Role of Leadership

The Leadership Quarterly 18 (2007) 319 – 340
www.elsevier.com/locate/leaqua
Leadership and the choice of order: Complexity and hierarchical

perspectives near the edge of chaos
Richard N. Osborn a,⁎, James G. (Jerry) Hunt b,1
a
Department of Management and Organization Science, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan 48202, USA
b
Institute for Leadership Research, Area of Management, Texas Tech University, Box 42101, Lubbock, TX 79407-4102, USA
Abstract
This conceptual article critically examines the view that, in complex adaptive systems (CAS), organizations are moved toward
the edge of chaos and will exhibit “order for free” behaviors. Will organizations naturally self-organize to seek greater fitness? We
suggest that, as hierarchies, organizations may be collectively led to establish a dynamic system where bottom-up structuration
emerges to increase the long-term viability of the organization. Thus, it is our contention that while there is order for free, a desired
order is not. To examine if a desired order for free emerges calls for analyses emphasizing the interplay among leadership,
organization hierarchy, and CAS perspectives where these are systematically compared and contrasted. Based on such compare and
contrast interplay, we argue that leadership researchers can help foster the evolution of a new type of dynamic emergent hierarchy
that yields a sustained desired order across time.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Order for free; Organizational hierarchy; Complex adaptive systems; Self-organize; Managerial leadership; Fitness
1. Introduction
Just north of Australia deep in the rugged highlands of New Guinea's interior was one of the very few societies
whose people had been able to live self-sustainably. For millennia this society evolved without the benefits and curses
of modern civilization simply because the terrain ruggedness confined European explorers to the coast and lowland
rivers. For over 400 years it was assumed that the interior of the island was covered with forests and uninhabited
(Diamond, 2005, pp. 279–286). It was not.
Diamond (2005) describes a society that appears to be far from our collective vision of the modern corporation.
Highlander society evolved from bottom-up dynamics to achieve ecological sustainability without the “assistance” of
outside civilization. It achieved a preferred niche that yielded a sustainability until the civilizers imposed changes for a
new order. The changes almost destroyed this viable society. Ultimately, the newly imposed order was considered more
desirable by the imposers, yet the tale of the highlanders raises some fundamental questions. What should leaders do if
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 313 577 4519.

E-mail addresses: Richardnosborn@hotmail.com (R.N. Osborn), Jerry.hunt@ttu.edu (J.G.(J.) Hunt).
1
Tel.: +1 806 742 3175x795 4582.
1048-9843/$ - see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2007.04.003
320 R.N. Osborn, J.G.(J.) Hunt / The Leadership Quarterly 18 (2007) 319–340
existing, emergent order is not considered desirable? How can senior executives lead a modern corporation without
destroying the emergent processes most likely to yield the developments that are key to the firm's future viability?
The isolated sustainability of the highlanders was an extraordinary feat, especially given that for most of this time
the inhabitants could neither read nor write. Critical problems were mastered, the Achilles heels of many failed
civilizations. These people conquered deforestation, erosion, the lack of water, declining soil fertility, and ultimately
the resulting need for population control. Diamond (2005) tells us the highlanders mastered these challenges and,
hence, survived, without importing economically important trade items from outside their area. Over time the
highlanders became so proficient that their techniques serve as textbook examples for modern-day agriculture.
There is solid historical evidence attesting to all the above, but little historical evidence of how it occurred. Diamond
tells us, however, that current New Guinea inhabitants have among the strongest “bottom-up orientations” in the world,
attributable in large measure to their insistence on frequent meetings with a strong push for consensus. For our
purposes, we can set the stage for the rest of this article by briefly describing highlander activities and then interpreting
this description using various complexity science concepts implied by the title of this article.
We start with the fact that when the highlands were originally settled, there was an existing, dynamic equilibrium
among habitable ecological factors: there were forests, rich soil and various other components that invited settlement.
The people who were to become the highlanders had to adapt to this environment and the environment (e.g., food
sources) had to adapt to their presence. Of course not all was perfect—the settlement would be in mountains several
thousand feet high with frost at the upper levels even though New Guinea is located close to the equator. Over time, the
highlanders found that the rugged mountainsides with sharp ridges and narrow valleys created many problems with
which they had to deal. One of these was deforestation that resulted from the building of fires, houses, and related
activities. To adapt, the highlanders learned which plants yielded the most food and could replace those originally
growing. They also learned to provide appropriate watering systems and fertilization, and ultimately, they learned how
to provide population control strategies (which, among other things, included ejecting the elderly and infirm from their
society).
The inhabitants lived in small villages (frequently, but not always, at war), worked through trial and error processes
and evolved their bottom-up consensus approach. Ultimately, over a very long period of time, they were able to develop
ways to reforest, modify the plants and provide for soil fertility, along with myriad other activities to provide
sustainability. In terms of leadership they depended on a “big man” (emergent leader by the force of his personality) in
each village who lived and worked beside them.
1.1. Analysis of example using complexity concepts
New Guinea's highlander society may be seen as a complex adaptive system (CAS). That is, it is an identifiable
collection of interacting elements characterized by dynamic and non-linear interaction (non-proportional interaction,
where small changes in one element can have large results and vice versa, (see, Cilliers, 1998). Interactions occurred
primarily among neighbors within the groups (the groups may be seen as what Kauffman, 1995, labels, patches,
defined loosely as interdependent clusters) and sometimes between neighboring groups. These patches are similar to
the divisions in a large organization. As groups of highlanders (patches) interacted with one another in their attempts to
improve their lot, the process forced all groups to adapt to each other as all were adapting to changes in their collective
ecological setting.
These interactions altered the prospects of fitness. This dynamic can be represented as a fitness landscape—a notion
drawn from biology and discussed by Kauffman (1993, 1995). In simplest terms, these landscapes represent different
choices in terms of consequences. The range of all possible consequences may be depicted as a fitness landscape
representing strategic choices a population could make. For instance, higher fitness strategies may be depicted as a
higher peak on the landscape. Across all consequences the fitness landscape may show variations in ruggedness or in
the number of peaks and in the variation between the fitness levels across the peaks. It is important to note that the
fitness landscape for a single complex adaptive system, here the highlanders, is altered by attempts of other complex
adaptive systems to improve their lot. As Kauffman noted, “... all organizations evolve and co-evolve on rugged,
deforming, fitness landscapes” (Kauffman, 1995, p 246).
As discussed shortly, fitness may be represented by a single criterion of interest or more realistically by a mix of
variables related to articulations of desired conditions (cf. Caldart & Ricart, 2004; Osborn, Hunt, & Jauch, 2002). In the
highlander example, Diamond chose to emphasize sustainability as the most important aspect of fitness. This notion of
R.N. Osborn, J.G.(J.) Hunt / The Leadership Quarterly 18 (2007) 319–340 321
a fitness landscape has also been applied as a mapping of the actions of sets of individuals and their performance (cf.
Levinthal & Warglain, 1999; McKelvey, 1999, for a much more detailed discussion). For the highlanders this latter
view may be expressed in terms of the landscapes involved in individual issues (e.g., reforestation vs. population
control) as well as deforming landscapes charting sustainability with conflicting internal and external constraints (other
predators seeking greater fitness and adjusting to changes in the ecology made by the highlanders).
Also, for the highlanders we can imagine their “order” as relating to those interactions involved in sustainability.
When the society's members entered the highlands, they evolved to be in a state near the “edge of chaos”: a delicately
poised, transition zone between stability and chaotic systems. If the behavior of a system is too ordered, there is not
enough variability or novelty; if, in contrast, the behavior of a system is too disordered, there is too much noise. For
successful adaptation a system should be neither too methodical nor too carefree in adaptive behaviors (cf. Osborn
et al., 2002). Thus, near the edge of chaos behaviors should be far from equilibrium (for in complexity science
equilibrium means death; cf. Dooley, 2004). We interpret this to mean that the highlanders have been near the desirable
edge of chaos state for many years, even as their environment has changed as a function of nature, encroaching
civilization and increasing top-down governmental hierarchical forces. Put another way, this society was not stable—
neither was it in chaos.
Organizations may be expected to seek higher fitness, yet as Kauffman (1995) notes “…organizations, when
complex, all face conflicting constraints and seek excellence as, ‘the best compromises we can attain’” (p. 246). Our
analysis, then, as noted, will be primarily restricted to complex adaptive systems (large economic organizations). And
we will investigate various aspects of what might constitute the best compromises we can obtain.
It is worth briefly considering hierarchy and the previously mentioned “big man” leadership in highlander society as
well as the hierarchy and leadership imposed by government officials. The social hierarchy of highlander society was
comparatively flat with no established bureaucracy. Groups of members met frequently under the leadership of a “big
man” to define problems, discuss issues and seek solutions to common problems. Of course, the discovery of these
assumed poor isolated backward villages prompted government officials to replace impromptu governance gatherings
with a full-blown governmentally based bureaucracy for governance. The charge government officials gave themselves
was to provide appropriate “guidance” to spur development and progress for the assumed underprivileged, uneducated,
unsophisticated villagers. The civilizers were to bring highlanders the benefits of modern society.
As told by Diamond, these officials almost killed the highlander society by imposing bureaucratic goals, plans,
solutions and processes—they disrupted the fitness peak that the highlanders had developed over centuries. For
instance, officials imposed a new, modern and well-tested irrigation plan based on extensive theoretical and practical
experience in other lands. The new plan almost destroyed the delicate soils on the harsh terrain of the highlander's
mountain fields. There also were official protests to well-established highlander practices not only on irrigation but also
reforestation, not to mention population control practices inconsistent with established religions and “human rights.”
Clearly the vision of the bureaucrats was different than the shared wisdom of the highlanders.
For the highlanders the earlier mentioned “big men” were emergent leaders. In meetings they emphasized
connecting members to each other, facilitating dialog and discussion to reach consensus and encouraging new solutions
to persistent problems. This profile is in stark contrast to the profile of officials brought in to help the highlanders.
Officials brought in additional recognized experts each with his/her own specialized goal, backed by a plan to
implement best practices to improve the lot of villagers. Each imposed a “better (but often unneeded and more
bureaucratic) solution” on these reluctant villagers.
1.2. The dilemma for leaders and leadership research
In a sense, our example of the highlander society illustrates the complexity theory tenet of order for free (Holland,
1995; Kauffman, 1993). Complex adaptive systems will naturally self-organize to seek greater fitness in an uncertain
world. Clearly the highlanders did this in isolation for thousands of years. Yet, for the home country bureaucratic
experts, this order did not fit their perspective of how the highlanders should be operating and the highlander's
emphasis simply on sustainability. In complexity terms order was for free; yet a desired order was not free (Osborn
et al., 2002).
Though sustainability may be highly desirable and a requisite for long-term societal survival, we do not live in only
one complex adaptive system. Instead we live in a whole series of complex adaptive organizations—bureaucracies
with specialized goals based on specialized contributions to society (Parsons, 1960). While the highlanders relied on
emergent leaders, modern corporations use multiple layers of formally appointed leaders. Also, while no doubt
emergent leadership is still important in the organizations comprising modern developed societies (e.g., Seers, Keller,
& Wilkerson, 2003), there is little question about the dominance of formally appointed leaders in organizations.
However, as shown below, this dominance does not mean these formally appointed leaders need to make the same
mistakes as the civilizers.
Modern organizations are intricately intertwined with individual and social demands, constraints, and choices
(Stewart, 1982a) where those at the pinnacle are often expected to have a powerful influence on the entire organization
(e.g., Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; Hunt, 1991; Jaques, 1989). From our complexity perspective, then, a primary task of
leadership in organizations is to establish a dynamic system where bottom-up structuration emerges (cf. Marion & Uhl-
Bien, 2001) and moves the system and its components to a more desirable level of fitness.
With our emphasis on appointed leaders, we need to outline our view of leadership. As used in this article,
leadership is built upon Katz and Kahn's (1978) idea that formal leadership is the incremental influence of position
holders exercised via direct and indirect means to maintain and/or alter the existing dynamics in and of a system. It is
having an impact beyond other formally designated aspects of the system. This leadership conception allows formally
designated managers to exert much or little leadership, depending on system requirements and constraints and the
extent to which one is able to move beyond these.2
While what those position holders at the top of organizations desire, expect and seek may be framed with the best of
intentions and in the most positive terms, we suggest they may well engage in practices as deleterious as were the
irrigation experiments of the bureaucrats wanting to help highlander society. We will challenge the normal definition of
desired order promulgated by and for senior managerial leaders using complexity theory. Yet, we still recognize that to
operate near the edge of chaos poses a dilemma for both leaders and leadership researchers. As shown shortly, it is not a
matter of adjusting the ingredients to some known formula for success. It calls for a deeper understanding of both the
context for leadership and leadership itself—an understanding we do not now have but argue we should seek.
1.3. Objective and organization of article
The treatment above leads us to an analysis highlighting choice rather than determinism, multiplicity rather than
singular vision, dynamic instrumentalism rather than dramatic transformation, dialog and discussion rather than
leadership magnetism, and open self-interest rather than hidden self-centeredness. In many respects, then, this article
echoes the themes of the sustainable highlander society. Specifically we discuss the interplay among organizations,
leadership and the choices of various kinds of order. We contend that for the analysis of a desired order, the notion of
organizational hierarchy, as emphasized especially from strategic leadership, should be included in our analysis and
compared and contrasted with order for free arguments of complexity science researchers. The discussion of such
analysis ultimately leads us to focus on different kinds of order and on possible paths forward that begin the integration
of CAS and hierarchical approaches.
To conduct the kind of analysis just mentioned, we start by considering, in more detail, what is meant by order for
free and how complex adaptive systems are able to achieve such a state. Such discussion moves us into an examination
of fitness and fitness landscapes and potential conflict among various kinds of fitness or order criteria. Then we move to
the differing ways that order can be achieved. This discussion brings us to treatment of non-linear dynamics and
traditional hierarchical emphases that deal with leadership at various organizational levels based on hierarchical
frameworks from the traditional organizational literature. Such frameworks involve recognition of organizational
context and an emphasis on various hierarchical managerial leadership approaches with special emphasis on the
stratified systems or requisite organization work of Elliott Jaques and closely related organizational hierarchical
treatments. There, as one moves up the organizational hierarchy, one finds increasing task complexity by domain and
echelon. We discuss hierarchy in some detail and it is compared and contrasted with the order for free notion of CAS.
With the above as a backdrop, we then discuss a reconciliation of the CAS and traditional hierarchical per-
spectives. For this reconciliation, we compare and contrast in some detail a number of key issues helping to define
2
In later portions of this article we will tend to use the term “managerial leader” in referring to those occupying a formal managerial role (cf.
Osborn et al., 2002). We also see this general definition as applying to non-managers and enacted through emergent leadership on their part either
individually or collectively. We argue that managerial leaders will have different mixes of incremental influence and demands, constraints and
choices but the role requires both management and leadership activities although they do not have to be fulfilled by the same person (see, Kotter,
1988).
each of the two perspectives. These issues start with the emphasis on decomposition or reductionism in each, with
CAS arguing for its necessity to a relatively limited degree to provide appropriate focus. A second emphasis is on the
roles of CAS and hierarchical position holders. This emphasis is followed by the importance and interpretation of the
concept of organizational attachment, one form of which was originally set forth by Etizoni (1961, 1975). The
discussion in this section is finalized with the hierarchical role of direct and indirect managerial leadership in
organizations.
We conclude the overall analysis with a summary reiterating an emphasis on five main points from our opening
vignette concerning the highlanders and a final argument for the application of order from leadership researchers. The
first of these points is that the consideration of CAS and hierarchy suggest the virtual impossibility of an integrated
theory of leadership effectiveness in the foreseeable future and the necessity for researchers to be explicit about the
desired order implicit in their work. Second, we show that a movement toward partial reconciliation calls for partial
organizational decomposition (reductionism), and an examination of externalities and consideration of system
commitment. Third, we argue that organizational decomposition needs to preserve the ability to detect dynamic
interaction, the analysis of direct and indirect managerial leadership, and emphasis on studies where complex adaptive
features are most likely to be important. Fourth, we contend that high singular interdependence on powerful external
entities is a potential problem for CAS's because of its overemphasis on top-down processes. This contrasts with
hierarchical emphases where such interdependence is desirable even though difficult to obtain. Finally, affiliation is
discussed as an important basis for attachment/compliance.
We conclude that it is possible but unlikely in large-scale economic organizations, to have order for free in CAS's
operating in turbulent environments. Rather, what is needed is bottom-up structuration combined with top-down
hierarchy. At the same time, the above discussion is reinforced by an ongoing treatment of possible paths forward to
strengthen the integration of these various elements.
We further conclude by arguing for the partial integration of complexity views with leadership research in order to discuss a
series of alternative desired orders. These orders would in one way or another combine order for free notions with hierarchy to
emphasize such desirability. They also would provide leadership researchers a voice in focusing on different orders.
2. How can there be order for free and how do systems achieve it?
With an understanding of where we are heading, we now ask the reader to consider a world where organizations
confront pervasive dynamism, non-linearity, and non-predictability. Once again we use the highlanders as an example
even though strictly speaking they are not a large economic organization. However, once the outside governmental
forces moved to institute changes that would influence a very large portion of the highlander's existence we consider
them as a medium to large sized political entity and for our purposes, close enough to an economic one.
The highlander's fitness landscape is deforming because other entities are themselves changing. This world is not so
extreme on these characteristics that organizations cannot survive—it is not chaos. When confronting chaos there is
little useful organizational memory (Marion, 1999) and organizations cannot reach toward a dynamic equilibrium. The
fitness landscape is so deformed and the organizations' current position on their fitness landscapes is so poor they face
death. With pervasive dynamism, organizations such as the highlanders typically must move toward a different peak on
their fitness landscape (fundamentally strategically change who and what they are and/or whom they serve) or suffer
the consequences. They must move beyond historic goals and carefully crafted strategies designed to cope with isolated
changes. As they dramatically start to shift peaks on their fitness landscape, these organizations are involved in moving
themselves and the other systems with which they deal into unknown new territory where their existence may be
threatened but the general fitness level and longer-term sustainability chances for those making the transition may be
increased. This is the earlier mentioned edge of chaos world (cf. Marion, 1999). Here, for complexity theorists, order is
free as the systems naturally reconfigure. The example here also, of course, heavily reflects hierarchical emphases
which we develop in more detail below.
3. Fitness, fitness landscapes and the potential conflict among preferred criteria
We begin our discussion with a brief exploration into the criteria used in complexity based views of leadership and
more conventional leadership analyses. While, as we have argued, the notion of fitness and a fitness landscape is central
to the notion of “order for free” in complexity theory, the criteria to determine leadership effectiveness in many studies
are almost conceptual afterthoughts. Although Hunt (1991 pp. 91–96), discusses several aspects of organizational
effectiveness, it is still a very difficult issue with which to deal.
In one sense the complexity views are quite clear—the effectiveness of an organization would equate to its fitness.
As noted earlier, fitness is the ability to adapt, thrive and survive (see, Marion, 1999 for a discussion). Organizational
scholars using complexity theory often speak of a rugged landscape and then proceed to suggest change dynamics
based on the ability of the organization to engage in searches for higher positions on the landscape peaks (cf. Levinthal,
1997). A key notion is that changes in the number, nature, type and character of the interdependency among
components of the organization yields dramatically different fitness peaks. However, as suggested by Anderson (1999),
among others, there are several problems with some translations of Kauffman's (1995) work on fitness landscapes.
Two of these are covered below.
First, as alluded to with the highlanders, the translation of fitness to a single organizational goal may be highly
problematic. Thus, the notion of a firm climbing toward a higher level of fitness on a single criterion may be
misleading. We agree with Kauffman's analysis of organizations that treats a landscape as multidimensional and
representing the best compromises available. We return to the analysis of multiple criteria later in this section of the
article where we discuss the dimensions of fitness selected by senior managerial leaders as a choice. Second, and most
important at this point in the discussion, is the tendency for those using complexity analysis to (a) either focus inside the
firm rather than include interfaces between the firm and its environment (see, Lewin, 1999 for an exception) or (b)
imply that the firm is a passive acceptor of its environment. We see these interpretations as oversimplifications, for
Kauffman and many other complexity theorists recognize both cooperation and competition among complex adaptive
systems that may change the environment itself.
Consistent with our reading of complexity theory, the key argument underlying our analysis is that individuals in
organizations do not merely accept environmental conditions. They may actively attempt to change externalities at the
same time as they attempt to alter internal characteristics. With these choices infused into the analysis, we find a
somewhat different view of fitness and the fitness landscape. Here we elaborate on our earlier definition of fitness: as
ability of a system to sustain itself, which includes the ability of the system to (a) select an environment that has a
greater relative potential and (b) alter the character of its interdependencies on others. We note later that the ability of
managerial leaders to exercise choices regarding the specific aspects of fitness to be emphasized may well be limited.
For now, we want to link the notion of fitness to the more conventional treatment of leadership.
3.1. Congruency between complexity analyses and traditional leadership studies
Unfortunately, beyond the general concept of fitness, far too many complexity researchers are as vague as the
leadership researchers when they speak of performance. The precise concept to be measured and the exact
measurement appear to be almost unique to each study. This vagueness is in stark contrast to many analyses in
corporate strategy where organizational performance is conceptualized in terms of contributions to stockholders and
where similar measures of short-term financial efficiency are the dominant measures (e.g., Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskinson,
2003).
Despite the vagueness and variety of measures, there appear to be a couple of points of congruence across the more
traditional leadership studies and complexity analyses. First, regardless of the measure, there may be substantial
differences in the outcomes and fitness of a system by time. Specifically, short-term, intermediate-term and long-term
measures may or may not be highly correlated or completely relevant. Here, we link the time horizon for analysis with
the analysis of hierarchy and examine three leadership domains (essentially the top, middle and bottom of the
organization). The outcomes emphasized within any particular domain of leadership partially reflect both the power of
external constituencies as well as an organizational understanding of a domain's contribution to the viability of the
organization as a whole. Further we recognize there are a number of “systems” goals that cascade down the different
leadership domains with shorter time frames. Finally, these systems goals represent both a response to the environment
as well as choices regarding how the organization should operate.
It is important to recognize, however, that the criteria used to evaluate an individual (unit) do not necessarily match
those used to evaluate a group (division) or patch where the individual (unit) is a member. In a similar manner, we do
not expect that role holders are automatically interested in the effectiveness of the organization or the achievement of
the system goals assigned to them, nor do role holders automatically subscribe to initiatives to improve the organization
or a component of the organization. Rather, we assume that individuals are predominately motivated by their own
interests. Of course, they may be induced to have an interest in the organization. And based on a complexity
perspective, we will introduce shortly another way to induce individuals to contribute to fitness.
A second point of congruence is that different perspectives by different constituencies within and affected by the
organization are likely to yield partially conflicting evaluations of organizational fitness (cf. Hunt & Dodge, 2000). For
instance, stockholder evaluations of a corporation might be quite different than evaluations by employees or customers
or suppliers. Neither the concept of performance nor fitness is one-dimensional by constituency.
So what does the previous discussion mean for the analysis of leadership domains beyond a continuation of the
current confusion? Most important is the expectation that analyses of organizations and leadership, using different
criteria under a generic title of performance, effectiveness or fitness, will not be cumulative. When leadership analyses
were confined to supervisors at the lowest levels in the organization many studies included both criteria reflecting the
viability of the organization (such as production rate or individual contribution assessments) as well as some assumed
interest in the subordinates (such as human resource maintenance, e.g., satisfaction; cf. Schermerhorn, Hunt, & Osborn,
1988). Even with limited short-term measures there was often no correspondence across the results for the
“performance” measures. We would expect no better across studies where performance is measured in terms of
innovation, profitability, adaptability, survival, viability, ethics, contributions to society, or functionality. Thus, we do
not foresee the development of a singular integrated theory of leadership effectiveness. Yet, there is an opportunity to
develop more bounded theories of leadership.
When the emphasis is on turbulent environments and the presumption that a system will seek the “edge of chaos” it
also seems clear that the performance criteria consistent with these conditions are quite unlike those often found in the
leadership literature. Issues of immediate efficiency are likely subordinated to questions of innovation and adaptation
as shown in our opening highlander illustration. The human resource maintenance question of whether members like or
dislike their employment or whether they are considered team players or good corporate citizens fades in comparison to
the question of dynamic emergence yielding a potentially greater opportunity to import more energy into the system.
We also are acutely aware that while many researchers are often extremely careful to theoretically discuss leadership
and build on prior work focusing on leadership, they will often accept the version of performance executives suggest is
important or go outside leadership theory and accept a convenient short-term measure. By selecting one or a series of
“performance” measures researchers are implicitly selecting a desired order. For the analysis of leadership at the most
senior level of organizations, for instance, the implicit desired order selected by many researchers (e.g., Waldman,
Ramirez, House, & Puranam, 2001) has emphasized near term financial estimates of efficiency.
As we note in our later description of leadership domains, the time horizon, the range of interests and the desired
systemic characteristics go far beyond a handful of yearly accounting estimates. It is little wonder, then, that there is still
controversy over whether leadership has a positive influence on organizational “performance” (the “does leadership
matter” question; cf. Waldman et al., 2001).
We suggest that it is extremely important that researchers theoretically explicate the view of the desired order that is
implicitly or explicitly selected in a particular study. Further, we think it is equally important that there be consistency
between the desired characteristics listed for a particular leadership study and the desired order implicitly or explicitly
selected by the researcher. For instance, if the desired leadership at the top of the organization involves establishing a
long-term organizational capability, then the degree to which this capability was developed should be assessed.
While it is clear that no one study can incorporate all of the potential dimensions of effectiveness or fitness,
researchers at least need to be sensitive to the potential for multiple partially conflicting aspects of “performance.” We
argue that there should be a moratorium on suggestions that any type of leadership alters performance. These
suggestions should be replaced by analyses suggesting that specific aspects of leadership in a specific domain appear to
influence specific aspects of performance in a specific context over a specific time. Specificity is the key.
4. How is order achieved?
4.1. Non-linear dynamics
How is order achieved? With a complexity perspective order is achieved by elements interacting to produce non-
linear dynamics that yield bounded instability. There is both determinism and human agency. For example, each time
an agent (individual or unit) interacts with another, the agent is free to follow, ignore or slightly modify the
arrangement. There is bounded choice and actions and interactions have consequences in the form of feedback loops.
Different actors within the system resonate with each other (impact their own behaviors) and may augment other
organizational aspects and thus influence an organization's self-organizing dynamic.
Depending on the degree to which agents modify their roles and scripts, there is a range of reasonably stable
outcomes at the edge of chaos. In complexity theory, when non-linear feedback operates in a state poised at instability,
there is both stable and unstable behavior at the same time. At the edge, behavior is boundedly unstable. The
boundaries between chaos and complexity are fuzzy but they can be distinguished. Complex systems are much less
dynamic in their behavior than chaotic systems because they blend both stable and chaotic characteristics. Complex
systems make “intelligent,” adaptive choices (Cilliers, 1998), they carry information for long periods of time, and they
appear predictable in many ways. In contrast, with chaos many changes are not adaptive because the system cannot
carry information for a sufficiently long time. Chaos is more unpredictable in the short term and it is subject to more
large non-linear changes than complex systems. However, the bounds for the behavior of a complex system may
change and a new pattern could emerge around a new set of attractors — or a bounded dynamic state toward which a
complex system moves (cf. Dooley, 2004).
The attractor may settle into a steady state, as in a clock. Or it may be a “strange attractor” (Sanders, 1998) that never
settles into a steady state. These “strange attractors” yield coherence but never repeat themselves across time. We can
envision them as a collection of variables that hold an inherently non-stable, non-linear system, such as an organization,
together and give it shape. At the edge of chaos, as we have said, organizations are steady enough to maintain
information about themselves and their environment but are sufficiently vibrant to process such information. These
organizations map the environment and interact with and become a part of that environment (Marion, 1999). The
resulting coherence is one of various types of order.
In contrast, more traditional views of organizations and leadership put an emphasis on senior managerial leaders to
establish goals, a way to reach these goals (a strategy) and structure the organization to accomplish the identified
limited objectives. Interestingly, however, whether the researcher starts from a bottom-up or top-down view, many
examine the co-evolutionary dynamics (all evolving together) among the environment of the organization, the
organization's viability in the setting, and its collective leadership (cf. Osborn et al., 2002).
4.2. Traditional view of hierarchy and organizations to yield goal attainment
4.2.1. Historical treatment of hierarchy and strategic leadership

To follow up on our earlier contention that hierarchy is important even while arguing that there is order for free, we
now examine the background and importance of hierarchies in organizations. This examination is important, in
combination with the earlier illustrative highland treatment of the order for free tenet, in laying the groundwork for later
portions of this discussion.
Consistent with notions from complexity theory that dynamics and history matter a great deal, we can briefly chart
some historical treatments of hierarchy and leadership. If one chooses, there are examples of leadership embedded in
hierarchy in the earliest civilizations (cf. Bass, 1990). However, some would argue that a systematic emphasis on
strategic leadership, sometimes termed leadership of an organization as contrasted with lower-level leadership in an
organization (cf. Dubin, 1979), goes back about 70 years to the classic work of Chester Barnard (1938). (For reviews,
see Hunt, 1991 and Jacobs & McGee, 2001, and for a review tracking the historical ebb and flow of the treatment of
strategic leadership in the literature, see Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996.)
Of particular relevance is the work of Elliott Jaques (1976) and extensions of his initial conceptualization of
leadership domains (see, Hunt, 1991; Jaques, 1989; Jaques & Clement, 1991). Jaques (1989) outlines a very specific
type of order, built around hierarchical leadership domains, for managerial leaders to follow and researchers to study.
During this same general time period, one also can see a related book by Zaccaro (2001). Beyond these pieces, Boal
(2004), Boal & Hooijberg (2001) and Boal & Schultz (2005) have prepared reviews; the Boal and Hooijberg one is
relatively extensive in nature. All of these suggest that strategic leadership is to establish a desired order, again
emphasizing hierarchy and upper-level managerial leaders, and lead the organization toward greater accomplishment
(see also, Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001).
Of special interest to this review is the work of Jacobs and McGee (2001) because of its extension of Jaques and
associates' work. Finally, a recent book on the topic, with a high tech twist, is provided by Sosik, Jung, Berson, Dionne,
and Jaussi (2004). All these works are replete with recommendations on how managerial leaders can strategize and
lead. There also has been related strategy, vision, planning and/or decision making work by those such as Mumford and
Nutt and associates (cf. Mumford, Bedell, & Hunter, in press; Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002; Strange &
Mumford, 2005; Nutt & Backoff, 1997a,b; Nutt, 2002;). Finally, Locke (2003) has prepared a related article arguing for
a strong integration of senior executive leadership and shared leadership from below.
4.2.2. Tipping point and context

All these works have contributed to what appears to us to be a “tipping point” in systematic strategic leadership of
literature and related work on top of the increasing interest in the lower-level, face-to-face leadership in literature
(Gladwell, 2002; Granovetter, 1978). Leadership scholars and strategic management scholars are willing to move into
doing strategic leadership of studies once a critical number of such studies have occurred based on other researchers
doing them. These scholars have now crossed this threshold or tipping point and strategic leadership of studies have
“tipped” and mushroomed very quickly. Relatedly, the general notion that our twenty-first century bureaucracies
should seek a static equilibrium and that senior managerial leaders should drive the firm toward equilibrium efficiency
also seems to have passed the tipping point as the technological, social, competitive and global environment of
organizations has become more intricate, sophisticated, and dynamic (see the call for radical change by Drucker, 1988
and the work by Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001).
Regardless, for us, an especially important thrust in extending these tipping points is explicit consideration of
organizational contexts (see, Osborn et al., 2002). An examination of organizational contexts explicitly considers
numerous aspects of both the environment of the organization as well as its hierarchy. Thus, the inclusion of context
considers the dynamics of what may be desired interactions with the current capabilities of the system and the
environmental inducements for change.
As noted in our discussion of the highlanders, our analysis is largely restricted to large organizations with an
economic function (e.g., Parsons, 1960) operating in specific types of environments. These restrictions are explicitly
introduced as our argument unfolds. Also, while restrictions on the analysis by size, function and environment focus
our contribution, these limits also mean that a discussion of the evolutionary dynamics yielding a large firm in a
dynamic environment are beyond the scope of this article. So we start with a discussion of some existing frameworks
describing the DNA, as it were, of large bureaucracies.
5. Suggestive hierarchical frameworks from the traditional literature
5.1. Jaques' framework
We start this treatment with Jaques' (1989) hierarchical framework and extend and refine it within the edge of chaos
perspective to help in illustrating our interpretation of its linkage with the order for free concept. Jaques' framework,
like the one earlier mentioned by Katz and Kahn (1978), uses open systems notions. Also, both conceptualize different
and increasingly complex requirements as one moves higher in the organization. Both are based on the pervasive
Weberian notion (Weber, 1947) that organizations are hierarchical systems with a specialization of labor.
Jaques framework has been labeled, “stratified systems theory” (“SST”), or requisite organization, among other
descriptors and we use the SST term throughout this essay. SST suggests a general model of organizational functioning
such that there are three domains from bottom to top — production, organizational, and strategic systems, each with no
more than two levels of managerial leadership, and an employee level at the bottom of the organization. Jacobs and
McGee (2001) point out that this general framework was first developed within large-scale organizations and can be
best interpreted as arguing that while there are three domains, as mentioned, there are no more and may even be less
than two levels or echelons of managerial leaders within each domain or no more than seven, including an employee
level, in all.
Whether there are less than two echelons inside one or more of the three domains would depend on such things as
the nature and size of the organization and the formal structural choices made within the organization. The number of
domains, as with Katz and Kahn's framework, is not seen to vary even as the echelons within might. At the same time,
while some could disagree as to the detailed differences by echelon, virtually all would agree that there are qualitatively
different managerial leadership requirements by domain.
Indeed, this qualitative difference notion underlies not only much of the pre-Jaques literature, but is often assumed
in numerous studies that do not use a systematic framework such as his, to try to tap the nature of the hierarchical
differences. Instead, such studies depend on atheoretical empirical work. In such work, levels are often treated in a
similar manner to demographic variables—when much of the variance from the other variables is accounted for, these
studies test to see if organizational level makes an empirical difference in results.
5.2. Task complexity by domain and echelon
We have spoken of different requirements by domain and by echelon or level within domain. These differing
requirements are conceptualized in terms of increasing critical task complexity moving up the organization. The
increasing critical task complexity is a function of the uncertainties created by the necessity to deal with a more
encompassing and turbulent environment as one moves up the organizational hierarchy. SST also argues that as
managerial leaders move up the hierarchy they need, themselves, to possess increasing levels of cognitive capacity or
complexity (see, Streufert & Nogami, 1989, or Hunt, 1991, for reviews of the cognitive complexity literature). While
this emphasis on individuals is consistent with the historical notion that one individual occupies a single and
comprehensive managerial leadership role, we suggest that the leadership capacity needed to reach toward a desired
order is more intricate and complex. This capacity might be demonstrated by one individual but in larger organizations
is more likely shared among managerial leadership role holders.
This increasing capacity is built on top of the capacity required at lower levels. At the very top of large-scale
organizations (echelon VII) the office of the chief executive is hypothesized to be operating in a nearly unbounded
world environment. Most important to this view, the individual at the top is to enact a vision with a time span of
20 years or more. Such a time span becomes progressively shorter at lower echelons until it is in the nature of
three months or so at the echelon I direct production, employee level (Hunt, 1991). A framework such as SST or
its extensions (cf. Hunt, 1991; Jacobs & Jaques, 1987; Jacobs & McGee, 2001; Jaques, 1989; Jaques & Clement,
1991; Sashkin & Sashkin, 2003) is especially useful in conceptualization of hierarchy in terms of leadership by
domain.
Let us start at the top.3 Those managerial leaders at echelons VII and VI operate within the relatively unbounded
environment (the strategic leadership levels). Executives at these echelons are to be concerned with the establishment
and modification of organizational domain, level V systems. They also oversee and provide resources for these systems
and sustain external environment conditions favorable to the system.
Level V is the first echelon at which there is a full-blown organizational system where there is a comprehensive
profit and loss account trading subsidiary of a larger corporation. The echelons below echelon V (i.e., IV through I) are
all subsystems contained within the boundary conditions established by echelon V. There are increasing constraints as
one moves down through echelon IV and into the direct production domain which typically contains two managerial
and an employee echelon with each level constrained more as one moves down the hierarchy and thus is less open but
with decreased rationality.
Choices made in the systems (echelons VI and VII) domain impact the total system's environment and it is within
this domain where the system's rules and regulations are developed to limit the setting within which the subsystem may
operate (see, Levinthal & Warglain, 1999 for a discussion). The typical bureaucratic positions in the organizational
domain include the executive vice president at echelon V, and general managers at echelon IV. Also, as mentioned
earlier, department and sectional managerial leaders are often conceptualized in the production domain at echelons III
and II, respectively (see, Hunt, 1991; Jacobs & Jaques, 1987; Sashkin & Sashkin, 2003).
5.3. Complexity views versus traditional perspectives
We may also examine the systems level leadership domain in terms of interpretations of complexity theory drawing
on the works of Caldart & Ricart (2004), Levinthal (1997) and Levinthal and Warglain (1999), among others.
Following Caldart and Ricart (2004), the main charges to leaders at the strategic apex are to “develop a representation
of the interfirm fitness landscape,” position the organization to climb towards a peak using preferred evolutionary
strategies and develop an architecture of the firm via manipulation of interdependencies. Consistent with Levinthal et
al. (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & Warglain, 1999), the choices regarding the representation of a fitness landscape, the
positioning of a firm and its architecture are, in part, dependent upon the characteristics of the firm's environment, the
3
For a more elaborate treatment see the discussion originally by Jaques and expanded upon by Jaques himself, along with work by Jacobs et al.,
by Hunt, and by Sashkin and Sashkin.
breadth of the managerial leader's vision as well as the history of the firm's evolutionary path. Choices are neither
environmentally determined nor unrestrained. For instance, variations in the organizational forms in a population may
reflect prior choices not just current characteristics of the environment.
This complexity view shares an emphasis on vision and environmental positioning with the historical perspective.
However, note the important differences. In the traditional view system coordination emanates from above and
cascades down through the lower-echelon system and its subsystem components to achieve a goal. In a complexity
perspective organizational adaptation is emphasized both internally and with the external environment. While both
emphasize increasing discretion and increasing leadership at-a-distance (indirect leadership discussed later) from those
at increasingly higher hierarchical levels (ala Dubin, 1979) the complexity perspective emphasizes the management of
interdependencies rather than controls over process or outcomes. Rather than goals, a complexity perspective of the top
leadership domain emphasizes evolutionary strategies.
By and large, then, the complexity scenario and the historical treatment of leadership domains are different. What
they attempt to understand and/or predict is different, the variables they identify are quite separable and the causal
mechanisms do not overlap. Yet, both appear to provide a compelling approach to the analysis of the domains of
managerial leaders.4
6. Toward a reconciliation of the order for free and hierarchical perspectives
As this quick review of the leadership domain research suggests, leadership researchers face a number of important
and fundamental challenges in understanding how, when and why individuals and teams in upper and middle echelon
organizational positions can or cannot facilitate or direct the type of emergence expected to yield greater fitness. From
the extensions of Jaques by Jacobs and McGee (2001), it seems clear that as researchers move up the organizational
hierarchy there is an increase in the intricacy of the factors managerial leaders should consider as well as the time
horizon for analysis. These complexity and time notions are in stark contrast to the earlier mentioned typical emphasis
in studies of strategic leadership where the criteria are often immediate financial gains (for a review see House &
Podsakoff, 1994, and for a counter example see, Bertrand & Schoar, 2003 who showed that there were significant lag
effects to uncover a positive effect from an executive change).
As noted above, much of the leadership domain literature focuses on managerial leaders and leadership moving
from the top down in a well-organized hierarchy with assumed clear-cut roles for leaders by hierarchical domain.
Within these hierarchical systems there is also a natural focus on individual and team considerations. This presumption
of hierarchical stability often deflects researchers from a more comprehensive analysis of the demands, constraints and
choices (Stewart, 1982a, b) facing managerial leaders. Instead of a focus on differing systemic issues, researchers often
concentrate on very detailed analyses of the leader and/or team factors managerial leaders should consider. Over a
series of studies the lists of leader and team characteristics grows and the consideration of non-leader factors shrinks
and the forest is lost for a concentration on the trees.
In concluding this section we suggest that researchers should consider some basic differences in conventional views
and a complexity perspective. We do not suggest that either is wrong, both are just incomplete. We can examine this
incompleteness in terms of (a) the heresy of decomposition (b) committing heresy for focus, (c) the essential roles of
position holders, (d) externalities and roles, (e) roles by echelon, (f) the issue of attachment presumed by conventional
and complexity views, and (g) the analysis of indirect leadership.
6.1. The required heresy of decomposition
Before we can deal with a partial integration of the complexity and conventional views, it is important to deal with
the question of decomposability. While the conventional literature is replete with detailed decompositions (e.g., by
echelon, by unit of analysis, by department, by role), some complexity theorists tend to argue (see, Cilliers, 1998) that
with non-linearity arising from element interactions, decomposition prohibits an understanding of a complex adaptive
4
In concluding this section and transitioning to its role in the order for free argument, it is important to reiterate that we regard the emphasis on
Jaques as notional. That is, it is suggestive but subject to modification as necessary to provide the flexibility necessary to link it with the order for
free concept.
system (a form of reductionism as it were). At the extreme it can be argued that to fully understand a complex adaptive
system the model of the system needs to be as complex as the system itself (Ashby, 1952).
Further, to decompose a system consisting of interactive elements yielding non-linear interaction over time is to
artificially eliminate some potentially important interactions. Simplification and decomposition would be similar to
eliminating numbers from a string of multiplications by dividing the numbers into groups and adding their sums. And
yet any application of complexity science will call for simplification and decomposition. Also, some of the key
concepts from a complexity perspective suggest that in a complex adaptive system not all the elements are interactive
and not all the interactions among the interactive elements yield non-linear dynamics. For us, applications of
complexity science call for a clear understanding of the system to be analyzed, the rules used for simplification and the
choices made for decomposition. No doubt, in our above system definition, simplification and decomposition is wrong
for some and only partially correct for others.
Organizations are not unknown entities and many scholars have discussed issues of systems definition,
simplification and decomposition (see Hall's discussion of the nature and types of organizations in Hall, 2002). Finally,
organizations are not strange entities from space. For present purposes, we accept the notion that organizations are
legitimated collective systems that seek multiple goals and may evolve into complex adaptive systems. We also accept
Parsons' notion that some organizations seek to provide economic contributions and we focus on these systems
(Parsons, 1960). The collectives we emphasize are aggregates of roles held by individuals and units comprised of
individuals holding roles. We emphasize roles and units rather than individuals simply because an individual may hold
many roles in many units inside and outside the organization.
At the same time, we implicitly accept two related notions. First, roles and units are created by an organization as
well as constituting the organization. Second, roles and units are created by individuals and thus, individuals also create
organizations. In other terms, organizations are social systems replete with individual discretion. We also recognize that
organizations are legitimated systems permitted to act as if they were legal persons. Thus, organizations but not the
people who perform the roles own things. So, for instance, the organization may own a patent or hold intellectual
property separate from those held by individuals who perform roles in the organization (cf. Boal, Hunt, & Jaros,
2003).5 In short, organizations are not just collections of individuals. The roles and units that evolve and their
interaction are as critical to understanding leadership impacts as are the individuals performing the roles and the
individuals in a unit.
There are two other important points for the analysis of managerial leadership domains. One is that elements (here
agents holding roles) in the system are ignorant of the behavior of the system as a whole but become more
knowledgeable as they move up the hierarchy even though no person or unit knows everything. Two, an interaction
among the elements has a short range impact where the impact may be amplified, suppressed or altered as it disperses
into the larger system. We draw on these characteristics as well as other insights from complexity theory in the
discussion of managerial leadership. For now we use some of the CAS characteristics for systemic decomposition.
6.2. Old useful notions and complex adaptive systems — committing heresy for focus
First, let us separate relatively simple organizations from complicated ones and from complex ones. Here, we deal
only with complex organizations or organizations that have evolved into complex adaptive economic systems (see
Cilliers, 1998). In other words, as stated earlier with the highlander qualifications, we restrict the analysis to large
organizations with dynamic and diverse technologies operating in settings characterized by uncertainty and high
interdependence with an economic function (see, Osborn et al., 2002 for a more complete discussion of these
characteristics and Levinthal, 1997 for a discussion of adaptation and selection over time).
There are numerous definitions of CAS. Our interpretation of Cilliers (1998) work suggests that complicated
systems may be separated from complex ones. Complicated systems can be understood accurately via decomposition
because they are not characterized by unpredictable non-linear interaction. As alluded to in our highlander discussion,
complex systems are composed of and the result of non-linear interactions among systems elements with unpredictable
5
Of course our focus on economic organizations, roles and units is but one way of looking at organizations. Others have focused on organizations
as a set of incomplete contracts, or organizations as collections of individuals seeking a common goal or organizations as a system of consciously
coordinated activities (see, Boal, Hunt, & Jaros, 2003; Hall, 2002). However, we think our view helps us integrate prior work and understand more
about multiple leadership domains.
consequences over time. Thus, they are extremely difficult to decompose without a very important loss of
understanding since the decomposition cuts through some non-linear interactions.
Beyond this non-linearity, we interpret Cilliers (1998) to suggest that many complex systems (a) have a large
number of elements with a history that partially accounts for the system's current behavior, (b) are characterized by rich
interaction among elements (e.g. any element influences the system and is influenced by many other elements), (c)
contain interactions that usually have a fairly short range (e.g., immediate neighbors but can have wide-ranging
influence), (d) have feedback loops where interaction feeds back on itself directly or indirectly (so called recurrency)
and (e) are open systems that must import more energy than they export (a so-called stable equilibrium in terms of a
balance in inputs and outputs is death). However, as noted by one reviewer, it is not necessary for there to be a large
number of interacting elements for markedly unpredictable behavior to emerge. Three is plenty to generate chaotic
dynamics (i.e., the classic three-body problem in physics).
Second, as we previously indicated, we assume it is possible to create three managerial leadership domains
consistent with Jaques' notions of system, organizational and direct production domains. However, unlike Jaques we
explicitly include non-managers in each of the domains as opposed to simply in the lowest echelon production domain.
While it is possible to create these leadership domains for analysis, this point should not be misinterpreted. The
domains are far from clearly bounded distinct entities operating within definable organizational boundaries. For
instance, membership of the three domains may overlap as a person may hold a role in both the system and the
organization domains. While choices and actions made in all domains influence choices and actions made in every
other domain, there is a very clear power differential. Role holders in the systems domain have the power to establish
the definition of roles and units for the other domains and select individuals (or at least types of individuals) to hold
these positions. As we emphasize below, the extent to which individual role holders accept these decisions may be
problematic and subject to considerable interpretation and alteration.
It is important to note that the organizational and production domains for all of the complex adaptive systems in our
analysis are also organized horizontally through formal choices ratified in the systems domain. We have chosen our
term “ratified” carefully. In some complex adaptive systems, role holders in the systems domain may specify the roles
and unit compositions in the organization and production domains. In other complex adaptive systems the roles and
unit composition for either the organization or production domains may emerge from below to be ratified at the system
level. Thus, one of the key questions for the analysis of managerial leadership becomes the type and character of the
direct and indirect (described shortly), and emergent leadership involved in defining the rules of unit composition.
The composition of units in the organizational domain may well follow conventional lines and conform to neat
divisions by line and staff, by function or by product. It also is possible that the organizational domain may be replete
with task forces, temporary committees, cross-functional teams, or matrix type structures. Some of the units considered
within the organizational domain may also be parts of other complex adaptive systems or what many recognize as
alliance and network relationships (see, Jacobs & McGee, 2001; Osborn, 2005). In a similar manner, the composition
of the system domain may include role holders whose primary identification is with other economic systems (e.g.
members of the board of directors or representatives of powerful stockholders, suppliers or distributors). In other
words, each of the domains is expected to be very messy, very fluid and very dynamic. However, to understand some of
the leadership challenges it is necessary to take a still picture to chart some of the more prominent characteristics.
6.3. The essential roles of position holders
In a bureaucratic view of leadership, there is little doubt that the essential role requirement of position holders in
most conventional analyses of leadership is to accomplish assigned goals. While the goals sought by leaders are
expected to become more complex or at least more complicated and have a longer time horizon as one moves up the
organizational ladder (e.g., Jacobs & McGee, 2001), it is still presumed that goals are assigned to position holders by
their superiors. At the very top for instance, finance researchers are little better than their strategic leadership
counterparts in assigning specific types of financial targets to the most senior members of a firm (see, Bertrand &
Schoar, 2003; Waldman et al., 2001 for reviews).
With the assumption that senior managerial leaders should and do develop a strategy for the firm, it is simply a
matter of following means–ends chains to derive the specific goals for any particular subunit in the organization. In a
bureaucratic view of leadership all goals cascade down and the question of which performance targets the position
holder is to achieve is outside of the question of leadership.
In a bureaucratic view of leadership, the key constraints on managerial leaders are also derived in a similar manner
by examining the formal structure to identify a series of budget, human resource, technology and process specifications
to estimate the degree and areas of discretion. To this internal list, the system may be opened to environmental
influences such as volatility and uncertainty. The key choices, by default, concern how to cope with externalities,
influence immediate subordinates and craft a method to reach the assigned targets with existing budgets, personnel,
technology and processes.
Of course, as one moves up the organization it is expected that there will be fewer internal constraints and greater
external pressures. Interestingly, in many conventional leadership studies, alterations in many demands, constraints and
choices, are considered management, not leadership (cf. Kotter, 1988). Thus, a senior managerial leader making a
serious error in the budget, the technology or the structure of the firm is faulted for poor management, not inadequate
leadership. Going back to our leadership definition, while managerial leaders in the most senior echelons are expected
to have the greatest discretion, too many analyses of leadership ignore important areas of choice and implicitly treat
these areas of choice as leadership constraints (cf. Stewart, 1982a, b).
In contrast to the bureaucratic model of leadership, complexity theory reverses the pattern. The target for the firm is
established in terms of fitness and organizations are encouraged to operate near the edge of chaos (cf. Marion, 1999).
Of course, as mentioned earlier, these terms are rarely defined with any precision. It is often not possible to develop a
clear-cut means–ends chain to specify specific targets for subordinate units. Instead of senior management developing
a strategy and driving it down the organization in a mechanical way, the strategy is to emerge from within the
organization (cf. Marion, 1999). Thus, at all levels the demands placed on managerial leaders are also choices–choices
of what is to be desired and how desires are to be accomplished, not just how to reach a goal via individual influence
within a position. These demands and choices emanate from the requirement that each unit become more fit and thus
the demands move up the organizational hierarchy. For a complexity analysis, there is no restriction that the analysis of
leadership is separate from management or strictly confined to interpersonal influence.
Beyond facilitating the fitness of lower-level units, complexity theory is, unfortunately, extremely vague about the
types of demands and constraints placed on managerial leaders by echelon. In the base literature from outside the social
sciences there appears to be comparatively little appreciation that organizations are hierarchies. Thus, hierarchical
treatment is difficult to locate, with the exception of Baliga and Hunt (1988), and we could not find any additional
specific references, analyzing the constraints on individuals at different hierarchical levels. Further, to simplify the
analysis many writers drawing from complexity theory maintain a concentration on the organization as a whole (e.g.,
Leventhal, 1999; Osborn et al., 2002). For instance, if an increase in fitness is desired, then the whole organization
would need to move to a higher fitness plane.
We contend that in examining domains it is necessary to decompose the whole organization into the analysis of
meaningful units along the lines that the complex adaptive system has used historically. We suggest that researchers
choose identifiable units of analysis as defined within the system itself. Our highlander illustration is consistent with
this if the current governmental units are included in the analysis.
Combined, then the decomposition analysis can focus on a comparatively simple vertical cut into top, middle and
bottom and a comparatively few horizontal cuts separating line (operating) from staff (service) units. Of course, the
horizontal cut disappears for the analysis of leadership at the top. While such a simple decomposition appears to violate
the expectation of non-linear interactions among elements, we suggest this vertical and horizontal separation may
actually aid researchers in identifying the most likely locales for non-linear dynamics. Researchers may concentrate on
those vertical and horizontal units most subject to environmental co-evolutionary dynamics. For instance, researchers
may want to spend more time examining the interaction among senior managerial leaders and R&D units than
organizational leaders and accounting units (see the discussions of vision, innovation and planning for innovation by
Mumford et al. (e.g., Mumford et al., in press; Mumford et al., 2002; Strange & Mumford, 2005). This work, like much
of Mumford's recent research, also shows the imposition of constraints by managerial leaders and the social processes
from below that influence managerial choices.
6.4. Externalities and essential roles of position holders
Under a complexity perspective, major demands and constraints on the system emanate from outside the system's
boundaries (Marion, 1999). Similar to traditional views, environmental uncertainty plays a key role. However, there is
also implicit recognition of the importance of environmental munificence and external interdependence in determining
whether a fitness plane is more or less beneficial to the system. Put another way, it seems clear to us that the analysis of
externalities in the traditional and complexity perspectives identifies similar factors even though the causal
mechanisms linking these factors to leader demands, constraints and choices is quite different as are the essential
expectations placed on the managerial leaders. Traditionally, environmental uncertainty has been considered
dysfunctional for rigidly structured bureaucratic firms as well as a major condition to which the organization must
adjust (see, Burns & Stalker, 1961; Thompson, 1967). For instance, firms are to buffer themselves from environmental
uncertainty (cf. Thompson, 1967). Complexity theory, in contrast, implies that placid environments provide fewer
opportunities for exploitation by the system (cf. Dooley, 2004).
In terms of leadership analysis, it is clear that the degree of uncertainty has mixed effects. From traditional
theory emphasizing stability, a placid environment does not place discounting penalties on managerial leaders
regardless of their echelon. It is also quite clear that the lack of environmental volatility promotes stagnation (in
terms of complexity analysis) and stability (in terms of classical theory). Thus, the question of whether
environmental volatility (particularly the lack of volatility) is a constraint seems to depend upon the desired
condition imposed by the researcher and the specific criteria to be explained and predicted. For instance, in
predicting near term financial performance, stability would be desirable, while in an analysis predicting innovation
success, researchers might prefer an uncertain setting as in Mumford and associates' innovation work (cf. Mumford
et al., in press).
Concerning environmental munificence, both perspectives suggest that higher munificence places fewer constraints
on all managerial leaders at all domains and echelons. As for interdependence, again there is a mixed picture depending
upon the researcher's specification of the desired condition and the specific criteria. For instance, following Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978), heavy reliance upon a powerful outside firm (high singular interdependence) is not considered
positive and can be expected to yield executive action to reduce dependence, deflect dependence and/or co-opt the
external entity. In terms of fitness, high singular interdependence may reduce the unit's flexibility and divert attention
away from innovation. Thus, higher singular interdependence may potentially push the unit away from the edge of
chaos and into chaos itself.
6.5. Roles by echelon, one more time
So what does the previous discussion mean for the essential roles by echelon? From a conventional perspective the
traditional analysis suggests that the unit head needs to appropriately react to high singular interdependence to protect
the unit. If the singular interdependence at the top of an independent unit (an organization) is expected by the strategy
and economics literature and is assumed by stockholders via the financial markets, then protection from this external
threat is an essential feature of the most senior managerial leaders of the firm. In the conventional literature this singular
interdependence cannot be easily avoided. From a complexity perspective, however, singular reliance upon any
particular external entity is potentially dysfunctional and a leadership failure. In a complexity view, the managerial
leader is to facilitate the development of extensive complementary interdependence—that is, balance positively
reinforcing power relations between and among the firm and its suppliers, distributors, and other members of its
immediate environment.
At the extremes, the implication for specifying the role of lower-echelon managerial leaders is profound. If there is a
high singular interdependence, it seems logical that the agenda established by the most senior managerial leaders to
cope with the singular interdependence cascades down the hierarchy. Conversely, if the expectation of these senior
managerial leaders is the development of complementary interdependence, then the agenda moves upward from below
as if in an imaginary upside down cascade, as it were. Most firms, as noted below, are not expected to be at either the
top-down or bottom-up extreme.
We suggested in the introduction to this Section 6, that both traditional and complexity perspectives were limited. To
us, it appears realistic to assume that the essential demands, constraints and choices on the senior-most managerial
leaders emanate from both outside and from bottom-up inside the system. There is no singular source and there is no
automatic way of assuming away one source regardless of how convenient that assumption might be. While most
executives of even the largest business firms would gladly construct a world without relatively high singular
dependence upon stockholders, few see this as a reality. Thus, we suggest response to the external agenda of a singular
external source of interdependence is common in many firms. If so, lower-level echelons are subject to cascading down
of the responses by their superiors. The choices of superiors become constraints for subordinate managerial leaders.
However, this is not the only flow. We suggest that if the system is to move toward higher fitness, the essential task of
the superior contains demands by the subordinates stemming from their choices to develop higher fitness and more
extensive complementary interdependence (cf. McKelvey, 1999, 2004; Mumford et al., in press).
6.6. The issue of attachment
So far our analyses have been quite scientific realist-oriented (cf. Boal et al., 2003). From the mechanical model of
the conventional analyses and the functional requirements of the complexity theorists we almost have organizations
populated by robotic organization people. Of course, such is not the case. For some time, we have wondered where the
dedicated managers populating conventional research studies actually come from. Our experience with managers and
executives suggests they tend to be similar to the rest of us and have a mind of their own. So a major issue for us is, why
are individuals who are attached to organizations willing to comply with leader initiatives and desire to improve the
fitness of their units? However, we do note that in CAS's, cooperative aggregates are argued to emerge from the
interdependent interaction of agents seeking selfish ends.
In the conventional leadership studies, an examination of attachment and compliance issues is similar to that found
in Etzioni (1961, 1975). He essentially argued that the basis of compliance in organizations emphasized (1) alienation
in response to coercion or (2) instrumentalism in response to remuneration or (3) morality in response to normative
appeals. There are direct parallels in the most recent leadership literature with the division between transactional
leadership (based on instrumentalism) and transformational (or, for some, charismatic or even authentic) leadership
(based on normative appeals as in Bass, 1990 and extended by the recently emphasized authentic leadership (cf. Avolio
& Gardner, 2005).
For us, the notion of coercion as an appeal has itself been transformed to the externalities facing both the leader and the
group. The hammer on subordinates does not fall because the leader threatens individual subordinates with termination, it
is because the leader indicates he/she must respond to externalities. It is not the leader that threatens the group or individuals
but external competition or other external entities (e.g., governmental requirements, customer demands, and/or union
specifications). To fight against outside threats, the leader is to emphasize aspects of instrumentalism and/or normative
appeals. The leader is the solution, not the source of coercion. The leader is to create meaning systems for subordinates so
they can make sense of their work.
In many respects analysis using complexity theory also emphasizes instrumentality and places coercion external to
the system. While some authors have noted the potential importance of normative appeals in reaching higher fitness
(e.g., Marion, 1999), complexity theory raises the specter of yet another basis for attachment and compliance–
affiliation stemming from interdependent dialog and discussion to stimulate emergence—interdependency creates an
imperative to ally oneself. That is, the individual chooses to develop, nurture and cultivate a social relationship with
others in the organization rather than stand alone.
In his original explanation, Etzioni suggested that a stress on coercion would be matched with alienation,
instrumentalism with utilitarianism and that normative compliance would be matched with moral commitment. If
affiliation stemming from dialog and discussion is stressed, we think it will be matched with social construction. We
think this social construction can be viewed as a form of team mental modeling and social knowledge. At the team
mental model-level we are suggesting that important social construction comes from dialog and discussion based upon
the education and experience of organizational members when affiliation is stressed as a basis for attachment.
Specifically, we estimate that a key aspect of organizational social construction is concerned with team mental models
dealing with both issues of internal integration as well as external adaptation (cf. Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).
Collections of individuals may interact and develop their own goals and ways of working together. This emphasis on
emergent processes and goals is similar to expectations drawn from cultural analyses. Groups of individuals are
expected to develop ways of living together (so called issues of internal integration as seen in Schein, 1985). The desire
for affiliation can also be translated into issues of external cultural adaptation—what the group wants to accomplish. It
is comparatively easy to understand order for free if the group alone chooses how members are to work and live
together and decide what it wants to be accomplished.
If affiliation yields social construction it is also clear that individuals can collectively create their own environment.
The environment is not totally imposed from the outside; dialog and discussion can create a collective view of the
setting. Dialog and discussion may also create emergent work processes (i.e., a key aspect of technology), an operative
informal structure, clear or vague rules of conduct, and the like. All of this is far from new to leadership researchers.
For us, what is new is a switch of perspective to suggest that the managerial leader may have a substantial influence
on social knowledge production by those at lower levels and echelons. In most conventional analyses of leadership,
influence attempts based on instrumental or normative appeals are expected to alter such factors as emergent work
processes and/or informational structures without altering the form of commitment and attachment of the individual to
the organization. For instance, the leader provides meaning consistent with a normative appeal. We are proposing that
by emphasizing social knowledge development the managerial leader can tap into a different basis of attachment to
influence social knowledge construction. While this dynamic involving affiliation has yet to be investigated by
leadership researchers, it is an intriguing extension from a complexity perspective and might open new avenues of
inquiry.
If we advocated a cultural-based analysis one would normally expect an emphasis on values and attitudes and leader
influence processes to alter values and attitudes. Why do we downplay values and attitudes and emphasize information
and knowledge? The answer comes directly from Weber (1947), for whom hierarchy is ubiquitous. Higher and lower-
echelon leaders and subordinates do not necessarily share the same values and attitudes.
Further, we argue that the organizational hierarchy distinguishes and reaffirms important class differences.
Managerial leaders are not workers any more than officers are enlisted personnel. Executives are not just managerial
leaders any more than generals are just officers. Profound differences in status and class are expected to mirror
differences in values and attitudes and to be difficult to change and evoke a moral response, even with an appeal to
transcendent values. This is the case even with immediate subordinate managerial leaders and employees, let alone
those more distant. We suggest managerial leaders can more easily alter some of the information going into subordinate
managerial leader and employee groups and these managerial leaders, at higher levels, may alter key aspects of
knowledge development (see, Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001).
Knowledge and information may be hierarchically as well as group specific. Jaques and associates argue that the
knowledge required of a position holder is more complex the higher the echelon and higher-echelon executives need
more information. We also want to emphasize the differences in content by echelon. Specifically, knowledge
development from dialog and discussion is by its very nature limited by the number of interacting agents in a group.
What the group member knows about the environment and internal operations, then, is specific to a group. Since
members overlap hierarchically, each can bring some information from lower-echelon groups into the higher-level
group. However, the development of knowledge from information filtering up or filtering down is likely to be
extremely limited. Each member is most likely to represent up the organization a positive picture of subordinate groups
and represent down only a small part of the knowledge developed above even while gaining much internet knowledge.
The echelons are, thus, only very loosely connected.
We realize that most traditional analyses suggest that the echelons are tied closely together. As evidence of loose
coupling we turn to complexity theory. A complexity view would suggest that tight vertical coupling would yield chaos
just as would tight coupling across units (see, Carroll & Burton, 2000). We suggest that the echelons are much more
tightly linked in the eyes of researchers than reality suggests.
Further, the manipulation of information in an organization may range from explicit and overt to implicit and covert.
Here, we are merely suggesting that the range of choice over when, where, if and how to manipulate information
increases by echelon. Thus, in addition to the formal authority differences by echelon yielding greater choice to upper
echelons, researchers should also consider the greater range of choice over the manipulation of information and the
ability to stimulate knowledge development.
Interestingly, we see a disconnection between the more traditional views and the complexity analyses in regard to
knowledge content. Most scholars expect that the content of knowledge development systematically differs by echelon
(see, Hunt, 1991). The issue is the application of this knowledge to find a higher level of fitness. In a more traditional
view, it is up to senior executives to change the strategy and then drive the strategy implementation down the
organizational hierarchy. While this sounds as if it moves the whole organization forward, it seems quite unlikely that
senior executives would have sufficient knowledge content regarding technologies, markets/customers, and product/
service variations to develop an effective business strategy all by themselves.
Strategic leadership researchers tend to substitute specific content knowledge with a call for the top echelon to
develop an integrative and appealing vision (cf. Sosik et al., 2004, p. 83) or some type of generic strategy. For us, the
specific content knowledge to develop an effective strategy is more likely to rest in the organizational domain—the
middle echelons. While the problem for the systems domain executives (echelons VII and VI) is to find out the
appropriate content knowledge from below, the issue for those in the organizational domain is to promote sufficient
dialog and discussion to find an integrative solution. In other terms, one can argue that the essential role requirements
for the systems domain executives should include the challenge of tapping the dispersed context knowledge of the
organizational domain while that of the organizational domain is to develop sufficient connections across the units to
develop a coherent and collective notion of strategy.
Some complexity writers also place a heavy emphasis on knowledge arising from dialog and discussion or use
information as an energetic factor in stimulating movement toward a higher fitness plane (cf. Dooley, 2004). For the
analysis of the previously mentioned demands, constraints, and choices, we are suggesting that (l) the degree to which a
role holder can influence the development of knowledge from dialog and discussion varies systematically by echelon,
or at least domain (2) the content systematically varies by echelon or domain and (3) the ability to use this information
in moving to greater fitness varies by echelon or domain.
The implication from a complexity perspective is that emergent knowledge yields another potential power source of
formal leader influence. As we argued previously, the base of the influence is affiliation. The formal leader is in a
position to partially shape emergent knowledge culture. Thus, in addition to coercive, instrumental and normative bases
for influence, affiliation expressed via encouragement of dialog and discussion also becomes important.6
It is also obvious to us, that the neat matches between the basis of commitment and the reaction initially proposed by
Etzioni detail an ideal dominant pattern. We contend that all four bases are operative in most organizations whether
they are placed inside or outside his model. Just because coercive aspects are labeled external does not suggest that they
are not operative. Similarly, just because a managerial leader does not evoke instrumentalism does not mean it is
irrelevant. Also, in some organizations for some managerial leaders, one of the four bases is more dominant than the
others. The key, we believe, is to include all four bases and examine influence up, across, and down the hierarchy.
6.7. Indirect effects of managerial leadership
We have discussed, more than once, the different core task requirements of echelon VII and VI systems domain
managerial leaders. Recall that in traditional views these requirements involve a heavy dose of goal setting and strategy,
as well as system design and maintenance for the system as a whole. Many would argue that these kinds of leadership
of activities tend to be managerial in contrast to the additional face-to-face traditional leadership in activities
emphasized more heavily at lower domains and echelons.
These systems domain leadership activities are considered indirect or higher-order effects in contrast to the direct,
first order, face-to-face effects, which tend to be emphasized increasingly as the lower domains and echelons are
considered (cf. Hunt, 1991). These indirect effects are quite wide-ranging and important for they help establish the rules
of the game for those deep within the organization even though these people may never come in contact with those
from whom the indirect leadership emanates.
Some examples are human resource planning (succession planning, et cetera), and empowerment programs (self-
managed teams, et cetera; cf. Yukl, 2006), which can take place with the encouragement of indirect and direct managerial
leadership. In summary, it can be hypothesized that the ratio of indirect to direct effects as a function of the managerial
leader, at each echelon, tends to become smaller from the systems to the organizational, and finally to the direct production
domain. For example, a 70% indirect, 30% direct split equals 2.33 at the top and a 20%/80% split at the bottom = 0.25.
These indirect vs. direct sources of managerial leadership have an impact on the order for free argument of
complexity theorists. The indirect effects, especially in combination with direct effects, can help plant the seeds of
emergence or hurt the emergence of order and the kind of order emanating from below. For example, what some have
termed high performance organizations, or HPO's (cf. Schermerhorn, Hunt, & Osborn, 2003), encourage a great deal of
freedom (seeking of order) as contrasted with traditional more hierarchical organizations.
Finally, we think it is important to define managerial leadership and management in a similar, if not identical manner
for those in the systems and organizational domains (leadership of) if one is to uncover indirect effects (see, Yukl &
6
It is important to stress a key point. Etizoni's (1961, 1975) analysis focused on individual reactions (aggregate individual level). The complexity-
based notion involving social construction is at a still more aggregate level of analysis. While individuals may possess extensive corporate social
knowledge developed from dialog and discussion with others, it appears unlikely all or even most individuals in a firm would share a similar set of
social constructions. We expect that collective intelligence will be dispersed with different social constructions by different interconnected
individuals. Organizational members may be loosely connected with one another up and across the organization via formal and informal networks
as well as the organization's formal hierarchy. Thus, the ability of more senior managerial leaders to tap into and integrate the collective knowledge
held in subordinate groups is problematic.
Lepsinger, 2004). Choices regarding strategy, structure, technology and the like are managerial leadership choices for
many in these domains. Further, individuals in these domains make important choices regarding which criteria are to be
emphasized. We think this choice is so important in examining the question of order that we discussed it early in this
article.
7. Summary and conclusion
In this article, we critically examined the view held by many complexity scientists that as complex adaptive systems
operating in turbulent environments, organizations tend to exhibit order for free behavior. That is, like the highlanders,
they will naturally self-organize to seek greater fitness. We compared and contrasted this perspective with the
traditional organization and leadership approaches emphasizing hierarchy in one form or another. Here we found a very
heavy emphasis on a desired order with important power and responsibility differences by leadership domain. In many
respects the traditional perspective reminds one of the bureaucrats who decided to “help” the highlanders. While the
order from the traditional view may be much more desirable, it may also threaten the fitness of a complex adaptive
system.
The dilemma for leaders and leadership researchers appears to be a direct analogy to our opening illustration. How
to “improve” highlander society without destroying it—how to identify and move toward a more desired order without
destroying the dynamic emergence needed to define it and get there? To unravel part of the dilemma we emphasized
five main points.
1. Not only is what highlanders have fundamentally different from what the bureaucrats want for them, both are
multidimensional. Whether defined in terms of fitness or goal attainment both “order for free” and desired order are
multifaceted. Beyond the expected differences by time and level of analysis, the comparison and contrast of
traditional and complexity views of order suggested (a) the virtual impossibility of developing a single integrated
theory of leadership effectiveness in the foreseeable future and (b) the necessity for researchers to specify the desired
order implicit in their studies to facilitate partial integration.
2. How highlanders get what they want (in terms of structure and process) is fundamentally different from how the
bureaucrats obtain it. In this section we argued that hierarchy is not only ubiquitous (Weber, 1947) but needs to be
explicitly incorporated into analyses of leadership with a consideration of three leadership domains. It is clear that
traditional views of leadership and complexity views both emphasize different hierarchical dynamics (top down
versus bottom up) but also stress different roles and influence processes for leaders by domain. While not
incompatible, traditional and complexity views cannot simply be reconciled by some magical balance between
extreme ends on a common set of leadership dimensions. We contended that partial reconciliation calls for
decomposition of organizations, an analysis of externalities, and examination of attachment and commitment to the
system
3. To understand highlanders called for analysis of village life rather than the whole societal view of the bureaucrats. In
this section we argued that decomposition of the organization is not only necessary but yields new challenges for
leadership researchers. It is necessary to understand the limited knowledge held by leaders in all domains. Yet,
decomposition needs to preserve ability to detect dynamic interaction. Decomposition also suggests loose coupling
across leadership domains, the necessity to combine analyses of direct and indirect influence (combine traditional
leadership with management) and an emphasis on studies where complex adaptive features are most likely to be
important.
4. For the highlanders singular dependence upon bureaucrats almost destroyed them. High singular interdependence
on a powerful external entity can be seen as a problem for complex adaptive systems because it yields an
overemphasis on top-down processes and a limited view of desired order. An emphasis on top-down processes to
achieve a restricted view of desired order may limit the influence attempts of leaders.
5. To effectively influence highlanders may call for an examination of why they are attached to their society and why
they comply. In this section we introduced the notion of affiliation as a basis for attachment/compliance. We
suggested that if affiliation stemming from dialog and discussion is stressed, we think it will be matched with social
construction. We think this social construction can be viewed as a form of team mental modeling and social
knowledge (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). To tap into this source of affiliation we suggested that both direct and
indirect views of new leadership dimensions would be appropriate.
Obviously each of these five points deals with one or a number of important and implicitly held assumptions in
many current leadership analyses. We think our comparison and contrast may be a starting point for leadership scholars
to reconceptualize leadership and develop new insights. The challenge is whether leadership scholars accept the order
of others or actively participate in the definition of a new desired order.
We concluded that while it is possible to have order for free in complex adaptive systems operating in turbulent
environments, it is unlikely in large-scale economic organizations. Instead, effective adaptation calls for a dynamically,
collectively-led system where bottom-up structuration emerges—structuration built around a desired order. Further, it
is critical to recognize that organizations are hierarchies and that individual discretion in all leadership domains is
necessary to establish and achieve a desired order. As a part of this compare and contrast interplay, we discussed the
emergence of various kinds of order and also emphasized possible paths forward to integrate analyses of complex
adaptive systems, hierarchy and traditional leadership approaches.
7.1. Conclusion: the application of order to leadership researchers
If it is reasonable to suggest that many leadership researchers are far from isolated theorists attempting to discover
truth, it is time for them to admit they are selecting a desired order and why this desired order is legitimate. While we
have criticized the strategy researchers for overemphasizing short-term efficiency (profitability ratios such as return on
assets), they are very clear about the desired order and those whom it serves. To us, the partial integration of complexity
views with leadership research offers the exciting opportunity to discuss a series of alternative desired orders. While
hierarchy is indeed ubiquitous (Weber, 1947) a hierarchy designed for short-term efficiency supported by
instrumentally evoking leadership in all managerial leadership domains need not be.
Many have recognized that the machine bureaucracy of the mid twentieth century is not the type of organization
needed to compete in the twenty-first century. Many have recognized that desired order emphasizing short-term profit
ratios is not as desirable as longer-term viability. Many also have recognized that much of the influence from the top of
the organization is indirect and at a distance. Finally, in contrast, many have recognized erroneously that the
organizational members are not often educated highly enough to contribute important organizational knowledge. In
contrast, few have recognized that the leadership needed for twenty-first century organizations is likely to be both
indirect and based on implementing the socially developed knowledge of distant managerial leaders and employees.
Here we charted linkages between traditional and complexity based views to explore the notion that while there is
order for free, a desired order is not. We believe it is possible for leadership researchers to lead all toward a new type of
organizational hierarchy with a supportive managerial leadership to compete in the twenty-first century. Leadership
researchers can throw off the shackles of the rigid nineteenth-century hierarchy and speak to the question of developing
dynamic emergent hierarchies that foster and support compassionate information-based influence in all leadership
domains. Twenty-first century leadership research does not need to yield to either the reoccurring frustration with the
lack of cumulative knowledge or the vain hope that somehow a singular visionary individual will transform our
outmoded organizations. Instead, future leadership research can recognize the new complexity science challenge and
develop a new order. This desired order will not be order for free. Such order for free should not be left to non-
leadership researchers to establish. This essay was designed to provide an early cut at such an order.
Acknowledgements
We acknowledge the assistance of A-Team Members: Adam Bailey, John Davis and Donna Hunt for help with this
manuscript.
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Role of Leadership

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The Leadership Quarterly 18 (2007) 319 – 340

Leadership and the choice of order: Complexity and hierarchical

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 313 577 4519.

1.1. Analysis of example using complexity concepts

1.2. The dilemma for leaders and leadership research

1.3. Objective and organization of article

3.1. Congruency between complexity analyses and traditional leadership studies

4. How is order achieved?

4.1. Non-linear dynamics

4.2. Traditional view of hierarchy and organizations to yield goal attainment

4.2.1. Historical treatment of hierarchy and strategic leadership

4.2.2. Tipping point and context

5. Suggestive hierarchical frameworks from the traditional literature

5.1. Jaques' framework

5.2. Task complexity by domain and echelon

5.3. Complexity views versus traditional perspectives

6. Toward a reconciliation of the order for free and hierarchical perspectives

6.1. The required heresy of decomposition

6.3. The essential roles of position holders

6.4. Externalities and essential roles of position holders

6.5. Roles by echelon, one more time

6.6. The issue of attachment

6.7. Indirect effects of managerial leadership

7. Summary and conclusion

7.1. Conclusion: the application of order to leadership researchers

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