Crimes Against Public Interest
The excerpts of the meetings transmitted to the offices of the
People vs. Pacana G.r. No. L-22621 (1924)
Facts:
There are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of
public documents and estafa committed by means of falsification of public
documents, in which the accused are Pedro A. Pacana, secretary of the
provincial board of Misamis, Isidro Adorable, member of the provincial
board of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member of the provincial board
of Misamis .The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana
relates to the falsification by the accused of minutes of the meeting of the
provincial board on June 9, 1923, for the alleged purpose of permitting
the district engineer to incur illegal expenses in the reconstruction of a
provincial road. The charge in the second case against the same accused
relates to the falsification of minutes of the provincial board on June 16,
1923. The charge in the third case against the same accused relates to the
falsification of an excerpt from the minutes of the provincial board of June
9, 1923. And the last two cases, one against provincial board member
Isidro Adorable and Pedro A. Pacana, and the other against provincial
board member Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A. Pacana, relate to the crimes
of estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents,
whereby it is alleged Adorable and Castro were each able to collect the
sum of P25 as per diems for two fictitious meetings of the provincial
board.
Defendants defends that on account of the carelessness of the provincial
secretary and the amount of work thrown on his inexperienced shoulders,
error was committed, and that, instead of meetings of the provincial
board being held on June 9 and 16, 1923, meetings were in reality
held on June 19 and June 21, 1923. Meetings of the provincial board
were actually had on the afternoons of June 19 and June 21, and to this
effect is the testimony of the members present, the secretary, and a clerk.
Subjects were treated in these two sessions which could not possibly have
come to the attention of the provincial board prior to the sessions. The
preoccupations of the provincial secretary due to the inspection trip of the
provincial board and the arrival and departure of the parties of the
Governor-General and of the Legislature, were the cause of the mistakes.
Errors of a similar character appear in other meetings of the provincial
board.
district engineer and district auditor, respectively, were prepared by a
clerk in the office of the provincial governor and were merely signed as a
matter of form by the provincial secretary.
According to the prosecution, the motive for the criminal acts was, first,
the desire on the part of the provincial secretary to fabricate resolutions
probably with the connivance of the provincial governor and the
members of the provincial board, which would placate the American
engineer, Mr. Allen. The motive in the second place, according to the
prosecution, was to permit the members of the provincial board to collect
a total of P50 not legally due them. On the other hand, according to the
defense, the cause of the prosecution is the enmity existing between the
district engineer and the district auditor, and has been brought about as
an act of vengeance by the district auditor. Political intrigue is also
insinuated.
ISSUE: whether there was an international and deliberate
falsification of public documents on the part of the accused?
Ruling:
NO. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be
crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts,
honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal
responsibility. The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a
duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal
intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence.
It must be admitted that the physical facts are mostly in favor of the
accused. The documents, Exhibits C and D, could not have been fabricated
on June 9 and June 16, if the matters to which they relate were not then
before the provincial board for action. Unless by supernatural means, that
would be an utter impossibility. Just how we can reconcile these
circumstances with the strong oral testimony, mostly circumstantial in
natur
Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure
a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, it must,
nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public document
must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change the effects
which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could
not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which
is required by article 1 of the Penal Code
All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should
be indulged in to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government has
suffered no loss. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction
CHOA VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003
FACTS : Alfonso Choa, a Chinese national, filed a verified petition for
naturalization. During the first hearing, he was not able to finish testifying
on the direct examination. Subsequently, he filed a motion to withdraw
his petition for naturalization which the court granted in 1990.
In 1992, upon the complaint of Choa’s wife, an information was filed in
MTCC charging Choa of perjury in his notarized / verified Petition for
Naturalization which stated (a) the address of his wife and children
(despite knowing that they left the said residence about 5 years ago) and
(b) that he is of good moral character (but in fact he was having an
immoral and illicit affair with another woman begetting 2 children with
her)
ISSUE : Whether Choa may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged
false statements in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two
years prior to the filing of the Information for perjury.
RULING: Yes. Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in
solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify
under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu
of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this
and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.
The elements of perjury are:
1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter;
2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer
authorized to receive and administer oath;
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose.
All the elements are present. Petitioner willfully and deliberately alleged
false statements concerning his "residence" and "moral character" in his
petition for naturalization. This was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution.
The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by
petitioner before Notary Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent
and authorized by law to receive and administer oath. Also, petitioner
started testifying under oath on his false allegations before the trial court.
The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral
character" are material matters because they are among the very facts in
issue or the main facts which are the subject of inquiry and are the bases
for the determination of petitioner's qualifications and fitness as a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
At the time Choa filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed
perjury. The withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for
naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already
committed.
Choa cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication
rule since the false statements he made in his petition for naturalization
has instead made a mockery of the administration of justice. Right to equal
protection cannot be invoked to protect his criminal act.
In People vs. Cainglet, this Court emphatically stressed that "every
interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by
artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes
at the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial
proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that
litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be
punished if they do not."
ANTONIO B. MONFORT III and ILDEFONSO B. MONFORT, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, PAUL MONFORT, RAMON H.
MONFORT, JACQUELINE M. YUSAY, YVETTE M. BENEDICTO, ESTER S.
MONFORT, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and CITY PROSECUTOR OF CADIZ
CITY, Respondents.
Facts: Petitioners are children of the late Antonio H. Monfort, Jr., one of
the original stockholders/incorporators of the Monfort Hermanos
Agricultural Development Corporation (MHADC).6 On 28 October 1998,
petitioners filed a letter-complaint for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz against private
respondents. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 8009. In the said
complaint, petitioners claimed that the private respondents made false
statements in their respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998
which the latter had executed and submitted to the City Prosecutor of
Cadiz in connection with another complaint for perjury, docketed as I.S.
No. 7883, earlier filed by the petitioners against the private respondents.
The alleged false statements referred to the declarations of the private
respondents that the 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC
was held on 16 October 1996, and that they were elected as board
directors of the MHADC during the same meeting. Petitioners insisted that
the 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC was held, not on 16
October 1996, but on 27 November 1996 as stated in the 1996 General
Information Sheet (GIS) accomplished by the MHADC and submitted to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Iloilo Extension Office.
Further, there is nothing in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC which states that
an election of the board of directors of the MHADC took place on 16
October 1996.7
Subsequently, private respondents filed their joint counter-affidavits
dated 9 December 1998 in I.S. No. 8009 before the City Prosecutor of
Cadiz. They alleged that they are stockholders of record of the MHADC;
that a stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996
where they were elected as board directors of MHADC; that the MHADC’s
corporate accountant, Litonjua, Desabelle and Associates (LDA), was
responsible for the preparation of the MHADC’s GIS; that the LDA made
erroneous statements in the 1996 GIS of MHADC; that the erroneous
statements refer to the date of the MHADC’s annual stockholders’ meeting
and the persons composing the MHADC’s board of directors; that the LDA
had admitted having committed such honest error; that the LDA had
rectified the same by submitting a letter to the SEC informing the latter
that the annual stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC for the year 1996
was held on 16 October 1996 and not on 27 November 1996; that what
transpired on 27 November 1996 was not the annual stockholders’
meeting of the MHADC but merely a special meeting of the board of
directors thereof; and, that, the private respondents were elected as
board directors of the MHADC during the annual stockholders’ meeting
on 16 October 1996.8
Private respondents thus argue that they cannot be held liable for perjury
since one of the elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code is that the assertion of falsehood must be willful and deliberate; that
the terms willful and deliberate imply malice and evil intent in asserting
falsehood; and that this element is lacking in the case at bar.
Issue: Are the respondents guilty of perjury?
Ruling: No. The third element of perjury requires that the accused had
willfully and deliberately asserted a falsehood. A mere assertion of a false
objective fact is not sufficient. The assertion must be deliberate and
willful.
In the instant case, the petitioners failed to establish the fact that the
private respondents made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood
in their counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998.
Private respondent Ramon H. Monfort had sufficiently and reasonably
explained the circumstances surrounding the preparation and his signing
of the erroneous statements in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC. He narrated
that as Vice-President of the MHADC, he signed and certified the same
under oath; that he was not, however, aware of the erroneous statements
therein at the time when he signed it; that it was LDA as MHADC’s
corporate accountant which had solely prepared the 1996 GIS of the
MHADC; that he always relied on the accuracy of LDA; that he hastily
signed it since, at that time, the LDA representative was in a hurry to beat
the deadline in submitting the same to the SEC; that after being informed
of the erroneous statements, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC informing
the latter of the mistakes and supplying the correct informations therein;
that the erroneous statements were due to the oversight of the LDA; and,
that he admitted that he was negligent in not carefully reading and
analyzing the statements therein.
The naïve reliance of the private respondents on the foregoing
circumstances in executing their respective counter-affidavits dated 11
June 1998 negates willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. Perjury
being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused.43
Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the
intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It
is equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies "meditated" as
distinguished from "inadvertent acts." It must appear that the accused
knows his statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth.44
In this case, the private respondents believed in good faith that, based on
the above-explained events, their statements in their respective counter-
affidavits dated 11 June 1998 are true and correct. Good faith or lack of
malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the allegation of deliberate assertion of
falsehood in perjury cases.
It should also be borne in mind that perjury cannot be willful where the
oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. Bona fide belief in
the truth of a statement is an adequate defense.46 The private
respondents had consistently claimed that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC is
erroneous on its face. They have maintained all along their stand that the
annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996
and not on 27 November 1996. They also submitted documentary
evidence to prove that the annual stockholders’ meeting took place on 16
October 1996, and that the LDA had already communicated to the SEC the
mistakes and corrections in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC.47 In addition
thereto, they also submitted a letter coming from the SEC which
acknowledged the corrections therein and had noted that the same now
form part of the records of the MHADC.
Further, the Secretary of Justice had found that the 1996 GIS of the
MHADC is patently erroneous. It concluded that the same is worthless and
has no probative value in evidence because it does not establish the fact
that the true date of the annual stockholders’ meeting for the year 1996
took place on 27 November 1996. This finding was sustained by the Court
of Appeals in its Decision dated 28 January 2005.
Garong vs. People GR 172539, Nov. 16, 2016
FACTS: Silverio and Ricar went to the home of the petitioner to seek his
help in the judicial reconstitution of Silverio’s TCT40361 issued by the
ROD of Mindoro. Petitioner, then a court interpreter, agreed to help.
Petitioner delivered to Ricar a copy of a court order (exhibit B) captioned
“IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECONSITUTION OF TCT NO. T-40361”.
Exhibit B bore the stamp mark “ORIGINAL SIGNED” above the printed
name of Judge Mario de la Cruz, the presiding judge of the RTC and the
words CERTIFIED TRUE COPY w/ a signature but no printed name
beneath it. Upon petitioner’s instruction, Silverio and Ricar brought
Exhibit B to the ROD for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate of TCT
40361. Meding Nacional, the person in charge of receiving court orders
in the ROD informed Ricar that Atty. Legaspi, chief of the Office of the ROD,
had returned Exhibit B because he had found some sentences thereof to
be erroneous. Atty Centron (clerk of court of the RTC) informed Ricar that
exhibit B appeared to be falsified because it referred to a “ghost petition”
because its docket number pertained to the petition of Emerenciano
Sarabia instead of Silverio Rosales. The petitioner was charged with
falsification as defined by Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the RPC.
RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. The RTC concluded that the
petitioner committed falsification committed by a private individual as
defined and punished under Article 172, with the generic aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of his public position under Article 14,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC opined that his position
as a court interpreter had facilitated the commission of the offense by him
as a private individual; and that his case did not come under Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code because it had not been his duty as the court
interpreter to prepare the court order for the court in which he had been
assigned. CA affirmed but disregarded the appreciation by the RTC of the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his official position by
him because his being a court interpreter did not facilitate the
falsification, observing that any person with access to or knowledge of the
procedure for judicial reconstitution of titles could have committed the
crime. It pointed out that his position as a court interpreter did not give
him custody of the document, or enabled him to make or prepare the
falsified document.
ISSUE: What crime did the petitioner commit?
RULING: Falsification committed by a private individual as defined and
penalized by Article 172, in relation to paragraph 7 of Article 171.
Article 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified
documents. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document; and
xxxx
Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or
ecclesiastical minister.
Xxxx
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of
an original document when no such original exists, or including in such a
copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original;
Xxxx
Petitioner is a Court Interpreter and does not have the duty to prepare or
intervene in the preparation of the subject document, neither doe he have
official custody of the documents falsified. It is not also the duty of the
accused to certify document released or issued from the Court. Thus, by
certifying that the duplicate copy is the true copy of the original, which
does not exist, he did not abuse his official position as required under
Article 171. He is, however, liable for falsification committed by a private
individual under Article 172.
People v. Sumaoy, G.R. No. 105961, October 22, 1996, ruled that: "If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position,
then there is no abuse of public position." In the situation at hand, the
accused, as a court interpreter, might have some knowledge of the
practical aspect of a petition for reconstitution and had easy access to
court forms, patterns or records but, even as an outsider, he could have
still committed the crime.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in disregarding the generic aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of his public position?
RULING: No. The falsification by the petitioner could have been
committed without taking advantage of his public position as the court
interpreter. His work for the court that had supposedly issued Exhibit B
was of no consequence to his criminal liability, for the crime could have
been committed even by any other individual, including one who did not
work in the court in any official capacity. In his case, the petitioner
committed the simulation of Exhibit B despite his not having the duty to
make, or prepare, or otherwise intervene in the preparation of court
orders.
Union Bank v. People
Facts: Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum
Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of
the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency”. The Certification was notarized in Makati
City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information
against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City Court (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-
Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it
has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled
that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-
Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner
which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the
false document was presented.
Issue: Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court?
Ruling:
The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is
the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury
case against the petitioners.
The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity. Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the
applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined
on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.” The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the
criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong
is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed
through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC
is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or
her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime
of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false
testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn
statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the
sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the
taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients
of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be
based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the
crime committed.
David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015
FACTS:
David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon retirement, David and his wife returned to the
Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where
they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land
with the DENR. In the said application, David indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen. Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that David, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also
filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under
Article 172 of the RPC against the David. Meanwhile, He re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
The CENRO rejected David’s MLA, ruling that David’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA
which was void ab initio. An information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the David. Since the crime for which he was charged was
alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had re- acquired
his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that he was at that time still
a Canadian citizen.
David elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition
was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not David may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225?
RULING:
YES. David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document,
that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when
in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows
dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by
taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of David at the time of
filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other
words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be
read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that
such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document,
that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application,
when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those
ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months
later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having
no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification
of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 194390, Aug 13, 2014
Facts: Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with
falsification of public document due to a false narration he made in his
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) when he answered “no” to the question of
whether there is a pending criminal case against him despite the
pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a
person in authority. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of Falsification
of Public Documents Through Reckless Imprudence. The Sandiganbayan
opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4)of the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent
to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that
Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the
false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365of the
RPC.
Issue: Whether or not Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification
of public document through reckless imprudence.
Ruling: YES. However, the designation of the felony is erroneous. The
Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under
Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public
document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed
as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The
foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article
365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality
in the commission of a crime. The proper designation of the felony should
be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and
not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.

There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged

against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the Information
charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents. In
case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be
convicted of the offense proved when the offense charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved. reckless imprudence resulting
to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily
included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter
being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents
notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of
falsification of public documents.