Sie sind auf Seite 1von 34

1

LIMITLESS POTENTIAL v. CA CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST BOND, SAME WITH PRELIMINARY
PRINCIPLES: ATTACHMENT - Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Revised Rules of
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Civil Procedure, which is similarly applicable to preliminary
WHAT: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party injunction,28 has outlined the procedure for the filing of a claim for
may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and damages against an injunction bond
interests during the pendency of an action. MALICE, LACK OF GOOD FAITH NOT AN ELEMENT OF RECOVERY ON
WHEN: It is an order granted at any stage of an action, prior to the THE BOND - Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of
judgment or final order, recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to require malice as
a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless formality.
CONTENTS: It requires a party, court, agency or person to perform
The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained
or to refrain from performing a particular act or acts.
in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was
NATURE: A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond
merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the
action.20 injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of
PURPOSE: petitioner’s main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for
1. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante, in order to protect the the purpose of recovery upon the bond.
rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, if INJUNCTION BOND ANSWERABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES - The bond
no preliminary injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain
judgment, do the act which the plaintiff is seeking the court to no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be
restrain. This will make ineffectual the final judgment that the court dissolved.32 Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to
may afterwards render in granting relief to the plaintiff.22 account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or
2. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened costs and reasonable counsel’s fees, incurred or sustained by the
or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their latter in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. issued.
STATUS QUO ANTE, DEFINITION - the last actual, peaceful, and CASE DIGEST
uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy. The status 2 SENTENCE RULING: Malice and lack of good faith is not required to
quo should be existing ante litem motam, or at the time of the filing recover on the bond. The dissolution of the injunction, even if the
of the case. For this reason, a preliminary injunction should not injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination
establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on
re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them. the injunction bond immediately accrues.
REQUISITES FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO ISSUE: FACTS:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; Limitless Potentials, Inc. (LPI) constructed one billboard
(2) a violation of that right; advertisement for Digital Networks Communications and Computers
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity which Digital would rent at P60,000 per month.
for the writ to prevent serious damage.24
The billboard, however, was destroyed by unknown persons so the
HOW: Granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not contract was considered terminated but Limitless refused to return
explicitly exempted, files with the court, where the action or Digital’s rental deposit for two months claiming that the loss of the
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person billboard was due to force majeure.
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that
Digital sued Limitless for the return of the deposit. Limitless filed a
the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he
third-
may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
party complaint against Macgraphics and herein respondents Bishop
order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not
Yalung and Atty. Villasor who were representatives of the Roman
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM). Digital alleged that Yalung
preliminary injunction shall be issued. Thus, the posting of a bond is
and Villasor destroyed the billboard they constructed over the land
a condition sine qua non for a writ of preliminary injunction to be
they leased from RCAM so that Macragraphics could erect their own
issued.
billboard on the land.
INJUNCTION BOND, PURPOSE - The injunction bond is intended as a
Respondents moved to dismiss the third-party complaint but the
security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction
same was denied by the MeTC.
ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect
the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
injunction,26 and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. Preliminary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the RTC.
2

The RTC granted the injunction after the respondents posted a bond right to pursue its case is suspended or delayed, which in this case, is
of P10,000 to preserve the status quo because the said court was the petitioner.
informed that the MeTC had continued to try the case despite the However, Limitless was not able to prove it’s entitlement to
pendency of the certiorari petition. However, the RTC later denied damages.
the certiorari and dissolved the injunction.
Petition denied.
Limitless claimed damages for attorney’s fees, litigation costs, and
QUICK DIGEST:
cost of delay and thus filed a Motion for Judgment Against the Bond
DIGITAL rented a billboard built by LIMITLESS. The billboard was
but the RTC denied the motion ruling that the injunction was
destroyed so DIGITAL demanded a refund but LIMITLESS refused
properly issued.
reasoning that the loss was due to force majeure.
Limitless filed for certiorari with the CA but this was dismissed for
Hence, DIGITAL sued LIMITLESS in the MeTC. However, LIMITLESS
lack of merit.
filed a third-party complaint against MACRAGRAPHICS and
Limitless argues that the mere dismissal of respondent’s certiorari ARCHBISHOP who allegedly caused the destruction of the billboard.
and the dissolution of the writ amounts to a determination that the
ARCHBISHOP filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint but
injunction was wrongfully or improvidently obtained and that there
the MeTC denied it.
was damage caused by the mere issuance of the injunction. Limitless
asserts that malice or lack of good faith was not an element of ARCHBISHOP filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC with a prayer
recovery on the bond. for writ of preliminary injunction. After ARCHBISHOP filed an
injunction bond, the RTC granted the injunction ordering the MeTC
Respondents on the other hand contends that Limitless did not
to stop hearing the case while the certiorari was pending. But the
suffer any damage because they were not restrained from doing any
RTC later dismissed the certiorari petition and dissolved the writ.
act, rather, the injunction was directed to the MeTC.
LIMITLESS filed a motion for judgment against the bond but the RTC
ISSUES: I. Does mere dissolution of the injunction amount to a
denied the same because the injunction was properly issued.
determination that it was wrongfully of improperly issued? Does
malice or lack of good faith need to be proven to recover on the LIMITLESS argues that the mere dissolution of the writ amounts to
bond? wrongful or improvident issuance which entitles it to recover
II. Can petitioner recover damages from the injunction bond? damages from the bond and that malice and lack of good faith is not
III. Was petitioner able to substantiate the damages? required.
HELD: ISSUE: WON the malice and lack of good faith is required to recover
Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the on the injunction bond?
bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite HELD: No.
would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The dissolution Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the
of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, bond. The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was
amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the
obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the
accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, injunction bond immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of
the dissolution of the injunction because of petitioner’s main cause recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction
of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery because of petitioner’s main cause of action provides the actionable
upon the bond. wrong for the purpose of recovery upon the bond.
The injunction bond is answerable for all damages. The bond insures
with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no
ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be
dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to
account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or III.A.5 DEFINITION OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION
costs and reasonable counsel’s fees, incurred or sustained by the III.I WHEN ISSUED... supra
latter in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully HOLDING:
issued. a writ of mandatory injunction is granted UPON SHOWING THAT:
It is erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not (1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial
entitled to claim damages from the injunction bond simply because (2) The right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable
the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and not (3) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
against the petitioner. The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages prevent serious damage.
from the injunction because it has no interest or stake in the Petition SEMIRARA COAL CORP. V. HGL DEVELOPMENT CORP
pending before it. Damage or loss is suffered by the party whose
3

FACTS: III. I (WHEN ISSUED) supra.


Semirara Mining Corp (petitioner) is a grantee by DOE of a Coal Aside from Section 3 of Rule 58 enumerating the grounds for
Operating Contract under PD 972 over the entire island of Semirara issuance of preliminary injunction, the instant case established
Antique containing an area of 5500 hectares while HGL Devt Corp is jurisprudential ruling when a writ of mandatory injunction is
a grantee of Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement by the Ministry of granted:
Environment and Natural Resources over 367 hectares in Bobog and (1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial
Pontod Semirara Antique. Since the grant HGL has been grazing (2) The right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable
cattle on the subject property. With HGL’s permission and on (3) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
condition that it will not violate the FLGLA, the trucks and prevent serious damage.
equipment of petitioner were allowed to pass through the property.
Subsequently, without permission of HGL, petitioner erected several
buildings as their admin office and employees residence, they also
conducted blasting and excavation, constructed access roads, “MANDATORY INJUNCTION”
maintained a stockyard for the coal all to the damaged of land
causing decimation of the cattle. A letter was sent to petitioner  It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory
demanding full disclosure of the activities however it was ignored. injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court, and
The DENR unilaterally cancelled the FLGLA and ordered HGL to the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court
vacate the premises on account of its failure to pay its annual rental should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest
abuse.
and non submission of grazing reports.
 It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ
HGL filed the following actions simultaneously: of preliminary mandatory injunction which would
Against DENR for specific performance and damages with prayer for effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
temporary restraining order and/writ of preliminary injunction with  To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however,
the RTC Caloocan the petitioners must establish the following requisites:
Against petitioner for Recovery of Possession and Damages with a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected
is material and substantial;
Prayer for TRO and/Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
b) the right of the complainant is clear and
The RTC granted HGL’s prayer which was affirmed by the CA. unmistakable; and
ISSUE: c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for
Whether HGL is entitled to Writ of Preliminary Mandatory the writ to prevent serious damage.
Injunction.  Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the
HELD: performance of an act, it does not preserve the status
quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere
YES.
prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ
Being a holder of a pasture lease agreement, HGL has a clear and
of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a
unmistakable right to the possession of the subject property. As clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the
lawful possessor of the property, he is therefore entitled to complainant's right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does
protection of its possession and any disturbance of its possession is not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
a valid ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunctive relief is improper.
injunction. Considering that petitioner’s continued occupation of the
property results in deprivation of HGL’s right to use and possess CHINA BANKING CORP VS CO
subject property, the urgency and necessity for the issuance of the
writ cannot be denied. The unilateral act of DENR in cancelling the FACTS:
agreement does not automatically render the FLGLA invalid since it
is still a subject of a separate pending case. Notably, in the pending Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold a lot located at St.
Benedict Subdivision, Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to
case the court has issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
petitioner-spouses Castro. It sold two other lots also located in the
DENR from its order of cancellation of FLGLA No. 184. same place to petitioner-spouses Nogoy. The lots of the Castro
III.A.5 spouses and the Nogoy spouses are commonly bound on their
DEFINITION south-eastern side by Lot No. 3783-E in the name of respondent
Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.
Based on Rule 58 Section 1, a writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction is an order which requires the performance of a particular
Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with respondent
act or acts.
Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation for the
In the instant case, the writ requires the following to be done: development of a subdivision project covering Lot No. 3783-E and
1. Restraint petitioner or its agents from encroaching on the subject adjacent lots.
land or conducting any activities in it
2. Commanded petitioner to restore possession of the subject land In 2003, respondents started constructing a perimeter wall on Lot
to HGL or its agents No. 3783-E.
4

On November 28, 2003, petitioners wrote to respondents asking In the case at bar, petitioners base their prayer for preliminary
them to stop constructing the wall, and remove all installed mandatory injunction on Section 44 of Act No. 496 (as amended by
construction materials and restore the former condition of Lot No. Republic Act No. 440), Section 50 of Presidential Decree 1529, and
3783-E which the petitioners claimed to be a road lot. They also their claim that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.
claimed that the construction obstructed and closed the only means
of ingress and egress of the Nogoy spouses and their family, and at To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the
the same time, caved in and impeded the ventilation and clearance petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion
due the Castro spouses’ residential house. of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b)
the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c)
Petitioners’ demand remained unheeded, prompting them to file there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
before the RTC a complaint for injunction, restoration of road serious damage.
lot/right of way and damages with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the
performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is
Before respondents filed their Answer, petitioners filed an Amended thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction.
Complaint, alleging that the construction of the perimeter wall was Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
almost finished and thus modifying their prayer for a writ of injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute.
preliminary injunction to a writ of When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does
preliminary mandatory injunction. not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive
relief is improper.
The RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction on the following grounds: The ocular inspection showed that petitioners will not lose access to
their residences. As a matter of fact, lot 3783-E is not being used as
a) Plaintiffs have not clearly shown that their rights have an access road to their residences and there is an existing secondary
been violated and that they are entitled to the relief road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves as the main access
prayed for and that irreparable damage would be suffered road to the highway. With respect to the blocking of ventilation and
by them if an injunction is not issued. light of the residence of the Sps. Castro, suffice it to state that they
b) Whether lot 3783-E is a road lot or not is a factual issue are not deprived of light and ventilation. The perimeter wall of the
which should be resolved after the presentation of defendants is situated on the left side of the garage and its front
evidence. entrance is still open and freely accessible,30and the absence of a
c) Plaintiffs failed to prove that they will be prejudiced by the showing that petitioners have an urgent and paramount need for a
construction of the wall. The perimeter wall of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent irreparable
defendants is situated on the left side of the garage and its damage, they are not entitled to such writ.
front entrance is still open and freely accessible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
This is indeed an issue of fact which should be ventilated in a full
blown trial, determinable through further presentation of evidence
by the parties.

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners


filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same and denied their subsequent Motion for SOFIA DEVESA V. CRISPIN ARBES
Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition. 13 Phil 273

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for the issuance
LONG DIGEST
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Principles:
RULING:
INJUNCTIONS; SPECIAL REMEDY OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
NO. PROCEDURE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE OLD SPANISH WRITS. —
Injunctions or interdictos prohibitorios, for the issuance of which
It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction provision is made in the new Code of Civil Procedure, while they
rests on the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of sound resemble the interdictal actions of the Spanish procedural law in
judicial discretion by the lower court should not be interfered with some respects, are wholly distinct therefrom and, as a rule, the
except in cases of manifest abuse. circumstances under which, in accordance with the Spanish law,
interdictos de adquirir, de retener, de recobrar or de despojo
properly issued would not justify nor sustain the issuance of an
It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ of injunction, interdicto prohibitorio, as defined and provided in the
preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of new Code of Civil Procedure.
the main case without trial.
5

ID.; LIMITATION UPON USE OF WRITS OF INJUNCTION. — An Defendant did not deny the execution of the partition
injunction is a special remedy contained in the new Code of Civil agreement, and wholly failed to proved that the land in question
Procedure and adopted from American and English law of was or is a part of the estate of Gregoria Arbes. He insisted that the
procedure, and the accepted American doctrine limiting its use to agreement was not binding upon the heirs of Gregoria Arbes,
cases where there is no other adequate remedy, and otherwise because at the date of its execution two of them were minors and
controlling the issue thereof, must be deemed to limit its use in like incapable of executing such a document.
manner in this jurisdiction.
The trial court on the pleadings and proof submitted found
ID.; WRITS NOT AVAILABLE FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY WHEN that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the land in
TITLE IS NOT ESTABLISHED. — Injunctions, as a rule, will not be question, and rendered final judgment in accordance with the
granted to take property out of the possession or control of one prayer of the complaint, granting a final injunction perpetually
party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly restraining the defendant administrator from continuing in
been established by law. possession of the land in question or enjoying the fruits thereof.

Issue:
Facts:

Plaintiff alleged that defendant had unlawfully taken Whether or not the preliminary injunction sought by the
possession of certain rice lands and coconut groves and prayed for plaintiff is the proper remedy.
an injunction restraining him from continuing in possession and
enjoying the fruits of the land in question until and unless he Ruling:
obtained a final judgment in a proper action declaring these lands to
be the property of the estate. No. We are in entire accord with the trial judge as to his
findings of fact, and agree with him that the evidence of record
The complaint alleges that the property in question was establishes plaintiff's right of possession in and to the lands in
assigned to plaintiff's deceased husband under the terms of an extra question.
judicial partition contract executed by the heirs of Gregoria Arbes
(plaintiff's husband's first wife) and that plaintiff and her husband
had continued in the quiet, peaceable, and exclusive possession We are of opinion, however, that the remedy by injunction
thereof. sought by the plaintiff and allowed the trial court was not the proper
remedy for the cause of action set out in the pleadings and
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction prayed established by the evidence, and that, in accordance with the
for, conditioned upon the execution of a bond for costs and provisions of section 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court
damages. should have granted "relief consistent with the case made by the
complaint and supported by the evidence and embraced within the
Defendant presented a motion which may fairly be issue," and to that end should have required an amendment of the
regarded as a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the complaint by striking out the prayer for an injunction and
facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and prayed that the substituting therefor a prayer for a judgment for possession of the
preliminary injunction be dissolved. land described in the complaint, and upon the complaint thus
amended, judgment should have been rendered in favor of the
The trial court overruled the demurrer and declined to plaintiff.
dissolve the preliminary injunction.
Both the parties to this action appear to have labored under a
Defendant withdrew his motion and filed his answer. In his misapprehension as to the purpose, scope, and limitations of the
answer, he admitted having taken possession of the land but denied special remedy, known as an injunction, and defined in section 162
plaintiff's allegation as to their exclusive possession thereof. He of the Code of Civil Procedure. The records in many cases in this
alleged that the land was the property of Gregoria Arbes, deceased, court disclose a considerable degree of doubt and uncertainty in the
of whose estate he is the administrator, and that after the death of minds of counsel as to the function of this remedy, and in some
Gregoria Arbes, it passed pro indiviso to her heirs, who from the cases a wholly erroneous concept of the purpose and object for
time of her death continued in joint possession thereof, until he which it is provided. This erroneous concept may, perhaps, be due
took possession upon his appointment as administrator; he also to the fact that in the Spanish version of the new Code of Civil
alleged that one of the heirs, Vicente Sola, widower of Gregoria Procedure, the term injunction is translated interdicto prohibitorio,
Arbes, married the plaintiff; that plaintiff's claim to an interest in the which may thus have given rise to the impression that the remedy
property in question is or should be strictly limited to the interest by injunction is similar in character to the summary interdictal
which she is entitled to take from her husband. actions of the Spanish procedural law; but while the injunction
resembles in many respects the interdicto of the Roman law,
During trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to prove that the especially the decretal (decretale, quod praetor re nata
land was originally the property of her husband acquired by him implorantibus decrevit), and while it also resembles to a certain
through purchase, in part prior to, and in part after his marriage degree in its operation and effect, the interdictos de adquirir, de
with his first wife; she also introduced in evidence a document, retener, and de recobrar or de despojo of the Spanish procedural
purporting to be a partition agreement between her husband and law; nevertheless, it is wholly distinct therefrom, and, as a rule, the
the other heirs of Gregoria Arbes. circumstances under which, in accordance with the former
procedural law, these interdictos properly issued, would not justify
6

nor sustain the issuance of an injunction, as defined and provided in new Code of Procedure in Civil Cases, the interdicto de
the new Code of Civil Procedure. An injunction is a "special recobrar or de despojo having been expressly displaced by the
remedy" adopted in that code from American practice, and summary remedies prescribed in section 80 of the new code, for the
originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was there recovery of lands or buildings of which one is deprived by force,
issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and intimidation, fraud, or strategy within a year prior to the institution
limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases of the action; and defendant insists that the action instituted by
where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law" plaintiff, while in form a proceeding praying for an injunction under
(30 Barb., 549; 5 R. I., 472; 121 N. Y., 46; 31 Pa., 387; 32 Ala., N. S., the new code, assimilated to the former proceeding praying for
723; 37 N. H., 254; 61 Hun., 140; 145 U. S., 459; 141 Ill., 572; 49 Fed. an interdicto de recobrar or de despojo, is in fact an action which
Rep., 517; 37 id., 357; 129 Md., 464; 109 N. C., 21; 83 Wis., 426; 115 could only be maintained under the provisions of section 80 of the
Mo., 613), which "will not be granted while the rights between the new code, of which original jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts
parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where of the justice of the peace, exclusive of the Court of First Instance.
material and irreparable injury will done," which cannot be Plaintiff and appellee on the other hand seems to have insisted that
compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate the injunction proceedings instituted by her were assimilated rather
remedy (3 Bosw., 607; 1 Beasl., 247, 542; 15 Md., 22; 13 Cal., 156, to the summary action known as the interdicto de retener and that
190; 6 Wis., 680; 16 Tex., 410; 28 Mo., 210; 24 Fla., 542; 39 N. H., the facts alleged and proven establishing her right to an interdicto
182; 12 Cush., 410; 27 Ga., 499; 1 McAll., 271; 54 Fed. Rep., 1005; 64 de retener, under the old law, she is entitled to an injunction under
Vt., 643), and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property the new code, that remedy being the equivalent provided by the
out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another new code for the interdicto of the old law.
whose title has not been established by law. (144 U. S., 119; 40 W.
N. C. Pa., 121.) But while we agree with defendant and appellant that the summary
remedies provided in section 80 may be said to replace and perhaps
This court has frequently held, when treating of the special remedies abrogate the old interdicto de recobrar or de despojo, and that if the
by injunction, mandamus and prohibition, which are provided in the facts alleged and proven made out a cause of action under that
new Code of Procedure in Civil Cases, that the accepted American section and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court
doctrine limiting the use of these remedies to cases where there is of the justice of the peace, it would be necessary to hold that the
no other adequate remedy, and otherwise controlling the issuance trial court was wholly without original jurisdiction; and while we
of these writs, and must be deemed to limit their use in like manner cannot agree with the plaintiff and appellee that the facts set out in
in this jurisdiction, when not otherwise provided by law: to hold the pleadings and evidence would support the issuance of
otherwise would be to render practically of no effect the various an interdicto de retener, even under the former procedure, because
provisions of the code touching many if not most of the ordinary possession of the land and buildings had been actually lost to
actions, and the enforcement of judgment in such actions; for it may plaintiff when the action was instituted, nor can we agree with her
well be supposed that if a complainant could secure relief by that even if a proper case for the granting of an interdicto de
injunction in every case where "the defendant is doing or threatens retener under the old procedure had been established, it necessarily
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act follows that an injunction should issue under the new procedure;
probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights" and could enforce the and without deciding whether all the summary interdictal remedies
judgment granting the injunction by the summary contempt of the Spanish law have been wholly and in all cases abolished under
proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish the provisions of the new code, it is sufficient for the purpose of this
violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights decision to hold that since there is nothing in the allegations or
in such cases by the ordinary remedies, involving as they do the proof to show that defendant obtained possession of the land in
difficult and of times fruitless labor of enforcing judgments obtained question by force, intimidation, fraud, or strategy, the action is not
therein by execution. But so many cases have come before us where in the nature of the summary remedy known to the old law as
preliminary injunctions have been issued apparently without regard an interdicto de recobrar or de despojo, nor is it the summary
to this rule, that we are satisfied that the erroneous impression still remedy of forcible entry and wrongful detainer provided in section
prevails, in some quarters, that a preliminary injunction must issue 80 of the new code, and therefore it does not fall within the
where a prima facie showing is made of the existence of the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace, to the
circumstances under which such injunctions may be granted as set exclusion of the Court of First Instance, which tried the case.
out in section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, without keeping in
mind the fact that applications for injunctions are made to the What has been said disposes of all the errors assigned by appellant,
sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of that discretion is except his assignment of error based on his contention that the
controlled by the accepted doctrines touching the granting of administrator having taken possession as an officer of the court
injunctions in such cases; and we may add that the records also wherein the estate was being administered, his conduct in that
disclose a dangerous tendency to grant permanent injunctions on regard should not be questioned, except in the course of the
insufficient grounds, as a result of a similar erroneous construction administration proceedings.
of the provisions of the code in that regard.
We have frequently held that a contested claim of an administrator
No brief was filed by plaintiff on appeal, and the contentions of the that certain rights of possession and ownership are the property of
parties in the court below are not very clearly set out in the very the estate which he represents must be determined in a separate
short brief of the defendant and appellant. It appears, however, that action, and not in the course of the administration proceedings; and
defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court, on the it should be necessary to add that the mere fact that an
ground that the summary interdictal actions of the Spanish administrator holds letters of appointment from some court, in no
procedural law have been done away with by the provisions of the wise authorizes him to take possession of property held by another
7

under a claim of a right to possession until and unless he successfully PRINCIPLE: The objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to
establishes his right to possession of such property in a proper preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be fully
proceeding in a competent court. heard. Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy.
QUICK DIGEST
FACTS:
FACTS:
Private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc., owns Tali Beach
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for unlawful possession
Subdivision. Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots
of land with prayer for injunction. The trial court granted the
therein and also two parcels of land adjacent to the subdivision. To
preliminary injunction upon the execution of a bond. Defendant filed
gain access to their lot petitioner has to pass through private
a demurrer to the complaint with prayer for the dissolution of
respondent's subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the
preliminary injunction, to which the trial court overruled. Defendant
easement of right of way but private respondent refused it for being
withdrew his motion and filed his answer, admitting that he took
grossly inadequate. Private respondent then barricaded the front
possession of the land but denying plaintiff’s allegation as to their
gate of petitioner's property to prevent petitioner and his family
exclusive possession thereof. He also alleged that the land was the
from using the subdivision roads to access said parcels.
property of Gregoria Arbes, deceased, of whose estate he is the
administrator. During trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to prove
that the land was originally the property of her husband and that The petitioner filed, with the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
there was a partition agreement between her husband and the Batangas, a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary
other heirs of Gregoria Arbes. Defendant did not deny the execution prohibitive injunction against private respondent. The RTC granted
of the partition agreement, and wholly failed to proved that the land the writ of injunction. The petitioner moved to clarify the December
in question was a part of the estate of Gregoria Arbes. The trial court 12, 1996 writ and asked the court to clearly define the action
ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the land in required of private respondent to avert further damage and
question, and rendered final judgment in accordance with the inconvenience to petitioner. RTC issued an amended writ.
prayer of the complaint, granting a final injunction perpetually
restraining the defendant administrator from continuing in Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
possession of the land in question or enjoying the fruits thereof. Appeals, which set aside the writ dated December 29, 1998 and
reinstated the original writ dated December 12, 1996 with
modification as to the amount of the bond. The petitioner moved for
ISSUE: reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Whether or not the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiff is ISSUE:


the proper remedy.
Whether or not there was a legal basis for the issuance of the
RULING: amended writ of injunction.

NO. RULING:

An injunction is a special remedy contained in the new Code of Civil Prefatorily, we note that what was granted by the trial court was the
Procedure and adopted from American and English law of preliminary injunction, and that the main case for right of way has
procedure, and the accepted American doctrine limiting its use to not yet been settled. We have in previous cases 9 said that the
cases where there is no other adequate remedy, and otherwise objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
controlling the issue thereof, must be deemed to limit its use in like quo until the merits of the case can be fully heard. Status quo is the
last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a
manner in this jurisdiction.
controversy. The Court of Appeals was correct in its findings that the
last actual, peaceful and uncontested situation that preceded the
Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the
controversy was solely the access of petitioner and his household to
possession or control of one party and place it into that of another his property outside the subdivision for visits and inspections. At the
whose title has not clearly been established by law. time the writ was applied for in 1995, there was still no construction
going on in the property. It was merely raw land. The use of the
Contested claims of an administrator, that certain rights of subdivision roads for ingress and egress of construction workers,
possession and ownership are the property of the estate which he heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation
represents, must be determined in a separate action, and not in the of power lines, are clearly not part of the status quo in the original
course of the administration proceedings. writ. Along this line, the Court of Appeals properly set aside the
amended writ and reinstated the original writ.

PREYSLER V. COURT OF APPEALS QUICK DIGEST:


8

X Inc., owns a Subdivision adjacent to two parcels of land owner by Y defendants, Alejandro Cajucom, on June 1, 1908; as acknowledged
and his wife. To gain access to their lot, Y has to pass through X's by said tenants.
subdivision. Y offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but X
refused it for being grossly inadequate. X then barricaded the front ISSUE:
gate of petitioner's property to prevent Y and his family from using
the subdivision roads to access said parcels. WON the respondents disobeyed the WPI and therefore was
properly cited in contempt.
Y filed a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary
prohibitive injunction against X. The RTC granted the writ of HELD:
injunction. Y moved to clarify the December 12, 1996 writ and asked
the court to clearly define the action required of X to avert further NO!
damage and inconvenience to petitioner. RTC issued an amended
writ.
The writ issued by the court contained no order instructing the
defendants to raise or remove the obstructions that prevented the
X filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set
water from flowing through the said canal or ditch.
aside the writ dated December 29, 1998 and reinstated the original
writ dated December 12, 1996 with modification as to the amount
of the bond. Y moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Section 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes:

“An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from


particular act.”

The canal was obstructed and closed on June 1st, and when the
persons who closed it were notified on July 3 that they should
MANTILE VS. CAJUCOM abstain from performing any act whatever tending to obstruct and
prevent the flow of water, the canal or ditch still remained closed,
TWO SENTENCE RULING: and the record shows no proof that it was afterwards opened to the
passage of water, nor that, after the defendants had been notified
A thing that has already been done cannot be prohibited, by the of the injunction, they again closed it.
mere fact of there not having been done what was not ordered in
the writ it cannot be held that a judicial order was disobeyed and The act of the closing of the canal occurred prior to the issuance of
willfully disregarded. the writ, and, since a thing that has already been done cannot be
prohibited, by the mere fact of there not having been done what
FACTS: (All dates pertain to 1908) was not ordered in the writ it cannot be held that a judicial order
was disobeyed and willfully disregarded.
Petitioners filed a WPI against the respondents to restrain them
from continuing to close the canals and obstructing the flow of The said writ prohibited the performance of any act that would
water which irrigated the petitioner’s rice fields. obstruct, close, or hinder the course of the water through the canal
or creek, when it was already obstructed and closed; and as the
In its complaint filed on June 22, petitioners aver that the removal of the impediment or obstruction was not ordered, the
defendants were not obliged to perform any particular act, and their
respondents started to obstruct the flow of water on June 1, and
inaction in leaving the canal closed does not constitute contempt of
that since then the water which it ordinarily carried had ceased to court, as they did not violate any judicial prohibition.
flow through it, the plaintiff's lands thereby being deprived of
irrigation.

On June 26 a WPI was issued wherein respondents were enjoined BAR TYPE QUESTION:
from performing any act whatever that might tend to close and
obstruct the canal and to cease to obstruct or hinder the course of X filed a WPI against Y on June 22, to enjoin the latter from
the water. obstructing the flow of water which commenced on June 1.

On July 6 petitioners filed a motion to site the defendants in Writ was issued on June 26.
contempt because they continue to obstruct and hinder the passage
of the water in utter disobedience of the WPI. The writ issued by the court contained no order instructing the
defendants to raise or remove the obstructions that prevented the
The defendants argue that since the 3rd of July, the date when they water from flowing through the said canal or ditch.
were notified by the deputy sheriff, they had complied with the
prohibitory order and had not done anything whatever, by Notice was received by defendants on July 3, from which date it
themselves or through others in their representation, to the stream started complying with the order of prohibition. And that it was their
or ditch in question, which was closed by two tenants of one of the tenants that obstructed the flow of water beginning June 1.
9

Respondent was cited in contempt.


ISSUE:
Is the order of the court citing respondent in contempt proper?
WON the MD is validly dismiss?
(99%) (Bar 2017)

YES! RULING:
It is not necessary to decide whether the petition for declaratory
judgment be granted in this case, because in the petition presented
in the court below, in addition to the declaratory judgment, the
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction, which
is equivalent to an action for prohibition against public officers, and
FELICIANO V. ALIPIO as such we consider it, without passing at this stage of the
proceedings on the merits of said action.
PRINCIPLE: Issuance of a permanent injunction, which is equivalent
In the present case, we cannot consider the question as to the
to an action for prohibition against public officers.
constitutionality of the circular as this will be decided after the
Distinctions between injunction and prohibition
regular hearing.
.Injunction is generally directed against a party in the action while
In view of the foregoing, the order of the court dismissing the
prohibition is directed against a court, tribunal or person exercising
petition is reversed, and the case returned to the Court of First
judicial powers;
Instance of Tarlac for further proceedings as in an action for
.Injunction does not involve the jurisdiction of the court, whereas
prohibition, without costs.
prohibition may be on the ground that the court against whom the
writ is sought acted without or in excess of jurisdiction;
.Injunction may be the main action itself, or just a provisional
remedy in the main action, whereas prohibition is always a main
PETRONILO J. BARAYUGA vs. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE
action. Hence, for temporary restraint in a proceeding for
PHILIPPINES
prohibition, preliminary injunction must be sought therein.
Principle:
The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff
FACTS:
does not demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected
by injunction, his suit for injunction must be dismissed for lack of a
On September 21, 1951, the Director of Public Schools issued cause of action.
Circular No. 20, series of 1951, which reads as follows:
Facts:
PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS AND STUDENTS MAY BE REQUIRED TO
AUP, a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational institution
SALUTE THE FLAG
incorporated under Philippine laws on March 3, 1932, was directly
To Division Superintendents: under the North Philippine Union Mission (NPUM) of the Southern
1. Quoted in the inclosure to this Circular for the information and Asia Pacific Division of the Seventh Day Adventists. During the 3rd
guidance of school officials and teachers, is Opinion No. 370, series Quinquennial Session of the General Conference of Seventh Day
of 1951, of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, "regarding the Adventists held from November 27, 2000 to December 1, 2000, the
power of the Director of Public Schools to require all pupils and NPUM Executive Committee elected the members of the Board of
students in public schools to salute the flag, on pain of being barred Trustees of AUP, including the Chairman and the Secretary.
from admission to, or expelled from, such schools." Respondent Nestor D. Dayson was elected Chairman while the
The petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac a petitioner was chosen Secretary.
petition for declaratory relief and mandatory injunction, praying that A group from the NPUM conducted an external performance audit.
the above circular be declared null and void, that preliminary The audit revealed the petitioners autocratic management style, like
injunction be issued prohibiting the respondents Mariano Alipio and making major decisions without the approval or recommendation of
other teachers of the Malacampa Elementary School, and the the proper committees, including the Finance Committee; and that
Director of Public Schools, from carrying out the provisions of said he had himself done the canvassing and purchasing of materials and
circular, and that, after trial, the preliminary injunction be made made withdrawals and reimbursements for expenses without valid
permanent. supporting receipts and without the approval of the Finance
The Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac filed a motion to dismiss the petition Committee. The audit concluded that he had committed serious
on the ground that under section 2, Rule 66, it was not a case in violations of fundamental rules and procedure in the disbursement
which a declaratory judgment could be rendered. The court and use of funds.
dismissed the case. Hence, the petitioners have appealed to this On January 15, 2003, Chairman Dayson and the NPUM Treasurer
Court. likewise informed the petitioner inside the NPUM office on the
10

findings of the auditors in the presence of the AUP Vice-President Working Policy of the Conference provided a five-year term for him,
for Financial Affairs, and reminded him of the possible consequences because the provision was inexistent. It ruled that the petitioners
should he fail to satisfactorily explain the irregularities cited in the term of office had expired on January 22, 2003, or two years from
report. He replied that he had already prepared his written his appointment, based on AUPs amended By-Laws; that,
explanation. consequently, he had been a mere de facto officer appointed by the
In the January 27, 2003 special meeting, the petitioner sent a letter members of the Board of Trustees; and that he held no legal right
to the Board of Trustees. The members, by secret ballot, voted to warranting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
remove him as President because of his serious violations of
fundamental rules and procedures in the disbursement and use of
Issues
funds as revealed by the special audit; to appoint an interim
committee consisting of three members to assume the powers and
functions of the President; and to recommend him to the NPUM for Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no
consideration as Associate Director for Secondary Education. legal right to the position of President of AUP that could be
On February 4, 2003, the petitioner brought his suit for injunction protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.
and damages in the RTC, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary Ruling:
restraining order (TRO), impleading AUP and its Board of Trustees,
represented by Chairman Dayson, and the interim committee. His
Yes, the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to
complaint alleged that the Board of Trustees had relieved him as
the position of President of AUP that could be protected by the
President without valid grounds despite his five-year term; that the
injunctive writ issued by the RTC
Board of Trustees had thereby acted in bad faith; and that his being
Petition is already moot
denied ample and reasonable time to present his evidence deprived
The injunctive writ issued by the RTC was meant to protect the
him of his right to due process.
petitioners right to stay in office as President. Given that the lifetime
In their answer with counterclaim, the respondents denied the of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-extensive with the
allegations of the petitioner, and averred that he had been validly duration of the act sought to be prohibited, this injunctive relief
removed for cause; and that he had been granted ample already became moot in the face of the admission by the petitioner
opportunity to be heard in his defense. himself, through his affidavit, that his term of office premised on his
On March 21, 2003, after summary hearing, the RTC issued the TRO alleged five-year tenure as President had lasted only until December
enjoining the respondents and persons acting for and in their behalf 2005. In short, the injunctive writ granted by the RTC had expired
from implementing the resolution removing him as President issued upon the end of the term of office (as posited by him).
by the Board of Trustees during the January 27, 2003 special A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence
meeting, and enjoining the interim committee from performing the submitted by the plaintiff establishing:
functions of President of AUP. The RTC did not require a bond. (a) a present and unmistakable right to be protected;
Proceedings in the CA (b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such
With the Interim Rules for Intra-Corporate Controversies prohibiting right; and
a motion for reconsideration, the respondents forthwith filed a (c) a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
petition for certiorari in the CA, contending that the petitioners damages. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
complaint did not meet the requirement that an injunctive writ injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result
should be anchored on a legal right; and that he had been merely to nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
appointed, not elected, as President for a term of office of only two disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
years, not five years, based on AUPs amended By-Laws. damage sans proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a
The respondents filed in the CA a verified urgent motion for a TRO preliminary injunction.
and to set a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction to For the RTC to base its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoin the RTC from implementing the assailed order granting a writ on the mere photocopies of the document, especially that such
of preliminary injunction and from further proceeding in the case. document was designed to play a crucial part in the resolution of the
The petitioner opposed the motion for TRO, but did not object to decisive issue on the length of the term of office of the petitioner,
the scheduling of preliminary injunctive hearings. was gross error.
On February 24, 2004, the CA issued a TRO to enjoin the RTC from Naturally, the officers, including the President, were to exercise the
proceeding for a period of 60 days, and declared that the prayer for powers vested by Section 2 of the amended By-Laws for a term of
injunctive relief would be resolved along with the merits of the main only two years, not five years.
case. Ineluctably, the petitioner, having assumed as President of AUP on
On August 5, 2004, the CA rendered its decision nullifying the RTCs January 23, 2001, could serve for only two years, or until January 22,
writ of preliminary injunction. It rejected the petitioners argument 2003. By the time of his removal for cause as President on January
that Article IV, Section 3 of AUPs Constitution and By-Laws and 27, 2003, he was already occupying the office in a hold-over
11

capacity, and could be removed at any time, without cause, upon The respondents filed in the CA a verified urgent motion for a TRO
the election or appointment of his successor. and to set a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction to
The removal of the petitioner as President of AUP, being made in enjoin the RTC from implementing the assailed order granting a writ
accordance with the AUP Amended By-Laws, was valid. We conclude of preliminary injunction and from further proceeding in the case.
that the order of the RTC granting his application for the writ of The CA issued a TRO to enjoin the RTC from proceeding for a period
preliminary injunction was tainted with manifestly grave abuse of of 60 days, and declared that the prayer for injunctive relief would
discretion; that the CA correctly nullified and set aside the order; be resolved along with the merits of the main case.
and that his claim for damages, being bereft of factual and legal
The CA rendered its decision nullifying the RTCs writ of preliminary
warrant, should be dismissed.
injunction.
Issues
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no
PETRONILO J. BARAYUGA vs. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE legal right to the position of President of AUP that could be
PHILIPPINES, protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.

The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff Ruling:
does not demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected Yes, the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to
by injunction, his suit for injunction must be dismissed for lack of a the position of President of AUP that could be protected by the
cause of action. injunctive writ issued by the RTC
The Supreme Court ruled that a valid writ of preliminary injunction
Facts:
rests on the weight of evidence submitted by the plaintiff
AUP, a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational under the
establishing:
North Philippine Union Mission (NPUM) of the Southern Asia Pacific
(a) a present and unmistakable right to be protected;
Division of the Seventh Day Adventists.
(b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such
A group from the NPUM conducted an external performance audit. right; and
The audit revealed the petitioners autocratic management style, like (c) a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
making major decisions without the approval or recommendation of damages.
the proper committees, including the Finance Committee; In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive
The audit concluded that he had committed serious violations of writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result to
fundamental rules and procedure in the disbursement and use of nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
funds. disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage sans proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a
The members, by secret ballot, voted to remove him as President
preliminary injunction.
because of his serious violations of fundamental rules and
In the case at bar the petitioner, the AUP’s By-Laws provides that
procedures in the disbursement and use of funds as revealed by the
the term of the president already expired and he was already
special audit; to appoint an interim committee consisting of three
occupying the office in a hold-over capacity, and could be removed
members to assume the powers and functions of the President; and
at any time, without cause, upon the election or appointment of his
to recommend him to the NPUM for consideration as Associate
successor.
Director for Secondary Education.
We conclude that the order of the RTC granting his application for
Petitioner brought his suit for injunction and damages in the RTC, the writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with manifestly grave
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. abuse of discretion; that the CA correctly nullified and set aside the
His complaint alleged that the Board of Trustees had relieved him as order; and that his claim for damages, being bereft of factual and
President without valid grounds despite his five-year term. legal warrant, should be dismissed.
After summary hearing, the RTC issued the TRO enjoining the
respondents
Proceedings in the CA
The respondents forthwith filed a petition for certiorari in the CA,
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY VS. MUN. OF PADRE GARCIA
contending that the petitioners complaint did not meet the BALAGTAS
requirement that an injunctive writ should be anchored on a legal
right; and that he had been merely appointed, not elected, as
President for a term of office of only two years, not five years, based
on AUPs amended By-Laws. INJUCTION WHEN ISSUED?
12

A TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by A decision was rendered by the RTC,
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
WHEREFORE, judgement (sic) is hereby
injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of
rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the
preliminary injunction could be heard.
respondents.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show
that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; There having been no timely appeal made, respondent
(2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment, which was granted by
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there the RTC. A Writ of Execution was thus issued.
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
and irreparable damage
After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a
Irreparable injury:
Petition for Relief from Judgment. This Petition was denied by the
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their RTC. The trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.

Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for
Batangas, G.R. No. 183367, March 14 2012 Certiorari and Prohibition petitioners filed before the CA a Motion
for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
FACTS: Injunction. The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC
from further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution,
Writ of Execution, and any other court processes in the case before
it.
In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of
respondent Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal
government, through its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez,
invited petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to The CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.The
rebuild the public market and construct a shopping center. CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioners claim that the
amount of APRIs investment in the Padre Garcia Shopping Center is
estimated at ₱30,000,000, the entirety of which the RTC declared
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)1[2] was executed
forfeited to respondent without just compensation. The execution
between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented by Mayor
of the allegedly void judgment of the RTC during the pendency of
Gutierrez and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Under the
the Petition before the CA would probably work injustice to the
MOA, APRI undertook to construct a shopping complex in the
applicant, as the execution would result in an arbitrary declaration
5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive
of nullity of the MOA without due process of law.
right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25
years.

ISSUE: whether the CA committed grave abuse of


discretion in denying petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Status
In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal
Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
mayor of respondent. On 6 February 2003, respondent, through
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas,
The Courts Ruling

The RTC issued summons to petitioners, requiring them to The Petition is denied for failure to show any grave abuse
file their Answer to the Complaint. However, the summons was of discretion on the part of the CA.
returned unserved, as petitioners were no longer holding office in
the given address.
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive
reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
Later, the RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in rights and interests. An application for the issuance of a writ of
default and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte. preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing
of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded.

Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence


of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious
13

damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately
that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the
issued immediately. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, a nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no
TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages.
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of FACTS:
preliminary injunction could be heard.
Then Executive Secretary petitioner Eduardo Ermita
assailed via certiorari the writ of preliminary injunction granted by
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners public respondent Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa Delorino, then
must show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in favor of
protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be private respondent Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; the Philippines (APMP or private respondent) denying petitioner’s
and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to Motion to Dismiss and enjoining the government from implementing
prevent serious and irreparable damage Executive Order No. 486.

E.O. 486 was issued on 2006 by then President Arroyo. It


In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
provides for the reduction of protective tariff rates from 10% to 5%
to the CA. It did not exercise judgment in a capricious and
on the entry of inexpensive products, particularly plastic food
whimsical manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic
packaging, from ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA) member countries into
manner.
the Philippines.

No irreparable injury APMP, an organization composed of manufacturers of


petrochemical and resin products, opposed the implementation of
E.O. 486. Contending that the E.O. would affect local manufacturers,
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by it filed a petition before the RTC of Makati, seeking the declaration
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. of its unconstitutionality for being violative of Sec. 4 of Republic Act
Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary No. 6647 which prohibits the President from increasing or reducing
estimation. Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to taxes while Congress is in session. It thereupon prayed for the
mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its
damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. implementation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED
Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused
her discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition and granting the writ of preliminary injunction as the
exercise of the quasi-legislative functions of the President cannot be
enjoined. He avers that writs of prohibition lie only against those
persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

By granting injunctive relief, petitioner contends that


public respondent effectively preempted the trial of and pre-judged
the case, given that what private respondent seeks is to stop the
Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures, BITANGJOL implementation of E.O. 486. Further, petitioner contends that the
grant of injunctive relief was not supported by fact and law, for what
APMP sought to be protected was "future economic benefits" which
may be affected by the implementation of the E.O. – benefits which
its members have no right to since protective tariff rates are
government privileges wherein no one can claim any vested right to.

On the merits, petitioner maintains that E.O. 486 is not


constitutionally infirm, it having been issued under the authority of
Ermita v. Aldecoa-Delorino (irreparable injury) Secs. 401 and 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code which set no
limitations on the President’s power to adjust tariff rate and serve as
PRINCIPLE: the government’s response to its AFTA commitment. Since it is only
the Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and granting a
Irreparable injury--- An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such writ of preliminary injunction that is being assailed, the Court will
constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable not pass on the constitutionality of E.O. 486 which is still pending
redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no before the trial court.
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation.
14

Private respondent prays in its Comment for the denial of The present case involves the constitutionality and
the present petition, alleging that, among other things, the petition implementation of an executive issuance involving tariff rates and,
is premature as petitioner failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration as alleged by petitioner, the Government’s commitments under the
of the assailed Omnibus Order of public respondent, and AFTA. Clearly, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be
maintaining the propriety of the remedy of prohibition which it filed dispensed with following exceptions.
to assail the E.O.
3. Yes. The respondent erred in granting the preliminary
ISSUE: (just focus on the 3rd issue) injunction. ( a good discussion on the issuance of
preliminary injunction in relation to the government)
1. Whether public respondent erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition and not It is well to emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of
granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition; preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof. In the present
2. Whether a motion for reconsideration should have been case, however, where it is the Government which is being enjoined
filed by petitioner; and from implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of
validity, such discretion must be exercised with utmost caution. The
suspension of the operation of the law is a matter of extreme
3. Whether public respondent erred in granting the writ of
delicacy because it is an interference with the official acts not only
preliminary injunction in favor of APMP.
of the duly elected representatives of the people but also of the
highest magistrate of the land.
SC RULING:
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does
1. Public respondent did not err in assuming jurisdiction over not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to
the petition for prohibition and not granting petitioner’s enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any
motion to dismiss the petition; other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The
"on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as
an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function… a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward "legislation or
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic
is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for processes." Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain,
its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction the status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant
"respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions prevails at a trial on the merits.
without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be
enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable
temporary restraining order.
relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate situation, including the public interest. In litigations between
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to
or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they
officials.6 Thus, even if the petition was denominated as one for are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.
prohibition, public respondent did not err in treating it also as one Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
for certiorari and taking cognizance of the controversy. enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.

2. No need to file motion for reconsideration. Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued precisely
to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
As a general rule, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or
unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the adjudicated – to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its can be heard fully. Still, even if it is a temporary and ancillary
assigned errors. However there are exceptions. (I will not discuss the remedy, its issuance should not be trifled with, and an applicant
exceptions) must convincingly show its entitlement to the relief.
15

It is thus ineluctable that for it to be entitled to the writ, organization composed of manufacturers of petrochemical and resin
the APMP must show that it has a clear and unmistakable right that products opposed its implementation. It prayed for preliminary
is violated and that there is an urgent necessity for its injunction alleging that the implementation of the said E.O will
issuance. That APMP had cause of action and the standing to
affect their "future economic benefits". The filing of the petition at
interpose the action for prohibition did not ipso facto call for the
grant of injunctive relief in its favor without it proving its the court was anchored on APMP and its members’ fear of loss or
entitlement thereto. reduction of their income once E.O. 1 is implemented and imported
plastic and similar products flood the domestic market due to
Contrary to public respondent’s ruling, APMP failed to reduced tariff rates. RTC granted it. CA affirmed.
adduce any evidence to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable
right which was or would be violated by the enforcement of E.O. ISSUE:
486. The filing of the petition at the court a quo was anchored on
APMP and its members’ fear of loss or reduction of their income Whether preliminary injunction can be issued on the basis of
once E.O. 486 is implemented and imported plastic and similar irreparable damages.
products flood the domestic market due to reduced tariff rates. As
correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking protection over SC RULING:
"future economic benefits" which, at best, it had an inchoate right
to. No. Preliminary injunction should not be issued.

More importantly, tariff protection is not a right, but a Jurisprudence provides that the applicant must show clear
privilege granted by the government and, therefore, APMP cannot and unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent
claim redress for alleged violation thereof. necessity for its issuance.

The distinction between statutory privileges and vested In this case, APMP failed to adduce any evidence to prove
rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in that it had a clear and unmistakable right which was or would be
statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, violated by the enforcement of E.O. 1. The filing of the petition at
which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take the court a quo was anchored on APMP and its members’ fear of
away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights. loss or reduction of their income once E.O. 1 is implemented. APMP
was seeking protection over "future economic benefits" which, at
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule best, it had an inchoate right to.
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. "An Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule
irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by
degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce
hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy… In
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement". An the present case, aside from APMP’s allegations that the reduced
irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of "a serious tariff rates will adversely affect its members’ business and may lead
charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either to closure, there is no showing what "irreparable injury" it stood to
physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, suffer with the implementation of E.O.1.
or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its
pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss
thereof". There no showing of a clear right on the part of APMP
which was violated; the injury sought to be protected is prospective
in nature, hence, the injunctive relief should not have been granted.
In the present case, aside from APMP’s allegations that the
reduced tariff rates will adversely affect its members’ business and
may lead to closure, there is no showing what "irreparable injury" it
stood to suffer with the implementation of E.O. 486.

There no showing of a clear right on the part of APMP


which was violated; the injury sought to be protected is prospective Overseas Workers Welfare Administration v. Chavez, G.R. No.
in nature, hence, the injunctive relief should not have been granted. 169802, June 8, 2007 SITOY

QUICK DIGEST: (You will not understand this if you will not read the
long digest.)

FACTS:

The president issued EO 1 which has the effect of the


reduction of protective tariff rates from 10% to 5% on the entry of Dungog v. CA, G.R. No. 139767. August 5, 2003
inexpensive products, particularly plastic food packaging. APMP, an
16

On the other hand, spouses Dungog contended that it was Gothong


Lines who breached their contract by stopping payment on the last 4
PRINCIPLES: checks.

 A preliminary injunction is merely temporary, subject to RTC ruled in favor of Gothong Lines.
the final disposition of the principal action. Its purpose is
to preserve the status quo of the matter subject of the ISSUE:
action to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the
pendency of the suit. Is the RTC correct. (What is a “status quo”?)

 The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested


status that preceded the controversy. RULING:

 The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests Yes.


entirely within the discretion of the court and is generally
not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely
temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action.
DUNGOG vs. CA Its purpose is to preserve the status quo of the matter subject of
the action to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency
G.R. 139767 of the suit. Otherwise, if no preliminary injunction is issued, the
defendant may, before final judgment, do the act which the plaintiff
FACTS:
is seeking the court to restrain.
Felipe alleges that he and his sister, Fortune, agreed to sell their lots
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely within
in Canjulao, Cebu, through their parents, Spouses Dungog.
the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with
The Spouses Dungog convinced other lot owners in Canjulao to sell except in cases of manifest abuse.
their lots either directly to them or to Felipe and his sister.
The status quo, which is the last actual peaceable uncontested
Later on, the Spouses Dungog entered into a Contract to Sell with status that preceded the controversy, was that Gothong Lines had
private respondent Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. covering several access to the lots subject of the Contract through the entrance gate
lots in Canjulao including Felipe’s lot (Lot 1031-F). in Lot 1031-F. That is why Gothong Lines commenced construction
of its pier and the development of the roads within the parcels of
Under the Contract, Gothong Lines was to pay on installment basis. land covered by the Contract. The issuance of the Writ would no
Gothong Lines issued 15 postdated checks as payment for 15 equal doubt preserve the status quo between the Spouses Dungog and
monthly installments except the last 4 checks which bounced due to Gothong Lines that existed prior to the filing of the case.
Gothong Lines’ stop payment order.
Clearly, in issuing the Writ, the trial court did not forthwith deprive
There happened to be an overpayment in the hands of spouses Felipe of his ownership of Lot 1031-F. Neither did the Writ have the
Dungog. Felipe claims, however, that despite Gothong Lines’ stop effect of ousting Felipe from possession of the lot. The trial court did
payment order of its last four checks, the Spouses Dungog still not rule on the merits of the case so as to amount to a deprivation
delivered parcels of land. Among those delivered is the parcel of or confiscation of property without due process of law or just
land owned by him. compensation. There was no adjudication on the rightful possession
or ownership of the contested parcels of land subject of the
The Spouses Dungog demanded payment for these 8 parcels of land, Contract. The trial court issued the injunction only as a preventive
but Gothong Lines refused to pay. Thus, the Spouses Dungog remedy to protect during the pendency of the action Gothong
informed Gothong Lines that they would no longer push through Lines’ right to a final and effective relief.
with their offer to sell the remaining lots.

Gothong Lines then filed a complaint for Specific Performance,


Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the
Spouses Dungog from the cancellation of the contract and from
preventing its representatives and vehicles from passing through
the properties subject of the Contract. Gothong Lines claimed that
it also paid an excess of what have been actually delivered by
Spouses Dungog.
17

RA 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas


Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect July 15, 1995 and its IRR were
2017 BAR EXAM QUESTION: published April 7, 1996.However, before the law took effect, on July
17, 1995, ARCO filed a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63
X agreed to sell his property through Y. Y entered into a Contract to
of the ROC with the RTC to declare as unconstitutional the following
Sell with Z on various lots which included the property of X.
of RA 8042:
Under the contract, Z was to pay on installment basis. 15 post-dated
- Section 2, paragraph (g)
checks were issued by Z for 15 equal monthly installments except
- Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m),
the last 4 checks which bounced due to Z’s stop payment order.
- Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and
- Sections 9 and 10
Y demanded for the payment but to no avail. Thus, Y informed Z that
they would no longer push through with their offer to sell the
with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
remaining lots. They also closed in ingress and egress on the
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein
remaining lots including X’s property from which the representatives
from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law. Also, that RA 8042
and vehicles of Z would pass slowing the development of the subject
is self-executory and no need for implementing Rules.
properties.

Z filed in the RTC a writ of preliminary injunction against Y to stop


the cancellation of the contract to sell and from preventing its There appears to be urgent an imperative need for this Honorable
representatives and vehicles from passing through the properties Court to maintain the status quo by enjoining the implementation or
subject of the contract. effectivity of the questioned provisions of RA 8042, by way of a
restraining order otherwise, the member recruitment agencies of
RTC ruled in favor of Z granting the writ of preliminary injunction
the petitioner will suffer grave or irreparable damage or injury. With
against Y.
the effectivity of RA 8042, a great majority of the duly licensed
recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations
X, as a result, contended that he was deprived of his property.
for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are
1. Is the RTC correct? Explain your answer. unjust and unconstitutional. This Honorable Court may take judicial
2. Define status quo. notice of the fact that processing of deployment papers of overseas
workers for the past weeks have come to a standstill at the POEA
and this has affected thousands of workers everyday just because of
the enactment of RA 8042.Indeed, this has far reaching effects not
only to survival of the overseas manpower supply industry and the
active participating recruitment agencies, the country’s economy
Executive Secretary v. CA, G.R. No. 131719, 25 May 1994 which has survived mainly due to the dollar remittances of the
overseas workers but more importantly, to the poor and the needy
who are in dire need of income-generating jobs which can only be
obtained from abroad. The loss or injury that the recruitment
PRINCIPLE:
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement agencies will suffer will then be immeasurable and irreparable. As of
of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish now, even foreign employers have already reduced their manpower
that: requirements from the Philippines due to their knowledge that RA
1. It will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an 8042 prejudiced and adversely affected the local recruitment
injuctive relief; agencies.
2. Must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the
merits; and On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a TRO for 20 days
3. That there are sufficient serious questions going to the
therefrom.
merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its
favor
Herein respondents alleges the following:
Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardships.
- That the aforequoted provisions violated Section 1, Article
Therefore, writ of injunction shall not issue to enjoin the II; Article II, Section 126 and Article XV, Sections 17 and
enforcement of a law unless it can be established with substantial 3(3) of the Constitution that Section 6(g) and (i)
hardship on the part of the plaintiff that the law assailed is discriminated against unskilled workers and their families
unconstitutional. and, as such, violated the equal protection clause; and that
the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino
FACTS:
workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights.
18

The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have - Section 11; and
the right to seek employment abroad - Section 40
- The grant of incentives to service contractors and manning
agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and Herein Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari with CA on the
authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed following grounds:
and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right
1. Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s
to property and due process and to the equality of the
or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive
person. It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal
relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the
recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and
assailed sections of R.A. 8042
registered recruiters is unconstitutional.
- That Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
2. Respondent Judge fixed a P50,000 injunction bond which is
because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are
grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioner-
placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters.It contended
officials may sustain, should respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally
that while the Labor Code distinguished between
adjudged as not being entitled thereto
recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders
thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 3. The respondent, as petitioner in the trial court, was burdened to
does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section adduce preponderant evidence of such irreparable injury, but failed
7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, to do so.
therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause,
besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are 4.The petitioners further insisted that the petition a quo was
violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution premature since the rules and regulations implementing the law had
- That the penalty imposed by law, being disproportionate yet to be promulgated when such petition was filed
to the prohibited acts, discourages the business of licensed
and registered recruitment agencies. 5. That respondents failed to establish the requisites for the issuance
- That Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections of a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, law and the rules and regulations issued implementing the same.
Article III of the Constitution prohibiting ex-post facto laws
The CA denied the Petition and likewise denied the motion for
and bills of attainder.
reconsideration.
- that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within
which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is Thus, this petition.
relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered
recruiters of their right to due process

Petitioner alleged that: ISSUE:

- the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory 1. Whether or not ARCO has locus standi
relief;
- the petition was premature as the rules implementing 2. Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
- the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of
Constitution; and, only P50,000
- the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the
police power of the State. HELD

The trial court issued on August 21, 1995, an order granting the The Petition is meritoriuous.
petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of
P50,000. They posted the requisite bond and on August 24, 1995, 1. Respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its eleven (11) licensed and
enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which
pending the termination of the proceedings: approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing the respondent
- Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd par.); to file the said suit for and in their behalf. We note that, under its
- Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16 Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the
- Section 7, subsections (a) & (b); purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and
- Section 8; development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the
- Section 9; local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring
- Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general
19

membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.
any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to
the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment
activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. agencies, which are members of the respondent, and their relatives
The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of who are employed in the government agencies charged in the
its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense enforcement of the law, would be indicted for illegal recruitment
identical. The respondent asserts that the assailed provisions violate and, if convicted sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale
the constitutional rights of its members and the officers and illegal recruitment, absent proof of irreparable injury, is not
employees thereof. The respondent is but the medium through sufficient on which to base the issuance of a writ of preliminary
which its individual members seek to make more effective the injunction to suspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. Rep. Act No. 8042 and avert any indictments under the law

However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced
and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to by the respondent that the officers and/or employees of its
implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing members had been threatened with any indictments for violations
to implead, as parties-Petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Neither is there any
recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed allegation therein that any of its members and/or their officers and
to comply with Section 2 of Rule of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, employees committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to
since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for (m) of the law for which they could be indicted. Neither did the
which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the respondent adduce any evidence in the RTC that any or all of its
petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid members or a great number of other duly licensed and registered
multiplicity of suits recruitment agencies had to stop their business operations because
of fear of indictments under Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and
registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business
2. The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law.A writ
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws
order and writ of preliminary injunction. cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court
cannot take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA
of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish
because of the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The
that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief
respondent must adduce evidence to prove its allegation, and the
and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or
petitioners accorded a chance to adduce controverting evidence. By
that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans
the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. It does not
any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the
appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with
prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue
any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding
victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain
brought lawfully and in good faith. The possible unconstitutionality
employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the
of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against
attainment of the salutary policies. In issuing the writ of preliminary
good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad
injunction, the trial court considered paramount the interests of the
faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call
eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies represented by
for equitable relief. The higher standard reflects judicial deference
the respondent, and capriciously overturned the presumption of the
toward legislation or regulations developed through presumptively
constitutionality of the assailed provisions on the barefaced claim of
reasoned democratic processes. Moreover, an injunction will alter,
the respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are
rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the movant
unconstitutional.
with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be
undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.
Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and
authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS CA
courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation,
including the public interest. In litigations between governmental
and private parties, courts go much further both to give and SHORT CASE DIGEST:
withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are
FACTS:
accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. Before
20

Before the IRR of RA 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers the equities of the situation, including the public interest. In
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 was published, ARCO filed a litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go
Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the ROC with a plea of a writ of much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of
preliminary Injunction assailing the constitutionality of some public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
sections of such Act with the RTC of Quezon City. ARCO was interests are involved. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to
organized for the purposes, inter alia, of promoting and supporting injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened to show some
the growth and development of the manpower recruitment substantial hardship.
industry; and, to act as the representative of any individual,
company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment
recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities agencies, which are members of the respondent, and their relatives
necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. who are employed in the government agencies charged in the
enforcement of the law, would be indicted for illegal recruitment
The RTC issued an order granting the Petitioners plea for the writ of and, if convicted sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale
preliminary injunction. Herein Petitioner filed a Petition for illegal recruitment, absent proof of irreparable injury, is not
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the Order and Writ of sufficient on which to base the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court. CA dismissed the Petition injunction to suspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of
and likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, this Rep. Act No. 8042 and avert any indictments under the law
petition.
There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced
by the respondent that the officers and/or employees of its
members had been threatened with any indictments for violations
ISSUE: of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Neither is there any
allegation therein that any of its members and/or their officers and
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
employees committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
(m) of the law for which they could be indicted. Neither did the
assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction
respondent adduce any evidence in the RTC that any or all of its
members or a great number of other duly licensed and registered
recruitment agencies had to stop their business operations because
HELD. of fear of indictments under Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law.A writ
of preliminary injunction . of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws
cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement cannot take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers
of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA
that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive because of the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The
relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the respondent must adduce evidence to prove its allegation, and the
merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the petitioners accorded a chance to adduce controverting evidence. By
merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. It issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans
does not appear from the record that petitioners (in the trial court) any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the
have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue
every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith. The victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain
possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the
itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, attainment of the salutary policies. In issuing the writ of preliminary
unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other injunction, the trial court considered paramount the interests of the
unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The higher eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies represented by
standard reflects judicial deference toward legislation or regulations the respondent, and capriciously overturned the presumption of the
developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes. constitutionality of the assailed provisions on the barefaced claim of
Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the status the respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are
quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the relief unconstitutional.
sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant
prevails at a trial on the merits. Considering that injunction is an
exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to
issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all
21

MABAYO FARMS VS. CA admitted that private respondent was not a defendant in Civil Case
No. 6695 since at the institution of the case in 1997, he (private
PRINCIPLE: respondent) did not have a right over any portion of petitioners lot.iv
Neither was he a trespasser then.v Also, nothing in the records
A preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy, an indicate that private respondent was acting on behalf of any of the
adjunct to a main suit.i Thus, a person who is not a party in the main defendants. Taking all these into consideration, we must hold that
the writ of preliminary injunction thus cannot be made to apply to
suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of
private respondent.
preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of
FACTS: an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from
a particular act.vi As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
Petitioner (Mabayo Farm) bought Lot 1379 located in
preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to
Morong, Bataan Cadastre and filed an application for land
protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the
registration. The application was contested by several oppositors,
pendency of the principal action. vii Its object is to preserve the
among them the heirs of one Toribio Alejandro.
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. viii It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
Trial court decided the land registration case in petitioners
adjunct to a main suit.ix Thus, a person who is not a party in the
favor. The losing parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be
A group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary
fences and drove away livestock owned by petitioner. Petitioner injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He
filed a complaint for injunction with damages, with a prayer for a cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 6695.
Named as defendants were Juanito Infante, Domingo Infante, Lito QUICK DIGEST- MABAYO FARM VS CA
Mangalidan, Jaime Aquino, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe. MABAYO FARMS VS. CA
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the FACTS:
defendants or persons acting on their behalf from entering and Petitioner X was able to buy land and registered it. Defendants Y et
cultivating the disputed property. al. oppose it and entered the premises destroyed the fences and
drove away livestock owned by X.
The sheriff in enforcing the writ found 5 persons other Thus, X applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
than the defendants cultivating the land. The latter refused to give defendants Y et al. Which was granted by the trial court. Upon
their names or receive copies of the TRO. They claimed that they implementation by the sheriff of the writ, it was found that Z also
were only farm workers of a certain Antonio Santos (private cultivated the land and he was not covered by the main action.
respondent) who allegedly owned the land. ii Z contested that since he is not named as defendant in the main
action, he cannot be covered by the writ of injunction.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
He claimed that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the
WON Z is bound by the writ issued by the trial court?
property alleged that he was not a party to Civil Case No. 6695 and
RULING:
that it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to enforce
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
the injunctive writ against him since it did not have jurisdiction
prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a
over him.
particular act. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
ISSUE: preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to
protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the
WON private respondent bound by the writ of preliminary injunction pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status
issued by the trial court? quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is not a cause of
action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main
RULING: suit. Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private
respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ,
We have minutely scrutinized the order granting the writ of
such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the
preliminary injunction and are unable to say that the writ applied to
private respondent. The order merely stated [L]et a writ of defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining and restraining the proceeding to which he is a stranger.
defendants or any person or persons acting in their place or stead
from further entering and cultivating the said land of the plaintiff
subject matter of this case until further order from the Court.iii The
persons specifically enjoined in the order were the defendants in
Civil Case No. 6695 or persons acting in their stead. Petitioner itself
22

On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a Very Urgent Application
for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Senate Blue RibboN v. Majuducon, G.R. No. 13378, BELLEZA (TRO Application), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing his
Decision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.

Ruling:

No. The Court did not grant the provisional relief for it would be tantamount
Southern Cross Cement vs Phil Cement Manufacturers to enjoining the collection of taxes, a peremptory judicial act which is

traditionally frowned upon, unless there is a clear statutory basis for it. In
that regard, Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court
Principle: from granting an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal
revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the internal revenue code. A similar
Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court from granting philosophy is expressed by Section 29 of the SMA, which states that the filing
an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, of a petition for review before the CTA does not stop, suspend, or otherwise
fee or charge imposed by the internal revenue code.[ toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the
adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures. This evinces a clear
legislative intent that the imposition of safeguard measures, despite the
availability of judicial review, should not be enjoined notwithstanding any
Facts:
timely appeal of the imposition.

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic


corporation engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production,
importation and exportation. Its principal stockholders are Taiheiyo Cement Quick Digest
Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the largest cement
manufacturers in Japan.
 Facts:

X Company applied for the imposition of provisional safeguard measures on


import of cement pursuant to a Safeguard Measures Act (SMA). This was
On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) granted by the DTI Secretary in its June 25, 2003 decision. Subsequently, Y
accepted an Company filed a very urgent application for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary
application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland from enforcing his decision in view of the pending petition before the court.
cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production,
capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused
depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first
of provisional, then later, definitive safeguard measures on the import of
cement pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA). Philcemcor filed the
application in behalf of twelve (12) of its member-companies.
 . Delta Ventures v. Cabato, March 9, 2000 REALINO

On 13 March 2002, the Tariff Commission issued its Formal Investigation


Report (Report). The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of
serious injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no
definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray
Portland cement.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary BRAGAT

on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling that there
was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application
for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination that, contrary to
the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered
serious injury as a result of the import surges.
23

claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a


subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish
Traders Royal Bank v. IAC,
his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from the
Traders Royal Bank v. IAC order denying his original third-party claim.

Facts:
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) filed a compliant before the
Pasay court against Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc with
application for writ of attachment. RCBC Capital Corporation v. Banco TIU
La Tondeña Inc (LTI) filed a compliant-in-intervention
claiming ownership over said attached properties but later
manifest its withdrawal.
Subsequently, LTI instituted a complaint before the Bulacan
court claiming ownership over the properties attached with
prayer for preliminary injunction. TRB filed its opposition.
The Bulacan court ruled in favor of LTI.
Now, the Bulacan court ordered the execution of the writ of
pre injunction in favor of LTI.
This followed by the Pasay court enforcing the writ of pre
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO R. NOLASCO
attachment in favor of TRB. (note that TRB file a case with
G.R. No. 155108
prayer for attachment in Pasay court, so nag conflict na ang
April 27, 2005
duha ka court).
This prompted TRB to file a petition with the IAC arguing PRINCIPLES:
that Bulacan Court constitutes undue interference with the R.A. 8975 definitively enjoins all courts, except the Supreme Court, from
exercise by the Pasay Court. Petition denied. issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
Issue: preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
whether or not a third-party claimant may file a separate subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or compel
action before another court to assert his right over an the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government,
attached property and the only exception would be if the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, such that unless the temporary restraining
Ruling:
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Yes, a third-party claimant may file a separate action before
another court to assert his right over an attached property. FACTS:
The Rules provide under sec. 14 Rule 57 . . . Nothing Nolasco (taxpayer) filed a Petition seeking a TRO and/or preliminary
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third injunction with the RTC and prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained
person from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent from awarding the contract (Agno River Flood Control Project) to Daewoo
the attaching party from claiming damages against a third- and Daewoo be disqualified as a bidder. Since based on the confidential
party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim, reports it was apparent that Daewoo’s bid was unacceptable and the
in the same or a separate action. putative award to Daewoo is illegal.
The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the remedy that may
RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO. The term of the TRO
be availed of by a person who claims to be the owner of
was for a period of twenty (20) days.
property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third-
party claim with the sheriff, and if the attaching creditor The OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Motion for Dissolution of

posts an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff, to file a TRO. They pointed out that Republic Act No. 8975 precisely prohibited the

separate and independent action to vindicate his claim. issuance by any court, save the Supreme Court, of a TRO or preliminary

In the case at bar, this precisely was the remedy resorted to injunction which restrains or prohibits the bidding for or awarding of a

by private respondent La Tondeña when it filed the contract/project of the national government. RTC issued an order dismissing

vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court. Nolasco’s petition.

Further; (principle) ISSUE:

The intervention as a means of protecting the third-party 1. Whether or not the trial court may issue a TRO with regards to projects of
claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not the National Govt.
exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring 2. Whether or not the trial court may dismiss the case outright based on RA
an independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party 8975.
24

HELD: issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in


controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
1. No. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this
Republic Act No. 8975 definitively enjoins all courts, except the Supreme Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or compel
the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government. For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require
The only exception would be if the matter is of extreme urgency involving a that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant.
constitutional issue, such that unless the temporary restraining order is Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant.
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

The TRO issued by the RTC failed to take into consideration said law. Neither
did it advert to any extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, as
required by the statute. The law ordains that such TRO is void, and the judge
who issues such order should suffer the penalty of suspension of at least
Facts:
sixty (60) days without pay.

2. No. Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends
Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
injunctive relief from the implementation of national government discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and
involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be
infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is the prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, acts.1 In such cases, let the hammer fall and let it fall hard.
preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not
preclude the lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their
battle cry, petitioners, all residents of Dasmariñas Village, are clamoring for
petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a
the reversal of the decision2 dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
national government infrastructure project. G.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000,
denying their motion for reconsideration.
Thus, when a court is called upon to rule on an initiatory pleading assailing
any material aspect pertinent to a national government infrastructure
The assailed decision3 of the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the
project, the court ordinarily may not dismiss the action based solely on Regional Trial Court of Makati, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against
Republic Act No. 8975 but is merely enjoined from granting provisional respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from
reliefs. If no other ground obtains to dismiss the action, the court should energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables
erected from Sucat, Parañaque to Araneta Ave., Quezon City.
decide the case on the merits.

Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped


steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006 Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’
homes are.
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME BLANCO,
JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER, VIVENCIO TINIO,
MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER, ROBERT KUA, GEORGE Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
LEE, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE, LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, AMADEO VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING, tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI SABNANI, MARCOS ROCES, RAYMUNDO Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P. ROQUE, MANUEL DY, Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
RAUL FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO CHENG, BARANGAY and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’
DASMARIÑAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, petitioners homes are.
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners got hold of
published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to
PRINCIPLE/S: exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to
leukemia.

Petitioners left no stones unturned to address their malady. They aired this
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings
cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the with them.
25

Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an impassé, development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there
with petitioners vying for the relocation of the transmission lines to Fort are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find
Bonifacio on one hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential
widening, on the other.6 Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance
of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint7 for Damages with
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this
Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects of
Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to themselves
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.18
and their families, petitioners, through the instant case, sought what they
had failed to achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and prayed,
inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to Lawton After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not
Avenue, Fort Bonifacio. require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of
be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of
On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order8 in Civil Case No.
Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
00-352, which temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs
transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project. to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated 3 May 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 is REVERSED as well as the
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary resolution dated 27 September 2000. The Order dated 3 April 2000 of the
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 00-352 is hereby REINSTATED.
assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No pronouncement as to costs
No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or
Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource QUICK DIGEST:
Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government,"
particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on Facts:
the ground of lack jurisdiction.
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which NAPOCOR steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
filed with the Court of Appeals was later amended to include the prayer for tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
the nullification and injunction of the Order dated 3 April 2000 of the trial Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
court. Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’
homes are.
In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s order
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners got hold of
published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to
exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to
leukemia.
Issue/s:

Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint7 for Damages with


Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29 Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR.
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree No. 1818.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
Held: assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (1981) and sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

Yes, the trial court may issue a temporary restraining and preliminary
Issue/s:
injunction.

Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
Presidential Decree No. 181816 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29
against government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos,17 Presidential decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction Presidential Decree No. 1818.
against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the
pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic
Held:
development effort of the nation.

Yes, the trial court may issue a temporary restraining and preliminary
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource injunction.
26

Presidential Decree No. 181816 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions FACTS: DFA secured the approval of the president of the implementation of
against government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos,17 Presidential machine reading passport and visa project. The award of the project was
Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction
given to BCA on a build operate and transfer agreement. Assignment
against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the
pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic Agreement was executed by BCA and PPC, whereby BCA assigned and ceded
development effort of the nation. its rights, title, interest and benefits arising from the Amended BOT
Agreement to PPC. Both DFA and BCA imputed breach on the said
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the agreement. DFA then sent a Notice of Termination to BCA and PPC due to
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there their alleged failure to submit proof of financial capability to complete the
are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find entire MRP/V Project in accordance with the financial warranty under
application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Section 5.02(A) of the Amended BOT Agreement. BCA’s request for mutual
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases
discussion under Section 19.01 of the Amended BOT Agreement was
involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance
of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in purportedly ignored by the DFA and left the dispute unresolved through
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. amicable means within 90 days. Consequently, BCA filed its Request for
On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this
Arbitration dated April 7, 2006 with the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center,
Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.18 Inc. (PDRCI), pursuant to Section 19.02 of the Amended BOT Agreement.
While arbitration proceeding is pending DFA and the BSP entered into a
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not Memorandum of Agreement for the latter to provide the former passports
require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the compliant with international standards. The BSP then solicited bids for the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of
supply, delivery, installation and commissioning of a system for the
be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of
Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional production of Electronic Passport Booklets or e-Passports. With this BCA filed
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs a Petition for Interim Relief under Section 28 of the Alternative Dispute
to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
Resolution Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9285), with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, presided over by respondent Judge Falcon. BCA alleged, in support
for its application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), that unless the
DFA and the BSP were immediately restrained, they would proceed to
undertake the project together with a third party to defeat the reliefs BCA
sought in its Request for Arbitration, thus causing BCA to suffer grave and
irreparable injury from the loss of substantial investments in connection with
the implementation of the MRP/V Project. trial court ordered the issuance of
a TRO restraining the DFA and the BSP, their agents, representatives,
awardees, suppliers and assigns from awarding a new contract to implement
the Project or any similar electronic passport or visa project, or if such
contract has been awarded, from implementing such or similar projects. trial
court issued an Order granting BCA’s application for preliminary injunction
after the latter posted a bond of P10M. DFA and the BSP questioned the
validity of the order of the respondent. DFA and the BSP argue that
respondent Judge Falcon gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or
DFA VS FALCON GR 176657 excess of jurisdiction when he issued the assailed orders, which effectively
enjoined the bidding and/or implementation of the e-Passport Project.
Doctrine: Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must
According to petitioners, this violated the clear prohibition under Republic
be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected
Act No. 8975 regarding the issuance of TROs and preliminary injunctions
and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the
against national government projects, such as the e-Passport Project.
said right. It must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders,
protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court,
and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
the writ to prevent serious damage. Moreover, an injunctive remedy may
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity,
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to
A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy that may restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests (a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. The location of any national government project;
dismissal of the principal action thus results in the denial of the prayer for
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
the issuance of the writ.
defined under Section 2 hereof;
27

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or
any such contract or project;
project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and necessary for such contract or project.
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for
CASE DIGEST (for quick digest see below)
such contract/project.

ISSUE: WON the preliminary injunction issued by respondent was valid. FACTS

RULING: no, the same was not valid. There is no doubt that the MRP/V In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ( NEA ) published an
Project is a project covered by the BOT Law and, in turn, considered a invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No.
"national government project" under Republic Act No. 8795. Under Section 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of
3(d) of that statute, trial courts are prohibited from issuing a TRO or writ of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the
preliminary injunction against the government to restrain or prohibit the country’s Rural Electrification Project. Thereafter, the qualified bidders
submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as
termination or rescission of any such national government project/contract.
the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract..
The rationale for this provision is easy to understand. For if a project
proponent – that the government believes to be in default – is allowed to However, on Decmeber 19, 2000, NEA’s BOD passed a resolution reducing by
enjoin the termination of its contract on the ground that it is contesting the 50% the material requirement of IBP No. 80, given the time limitation of the
validity of said termination, then the government will be unable to enter into delivery of materials and the loan closing date is fast approaching. NEA
a new contract with any other party while the controversy is pending allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IBP 80 while
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the
litigation. Obviously, a court’s grant of injunctive relief in such an instance is
Department of Energy, issued a resolution for the invitation to pre-qualify
prejudicial to public interest since government would be indefinitely
and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification
hampered in its duty to provide vital public goods and services in order to Project.
preserve the private proprietary rights of the project proponent. Verily, there
is valid reason for the law to deny preliminary injunctive relief to those who NERWIN filed a complaint with injunctive application.
seek to contest the government’s termination of a national government
RTC: GRANTED the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction,
contract. The only circumstance under which a court may grant injunctive
issued against NEA and PNOC-EDC
relief is the existence of a matter of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a TRO or injunctive writ is issued, grave Respondents filed a special action for certiorari before the CA, that the
injustice and irreparable injury will result. issuance is a blatant violation of the Rules of Court and express prohibition
from the law and SC.

CA: GRANTED the petition and annulled and set aside the decision of RTC-
complaint for issuance of TRO/WPI before RTC is DISMISSED. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court Judge acted in GADALEJ by issuing a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the
Government or any of its subdivision or officials or any person or entity?

SC RULING:

TOPIC: III. N. INJUNCTION ON GOVERMENT PROJECTS OR CONTRACTS The RTC Judge gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it

CASE TITLE: NERWIN INSDUSTRIES CORPORATION vs. PNOC-ENERGY entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUEEZON, Chairman, bids and that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3
awards committee.
and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding
PRINCIPLE: Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the
out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO),
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or
any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding
or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c)
28

Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Rural Electrification Project. However, X passed a resolution decreasing the
Restraining Order, Preliminary material requirement to 50% and allegedly held negotiations with other
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory bidders relative to the contract. While PNOC-Energy Department Corp issued
Injunctions. No court, except the
a resolution for the invitation to bid for wooden poles covered under Y’s
Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary contract. Y filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunctive application which the latter court granted. CA annulled and set
injunction against the government, or aside RTC’s ruling, hence this petition.
any of its subdivisions, officials, or any
person or entity, whether public or Issue: Whether or not the RTC judge is correct in granting the issuance of writ
private, acting under the governments of preliminary injunction?
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel
the following acts: Held:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of
contract/project of the national
No. SC agrees with CA’s ruling since RA 8975 expressly prohibits ANY court,
government as defined under Section 2
hereof; EXCEPT the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to
disputes or controversies instituted by a
private party, including but not limited to RESTRAIN, PROHIBIT or COMPEL the Government, or any of its subdivisions
cases filed by bidders or those claiming
to have rights through such bidders or officials or any person or entity whether public or private, acting under the
involving such contract/project. This
prohibition shall not apply when the Government’s discretion from bidding or awarding of a contract or project of
matter is of extreme urgency involving a
the National Government or terminating, rescinding any such contract or
constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, project or undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for
grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise. xxx such contract or project. Furthermore, AC no. 11-2000 likewise instructs
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders.
- Any temporary restraining order, judges and justices of the lower courts to comply with and respect the
preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory
Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and
effect. or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.

The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing The respondent Judge did not even show that the instant case falls under the

was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e. when the

obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that

under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable

all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular injury will arise. Judge is fined with P 40,000 for gross misconduct and gross

No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance ignorance of the law.

of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving

contracts and projects of the Government.

BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC. V. MASWENG,

The respondent Judge did not even endeavour to show that the instant case Principle/s:
falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, 1. It is required before the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that claimants show the
i.e. when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue,
existence of a right to be protected.
such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and 2. The prohibited acts in Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8975 regarding the issuance of TROs and preliminary
irreparable injury will arise.
injunctions against national government projects
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
QUICK DIGEST urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that
unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
X, a government subdivision, awarded a government contract in favour of Y injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
for the supply and delivery of woodpoles and crossarms required for the
29

Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has
Case Digest: the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs
Facts: of injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents
Private Respondents filed before the National Commission on were entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) a Petition for Injunction, with an Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim, as it
thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families as
the petitioners et. al from fencing the Busol Watershed claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but
Reservation. They claimed that they are members of the does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Since it is
Ibaloi and Kankanaey tribes of Baguio City and that their required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary
ancestors own the Busol Watershed Reservation expressly injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be
recognized in Proclamation No. 15 issued by Governor protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted
General Leonard Wood. Petitioners alleged that the fencing the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside
project of petitioners would impede their access to and from the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein.
their residences, farmlands and water sources, and
dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals and
ceremonies are usually held.

NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S. Masweng issued a 20-


day TRO ordering petitioners to refrain, stop, cease and desist Quick Digest:
from fencing and/or constructing fences around and between Respondent filed a Petition for Injunction, with an application
the areas and premises of private respondent’s ancestral land for a TRO, and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on a
claims. Motion to dissolve TRO was denied dismissed on the government project before the NCIP. They claimed that they
ground that it may be issued motu proprio where the matter are the owners of the ancestral land as expressly granted to
is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave them by a proclamation. NCIP granted the TRO. Petitioner
injustice and irreparable injury. Atty. Masweng then issued an moved to dissolve the TRO to which the NCIP dismissed on
Order for the writ of Preliminary Injunction and denied the the ground that it may be issued motu proprio where the
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
out of time. CA also affirmed the Order and dismissed the grave injustice and irreparable injury. The Writ of Preliminary
petition for Certiorari of Petitioners upholding the conclusion Injunction was then issued. Motion for Reconsideration was
of Atty. Masweng that the NCIP can issue injunctive writs as a denied as well as the Petition for Certiorari to the CA. CA
principal relief against acts adversely affecting or infringing affirmed the decision of NCIP.
on the rights of ICCs or IPs, because "(t)o rule otherwise
would render NCIP inutile in preventing acts committed in Question:
violation of the IPRA. Was the CA correct in affirming the writ?

Answer:
Issue/s: No. In the case of Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v.
Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction was proper Masweng, the SC ruled that although the NCIP has
jurisdiction over cases involving the protection of rights to
SC Ruling: ancestral domains, it is required before the issuance of a writ
No, the Court ruled that the NCIP may issue temporary of preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of
restraining orders and writs of injunction without any a right to be protected. Since, the proclamation does not
prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main appear to be a definitive recognition of the ancestral land
action is for injunction on the basis of Section 69(d)18 of the claimed, as it merely identifies the claimants of a portion of
IPRA and Section 82, Rule XV19 of NCIP Administrative theland but does not acknowledge vested rights over the
Circular No. 103. On petitioners’ argument that the City of same, the writ of preliminary injunction can’t be validly
Baguio is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA and, issued.
consequently, the jurisdiction of the NCIP, this Court ruled in
G.R. No. 180206 that said exemption cannot ipso facto be
deduced from Section 7821 of the IPRA because the law
concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or
acquired through any process before its effectivity.

REPUBLIC VS EVANGELISTA, G.R. NO. 156015, AUG. 11, 2005


30

HOLDING: (1) the right to be protected prima facieexists; and, (2) the acts sought to be

It is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was enjoined are violative of that right.

a violation of his rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of

Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has an preliminary injunction may be issued when it is established:

ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. (a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, the whole or part of

FACTS: such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
The case at bar stems from a complaint for damages, with prayer for the
for a limited period or perpetually;
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by private respondent
Dante Legaspi, through his attorney-in-fact Paul Gutierrez, against petitioners (b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

Gen. Jose M. Calimlim. complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
The Complaint alleged that private respondent Legaspi is the owner of a land
located in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner Calimlim, representing the (c) that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is

Republic of the Philippines, and as then head of the Intelligence Service of attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts

the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Presidential Security Group, probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of

entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with one Ciriaco Reyes. the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

The MOA granted Reyes a permit to hunt for treasure in a land in Bigte, It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner Diciano signed the MOA as a witness.It was injunction, mere prima facie evidence is needed to establish the applicants
further alleged that thereafter, Reyes, together with petitioners, started, rights or interests in the subject matter of the main action. It is not required
digging, tunneling and blasting works on the said land of Legaspi. The that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a violation of his
complaint also alleged that petitioner Calimlim assigned about 80 military rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. Thus, an
personnel to guard the area and encamp thereon to intimidate Legaspi and applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has an ostensible right to
other occupants of the area from going near the subject land. the final relief prayed for in his complaint.

Legaspi executed a special power of attorney (SPA) appointing his nephew, In the case at bar, we find that respondent judge had sufficient basis to issue

private respondent Gutierrez, as his attorney-in-fact. Gutierrez was given the the writ of preliminary injunction. It was established,prima facie, that Legaspi

power to deal with the treasure hunting activities on Legaspis land and to file has a right to peaceful possession of his land, pendente lite. Legaspi had title

charges against those who may enter it without the latters authority. to the subject land. It was likewise established that the diggings were

Gutierrez filed a case for damages and injunction against petitioners for conducted by petitioners in the enclosed area of Legaspis land. Whether the

illegally entering Legaspis land. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss land fenced by Gutierrez and claimed to be included in the land of Legaspi

contending: first, there is no real party-in-interest as the SPA of Gutierrez to covered an area beyond that which is included in the title of Legaspi is a

bring the suit was already revoked by Legaspi on March 7, 2000, as factual issue still subject to litigation and proof by the parties in the main

evidenced by a Deed of Revocation, and, second, Gutierrez failed to establish case for damages. It was necessary for the trial court to issue the writ of

that the alleged armed men guarding the area were acting on orders of preliminary injunction during the pendency of the main case in order to

petitioners. preserve the rights and interests of private respondents Legaspi and
Gutierrez.
The trial court granted private respondents application for a writ of
preliminary injunction on the following grounds: (1) the diggings and
blastings appear to have been made on the land of Legaspi, hence, there is
an urgent need to maintain the status quo to prevent serious damage to
Legaspis land; and, (2) the SPA granted to Gutierrez continues to be valid. III. Q. Sufficiency of Complaint, Application and other Requisites (S4, 5)

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was Landbank of the Philippines v. Continental Watchman, G.R. No. 136114,
justfied. January 22, 2004

HELD:
PRINCIPLES:
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is justified. A writ of
The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive
preliminary injunction is an ancilliary or preventive remedy that is resorted to
matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.
by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is issued by the court The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the applicant until the merits of the case can be heard.
before his claim can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its aim is to
preserve the status quo ante until the merits of the case can be heard fully, Special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used as a substitute
for a lost appeal.
upon the applicants showing of two important conditions, viz.:

CASE DIGEST
31

FACTS: 3. that he grant or denial of an injunction rests on the sound


discretion of the trial court and will not be interfered with by
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) petitioner published in the Philippine Daily appellate courts except on a clear abuse of discretion. The
an "Invitation to Pre-Qualify," inviting reputable security agencies to pre- respondent court conducted hearings before issuing a writ of
qualify for security guard services in the different LBP offices, properties and preliminary injunction and the private respondent was even
installations nationwide. Continental Watchmen Agency Incorporated (CWAI) required to put a bond to answer for possible damages which may
respondent responded to the invitation and participated in the public arise from the issuance of said writ of preliminary injunction.
bidding. All the pre-qualified security agencies, including respondent, Supreme Court rulings showed that erroneous conclusions or
submitted their individual sealed bid proposals to petitioner's Special errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's
Committee for the Selection of Security Agencies (Bid Committee). Private jurisdiction or involving grave abuse of discretion, are
respondent submitted a bid for three (3) areas, namely, Area I, Area III, and not reviewable by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Area V, all in Luzon. for such errors are reviewable by timely appeal.

After all the bids were opened and evaluated, it turned out that private Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate
respondent was the lowest bidder for those three areas. However, the Bid Court in its Resolution dated September 22, 1998. Hence; petitioner filed a
Committee declared private respondent disqualified because (1) its bid price certiorari.
was below the monthly salary of a guard prescribed by the Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.; and (2) it ISSUES:
violated petitioner's Bid Bulletin No. 1 requiring that the bid price should
include night differential pay for all the guards. Private respondent asked for 1. WON preliminary injunction was properly issued
reconsideration but was denied by the Bid Committee. Hence, private 2. WON petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Manila, a petition
for injunction and damages with a prayer for a preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioner LBP. HELD:

On August 1, 1997, after the hearing wherein both parties presented their 1. Preliminary injunction was properly issued.
respective evidence, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the
(TRO) effective for twenty (20) days. At the same time, the trial court set for sound discretion of the trial court. Section 4 of Rule 58 gives
hearing private respondent's application for preliminary injunction which is generous latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the reason
granted by the court – August 22, 1997). that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more
often than not involve a factual determination which is not the
Petitioner filed its "Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and function of the appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound
Compulsory Counterclaim" but was denied by the court – January 12, 1998. judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not
Thus, petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse. Also, the
Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
Restraining Order" under Rules 58 and 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Here, after
Procedure, as amended, alleging that the two Orders of the trial court dated evaluating the evidence presented by both contending parties,
August 22, 1997 and January 12, 1998 were issued without jurisdiction or the trial court held that justice would be better served if the
with grave abuse of discretion. status quo is preserved until the final determination of the merits
of the case. We find nothing whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious in
On July 31, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision dismissing the such ruling.
petition and ruled as follows:
2. Petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy.
1. that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of Petitioner's remedy is an appeal to this Court from the Court of
discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. Grave abuse of Appeals' Decision dated July 31, 1998 by way of a petition for
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, it filed this petition
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction here the power is for certiorari under Rule 65 only on November 18, 1998 or forty
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion three (43) days after it received the Appellate Court's Decision
or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to denying its motion for reconsideration. Apparently, petitioner
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to resorted to certiorari because it failed to interpose an appeal
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. seasonably. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as
The record does not show such kind of actuation on the part of a substitute for a lost appeal. However the Court, in accordance
the respondent judge. with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for
2. that a petition for certiorari is not a remedy for the special civil certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
action for certiorari (Rule 65) is a remedy designed for the especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment and petition for review which petitioner failed to do so.
not even issue for simple abuse of discretion.

QUICK DIGEST
32

FACTS: may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is
entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance
Continental Watchmen Agency Incorporated (CWAI) is the lowest bidder in
thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or
the bid invitation done by Land Bank but the Bid Committee rendered CWAI
person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such
as disqualified. Thus; CWAI filed a petition for injunction and damages with a
prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner LBP which damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by
was granted by the court. LBP on the other hand filed its "Answer with the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the applicant may
Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim" but suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order.
denied by the court. Thus, petitioner filed a "Petition for Certiorari and Two conditions must concur:first, the court in the exercise of its discretion,
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to
under Rules 58 and 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such
the grounds that granting of preliminary injunction and the court’s resolution
damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter-bond.
denying the "Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim" were issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion but denied by the court. Facts:

ISSUE: Respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank, for brevity) filed

1. WON the preliminary injunction was properly issue. a collection suit with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
2. WON petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
attachment against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go in the RTC of Makati

which rendered a Decision in favor of respondent iBank and found Alberto


HELD:

Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go liable, ordering them to pay the amount of ninety-
1. The PI was properly issued for the court’s acted without grave
abuse of discretion and upon its sound discretion. Section 4 of
six million pesos (P96,000,000.00), plus penalty. Thereupon, respondent
Rule 58 gives opportunity to the court to render decision based on
discretion for the reason that conflicting claims in an application Renato C. Flora, Sheriff of Branch 150 of the RTC of Makati City, issued a
for a provisional writ involve a factual determination which is not
the function of the appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound Notice of Sheriffs Sale notifying all the parties concerned, as well as the
judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must
not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse. public in general, to which properties allegedly owned by Mr. Go will be sold
Also, the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The trial at public auction. To this petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap filed a
court held that justice would be better served if the status quo is
preserved until the final determination of the merits of the case Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or

2. Petitioner's proper remedy should be an appeal by way of a Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Pasig City seeking to stop the auction
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15 days
sale alleging that the properties are already owned by them by virtue of
after receiving the court’s decision but because the petitioner was
not able to file an appeal within the reglementary period thus;
Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Jimmy Go in their favor. They further
resorted to certiorari under Rule 65 but special civil action of
certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal. alleged that respondent sheriff disregarded their right over the properties
However the Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion despite their execution of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to prove their claim
to treat a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, especially if filed within over the properties and the publication of a Notice to the Public warning that
the reglementary period for filing a petition for review which
petitioner failed to do so. various deeds had already been issued in their favor evidencing their right

over the same.

on 22 August 2000 respondent sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale

Spouses Yap vs International Exchange Bank stating that the subject properties had been sold at public auction in favor of

respondent iBank, subject to the third-party claims of petitioners.

Two sentence ruling: Petitioners filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant case for

Grounds for objections of preliminary injunction: Annulment of Sheriffs Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale
Under the afore-quoted section (section 6 rule 58) a preliminary injunction
33

against iBank, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC Makati City, Procedure while the grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6,

and Sheriff Flora. The amended complaint included a prayer for the issuance Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the

of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the

13 August 2001, upon posting a bond in the amount of three million pesos grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this

(P3,000,000.00), Judge Janolo issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of

Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed on 29 August 2001 a Motion for discretion.

Reconsideration of the order granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction

which the trial court denied. Subsequently, respondents iBank and Sheriff a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that

Flora filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the

Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable

January 2006 praying that their pending Motion for Reconsideration dated damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully

26 February 2001 which seeks for the dismissal of the case be resolved compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond

and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved. in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all damages

Petitioners filed their Comment thereon with Motion to Cite in Contempt the which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the

counsel of respondents. They pray that the pending Motion for injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur:first, the court in

Reconsideration be denied for being devoid of merit, and that the Motion to the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction

Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction be also denied, it being a clear would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully

defiance of the directive of the Supreme Court which ruled with finality that compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files

the injunction issued by the trial court was providently issued and was not a counter-bond.

tainted with grave abuse of discretion. They further ask that respondents
In the case at bar, the trial court, after hearing, found that
counsel be cited in contempt of court and be meted out the appropriate
respondents duly showed that they would suffer great and irreparable injury
penalty.
if the injunction shall continue to exist. As to the second condition, the trial
Issue:
court likewise found that respondents were willing to post a counter-bond
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the trial court
which could cover the damages that petitioners may suffer in case the
recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the rulings of
judgment turns out to be adverse to them. The Order of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals and by this Court that its issuance was not tainted with
recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and
grave abuse of discretion?
approval of the counter-bond that it ordered. Failure to post the required

Held: counter-bond will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution of the preliminary

injunction. The Order of Dissolution cannot be implemented until and unless


Affirmative. trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary
the required counter-bond has been posted.
injunction it previously issued.

The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its


The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of
issuance is governed by Section 3,[38] Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial
34

court, and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is

demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or,

otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court that

issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the

circumstances may warrant.[40] In the case on hand, the trial court issued

the order of dissolution on a ground provided for by the Rules of Court. The

same being in accordance with the rules, we find no reason to disturb the

same.