts', Minerva, 11 (April 1973),
243-62.
10 Guy Benveniste,The Politics of Expertise (Berkeley,Calif.: Glendessary
Press, 1972). See also Leonard Rubin, 'Politics and Information in the
Anti-Poverty Programs',Policy Studies Journal,2 (Spring1974), 190-5.
11 Lauriston R. King and Philip Melanson,'Knowledge and Politics',Public
Policy, 20 (Winter1972), 82-101.

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PoliticalImpactof TechnicalExpertise 41

announcedits intentionto build Bell Station."2 Groupsof scientists

and citizens,concernedwiththe thermalpollutionof CayugaLake,
organizedthemselves to opposetheplant,anddemandedthatNYSE&G
considerdesignalternatives thatwouldminimize thedamageto thelake
caused by waste heat. They forced the utilityto postpone its
applicationfora construction permit,and to contractforadditional
researchon the environmental impactof the plant.In March1973,
followingconsultants' recommendations, NYSE&G announceda power
stationplan that was essentially the same as its earliercontroversial
design.Thecompany, however, wasnowarmedwithdatafromone and
a halfmilliondollars'worthof environmental researchsupporting its
claimthattheheat fromBell Stationwouldnot damagethelake.Yet
once moretherewas concertedand well-informed publicopposition,
thistimefocusedon radiation hazards.Fourmonthslaterthecompany
wasforcedto abandonitsplan.
The proposednew9200-footrunwayat LoganAirport waspartofa
majorexpansionplan thathad been a sourceof bitterconflictin East
Bostonformanyyears.1 3 Locatedonlytwo milesfromthe centreof
downtownBostonin an Italianworking-class community, thismodern
convenientairportis a source of extremeirritation,fear, and
community disruption.The expansionpoliciesof the Massachusetts
Port Authority (Massport)have been opposed,not only by airport
neighbours but also by Boston'scitygovernment and bystateofficials
concernedwiththedevelopment of a balancedtransportation system.
Here,as in the CayugaLake powerplantsitingdebate,knowledge was
used as a resourceboth by Massport,seekingjustification for its
expansionplans,and by thoseopposedto suchplans.Massport's staff
was backed by consultants who claimedthatwithoutexpansionthe
airportwould reach saturationby 1974, and that the new runway
wouldcause no environmental damage.The opponents, primarilyfrom
the adjacent working-class neighbourhoodof East Boston, used
technicaladvice providedby the cityof Boston.Followingpressure
fromthe governoras well as fromthe mayor,Massporteventually

12
For a historyand analysisof thiscontroversy see DorothyNelkin,Nuclear
Power and its Critics(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress,1971); 'Scientistsin
an EnvironmentalControversy', Science Studies, 1 (1971), 245-61; and 'The Role
of Experts in a Nuclear Siting Controversy',Science and Public Affairs,30
(November1974), 29-36.
1 3 Documentationof this conflictcan be foundin
DorothyNelkin,Jetport:
The Boston Airport Controversy(New Brunswick,N.J.: Transaction Books,
1974).

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42 DorothyNelkin

deletedthe proposedrunwayfromthemasterplanforfutureairport
development.
Whilethispaperwillfocuson similarities in thedynamics of these
two disputes,it is necessaryfirstto pointout important differences.
The community opposedto the powerplantwas a collegetown;the
dispute was a middle-classenvironmental conflict,sustainedby
expertisefrom scientistsin a nearby universitywho also livedin the
In
area. contrast, the opposition to the came
airport primarilyfroma
working-class neighbourhood dependenton expertiseprovidedby
government who,forpoliticaland economicreasons,choseto
officials
opposetheairportdevelopment plans.
The technicalaspectsof thetwo disputeswerealso quitedifferent.
The powerplantissuewasembeddedin a setofvagueuncertainties and
intangiblefearsabout radiation;airportexpansionposedtheconcrete
and directthreatofincreased noiseandlandpurchase. Themainareaof
technicalconflictin the formercase was thepotentialenvironmental
impactof the new powerplantand theexpertsinvolvedweremostly
andengineers.
scientists issuewasthe
In thelattercasethecontroversial
validityof projections- whether therunway wasreallynecessary at all
- and thedispute involved economists andlawyersas wellas engineers.
Despitesuchdifferences, thetwocaseshavea greatdealin common:
the use of expertise,the styleof technicaldebate,and theimpactof
expertson thepoliticaldynamics ofthedisputeareremarkably similar.

THE USE OF EXPERTISE

Oppositionto both the powerplantand the airportdevelopedin

several stages. The developers(utilitymanager,airportmanager)
contractedfor detailedplans on the construction of theirproposed
As
facility. theyapplied forthe necessary permits, groupstried
affected
to influencethedecision.The developer in eachcase arguedthatplans,
based on theirconsultants'
predictionsoffuture demandsandtechnical
imperatives concerningthe locationand designof the facility, were
definitive,except perhapsfor minoradjustments necessaryto meet
federalstandards.
In the powerplantcontroversy, scientists fromCornellUniversity
who livedin thecommunity werethefirstto raisequestionsaboutthe
NYSE&G plan whenit was announcedin 1967. By mid4968, their
activity politicalsupportto persuadeNYSE&G
had builtup sufficient
to postponeitsplans,andto undertake further environmentalresearch.

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PoliticalImpactof TechnicalExpertise 43

A new sequenceof eventsbeganin March1973, whenNYSE&G

againannounceditsintention to buildtheplantandclaimedthatitwas
imperative to beginconstructionpromptly. The company'sconsultants,
Nuclear UtilitiesServicesCorporation, had prepareda five-volume
technicalreport.NYSE&G placedcopiesin local libraries, circulateda
summary to itscustomers,
andinvitedcomments. The reportsupported
NYSE&G's earlierplan fora plantinvolving a GeneralElectricboiling
waterreactorwitha once-through coolingsystem. The studyconcluded
that coolingtowers(whichhad been recommended by powerplant
criticsin 1968) wereeconomically unfeasiblein thesizerangerequired
fortheplant,unsuitedto thetopography ofthearea,andwouldhavea
tendencyto create fog. To develop an optimumdesign for a
once-through coolingsystem,consultantsdesigneda jet diffuser to
providerapidmixingof theheateddischarge withthelakewater.With
this system,they arguedthat the plantwouldhave an insignificant
effecton the aquaticenvironment of CayugaLake. The consultants
onlybriefly concernedthemselves withtheissueof radioactive wastes
on thegroundsthatthiswasnota problemuniqueto CayugaLake;the
reportonlystatedthattheeffectwouldbe substantially belowcurrent
radiation protectionstandards.
NYSE&G organizedan information meetingattendedby 1,000
citizens,and fortwo hourssummarized the highlytechnicalmaterial
supporting itsplans.This,however,was followedby two and one-half
hoursof angrydiscussion, and theutility'spresident announcedthatif
publicprotestwas likelyto cause delay,theywouldbuildtheplantat
anothersite.He hoped,however,thatthedecisionwouldbe 'basedon
factandnoton emotion'.
The firstorganizedresponsecamefromtwenty-four scientists
who
volunteered to providethepublicwitha reviewand assessment of the
utility'smassivetechnical
report.'4 Theirreviewwashighlycriticaland
NYSE&G's consultantsrespondedin kind (see below). Meanwhile,
citizens'groupsformedand thecommunity polarized,as thecompany
posedtheissuein termsof'nuclearpoweror blackouts'.
The airportcase also involvedexpertson both sides of the
controversy. Opposingforcesmobilizedin February1971, at a public
hearingrequiredby the Corps of Engineersin orderto approve

14
Two hundredcopies of the critiquewere sentto libraries,citizens'groups,
faculties at universitiesand colleges in the area, officialsin state and federal
agencies, political representativesin local, state and federal government,and
newspapers.

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44 DorothyNelkin

Massport'srequestto fillin partof BostonHarbour.One thousand

people attendedand for ten hours scientists,politicians,priests,
schoolteachersand othersdebatedthepriorities whichtheyfeltshould
governairportdecisions.Massport'sstaffwas backedby consultants,
who claimed that withoutthe runwaythe airportwould reach
saturationby 1974. Consultantsprovideda brief environmental
statementarguingthat the new runwaywould have no direct
detrimentaleffectsof ecologicalsignificance.The onlyenvironmental
costswould be the elimination of ninety-three acresof pollutedclam
flatsand two hundredand fiftyacres of wildlifepreserve- which
constituteda hazard in any case because birdsinterfere withjets.
Furthermore, because of the added flexibility, the runwaywould
relievenoiseand congestioncausedby an expectedincreasein aircraft
operations.Massport'sclaimswerelaterbuttressed byan environmental
impactstatementcommissioned fromLandrumand Brown,Airport
Consultants,Inc. at a cost of $166,000. The study documented
Massport'scontention thatthenewrunway wasessentialforsafetyand
would be environmentally advantageous; it emphasizedthe positive
contributionsof LoganAirport- itseconomicimportance to theCity
of Boston,and thereduction of noisethatwouldresultfromincreased
runwayflexibility.
The oppositionwas organized by a coalitionofcitizens'groupscalled
theMassachusetts AirPollutionand NoiseAbatement Committee. The
issues raised were diverse.Neighbourhoodpeople spoke of the
discomfort causedby aircraft operations,and of Massport's piecemeal
and closed decision-making procedures.Environmentalists fearedthe
destructionof BostonHarbour,and plannersrelatedairportdecisions
to generalurban problems.Legal, economic,and technicalexperts
became involvedas the Mayor'sofficeand the Governorevaluated
Massport'sclaims.As in thepowerplantcase,theconflict polarizedas
Massportposed the issue in termsof 'airportexpansionor economic
disaster'.

THE STYLE OF TECHNICALDEBATE'5

rhetorical
In both cases the technicaldebateinvolvedconsiderable

15
Unless otherwise noted, the quotations that follow are from local
environmentalreports,memos, lettersand public hearings.They are statements
by the opposingscientistsinvolvedin the controversy.

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PoliticalImpactof TechnicalExpertise 45

licence,withmanyinsinuations concerning the competenceand the

biasesof theinvolvedscientists.'
6 NYSE&G emphasised thattheneed
fora nuclearpowerplanton CayugaLake was 'imperative', thatthere
wouldbe a seriousenergy shortage iftheydidnotproceedimmediately
with the plan, and that the impact of the plant on the local
environment wouldbe 'insignificant'.
NYSE&G insistedon theirunique
technicalcompetenceto makethisdecision.
Ourstudyis themostcomprehensivestudyevermadeon thelake.Opponents
cancreatedelaysbutarenotrequired
to assumeresponsibility.

However,the Cornellcriticscalled NYSE&G's data 'inadequate',

'misleading',
'non-comprehensive',and'limitedin scopeandinadequate
in concept'.Some of thecriticsprovideddatafromotherresearch that
contradictedNYSE&G's findings.They emphasizedthat therewas
simplynotenoughknownaboutdeep-water lakesto assesstherisks.
NYSE&G consultantscounteredby claimingthat Cornellcritics
wereunfamiliar withthescope and requirements of an environmental
feasibilityreport;in particular,that the critics'reviewfailed to
distinguish
betweenthegoalsofpureandappliedresearch.
Froman academicpositiona completeecologicalmodelthatpredictedall
possiblerelationships
wouldbe desirable,but thiswas neitherfeasiblenor
necessaryforassessing
theminorperturbations
causedbyoneplant.

In fact,each groupused differentcriteriato collectand interpret

technicaldata. The two studieswerebasedon diversepremises which
required differentsamplingintervalsand techniques.NYSE&G
consultants,for instance,claimedthat theirwater quality studies
focusedon establishing base-lineconditionsto predictthe changes
causedby thepowerplant;Cornellstudiesfocusedon limiting factors,
suchas theimpactofnutrients on lakegrowth.
Scientistsattacked each other with little constraint.Cornell
reviewersaccusedNYSE&G consultants of valuejudgments thatled to
'glaring omissions', 'gross inadequacies', and 'misleading
interpretations'.
Consultantsreferredto theCornellreport's'confusion
resultingfromreviewers readingonly certainsectionsof the report',
and 'imaginative,but hardlypracticablesuggestions'. The NYSE&G
presidentaccusedtheCornellreviewersofbias:

16
Mazur, op. cit. note 9, also documentsthe use of rhetoricin technical
debates.

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46 DorothyNelkin

It is of some interestthat many of the individualswho participatedin the

Cornell reviewhave taken a public position in oppositionto nuclearplants.
Philosophicalcommitmentin oppositionto nucleargenerationmay have made
it difflcultforthesereviewersto keep theircommentscompletelyobjective.1 7

A similarstyleofdebatecharacterized thetechnical disputeoverthe

airportrunway.Expansionof Loganwas recommended by consultants
as 'the bestopportunityto realizea reductionofcurrentsocialimpact'.
Failureto expandtheairportas proposedwouldcausedelays,increase
air pollution, reduce safety marginsand have a 'drastic' and
'immeasurable' impacton the local economy- 'an impactwhichthe
Boston area could not afford'. Massport'senvironmental report
describedand rejected,one by one, alternatives proposedby airport
opponents.Banningspecifictypesof aircraft 'interferes
withinterstate
commerce'.Limitingmaximumpermissiblenoise levels is 'legally
questionable',since the airportfunctionsas part of a coordinated
nationalsystem.A surcharge fornoisyaircraft wouldbe 'useless'as
economicleverage,sincelandingfeesrepresent a negligible
percentage
of total airlineexpenses.Settingnightcurfewsis 'precluded'by the
interdependenceof flight schedules and aircraft utilization
requirements: it would relegateBostonto a 'second-class'airportand
have 'disastrous on serviceto sixtyfivepercentofthe267 cities
effects'
servedby Boston. Moreover,seventypercentof the cargobusiness
wouldbe 'negatively affected'.
Soundproofing neighbouringhousesand
buildingwouldbe 'economically andhavelittleeffect.
prohibitive' The
only feasiblesolutionto noiseand environmental problems, according
to theconsultants' report,was an expandedrunwaysystem thatwould
permitincreasedflexibility. Massportinsistedon the validityof its
expertise:
We are closer and more knowledgeablethan any othergroup no matterwhat
theirintentionmay be, on what Logan Airport... what MetropolitanBoston,
what the entirestate of Massachusettsand New Englandneeds.18

And Massportconsultantssuggestedtheiragreement withtheirclient

when,in a technicalanalysisof the airport'seconomicimpact,they

17 WilliamA. Lyons, 'Recommendationsof the Executive Offices of New

York State Electric and Gas Corporationto the Board of Directors' (13 July
1973).
18 Edward King, Massport Executive Director,Testimonyat U.S. Corps of
Engineers''Hearingson the Application by the M.P.A. for a Permitto Fill the
Areas of Boston Harbour'(Boston, 26 February1971), mimeograph,101.

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PoliticalImpactof Technical
Expertise 47

stated:
It is inconceivable
thatan enterpriseof thismagnitude
canbe treatedother
thanwiththemostprofound respect.19

AirportopponentscalledtheMassporttechnicalreports'thelogical
outcomeofefforts directed towardnarrowobjectives'. Cityconsultants
contendedthatauthority to restrictaircraftnoisewas in factlimited
neitherby the FAA nor by the Massportenablingact, and thatthe
FAA actuallyencouragedairportoperatorsto restrictairportnoise
independently. They arguedthat Massport'sassumptions concerning
anticipateddemandfor increasedairportcapacitywerequestionable
and in anycaseweresubjectto modification byconsolidating schedules
and dispersinggeneralaviationflights.Massport'sown raw data
suggestedthat with a reasonableadjustmentLogan Airportcould
accommodatea considerableincreasein actualbusiness,foraircraft
were operatingat an averageof just underhalfcapacity.Moreover,
projectionswere based on the growthpatternof the 1960s. The
decreasein airtraveldemandin 1970 couldhavebeen regarded either
as a new data point or as an anomaly.Massportchose the latter
interpretation,ignoringthe 1970 slump.Theirprojections alsoignored
thepossibility ofcompetitive to airtravel.20
alternatives
Massport'sfigures concerning theeconomicimpactofexpansionand
the consequencesof a moratorium on expansionweredebunkedby
criticsas 'blatantpuffery'. As forMassport's contention thatthenew
runwaywould be environmentally advantageous, cityrepresentatives
concluded that an expanded airfieldwould only expose new
populationsto intolerable noise.Instead,theyrecommended measures
to increasecapacityat Logan throughschedulingadjustments and
effortsto distribute the hoursof peak demandby economiccontrols
suchas landingfees.
Differences wereto be airedat a secondroundof publichearings
scheduledforJuly10, 1971. However, on July8, followinga task-force
studythatrecommended alternativesto expansion,Governor Sargent
publiclyopposed the construction of the new runway.Underthese
circumstances, the Corps of Engineerswas unlikelyto approvethe

19 Landrum and Brown, Inc., Boston-Logan International Airport

EnvironmentalImpactAnalysis(11 February1972), sectionix, 3.
20 A systematiccritique of Massport's data was made by a commission
chaired by Robert Behn (Chairman of Governor's Task Force on Inter-City
Transportation),'Report to GovernorSargent'(April 1971).

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48 DorothyNelkin

project, so Massportwithdrewits applicationfor a permitand

temporarily put asideitsplansfortherunway.A yearanda halflater,
in February1973, Massportdeletedthe proposedrunwayfromthe
masterplan for futureairportdevelopment. Citingprojectionsthat
wereclose to thoseused by airportopponentstwo yearsearlier,the
PortAuthority offuture
claimedthatre-evaluation needsindicatedthat
thenewrunwaywasno longernecessary.
Both disputesnecessarilydealt with a greatnumberof genuine
uncertainties predictionsfromavailabledata.
that allowed divergent
The opposingexpertsemphasizedtheseuncertainties; but in anycase,
the substanceof the technicalarguments had littleto do withthe
subsequent politicalactivity.

THE IMPACTOF EXPERTISE ON POLITICAL ACTION

In boththeairportandpowerplantcontroversy, it wastheexistence
of technicaldebatemorethanits substancethatstimulated political
activity.2 In each case the factthattherewas disagreement among
expertsconfirmed thefearsofthecommunity anddirectedattention to
what they feltwas an arbitrary decision-making procedurein which
expertisewasusedto maskquestionsofpoliticalpriorities.
This relationship betweentechnicaldisputesand politicalconflict
was moststriking in thepowerplantcase.Cornellscientists assessedthe
NYSE&G reportwiththeintention of providing technicalinformation
to the public.They focusedalmostentirelyon the issue of thermal
pollution- the effectof theplant'sheatedeffluent on CayugaLake.
The citizens'groups,however,weremostconcernedwiththeissueof
radiation.Theyhad followedthe considerablediscussionin thepress
and in popularjournalsabouttheriskg associatedwiththeoperationof
nuclearreactors- risksthat had not been as widelypublicizedat the
timeof the firstcontroversy in 1968. Thus, thethermal pollutionissue
(which had dominated earlier
controversy) became, in 1973,a relatively
minor concern.Citizens,in contrastto the who
scientists were advising
them,focusedon problemsof transporting and disposingof nuclear
wastes,on thereliabilityof reactorsafetymechanisms, on reactorcore
defectsthatwould allow the releaseof radioactivegases,and on the
dangerofhumanerrororsabotage.

21
For furtherdiscussionof this point,see Nelkin,'The Role of Expertsin a
NuclearSitingControversy',op. cit. note 12.

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PoliticalImpactof TechnicalExpertise 49

Whenthecitizens'committee firstmetto establisha positionon the

issue, its newsletterconcentratedentirelyon the reactorsafety
issue.22 This set the tone of subsequentdiscussion,in whichthree
possiblecoursesof actionwereconsidered:thatthecommittee oppose
construction of any nuclearplanton CayugaLake untilproblemsof
reactorsafetyand disposalof radioactive wasteswereresolved;thatit
take up its 1968 positionand opposeonlythecurrent designof Bell
Station;or thatit supportNYSE&G plans.The firstproposal,one of
totalopposition, won overwhelming support.The emphasis ofcitizens'
groupsthereafter was on the risksassociatedwithnuclearpower,
despitethefactthatthetechnical debatedealtmainlywiththeproblem
ofthermal pollution.
The disputesbetweenscientists, however,servedas a stimulusto
politicalactivity.In the firstplace, thecriticismby Cornellscientists
neutralized theexpertiseofthepowercompany.Simplysuggesting that
therewereopposingpointsof viewon one dimension of thetechnical
problemincreasedpublic mistrustof the company'sexperts,and
encouragedcitizensto oppose the plant.Second,the involvement of
scientistsgavemoralsupportto community activists,
suggestingthat
theirworkwouldbe effective. The citizens'groupscalledattention to
NYSE&G's statementthat if therewere concertedopposition,the
companywouldnot go aheadwithitsplans.The readysupportoflocal
scientistsled to substantialexpectationin the community thatthe
effortinvolvedin writing lettersand goingto meetings wouldnot be
wasted.
As for the detailsof the technicaldispute,theyhad littledirect
bearingon thedynamics ofthecase.Citizenstrusted thoseexpertswho
supportedtheirposition.Peoplewho supported NYSE&G voicedtheir
trustin theconsultants employedby thepowercompany:
Let us allow the professionalsto make the decisions that they get paid to
make.

And powerplantcriticsused expertiseonlyas a meansto bringthe

issuebackto itsappropriate
politicalcontext.The casewasone oflocal
priorities,
theyclaimed;it wasnota technicaldecision:

22
CCSCL (Citizens Committeeto Save Cayuga Lake), Newsletter,6 (April
1973). This newsletterreprintedin full a selection of well-informed articles-
notably those by Robert Gillettein Science, 176 (5 May 1973); 177 (28 July;1,
8, 15 and 22 September1972); and 179 (26 January1973).

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so DorothyNelkin

and
to scientists
To say thatour futureis out of our handsand entrusted
assumption...We suggest
is an arrogant
technicians thattheopinionsofarea
whocaredeeplyabouttheirenvironment
residents anditsfutureareofequal
ifnotgreaterimportance.23

In the airportcase, the technicalarguments servedprimarily to

reinforcethe existingmistrust of Massportamongthoseopposedto
airportexpansion,and they were virtuallyignoredby those who
supportedMassport.Opinionsaboutthenecessity of therunwaywere
well establishedpriorto the actualdispute.In East Boston,Massport
employeesand local sportsclubswhichweresupported by an airport
community relationsprogramme defendedthe PortAuthority's plans
fora newrunwayandmaintained competence.
theirtrustin Massport's
operation,
andcompetent
In termsof efflcient is headandshoulders
Massport
aboveotheragencies.

fromthe adviceprovidedby
Airportopponents,whilebenefitting
expertsfromthe Cityof Boston,claimedthe issuewas a matterof
commonsenseandjustice.Theydefinedtheproblemintermsofvalues
whichare not amenableto expert
solidarity)
(such as neighbourhood
analysis.
We need no experts.Thesepeoplewillverifythemselvestheeffectof noise.
arrogant.
is extremely
. . . Massport conception
Theydo nothavetheslightest
ofthehumansuffering theycauseandcouldnotcareless.24

Airportcriticspointedout varioustechnicalerrorsand problemsof

interpretationin Massport'spredictionsand environmental impact
statements;but thissimplyre-confirmed the community's suspicionof
Massport,and further polarizedthe Later,
dispute. these same experts
who were sympatheticto East Boston's noise problemfailed to
convincethecommunity to accepta Massport planfora soundbarrier.
Despiteadvicethatthiswouldhelp to relievetheirnoiseproblem,- the
community choseto opposeconstruction ofthebarrier.Local activists

23Statement (14 May1973),1.

byJaneRicecitedin theIthacaJournal,
24
These statements are fromtestimonyat U.S. Corps of Engineers'
op. cit.note 18. The ultimate
Hearings, ofthiskindofsentiment
expression was,
of course,theremark allegedto havebeenmadeby former Spiro
vicepresident
Agnew,respondingto the reportby the U.S. Presidential Commissionon
Pornography and Obscenity:'I don't care what the expertssay, I know
pornography corrupts!'

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 PoliticalImpactof Technical
Expertise 51

fearedthatthiswas a diversion,
and thatif theyacceptedthisproject
the community would somehowlose out in thelongrun.Thus,they
disregarded
expertopinionthatthiswas a favourable decision,andthe
old mistrust
prevailed.

SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS

The two conflicts describedabove,overthesitingof a powerplant

and theexpansionof an airport, haveseveralaspectsin common.One
can trace parallels,for instance,in the way the developersused
expertiseas a basis and justification of theirplanningdecisions;how
expertson both sides of the controversy enteredthe disputeand
presentedtheirtechnicalarguments; and how citizensaffected by the
planperceivedthedispute.Similarities areevidentinpublicstatements,
as developers,expertsand citizensexpressedtheirconcernsabout
variousaspectsof thedecision-making process.Theseare comparedin
Table 2. These similarities, especiallywith respectto the use of
scientific knowledge, suggestseveralrelatedpropositionswhichmaybe
generalizableto other controversies involvingconflictingtechnical
expertise:
First, developersseek expertiseto legitimizetheirplans and
they use their commandof technicalknowledgeto justifytheir
autonomy.They assumethatspecialtechnicalcompetenceis a reason
to precludeoutsidepublic(or 'democratic') control.
Second,whileexpertadvicecanhelpto clarify technicalconstraints,
italso is likelyto increaseconflict,
especiallywhenexpertise is available
to those communitiesaffectedby a plan. Citizens' groups are
increasingly seekingtheirownexpertise to neutralize
theimpactofdata
providedby project developers.25Most issues that have become
politicallycontroversial (environmental problems,fluoridation, DDT)
containbasic technicalas well as politicaluncertainties,and evidence
can easilybe mustered to supportor opposea givenproposal.
Third,theextentto whichtechnicaladviceisaccepteddependsless
on its validity and thecompetence of theexpert,thanon theextentto

25
For furtherdiscussion of the tactics of using expertise within the
fluoridationcontroversy,for example, see Robert Crain et al., The Politics of
CommunityConflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill,1969); and H. M. Sapolsky,
'Science, Voters and the FluoridationControversy',Science, 162 (25 October
1968), 427-33.

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52 DorothyNelkin

on DecisionMakingand Expertise
Table2. Perspectives

Powerplantdispute Runwaydispute

Developers
On responsibility Ourstudyis themost Wearecloserandmore
andcompetence comprehensive studyever thananyother
knowledgeable
forplanning madeon thelake.Opponents whattheir
groupno matter
can createdelaysbutare maybe,on what
intention
notrequiredto assume LoganAirport.. . what
responsibility. Boston.... what
Metropolitan
NewEnglandneeds.

On publicdebate Wehaveadopteda postureof Wehavecompetent staffs.. . I

no publicdebate. can'tsee anysenseinhaving
.. Ifit is
a publichearing.
to be byconsensus thatthe
authority operates...

Experts(consultants)
On impactofproject Alternate approaches would Adverseenvironmental impact
haveundesirableeffects
on willresultfromfailureto
thehumanenvironment. .. undertake thisprojectas
theproposeddesignshould contrastedwiththeimpact
produceno significant
impact. iftheAuthority proceeds.
wouldbe
Actualindividuals Noisemeasurements of typical
exposedto muchlowerdoses urbannoiseconditions.. .
thanthatdue to normal showthatstreetlevel
habits. background noiseovershadows
taxi-waynoise.

On planning Although an ecologicalmodel A masterplanwouldbe

mightbe desirablefroman nothing morethanan academic
academicviewpoint itis not exercise... a studyof this
feltto be necessaryto magnitude couldneverbe
fora smallproject
providean adequateassessment justified
of theimpactof theminor ofthisnature.
perturbation introduced by
theproposedplant.

Experts(critics)
On developers'data Statementsandconclusions of theeconomic
Analysis
werenotjustifiedandmust impactof LoganAirport
therefore
be regardedas showsdemonstrated 'blatant
nothingmorethanguesses... inthefigures
puffery'
The databaseis notonly appearingin thereport.
butmisleading.
inadequate,

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PoliticalImpactof Technical
Expertise 53

Table 2 contd. Perspectives

on DecisionMakingand Expertise

Citizens (project
supporters)
On decision-making Let us allowtheprofessionals In termsofefficient
and
responsibility to makethedecisionsthat competent operation,
theygetpaidto make. Massportis headand
shouldersaboveother
agencies.

Citizens (project
opponents)
Citizens(project To say that our futureis We need no experts.These
On decision-making out ofourhandsand peoplewillverifythemselves...
responsibility entrusted
to scientists
and Massportis extremely
arrogant.
technicians
is an arrogant Theydo nothavethe
assumption...Wesuggest slightest
conception of the
thattheopinionsofarea humansuffering theycause
residents
whocaredeeply andcouldnotcareless.
abouttheirenvironment and
itsfuture
is ofequalifnot
greater
importance.

On decision-making Weretheyusingthepower Whatis reallyon trialhere

process thepeoplegavethemto is notjustthePort
supporttheirownfeelings Authority, itis reallythe
or thoseofprivateconcerns? American system. Willit
Thereis representative listento spokesmen forthe
government in ourcountry, peopleand thepeoplewho
butit sureisn'tin our speakforthemselves?
county.

Sources: These perspectives

are directquotationsfrompublic hearings,lettersor
transcripts
ofmeetings.

whichitreinforces existing
positions.Ourtwocasessuggest thatfactors
such as trustin authority, the economicor employment contextin
whicha controversy takesplace,andtheintensity
oflocal concernwill
mattermorethanthequalityofcharacter oftechnicaladvice.26
Fourth,thoseopposinga decisionneednotmuster equal evidence.It
is sufficient
to raisequestionsthatwill underminetheexpertiseof a

26
The relation between beliefs and the interpretationof scientific
informationis analyzed in S. B. Barnes,'On the Reception of ScientificBeliefs',
in Barry Barnes (ed.), Sociology of Science (Harmondsworth,Midx.: Penguin
Books, 1972), 269-91.

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54 DorothyNelkin

developerwhose power and legitimacyrests on his monopolyof

knowledge orclaimsofspecialcompetence.
Fifth,conflictamongexpertsreducestheirpoliticalimpact.The
influenceof expertsis based on public trustin the infallibility of
expertise.Ironically,the increasingparticipationof scientistsin
politicallife may reducetheireffectiveness, for the conflictarnong
scientists that invariably follows from their participationin
controversialpolicieshighlights theirfallibility,
demystifiestheirspecial
expertiseand callsattention to non-technical andpoliticalassumptions
thatinfluence technicaladvice.27
Finally,the role of expertsappears to be similarregardless of
whethertheyare 'hard'or 'soft'scientists. The twoconflicts described
hereinvolvedscientists, engineers, economists and lawyersas experts.
The similaritiessuggest that the technical complexityof the
controversialissuesdoes not greatlyinfluence thepoliticalnatureof a
dispute.
In sum, the way in whichclients(eitherdevelopersor citizens'
groups)directand use the workof expertsembodiestheirsubjective
construction of reality- theirjudgments, forexample,aboutpublic
prioritiesor about the level of acceptableriskor discomfort. When
thereis conflictin suchjudgments, it is bound to be reflectedin a
biaseduse oftechnical knowledge, in whichthevalueofscientific work
dependslesson itsmeritsthanon itsutility.

27 of how controversy
See discussion legislators
influences
amongscientists
in Barnes,ibid.

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