06 Flores V Montemayor

11/18/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 629
Notes.—Where a supervening event does not reinforce

or aid the original demand but because of it a plaintiff’s
demand could no longer be enforced, thus justifying the
change in relief sought, such party’s remedy is not to
supplement but rather to amend its complaint. (Superclean
Services Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 165
[1996])
Supervening events, whether intended or accidental,
cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there
is a grave violation of the Constitution. Another reason
justifying the resolution by the Court of the substantive
issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” (Province of Batangas vs.
Romulo, 429 SCRA 736 [2004])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 170146. August 25, 2010.*
HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior

Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President,
HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC),
petitioners, vs. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR,
respondent.
Public Officers; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.

3019); Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC); The
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) was created by virtue
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to
speedily address the problem on corruption and abuses committed
in the government, particularly by officials appointed by the
President.—The PAGC was created by virtue of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily address the
problem on corruption and abuses
_______________
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015fcfc5950df2a9dc3b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/40
* THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 179
Flores vs. Montemayor
committed in the government, particularly by officials appointed

by the President. Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has
the power to investigate and hear administrative complaints
provided (1) that the official to be investigated must be a
presidential appointee in the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official must be occupying
the position of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank,
or higher.
Same; Same; Same; Anonymous Complaints; Because of
Section 4 (c) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 12, an anonymous
complaint may be given due course even if the same is without
supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the
complaint that there is probable cause.—Section 4 (c) of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 12, however, states that the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission (PAGC) has the power to give due course to
anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there
appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting
documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause
to engender a belief that the allegations may be true. The use of
the conjunctive word “or” in the said provision is determinative
since it empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due
course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision,
an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the
same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from
the face of the complaint that there is probable cause. The clear
implication of the said provision is intent to empower the PAGC
in line with the President’s objective of eradicating corruption
among a particular line of government officials, i.e., those directly
appointed by her. Absent the conjunctive word “or,” the PAGC’s
authority to conduct investigations based on anonymous
complaints will be very limited. It will decimate the said
administrative body into a toothless anti-corruption agency and
will inevitably undermine the Chief Executive’s disciplinary
power.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice;
Elementary is the rule that the mere pendency of a special civil
action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending
before a lower court or an administrative body such as the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), does not interrupt

the course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction
restraining it.—We find nothing irregular with the PAGC’s
decision to proceed with its investigation notwithstanding the
pendency of Montemayor’s petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals (CA). The filing of a petition for certio-
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
rari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction
validly acquired over the case before it. Elementary is the rule
that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or
an administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the
course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction
restraining it. For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining
order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no
impediment exists, and nothing prevents the PAGC from
exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before its office. And even if such injunctive writ or order is
issued, the PAGC continues to retain jurisdiction over the
principal action until the question on jurisdiction is finally
determined.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Presumption of Regularity;
Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof whatsoever, will
not tilt the balance against the presumption of regularity, if only to
provide constancy in the official acts of authorized government
personnel and officials; The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.—First, it must be remembered that the PAGC’s
act of issuing the assailed resolution enjoys the presumption of
regularity particularly since it was done in the performance of its
official duties. Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof
whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against the presumption, if
only to provide constancy in the official acts of authorized
government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of the
issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by itself cannot be used
to discredit, much less nullify, what appears on its face to be a
regular performance of the PAGC’s duties. Second, Montemayor’s
argument, as well as the CA’s observation that respondent was
not afforded a “second” opportunity to present controverting
evidence, does not hold water. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling

complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to
explain his side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with.
Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Jurisdiction; The
Ombudsman cannot take over a task that is already a fait
accompli.—The cases filed against respondent before the
Ombudsman were initiated
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VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 181
after the Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor.

More importantly, the proceedings before the PAGC were already
finished even prior to the initiation and filing of cases against him
by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGC’s findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the
President’s decision to dismiss Montemayor from government
service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office of the President of
its concurrent investigatory and prosecutorial power over
Montemayor had already been terminated even before the
Ombudsman could take cognizance over the matter. The
Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over a task that is already a
fait accompli.
Same; Same; Same; Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SSAL); Even if a motor vehicle was acquired through chattel
mortgage, it is a government employee’s ethical and legal
obligation to declare and include the same in his Sworn Statement
of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL)—every asset acquired by a civil
servant must be declared in the SSAL.—Montemayor’s argument
that he did not deliberately omit to declare the 2001 Ford
Expedition in his 2001 SSAL and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser
in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL fails to persuade us. Even if a motor
vehicle was acquired through chattel mortgage, it is a government
employee’s ethical and legal obligation to declare and include the
same in his SSAL. Montemayor cannot wiggle his way out of the
mess he has himself created since he knows for a fact that every
asset acquired by a civil servant must be declared in the SSAL.
The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in
detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired.
Montemayor, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that
the ownership of the 2001 Ford Expedition has not yet passed to
him on the basis of a lame excuse that the said vehicle was
acquired only on installment basis sometime on July 3, 2001.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Sworn Statement of Assets

and Liabilities (SSAL) is not a mere scrap of paper—it serves as
the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the
income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government
in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate
corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that
all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives.
—Respondent apparently fails to understand that the SSAL is not
a mere scrap of paper. The law
182
requires that the SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as

detailed and as accurately as possible. The filing thereof not later
than the first fifteen (15) days of April at the close of every
calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine,
but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servant’s
duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and
the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and
employees in the government in compliance with the
Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote
transparency in government, and ensure that all government
employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this
reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to
the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations.
BERSAMIN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Public Officers; Security of Tenure; Civil Service; The
guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution and the
statutes is an important cornerstone of the Civil Service system
instituted in our country, because it secures for a faithful employee
permanence of employment, at least for the period prescribed by
law, and frees the employee from the fear of political and personal
reprisals.—Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides
that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.” Both the Civil
Service Law and the Administrative Code of 1987 reflect this
constitutional edict of security of tenure for employees in the Civil
Service. The guarantee of security of tenure under the
Constitution and the statutes is an important cornerstone of the
Civil Service system instituted in our country, because it secures
for a faithful employee permanence of employment, at least for
the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear
of political and personal reprisals.
Same; Due Process; Administrative Law; Presidential Anti-

Graft Commission (PAGC); It is clear from Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), that the Office of the
President should have itself reviewed and appreciated the evidence
presented and independently considered the facts and the law of
the controversy, because the PAGC was only the OP’s fact-finding
subordinate.—It is clear from Ang Tibay that the OP should have
itself reviewed and appreciated the evidence presented and
independently considered the facts and the law of the controversy,
because the PAGC was only the OP’s fact-finding subordinate.
The OP could not
183
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 183
just accept the entire findings and recommendation of the PAGC

in arriving at a decision, considering that such a shortcut was
unfair and impermissible. Thereby, the OP took for granted the
fact that at stake were the honor, the reputation, and the
livelihood of the person administratively charged. The OP’s action
consequently left its decision bereft of proper factual and legal
basis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidency; Power of Control;
Delegation of Powers; The President’s power to investigate and
discipline a presidential appointee is original, not appellate—such
original power could not be delegated to the subordinate
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), in the absence of any
law that expressly authorized the delegation, for the rule was
rooted in the ethical principle that delegated power constituted not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment, not through the intervening
mind of another.—I wish to stress that the President’s power to
investigate and discipline a presidential appointee was original,
not appellate. If we were to accord deference to the rule of
delegata potestas delegare non potest, therefore, such original
power could not be delegated to the subordinate PAGC, in the
absence of any law that expressly authorized the delegation, for
the rule was rooted in the ethical principle that delegated power
constituted not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment, not
through the intervening mind of another. This inevitably signified
that the OP should directly exercise its power, instead of simply
adopting the PAGC’s entire findings and recommendation. Yet, by
holding itself as an appellate body in relation to the PAGC, which,
in the first place, was not even performing adjudicative powers,

and by deeming itself bound and concluded by the PAGC’s
findings and recommendation, the OP committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of its vaunted power to
investigate and discipline. The OP’s jurisdictional error should be
overturned.
Same; Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL);
Although Section 11 (b) states that a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) 6713, if proven in a proper administrative
proceeding and warranted depending on the gravity of the offense,
shall be sufficient cause for the removal or dismissal of the public
official or employee even without a criminal prosecution, such
provision cannot be understood as immediately warranting
dismissal without due
184
regard to the gravity of the offense.—It is clear from the foregoing

provisions, however, that the penalty for a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 6713, inclusive of the failure to
accomplish and submit SSAL under Section 8, supra, is not
exclusively removal or dismissal of the erring public official or
employee. Section 11 (b) should be applied in conjunction with
Section 11 (a), which specifies a punishment of either a (1) fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six months salary, or (2) suspension
not exceeding one year, or (3) removal, depending on the gravity of
the offense. Thus, although Section 11 (b) states that a violation of
the provisions of RA 6713, if proven in a proper administrative
proceeding and warranted depending on the gravity of the offense,
shall be sufficient cause for the removal or dismissal of the public
official or employee even without a criminal prosecution, such
provision cannot be understood as immediately warranting
dismissal without due regard to the gravity of the offense.
Same; Same; The Office of the President (O.P.) ignored that
under the implementing rules and regulations of the Civil Service
Commission, the failure to file the Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SSAL) is only a less grave offense, which leaves the
omission to declare certain assets in the SSAL to be not a grave
offense; A grave injustice is committed in the name of justice when
the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong
committed—the disparity is offensive to our consistent adherence
to the principle that the penalty to be imposed on any erring
employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his offense.—
The OP meted dismissal from the service on the respondent. In so

doing, the OP ignored that under the implementing rules and
regulations of the CSC, the failure to file the SSAL was only a
less grave offense, which left the omission to declare certain
assets in the SSAL to be not a grave offense. As a result, there
was a great disparity between the violation or offense committed
by the respondent, on one hand, and the penalty imposed on him,
on the other hand. We should not allow the disparity to last, for a
grave injustice is committed in the name of justice when the
penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong
committed. The disparity is offensive to our consistent adherence
to the principle that the penalty to be imposed on any erring
employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his offense.
As we held in Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, 471 SCRA
589 (2005): “We stress that the law does not tolerate misconduct
by a civil servant. Public
185
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 185
service is a public trust, and whoever breaks that trust is subject

to sanction. Dismissal and forfeiture of benefits, however,
are not penalties imposed for all infractions, particularly
when it is a first offense. There must be substantial
evidence that grave misconduct or some other grave
offense meriting dismissal under the law was committed.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eleazar S. Calasan for respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a Rule 45 petition assailing the October 19,
2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84254. The appellate court, in the said decision, had
reversed and set aside the March 23, 2004 Decision2 and
May 13, 2004 Resolution3 of the Office of the President in
O.P. Case No. 03-1-581 finding respondent Atty. Antonio F.
Montemayor administratively liable as charged and
dismissing him from government service.
The facts follow.
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed
by the President as Regional Director II of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando,

Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President
received a letter from “a concerned citizen” dated January
20, 2003 re-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 56-67. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang,

with Associate Justice (now Presiding Justice) Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 86-91.
3 Id., at pp. 92-93.
186

lating Montemayor’s ostentatious lifestyle which is

apparently disproportionate to his income as a public
official. The letter was referred to Dario C. Rama,
Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) for appropriate action.4 The Investigating Office of
the PAGC immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry
into the matter and issued subpoenas duces tecum to the
responsible personnel of the BIR and the Land
Transportation Office (LTO). In compliance with the
subpoena, BIR Personnel Division Chief Estelita Datu
submitted to the PAGC a copy of Montemayor’s
appointment papers along with a certified true copy of the
latter’s Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL)
for the year 2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its
Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla, furnished
the PAGC with a record of vehicles registered to
Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a 1997 Toyota
Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant.5
During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism, a media organization
which had previously published an article on the
unexplained wealth of certain BIR officials, also submitted
to the PAGC copies of Montemayor’s SSAL for the years
1999, 2000 and 2001.6 In Montemayor’s 1999 and 2000
SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor declared his
ownership over several motor vehicles, but failed to do the
same in his 2001 SSAL.7
On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a
Formal Charge8 against Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for
violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 30199 in

rela-
_______________
4 Id., at p. 69.
5 CA Rollo, pp. 73-74.
6 Id., at pp. 70-72.
7 Id.
8 Rollo, p. 71.
9 Section 7 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, provides in full:
187
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 187

tion to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 671310 due to his failure to
_______________
SEC. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities.—Every public officer,

within thirty days after assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the
fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as
upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department
or Chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true,
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming
office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file
their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the
close of the said calendar year.
10 Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, as
amended, provides in part:
SEC. 8. Statements and Disclosure.—Public officials and employees
have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of,
and the public has the right to know, the assets, liabilities, net worth and
financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
(A) Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure.—All
public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary
capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath
their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses
and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
x x x x
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the
aforestated documents shall also execute within thirty (30) days from the
date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the
Ombudsman, to obtain from all appropriate government agencies,
including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show
their liabilities, net worth, and also
188

declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging

from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997 Toyota
Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million to 1.2
million pesos in his 200111 and 200212 SSAL. The charge
was docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same date,
the PAGC issued an Order13 directing Montemayor to file
his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal
charge against him within ten (10) days from the receipt of
the Order. Montemayor, however, failed to submit his
counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge
lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference,
Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the deferment of
the administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA14 questioning the
PAGC’s jurisdiction to conduct the administrative
investigation against him. The PAGC denied Montemayor’s
motion for lack of merit, and instead gave him until June 9,
2003 to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer.15
Still, no answer was filed.
On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285
enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation
for sixty (60) days.16 On September 12, 2003, shortly after
the expiration of the sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued
a Resolution17 finding Montemayor administratively liable
as charged and recom-
_______________
their business interests and financial connections in previous years,

including, if possible the year when they first assumed any office in the
Government.
11 CA Rollo, p. 72.

12 Id., at pp. 91-92.
13 Id., at pp. 50-51.
14 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. See CA Rollo, pp. 53-66.
15 CA Rollo, pp. 83-85.
16 Id., at p. 87.
17 In PAGC-ADM-0149-03. See Rollo, pp. 72-85.
189
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 189

mending to the Office of the President Montemayor’s

dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through
Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P. Autea, issued a
Decision adopting in toto the findings and recommendation
of the PAGC. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
“After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees

with the recommendation of PAGC and the legal premises as well
as the factual findings that hold it together. Respondent failed to
disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach
of the prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in
relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded ample
opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the
opportunity pass by.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Antonio F.
Montemayor is hereby found administratively liable as charged
and, as recommended by PAGC, meted the penalty of dismissal
from the service, with all accessory penalties.
SO ORDERED.”18
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said

decision.19 This time, he argued that he was denied his
right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to
investigate his case notwithstanding the pendency of his
petition for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent
elevation to the Supreme Court.20 The motion was
eventually denied.21
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA
via a petition for review22 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. He made the following
assertions: first, that the PAGC exceeded its authority

when it recom-
_______________
18 Rollo, p. 90.
19 CA Rollo, pp. 35-45.
20 Docketed as G.R. No. 160443. The said petition for review on
certiorari was eventually dismissed through a minute Resolution dated
January 26, 2004. See Rollo, p. 170.
21 Rollo, pp. 92-93.
190

mended that he be dismissed from government service

since the power to investigate does not necessarily carry
with it the power to impose penalty unless the same was
expressly granted; second, that the PAGC grossly violated
his right to due process of law when it did not give him the
opportunity to present his countervailing evidence to the
charges against him; third, that the PAGC cannot validly
proceed with the investigation of the charges against him
on the basis of an unverified anonymous letter-complaint
without any supporting documents attached thereto,
contrary to the requirement of Section 4 (c) of Executive
Order (EO) No. 12;23 fourth, that it was an error for the
Office of the President to hold him liable for violation of
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 and Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713
since the SSAL should reflect assets and liabilities
acquired in the preceding year; and fifth, that the assailed
PAGC Resolution was not supported by substantial
evidence.
As aforesaid, the CA in its assailed Decision dated
October 19, 2005, ruled in favor of Montemayor. The CA
concluded that Montemayor was deprived of an opportunity
to present controverting evidence amounting to a brazen
denial of his right to due process.
Hence, petitioners now appeal the matter before us
raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER PETITIONER PAGC HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL

DUTY TO ACCORD RESPONDENT A “SEC-
_______________
23 Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12, series of 2001, entitled “Creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Providing for its Powers, Duties
and Functions and for Other Purposes,” provides:
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions.—
x x x x
(c) Anonymous complaints against a presidential appointee shall not
be given due course unless there appears on its face or the supporting
documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to
engender a belief that the allegations may be true.
191
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 191

OND” OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN

PAGC-ADM-0149-03 AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE
TRO ISSUED IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 77285.
II. WHETHER THE MERE PENDENCY OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 77285
WAS A LEGAL GROUND FOR RESPONDENT’S REFUSAL TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN [PAGC]-ADM-0149-03.
III. WHETHER THE ALLEGED UNDUE HASTE AND APPARENT
PRECIPITATION OF PROCEEDINGS IN [PAGC]-ADM-0149-03
HAD RENDERED THE SAME INFIRM.
IV. WHETHER RESPONDENT HAD COMMITTED A MAJOR
ADMINISTRATIVE INFRACTION WARRANTING DISMISSAL
FROM [GOVERNMENT] SERVICE.
V. WHETHER THE [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S]
DETERMINATION THAT RESPONDENT COMMITTED THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE CHARGED IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
VI. WHETHER THE PAGC HAD AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND
TO THE PRESIDENT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL,
FOLLOWING ITS INVESTIGATION INITIATED BY AN
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, AND DESPITE THE PENDENCY
OF ANOTHER INVESTIGATION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
BEFORE THE [OFFICE OF THE] OMBUDSMAN.24
The issues may be summarized as follows:
I. WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO

DUE PROCESS WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO INVESTIGATE
HIM ON THE BASIS OF AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, AND
ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE;
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 233-234.
192

II. WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO

RECOMMEND RESPONDENT’S DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE;
III. WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN OF ITS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE
RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE DEPRIVED THE
PAGC [WITH ITS JURISDICTION] FROM PROCEEDING WITH
ITS INVESTIGATION; AND
IV. WHETHER THE PAGC’S RECOMMENDATION WAS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
We discuss the first three (3) issues jointly as these

involve procedural aspects.
The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on
April 16, 2001 to speedily address the problem on
corruption and abuses committed in the government,
particularly by officials appointed by the President. Under
Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has the power to
investigate and hear administrative complaints provided
(1) that the official to be investigated must be a
presidential appointee in the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official
must be occupying the position of assistant regional
director, or an equivalent rank, or higher.25
_______________
25 Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, series of 2001, provides in full:

SECTION 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions.—
x x x x
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the
authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints
against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its
agencies or instrumentalities (including members of the governing board
of any instrumentality, regulatory agency, chartered institution and
directors or officers appointed or nominated by the President to
government-owned or controlled corporations or corporations where the
government has a minority interest or who otherwise represent the
interests of the government), occupying the position of
193
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 193

Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to

due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate him
on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of
any documents supporting the complainant’s assertions.
Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12, however, states that the
PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous
complaints against presidential appointees if there appears
on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting
documents attached to the anonymous complaint a
probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations
may be true.26 The use of the conjunctive word “or” in the
said provision is determinative since it empowers the
PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to
anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision, an
anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the
same is without supporting documents, so long as it
appears from the face of the complaint that there is
probable cause. The clear implication of the said provision
is intent to empower the PAGC in line with the President’s
objective of eradicating corruption among a particular line
of government officials, i.e., those directly appointed by her.
Absent the conjunctive word “or,” the PAGC’s authority to
conduct investigations based on anonymous complaints will
be very limited. It will decimate the said administrative
body into a toothless anti-corruption agency and will
inevitably undermine the Chief Executive’s disciplinary
power.
_______________
assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank, and higher, otherwise

classified as Salary Grade “26” and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758). In the same
manner, the Commission shall have jurisdiction to investigate a non-
presidential appointee who may have acted in conspiracy or may have
been involved with a presidential appointee or ranking officer mentioned
in this subsection. The Commission shall have no jurisdiction over
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police.
26 Supra note 23.
194

Respondent also assails the PAGC’s decision to proceed

with the investigation process without giving him the
opportunity to present controverting evidence.
The argument is without merit.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGC’s decision to
proceed with its investigation notwithstanding the
pendency of Montemayor’s petition for certiorari before the
CA. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA did
not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired over
the case before it. Elementary is the rule that the mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced
in relation to a case pending before a lower court or an
administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt
the course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction
restraining it.27 For as long as no writ of injunction or
restraining order is issued in the special civil action for
certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing prevents the
PAGC from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with
the case pending before its office.28 And even if such
injunctive writ or order is issued, the PAGC continues to
retain jurisdiction over the principal action29 until the
question on jurisdiction is finally determined.
In the case at bar, a sixty (60)-day TRO was issued by
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. However, barely a week
after the lapse of the TRO, the PAGC issued its resolution
finding Montemayor administratively liable and
recommending to the Office of the President his dismissal
from government service. The CA believes that there has
been “undue haste and apparent precipitation” in the
PAGC’s investigation proceedings.30 It notes with
disapproval the fact that it was barely eight (8) days after
the TRO had lapsed that the PAGC issued the said
_______________
27 Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217
SCRA 633, 647.
28 Id., at pp. 647-648.
29 Id., at p. 648.
30 Rollo, p. 62.
195
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 195
resolution and explains that respondent should have been

given a second chance to present evidence prior to
proceeding with the issuance of the said resolution.31
We beg to disagree with the appellate court’s
observation.
First, it must be remembered that the PAGC’s act of
issuing the assailed resolution enjoys the presumption of
regularity particularly since it was done in the performance
of its official duties. Mere surmises and conjectures, absent
any proof whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against the
presumption, if only to provide constancy in the official acts
of authorized government personnel and officials. Simply
put, the timing of the issuance of the assailed PAGC
resolution by itself cannot be used to discredit, much less
nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular
performance of the PAGC’s duties.
Second, Montemayor’s argument, as well as the CA’s
observation that respondent was not afforded a “second”
opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not
hold water. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.32 So long as the party is given the
opportunity to explain his side, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with.33
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an
order informing Montemayor of the formal charge filed
against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to
present a counter-affidavit or verified answer.34 When the
said period lapsed without respondent asking for an
extension, the PAGC gave Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day
period to file his
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 62-64.

32 Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 119509,
February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 38, 45.
33 Calma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122787, February 9, 1999, 302
SCRA 682, 689.
34 Rollo, pp. 132-133.
196

answer,35 but the latter chose to await the decision of the

CA in his petition for certiorari.36 During the preliminary
conference, Montemayor was again informed that he is
given a new ten (10)-day period, or until June 19, 2003
within which to file his memorandum/position paper as
well as supporting evidence with a warning that if he still
fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for
resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence
on record.37 Again, the deadline lapsed without any
evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense.
We stress that the PAGC’s findings and
recommendations remain as recommendations until finally
acted upon by the Office of the President. Montemayor,
therefore, had two (2) choices upon the issuance of the
PAGC resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or
to ask for another opportunity before the Office of the
President to present his side particularly since the assailed
resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having
failed to exercise any of these two (2) options, Montemayor
cannot now be allowed to seek recourse before this Court
for the consequences of his own shortcomings.
Desperately, Montemayor contends that the authority of
the PAGC to investigate him administratively, as well as
the power of the Office of the President to act on the
PAGC’s recommendation, had already ceased following the
initiation and filing of the administrative and criminal
cases against him by the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman).38 He points out that the Ombudsman is
mandated by Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA No. 677039 to
take over the investigation
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 149-150.

36 Id., at pp. 151-154.
37 Id., at pp. 155-158.
38 Docketed as OMB-C-A-04-0096-C and OMB-C-C-04-0084-C.
39 Paragraph (1) of Section 15 of RA No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides in part:
197
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 197

and prosecution of the charges filed against him.40

We are still not persuaded.
The cases filed against respondent before the

Ombudsman were initiated after the Office of the President
decided to dismiss Montemayor.41 More importantly, the
proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even
prior to the initiation and filing of cases against him by the
Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGC’s findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of
the President’s decision to dismiss Montemayor from
government service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office
of the President of its concurrent investigatory and
prosecutorial power over Montemayor had already been
terminated even before the Ombudsman could take
cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore,
cannot take over a task that is already a fait accompli.
As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGC’s
recommendation to dismiss Montemayor from government
service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in
favor of petitioners.
Montemayor’s argument that he did not deliberately
omit to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2001 SSAL
and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser in his 2001 and 2002
SSAL fails to persuade us. Even if a motor vehicle was
acquired through
_______________
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of the

Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases;
x x x x
40 Rollo, pp. 182-183.
41 Id., at pp. 204-205.
198

chattel mortgage, it is a government employee’s ethical and

legal obligation to declare and include the same in his
SSAL. Montemayor cannot wiggle his way out of the mess
he has himself created since he knows for a fact that every
asset acquired by a civil servant must be declared in the

SSAL. The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished
truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the
property was acquired. Montemayor, therefore, cannot
escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the 2001
Ford Expedition has not yet passed to him on the basis of a
lame excuse that the said vehicle was acquired only on
installment basis sometime on July 3, 2001.42
Montemayor also argues that even if ownership of the
said vehicle had been transferred to him upon acquisition,
the vehicle was sold to another person on December 15,
2002;43 hence, there is no need to declare it in his 2001
SSAL. Respondent’s reasoning is anemic and convoluted. It
is evasive of the fact that the said vehicle was not reported
in his 2001 SSAL. Notably, the acquisition value of the
2001 Ford Expedition was P1,599,000.0044 is significantly
greater than the amount declared by Montemayor under
“machinery/equipment,” worth P1,321,212.50, acquired by
him as of December 31, 2001,45 and to the P1,251,675.00
worth of “machinery/ equipment” acquired by him as of
December 31, 2002.46 This belies Montemayor’s claim that
the said vehicle has been included among the
“machinery/equipment” assets he declared in his 2001 and
2002 SSAL.47 Neither did Montemayor satisfactorily reflect
the P1,000,000.00 that has come to his
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 109-110 and pp. 127-129.

43 Id., at p. 110 and p. 130.
44 Id., at p. 129.
45 CA Rollo, p. 72 and unnumbered reverse page.
46 Supra note 12.
47 Id., at p. 18.
199
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 199

hands as payment for the alleged sale of his 2001 Ford

Expedition in his 2002 SSAL.48
Respondent apparently fails to understand that the
SSAL is not a mere scrap of paper. The law requires that
the SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as detailed
and as accurately as possible. The filing thereof not later
than the first fifteen (15) days of April at the close of every
calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial
routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of

every civil servant’s duty to the people. It serves as the
basis of the government and the people in monitoring the
income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the
government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to
eradicate corruption,49 promote transparency in
government,50 and ensure that all government employees
and officials lead just and modest lives.51 It is for this
reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made
accessible to the public, subject to reasonable
administrative regulations.
Montemayor’s repeated and consistent failure to reflect
truthfully and adequately all his assets and liabilities in
his SSAL betrays his claim of innocence and good faith.
Accordingly, we find that the penalty of dismissal from
government service, as sanctioned by Section 11 (a) and (b)
of RA No.
_______________
48 Rollo, p. 130; CA Rollo, pp. 91-92.

49 Section 27, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution provides in full:
SEC. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
50 Section 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution provides in full:
SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
51 Section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides in full:
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
200

6713,52 meted by the Office of the President against him, is

proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated October 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84254 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the March 23, 2004 Decision and the May 13,
2004 Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case
No. 03-1-581 are REINSTATED and UPHELD.
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby

DISMISSED from government service.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Brion and Sereno, JJ.,

concur.
Bersamin, J., I dissent.
_______________
52 Section 11 of RA No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct

and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, as amended,
provides in full:
SEC. 11. Penalties.—(a) Any public official or employee, regardless of
whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary,
holdover, permanent or regular capacity committing any violation of this
Act, shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6)
months salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal
depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the
appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier
penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter
statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or both, and in the discretion of the court of
competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding
shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or
employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
x x x x
201
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 201

DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
I vote to deny the petition.
Firstly, I believe that the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly
held that the petitioner had not been afforded his right to
due process.
And, secondly, assuming that the investigation of the
respondent by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) was sustainable, and that the Office of the
President (OP) validly relied on PAGC’s findings and
recommendation, the penalty of dismissal was too harsh
Antecedents
The PAGC investigated the respondent, Atty. Antonio F.

Montemayor, a Regional Director II of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue in San Fernando, Pampanga, based on
an anonymous letter-complaint. Following its fact-finding
inquiry, the PAGC concluded that the respondent had
failed to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liability (SSAL) the fact that in 2001 he had
acquired a 2001 model Ford Expedition and a Toyota Land
Cruiser.1
The PAGC then directed the respondent to file his
counter-affidavit or verified answer.2 However, he failed to
submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer.
On June 4, 2003, the respondent moved3 for the
deferment of the proceedings due to his filing of a petition
for certiorari in the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 77285), in order to
challenge the PAGC’s jurisdiction to conduct an
administrative investigation against him. The PAGC
denied the motion for deferment,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 7-8.

2 Id., at pp. 132-133.
202

and instead required him to submit his counter-affidavit or

verified answer until June 9, 2003 and his position paper
on or before June 19, 2003.4 Still, he filed neither a
counter-affidavit or verified answer nor a position paper.
On June 23, 2010, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO),5 enjoining the PAGC from
investigating the respondent. The TRO lapsed after 60
days.
On September 1, 2003, which was shortly after the lapse
of the TRO but during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
77285, the PAGC came up with a resolution,6 whereby it
found the respondent guilty as administratively charged
and recommended his dismissal from government service
to the OP.
It is noteworthy that the respondent was not given a
copy of the prejudicial PAGC resolution.
On March 23, 2004, the OP issued its decision,7 adopting

the findings and recommendation of the PAGC in full, and
decreeing thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Antonio F.

SO ORDERED.”
The respondent sought reconsideration of the OP

decision, arguing that he had been denied his right to due
process; that PAGC had overstepped its bounds; and that
the decision had erred in holding him liable for violation of
Section 7, RA 3019, as amended, and/or Section 8, RA 6713.
The OP denied the motion through the resolution dated
May 13, 2004.
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 83-86.

5 Id., at pp. 87-88.
6 Rollo, pp. 72-85.
7 Id., at pp. 86-91.
203
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 203

The respondent thus went to the CA on appeal via

petition for review (Rule 43 of the Rules of Court).8
In its decision dated October 19, 2005,9 the CA held in
favor of the respondent and set aside the decision of the
OP, mainly because the CA found that the respondent had
been deprived of the opportunity to present controverting
evidence amounting to a denial of his right to due process;
and because a public document attached to the record
tended to show “in no uncertain terms that petitioner was
justified when he did not include and declare the 2001 Ford
Expedition in his 2002 SSAL.” The CA decreed:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the impropriety

of petitioner’s discharge from government service on ground of
violation of due process, the herein impugned March 23, 2004
Decision and May 13, 2004 Resolution of the Office of the
President are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.”10
The petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, are now before us to assail the CA decision.
Submissions
The reasons for my vote to deny the petition follow.
A.
The respondent was denied due process

Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides
that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or
_______________

9 CA Decision penned by Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now Presiding
Justice of the CA) and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa (retired); Rollo, pp. 56-
67.
10 Id., at p. 66.
204

suspended except for cause provided by law.” Both the Civil

Service Law and the Administrative Code of 1987 reflect
this constitutional edict of security of tenure for employees
in the Civil Service.
The guarantee of security of tenure under the
Constitution and the statutes is an important cornerstone
of the Civil Service system instituted in our country,
because it secures for a faithful employee permanence of
employment, at least for the period prescribed by law, and
frees the employee from the fear of political and personal
reprisals.11
Being a Regional Director II of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in San Fernando, Pampanga, the respondent
occupied a Career Executive Service Position, which was
included in the Civil Service and protected with security of
tenure pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil
Service Law).12 He might be removed only for cause and in
accordance with procedural due process.13 Consequently,
that the respondent was a presidential appointee did not
give the appointing authority the license to remove him at
will or at the appointing authority’s pleasure.
_______________
11 Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 1677762, December

15, 2005, 478 SCRA 142, 148.
12 Section 5 of P.D. 807 provides:
Section 5. The Career Service shall be characterized by (1)
entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable
by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications;
(2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
security of tenure. The Career Service shall include: x x x
3. Positions in the Career Service; namely Undersecretary x x x
Regional Director x x x and other officers of equivalent rank as may be
identified by the Career Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President;
x x x
13 See Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997,
280 SCRA 713, 725.
205
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 205

However, the records show that the PAGC subjected the

respondent to a unilateral investigation and did not afford
due process of law to him. The PAGC crowned its
investigation with the rushed resolution issued only a few
days from the expiration of the TRO issued by the CA.
Such resolution became the basis for the OP to decide
against him by dismissing him from the service.
I submit that the investigation of the PAGC suffered
from fundamental defects and flaws that infirmed the OP’s
decision against the respondent.
Firstly, the respondent’s non-submission of his counter-
affidavit or verified answer as directed by PAGC was not
motivated by bad faith, considering his firm belief, then
and now, that the PAGC did not have jurisdiction to
administratively or disciplinarily investigate him. On the
contrary, his non-submission should not be taken against
him, for his act of bringing the suit in the CA precisely to
challenge the PAGC’s jurisdiction singularly exhibited his
undeterred resolve to contest the charges made against
him.
Secondly, there was a rush on the part of the PAGC to
find the respondent guilty of the charges. The rush was
clearly manifested in the issuance by the PAGC of its
resolution against him even without taking into
consideration any explanation and refutation of the charges
that he might make, and even before the CA could finally

resolve his suit to challenge the PAGC’s jurisdiction to
investigate him.
The rush of the PAGC to find the respondent guilty of
the charges and to recommend his dismissal from the
service did not escape the attention of the CA, which
forthrightly observed, viz:14
“After a careful analysis of the procedural antecedents

surrounding the instant case vis-à-vis the foregoing doctrine on
the matter of due process, it did not escape Us that undue
haste and
_______________
14 Rollo, pp. 62-64.
206

apparent precipitation attended the proceedings before

the PAGC, which ultimately recommended the dismissal of
petitioner from government service to the OP. Quite
clearly, the PAGC issued the September 1, 2003
Resolution/Report recommending to the Office of the
President petitioner’s discharge by relying solely upon the
documentary evidence that it secured from the BIR, LTO,
and PCIJ, and without having the benefit of passing upon
and evaluating the evidence that petitioner might have to
offer to establish that he does not deserve to be discharged
from government service. It is to be remembered that in a
resolution promulgated on June 23, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No.
77285, this Court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the PAGC from concluding further administrative
proceedings against petitioner. Technically speaking, in the
name of fair play, petitioner should have been afforded by
PAGC a reasonable opportunity to present evidence after
the expiration of the 60-day TRO. Such, though, was not to
be the case. As it turned out, the PAGC immediately issued
the Resolution/Report to recommend petitioner’s dismissal
from government service just barely eight days after the
TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 has lapsed, and without
anymore requiring or directing petitioner to adduce
evidence to show his innocence. Certainly, the undue
haste that attended the issuance of the PAGC “dismissal-
recommendation”, which was referred to the OP,
practically precluded and foreclosed any opportunity on
the part of petitioner to rebut and defend himself against

the administrative charge leveled against him. And this, to
the well-considered view of this Court is tantamount to a
denial of petitioner’s right to due process of law,
specifically considering that the administrative sanction
involved herein is by no means trivial and ignorable, but
on the contrary, the same involved termination from
government service which is the ultimate and harshest
penalty that may be meted upon a government personnel.
This being so, under the circumstances, the OP should
have taken notice of the suddenness of the issuance of the
recommendation of the PAGC, and the fact that the same
was anchored principally and solely upon the documents
obtained from the BIR, LTO, and PCIJ, but without any
rebuttal or countervailing evidence coming from
petitioner, and a combination of these
207
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 207

facts should have led the OP to refuse to adopt and be

swayed by the PAGC recommendation on ground that
petitioner’s right to be heard and present evidence may
have been rendered at naught.”
Yet, simple prudence and innate fairness should have

dictated that the PAGC first accorded to the respondent an
opportunity to respond to the charges once the TRO issued
by the CA expired without the writ of injunction being
issued—simple prudence, considering that his challenge to
the PAGC’s jurisdiction remained at that point an issue
still to be resolved by the CA; and innate fairness,
considering that he was entitled to all safeguards because
his honor, reputation, and career were on the line. That
opportunity would be to enable him to render his
explanation in his defense; after all, there was no urgency
to discipline him! Denying him such opportunity was
ignoring his right to be heard upon a matter that put his
entire career on the line.
Thirdly, the majority consider the respondent to have
abandoned his right to present evidence by failing to move
for a reconsideration of the PAGC resolution, or seeking
another opportunity to present his side.
I submit that the respondent did not abandon his right
to present evidence. For one, the records bear out that the
PAGC resolution came to his knowledge for the first time
only when he received the OP decision dated March 23,
2004. Before then, he had not been furnished any copy of

the PAGC resolution. Surely, he had no opportunity to
move for reconsideration of the resolution before the PAGC.
Moreover, I cannot but note that he quickly assailed the OP
decision dated March 23, 2004 (which he had received only
on April 14, 2004)15 by timely filing on April 19, 2004 a
Motion for Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To
Admit Explanation/Refutation of
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 86-91.
208

Complaint,16 wherein he rendered his explanation and

refutation of the charges leveled against him.
And, fourthly, the recitals of the OP resolution dated
May 13, 2004 (denying the respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To Admit
Explanation/Refutation of Complaint) disclose that the OP
entirely adopted the findings and recommendation of the
PAGC, viz.:
“This refers to the motion of Antonio F. Montemayor seeking

reconsideration of the Decision of this Office dated March 23,
2004, and accordingly prays that a new one be rendered,
reversing and setting aside the earlier decision, ultimately
exonerating him from the charges.
It will be recalled that this Office, in the assailed Decision,
fully agreed with the recommendation of the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission (PAGC), upholding the legal premises and
factual findings contained in said decision.
Movant raises the following grounds:
1. Respondent was deprived of due process.
2. PAGC overstepped its bounds.
3. The Decision erred in holding respondent liable for
violation of Section 7, RA 3019, as amended, and/or Section 8 of
RA 6713.
The motion has to fail. The issues raised involve factual
matter, which movants attempts to argue prolifically. However,
as held in the earlier Decision of this Office, the “findings of
fact and conclusions of any adjudicative body, which can
be considered as a trier of facts on specific matters within
its field of expertise, should be considered as binding and
conclusive upon the appellate courts when supported by

substantial evidence, as they were in a better position to assess
and evaluate the credibility of the contending parties and the
validity of their respective evidence”
Upon due consideration, this Office finds no cogent reason to
disturb its earlier Decision. We have carefully reviewed the
_______________
16 CA Rollo, pp. 35-45.
209
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 209

arguments raised in the instant motion and find the same

to be a mere reiteration of matters previously considered
and found to be without merit in the assailed decision. A
motion for reconsideration which does not make out “any new
matter sufficiently persuasive to induce modification of judgment
will be denied.”17
I contend that the OP’s complete reliance on the PAGC’s

findings and recommendation constituted a gross violation
of administrative due process as set forth in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations,18 to wit:
1. There must be a hearing, which includes the right to

present one’s case and to submit evidence in support
thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing or, at least, contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties;
6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the facts and the law of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision.
It is clear from Ang Tibay that the OP should have itself

reviewed and appreciated the evidence presented and
independently considered the facts and the law of the

controversy,
_______________
17 Underscoring is supplied for emphasis only.

18 69 Phil. 635, (1940).
210

because the PAGC was only the OP’s fact-finding

subordinate. The OP could not just accept the entire
findings and recommendation of the PAGC in arriving at a
decision, considering that such a shortcut was unfair and
impermissible. Thereby, the OP took for granted the fact
that at stake were the honor, the reputation, and the
livelihood of the person administratively charged.19 The
OP’s action consequently left its decision bereft of proper
factual and legal basis.
Furthermore, the OP’s statement that the respondent’s
arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration With Motion
For Leave To Admit Explanation/Refutation of Complaint
were “a mere reiteration of matters previously considered”
was a patent untruth. The OP conveniently and
unfoundedly ignored that neither the PAGC nor the OP
had earlier considered and taken into account his evidence
and explanation (of the alleged failure to disclose the
acquired vehicles in his SAL) which were being presented
in the case only for the first time through the Motion for
Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To Admit
Explanation/Refutation of Complaint.
Would the result be probably different had the OP itself
considered and passed upon the explanation and evidence
submitted in the Motion for Reconsideration With Motion
For Leave To Admit Explanation/Refutation of Complaint?
I maintain so.
The OP, if objective and fair-minded, was likely not to
have immediately adopted the PAGC’s findings and
recommendation, but, instead, would have easily found in
favor of the respondent, for there were good and valid
reasons towards that end. The CA held so in its decision:20
“Furthermore, a public document attached on record tends to

show in no uncertain terms that petitioner was justified when he
did
_______________
19 DOH v. Camposano, G.R. No. 157684, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 438, 454.
20 Rollo, pp. 65-66.
211
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 211

not include and declare the 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2002
SSAL. Apparently, petitioner already conveyed and transferred
the ownership over the 2001 Ford Expedition in favor of a certain
Raymundo Ramon P. Lacson on the strength of a duly notarized
Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle executed on December 15, 2002
(Rollo p. 39). Perforce, while it may have been true that petitioner
still remains as the registered owner of the 2001 Ford Expedition,
this supposed ownership extends only in so far as LTO
registration and recording purposes are concerned, but strictly
and legally speaking, real and actual ownership over the subject
automobile has already been completely divested and effectively
transferred from petitioner to Raymundo Ramon P. Lacson. In the
case of Aguilar, Sr. vs. Commercial Savings Bank (360 SCRA
395), the High Court pronounced, in essence, that automobile
registration is required not to make said registration the
operative act to determine the identity of the person to whom the
ownership over the subject automobile is actually transferred and
vested. Unlike in land registration cases, the administrative
proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to
the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla v. Rafael &
Verdague, 39 Phil. 888). The main aim of motor vehicle
registration is merely to identify the registered owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury
is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite and
specific individual, that is, the registered owner. Bringing
this instructive doctrine to the fore, it is clear that while
petitioner is still the owner of the 2001 Ford Expedition
per LTO registration, the contrary is true as far as the
actual facts are concerned, for the real owner of the said
automobile since December 15, 2002 is already Raymundo
Ramon P. Lacson. Simply put, petitioner not being the
owner of the 2001 Ford Expedition anymore as early as
December 15, 2002, there is no longer any legal necessity
or obligation for him to include and declare the said
automobile in his 2002 SSAL, which covers only those
properties actually owned by petitioner as of December 31,
2002.”
Also, the OP’s statement in the resolution dated May 13,

2004 that the “findings of fact and conclusions of any
adjudicative body, which can be considered as a trier of
facts on specific matters within its field of expertise, should
be consid-
212

ered as binding and conclusive upon the appellate courts

when supported by substantial evidence” unraveled yet
another weakness infecting the OP’s decision against the
respondent. The statement spotlighted two fundamental
errors, namely: one, contrary to the Ang Tibay dictum, the
OP did not itself consider and pass upon the evidence and
explanation being submitted by the respondent for the first
time; and, two, the OP unwarrantedly considered itself
appellate in relation to the PAGC.
Having just explained the first of the fundamental
errors, I need only to expound on the second one now.
I wish to stress that the President’s power to investigate
and discipline a presidential appointee was original, not
appellate. If we were to accord deference to the rule of
delegata potestas delegare non potest, therefore, such
original power could not be delegated to the subordinate
PAGC, in the absence of any law that expressly authorized
the delegation, for the rule was rooted in the ethical
principle that delegated power constituted not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment, not through the
intervening mind of another.21 This inevitably signified
that the OP should directly exercise its power, instead of
simply adopting the PAGC’s entire findings and
recommendation.
Yet, by holding itself as an appellate body in relation to
the PAGC, which, in the first place, was not even
performing adjudicative powers, and by deeming itself
bound and concluded by the PAGC’s findings and
recommendation, the OP committed manifest grave abuse
of discretion in the exercise of its vaunted power to
investigate and discipline. The OP’s jurisdictional error
should be overturned.
_______________
21 United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330 (1908).
213
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 213

B.
Penalty of dismissal was too harsh
The OP dismissed the respondent for his failure to
declare some vehicles in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL, viz:
“After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees

with the findings that hold it together. Respondent failed to
disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach
of the prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in
relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded ample
opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the
opportunity pass by.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Antonio F.
SO ORDERED.”22
In proceeding against the respondent, both the PAGC

and the OP relied upon the following provisions of Republic
Act No. 6713,23 thus:
“Section 8. Statements and Disclosure.—Public officials

and employees have an obligation to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the
right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and
financial and business interests including those of their
spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial
Disclosure.—All public officials and employees, except those
who
_______________
22 Rollo, p. 90.
23 An Act Establishing A Code Of Conduct And Ethical Standards For Public
Officials And Employees, To Uphold The Time-Honored Principle Of Public Office
Being A Public Trust, Granting Incentives And Rewards For Exemplary Service,
Enumerating Prohibited Acts And Transactions And Providing Penalties For
Violations Thereof, And For Other Purposes.
214

serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or

temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of
their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households.
x x x
Section 11. Penalties.—(a) Any public official or
employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or
employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent
or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act
shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent
of six (6) months salary or suspension not exceeding one
(1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the
offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate
body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier
penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the
latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a
fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in
the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction,
disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper
administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for
removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even
if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
x x x
Section 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations,
Administration and Enforcement of this Act.—The Civil Service
Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the
administration and enforcement of this Act. It shall transmit all
cases for prosecution arising from violations of this Act to the
proper authorities for appropriate action: Provided, however, that
it may institute such administrative actions and disciplinary
measures as may be warranted in accordance with law. Nothing
in this provision shall be construed as a deprivation of the right of
each House of Congress to discipline its Members for disorderly
behavior.
The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out
the
215
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 215
provisions of this Act, including guidelines for individuals

who render free voluntary service to the Government. The
Ombudsman shall likewise take steps to protect citizens who
denounce acts or omissions of public officials and employees which
are in violation of this Act.”
It is clear from the foregoing provisions, however, that

the penalty for a violation of the provisions of RA 6713,
inclusive of the failure to accomplish and submit SSAL
under Section 8, supra, is not exclusively removal or
dismissal of the erring public official or employee. Section
11 (b) should be applied in conjunction with Section 11 (a),
which specifies a punishment of either a (1) fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six months salary, or (2)
suspension not exceeding one year, or (3) removal,
depending on the gravity of the offense. Thus, although
Section 11 (b) states that a violation of the provisions of RA
6713, if proven in a proper administrative proceeding and
warranted depending on the gravity of the offense, shall be
sufficient cause for the removal or dismissal of the public
official or employee even without a criminal prosecution,
such provision cannot be understood as immediately
warranting dismissal without due regard to the gravity of
the offense.
Moreover, Section 12 of RA 6713 entrusts the primary
responsibility to administer and enforce RA 6713 in the
Civil Service Commission (CSC); and expressly vests in the
CSC the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the provisions of RA 6713. For that
purpose, the CSC promulgated the Omnibus Rules
implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other
pertinent Civil Service Laws, which relevantly provide:
RULE XIV DISCIPLINE

Section 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed,
mitigating and aggravating circumstances may be
considered. Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same
must be invoked or pleaded by the proper party, otherwise, the
said circumstances shall not be considered in the determination of
the proper penalty to be imposed against the respondent
concerned.
216

Section 17. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more

charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that
corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest
may be considered as aggravating circumstances.
Section 18. The imposition of the penalty shall be made in
accordance with the manner herein below detailed, provided the
penalty attached to the offense is divisible into minimum, and
maximum, to wit:
(a)The minimum of the penalty shall be imposed where only
mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present;
(b)The medium of the penalty shall be imposed where no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present or when
both are present they equally offset each other;
(c)The maximum of the penalty shall be imposed where only
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present;
Where aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present,
the minimum of the penalty shall be applied where there are
more mitigating circumstances present; the medium period if the
circumstances equally offset each other; and the minimum where
there are more aggravating circumstances.
x x x
Section 23. Administrative offenses with its
corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less
grave, and light depending on the gravity of its nature and
effects of said acts on the government service
x x x
The following are less grave offenses with their
corresponding penalties:
x x x
(i) Failure to file Sworn Statements of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth, and Disclosure of Business
Interest and Financial Connections including those of
their spouse and unmarried children under eighteen years
of age living in their households
1st offense—Suspension for one (1) month and one (1)
day to six months
217
VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 217

2nd offense—Dismissal.
The OP meted dismissal from the service on the

respondent. In so doing, the OP ignored that under the
implementing rules and regulations of the CSC, the failure
to file the SSAL was only a less grave offense, which left
the omission to declare certain assets in the SSAL to be not

a grave offense.
As a result, there was a great disparity between the
violation or offense committed by the respondent, on one
hand, and the penalty imposed on him, on the other
hand. We should not allow the disparity to last, for a grave
injustice is committed in the name of justice when the
penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong
committed.24 The disparity is offensive to our consistent
adherence to the principle that the penalty to be imposed
on any erring employee must be commensurate with the
gravity of his offense.25 As we held in Civil Service
Commission v. Ledesma:26
“We stress that the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil
servant. Public service is a public trust, and whoever breaks that
trust is subject to sanction. Dismissal and forfeiture of
benefits, however, are not penalties imposed for all
infractions, particularly when it is a first offense. There
must be substantial evidence that grave misconduct or
some other grave offense meriting dismissal under the law
was committed.”
It is not amiss to cite Cavite Crusade for Good

Governance v. Judge Cajigal,27 where the Court found the
respondent presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court in
Cavite guilty of violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and
Section 8 of RA 6713 for
_______________
24 HSBC v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116542, July 30, 1996, 260 SCRA 49, 56.
25 Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Delia V. Panado, G.R. No.
154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589.
26 G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 611.
27 A.M. No. RTJ-00-1562, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA 423.
218

his failure to file on time his SSAL and his non-filing of his
SSAL in some years. In imposing the penalty against him,
the Court gave due consideration to his service in the
Judiciary and to the fact that he later filed his SSAL, and
suspended him for six months without pay but ordered him
to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with

more severely.
In fine, even assuming that the respondent failed to
correctly include some assets in his SSAL, his failure did
not warrant his immediate dismissal upon his first
violation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to deny the
petition.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Corruption operates to make a judge a

deceased member, which must be decisively severed from
the body of the judiciary and cast aside. (Virata vs. Supnet,
393 SCRA 12 [2002])
By any legal or moral yardstick, the 1.754 billion in
commissions paid to various individuals for “professional
efforts and services in successfully negotiating and
securing” the reclamation contract obviously constitutes
bribe money. (Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 415
SCRA 403 [2003])
——o0o——
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06 Flores V Montemayor

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11/18/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 629

Notes.—Where a supervening event does not reinforce

G.R. No. 170146. August 25, 2010.*

HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior

Public Officers; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 179

Flores vs. Montemayor

committed in the government, particularly by officials appointed

Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), does not interrupt

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Flores vs. Montemayor

or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 181

Flores vs. Montemayor

after the Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Sworn Statement of Assets

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Flores vs. Montemayor

requires that the SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as

Same; Due Process; Administrative Law; Presidential Anti-

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 183

Flores vs. Montemayor

just accept the entire findings and recommendation of the PAGC

in the first place, was not even performing adjudicative powers,

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Flores vs. Montemayor

regard to the gravity of the offense.—It is clear from the foregoing

The OP meted dismissal from the service on the respondent. In so

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 185

Flores vs. Montemayor

service is a public trust, and whoever breaks that trust is subject

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando,

1 Rollo, pp. 56-67. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang,

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lating Montemayor’s ostentatious lifestyle which is

violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 30199 in

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 187

tion to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 671310 due to his failure to

SEC. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities.—Every public officer,

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging

their business interests and financial connections in previous years,

11 CA Rollo, p. 72.

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 189

mending to the Office of the President Montemayor’s

“After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees

Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said

assertions: first, that the PAGC exceeded its authority

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

mended that he be dismissed from government service

I. WHETHER PETITIONER PAGC HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 191

OND” OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN

The issues may be summarized as follows:

I. WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO

24 Rollo, pp. 233-234.

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

II. WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO

We discuss the first three (3) issues jointly as these

25 Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, series of 2001, provides in full:

VOL. 629, AUGUST 25, 2010 193