Review: Greater and Lesser Evils in the War on Terrorism and Beyond

Reviewed Work(s): Counter-Terrorism, Aid, and Civil Society: Before and After the War
on Terror by Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind; Debating the War of Ideas by Eric D.
Patterson and John Gallagher; Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism:
Liberty, Security and the War on Terror by Andrew W. Neal
Review by: Brigitte L. Nacos
Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 2012), pp. 308-313
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23279998
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 International Studies Review (2012) 14, 308-313

Greater and Lesser Evils in the War on Terrorism

and Beyond
Review by Brigitte L. Nacos

Columbia University

Counter-Terrorism, Aid, and Civil Society: Before and After the War on Terror. By J
and Jeremy Lind. Houndsville, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 242 pp., $95.00 h
(ISBN-13: 978-0-230-22949-5).

Debating the War of Ideas. Edited by Eric D. Patterson and John Gallagher. New
grave Macmillan, 2009. 264 pp., $100.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-230-61936-4)

Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the War on
Andrew W. Neal. London and New York: Routledge, 2010. 186 pp., $130.00 h
(ISBN-13: 978-0-415-45675-3).

In dealing with the problem of terrorism, Paul Wilkinson warns, a libera

racy must never resort to "methods which are incompatible with liberal
humanity, liberty, and justice. It is a dangerous illusion to believe one c
tect' liberal democracy by suspending liberal rights and forms of gover
Moreover, Wilkinson (2001:115) cautions that repressive responses "play
hands of terrorists and, if prolonged, become totally counterproductive
books under review here contribute to the perennial debate about the n
consequences, and pros and cons of Western responses to domestic and i
tional terrorism. Following the attacks of 9/11, similar strikes thereafter
continuing threat of further terrorism, this debate has become more ur
divisive. While focusing on different aspects of the post-9/11 "war on te
and utilizing different methodologies, the three texts under review her
distinctive ways with the fundamental rights and values of liberal democr
how those liberties and ideals figure, rightly or wrongly, into post-9/1
tions and justifications of formal and informal measures taken in the n
anti- and counterterrorism. Either fully or partially, each book address
and problems involving Muslims in the Western diaspora and their bret
the Muslim world. The studies by Andrew W. Neal, Jude Howell, and Jere
as well as several chapter authors in the edited volume by Eric D. Patter
John Gallagher underscore Wilkinson's concerns about the consequ
illiberal responses to terrorism; however, several contributors to Patterso
gher are preoccupied with exposing Islam and the Koran as roots of
terrorism.

Debating the War of Ideas, edited by Patterson and Gallagher, is devoted to a far
ranging discussion of and comparisons between secular and religious principles
of the West and the Muslim world. Counter-Terrorism, Aid, and Civil Society by
Howell and Lind traces the increasing centrality of domestic and international
security consideration in international aid programs, especially during the "war
on terrorism," and how this trend affects civil society, especially Muslim groups,
at home and abroad. Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism by Neal pre
sents a critical examination of classical and modern-day political theorists' take

Nacos, Brigitte L. (2012) Greater and Lesser Evils in the War on Terrorism and Beyond. International Studies Review,
doi: 10.1111/j. 1468-2486.2012.01108.x
© 2012 International Studies Association

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 Brigitte L. Nacos 309

on the weight of liberty and security in exceptional times, while also l

theory and actual post-9/11 "emergency" practices, the latter primaril
expense of Muslims' civil liberties and human rights.
As I read Neal's captivating monograph about the politics of excep
general and during the "war on terrorism" in particular, I was reminde
ident George W. Bush's contradictory post-9/11 contributions to th
versus-security debate. Thus, on the first anniversary of 9/11, Bush sa
interview, "We will protect America but we will do so within the guid
the Constitution...the American people got to understand that the Cons
is sacred as far as I am concerned" (CBS News 2002). This was preci
argument that the defenders of civil liberty made in the aftermath of
terror attacks and continue to make today. But on another occasion, th
dent declared that the enemies in the war on terrorism must not be allowed to
use "the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself' (Lane 2002). This was and
remains the argument of those who call for extraordinary security measures,
even at the expense of certain civil liberties and human rights. The rational
here is the Hobbesian theorem that without security there will not be freedom
and that therefore security trumps liberty.
Bobbitt (2008:241) has invoked the image of "a needle oscillating between
two poles moving toward the pole of the State's power in times of national emer
gency or toward the pole of the People's liberty in times of tranquility." Neal,
too, notes that freedom and security are not stable values and that this mobility
makes them subject to changing referents in the liberty-security discourse and
therein lies the problem. Take, for example, the post-9/11 USA Patriot Act and
other antiterrorism laws adopted in the United States and in Europe—all
enacted in the name of security and ultimately the protection of free societies
Civil libertarians opposed certain provisions, but most saw the need for their
governments to acquire greater security powers in the face of what was widely
perceived as a time of exceptional threats. At issue was the proper balanc
between freedom and security. Ignatieff (2004) wrote that the choice wa
between existentially threatening evil and lesser evils and that "[s] ticking too
firmly to the law simply allows terrorists too much leeway to exploit our free
doms. Abandoning the rule of law altogether betrays our most valued instit
tions. To defeat evil, we may have to traffic in [lesser] evils."
For Neal, the paradox of this conventional security/liberty debate is its lack
of a clear distinction between the two values since "the language of freedom
and rights can be used both to legitimate and to oppose violent and illiber
practices" (p. 9). He turns to the discourse of exceptionalism and securitiza
tion theory to examine in detail the relationships between liberty and security
in classic and contemporary political thought with particular attention to the
works of Thomas Hobbes, Emanuel Kant, Georgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt,
and Michel Foucault. Unlike the contemporary liberty-versus-security debate,
he stresses that classical political theory recognizes the limits and contradi
tions of freedom. But the centerpiece and most valuable contribution to pos
9/11 counterterrorism discourse—and practices—is the author's critical analysis
of Schmitt's theory of exceptionalism, also in the context of securitization the
ory, and Foucault's challenge to and rebuke of the Schmittian tenet of the
sovereign's absolute prerogative to decide unilaterally what amounts to a
exception and what extra-legal measures can be taken in response to declare
emergencies.
In the book's most interesting chapters 6 ("Foucault in Guantanamo") and 7
("The rise and fall of Schmitt at the hands of Foucault and others"), Neal
examines Foucault's archeological approach as antidote to the abstract discourse
of exceptionalism a la Schmitt. Here, the issue of torture in the United States is
used to demonstrate that post-9/11 discourse of exception was not in response

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310 Greater and Lesser Evils in the War on Terrorism and Beyond

to something completely new, not an exceptional rupture, but rather "a novel
recombination of already-existing discourses, mechanisms and modalities of
power, some in active use already, others reawakened from dormancy" (p. 124).
In the United States, there were indeed earlier cases of discourses of exception
with executive overreaction. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the Espionage
Act of 1917, Sedition Act of 1918, and the internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II serve as examples. And references to and comparisons with
earlier cases were part of the immediate post-9/11 mass-mediated debate. On the
day of the attacks, for example, anchors, correspondents, and reporters of the
three TV networks ABC, CBS, NBC, and their interviewees and sources men
tioned the term "Pearl Harbor" 58 times. Yet, there was also immediate agree
ment that this was an utterly new type of crisis that called for exceptional
reactions.
Neal points to Foucault-inspired empirical research of actual practices in the
war on terrorism, including Guantanamo, that validate Foucault's rejection of a
discourse of exceptionalism around the central decision-making power and
"locate exceptionalism away from the sovereign center instead locating it in dis
persed officialdom" (p. 148). To be sure, a multitude of dispersed officials deal
with and decide upon regulations and operation procedures at all times—not
only in the United States. This was also the case in the post-9/11 years in many
respects and many places, including Guantanamo and similar US-run facilities.
But when it comes to torture, other "aggressive" interrogation practices, and
many more violations of domestic and international law, cutting the King's head
off and looking for a multitude of little sovereigns would ignore the starring role
of central decision makers. Indeed, the crucial role of the Bush White House in
both the discourse of exceptionalism and the manufacturing of unlawful
responses is well documented, most thoroughly with respect to the torturing of
"enemy combatants" (Greenberg and Dratel 2005).
In Counter-Terrorism, Aid, and Civil Society: Before and After the War on Terror,
Howell and Lind, too, deal with post-9/11 measures and the effects of what they
describe as an entrenched worldwide "war on terror" regime on the relationships
between government and civil society in Western countries and elsewhere. While
established in the post-Cold War years as a result of increased military roles in
humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions, the primacy of security became
more rigid as part of the war on terrorism that required groups and individuals to
make certain that none of their aid benefited terrorists. Laws and regulations,
Howell and Lind find, handcuff "INGOs and local groups working in conflict
areas where terrorists are alleged to operate" (p. 73). A recent example was the
2011 famine in parts of Somali controlled by the Islamist al-Shabaab organization
known to have ties to A1 Qaeda. Aid groups were not only hindered by al-Shabaab
violence but also by fears that they could violate laws prohibiting material assis
tance to terrorists since some of the aid was likely to fall into the hands of the Isla
mists. In this case, the Obama administration exempted aid organization from
the legal restraints and promised new guidelines for Somalia that would allow
emergency aid by NGOs who pledged to do their best to keep aid from being
exploited by a dangerous terrorist group. While Washington's handling of the
Somalia famine was another manifestation of the Obama administration's more
flexible approach to counterterrorism, the authors conclude nevertheless that the
overall security regime "remains deeply entrenched in a thick web of regulations,
policies, laws, institutional arrangements, and bureaucratic practices" (p. 3).
Ten years into the Afghanistan War, there were frequent reports about deterio
rating security in spite of the troop surge ordered by President Obama and the
implementation of a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. COIN
requires troops to live in close proximity to civil populations, win people's trust,
and build or rebuild not only schools and hospitals and infrastructure but, most

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 Brigitte L. Nacos 311

important, governmental institutions and processes as well as civic soci

in theory suited for a division of labor between the military and civili
ment agencies, retired Army colonel Douglas Macgregor concluded
counterinsurgency model "essentially rebrands the military, expa
authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and politi
warfare: Think the Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps" (Hastin
Howell and Lind found that the military's involvement in both hard a
measures has adverse effects on NGOs and their work because linking
dinating development efforts to military strategy "poses strategic an
dilemmas for NGOs, which wish to prioritize human security and claim
and impartiality in their operations" (p. 111). The result is that int
NGOs lose credibility and effectiveness among Afghans and become in
targets of attacks.
A few weeks into his presidency, President Barack Obama (2009) sum
the objectives in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, when he said
the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused g
rupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and
their return to either country in the future. That is the goal tha
achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just." But Vice Pre
Biden's advice to limit the Afghan military effort to the deploym
Special Operations Forces with the exclusive goal to defeat al Qaeda wa
by Obama. Biden's model, a small force with narrow military objectiv
have decreased the military's predominance in the area of develop
presumably, led to more positive effects on the work of NGOs and A
society. As Howell and Lind note, "the idea that a peaceful civil so
flourish or be strengthened in a context of armed conflict and where
interventions in development are accompanied by weapons of coercion
doxical" (p. 128).
Ten years after 9/11, security concerns in the United States and Eu
tinued to focus mostly, if not exclusively on Muslim communities and
their members' radicalization. Although terrorism by white supremac
immigration actors was on the rise long before the July 2011 attacks i
the exceptional security regime continued to single out Muslim co
and groups. In the United States, when the administration looke
Muslims as the usual suspects, political factions resented the mor
approach. Thus, when in early 2009 the US Department of Homeland S
released a report about a potential threat of terrorism by right-wing e
inside the United States, including some disgruntled veterans, there w
storm of protests by conservatives that the document was withdrawn. S
the virus of Islamophobia that infected Europe earlier spread in t
States as well.
In the hours, weeks, and months after the 9/11 strikes, there were many
voices in the news that emphasized the profound differences between the archi
tects and perpetrators of the terrorist spectacular, on the one hand, and the
mass of peaceful Muslims and their religion, on the other. On the day of the
attacks, for example, New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani said during an ad hoc
news conference, "Nobody should engage in group blame.... Nobody should
blame any group of people or any nationality or any ethnic group" (Federal
News Service 2001). He assured Arabs and Muslims in New York City of special
police protection and warned that anyone trying to harass them would be
arrested. But as time went by, divisive voices became more numerous and
louder than conciliatory ones. During the heated debates and angry protests
concerning the so-called Ground Zero mosque, Giuliani called the planned
project "a desecration" and noted that "[n]obody would allow something like
that at Pearl Harbor. Let us have some respect for who died there and why they

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312 Greater and Lesser Evils in the War on Terrorism and Beyond

died there" (Haberman 2010). Distinguishing between "good" and "bad" civil
society, the counterterrorism regime reserved the problematic side mostly for
Muslim groups and individuals. Increasingly, non-Muslims came to accept the
good/bad divide. As Howell and Lind observe, "the silence of mainstream civil
society in respect of the targeting of Muslim communities and the violation of
civil liberties has been alarming" (p. 73).
The construction of Muslims and Islam as inherently problematic and related
to terrorism, on the one hand, and the rejection and modification of that con
struct, on the other hand, guide the discussions and arguments that 16 authors
make in the volume, Debating the War of Ideas, edited by Patterson and Gallagher.
Albeit more scholarly, theoretical, and less passionate, the narratives reflect the
sharp divisions in the current public debate about compatibility and incompati
bility of Western Judeo-Christian and Eastern Islamic religious, cultural, and
political doctrines and traditions.
Several authors argue that the jihadist war on the United States and other
democracies is not simply fought by extremists who misuse their religion but that
the roots of this sort of terrorism are at the core of Islam itself. These authors
point to passages in the Quran and how violent Islamists use this text to justify
their deeds. To drive this point home, Raymond Ibrahim ends his essay (chapter
5) with the same quote by nineteenth-century philosopher James Lorimer that
he mentions on a previous page: "So long as Islam endures, the reconciliation
of its adherents, even with Jews and Christians, and still more with the rest of
mankind, must continue to be an insoluble problem." Robert Spencer (chapter
16) and Walid Phares (chapter 2) have harsh words for those in the West who
defend Islam, the religion, and differentiate between peaceful mainstream
Muslims and militant Islamists. Among their culprits are former presidents Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, current
president Barack Obama, the mainstream media (Spencer), and government
advisers from an "academia sympathetic to Islamists" (Phares). Presumably, they
put several of their fellow contributors to this volume into the group of apolo
gists, Karen Armstrong (chapter 4) among them. Noting that Muslim extremists
cite passages from the Koran selectively to justify jihad, she reminds Westerners
that "there is far more violence in both the Jewish scriptures and the New Testa
ment than in the Quran."
Still other authors argue that the discourse that matters most is taking place
inside Muslim societies between absolutists or militant Islamists on the one side
and pluralists or reformist Muslims on the other. But whether they see most o
all a struggle within Muslim communities or a clash between the Western and
Muslim worlds, most authors are either uncertain or gloomy concerning th
ultimate outcome of this "war of ideas."
While contributors to Debating the War of Ideas or other authors have discusse
similar topics and taken similar positions elsewhere, Patterson and Gallagh
managed to select and present a wide range of views in a single volume that is
accessible to college students and interested general readers. What Howell a
Lind reveal about the links between counterterrorism, aid and development, an
civil society in their interesting volume should be of particular interest for s
dents of international and public affairs as well as officials in government
including military leaders, and international and domestic NGOs in donor and
recipient countries. Neal's scholarly book is recommended for undergradua
and graduate students, but decision makers would be well advised to read a
learn from this important work as well.

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 Brigitte L. Nacos 313

References

Bobbitt, Philip. (2008) Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Knopf.
CBS News. (2002) 60 Minutes, Sept. 11.
Federal News Service. (2001) Guiliani News Conference, Sept. 11, 2001, Lexis/Nexis electronic
archives.

Greenberg, Karen J., and Joshua L. Dratel. (2005) The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Haberman, Maggie. (2010) Rudy GZ Mosque is a "desecration," "decent Muslims" won't be
offended. Politico, August 2, available at http://www.politico.com/blogs/maggiehaberman/
0810/Rudy_Mosque_is_a_desecration_.html, accessed June 1, 2011.
Hastings, Michael. (2010) The Run-Away General. Rolling Stone, June 22, Available at http://
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236?RS_show_page=0, accessed June 28, 2010.
Ignatieff, Michael. (2004) Lesser Evils. New York Times Magazine. Available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/05/02/magazine/lesser-evils.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. (Accessed May 2, 2012.)
Lane, Charles. (2002) Fighting Terror vs. Defending Liberties. Washington Post, Weekly Edition,
Sept. 9-15.
Wilkinson, Paul. (2001) Terrorism versus Democracy. London: Frank Cass.

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