Mueller Report With OCRed Text

U.S.
Departmentof Justice
-WorkPreduet // Preteeted
Report On The Investigation Into

Russian Interference In The
2016 Presidential Election
VolumeI of II
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, II

Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c)
Washington, D.C.
March 2019
U.S. Departmentof Justice
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U.S. Department of Justice
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TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUMEI
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME F cssssssesseseneveesvescssnsinsstevncsnesaenkensenesvesi on ccvvexvenansonienianianensesearteventsrersives t
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME L....ccscccceseeeeeseceeesseecesieeesirsienesseseseesseseeseisennenseeinaeeee 4

I. THE SPECIAL. COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION sssssrsssessvscsrssstssstceansanestsiorenveveveovevensvasnstieneveevevervessvenns 11
II, RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN....ssssssessesessesssesesessenenensscseaeseseanens 14
A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency .......sseessssseeseescsesseserecnsnesssneeseneeeneeseatens 15
B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin wc. eesceeseeeeteteesseeeeeeeeeneees 16
C. The JRA Targets: U.S: Blsctions ccncnsucnacnsnsmrannmmunncamaremnnnanaaias 19
1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 oo. iceeeeeeneteeneneeeeees 19
2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts v0... 22
3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook... .eeccsssssseesesesecesseesetenetenseseeeeeaeaeaeeneeatanes 24
4. US. Operations Through Twitter sssvssscasssscsessnnerernncremenenereceuerernceves 26
a. Individualized ACCOUNTS... .seceseessseesetensessseseneneeresevesecasnesesenseetesentnesseted 26
b. IRA Botitet Activities essscsprinamanncnrannmnnanaanininnN 28
5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies. ccecsceeeseeeteteeseseeeeeseseaeeeeteneees 29
6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons... eee ese ceeeseeneneaeaee 31
7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaigty......cccsseesssesseseensseesees 33
a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials... teeeeee 33
b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies.........0....... 35
TI]. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS....cscsccsessesssssseeesesseseseseseseevesesesessssesasesesneseanens 36
A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaigni..... cesses reseeenseeneneees 36
1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign... csesesessssessnenessenesreneees 36
2. Intrusionsinto the DCCC and DNC Networks ....ccccceeceeeeeseeeteceeeeeseteeaeeees 38
Ax Initial AtteccinnieonsvenversvessriuncvsousvevessaepecsssaynstsienicetsivaistisaaeesaneaseuaeeNveuneuey 38
b. Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks ......ceceeeseeeeteteeeeee 38
c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks .......seeseeseeeeeeteseeeeeees 40
B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials... ccc eeresssssesseeseceeseeesasenenenes Al
L. DCLOAKS wc ecccscecesessesesessesscesssessssssssscsesvescaresssnsssasavssessssssaneneseneaeeeenensensiees Al
Pe MCGILL PAOssa sessecasareccszavessunananauarsyacrsiaksansteddsenanennrnanennnmnsenanansnnnannenensneneneremnariessnts 42
3. Userof WikiLeak cavcsssseanimnmcnnnianncnnnnnnamnnnnancanmmnniannarnara 44
a. WikiLeaks’s Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign .............. 44
b. WikiLeaks’s First Contact with Guecifer 2.0 and DCLeaks ......ceeceeeeeeeeees 45
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c. The GRU’s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks.........ccssssseeseseeneees 45

d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen
Materials sessvsiscssvssvevsvssisrsvvsuvevsvesevinnsstovownvesstetavevesistuavsnveveveussrsconewsedtstersetoseves 48
C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations 0... cess tersesescseeseseseseseerenteraseeenneees 49
1. Summerand Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims............ 49
2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections.........ccccssssseeesees 50
D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials ...........sscssseeeeenes 51
1, RGU anaesssssnesssneenseennennnnsanusneneense 51
a. Backstound wiccscass nasamnnsnnsncnamninnanasreenaEEE 51
b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks.... cc eesesessnsenereteneeneeee 52
:
d. WikiLeaks’s October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails..............08 58
a... s
e. Donald TrumpJr. Interaction with WikiLeaksoc seseseneneeeneneeneneneeee 59
2. Other Potential CampaignInterest in Russian Hacked Materials... eee 61
a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) ...cccccececeeeeteteteteeeeeteneteenees 61
b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails ..0.0.. cece 62
IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTLINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 — November8, 2016)....
1. Trump Tower Moscow Project .......cssssessesesesessssssescssnsnerssessssseeseneeenseneseenneees 67
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)... 67
b. Communications with I.-C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi
Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)... ccs 69
c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-
January 2016) sivciesvcsnisvisesevsevessmursonnvnservinenienvesneistowenveetueverevatvesvereieees 70
i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization.... 70
ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia ........sscseseeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeees 72
d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump
(December 2015-June 2016) c s es es e st es e s erse se s es s sen en ats . 76
i. Sater’s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
ii. Candidate Trump’s Opportunities to Travel to Russia....
2, George Papadopoulos cscs ca nncmonmnanr nnn 80
a. Origins of Campaign Work... cece rss sneececscessesescsssesseneeeaeereses 81
b. Initial Russia-Related Comtacts.......ccccscsssecsesssesssescesesereneesssssseresssesvenenserenenss 82
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team. Meeting ji cassssaaveoresvevsweanesunnuanernaneninerareenvegs 85
ii
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d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has “Dirt” in the Form of

Clintott Emaills.,......rrereesmrononssseeneetdsshinaunnninnninnnniiinnanara aaa ute 86
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign........ccccssssseseseeeees 89
f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of “Dirt?oo... cccceseeeseseseteeeceeseesseseseseseeneees 93
g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact......ccccscseserscssesesseesseseseseseseseseeeeees 94
Be (Carter Pages sienvscnswncveessvsmwenwsvevnsecnsanrevess cavounvnsessteviistiinnssestoeasexcsianentsrennete 95
A, BACKBPOUT.....rcerrrnnaresraneennesnsnensnescsranennenaaiA ints sidiedssunetatcbestU TRATES 96
b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work ........ccessscssessseeesssesesssneeseesenessseeresees 97
c. Carter Page’s July 2016 Trip To MOSCOW ....cccsecseesceceseseteteescsessseseeeeeseseseeses 98
d. Later Campaign Work and Removalfrom the Campaign ........ccsseeeeseees 102
4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest .........c.ccscsesseeseestees 103
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign... 103
b. NationalInterest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel
seesecuesesesesueaeceseveusaveveneneensveneseneaesesesessescensussesessaseseeesssessssssessssessesssseacasssaenees 105
c. Jeff Sessions’s Post-Speech Interactions with CNI .....cccssssscsseseseereseseseeen 107
d. Jared Kushner’s Continuing Contacts with Simes......ccsceesseeseee nese 108
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower.......cccsccscesssssseseseegeesseeesesesseneenes 110
a, Setting Up the-June 9 Meeting sicsssssisssossosecevecssiviseesssesssevevovsvssesasessssstenbeebeies 110
i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jro. i seseeseseeenneecnsssesseeesseeeees 110
ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign...........cccccsseeseseeees 114
b, “The Events of June! 9;: 2016 scsssvsvsarerorrrenemennesscnnnvinnanvcenmonenaivenesuvene, 116
i. Arrangements for the Meeting
ii. Conduct of the Meeting.
c. Post-June 9 Event.....cecceceeseees
6. Events at the Republican National Convention ........ccccssssseceeesessereesensenenes 123
a. Ambassador Kislyak’s Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D.
Gordon the Week of the RNC woccciseccuscsscesseesssserssnerscersseeseceenees 123
b. Change to Republican Party Platforim........ccssesesseseesseeesessssesenesessseereseneneees 124
7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak oes sere sereeseesssseseseenenseseseseees 127
a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the
Armbassador’s Residence .........csesesssesssesesssssssssesenessssseessesssessesescsvesseassenes 127
b. Senator Sessions’s September 2016 Meeting with AmbassadorKislyak...... 127
8. Pal Manafort.......nnnsiceiaaniianunauaumnnn sere 129
a. Paul Manafort’s Ties to Russia and Ukraine... cccssesesesesessesseeerneseeaeee 131
iii
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i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work

ii. Political Consulting Work...
iii. Konstantin Kilimnik.........
b. Contacts during Paul Manafort’s Time with the Trump Campaign ..
i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign..............
ii. Paul Manafort’s Campaign-Period Contacts...
iii. Paul Manafort’s Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin
Kilimnik in the United States: civsscccvsssvosissseeerewivvecesavevavaveorenessssecctours 138
C. Post-Resignation Activities... cesses sssseseesstetesesesesersessseesesasssseees 141
B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts w.cccccccssseseseresscsssesseresestesesnsees 144
1, Immediate Post-Election Activity sccccssccssssssssrareccceasrreroravarvannverseveverasnerreneaversens 144
a. Outreach from the Russian Government... ccccsseesseeseresenesesseeeneseeeesaeees 145
b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ....... 146
2. Kirill Dmitriev’s Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration.
a. Background
b. Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming
Admintstrabioniensssssseemccsosccnmmncitensvsnissnevesinartnasnavsssngnevenenetuinenanesa 149
c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles oe ccseeteeeeeeee 151
i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with
DMitrieV a... eeeceeesesrsssseresessssssesesesesesssesessssssessnensesesesessssessscasanaseneees 151
il, "The Seychelles MeciS sscscsvsscsisissnsnssamamansancneassmommmreenstmnsrmananneness 153
iii. Erik Prince’s Meeting with Steve Bannonafter the Seychelles Trip.... 155
d. Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding
U.S.-Russia Relations sssssscvsesssecessssassaverisarinensvessnsvnorsnsvenonovevvavvesvscrevscearsiens 156
3. Ambassador Kislyak’s Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynnin
Trump TowerFollowing the Electionn....ccscseeseescseseneeenensseseresseeeeeees 159
4. Jared Kushner’s Meeting with Sergey GorkOv......cceccssesssseseseeseneseseseseeresenees 161
5. Petr Aven’s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ...........cesessssssseseneseseenes 163
6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich............. 166
7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. FLYNN... ccc eeseseseseseeseeneeesees
a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlement..........ccccsceeteseeeeescteneeseneeeeneees
b. U.S, Sanctions Against RUSSIa....... cs seeseeesererseenereeerererereteeseecsserseseseneneaes
V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS .i..sssseccccesssetsssesseeeseens
A. Russian “Active Measures” Social Media Campaign
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B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations ...........:cssesessesesneeereeeeeseeeeneseneneneneeetneee 175

1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspitacy....cccccsssesseeeseeceeeseeeseseseeeaes 175
a., BackStOUtid s:cscssssvsmmomnasemanaraseniaen comers eens 175
b. Charging Decision As to FEW ROnTSiTe TEC 176
2. Potential Section 1030 Violation pg Privacy. Mi 179
C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts ......cccccssseceeeneseeeseeescsesssenstenesesenees 180
1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion.....ccccsececseseseeeeeesereeees 180
2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951). 181
a. Governing Law.. SGN SET 181
by, Application cncnncseresonsvcsacceceesnvtccsseveastanietestnnenntteronibornenanenensaiensannntents 182
3. Campaign Finance .0...... cc sssescsesessseseesessssssseseeneressseneneseseecssenesseseneeeeerersesegss 183
a, Overview OF Governing LAW sewissscsseasesccssesssreiienosoneeesnreannnsorieeveraraeas 184
b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting... 185
i, Thing-of-Value Element ......c.ccccccscssessssesesesesssssssesereseresesesensseseenenesenseees 186
Hs, WaneSSsas oscecsnescasevseesoscaussrerovesvinsuevstestenacinnssessesiavetennnrestacannecieaes 187
iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information ............:ssscsceeeeeerseenees 188
c. Application to WikiLeaks
enecietmencararm to Ongoing Matter
Hi: WillfUINeSS ssssssissssgsvevisessresvsesrsvenieossvanevseovnesxorsnsnsesssseesnevecsvseanseceeseeest¥es 190

iii, Constitutional Considerations...
iv. Analysis HOM ti‘é&C anaes 190
4. False Statements and Obstruction ofthe Investigationn.......cseeeeeseseeeenens 191
a. Overview Of Governing Law.......ccscssssesesesessereessetssssssssesessesssessesesseessesees 191
b. Application to Certain Individuals..........ccsccescseeesesesneeseseeeeseseseseesenenenenes 192
i. George Papadopoulos.........secsesesessssesesesssssessnssessssessssesesssseseneeeeseesaenens 192
ii, RBBB oooaaa eeecssseseessetsssennsestee 194
Lif, Michasl-Flyninn sssssssccssstsstsreccscstosncscosssnrconnsanvnaesvevedisnnceowucnnenusncenesi seo 194
TV. Michel Coheti ......cmursueomenisisiirnnnannnniananmnmniurnienneniaints 195
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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuantto 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which
states that, “[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work, he . . . shall provide the Attorney
General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special
Counsel] reached.”
The Russian governmentinterfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and

systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In
June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that
Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials—hacks
that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government—began that same month.
Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in
October and November.
In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks’s first release of stolen documents, a foreign
governmentcontacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaignforeign policy
advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign
governmentthat the Trump Campaignhadreceived indications from the Russian governmentthat
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July
31, 2016, to openaninvestigation into whetherindividuals associated with the Trump Campaign
were coordinating with the Russian governmentin its interference activities.
That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government “directed
recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political
organizations,” and, “[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the USelection
process.” After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia
for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were
examining Russia’s interference in the election.
Within the Executive Branch,these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017
appointmentof Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel
authorized him to investigate “the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential election,” including any links or coordination between the Russian government and
individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
Asset forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel’s investigation established that
Russiainterfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a
Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J.
Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russianintelligence
service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers
working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also
identified numerous links between the Russian governmentand the Trump Campaign. Although
the investigation established that the Russian governmentperceivedit would benefit from a Trump
presidency and workedto secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit
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electorally from information stolen and released through Russianefforts, the investigation did not
establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian
governmentin its election interference activities.
* OK OK
Below wedescribe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the

results of our investigation and the Special Counsel’s charging decisions, and we then provide an
overview of the two volumesofourreport.
The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel’s Office found to be
supported by the evidencecollected in our investigation. In someinstances, the report points out
the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other
instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with
confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events
occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there
wasno evidence ofthose facts.
In evaluating whether evidence aboutcollective action of multiple individuals constituted

acrime, weapplied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of “collusion.” In so doing,
the Office recognized that the word “collud[e]” was used in communications with the Acting
Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation’s scope and that the term has
frequently been invokedin public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific
offense or theory ofliability found in the United States Code, noris it a term of art in federal
criminal law. For those reasons,the Office’s focusin analyzing questionsofjoint criminalliability
was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the
factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign “coordinat[ed]”—a term that appears
in the appointment order—with Russian election interference activities. Like collusion,
“coordination” does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood
coordination to require an agreement—tacit or express—between the Trump Campaign and the
Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking
actions that were informedbyorresponsive to the other’s actionsor interests. We applied the term
coordination in that sense whenstating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the
Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian governmentin its election interference activities.
* Ok ok
The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:
Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel’s investigation of Russia’s
interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign.
Section I describes the scopeof the investigation. SectionsII andIII describe the principal ways
Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the Russian
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governmentandindividuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special
Counsel’s charging decisions.
Volume II addresses the President’s actions towards the FBI’s investigation into Russia’s
interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the
Special Counsel’s investigation. VolumeII separately states its framework and the considerations
that guided that investigation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I
RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference
operations identified by the investigation—a social media campaign designed to provoke and
amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg,
Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he
controlled. Prigozhin is widely reported to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Harm to Ongoing Matter
In mid-2014, the IRA sent employees to the United States on an intelligence-gathering

Micstmiencrcsena arm to Ongoing Matter
The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
political system through what it termed “information warfare.” The campaign evolved from a
generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a
targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton.
The IRA’s operation also included the purchaseofpolitical advertisements on social media in the
names of U.S. personsand entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United
States. To organize thoserallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and
made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The
investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the
IRA. Section II of this report details the Office’s investigation of the Russian social media
campaign.
RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS
Atthe sametime that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in
early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions
(hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
intelligence service knownas the MainIntelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian
Army (GRU) carried out these operations.
In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign
volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU
hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
(DCCC)and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRUstole hundreds of thousands
of documentsfrom the compromised email accounts and networks. Aroundthe time that the DNC
announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government’s role in hacking its network, the GRU
began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas “DCLeaks” and
“Guccifer 2.0.” The GRUlater released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks.
The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (“Trump Campaign” or “Campaign’)
showedinterest in WikiLeaks’s releases of documents and welcomedtheir potential to damage
candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, forecast to
senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate
Clinton. WikiLeaks’s first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump
announcedthat he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from private server
of State (he later said that he was speaking sarcasticall
WikiLeaks began releasing

Podesta’s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hourafter a U.S. media outlet released
video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section III of this Report details the Office’s
investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign
supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.
RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN
The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of
contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government.
The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring
or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation
established that the Russian governmentperceived it would benefit from a Trumppresidency and.
worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expectedit would benefit electorally from
information stolen and released through Russianefforts, the investigation did not establish that
members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian governmentin its
election interference activities.
The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the

Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person,invitations for Campaign
officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking
improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia
and the Trump Campaign during the campaign andtransition periods, the most salient of which
are summarized below in chronologicalorder.
2015. Someof the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization
real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trumpsigned a Letter
ofIntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization
executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian
governmentpress secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through
at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.
Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos madeearly contact
with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to
Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told
Papadopoulosthat the Russian government had “dirt” on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands
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of emails. One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a
representative of a foreign governmentthat the Trump Campaign had receivedindications from
the Russian governmentthat it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of
information damagingto candidate Clinton. Throughoutthat period oftime and for several months
thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting
between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting tookplace.
Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of
2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nomineefor President. On
June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaignofficials Donald
Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email
proposing the meeting had described as “official documents and information that would
incriminate Hillary.” The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as “part of Russia and its
government’s support for Mr. Trump.” The written communications setting up the meeting
showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist
candidate Trump’s electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer’s presentation did not provide such
information.
Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC
announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to
opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents.
In July 2016, Campaignforeign policy advisor Carter Pagetraveled in his personal capacity
to Moscow and gavethe keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived and worked
in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted
with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with
conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Page’s July 2016 trip to Moscow andhis
advocacyfor pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaignthen distanceditself
from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign.
July 2016 wasalso the month WikiLeaksfirst released emails stolen by the GRU from the
DNC. OnJuly 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing
information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public reporting that U.S.
intelligence agencies had “high confidence” that the Russian government was behind thetheft of
emails and documents from the DNC. And within a weekof the release, a foreign government
informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the
Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign
governmentreporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the
Russian governmentand individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York
City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBIassesses to haveties
to Russian intelligence. Kilimnil requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for
Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel’s Office was a “backdoor” way for
Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate
Trump’s assent to succeed (were heto be elected President). They also discussed the status of the
Work // Proteeted
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Trump Campaign and Manafort’s strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states.
Monthsbefore that meeting, Manafort had causedinternal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik,
and the sharing continued for someperiodoftime after their August meeting.
Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in
graphic terms about womenyears earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less
than an hourlater, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta’s emails that
had been stolen by the GRUin late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. governmentinstitutions
wereat the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian governmentefforts to interfere
in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and
the Office of the Director ofNationalIntelligence issued a joint public statement “that the Russian
Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions,
including from US political organizations.” Those “thefts” and the “disclosures” of the hacked
materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, “are intended to
interfere with the US election process.”
Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government

officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
administration. The most seniorlevels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The
Russian Embassy made contacthours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to
arrange a call with President Putin. Several Russian businessmen picked upthe effort from there.
Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, was among
the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December, a
business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an
associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in
January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period,
another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served
on the Campaignor the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner’s friend collaborated on a short
written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been
cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and
Kushnerlater gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having
interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the
sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in
response to the sanctionsat that time. Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, “Great move
on delay (by V. Putin).” The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn andtold him
the request had beenreceived at the highest levels and Russia had chosen notto retaliate as a result
of Flynn’s request.
ok oR
OnJanuary 6, 2017, membersoftheintelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump

on a joint assessment—drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and
U.S. DepartmentofJustice
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National Security Agency—that concluded with high confidence that Russia hadintervenedin the
election through a variety of means to assist Trump’s candidacy and harm Clinton’s. A
declassified version of the assessment waspublicly released that same day.
Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees—the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC)—announced that they would
conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the
election. Then-FBI Director James Comeylater confirmed to Congressthe existence of the FBI’s
investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017,in
open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comeystated:
I have been authorized by the Departmentof Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part
of our counterintelligence mission,is investigating the Russian government’s efforts
to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the
nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and
the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the
campaign and Russia’s efforts. ... As with any counterintelligence investigation,
this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.
Theinvestigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May 9,
2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Director—an action which is analyzed in
VolumeII of the report.
On May17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel
and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional
testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within
the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the
investigation.
President Trumpreacted negatively to the Special Counsel’s appointment. He told advisors

that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (Jeff) Sessions
unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed, and engaged in
efforts to curtail the Special Counsel’s investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidencetoit,
including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. Those andrelated actions
are described and analyzed in VolumeII of the report.
KKK
THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S CHARGING DECISIONS
In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the report, the Office
determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law
chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual § 9-27.000 et seq.
(2018). The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if
so, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction;
Attorney-WorkPreduet // Proteeted-Under
and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately
served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual § 9-
27.220.
Section V of the report providesdetailed explanationsof the Office’s charging decisions,

which contain three main components.
First, the Office determined that Russia’s twoprincipal interference operationsin the 2016
U.S. presidential election—the social media campaign andthe hacking-and-dumping operations—
violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media
campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by
undermining through deceptiveacts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign
influencein U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet
Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers who
carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of
individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws,
the federal computer-intrusion statute, and they have been so charged. See United States v.
sho, et al., No. 18-cr-215 (D.D.C.). PETRI OeTTe ETT
Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to
the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was
not sufficient to support criminal charges. Amongother things, the evidence was not sufficient to
charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agentof the Russian governmentor other Russian
principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks’s releases of hacked
materials wasnotsufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation. Further, the evidence
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with
representatives of the Russian governmentto interfere in the 2016 election.
Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump
Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated
individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian
election interference. The Office charged some ofthose lies as violations of the federal false-
statements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about
his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George
Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to
investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the
professor who told Papadopoulosthat the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of
thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to
making false statements to Congress about the Trump Moca arm to Ongoing
Andin February 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that
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Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications
with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine.
KOK
The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve
potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions
between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaignofficials both at the candidate’s April
2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C., and during the week ofthe Republican National
Convention werebrief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that
one Campaign official’s efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing
assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. The
investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September
2016 at Sessions’s Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential
campaign.
The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete
picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked
their Fifth Amendmentright against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office’s
judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other
witnesses and information—suchas information knowntoattorneys or individuals claiming to be
members of the media—in light of internal Department of Justice policies. See, e.g., Justice
Manual§§ 9-13.400, 13.410. Someofthe information obtained via court process, moreover, was
presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or
“taint”) team. Even whenindividuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes
provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to someofthe false-statements charges
described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as
well—numerouswitnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United
States.
Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct
we investigated—including some associated with the Trump Campaign—deleted relevant
communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature
encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. In
such cases, the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to
contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared
inconsistent with other knownfacts.
Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinationsthat the Office
believes to be accurate and completeto the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps,
the Office cannotrule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional
light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report.
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I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION
On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein—then serving as Acting
Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016—appointed the Special Counsel “to investigate Russian
interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters.” Office of the Deputy Att’y
Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment ofSpecial Counselto Investigate Russian Interference
with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017) (“Appointment Order”),
Relying on “the authority vested” in the Acting Attorney General, “including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509,
510, and 515,” the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel “in
order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General’s] responsibility to provide supervision and
managementof the Departmentof Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the
Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.” Appointment Order
(introduction). “The Special Counsel,”the Orderstated,“is authorized to conductthe investigation
confirmed by then-FBIDirector James B, Comeyin testimony before the House PermanentSelect
Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017,” including:
(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian governmentand individuals
associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and
(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).
Appointment Order { (b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel “the authority to investigate
and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the
Special Counsel’s investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence,
and intimidation of witnesses.” 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). The authority to investigate “any matters
that arose . . . directly from the investigation,” Appointment Order { (b)(ii), covers similar crimes
that may have occurred during the course of the FBI’s confirmed investigation before the Special
Counsel’s appointment. “If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate,” the
Order further provided,“the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from
the investigation ofthese matters.” Id. J (c). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable
“Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” Jd. J (d).
The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel’s
investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. A memorandum dated August 2, 2017,
explained that the Appointment Order had been “worded categorically in order to permit its public
release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals.” It then
confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate
allegations that three Trump campaign officials—Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George
Papadopoulos—‘committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian governmentofficials
with respect to the Russian government’s efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.”
The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel’s authority to investigate certain other
matters, including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from
payments hereceived from the Ukrainian governmentand crimes arising from his receipt of loans
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from a bank whose CEO wasthen seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations
that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli
government; and foursets of allegations involving Michael Flynn, the former National Security
Advisorto President Trump.
On October 20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a. memorandum the
Special Counsel’s investigative authority as to several individuals andentities. First, “as part of a
full and thorough investigation of the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential election,” the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate “‘the pertinent activities
of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates RIERA a Roger Stone, and
> “Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals,” the memorandum
stressed, “does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has
committed a crime.” Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the
Special Counsel’s authority to investigate “leads relate[d] to Cohen’s establishment and use of
Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds from Russian-backed entities.” Third, the
memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel’s authority to investigate individuals andentities
who were possibly engaged in “jointly undertaken activity” with existing subjects of the
investigation, including Paul Manafort. Finally, the memorandum described an FBIinvestigation
opened before the Special Counsel’s appointment into “allegations that [then-Attorney General
Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]” and confirmed the Special
Counsel’s authority to investigate that matter.
The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority “to
exerciseall investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Special Counsel’s Office considered a range of
classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office’s Russia
investigation, and the Office structured that work around evidencefor possible use in prosecutions
of federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution).
There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of
the investigation in May 2017 because the FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian
election interference for nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel’s Office exercised its judgment
regarding whatto investigate anddid not, for instance, investigate every public report of a contact
between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals and entities.
The Office has concludedits investigation into links and coordination between the Russian
governmentand individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain proceedings associated
with the Office’s work remain ongoing. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney
General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components
of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix lists those transfers.
Twodistrict courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel’s authority to investigate
Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the Trump Campaign. See United
States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 79-83 (D.D.C. 2018); United States v. Manafort, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 640, 650-655 (E.D. Va. 2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office
periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the
Special Counsel’s authority established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with
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the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law
enforcementauthorities, principally other componentsof the DepartmentofJustice and to the FBI.
Appendix D summarizes thosereferrals.
eR
To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special
Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys—five of whom joined the
Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice
components. These attorneys were assisted by a filter team of Department lawyers and FBI
personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before
turning those materials over to investigators; a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the
Department’s Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget,
finance, purchasing, human resources, records, facilities, security, information technology, and
administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and
worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, a
paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBIto assist the Special Counsel’s investigation.
Those “assigned” FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on
which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel.!
Duringits investigation the Office issued more than 2,800 subpoenas underthe auspices of
a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia; executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants;
obtained more than 230 orders for communications records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); obtained
almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers; made 13 requests to foreign governments
pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties; and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses,
including almost 80 before a grand jury.
oR Ok
From its inception, the Office recognized that its investigation could identify foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the FBI’s broader national security
mission. FBI personnel whoassisted the Office established procedures to identify and convey
such information to the FBI. The FBI’s Counterintelligence Division met with the Office regularly
for that purpose for most of the Office’s tenure. For more than the past year, the FBI also
embedded personnel at the Office who did not work on the Special Counsel’s investigation, but
whosepurpose wasto review the results of the investigation and to send—in writing—summaries
of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices.
Those communications and other correspondence between the Office and the FBI contain
information derived from the investigation, not all of which is contained in this Volume. This
Volumeis asummary. It contains, in the Office’s judgment, that information necessary to account
for the Special Counsel’s prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the investigation’s
main factual results.
' BI personnel assignedto the Special Counsel’s Office were required to adhereto all applicable
federal law and all Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, and policies. An FBI attorney worked on
FBI-related matters for the Office, such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures, including
the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI
legal supervision, not the Special Counsel’s supervision.
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II. RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
The first form of Russian election influence cameprincipally from the Internet Research
Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and
companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord
Catering (collectively “Concord”).? The IRA conducted social media operationstargetedat large
U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.? These operations
constituted “active measures” (akTHBHEIe MeporpuaTHa), a term that typically refers to operations
conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.
The IRA and its employees began operationstargeting the United States as early as 2014.
Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages
designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S.
political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these
social media accounts became a meansto reachlarge U.S. audiences. IRA employeestravelled to
the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and
photographsfor use in their social mediaposts.
IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number ofcandidates in the 2016
US. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump
Campaign anddisparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA madevarious expendituresto carry
out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the namesof U.S.
persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their
Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump
Campaignand with otherpolitical activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the
staging of political rallies.» The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons
knowingly orintentionally coordinated with the IRA’s interference operation.
By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S.
persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlled Facebook groups and
2 The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measures
operationstargeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports,
and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Departmentof Justice and FBI.
see also SM-2230634,serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case numbercited here, and other FBI case numbers
identified in the report, should betreated as law enforcementsensitive given the context. The report contains
additional law enforcement sensitive information.
4 As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges
against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Volume I, Section V.A, infra; Indictment, United States
v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1:18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc. 1 (“dnternet Research Agency
Indictment’).
* Internet Research A Indictment [J 52, 54, 55(a), 56, 74; GET CM eneroTare)
14
Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter

accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers, including multiple U.S. political figures
who retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative testified that
Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80,000
posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as
126 million persons through its Facebook accounts.° In January 2018, Twitter announced thatit
had identified 3,814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1.4 million
people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.’
A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency
Harm to Ongoing Matter tmHarm to Ongoing

Matter
Cae iarm to Ongoing Matter
The growth of the organization also led to a more detailed organizational structure.
® Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook)(“We
estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA’s
80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared,liked, and followed by people on
Facebook,and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposedto a story that originated from
the Russian operation. Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served
content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period.”). The Facebook
representativealso testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately
120,000pieces of content during that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via
Instagram.
7 Twitter, Update on Twitter’s Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan. 31, 2018).
5 See SM-2230634,serial 92.

wiHarm to Ongoing Matter

BRYAVOVAULEME Harm to Ongoing Matter
wiHarm to Ongoing Matter
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BELG nie (odie MiEace
Twoindividuals headed the IRA’s management: its general director, Mikhail Bystrov, and
its executive director, Mikhail Burchik. Harm to oleae] Matter
Asearly as the spring of 2014, the IRA beganto hideits funding and activities.
The IRA’s U.S. operations are part of a larger set of interlocking operations known as
Ba coselnemg arm to Ongoing Matter
EgHarm to Ongoing Matter
B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin
Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies
funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman whoserved as the head of Concord.

4 See, e.g. SM-2230634,serials 9, 113 & 180 EMEC RenterEe

wHarm to Ongoing Matter
See SM-2230634,serials
131 & 204.
WHarm to Ongoing Matter
16
USS. Department of Justice
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Prigozhin was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in December 2016,
EagHarm to Ongoing Matter
Numerous media
sources have reported on Prigozhin’s ties to Putin, and the two have appeared together in public
photographs.”
[aElanm om dare eae ieticie
g@aHarm to Ongoing Matter
BaHarm to Ongoing Matter
EaHarm to Ongoing Matter
'° U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with
Russia’s Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine” (Dec. 20, 2016).
gaHarm to Ongoing Matter
“iHarm to Ongoing Matter
22 See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known
as “Putin’s Cook”, New York Times (Feb. 16, 2018).
faHarm to Ongoing Matter
tfaHarm to Ongoing Matter

25 [RETaaim com lateceliare Miieliccie see also SM-
2230634, serial 113 [ghey
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ggHarm to Ongoing Matter

“aHarm to Ongoing Matter
28 The term “troll” refers to internet users—in this context, paid operatives—whopostinflammatory
or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites.
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IRA employees were aware that Prigozhin was involved in the IRA’s U.S. operations,
2016, IRA employees,claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators of Facebook groups,
recruited U.S. personsto hold signs (including onein front of the White House) that read “Happy
55th Birthday Dear Boss,” as an homage to Prigozhin (whose 55th birthday was on June 1, 2016).?!
C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections
1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
The IRA’s U.S. operations sought to influence public opinion through online media and
forums. By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U.S. operations within a single
general department, known internally as the “Translator” (Ilepepogunx) department.
IRA subdivided the Translator Department into different
responsibilities, ranging from operations on different social media platforms to analytics to
malnvestigative Technique See SM-2230634,

serials 131 & 204.
39 See SM-2230634,serial 156.
31 Internet Research Agency Indictment §_12(b); see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID
1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) &
aHarm to Ongoing Matter
see also SM-2230634, serial 189. [meNaumcom@larefoliate Melis
19
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graphics and IT.
waHarm to
Ongoing Matter
ma Harm to Ongoing Matter

See SM-2230634, serial 205.
34 See SM-2230634,serial 204 [BETA com elatefey iate MUEvaKcdg
20
IRA employeesalso traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions. In

June 2014, four IRA employeesapplied to the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States,
while lying aboutthe purposeoftheirtrip and claimingto be fourfriends who had metat a party.>®
Ultimately, two IRA employees—Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova—received visas and
entered the United States on June 4, 2014.
Prior to traveling, Krylova and Bogacheva compileditineraries and instructionsforthe trip.

waHarm to Ongoing Matter
maHarm to Ongoing Matter

SaHarm to Ongoing Matter
37 TEVEra com @larecediave uenatcia

38 See SM-2230634,serials 150 & 172 BEVINreferM ECs
saHarm to Ongoing Matter

WerkProduet // Protected
May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crim P-6fe}

2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts
Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on
different U.S. social media platforms. The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the
social media accounts as “specialists.”“? Starting as early as 2014, the IRA’s U.S. operations
included social mediaspecialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.’? The IRA later
added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.
Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts
of U.S. persons.*” By early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public
social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots
organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations.
For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN_GOP,purported to be connectedto the
Tennessee Republican Party.“ More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of
fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as anti-
immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and
political activists.
The IRA closely monitored the activity of its social media accounts.
| 40 DET@m com Oneloinemieiicis
‘ETT OM eliefone miericis
4 [RETdare relate Mice
kaHarm to Ongoing Matter
“4 See, e.g., SM-2230634, serial 179 RET Me Ne ferare MELele

ES
5 See, e.g., Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson); Facebook ID 100009626173204
(Andrea Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams); Facebook ID 100013640043337
(Lakisha Richardson).
‘6 The account claimed to be the “Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans” and made posts
that appeared to be endorsements of the state political party. See, e.g., @TEN_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet
(“Tennessee GOP backs @realDonaldTrumpperiod #makeAmericagreatagain #tngop #tennessee #g0p”).
22
May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crim- P-6fe}
EHarm to Ongoing Matter
By February 2016, internal IRA documents referred to support for the Trump Campaign
and opposition to candidate Clinton.” For example, HOM directions to IRA
worveiarm to Ongoing Matter
“Main idea: Use any opportunity to criticize Hillary [Clinton] and the rest (except
Sanders and Trum BeHarm to Ongoing Matter
The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016. In 2016
internal La reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group “Secured Borders,” the
MaHarm to Ongoing Matter

48 See, e.g., SM-2230634serial 131 LQ .
“© The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her
presidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton’s record as Secretary of
State and promoted variouscritiques of her candidacy. The IRA also used other techniques.
See SM-2230634, serial 70.
muHarm to Ongoing Matter
23
authorcriticized the “lower numberofposts dedicatedto criticizing Hillary Clinton” and reminded
the Facebookspecialist “it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton.”>!
IRA employees_also_ acknowledged that their_work focused_on influencing the U.S.

ei cate arm to Ongoing Matter
3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook
Many IRA operations used Facebook accounts created and operated by its specialists.
| |i
i rr
. ak
IRA Facebookgroupsactive
during the 2016 campaign covereda rangeofpolitical issues and included purported conservative
ZaHarm to Ongoing Matter

53 ETIOne Ce Mielcn
matarm to Ongoing Matter
24
Attorney-WorkProduet // Protected
May-Conti Fed R-Crim-P-6fe}
groups (with names such as “Being Patriotic,” “Stop All Immigrants,” “Secured Borders,” and
“Tea Party News”), purported Black social justice groups (“Black Matters,” “Blacktivist,” and
“Don’t Shoot Us”), LGBTQ groups (“LGBT United”), and religious groups (“United Muslims of
America”).
Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting

the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the
operational account “Matt Skiber” began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook
groups asking them to help plan a “pro-Trumprally near Trump Tower.”
To reach larger U.S. audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that
promoted the IRA groups onthe newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook,
the IRA purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately
$100,000.°¢
During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased advertisements explicitly

supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA
(discussed below). As early as March 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly
opposed the Clinton Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an
advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, “If one day God lets
this liar enter the White House as a president — that day would be a real national tragedy.”°”
Similarly, on April 6, 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements for its account “Black Matters”
calling for a “flashmob”of U.S. personsto “take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or
#nohillary2016.°°° TRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few
exceptions, negative.”
IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his

campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was
purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an advertisementfor its Instagram account “Tea
Party News”asking U.S. personsto help them “makea patriotic team of young Trump supporters”
by uploading photos with the hashtag “#KIDS4TRUMP.”® In subsequent months, the IRA
purchased dozensof advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the
Facebookgroups “Being Patriotic,” “Stop All Invaders,” and “Secured Borders.”
°5 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID

5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID
%6 Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17)(testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook).
57 3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575.
°° See SM-2230634, serial 213 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger
set provided by Facebook).
25
Atterney—WorkPreduet // Protected
Collectively, the IRA’s social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons.
Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousandsof followers. For example,
at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA’s “United Muslims of
America” Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the “Don’t Shoot Us” Facebook group had
over 250,000 followers, the “Being Patriotic” Facebook group had over 200,000 followers, and
the “Secured Borders” Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.°! According to Facebook, in
total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017,
and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and “may have reached an estimated 126
million people.”
4. US. Operations Through Twitter
A number of IRA employees assigned to the Translator Department served as Twitter

A eniace arm to Ongoing Matter
The IRA’s Twitter operations involved two strategies. First, IRA specialists operated
certain Twitter accounts to create individual U.S. personas, ElucMenrefole mL ELeye
Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts

(commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing content
on Twitter.
a. Individualized Accounts
[netic dare(olinemiieiccia
$1 See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID

1157233400960126 (Don’t Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Being Patriotic); Facebook ID
757183957716200 (Secured Borders). [EWM Meyer weet

® Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook).
64 TEV ata com lave (oli aremiutetitcia
iHarm to Ongoing Matter
26
Atterney-Work // May ein- Material Preteeted
Harm to Ongoing Matter 66

The IRA operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook
accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with
U.S. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter’s private messaging).
The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the
election. Individualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included
@TEN_GOP (described above); @jenn_abrams(claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with
70,000 followers); @Pamela_Moore13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000
followers); and @America_1st_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers).°” In May
2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump, which promoted IRA-organized
rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below).
Usingthese accounts and others, the IRA provokedreactions from users and the media. Multiple
IRA-posted tweets gained popularity.” U.S. mediaoutlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled
accounts andattributed them to the reactions of real U.S. persons.”! Similarly, numerous high-
mHarm to Ongoing Matter

67 Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an account with 3,800 followers
that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).
68 See @march_for_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet(first post from account).
” For example, one IRA account tweeted, “To those people, who hate the Confederate flag. Did
you know that the flag and the war wasn’t aboutslavery,it was all about money.” The tweet received over
40,000 responses. @Jenn_Abrams4/24/17 (2:37 p.m.) Tweet.
7! Josephine Lukito & Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources for
Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism Review (Mar. 8, 2018); see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain
#NewYorkValues to Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are Slamming
the CIA for Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News & World Report (Dec. 12, 2016).
27
Attorney-Work // Protected
profile U.S. persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaul,” Roger Stone,” Sean
Hannity,” and Michael Flynn Jr.,” retweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRA-
controlled accounts. Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA
tweets (discussed below).
b. IRA Botnet Activities
In January 2018, Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the
IRA.” According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these
accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, “approximately 8.4% of which were election- ’
” @McFaul4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams).

@RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moore13); @RogerJStoneJr 4/26/16
Tweet (same).
™ @seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moore13).
® @mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet (“RT @Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you add the voice
over of an old documentary about mentalillness onto video of SJWs. . .”).
76 A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts controlled as a group to send
specific automated messages. On the Twitter network, botnets can be used to promote and republish
(“retweet”) specific tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences.
mHarm to Ongoing Matter
”Bli Rosenberg, Twitter to Tell 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some Signs Show
the Problem Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019).
28
related.”®° Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who
Twitter believed may havebeen in contact with an IRA-controlled account.*!
5. U.S. Operations InvolvingPolitical Rallies
The IRA organized and promotedpoliticalrallies inside the United States while posing as
U.S. grassroots activists. First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas
(Facebook groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The
IRA then sent a large numberof direct messages to followers of its social media account asking
them to attend the event. From those who respondedwithinterest in attending, the IRA then sought
a U.S. personto serve as the event’s coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would
tell the U.S. person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict
or because they were somewhereelse in the United States.*? The IRA then further promoted the
event by contacting U.S. media aboutthe event and directing them to speak with the coordinator.
After the event the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA’s social media
accounts.®
The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of
a rally was a “confederate rally” in November 2015. The IRA continued to organizerallies even
after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendanceatrallies varied. Some rallies appear to
have drawn few (if any) participants, while others drew hundreds. The reach and success of these
monitored EDCMenye ere MM Ee
* Twitter, “Update on Twitter’s Review ofthe 2016 US Election”(updated Jan. 31, 2018). Twitter
also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which tweeted
more than a million times in the ten weeksbefore the election.
51 Twitter, “Update on Twitter’s Review of the 2016 US Election” (updated Jan. 31, 2018).
82 8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID
8 See, eg., 7/21/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to I: 7/21/16 Email,

joshmilton024@gmail.com to
8+ @march_for_trump 6/25/16 Tweet(posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower).
55 Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post (“Good evening buds! Well I am
planning to organize a confederaterally [. . .] in Houston on the 14 of Novemberand I want more people
to attend.”). ‘
29
May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crint 6fe)
Werk // Proteeted-Under
From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign,

almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the
U.S. election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing
the Clinton Campaign. Pro-Trumprallies included three in New
York; a series of pro-Trumprallies in Florida in August 2016; and a
series of pro-Trumprallies in October 2016 in Pennsylvania. The
Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign, which
posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump’s Facebook
BRING BACK OUR JOBS account(as discussed below).®°
Many of the same IRA employees who oversaw the IRA’s

HELP MR, TRUMP FIX IT! social media accounts also conducted the day-to-day recruiting for
Ma ae political rallies inside the United States.
Maia p Harm to Ongoing Matter
aa
IRA Posterfor Pennsylvania

Rallies organized by the IRA
6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons
Asearly as 2014, the IRA instructed its employees to target U.S. persons who could be
used to advance its operational goals. Initially, recruitment focused on U.S. persons who could
amplify the content posted by the IRA. [ETGUNMeriter ETc
IRA employeesfrequently used [fj ( 2 : Twitter, Facebook, and

Instagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S.
ersons from across the political spectrum. For example, the IRA targeted the family of
and a numberof black social justice activists
8° The pro-Trumprallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts.
See, ¢.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being
Patriotic); Twitter Account @march_for_trump; beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized in
New York on June 25, 2016; Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2, 2016.)
wHarm to Ongoing Matter
aaHarm to Ongoing Matter
31
while posing as a grassroots group called “Black Matters US.”®? In February 2017, the persona
“Black Fist” (purporting to wantto teach African-Americansto protect themselves when contacted
by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by
Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote
IRA-generated content,”as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking
around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask).”!
E#Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing
Matter
as the IRA’s online audience becamelarger, the IRA tracked U.S.

persons with whom they communicated and had successfully tasked (with tasks ranging from
organizing rallies to taking pictures with certain political messages). EUMMEC Men refers)
Matter
89 3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID

6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID
& ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks).
* 8/19/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID
°! 12/8/16 Email, robot@craigslist.org to beingpatriotic@gmail.com (confirming Craigslist

advertisement).
* $/18-19/16 Twitter DMs, @march_for_trump ‘aa
3 See, _e.g., Il/1l-27/16 Facebook Messages, ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) &
eee00 payfor pane tickets and fora
bull horn).
* See, e.g., 9/10/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) &
I (discussing payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM,
@march_for_trump to (discussing payment for construction materials).
32
May-Cent i Materi l Fed R-Crint P-6fe)
7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign
The investigation identified two different forms of connections between the IRA and
members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified no similar connections between
the IRA and the Clinton Campaign.) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the
Trump Campaign promoted—typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of reposting—
pro-Trumporanti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled social media
accounts, Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees represented themselves as U.S. persons
to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and
coordination on IRA-organizedpolitical rallies inside the United States.
a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIRA Political Materials
Amongthe U.S. “leaders of public opinion” targeted by the IRA were various members
and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaignaffiliates promoted dozens of
tweets, posts, and other political content created by the IRA.
- Posts from the [RA-controlled Twitter account @TEN_GOP were cited or retweeted by
multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,?° Eric
% See, e.g, @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of

names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #VoterFraud. #DrainTheSwamp.”);
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens of
thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida.”);
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could
vote for Trump. Here heis in his #MAGAhat. #voted #ElectionDay.”). Trump Jr. retweeted additional
@TEN_GOPcontent subsequentto the election.
33
Attorney-WorkProduct // Protected
Trump,’” Kellyanne Conway,” Brad Parscale,”? and MichaelT. Flynn.'° These posts included
allegations of voter fraud,'®! as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled
classified information.!
- A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled awe

Twitter account @Pamela_Moore13 was retweeted by rank vouroryoursupport iam! My team just shored photos rom yout
103 TRUMP SIGN WAVINGDAY, yesterday!| love you - and thereis no question
Donald J. Trump Jn - TOGETHER,WEWILL MAKE AMERICA GREATAGAIN!
- On September 19, 2017, President Trump’s personal

account @realDonaldTrump respondedto a tweet from
the IRA-controlled account @10_gop (the backup
account of @TEN_GOP, which had already been
deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: ““We love you,
Mr. President!”!°
IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump

Campaign and,later, Trump Administrationofficials to their
tweets. For example, on August 23, 2016, the IRA-
controlled persona “Matt Skiber” Facebook accountsent a
message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writing that “Mr. he Like to
Trumpposted about our event in Miami! This is great!”! or
The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate
Trump’s Facebook account, which included a post about the Screenshot of Trump Facebook
August 20, 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA. Account(from Matt Skiber)
°7 @EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press
conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption & #VoterFraud #debatenight #TrumpB”).
°8 @KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: Mother ofjailed sailor: ‘Hold Hillary to
same standards as my son on Classified info’ #hillarysemail #WeinerGate.”).
» @parscale 10/15/16 Tweet (“Thousandsof deplorables chanting to the media: ‘Tell The Truth!’
RTif you are also done w/ biased Media! #FridayFeeling”).
100 @GenFlynn 11/7/16 (retweeting @TEN_GOPpost that included in part “@realDonaldTrump
& @mike_pence will be our next POTUS & VPOTUS.”).
101 @TEN_GOP 10/11/16 Tweet(“North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over the age of 110!!”).
12 @TEN_GOP 11/6/16 Tweet (“Motherofjailed sailor: ‘Hold Hillary to same standards as my
sonon classified info #hillaryemail #WeinerGate.’”).
103 @DonaldJTrumpJr 11/7/16 Tweet (“RT @Pamela_Moore13: Detroit residents speakout against
the failed policies of Obama, Hillary & democrats... .”).
104 @realDonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7:33 p.m.) Tweet (“THANK YOUfor your support Miami! My
team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WAVINGDAY,yesterday! I love you — andthere is no
question - TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!”).
5 8/23/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID
34
b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies
Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. personsaffiliated with the Trump
Campaignin an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organizedrallies inside the United States. In
all cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claimingto be U.S. political activists working on
behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA’s contacts included requests for signs
and other materials to useatrallies,!” as well as requests to promotetherallies and help coordinate
logistics.'°§ While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for
example, agreeing to set aside a numberofsigns), the investigation has not identified evidence
that any Trump Campaignofficial understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals.
ae ok ok
In sum,the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election
through the “active measures” social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization
funded by Prigozhin and companiesthat he controlled. As explained further in VolumeI, Section
V.A,infra, the Office concluded (anda grandjury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies, and
IRA employees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally by undermining through
deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S.
elections.
106 HE Tanimcem dare loliare ueticcia
107 See, e.g., 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to GY@donaldtrump.com (asking for

Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/18/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to
@donaldtrump.com (asking for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email,
joshmilton024@gmail.com to @donaldtrump.com (asking for “contact phone numbers for Trump
Campaignaffiliates” in various Floridacities and signs).
108 8/15/16 Email, Ey to joshmilton024@gmail.com (asking to add to
locations to the “Florida Goes Trump,” list); 8/16/16 Email, to
joshmilton024@gmail.com (volunteering to send an email blast to followers).
35
AttorneyWorkPreduet // Protected
III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS
Beginning in March 2016,units of the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate

of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations, employees,
and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign
chairman John Podesta.Starting in April 2016, the GRU hackedinto the computer networks of the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National
Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign
employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundredsof thousands of documents
from the compromised email accounts and networks.The GRUlater released stolen Clinton
Campaign and DNC documents throughonline personas, “DCLeaks”and “Guccifer 2.0,” andlater
through the organization WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to
interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign.
The Trump Campaign showedinterest in the WikiLeaks releases and, in the summer and
MimomANtagrarm to Ongoing Matter
WikiLeaks’s first Clinton-related release elu , the Trump Campaign

stayed in contac about WikiLeaks’s activities. The investigation was unable to resolve
ETM Os MeMUCICaM WikiLeaks’s release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7,
2016, the same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language
about women.
A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign
1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign
Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton
Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and 74455.!!° Military Unit 26165 isa GRU
cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental
organizations outside of Russia, including in the United States.''! The unit was sub-divided into
departments with different specialties. One department, for example, developed specialized
malicious software (“malware”), while another department conducted large-scale spearphishing
campaigns.'! a bitcoin mining operation to
109 As discussed in Section V below,our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from
the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§1030 and 371. See VolumeI, Section V.B, infra; Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No.
1:18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018), Doc. 1 (“Netyksho Indictment”).
10 Netyksho Indictment 1.
‘1! Separate from this Office’s indictment of GRUofficers, in October 2018 a grandjury sitting in
the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with
hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sport
associations. United States v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.).
12 4 spearphishing email is designed to appear as thoughit originates from a trusted source, and
solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network, or causes the recipient to
36
secure bitcoins used to purchase computerinfrastructure used in hacking operations.'?
Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber
operations. Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165, the promotion
ofthosereleases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by
the GRU. Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of
elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology
related to the administration of U.S. elections.!!*
Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the
DCCCand DNC,as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign:!!>
- Unit 26165 used to learn about

different Democratic websites, including democrats.or; , hillaryclinton.com, dnc.org, and
began before the GRU had obtained any credentials or gained access
to these networks, indicating that the later DCCC and DNCintrusions were not crimes of
opportunity but rather the result of targeting.!!°
- GRUofficers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email
accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers. Between March 10, 2016 and March
15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email
accounts athillaryclinton.com. Starting on March 15, 2016, the GRU begantargeting Google
email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller numberof dnc.org
email accounts.!!7
The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of
Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, including campaign chairman John Podesta, junior
volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign’s advance team, informal Clinton Campaign
advisors, and a DNC employee.''® GRU officers stole tens of thousands of emails from
spearphishing victims, including various Clinton Campaign-related communications.
download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. Netyksho Indictment
q 10.
13 Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems.
kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX.io. To make
purchases, the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source
of funds. Netyksho Indictment {| 62.
"4 Netyksho Indictment J 69.
‘5 Netyksho Indictment 9.
116 See SM-2589105, serials 144 & 495.
117
37
2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks
a. Initial Access
By no later than April 12, 2016, the GRU had gained access to the DCCC computer
network using the credentials stolen from a DCCC employee who had been successfully
spearphished the week before. Over the ensuing weeks, the GRU traversed the network,
identifying different computers connected to the DCCC network. By stealing network access
credentials along the way (including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the
system), the GRU compromised approximately 29 different computers on the DCCC network.!!”
Approximately six days after first hacking into the DCCC network, on April 18, 2016,
GRUofficers gained access to the DNCnetworkvia virtual private network (VPN) connection!”
between the DCCC and DNCnetworks.'?! Between April 18, 2016 and June8, 2016, Unit 26165
compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network, including the DNC mailserver and
sharedfile server.!”
b. Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks
Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types of customized
malware,!?? known as “X-Agent” and “X-Tunnel”; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool; and
rar.exe, a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration. X-Agent
was a multi-function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and
gather other data about the infected computers (e.g., file directories, operating systems).’"* X-
Tunnel was a hacking tool that created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC/DNC
computers and GRU-controlled computers outside the DCCC and DNC networksthat was capable
oflarge-scale data transfers.!> GRU officers then used X-Tunnelto exfiltrate stolen data from the
victim computers.
119
20 A VPN extends a private network, allowing users to send and receive data across public
networks (suchasthe internet) as if the connecting computer wasdirectly connected to the private network.
The VPN in this case had been created to give a small number of DCCC employees access to certain
databases housed on the DNC network, Therefore, while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC’s
private network, they could access parts of the DNC network from their DCCC computers.
121
SM-2589105-HACK,serial 5.
122
M-2589105-HACK,serial 5.
123 «Mfalware” is short for malicious software, and here refers to software designed to allow a third
party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer’s user or operator.
124
125
38
Atterney-Weorlk // May
To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks, Unit 26165 officers
set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted
malware.!*° The first set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as“middle servers,”
sent and received messages to and from malware on the DNC/DCCC networks. The middle
servers, in turn, relayed messages to a secondset of GRU-controlled computers, labeled internally
by the GRU as an “AMSPanel.” The AMS Pane! GRESACERRCNCE served as a
nerve center through which GRU officers monitored and directed the malware’s operations on the
DNC/DCCCnetworks.2”
The AMSPanel used to control X-Agent during the DCCC and DNC intrusions was housed
on a leased computer located near[iJ Navannvestigative Technique
Investigative Technique
26 Tn connection with these intrusions, the GRU used computers (virtual private networks,
dedicated servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased from third-party providers locatedall
over the world. The investigation identified rental agreements and payments for computerslocated in, inter
aicminvestigative Technique all of which were used in the operations
targeting the U.S. election.
27 Netyksho Indictment { 25.
28 Netyksho Indictment § 24(c).
29 Netyksho Indictment {| 24(b).
39
Werk // May 6 1 6 6
The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containing keylogging
sessions captured through X-Agent. These sessions were captured as GRU officers monitored
DCCC and DNCemployees’ work on infected computers regularly between April 2016 and June
2016. Data captured in these keylogging sessions included passwords, internal communications
between employees, banking information, and sensitive personal information.
c. Theft ofDocumentsfrom DNC and DCCC Networks
Officers from Unit 26165 stole thousands of documents from the DCCC and DNC
networks, including significant amounts of data pertaining to the 2016 U.S. federal elections.
Stolen documents includedinternal strategy documents, fundraising data, opposition research, and
emails from the work inboxes of DNC employees.'*°
The GRU beganstealing DCCCdata shortly after it gained access to the network. On April
14, 2016 (approximately three days after the initial intrusion) GRU officers downloadedrar.exe
onto the DCCC’s document server. The following day, the GRU searched one compromised
DCCC computer for files containing search terms that included “Hillary,” “DNC,” “Cruz,” and
“Trump.”3! On April 25, 2016, the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents
from folders on the DCCC’s sharedfile server that pertained to the 2016 election.'3 The GRU
appears to have compressed and exfiltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from thisfile server.!*7
The GRUalso stole documents from the DNC network shortly after gaining access. On
April 22, 2016, the GRU copiedfiles from the DNC network to GRU-controlled computers. Stolen
documents included the DNC’s opposition research into candidate Trump.' Between
approximately May 25, 2016 and June 1, 2016, GRU officers accessed the DNC’s mail server
from a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States.'*° During these connections,
'30 Netyksho Indictment {| 27-29; EMSS
ie Rea
SM-2589105-HACK,serial 5. JI
ES nivastic i
See SM-2589105-GJ, serial 649. As part ofits investigation, the FBI later received images of DNC
servers and copies of relevanttraffic logs. Netyksho Indictment ff 28-29.
40
Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which werelater
released by WikiLeaks in July 2016.'%
B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials
The GRU’s operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing
documents stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the
anonymousrelease through twofictitious online personasthat it created—DCLeaks and Guccifer
2.0—andlater through the organization WikiLeaks.
1. DCLeaks
The GRUbeganplanningthereleases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit 26165
registered the domain dcleaks.comthrougha service that anonymizedthe registrant.'?” Unit 26165
paid fortheregistration using a poolofbitcoin that it had mined.3* The deleaks.com landing page
pointed to different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other
dcleaks.com pages contained indexesof the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the
sender, recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of releases, pages were
sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public.
Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks.com,
including documentsstolen from a numberof individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign.
These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts(in particular, Google
and Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaksvictims
included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign
employee, and four other campaign volunteers.'3? The GRU released through dcleaks.com
thousands of documents, including personal identifying and financial information, internal
correspondencerelated to the Clinton Campaign andpriorpolitical jobs, and fundraising files and
information.'°
'3¢ Netyksho Indictment J 29. The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May
25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC’s email server.
Netyksho Indictment J 45.
187 Netyksho Indictment § 35. Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks.com,the
same actors RS to femei the website electionleaks.com using the same domainregistration service.
138 See SM-2589105, serial 181; Netyksho Indictment 21(a).

139
140 See, e.g., Internet Archive, “https://dcleaks.com/”(archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally,
DCLeaksreleased documents relating to , emails belonging
to pp and emails from 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (underthe portfolio name
“The United States Republican Party”). “The United States Republican Party” portfolio contained
approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs, campaigns,state parties, and businesses
dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same
41
Attortey-WorkPreduet // Protected
GRUofficers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily
used to promotereleases of materials.4! The Facebook page was administered through a small
numberof preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.'”
GRUofficers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_,
and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and
other U.S. persons. GRUofficers using the DCLeaks persona gavecertain reporters early access
to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com
website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating
under the DCLeakspersonasent a link and passwordfor a non-public DCLeaks webpageto a U.S.
reporter via the Facebook account.Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent
reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of
the dcleaks.com website.“
The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017.
2. Guecifer 2.0
On June 14, 2016, the DNCandits cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC
network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team
alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as “Fancy Bear’) were
responsible for the breach.'*° Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016,
GRUofficers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up
to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and
managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English,
including “some hundred sheets,” “illuminati,” and “worldwide known.” Approximately two
hoursafter the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC
server hack to a lone Romanian hackerand using several of the unique English words and phrases
that the GRU officers had searchedfor that day.'“
Tennessee-based web-hosting company, called Smartech Corporation. William Bastone, RNC E-Mail Was,
In Fact, Hacked By Russians, The Smoking Gun (Dec. 13, 2016).
14 Netyksho Indictment { 38.
2 See, e.g., Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan).
8 7/14/16 Facebook Message,ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID [ERMAN
M4 See, e.g. 9/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to IM: 9/14/16 Twitter DM,
@dcleaks_to . The messagesread: “Hi https://t.co/QTVKUjQcOxpass:
KvFsg%* 14@gPgu& enjoy ;).”
45 Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,
CrowdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016). CrowdStrike updated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer
2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion.
46 Netyksho Indictment Jf 41-42.
42
May-Conti Materi l Under Fed R-Crinr P6fe)
That sameday, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin
releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The
Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC
in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016.'47 Released documents
included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing
potential criticisms of candidate Trump),internal policy documents (such as recommendations on
how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and
fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states
(e.g., Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.
Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release
documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Specifically, on June 27, 2016,
Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide “exclusive
access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton’s staff.”'*® The GRUlater sent the
reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an
archiveof emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.'? That
the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters accessto a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website
tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of
people.!*°
The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For
example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress
documents related to the candidate’s opponent.'*! On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona
transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S.
blogger covering Florida politics.'°* On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S.
reporter documents stolen from the DCCCpertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.!°?
47 Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016; June 20, 2016; June
21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016; August 31,
2016; September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October18, 2016.
48 6/27/16 Email, ‘nl fyPersonal/Privacy (subject “leaked emails”); Jj
149 6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to TEE (sv ject “leaked emails”);

3 see also 6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to
(subject “leaked emails”); (claiming DCLeaks was a “Wikileaks sub
project”).
‘5° Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an
apparenteffort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same
organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a “Wikileaks
sub project” and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaksto release the leaked emails with “closed access”to
give reporters a preview ofthem.
151 Netyksho Indictment {| 43(a).
152 Netyksho Indictment { 43(b).
'S3 Netyksho Indictment 43(c).
43
a former
In early August 2016, hel Twitter’s suspension of the

Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote
via private message, “thank u for writing back .. . do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the
docs i posted?” On August 17, 2016, the GRU added,“pleasetell me if ican help u anyhow...
it would be a great pleasure to me.” On September 9, 2016, the GRU—again posing as
Guccifer 2.0—teferred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked “what do u
think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign.”
responded, “pretty standard.”!°° The investigation did not identify evidence of other
communications between ed] and Guccifer 2.0.
3. Use of WikiLeaks
In order to expandits interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the GRU units
transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton
Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to
communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through encrypted channels,
including possibly through WikiLeaks’s private communication system.
a. WikiLeaks’s Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign
WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privately expressed opposition to
candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange
wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that “[w]e believe it would be much better
for GOP to win... Dems+Media+liberals woud][sic] then form a block to reign in their worst
qualities.... With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities.,
dems+media+neoliberals will be mute. ... She’s a bright, well connected, sadisitic sociopath.” !°°
In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton

emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation.'5? While designing the archive, one
WikiLeaks memberexplained the reason for building the archive to anotherassociate:
eHarm to Ongoing Matter

'56 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeakset al. Assange
also wrote that, “GOP will generate a lot oposition [sic], including through dumb moves. Hillary will do
the same thing, but co-optthe liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hencehillary has greater freedom
to start wars than the GOP andhasthe will to do so.” Id.
157 WikiLeaks, “Hillary Clinton Email Archive,” available at https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/.
44
May-Conti Materi l Fed-R-Crinr P-6fe)
[W]e want this repository to become “the place” to search for background on hillary’s
plotting at the state department during 2009-2013.... Firstly because its useful and will
annoy Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US
election, becauseeit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks.'*8
b. WikiLeaks’s First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
Shortly after the GRU’s first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in June
2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible
coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016, @dcleaks_ sent a direct
message to @WikiLeaks, noting, “You announced your organization was preparing to publish
more Hillary’s emails. We are ready to support you. We have somesensitive information too,in
a
i Ta Technique
particular, her financial documents. Let’s do it together. What do you think about publishing our
Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona
Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22,
2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0’s first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used
Twitter’s direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest that
Guccifer 2.0 “[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] herefor usto review andit will have
a muchhigher impact than what you are doing.”!°
On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter’s private
messaging function, writing, “if you have anythinghillary related we wantit in the next tweo[sic]
days prefable [sic] because the DNCis approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind
her after.” The Guccifer 2.0 persona responded, “ok...i see.” WikiLeaks also explained, “we
think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary . . . so conflict between bernie and
hillary is interesting.”!*!
c. The GRU’s Transfer ofStolen Materials to WikiLeaks
Both the GRU and WikiLeaks soughtto hide their communications, which has limited the
Office’s ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus, althoughit is clear that
the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred from the GRU to WikiLeaks,
'88 3/14/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks i Less than two weeksearlier, the same
account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton “in whitehouse with her
bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees.” 11/19/15 Twitter
Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaksetal.
'S9 6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks.
169 Netyksho Indictment J 47(a).
‘6! 7/6/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks & @guccifer_2.
45
Atterney-Work // Preteeted-Under
The Office wasable to identify when the GRU (operating throughits personas Guccifer 2.0
and DCLeaks)transferred someof the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set
up by the GRU. Assange had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embassy in London,
On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an
email bearing the subject “big archive” and the message “a new attempt.”!© The email contained
an encrypted attachment with the name “wk dne link1.txt.gpg.”!* Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter
account, GRUofficers sent WikiLeaks an encryptedfile and instructions on how to openit.On
July 18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Guccifer 2.0 account that it had
“the 1Gb or so archive” and would make release of the stolen documents “this week.”!® On
July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC
computer networks.!®” The Democratic National Convention began three dayslater.
Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona

DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016, @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, “hi there! I'm from DC
Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach outto you via
your secured chat but getting no response. I’ve got something that might interest you. You won't
be disappointed, I promise.”!°® The WikiLeaks account responded, “Hithere,” without further
elaboration. The @dcleaks_ accountdid not respond immediately.
The same day, the Twitter account @guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a direct message, which
is the first known contact between the personas.! During subsequent communications, the
1 This was hot the GRU’s first attemptat transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the
GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send a large encrypted file to a WikiLeaks email account.
6/29/16 Email, guccifer2@mail.com (ae (The email appears to have been
undelivered.)
164 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS,serial 28 (analysis).
'6 6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 to @WikiLeaks.
‘66 7/18/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks.
167 «DNC Email Archive,” WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available at https://wikileaks.org/dnc-emails.
‘6 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks.
' 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @guccifer_2 to @dcleaks_.
46
Attorney-WerkProduet // Protected
Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and
arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails.!”°
An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen
Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19, 2016.!”! Based on information about
Assange’s computerandits possible operating system, this date may be when the GRUstaged the
stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU hadpreviously done in July 2016 for
the DNC emails).!” The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from
Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had a creation date of
October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by
WikiLeaks onits site.!?
Beginning on September 20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in

a brief exchange. On September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com
sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject “Submission” and the message “Hi from
DCLeaks.” The email contained a PGP-encrypted message with the filename
“wiki_mail.txt.gpg.”!4 The email, however, bears a
numberof similarities to the July 14, 2016 email in which GRU officers used the Guccifer 2.0
personato give WikiLeaks accessto the archive of DNCfiles. On September 22, 2016 (the same
day of DCLeaks’ email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account @dcleaks sent a single message to
WikiLeaks with the string of characters
The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through
intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified
Andrew Miiller-Maguhnas a WikiLeaks associate who may haveassisted with the transfer of these
stolen documents to WikiLeaks.'7°
179 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks.
172
At the time, certain Apple operating systems used a setting that left a
downloadedfile’s creation date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would
explain whythe creation date on WikiLeaks’s version ofthe files was still September 19, 2016. See SM-
2284941, serial 62
'3 When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer system
appears to have treated each attachmentas a newfile and given it a new creation date. See SM-2284941,
serials 63 & 64.
™See 9/22/16 Email, dcleaksproject@gmail.com [nn
5 Bilen Nakashimaet al., 4 German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of
Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2018).
47
On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email
account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches ofstolen emails between October 7, 2016 and
November 7, 2016. The releases included private speeches given by Clinton; "77 internal
communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign; 178
and correspondencerelated to the Clinton F oundation.'” In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000
documents stolen from Podesta’s personal email account. The last-in-time email released from
Podesta’s account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing
email sent by the GRU.
d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source ofStolen Materials
As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged,
WikiLeaks and Assange made severalpublic statements apparently designed to obscure the source
of the materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described above and
other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks’s claims about the
source of material that it posted.
Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a numberof statements
about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member whowaskilled in July 2016. The statements about
Rich implied falsely that he had beenthe source of the stolen DNC emails. On August 9, 2016,
the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: “ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a
US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNCstaffer Seth Rich.”!®
Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange wasasked in an interview, “Why are you so interested in
Seth Rich’s killer?” and responded, “We’re very interested in anything that might be a threat to
alleged Wikileaks sources.” The interviewer responded to Assange’s statement by commenting,
“I know you don’t wantto reveal yoursource,butit certainly soundslike you’re suggesting a man
wholeaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered.” Assangereplied, “If there’s someone
who’s potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious
178
'? Netyksho Indictment {| 43.

180 @WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet.
Attorney-WeorkProduet // Protected
circumstances, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the two are connected. Butit is a very serious
matter...that type of allegation is very serious,asit’s taken very seriously by us?!
After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announcedits assessment that Russia was
behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by
WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S.
congressmanthat the DNC hack was an“inside job,” and purported to have “physical proof”that
Russians did notgive materials to Assange.'*?
C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations
While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and
WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hackvictimslinked to the Democratic campaign
and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in severalstates.
1. Summerand Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims
On July 27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton’s
personal office Na Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that
included the following: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails
that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.”'®? The “30,000
emails” were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored
on a personalserver that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State.
Within approximately five hours of Trump’s statement, GRU officers targeted forthefirst
time Clinton’s personal office. After candidate Trump’s remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent
malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain eas including an email
account belonging to Clinton aid The investigation did not find evidenceofearlier
GRUattempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was
able to identify these email accounts, which were not public.!*4
Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service
On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate
copies of the DNC datausin function designed to allow users to produce backups of
databases (referred to as “snapshots”). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving
181 See Assange: “Murdered DNC Staffer Was ‘Potential’ WikiLeaks Source,” Fox News(Aug.25,
2016)(containing video of Assange interview by MegynKelly).
182 MI. Raju & Z. Cohen, 4 GOP Congressman’s Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange, CNN
(May 23, 2018).
18 “Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails,” YouTube Channel C-SPAN,
Posted 7/27/16, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU(starting at 0:41).
184
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them to Ease account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-
controlled computers. The GRUstole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud-
based account.!85
2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections
In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRUofficers also

targeted individuals andentities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included
USS. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and
county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.'8 The GRU also
targeted private technologyfirmsresponsible for manufacturing and administering election-related
software and hardware, such as voterregistration software and electronic polling stations.'®” The
GRUcontinued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the
investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office
did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examineservers or other
relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.
Byat least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer
networksby exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental
entities. GRUofficers, for example, targeted state and local databases ofregistered voters using a
technique known as “SQL injection,” by which malicious code was sent to the state or local
website in order to run commands(such as exfiltrating the database contents).'** In one instance
in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State
Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE’s website. The GRU then gained
access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,!® and
extracted data related to thousands ofU.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.!"°
| GRUofficers
ulnerabilities. For example, over a two-day
scanned state and local websites for
period in July 2016, GRU officers
for vulnerabilities on websites of more than
two dozenstates.
85 Netyksho Indictment J 34;see also SM-2589105-HACK,serial 29 MeN
186 Netyksho Indictment{| 69.

187 Netyksho Indictment 69;
188
189
190
o
wn
Similar for vulnerabilities continued through theelection.
Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election
administration and personnel at companiesinvolved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU
officers targeted employees a. a voting technology companythat developed software
used by numerous U.S. counties to managevoterrolls, and installed malware on the company
network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email
accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election.'*!
The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software
(commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.'”
The FBI wasseparately responsiblefor this investigation. We understand the FBI believesthat this
operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county
government. The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not
undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials
The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks’s releases of hacked materials

hout the summer and fall of 2016. [EDGR MenTeTe Tite METCT
a
a. Background
'91 Netyksho Indictment 4 76; [eeeEUom cae [eke
ialnvestigative Technique
51
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b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks
On June 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to “have emails relating
to Hillary Clinton which are pendingpublication,”!™ but provided no additional context.
In debriefings with the Office, former deputy campaign chairman Rick Gates said that,
Gates recalled candidate

Trumpbeinggenerally frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found.'°
Paul Manafort, who would later become campaign chairman, EUG) Ongoing Matter
sum@Harm to Ongoing Matter
fa Harm to Ongoing Matter
194 See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic Convention,
Time (July 27, 2016) (quoting the June 12, 2016 television interview).
195 Tn February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuantto a plea agreement, to a supersedingcriminal
information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses(7.e., tax fraud, failure
to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the
United States, as well as makingfalse statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United
States v. Richard W. Gates ITT, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 (“Gates Superseding Criminal
Information”); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. GatesIII, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018),
Doc. 205 (“Gates Plea Agreement”). Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office
has deemedtobereliable.
196 Gates 10/25/18 302,at 1-2.
'7 As explained further in VolumeI, Section IV.A.8,infra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement
with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and
before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only whenhis
statements are sufficiently corroboratedto be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort’s untruthful
responses may themselvesbeofevidentiary value; or to provide Manafort’s explanations for certain events,
even when we were unable to determine whetherthat explanation was credible. His account appears here
principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses.
52
Michael Cohen, former executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special
counsel to Donald J. Trump,'”? told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in
candidate Trump’s office in Trump Tower EUR enter Tite VET
Cohen further told the Office that, after WikiLeaks’s subsequent release of stolen
DNC emails in July 2016, candidate Trump said to Cohen something to the effect of,
202

According to Gates, Manafort expressed excitement about the
203 Manafort, for his part, told the Office that, shortly after
WikiLeaks’s July 22 release, Manafort also spoke with candidate Trump
Manafort also (leu wanted to be kept apprised of any
199 Tn November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count
information charging him with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) &
(c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’s
Office in the Southern District of New York, after a referral from this Office. In the months leading up to
his false-statements guilty plea, Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and
provided information that the Office has generally assessed to bereliable andthatis includedin this report.
201 EET aaa com Odare collate miieuccig
202 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. EMC elareine ierics

RETaumrom @)nrsloiae miele
203 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241),at 4.

BaGrand Jury
aa Grand Jury
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developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch Tea about future
WikiLeaksreleases.?%
According to Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a
press strategy, a communications campaign, and messaging based on the possible release of
Clinton emails by WikiLeaks.2°” [ETM MeMyeTe ewe
eugHarm to Ongoing Matter
while Trump and Gates were driving to LaGuardia Airport.
Harm to Ongoing Matter , shortly after the call
candidate Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming.?
c. EVR Mo nye ere wee
Corsiis an author who holds a doctoratein political science.*'* In 2016, Corsi also worked for the
media outlet WorldNetDaily (WND). [GETGINSWeyireresiirew METcg
mag Grand Jury

2°7 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302,at 2.
2 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4.
212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for
Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained
prominence for being a leading proponentofthe allegation that Barack Obama wasnotborn in the United
States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with
Trump on the phone onatleast six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3.
13 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2; Corsi was first
interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counsel’s offices in Washington, D.C. He was
accompanied by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September 17,
2018; September 21, 2018; October 31, 2018; November 1, 2018; and November 2, 2018. Counsel was
54

* Corsi told the Office during
interviews that he “must have” previously discussed Assange with Malloch.2!5
According to Malloch, Corsi asked him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsi
wishedto interview. Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the “orbit” of
U.K.politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them.
Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made noactual attempt to connect
Corsi with Assange.!®
presentforall interviews, andthe interviews beginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuantto
a proffer agreementthat precluded affirmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances.
215 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 4,
BaGrand Jury Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange

or WikiLeaks, stating that he did not pursue the request to contact Assange because he believed he had no
connections to Asse, ili
220 TRETat com late eliats mii renake\g
Mallochstated to investigators that beginning in or about August 2016, he and Corsi had
multiple FaceTime discussions about WikiLeaks REDAMMen Tere ET
had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released
prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or
around August or September 2016, Corsi told Mallochthat the release of the Podesta emails was
coming, after which “we”were going to be in the driver’s seat.2?!
QaaHarm to Ongoing Matter

EijHarm to Ongoing Matter
KagiHarm to Ongoing Matter
BigHarm to Ongoing Matter
eaGrand Jury
eaHarm to Ongoing Matter

ZaiHarm to Ongoing Matter
225 EVau mom daveodlave Mi ELtccis
228
56
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(arelatim om Oarsfoliare Mieticcls

@aHarm to Ongoing
WEWls
EigHarm to Ongoing Matter
gagiHarm to Ongoing Matter
aa
gagHarm to Ongoing Matter
3 |
fagHarm to Ongoing Matter

=
231
arm to Ongoing Matter
aq
232
fauHarm to Ongoing Matter

fatHarm to Ongoing Matter
faaHarm to Ongoing Matter
a7
d. WikiLeaks’s October 7, 2016 Release ofStolen Podesta Emails
On October7, 2016, four days after the Assange press conference

, the Washington Post published an Access Hollywoodvideothat
captured comments by candidate Trump someyearsearlier and that was expected to adversely
affect the Campaign.2»? Less than an hourafter the video’s publication, WikiLeaks released the
first set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman
John Podesta.
KaggHarm to Ongoing Matter
RagHarm to Ongoing Matter

HHarm to Ongoing Matter
Corsisaid that, because he had no direct means of communicating with

WikiLeaks, he told membersof the news site WND—whowereparticipating on a conference call °
with him that day—to reach Assange immediately“* Corsi claimed that the pressure was
239 Candidate Trumpcan be heard off camera making graphic statements about women.
240
241
242,
243
244 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated EDUIMMere feito MEce
that he believed Malloch was on thecall but then focused
on other individuals who wereonthecall-invitation, which Malloch wasnot. (Separate travel records show
that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboarda transatlantic flight). Corsi at one point stated that after
WikiLeaks’s release of stolen emails on October7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with
Assange. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6.
58
Atterney_Werk-Preduct // May
enormousand recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.5 Corsi
stated that he was convincedthat his efforts had caused WikiLeaksto release the emails when they
did2° Ina later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people
on a WNDconference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether
anyonecould contact Assange, but then said that maybe he had done nothing.”47”
TheOffice investigated Corsi’s allegations about the events of October 7, 2016 but found
little corroboration for his allegations about the day.48 EUIICMenTefeireM ET
However, the phone records

themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the
Access Hollywood story, and the Office has not otherwise been able to identify the substance of
exerci arm to Ongoing Matter
>" However, the Office
has not identified any conferencecall participant, or anyone whospoke to Corsi that day, who says
that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having
contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation with Corsi.
e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks
Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the
campaign period. On September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks
ro
the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump’s “unprecedented and dangerous”ties
245 During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may havesent out public tweets because
he knew Assange wasreadinghis tweets. Our Office was unableto find evidence of any such tweets.
4 Corsi 9/21/18 302, at 6-7.
247 Corsi 11/1/18 302,at 6.
fiatarm to Ongoing Matter
awHOM Harm to Ongoing Matter
I
59
to Russia, PutinTrump.org.2* WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: “‘Let’s bomb Iraq’ Progress for
America PAC to launch “PutinTrump.org’ at 9:30am. Oops pw is ‘putintrump’ putintrump.org.”
Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald TrumpJr., “A PAC run
anti-Trump site putintrump.org is about to launch. The PACis a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We
have guessed the password. It is ‘putintrump.’ See ‘About’ for who is behind it. Any
comments?”
Severalhours later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaignstaff:
GuysI got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below.I tried the password andit
works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind
it. Not sure if this is anything but it seemslike it’s really wikileaks asking meas I follow
them andit is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are
looking for could be? These are just screen shots butit’s a fully built out page claiming to
be a PAClet me know yourthoughts and if we wantto lookinto it.254
TrumpJr. attached a screenshotof the “About” page for the unlaunchedsite PutinTrump.org. The
next day (after the website had launched publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks:
“Off the record, I don’t know whothatis but I’ll ask around. Thanks.”
On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking “you
guys”to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a droneto target
Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already “had done so,” and asked, “what’s behind
this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?””° WikiLeaksdid not respond.
On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was “great to see you and your dad
talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us
wlsearch.tk.”*>7 WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in “digging through” leaked
emails and stated, “wejust released Podesta emails Part 4.”*° Two dayslater, TrumpJr. publicly
tweeted the wlsearch.tk link.?°
252 9/20/16 Twitter DM, @JasonFishbein to @WikiLeaks; see JF00587 (9/21/16 Messages,
BE @)abber.cryptoparty is SHEMINI 2bcryptopartyi) Fishbein 9/5/18 302, at 4. When
interviewed by our Office, Fishbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the
participants discussed U.S. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and passwordthat
Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks.
*53 9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr.
254 TRUMPORG28000629-33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Conway et al. (subject
“Wikileaks”)).
255 9/21/16 Twitter DM, @DonaldJTrumpJr to @WikiLeaks.
256 10/3/16 Twitter DMs, @DonaldJTrumpJr & @WikiLeaks.
257 At the time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents.
258 10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr.
259 @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/16 (6:34 a.m.) Tweet.
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2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials
Throughout 2016, the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton’s private
email server and whether approximately 30,000 emails from that server had in fact been
permanently destroyed, as reported by the media. Several individuals associated with the
Campaign were contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton emails and
other stolen material in support of the Trump Campaign. Someof these contacts were met with
skepticism, and nothing cameof them; others were pursued to some degree. The investigation did
not find evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any such Clinton emails, or that these
contacts were part of a coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign.
a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)
In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a Florida-
based Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian, Henry Oknyansky (whoalso
went by the name Henry Greenberg), claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton.
Caputo notified Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky.
Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in-person meeting?
Oknyansky was accompanied to the meeting by Alexei Rasin, a Ukrainian associate

involved in Florida real estate. At the meeting, Rasin offered to sell Stone derogatory information
on Clinton that Rasin claimed to have obtained while working for Clinton. Rasin claimed to
possess financial statements demonstrating Clinton’s involvement in money laundering with
Rasin’s companies. According to Oknyansky, Stone asked if the amounts in question totaled
millions of dollars but was told it was closer to hundreds of thousands. Stone refused the offer,
stating that Trump would not pay for opposition research.°!
Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin’s motivation was financial. According to
Oknyansky, Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other
interested parties, and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold.2 Rasin is
noted in public source documents as the director and/or registered agent for a numberofFlorida
companies, none of which appears to be connected to Clinton. The Office foundno other evidence
that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entities.
In their statementsto investigators, Oknyansky and Caputo had contradictory recollections

about the meeting. Oknyansky claimed that Caputo accompanied Stone to the meeting and
provided an introduction, whereas Caputo did nottell us that he had attended and claimed that he
was never told what information Oknyansky offered. Caputo also stated that he was unaware
Oknyansky soughtto be paid for the information until Stone inforrned him after the fact.
269 Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302,at 1.

261 Oknyansky 7/13/18 302,at 1-2.
26 Oknyansky 7/13/18 302,at 2.
263 Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302,at 1.
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The Office did not locate Rasin in the United States, although the Office confirmed Rasin
had been issued a Florida driver’s license. The Office otherwise was unable to determine the
content andorigin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone. Finally, the investigation
did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian
interferenceefforts.
b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails
After candidate Trump stated on July 27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would “find the
30,000 emails that are missing,” Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaignto find the
deleted Clinton emails.*& Michael Flynn—who wouldlater serve as National Security Advisor in
the Trump Administration—recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and Flynn
subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails.2%
Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Flynn. Ledeen, a
long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails, provided updates to Flynn
about herefforts throughout the summer of 2016.2Smith, an investment advisor who wasactive
in Republican politics, also attemptedto locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails.267
Ledeen beganherefforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn’s request, as early as
December 2015.2 On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails,
stating, “Here is the proposalI briefly mentioned to you. The person I described to you would be
happyto talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which 1.
Wereclassified and 2. Were purloined by our enemies. That would demonstrate what needs to be
demonstrated.”
Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the “Clinton email server was, in
all likelihood, breached long ago,” and that the Chinese, Russian, andIranian intelligence services
could “re-assemble the server’s email content.”?”” The proposalcalled for a three-phase approach.
Thefirst two phases consisted of open-source analysis. The third phase consisted of checking with
certain intelligence sources “that have access through liaison work with various foreign services”
to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. The proposal noted, “Even if a
single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it would
be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign[.]” Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and
264 Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3.

265 Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3.
266 Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 7; Flynn 5/4/18 302, at 1-2; Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8.
267 Flynn 11/29/17 302,at 7.
268 Szobocsan 3/29/17 302,at 1.
269 19/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith.
27 12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith (attachment).
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wrote, “we can discuss to whom it should be referred.”””! On December 16, 2015, Smith informed
Ledeen that he declined to participate in her “initiative.” According to one of Smith’s business
associates, Smith believed Ledeen’s initiative was not viableat that time.?”
Just weeks after Trump’s July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails, however, Smith
tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a company, raised tens of thousands of
dollars, and recruited security experts and business associates. Smith made claims to others
involved in the effort (and those from whom hesought funding) that he was in contact with hackers
with “ties and affiliations to Russia” who had access to the emails, and that his efforts were
coordinated with the Trump Campaign.??
On August 28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject “Sec.
Clinton’s unsecured private email server”to an undisclosedlist of recipients, including Campaign
co-chairman Sam Clovis. The email stated that Smith was “[j]ust finishing two daysof sensitive
meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that the
Clinton’s home-based, unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-related players, and
private mercenaries. Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of the election.”
On September2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC
in furtheranceofhis search for the deleted Clinton emails.” One of the purposes of KLS Research
was to manage the funds Smith raised in support ofhis initiative.7”° KLS Research received over
$30,000 during the presidential campaign, although Smith represented that he raised even more
money.?”7
Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including security experts to search for
and authenticate the emails.?”* In early September 2016,as part of his recruitment and fundraising
effort, Smith circulated a documentstating thathis initiative was “in coordination”with the Trump
Campaign,“to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization.”””? The document
listed multiple individualsaffiliated with the Trump Campaign,including Flynn, Clovis, Bannon,
27 12/3/15 Email, Smith to Szobocsan & Safron.

22 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 1.
273 8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith.
275 Tncorporation papers of KLS Research LLC, 7/26/Grand Jury
Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 2.
276 S7obocsan 3/29/18 302,at 3.
277 Financial Institution Record of Peter Smith and KLS Research LLC, 10/31/17 Eee
10/11/16 Email, Smith to
28 Tait 8/22/17 302, at 3; York 7/12/17 302, at 1-2; York 11/22/17 302,at 1.
279 York 7/13/17 302 (attachment KLS Research, LLC,“Clinton Email ReconnaissanceInitiative,”
Sept. 9, 2016).
63
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and Kellyanne Conway.”*° The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least
Flynn and Clovis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,”*! but the Office did not identify
evidence that any ofthelisted individuals initiated or directed Smith’s efforts.
In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their
respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, “wondering if you had some moredetailed reports or
memos orother data you could share because we have come a long wayin our efforts since we
last visited... . We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marryit
against the new data we have found and then could shareit back to you ‘your eyes only,’”282
Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the “dark
web”) that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails
and solicited contributionsto fundthat effort. Erik Prince provided fundingto hire a tech advisor
to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that
the emails were not authentic.28
A backup of Smith’s computer contained two files that had been downloaded from
WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. Thefiles on
Smith’s computerhad creation dates of October 2, 2016, which waspriorto the date of their release
by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect
whenthefiles were downloaded to Smith’s computer. (It appears the creation date was when
WikiLeaks staged the documentfor release, as discussed in VolumeI, Section III.B.3.c, supra.?*4)
The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their
release by WikiLeaks.
Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton’s deleted
emails until shortly before the election. For example, on October 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there
wasa “tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks overits planned releases in the next few days,” and
that WikiLeaks “has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this
allowslittle time for response prior to the U.S. election November 8.”78 An attachment to the
280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under “Independent
Groups/Organizations/Individuals,” and described him as an “established author and writer fromthe right
on President Obama andSec. Clinton.”
31 Flynn 11/29/17 302,at 7-8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynnet al.; 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith
(bee: Cloviset al.).
282 9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to Smith.
283 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5.
28 The forensic analysis of Smith’s computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple
operating system that would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded
(no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See VolumeI, Section III.B.3.c, supra. The
Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the two files found on Smith’s computer from
WikiLeaks’s site using the same Apple operating system on Smith’s computer; both files were successfully
downloaded andretained the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62.
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email claimed that WikiLeaks would release “All 33k deleted Emails” by “NovemberIst.” No
emails obtained from Clinton’s server were subsequently released.
Smith drafted multiple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian
hackers. For example, in one such email, Smith claimedthat, in August 2016, KLS Research had
organized meetings with parties who hadaccessto the deleted Clinton emails, including parties
with “ties andaffiliations to Russia.”**° The investigation did not identify evidence that any such
meetings occurred. Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on theinitiative did
not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such
connection.2*’ The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers
or that Smith, Ledeen,or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaignultimately obtained
the deleted Clinton emails.
In sum,the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons
affiliated with the Clinton Campaign,as well as the computers of the DNC and DCCC. The GRU
then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and
disseminated that data through fictitious online personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later
through WikiLeaks. The investigation also established that the Trump Ca n_ displayed
interest in the WikiLeaksreleases, and that Harm to Ongoing Matter
explained in VolumeI, Section V.B, infra, the evidence was sufficient to support computer-
intrusion (and other) charges against GRU officers for their role in election-related hacking.

287 Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302,at 6.
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IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTLINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
The Office identified multiple contacts—“links,”in the words of the Appointment Order—
between Trump Campaignofficials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The
Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian
interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation
examined whether these contacts involved orresulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the
Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the
Campaign in exchangefor anysort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available
information, the investigation did not establish such coordination.
This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals
with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with Campaign officials or associates
that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an
overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describesin detail the relevant facts, which are
generally presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the Campaign and
extending throughthe post-election, transition period.
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 — November8, 2016)
Russian-government-connected individuals and media entities began showinginterest in

Trump’s campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015.78° Because
Trump’s status as a public figure at the time wasattributable in large part to his prior business and
entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked
individuals and entities during the campaign period—the Trump Tower Moscow project, see
VolumeI, Section IV.A.1, infra—led to or involved coordination ofelection assistance.
Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continuedin the spring and summerof 2016,
when Trump was moving toward—and eventually becoming—the Republican nominee for
President. As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period:
outreach to two of Trump’s then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a
representation that Russia had “dirt” on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (VolumeI,
Sections IV.A.2 & IV.A.3); dealings with a D.C.-basedthink tank that specializes in Russia and
has connections with its government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4); a meeting at Trump Tower
between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was “part of
Russia and its government’s support for [Trump]” (Volume I, Section IV.A.5); events at the
Republican National Convention (VolumeI, Section IV.A.6); post-Convention contacts between
Trump Campaign officials and Russia’s ambassador to the United States (Volume I, Section
IV.A.7); and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for
a Russianoligarch and a pro-Russianpolitical party in Ukraine (VolumeI, Section IV.A.8).
288 For example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper
Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phoneor in-person
candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication’s founder (and
former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites—Trump2016.ru
and DonaldTrump2016.ru. Nointerview tookplace.
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1. Trump Tower Moscow Project
The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as
part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership
(through subsidiary corporate structures) of property. In other cases, the Trump Organization has
executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies,oftenlocalto the
country where the project waslocated.
Between atleast 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similarlicensing deal
in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project,
commonlyreferred to as a “Trump Tower Moscow”or “Trump Moscow”project, anticipated a
combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building.
Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-
president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian
counterparties. From thefall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the
Trump Organization’s pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the
project’s status to candidate Trumpandother executivesin the Trump Organization.”
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)
The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned
and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-basedreal estate project shortly after
the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.2*! Donald J. Trump Jr. served as
the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin Agalarov (son of Aras
Agalarov) and Irakli “Ike” Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations,” with
the occasionalassistance of Robert Goldstone.”
In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of
2®See, e.g., Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 151-52
(Sept. 7, 2017) (discussing licensing deals of specific projects).
29 As noted in Volume I, Section IJI.D.1, supra, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to
making false statements to Congress concerning, among otherthings, the duration of the Trump Tower
Moscow project. See Information J 7(a), United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-ct-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,
2018), Doc. 2 (“Cohen Information”).
29! See Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7,
2017) (“Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov’s company, Crocus Group, began
preliminarily discussion[sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow.”). As has been widely reported, the
Miss Universe pageant—which Trump co-ownedat the time—was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus
City Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras
Agalarov’s son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trumpattended.
” Kaveladze 11/GN7 302, ot 2, +6; TT osc.

KAV_00385 (12/6/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov).
293
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an agreementfor the Trump Tower Moscowproject.2* On December 23, 2013, after discussions
with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the
organization receiveda flat 3.5% commission onallsales, with nolicensing fees or incentives.”
Theparties negotiateda letter of intent during January and February 2014.2"
From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group
discussed development plans for the Moscow project. Some time before January 24, 2014,the
Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be
constructed at an Agalarov-ownedsite in Moscowcalled “Crocus City,” which had also beenthe
site of the Miss Universe pageant.2°7 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov
and toured the CrocusCity site during a visit to Moscow.”* From March 2014 through July 2014,
the groups discussed “design standards” and otherarchitectural elements.””? For example,in July
2014, membersof the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the
“demographics of these prospective buyers” in the Crocus City area, the development of
neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portionsof the building.” In
August 2014,the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded
tower beingbuilt in Crocus City”!
Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely

fashion to correspondenceand proposals from the Crocus Group.°? Communications between the
two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the
last communication is dated November 24, 2014.2The project appears not to have developed
past the planning stage, and no construction occurred.
macrand Jury
295 OSC-KAV_00452 (12/23/13 Email, TrumpJr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov).
28 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. & E. Agalarov); OSC-
KAV_01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to TrumpJr.et al.).
297 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGeeto Khooetal.) (email from Crocus Group
contractor aboutspecifications); OSC-KAV_00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to TrumpJr.et al.).
298 See OSC-KAV_00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. Agalarov to Ivanka Trump, TrumpJr. & Kaveladze);
Goldstone Facebookpost, 2/4/14 (8:01 MRlinvestigative Technique
2 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to TrumpJr. et al.; OSC-KAV_00799
(6/10/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladzeetal.); OSC-KAV_00817 (6/16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze
et al.).
30° OSC-KAV_00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGeeetal.).
301 OSC-KAV_00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGeeetal.).
3 OSC-KAV_00903 (9/29/14 Email, Tropea to McGee & Kaveladze (noting last response was on
August 26, 2014)); OSC-KAV_00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea & McGee(suggestingsilence
“proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project”)); OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/14 Email,
McGeeto Khooet al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)).
393 OSC-KAV_01140(11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGeeet al.).
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b. Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi

Rtskhiladze (Summerand Fall 2015)
In the late summer of 2015, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing
a Trump Towerproject in Moscow. In approximately September 2015, Felix Sater, a New York-
based real estate advisor, contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump
Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.° Sater had previously worked with the
Trump Organization and advisedit on a number of domestic and international projects. Sater had
explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump
Organization and therefore knew of the organization’s general interest in completing a deal
there.Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow
previously and had accompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid-
2000s.7%
Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I.-C. Expert Investment Company (J.C. Expert), a
Russian real-estate developmentcorporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov.*°’ Sater
had known Rozov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014, had served as an agent on behalf of
Rozov during Rozov’s purchase ofa building in New YorkCity.*°* Sater later contacted Rozov
and proposedthat I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscowproject in which I.C. Expert would
license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own.
Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another employeeofI.C. Expert.3”
Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with I.C.
Expert or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohenobtained approval to negotiate with
I.C. Expert from candidate Trump, who wasthen president of the Trump Organization. Cohen
provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016,assuring him
the project was continuing.*!° Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka
Trumpas to design elements (such as possible architects to use for the project*'') and Donald J.
Trump Jr. (abouthis experience in Moscow and possible involvementin the project®!”) during the
fall of 2015.
3 Sater provided information to our Office in two 2017 interviews conducted under a proffer
39 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 1-2, 5.

397 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3.
38 Rozov 1/25/18 302,at 1.
39 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at 1; see also 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozovetal. (sendingletter ofintent).
310 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 1-2, 4-6.

311 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at5.
3 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 4-5.
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Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscowproposalwith
Giorgi Rtskhiladze, a business executive whopreviously had been involved in a developmentdeal
with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia.?!? Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in
part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow,including a licensing deal with
the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group.*!4 On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary
design study for the Trump Moscowproject to Rtskhiladze, adding “I look forward to your reply
aboutthis spectacular project in Moscow.” Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen’s email to an associate
and wrote, “[i]f we could organize the meeting in New Yorkat the highest level of the Russian
Government and Mr. Trumpthis project would definitely receive the worldwide attention.”3!5
On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a

proposed “[I]etter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trumporg,”explaining that “[w]e need to send
this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware ofthe potential project and
will pledge his support.”3!® In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a
translation of the letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a “symbolof stronger
economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow andtherefore
United States and the Russian Federation.”?!’ On September 27, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent another
email to Cohen,proposingthat the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscowproject with
“Global Development Group LLC,”which hedescribed as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a
Russianarchitect, and Simon Nizharadze.*!® Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the
proposalandinstead continued to work with I.C. Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater?”
c. Letter ofIntent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January

2016)
i. Trump Signs the Letter ofIntent on behalfof the Trump Organization
Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November2, 2015, the Trump Organization
(throughits subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOD
for a Trump Moscowproperty. The LOLsigned by Trumpfor the Trump Organization and Rozov
on behalf of I.C. Expert, was “intended to facilitate further discussions” in order to “attempt to
313 Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In
approximately 2011, Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreementto
build a Trump-branded property in Batumi, Georgia. Rtskhiladze was also involved in discussions for a
ca ae in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze, aa
314 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12; see also Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302,at 1.
315 9/99/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze.
316 9/94/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.
319 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 12.
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enter into a mutually acceptable agreement”related to the Trump-brandedprojectin Moscow.3””

The LOI contemplated a developmentwith residential, hotel, commercial, and office components,
and called for “[a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums,” as well as “[o]ne
first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150
hotel rooms.”22!_ For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump
Organization would receive between 1% and 5% ofall condominium sales,°”* plus 3% ofall rental
and other revenue.°* Forthe project’s hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base
fee of 3% of gross operating revenues for thefirst five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separate
incentive fee of 20% of operating profit. 324 Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would
receive a $4 million “up-front fee” prior to groundbreaking.>*° Under these terms, the Trump
Organization stood to earn substantial sums overthe lifetime of the project, without assuming
significantliabilities or financing commitments.>”°
On November 3, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Sater
emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate
Trump’s chancesat beingelected, writing:
Buddy our boy can becomePresident of the USA and we can engineerit. I will get all of
Putins team to buyin on this, I will manage this process. ... Michael, Putin gets on stage
with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow, and Donald ownsthe republican
nomination. And possibly beats Hillary and ourboyis in... . We will manage this process
better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very
shortly. That the game changer.?””
Later that day, Sater followed up:
Donald doesn’t stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin
only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good
candidate for someone who knowshowto negotiate. “Business, politics, whateverit allis
the same for someone who knowshowto deal”
320 11/2/15 Email, Cohento Rozovetal. (attachment) (hereinafter “LOI”); see also 10/13/15 Email,
Sater to Cohen & Davis (attaching proposedletter of intent).
321 LOI,p. 2.
322 The LOI called for the Trump Organizationto receive 5% ofall gross sales up to $100 million;
4% ofall gross sales from $100 million to $250 million; 3% ofall gross sales from $250 million to $500
million; 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion; and 1% ofall gross sales over$1 billion.
LOI, Schedule 2.
323 LOL, Schedule 2.
324 TOL, Schedule 1.
5 LOL, Schedule 2.
6 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 3.
327 11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:14 p.m.).
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I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscowpress conference.
If he says it we ownthis election. Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald
is a good guyto negotiate. ...
Wecan ownthis election.
Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people, we can pull
this off.
Michaellets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is goodreally
good.>8
According to Cohen,he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscowproject
to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or
anyoneaffiliated with the Trump Campaign discussingthe political implications of the Trump
Moscow project with him. However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the
candidate suggested that his campaign would be significant “infomercial” for Trump-branded
properties.???
ii, Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia
Giventhesize ofthe Trump Moscowproject, Sater and Cohenbelieved the project required
approval (whether expressor implicit) from the Russian national government, including from the
Presidential Administration of Russia.*7° Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the
Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact.?3! In early negotiations
with the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his
attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials. On October 12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote
to Cohen that “all we need is Putin on board and weare golden,” and that a “meeting with Putin
and top deputyis tentatively set for the 14th [of October].3*” a this meeting
wasbeing coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had nodirect interaction with the Russian
government.
Approximately a monthlater, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed Ivanka
Trump on behalf of Erchova’s then-husband Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov’s assistance to the
Trump Campaign.?** Klokov wasat that time Director of External Communications for PJSC
Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission

329 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15.
90 Tn Sater 12/15/17 302, at 2.
331 Sater 12/15/17 302,at 3-4.
332 10/12/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (8:07 a.m.).
334 Tvanka Trumpreceived an email from a woman whoidentified herself as “Lana E. Alexander,”
whichsaidin part, “If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov, you’ll
see who heis close to and that he has done Putin’s political campaigns.” 11/16/15 Email, Erchova to
I. Trump.
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company, and had been previously employed as an aide andpress secretary to Russia’s energy
minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen.**° Hetold the Office that, after receiving
this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov’s name and concluded(incorrectly)
that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter?
Between November 18 and 19, 2015, Klokov and Cohen hadat least one telephonecall
and exchanged several emails. Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a “trusted person” who
could offer the Campaign “political synergy” and “synergy on a governmentlevel,” Klokov
recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary.
Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the
candidate and an individual Klokov described as “our person ofinterest.’37 In an email to the
Office, Erchovalater identified the “person of interest” as Russian President Vladimir Putin.***
In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use
a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscowproject with local
. developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified
intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump—
including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin—would need to be “in
conjunction with the developmentandan official visit” with the Trump Organization receiving a
formal invitation to visit.? (Klokov had written previously that “the visit [by candidate Trump
to Russia] has to be informal.”)*“°
Klokovhadalso previously recommendedto Cohen that he separate their negotiations over

a possible meeting between Trumpand“the personofinterest” from any existing businesstrack.*"!
Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done onbehalfof any business, Klokov added in second
email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have “phenomenal” impact “in a
business dimension” and that the “person of interest[’s]” “most important support” could have
significant ramificationsfor the “level of projects and their capacity.” Klokov concluded bytelling
335 11/16/15 Email, I. Trump to Cohen.

336 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 17. During his interviews with the Office, Cohenstill appeared to believe
that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email
address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov,as described above.
337 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.).
338 Tn July 2018, the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which
she wrote that “[a]t the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact Ivanka
Trump... and offer cooperation to Trump’s team on behalf of the Russian officials.” 7/27/18 Email,
Erchovato Special Counsel’s Office. The email claimedthat the officials wanted to offer candidate Trump
“land in Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin.” Jd. In orderto vet the email’s
claims, the Office responded requesting more details. The Office did not receive any reply.
339 11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15 a.m.).
3411/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.).
341 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.) (“I would suggest separating your negotiations
and our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be
completely different, having the most important support.”).
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Cohen that there was “no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of
interest.”*4? Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that “[cJurrently our LOI developeris in talks
with VP’s Chiefof Staff and arranging a formalinvite for the two to meet.”*43_ This email appears
to be their final exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought
Klokov’s initial offer of assistance to the Campaign’s attention or that anyone associated with the
Trump Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he
did not pursue the proposed meeting because he wasalready working on the Moscow Project with
Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government.*44
By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to
use those connectionsto set up the promised meeting with Russian governmentofficials. Cohen
told Sater that he was “setting up the meeting myself.”*4° On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed
the office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government’s press secretary, indicating that he desired
contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin’s chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used the email address
“Pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru” instead of “Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru,” so the email apparently
did not go through.“ On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address
(info@prpress.gov.ru) with the following message:
Dear Mr. Peskov,

Overthe past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding
the development of a Trump Tower-Moscowproject in Moscow City.
Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has
stalled. As this project is too important, 1 am hereby requesting yourassistance.
I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the
specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals.
I thank you in advancefor yourassistance and look forward to hearing from you soon.3*7
Twodays later, Cohen sent an email to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak
with Sergei Ivanov.2#8
Cohentestified to Congress, andinitially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a
response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump
Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohenlater admitted that these statements were false. In
342 11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 a.m.).

343 11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 p.m.).
4 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12.
345 F§00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohento Sater (6:17 p.m.)).
346 1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru (9:12 a.m.).
347 1/14/16 Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru (9:21 a.m.).
348 1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru (10:28 a.m.).
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fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to
work on and update candidate Trump onthe project through as late as June 2016.
On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova, Peskov’s personal
assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Poliakova stated that she had beentrying to
reach Cohen and asked thathe call her on the personal number that she provided.’ Shortly after
receiving Poliakova’s email, Cohen called and spoketo her for 20 minutes.*>! Cohen described to
Poliakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow
project, including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization
had partnered. Cohen requested assistance in movingthe project forward, both in securing landto
build the project and with financing. According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and
took notes, stating that she would need to follow up with others in Russia.*>
Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other
representative of the Russian government, nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct
follow-up. However, the day after Cohen’s call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him
to “[c]all me when you have a few minutesto chat . . . It’s about Putin they called today.”°*? Sater
then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project,?*4
along with a note to “[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes
you wantandsendit back to me.”3°> After a further roundof edits, on January 25, 2016, Sater
sent Cohen an invitation—signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ—totravel to
“Moscowfor a working visit” about the “prospects of developmentand the construction business
in Russia,” “the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower,” and
“the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump.”3°° According
4° Cohen Information J] 4, 7. Cohen’s interactions with President Trump and the President’s
lawyers whenpreparing his congressional testimonyare discussedfurther in Volume II. See Vol. II, Section
ILK.3, infra.
3° 1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5:57 a.m.) (“Mr. Cohen[,] I can’t get through to both your
phones. Pls, call me.”).
aed Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January 20, 2016 between Cohen and the number
Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen FEE After
the call, Cohen saved Poliakova’s contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contactlist.
1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.).
* Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 2-3.
3°3 FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Messages,Sater to Cohen).
354 The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater,
working at the behest of a larger bank, VIB, and would considerproviding financing. FS00008 (12/31/15
Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found infra.
35> FSO0011 (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44 p.m.)); 1/21/16 Email, Sater to Cohen
(6:49 p.m.).
356 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01 p.m.) (attachment).
75
to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete
proposals about landplots that could be considered as optionsfor the project.**”
d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump

(December 2015-June 2016)
i. Sater’s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen
contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning in late 2015,
Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump,as representatives of the Trump
Organization,to travel to Russia to meet with Russian governmentofficials and possible financing
partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a numberof emails aboutlogistics for traveling to
Russia for meetings.>°° On December19, 2015, Sater wrote:
Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line.[*°*] He needs a copy ofyour
and Donald’s passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations &
Visas will be issued this week by VIB Bankto discuss financing for Trump Tower
Moscow. Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue
invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia’s 2 biggest bank and
VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business
meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this weekto receive invite
& havevisa issued?
In response, Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport.**! Cohentold the Office that at one
point he requested a copy of candidate Trump’s passport from Rhona Graff, Trump’s executive
assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump’s passport to Cohen’s
357 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 6-7.

358 See, e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 p.m.) (“Please scan and send me a copy of your
passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”).
*°° Toll records show that Sater was speaking to Evgeny Dvoskin. Call Records of Felix Sater
Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank,a large bank with lending focused
in Crimea, Ukraine. At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank wassubject to
U.S. government sanctions, see Russia/Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identifications, Office of Foreign
Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx. Dvoskin, who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for
criminal activity, was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud underthe aliases Eugene Slusker
and Gene Shustar. See United States v. Rizzo, et al., 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y.Feb. 6, 2003).
36° 12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50 a.m.); FS00002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Sater to
Cohen, (10:53 a.m.).
*61 F§00004 (12/19/15 Text Message, Cohento Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/19/15 Text Messages,
Cohen & Sater).
76
eH Nd 9 =
office.3? Theinvestigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwardedto Sater.
Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in
connection with the Trump Moscowproject. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, “[t]he People
wanted to know whenyou are coming?”On May 4, 2016, Sater followed up:
I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMINGthetrip does happenthe question is before or after
the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that’s it’s probably after the
convention. Obviously the pre-meetingtrip (you only) can happen anytime you wantbut
the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. I said I would confirm and revert.... Let me
know aboutIf I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you wantto
speakto them andpossibly fly over>
Cohen responded, “My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the
convention.”
The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen’s travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum (“Forum”), an annual event attended by prominent Russian
politicians and businessmen. Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate
that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum.*6” On May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen:
Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum whichis Russia’s
Davosit’s June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to
either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there.
This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well.
He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to
discuss[.]°%
The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen
wrote back, “[w]Jorks for me.”3
3© Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.

363 On December 21, 2015, Sater sent Cohen a text messagethat read, “They need a copy of DJT
passport,” to which Cohen responded,“After I return from Moscowwith you with a date for him.” FS00004
(12/21/15 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). .
364 FS00014 (4/20/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (9:06 p.m.)).

36 FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38 p.m.)).
36 FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohento Sater (8:03 p.m.)).
367 Sater 12/15/17 302,at 4.
368 FS00016 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen (6:26 & 6:27 a.m.)).
3 F§00016 (5/6/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater).
a7
Work // Preteeted
On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badgesfor
the Forum, adding, “Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well.”
On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohenaninvitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the
Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum”! Sater also sent Cohen a
Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos.” According to Cohen,the
invitation gave no indication that Peskov had beeninvolvedin inviting him. Cohen was concerned
that Russianofficials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as
Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum.>” On June 14, 2016, Cohen met
Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be
traveling at that time.?>”
ii. Candidate Trump’s Opportunities to Travel to Russia
The investigation identified evidence that, during the period the Trump Moscowproject
was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trumpvisiting Russia arose in two contexts.
First, in interviews with the Office, Cohenstated that he discussed the subjectof traveling
to Russia with Trump twice: oncein late 2015; and again in spring 2016.7° According to Cohen,
Trumpindicated a willingnessto travelif it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion,
Trump told Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowskito coordinate the
candidate’s schedule. Cohenrecalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they
speak again when Cohen hadactual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however, that he knew
that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate’s
preexisting commitments to the Campaign.”
Second,like Cohen, Trump received and turned downaninvitation to the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma—acontact of Ivanka Trump’s
from the fashion industry—first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump
from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.>”” On January 14,
2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Dumastating that Trump was “honored to be asked to
participate in the highly prestigious” Forum event, but that he would “have to decline” the
invitation given his “very grueling and full travel schedule”as a presidential candidate.2”* Graff
379 FS00018 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen).

3? FS00018 (6/13/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (2:20 p.m.)); 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen.
373 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-8.
34 FS00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater (12:06 and 2:50 p.m.)).
375 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 2.
37 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 7.
377 12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments); TRUMPORG_16_000057
(1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff (9:18 a.m.)).
378 1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira.
78
asked Duma whether she recommendedthat Graff “send a formal note to the Deputy Prime
Minister” declininghis invitation; Dumareplied that a formal note would be “great.”3”
It does not appear that Graffprepared that note immediately. According to written answers
from President Trump,*®° Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on
March17, 2016, again inviting Trumpto participate in the 2016 Forumin St. Petersburg.**' Two
weeks later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump’s signature a two-paragraphletter
declining the invitation>® The letter stated that Trump’s “schedule has become extremely
demanding” becauseof the presidential campaign, that he “already ha[d] several commitments in
the United States”for the time of the Forum,but that he otherwise “would have gladly given every
consideration to attending such an important event.”2°? Graff forwarded the letter to another
executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructionsto print the documentonletterhead
for Trump to sign.?*4
At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman—a
New York-based investment banker—beganreaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting
with candidate Trump. According to Foresman,he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian
presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speakat the
Forum.28 Foresman first emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction
brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who producedthe television show The
Apprentice). In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional
expertise in Russia and Ukraine,his worksetting up an early “private channel” between Vladimir
Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush,andan “approach”he had received from “senior
Kremlin officials” about the candidate. Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate,
Corey Lewandowski, or “another relevant person” to discuss this and other “concrete things”
Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over “unsecure email.”On April 4, 2016, Graff
forwarded Foresman’s meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another executive assistant
to Trump.?*”
379 1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff.

380 As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent written
questionsto the President’s counsel. On November 20, 2018, the President provided written answers to
those questions through counsel.
381 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV,
Part (e)) (“[DJocuments show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the
invitation.”).
382 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part
(e)); see also TRUMPORG_16_000134 (unsigned letter dated March 31, 2016).
383 TRUMPORG_16_000134 (unsignedletter).
384 TRUMPORG_16000133 (3/31/16 Email, Graffto Macchia).
385 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 3-4.
386 See TRUMPORG_16_00136 (3/31/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); see also Foresman 10/17/18
302, at 3-4,
387 See TRUMPORG_16_00136 (4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia).
79
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May-Conti Material Fed R-Crim-P-6fe)
With no response forthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff—first on April 26

and again on April 30, 2016.78* Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwardedhis April 26
email (as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski2* On May 2, 2016, Graff
forwarded Foresman’s April 30 email—which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald
Trump Jr. or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that “should be
conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts’—to
policy advisor Stephen Miller.*°°
No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump
Campaignlearned that Foresman wasreachingout to invite the candidate to the Forum orthat the
Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election, when he interacted with
the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration.°! When
interviewed by the Office, Foresman denied that the specific “approach” from “senior Kremlin
officials” noted in his March 31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov’s invitation to
Roscongress. According to Foresman, the “concrete things”he referenced in the same email were
a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman’s personal perspectives on the invitation and
Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest
Institute). Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extendedsimilar invitations through him
to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that
Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate
withdrew from the race and the otherpolitician’s participation did not work out.” Finally,
Foresman claimed to have no plansto establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the
reference to his involvementin the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnishhis credentials
to the Campaign. Foresman commentedthat he had not recognizedany of the experts announced
as Trump’s foreign policy team in March 2016, and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with
the candidate to share his professional background andpolicy views, including that Trump should
decline Kobyakov’s invitation to speak at the Forum?”
2. George Papadopoulos
George Papadopoulos wasa foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March
388 See TRUMPORG_16_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); TRUMPORG_16_00141

(4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graff).
38 See TRUMPORG_16_00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman); TRUMPORG_16_00137
(4/27/16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski).
39° TRUMPORG__16_00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller); see also TRUMPORG_16_00143
(5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman).
391 Foresman’s contacts during the transition period are discussed further in VolumeI, Section
IV.B.3, infra.
32 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 4.
33 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 8-9.
80
Attorney—WorkProduct // Protected
May-Centi Materi l Fed R-Crits P-
2016 to early October 2016.3 In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based
professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud’s return from a trip to Moscow, that the
Russian government had obtained “dirt” on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails.
One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign
governmentthat the Trump Campaign had receivedindications from the Russian government that
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymousrelease of information that would be
damaging to candidate Clinton.
Papadopoulos shared information about Russian “dirt” with people outside of the
Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official.
Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom heinteracted told the Office that they did
notrecall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughoutthe relevantperiod oftime
and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals
to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never
cameto pass.
a. Origins of Campaign Work
In March 2016, Papadopoulos becamea foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.?”
Asearly as the summerof 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in
a September 30, 2015 email, he wastold that the Campaign wasnothiring policy advisors.?° In
late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential
candidate Ben Carson.??”
Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016, Papadopoulos
had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016.°°° At that time,
Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice
(LCILP), which billed itself as a “unique institution . . . comprising high-level professional
international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the
practice of international law.”°? Papadopoulossaid that he had finished his role with the Carson
3° Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summerandfall
of 2017, after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in
a January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and
communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev.
Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with
making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
3°54 Transcript of Donald Trump’s Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board,
Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016).
36 7/15/15 LinkedIn Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski(6:57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner
to Papadopoulos (7:42:21 a.m.).
°7 Papadopoulos8/10/17 302,at 2.
3°8 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2; 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Idris.
399 London Centre of International Law Practice, at https://www.lcilp.org/ (via web.archive.org).
81
campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.*°° In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join
LCILP andarrived in Londonto begin work.4%!
Ashe wastakinghis position at LCILP, Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager

Corey Lewandowski via LinkedIn and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his
interest in joining the Trump Campaign.“ On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner
another messagereiteratinghis interest.4°? Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos’s interest
to another campaignofficial, Joy Lutes, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been
told by Glassnerto introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump Campaign’s national co-
chair and chief policy advisor.
At the time of Papadopoulos’s March 2 email, the media was criticizing the Trump
Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks.‘°°
To addressthat issue, senior Campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together
on short notice.“ After receiving Papadopoulos’s name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google
search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the HudsonInstitute, and believed that he
had credibility on energy issues.°’7 On March 3, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with
Papadopoulosby phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor,
and on March6, 2016, the two spoke.*°8 Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a
topic, and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the
Campaign’s foreign policy.’ At the end ofthe conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulosa role
as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and Papadopoulosaccepted the offer.*!°
b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts
Approximately a weekafter signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulostraveled
409 9/4/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Idris.

491 3/5/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (6:11:25 p.m.); 2/6/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos
(5:34:15 p.m.).
402 9/4/16 LinkedIn Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:28 p.m.); 2/4/16 Email,
Papadopoulos to Glassner (2:10:36 p.m.).
403 3/2/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Glassner (11:17:23 a.m.).
‘4 3/2/16 Email, Lutes to Papadopoulos(10:08:15 p.m.).
#5 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of 2), at 4.
46 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of 2), at 4.
aor GrandJury 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis & Papadopoulos
(6:05:47 p.m.).
4°8 3/6/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24:21 p.m.).
49 Statement of Offense J 4, United States v. George Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5,
2017), Doc. 19 (“Papadopoulos Statement of Offense”).
41° Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302,at 2.
82
to Rome,Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP.*!! The purposeofthe trip was to meetofficials
affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian
governmentofficial.*!? During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud.
Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of

Diplomacyin London,England.*!3 Although Mifsud worked out of Londonand wasalsoaffiliated
with LCILP, the encounter in Rome wasthefirst time that Papadopoulos met him.4* Mifsud
maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among
his contacts was a. a one-time employee of the IRA,the entity that carried out
the Russian social media campaign (see VolumeI, Section II, supra). In January and February
2016, Mifsud and | discussed. eres possibly meeting in Russia. The
investigation did not identify evidence of them meeting. Later, in the spring of 2016,
was also in contact that was linked to an employee of the Russian
Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military-
controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaksreleases in the
course of the GRU’s hack-and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.1, supra).
According to Papadopoulos, Mifsud atfirst seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when

they met in Rome.*!® After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign,
however, Mifsud appearedto take greater interest in Papadopoulos."!” The two discussed Mifsud’s
Europeanand Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to
introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian
government.*!® Papadopoulostold the Office that Mifsud’s claim of substantial connections with
Russian governmentofficials interested Papadopoulos, who thoughtthat such connections could
increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.*!
‘1! Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Statement of Offense { 5.

42 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., Joseph Mifsud: more
questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) (“Link
Campus University . . . is headed by a formerItalian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti.”).
413 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense J 5.
L t | nn
et to ole taitel Matter
“16 Papadopoulos Statementof Offense J 5.

“'7 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense { 5.
418 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302,at2.
419 Papadopoulos Statementof Offense {| 5.
83
U.S. Depa rtment of Justice
es NA ateeted
Attorney-WorkPreduet // May ain pt oss D
On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London.’ Four days later, candidate
Trump publicly named him as a memberofthe foreign policy and national security advisory team
chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulosas “an oil and energy consultant” and
an “[e]xcellent guy.’4?!
On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London.” Mifsud was
accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a
former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin.’?? Papadopoulos understoodat the
time that Polonskaya may have beenPutin’s niece butlater learned that this was not true.24 During
the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulosestablish contacts in Russia and stated that
the Russian ambassadorin London wasa friend of hers.’ Basedonthis interaction, Papadopoulos
expected Mifsud and Polonskayato introduce himto the Russian ambassador in London,butthat
did not occur.’
Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulossent an email to members of the Trump
Campaign’s foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was “Meeting with
Russian leadership--including Putin.’“?” The messagestatedin pertinentpart:
I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the
director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--whointroduced meto both Putin’s niece
and the Russian Ambassadorin London--whoalso acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister.’
Thetopic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to
discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a “neutral”
city, or directly in Moscow.They said the leadership, including Putin,is ready to meet with
us and Mr. Trumpshould there be interest. Waiting for everyone’s thoughts on moving
forward with this very importantissue.*”?
29 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302,at 2.

“1 Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, Trump Questions Needfor NATO, Outlines Noninterventionist
Foreign Policy, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016).
‘22 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302,at 3; 3/24/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos.
3 Papadopoulos8/10/17 302,at 3.
4 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 2/10/17 302, at 2-3; PapadopoulosInternet
Search History (3/24/16) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for
“putin’s niece,” “olga putin,” and “russian president niece olga,” amongother terms).
®5 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302,at 3.
“6 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense { 8 n.1.
27 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Pageet al. (8:48:21 a.m.).
#8 Papadopoulos’s statements to the Campaign were false. As noted above, the woman he met was
not Putin’s niece, he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London, and the Ambassadordid not also
serve as Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister.
“29 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Pageetal. (8:48:21 a.m.).
84
US. Department of Justice
WorkProduet // Protected
Papadopoulos’s message cameat a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign’s approach
Clovis’s response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shift. Replying to
Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied ontheinitial
email, Clovis wrote:
This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitmentsuntil we

see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any
meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATOallies,
especially France, Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are
not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page.
Morethoughts later today. Great work.’?!
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting
The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions
and candidate Trump approximately one weeklater, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C.4”
The meeting—whichwasintended to generate press coverage for the Campaign*??—tookplace at
the Trump International Hotel.“4* Papadopoulosflew to Washingtonfor the event. At the meeting,
Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trumpsat at the other. As reflected in the
photograph below (which was posted to Trump’s Instagram account), Papadopoulossat between
the two, two seats to Sessions’s left:
‘es
451 3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulosetal. (8:55:04 a.m.).
‘32 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4; Papadopoulos8/11/17 302,at3.
433 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16-17.
434 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302,at4.
85
May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crimt P62}
March 31, 2016 Meeting ofForeign Policy Team, with Papadopoulos (Fourth from Right ofCandidate Trump)
During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced
themselves andbriefly described their areas of experience or expertise.43> Papadopoulos spoke
abouthis previous workin the energy sector and then brought upa potential meeting with Russian
officials.° Specifically, Papadopoulostold the group that he had learned through his contacts in
London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help
arrange that meeting.?”
Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos’s statement. Papadopoulos and

Campaign advisor J.D. Gordon—whotold investigators in an interview that he had a “crystal
clear” recollection of the meeting—have stated that Trump wasinterested in andreceptive to the
idea of a meeting with Putin.7* Papadopoulos understood Sessionsto be similarly supportive of
his efforts to arrange a meeting.**? Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions
generally opposed the proposal, though theydiffer in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or
the strength of the opposition he expressed.“
d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has “Dirt” in the Form of Clinton
Emails
Whatever Sessions’s precise words at the March 31 meeting, Papadopoulos did not
understand Sessions or anyoneelse in the Trump Campaignto have directed that he refrain from
‘85 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302,at 4.

‘87 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense J 9; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 14; Carafano 9/12/17 302,
at 2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1.
“38 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Gordon 9/7/17 302,at 4-5.
‘3° Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302,at 3.
440 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 17; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 5; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1; Carafano
9/12/17 302, at 2.
86
May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crint P-6fe}
making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government.
To the contrary, Papadopoulostold the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive
of his efforts to arrange such a meeting.“4! Accordingly, when he returned to London,
Papadopoulos resumed those efforts.“
Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek
Russia contacts through Mifsud and,at times, Polonskaya.“4? For example, within a week of her
initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message—
which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud—addressing
Papadopoulos’s “wish to engage with the Russian Federation.”“** When Papadopouloslearned
from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another
meeting.“* Polonskaya responded the next day that she was “back in St. Petersburg” but “would
be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos’s] initiatives between our two countries” and “to meet
[him] again.’“#° Papadopoulosstatedin reply that he thought“a good step” would beto introduce
him to “the Russian Ambassadorin London,” and that he wouldlike to talk to the ambassador, “or
anyoneelse you recommend,about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia.“
Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11,
2016. He wrote, “This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow onthe 18th for a Valdai
meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. Wewill talk tomorrow.“ The two bodies referenced
by Mifsud arepart of or associated with the Russian government: the Dumais a Russianlegislative
assembly,” while “Valdai”refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that“is
close to Russia’s foreign-policy establishment.’“5° Papadopoulos thanked Mifsudandsaid that he
would see him “tomorrow.”“>! For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had “already alerted
my personal links to our conversation and your request,” that “we are all very excited the
possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump,”and that “[t]he Russian Federation would love
to welcome him oncehis candidature would be officially announced.’4
‘4! Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302,
at 2.
4“Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 10.
“8 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ff 10-15.
444 3729/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3:39 a.m. and 5:36 a.m.).
“45 4/10/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59 p.m.).
“46 4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3:11:24 a.m.).
47 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Polonskaya (9:21:56 a.m.).
“48 4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos(11:43:53).
“© Papadopoulos Statement of Offense { 10(c).
459 Anton Troianovski, Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to US.
Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018).
‘5! 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Mifsud (11:51:53 a.m.).
452 4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06 a.m.).
87
Papadopoulos’s and Mifsud’s mentions of seeing each other “tomorrow” referenced a

meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April 12, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in
London. Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Office,*? and
records from Papadopoulos’s UKcellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the
meeting took place.**4
Following the meeting, Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow.**> On April 18, 2016,
while in Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a memberofthe
Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).*°° Mifsud had described Timofeev as having
connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),**” the executive entity in Russia
responsible for Russian foreign relations.*** Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and
Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting “the groundwork” for a
“potential” meeting between the Campaign and Russian governmentofficials“? Papadopoulos
told the Office that, on one Skypecall, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being
monitored or supervised by an unknownthird party, because Timofeev spoke in an official manner
and Papadopoulos heard odd noiseson theline.“ Timofeev also told Papadopoulosin an April
25, 2016 email that he had just spoken “to Igor Ivanov[,] the President of RIAC and former Foreign
Minister of Russia,” and conveyed Ivanov’s advice about howbestto arrange a “Moscowvisit.“°!
After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April 25, 2016.4 The next day,
Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel (the same location as their last
‘53 Panadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 7.

454 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39 a.m.) (forwarding Libya-related document);
4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos & Obaid (10:28:20 a.m.); Papadopoulos Internet Search History
(Apr. 11, 2016 10:56:49 p.m.) (search for “andaz hotelliverpool street”); 4/12/16 Text Messages, Mifsud
& Papadopoulos.
455 See, e.g., 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (8:04:54 a.m.).
456 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5.
‘57 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense { 11.
“8 During the campaign period, Papadopoulos connected over LinkedIn with several MFA-
affiliated individuals in addition to Timofeev. On April 25, 2016, he connected with Dmitry Andreyko,
publicly identified as a First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Ireland. In July 2016, he connected with
Yuriy Melnik, the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov,
publicly identified as a counselor with the MFA. And on September 16, 2016, he connected with Sergei
Nalobin, also identified as an MFAofficial. See Papadopoulos LinkedIn <a
‘°° Papadopoulos Statement of Offense {| 11.

469 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302,at 10.
461 4/25/16 Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos(8:16:35 a.m.).
42 4/22/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos(12:41:01 a.m.).
88
Contie
Axtterney-Work // Veotected: Mistoral Bed Ri Seini<P t e
meeting).’? During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulosthat he had met with high-level
Russian governmentofficials during his recenttrip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on thetrip,
he learned that the Russians had obtained “dirt” on candidate Hillary Clinton. As Papadopoulos
later stated to the FBI, Mifsudsaid that the “dirt” was in the form of “emails of Clinton,” and that
they “have thousands of emails.”4** On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud,
Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign governmentthat the Trump Campaign had
received indications from the Russian governmentthat it could assist the Campaign through the
anonymousrelease of information that would be damagingto Hillary Clinton.*®
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign
While he wasdiscussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaignofficials

with Russian governmentofficials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts.
On April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote
to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that “[t]he Russian governmenthas an open invitation by
Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him whenheis ready,” and that “[t]he advantage of being in London
is that these governmentstend to speaka bit more openly in ‘neutral’ cities. »466 On April 27, 2016,
after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second messageto Miller stating that “some
interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow abouta trip whenthe timeis right.467 The
same day, Papadopoulossent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling
Lewandowskithat Papadopoulos had “been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin
wanting to host [Trump] and the team whenthetimeis right.468
Papadopoulos’s Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued

throughout the spring and summerof 2016. On May4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an
email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski
whether that was “something we want to move forward with.“ The next day, Papadopoulos
forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email “Russia
update.”*” He included the same email in a May 21, 2016 message to senior Campaignofficial
Paul Manafort, under the subject line “Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump,” stating that
“Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trumpfor quite sometime and have been reaching out to me
463 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense { 14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos.
464 Papadopoulos Statementof Offense J 14.
ae TH iinformation is eomaitied i1 n the FBI case-openine dSpainent: ane related materials. Fhe
dissemination: The foreign government conveyed fig iene io ‘he U. 8. poyerhinsit onache 26,
2016, a few days after WikiLeaks’s release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI openedits investigation of
potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaigna few days later based on the information.
466 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulosto S. Miller (8:12:44 p.m.).
487 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulosto S. Miller (6:55:58 p.m.).
468 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.).
469 5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.).
470 5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.).
89
to discuss.”*7! Manafort forwarded the messageto another Campaignofficial, without including ©

Papadopoulos, andstated: “Let[’]s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is
not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send
any signal.”47
On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulosreplied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about

a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski “want[ed] to have a call about this topic” and whether “we
were following up with it.47? After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to “connect with” Clovis
becausehe was “running point,” Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that “the Russian MFA”wasasking
him “if Mr. Trumpis interested in visiting Russia at some point.“ Papadopoulos wrote in an
email that he “[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what’s best to do with it
and what message I should send(orto ignore).’4”5
After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev,'”® Papadopoulos sent one more
email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski’s last day as campaign manager.*”” The
email stated that “[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs” had contacted him and asked whether,
if Mr. Trump could nottravel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could
attend meetings.*”® Papadopoulos told Lewandowskithat he was “willing to makethetrip off the
record if it’s in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meetspecific people.”*”
Following Lewandowski’s departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated

with Clovis and Walid Phares, another memberof the foreign policy advisory team, about an off-
the-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with
Papadopoulos’s other Russia connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.**° Papadopoulosalso interacted
“71 5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30:14 p.m.).

* Papadopoulos Statement of Offense J 19 n.2.
4 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to
Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.).
“75 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos’s email coincided in time
with another messageto Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First, on May 15, 2016, David Klein—
a distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt—emailed Clovis about a potential
Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The email stated that Klein had contacted
Lazar in February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was “a very close confidante of
Putin.” DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.m.)). The investigation did not find
evidence that Clovis responded to Klein’s email or that any further contacts of significance came out of
Klein’s subsequent meeting with Greenblatt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2.
“6 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense § 21(a).
“Eh
‘80 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 21; 7/14/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11:57:24
p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 p.m.).
90
Attormey—Werk-Preduet // May
directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary
Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Phares wasco-secretary general.“®! On July
16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to
Clovis(as reflected in the photograph below).‘*
George Papadopoulos (far right) and Sam Clovis (secondfrom right)
AlthoughClovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit,'%

Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Phares
during the event.*** Papadopoulos’s recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after
the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Phares
suggested meeting Papadopoulosthe dayafter the summitto chat,"® and a July 12 messagein the
same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulosthat other summit attendees “are very nervous
about Russia. So be aware.”**° Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulossent an email to Mifsud
listing Phares and Clovis as other “participants” in a potential meeting at the London Academy of
Diplomacy.**”
Finally, Papadopoulos’s recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a
‘81 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17; 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic
Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism.
482 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism.
484 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17.

485 7/11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos.
486 7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos(14:52:29).
“87 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14:14:18).
91
US. Departmentof Justice
WerkProduct // Proteeted
journalthat he kept at the time.*** Those notes, whichare reprinted in part below, appearto refer
to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the “office of Putin,” and
suggest that Phares, Clovis, and Papadopoulos (““Walid/Sam me”) would attend withoutthe official
backing of the Campaign(“noofficial letter/no message from Trump”)."*”
September: Seplehas ; ge
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with = £m (on:
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him. “a a
Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel.
On August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple
foreign governments, “even Russia[],” for “closed door workshops/consultations abroad,” and
asked whetherthere wasstill interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos“to go onthattrip."
Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not“travel before the election” but
that he “would encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to makethetrips,if it is feasible.*"

“8° Papadopoulos declined to assist in decipheringhis notes, telling investigators that he could not
read his own handwriting from the journal. Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 21. The notes, however, appear
to read aslisted in the columnto the left of the image above.
459 8/15/16 Email, Papadopoulosto Clovis (11:59:07 a.m.).
491 8/15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos(12:01:45 p.m.).
92
Atterney-WeorleProduet // May
Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an
interview he gave to the Russian news agency Interfax generated adverse publicity.”
ji Trump Campaign Knowledge of “Dirt”
Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaign—

specifically, the then-Greek foreign minister—about Russia’s obtaining Clinton-related emails,4”3
In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that, 10 days after meeting with
Mifsud in late April 2016, Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received
indications from the Russian governmentthatit could assist the Campaign through the anonymous
release of information that would be damagingto Hillary Clinton.4 (This conversation occurred
after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta andstole his emails, and
the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC, see VolumeI, Sections III.A & TI.B, supra.) Such
disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulosinformed any Trump Campaignofficial
aboutthe emails.
Wheninterviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told
the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos’s sharing the information that Russia had
obtained “dirt” on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia couldassist the Campaign
through the anonymousrelease of information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could
notclearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately
remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upsetafter hearing Papadopoulostell Clovis
that Papadopoulos thought“they have her emails.”“?° The Campaignofficials who interacted or
corresponded with Papadopoulos havesimilarly stated, with varying degreesof certainty, that he
did not tell them. Senior policy advisor Stephen Miller, for example, did not remember hearing
anything from Papadopoulos or Clovis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate
Clinton.*%° Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone, including Papadopoulos, having given him
non-public information that a foreign government might be in possession of material damaging to
Clinton.4%7
‘2. George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have DoneLittle More Than to Turn Russia Towards China,
Interfax (Sept. 30, 2016).
493 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 14-15; Def. Sent. Mem., United States v. George Papadopoulos,
1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 45.
454 See footnote 465 of Volume I, Section IV.A.2.d, supra.

495 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302,
at 2.
96S Miller 12/14/17 302, at 10.
497
93
USS. Departmentof Justice
Attorney-WorkPreduet // Proteeted-Cnder
May-Conti Material Fed R-Crimt P-6fe}
No documentary evidence, and nothingin the email accountsor other

communications facilities reviewed by the Office, shows that Papadopoulos shared this
information with the Campaign.
g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact
The Office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The Office was
not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue—Sergei Millian—remained
out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of
the Office despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview.
Papadopoulosfirst connected with Millian via LinkedIn on July 15, 2016, shortly after
Papadopouloshadattended the TAG Summit with Clovis.Millian, an American citizen who is
anative of Belarus, introduced himself “as president of [the] New York-based Russian American
Chamber of Commerce,” and claimed that through that position he had “insider knowledge and
direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics.”°! Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether
he had heard of Millian.*°? Although Timofeevsaid no,*° Papadopoulosmet Millian in New York
City.°* The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1, 2016.°° Afterwards, Millian invited
Papadopoulos to attend—and potentially speak at—two international energy conferences,
including one that wasto be held in Moscow in September 2016.°% Papadopoulosultimately did
not attend either conference.
On July 31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos
emailed Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted “by some leaders
of Russian-Americanvoters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr. Trump,” and to
ask whether he should “put you in touch with their group (US-Russia chamber of commerce).”°°"
Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos “for taking the initiative,” but asked him to “hold off with
599 7/15/16 LinkedIn Message, Millian to Papadopoulos.

591 7/15/16 LinkedIn Message, Millian to Papadopoulos.
502 7/22/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (7:40:23 p.m.); 7/26/16 Facebook
Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (3:08:57 p.m.).
503 7/23/16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (4:31:37 a.m.); 7/26/16 Facebook
Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (3:37:16 p.m.).
54 7/16/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (7:55:43 p.m.).
5°5 7/30/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:38 & 6:05 p.m.); 7/31/16 Text Messages,
Millian & Papadopoulos (3:48 & 4:18 p.m.); 8/1/16 Text Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (8:19 p.m.).
506 8/2/16 Text Messages, Millian & Papadopoulos (3:04 & 3:05 p.m.); 8/3/16 Facebook Messages,
Papadopoulos & Millian (4:07:37 a.m. & 1:11:58 p.m.).
597 7/31/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk (12:29:59 p.m.).
94
outreach to Russian-Americans” because “too manyarticles” had already portrayed the Campaign,
then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trumpas “being pro-Russian.”>
On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promisingthat he

would “share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in yourpolitical work
for the campaign.”°° Papadopoulosclaimedto have no recollection ofthis matter.>!°
On November9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian
in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian “billionaires
who are not under sanctions.”>!! The meeting took place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump
Hotel and Towerin Chicago.°” According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on
business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian’s attitude toward him changed when
Papadopoulosstated that he was only pursuing private-sector opportunities and was notinterested
in a job in the Administration®!3 The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online
discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia.*'* The twoalso arranged to meetat a
Washington, D.C. bar when both attended Trump’s inauguration in late January 2017515
3. Carter Page
Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016. He
was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March
2016.°'6 Page hadlived and workedin Russia, and he had been approachedby Russianintelligence
officers several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the
Campaign, Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his
personalcapacity. Russian intelligence officials had formedrelationships with Page in 2008 and
2013 and Russianofficials may have focused on Page in 2016 becauseofhis affiliation with the
Campaign. However, the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian
governmentin its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.
598 7/31/16 Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos(21:54:52).

5 8/23/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos(2:55:36 a.m.).
51 Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302,at 2.
511 11/10/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05 p.m.).
512 11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos(1:32:11 a.m.).
513 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 19.
54 Eg, 11/29/16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:09 - 5:11 p.m.); 12/7/16
Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (5:10:54 p.m.).
515 1/20/17 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (4:37-4:39 a.m.).
516 Page was interviewed by the FBI during five meetings in March 2017, before the Special
Counsel's point, St
95
a. Background
Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior
experience studying Russianpolicy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004to 2007,
Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch’s Moscow office.*!” There, he worked on
transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom’s
deputy chieffinancial officer, Sergey Yatsenko.*!
In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and
me firm focused on the a) sector in emerging markets,>!” EE
°20 The company otherwise had no sources of income, and
Page was forced to draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business
venture.2! Page asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC asa senior advisor on a contingenc
basis,
>
In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government official who worked at the
Russian Consulate in New York.>2? Page later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelligence
officer, Je
In 2013, Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the
United States under diplomatic cover, formeda relationship with Page> Podobnyy met Page at
an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him.°*° Podobnyy
and Page also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Pageoffered his outlook on the
future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy business.*?”
In a recorded conversation on April 8, 2013, Podobnyy told anotherintelligence officer that Page
wasinterested in business opportunities in Russia.?* In Podobnyy’s words, Page “got hooked on
°!7 Testimony ofCarter Page, Hearing Before the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, PermanentSelect
Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 40 (Nov. 2, 2017) (exhibit).
318 Page 3/30/17 302,at 10.
EE
macrand Jury
°Es a)
page 3307 302, 1
sacrand Jury
gacrand Jury
5 25 Complaint ff] 22, 24, 32, United States v. Buryakov, 1:15-
mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015), Doc. 1 (Buryakov Complaint”).
26 Buryakov Complaint 34.
7 Buryakov Complaint J 34.
°°8 Buryakov Complaint{ 32.
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Gazpromthinkingthatif they have a project, he could. . . rise up. Maybe he can. . .. [I]t’s obvious
that he wants to earn lots of money.”°*? Podobnyysaid that he had led Page on by “feed[ing] him
empty promises” that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page>
Podobnyytold the other intelligence officer that his methodof recruiting foreign sources was to
promise them favors and then discard them once heobtained relevant information from them.*3!
In 2015, Podobnyy and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with
conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government.°?_ The criminal complaint
detailed Podobnyy’s interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identified only as
“Male-1.”°33 Based on the criminal complaint’s description of the interactions, Page was aware
that he wasthe individual described as “Male-1.”°*4 Page later spoke with a Russian government
official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would
(nothaa
understand he was “Male-1” from the Podobnyy complaint.>*> Page told the official that he “didn’t
In interviews with the FBI before the Office’s opening, Page acknowledged that he
understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence
services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and
that he did not view this relationship as a backchannel.°*’ Page told investigating agents that “the
more immaterial non-public information I give them,the better for this country.”°**
b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work
In January 2016, Page began volunteering on an informal, unpaid basis for the Trump
Campaign after Ed Cox, a state Republican Party official, introduced Page to Trump Campaign
officials.’ Page told the Office that his goal in working on the Campaign wasto help candidate
Trumpimproverelations with Russia.*“° To that end, Page emailed Campaignofficials offering
his thoughts on U.S.-Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and
9 Buryakov Complaint.
°30 Buryakov Complaint.
3! Buryakov Complaint.
Fe, 2013)be, 10ee

532 See Buryakov Complaint; see also Indictment, United States v. Buryakov, 1:15-cr-73 (S.D.N.Y.
° bupatov Complsin32
page 3/67 302,rr
pag3617 302, +rrr
531 Page 3/30/17 302,at 6; Page 3/31/17 302, at 1.
538 Page 3/31/17 302,at 1.
© page 316117302, |
49 Page 3/10/17 302,at 2.
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proposedthat candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.™*!
In communications with Campaign officials, Page also repeatedly touted his high-level
contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior
Russian governmentalofficials. For example, on January 30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior
Campaignofficials stating that he had “spentthe past week in Europe andha[d] been in discussions
with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin” who recognized that Trump could have a
“game-changing effect . . . in bringing the end of the new Cold War.”5?_ The email stated that
“{t]hrough [his] discussions with these high level contacts,” Page believed that “a direct meeting
in Moscow between Mr[.] Trump and Putin could be arranged.”5"3 Page closed the email b
criticizing U.S. sanctions on Russia.5“4
On March 21, 2016, candidate Trump formally and publicly identified Page as a member
of his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector.“ Over the next several
months, Page continued providing policy-related work product to Campaign officials. For
example, in April 2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speechthat the
candidate gave at the Mayflower Hotel,>“” see VolumeI, Section IV.A.4,infra. In May 2016, Page
prepared anoutline of an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck,
North Dakota, to watch the candidate deliver the speech.“* Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis
expressed appreciation for Page’s work and praised his work to other Campaign officials.“
c. Carter Page’s July 2016 Trip To Moscow
Page’s affiliation with the Trump Campaign tookon a higherprofile and drew the attention
of Russian officials after the candidate named him a foreign policy advisor. As a result, in late
April 2016, Page was invited to give a speech at the July 2016 commencement ceremonyat the
541 See, e.g., 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassneret al.; 3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a
“President’s Daily Brief” prepared by Page that discussed the “severe degradation of U.S.-Russiarelations
following Washington’s meddling” in Ukraine); as
5# 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassneretal.
543 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassneretal.
544 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassneret al.
546 4 Transcript of Donald Trump’s Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board,
|
Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016);
547
548
549 See, e.g., 3/28/16 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski etal. (forwarding notes prepared by Page and
stating, “I wanted to let you know the type of work someofouradvisors are capable of.”).
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“5
New Economic School (NES) in Moscow.>°? The NES commencement ceremony generally
featured high-profile speakers; for example, President Barack Obama delivered a commencement
addressat the school in 2009.**! NESofficials told the Office that the interest in inviting Page to
speak at NES wasbased entirely on his status as a Trump Campaign advisor who served as the
candidate’s Russia expert.°°? Andrej Krickovic, an associate of Page’s and assistant professor at
the Higher School of Economics in Russia, recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weberinvite
Page to give the commencementaddress based on his connection to the Trump Campaign.>
Denis Klimentov, an employee of NES, said that when Russians learned of Page’s involvementin
the Trump Campaign in March 2016, the excitement was palpable.*** Weberrecalled that in
summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow,andhefelt that
bringing a memberof the Campaign to the school would be beneficial.°*
Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he sought approval from
Trump Campaignofficials to makethetrip to Russia.°°° On May 16, 2016, while that request was
still under consideration, Page emailed Clovis, J.D. Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that
candidate Trumptake his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow.°*” On June
19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approvalto speak at the NES event and to reiterate
that NES “would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annual celebration” in Page’s place.°°*
Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski respondedthe sameday,saying, “If you wantto dothis,
it would be outside [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr.
Trumpwill notbe able to attend.”°°
In early July 2016, Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. On July 5, 2016, Denis
Klimentov, copying his brother, Dmitri Klimentov,*©° emailed Maria Zakharova, the Director of
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Information and Press Department, about Page’s visit and
his connection to the Trump Campaign.°¢! Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to
draw the Russian government’s attention to Page’s visit in Moscow.” His message to Zakharova
550 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2-3; Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.
351. § Weber 7/28/17 302,at 3.
52-y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4-5; S. Weber 7/28/17 302,at 3.

553 See Y, Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3.
554 De, Klimentov 6/9/17 302, at 2.
555 § Weber 7/28/17 302,at 3.
558 See 5/16/16 Email, Page to Pharesetal. (referring to submissionof a “campaign advisor request
form”).
maGrand Jury 5/16/16 Email, Page to Pharesetal.
°°8 6/19/16 Email, Page to Gordonetal.
55° 6/19/16 Email, Lewandowskito Pageetal.
56 Dmitri Klimentov is a New York-based public relations consultant.
561 7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova(translated).
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continued: “Page is Trump’s adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman;he used to

work in Russia. . . . If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him.”°° Dmitri
Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page’s visit to see if
Peskoy wanted to introduce Page to any Russian governmentofficials.°°* The following day,
Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharova email
thread. Peskov wrote, “I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main
one. SoI better notinitiate a meeting in the Kremlin.”>®
OnJuly 7, 2016, Page delivered thefirst of his two speeches in Moscow at NES.In the
speech, Page criticized the U.S. government’s foreign policy toward Russia, stating that
“Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often
hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change.”°°7
OnJuly 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement.*® After Page delivered
his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady
Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremonyandstated that the sanctionsthe United States had imposed on
Russia had hurt the NES.°® Page and Dvorkovich shook handsat the commencement ceremony,
and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to Page about working together in the
future.>” ie
Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew
from whenhelived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had
becomethe headofinvestor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company.°” Page stated that
he and Baranoy talked about “immaterial non-public” information.°”? Page believed he and
Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned

564 Dm, Klimentov 11/27/18 302, at 1-2.
56 7/6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated).
>66 Page 3/10/17 302,at 3.
567 See Carter W. Page, The Lecture of Trump’s Advisor Carter Page in Moscow, YouTube
Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
time_continue=28&v=1CYF29saA9w. Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech andslides
from the speech. See Carter Page, “The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential,” Speech
at National Economic Speech (July 7, 2016).
568 Page 3/10/17 302,at 3.
56 Page 3/16/17 302,at 3.
579 § Weber7/28/17 302,at 4.
5? Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 3; Page 3/31/17 302,at 2.

533 Page 3/30/17 302, at 3.
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the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing.” Page recalled mentioning his
involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov, although he did not rememberdetails of the
conversation." Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to
discuss possible businessdeals, including having Page workas a consultant.>”6
On July 8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaignofficials and
stated he would send“a readout soon regarding someincredible insights and outreach I’ve received
from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here.”>””
OnJuly 9, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part:
Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke
before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr.
Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the
vast range of current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of
other sources close to the Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this
sentiment is widely heldatall levels of government.°”8
Despite these representations to the Campaign,
The Office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about who Page
may have met or communicated with in Moscow; thus, Page’s activities in Russia—as described
in his emails with the Campaign—werenotfully explained.
54 Page 3/30/17 302, at 9.

7 TT Page 3/30/17 302, at 3.
57Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 7; Page 3/31/17 302,at 2.
°77 IR1n 7/8/16 Email, Page to Dahl & Gordon.
ane aa 7/9/16 Email, Page to Clovis.
579
580
581
582
101
d. Later Campaign Work and Removalfrom the Campaign
In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the Republican National
Convention in Cleveland.**? While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States
Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in VolumeI, Section IV.A.6.a, infra®™ Pagelater
emailed Campaignofficials with feedback he said he received from ambassadorshe had metat the
Convention, and he wrote that Ambassador Kislyak was very worried about candidate Clinton’s
world views.>°>
Following the Convention, Page’s trip to Moscow andhis advocacy for pro-Russia foreign
policy drew the media’s attention and beganto generate substantial press coverage. The Campaign
respondedby distancing itself from Page, describing him as an “informal foreign policy advisor”
who did “not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign.”5*” On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News
reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private
communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible
Trump Administration.°*® A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo! Newsthat Page had “norole” in
the Campaign and that the Campaign was “not aware ofany ofhis activities, past or present.”°*
On September 24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the Campaign.>°
Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a
position in the Trump Administration.**! On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to
the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a
Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with “top world leaders” and “effectively
58Page 3/10/17 302,at 4; Page 3/16/17 302,at 3.

5% Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302,at 3.
°° CT ; 7/23/16 Email, Page to Clovis; 7/25/16 Email,
Page to Gordon & Schmitz.
587 See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger, Trump Advisor’s Public Comments, Ties to
Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties, Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016).
588 MichaelIsikoff, U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo!
News(Sept. 23, 2016).
589 MichaelIsikoff, U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo!
News(Sept. 23, 2016); see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon(instructing that inquiries about
Page should be answered with “[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has
hadnorole or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledgeof activities past or present and
he nowofficially has been removed from alllists etc.”).
5 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2; see, e.g., 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller (discussing
plans to remove Page from the campaign).
re
a re “Transition Online Form,” 11/14/16 Ga
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responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior governmentofficials in Asia, Europe, the
Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas.’5°? Page received no response from the Transition Team.
When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one
Russian governmentofficial. That interaction and a discussion of the Decembertrip are set forth
in VolumeI, Section IV.B.6, infra.
4. Dimitri Simes and the Centerfor the National Interest
Membersof the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the
National Interest (CNJ), principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dimitri
Simes. CNIis a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government. Simes
was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April
2016, candidate Trumpdeliveredhisfirst speech on foreign policy and national security at an event
hosted by the NationalInterest, a publication affiliated with CNI. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and
Russian AmbassadorKislyak both attended the eventand,as a result, it gained someattention in
relation to Sessions’s confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various
other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia.
Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. The
investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messagesto or
from the Russian government through CNIor Simes.
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign
CNI is a Washington-based non-profit organization that grew outof a center founded by

former President Richard Nixon.5®? CNI describes itself “as a voice for strategic realism in U.S.
foreign policy,” and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine, the National Interest.°°* CNI
is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose
membersat the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on
national security and foreign policy issues.°”
Dimitri Simesis president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National
Interest.°®° Simes wasborn in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early
1970s, and joined CNI’s predecessorafter working at the Carnegie Endowmentfor International
“Transition Online Form,” 11/14/16
53 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.

5% About the Center, CNI, available at https://cftni.org/about/.
595 Advisory Counsel, CNI, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20161030025331/
http://cftni.org/about/advisory-council/; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 3-4; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 4; Sessions
1/17/18 302, at 16.
5% Simes 3/8/18 302,at2.
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Peace.°*? Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government
officials,°°8 as does CNI collectively. As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie
Corporation in 2015, CNI has “unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among
Washington think tanks,”°” in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia
and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called “Track II” diplomatic
‘efforts.°°
On March 14, 2016, CNI board memberRichard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and
its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York.®! The idea
behind the event wasto generateinterest in CNI’s work and recruit new board members for CNI.°?
Along with Simes, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner, son-in-law of candidate
Trump.© Kushner told the Office that the event cameat a time when the Trump Campaign was
havingtrouble securing support from experiencedforeign policy professionals andthat, as a result,
he decided to seek Simes’s assistance during the March 14 event.
Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephonecall,three days after
Trumphad publicly namedthe team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short
notice.On March 31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person, one-on-one meeting in
Kushner’s New York office.” During that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to
handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign wouldbe to organize an advisory group of
experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent
with Trump’s voice.Simes believed that Kushner wasreceptive to that suggestion.°”
Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign
regarding the Campaign’s foreign policy positions. For example, on June 17, 2016, Simes sent
J.D. Gordon an email with a “memoto Senator Sessionsthat we discussed at our recent meeting”
597 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; Simes 3/27/18 302,at 19.

58 Simes 3/27/18 302, at 10-15.
59 ©00011656 (Rethinking U.S.-Russia Relations, CNI (Apr. 18, 2015)).
609 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 29-30; Zakheim 1/25/18 302,at 3.
61 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; CO0006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12 p.m.); of
Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 1 (Kissinger was CNI’s “Honorary Chairman of the Board”); Boyd 1/24/18 302,
at 2; P. Sanders 2/15/18 302, at 5.
602 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5-6; Simes 3/27/18 302,at 2.
$93 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302 at2.
6 Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 2.
65 Simes 3/8/18 302,at 6-7.
egcrand Jury see VolumeI, Section IV.A.2, supra.
597 Simes 3/8/18 302,at 7-9.
608 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-8.
509 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8; see also Boyd 1/24/18 302,at 2.
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and asked Gordonto bothreadit and share it with Sessions. The memorandum proposedbuilding
a “small and carefully selected group of experts”to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating
under the assumption “that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign
policy issues.” The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign, including a “new
beginning with Russia.”>!°
b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel
During both their March 24 phonecall and their March 31 in-person meeting, Simes and
Kushnerdiscussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump.°!!
Following those conversations, Simes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would
provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign-policy speech and that CNI
officials would coordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, including
Sessions’s chiefofstaff, Rick Dearborn.°!?
In mid-April 2016, Kushnerput Simesin contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller
and forwarded to Simesan outline ofthe foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared.°!? Simes
sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI
Executive Director Paul Saunders and board memberRichard Burt." Simes received subsequent
draft outlines from Miller, and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive
changesto the speech.°'5 It is not clear, however, whether CNIofficials received an actual draft
of the speech for comment; while Saunders recalled having received an actualdraft, Simes did not,
and the emails that CNI producedto this Office do not contain such a draft.°!°
After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNI’s hosting the speech could be
perceived as an endorsementof a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication, the
National Interest, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club.°'? Kushner
later requested that the event be moved to the Mayflower Hotel, which was another venue that
Simes had mentioned during initial discussions with the Campaign, in order to address concerns
about security and capacity.°!®
610 ©Q0008187 (6/17/16 Email, Simes to Gordon (3:35:45 p.m.)).

$11 Simes 3/8/18 302,at7.
612 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8-11; C00008923 (4/6/16 Email, Simes to Burt (2:22:28 p.m.)); Burt 2/9/18
302, at 7.
513 00008551 (4/17/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (2:44:25 p.m.)); C00006759 (4/14/16 Email
Kushnerto Simes & S. Miller (12:30 p.m.)).
54 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 7; Saunders 2/15/18 302,at 7-8.
515 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8.
616 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8.
617 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 8; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12; CO00003834-43 (4/22/16 Email, Simes to
Boydetal. (8:47 a.m.)).
618 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12, 18; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11.
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On April 25, 2016, Saunders booked event roomsat the Mayflowerto host both the speech
and a VIP reception that wasto be held beforehand.°!? Saunders understoodthat the reception—
at which invitees would have the chance to meet candidate Trump—would be a small event.°°
Saunders decided who would attend by lookingatthe list of CNI’s invitees to the speechitself and
then choosing a subset for the reception.! CNI’s invitees to the reception included Sessions and
Kislyak,%? The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to
the speech, and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump.
Whenthe pre-speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line was quickly organized
so that attendees could meet Trump.Sessionsfirst stood next to Trumpto introduce him to the
members of Congress who were in attendance.After those members had beenintroduced,
Simes stood next to Trump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance, including
Kislyak.° Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly, but thoughtit clear that
Kislyak and Trumphad just met for the first time.” Kislyak also met Kushner during the pre-
speech reception. The two shook handsand chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner
recalled Kislyak saying, “welike what your candidate is saying. . . it’s refreshing.”°8
Several public reports state that, in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech
reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time.Sessions stated to
investigators, however, that he did not rememberany such conversation.©° Nor did anyoneelse
affiliated with CNI or the National Interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between
Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception.™! It appears that, if a conversation occurredat
the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view, similar to the exchange
between Kushnerand Kislyak.
519 Saunders 2/15/18 302,at 11-12; CO0006651-57 (Mayflower Group Sales Agreement).
620 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12-13.
621 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12.
822 00002575 (Attendee List); C00008536 (4/25/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (4:53:45 p.m.)).
9 Simes 3/8/18 302,at 19-20.
64 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21.
5 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21.

6 Simes3/8/18 302,at 21.
627 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21.
628 Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 4.

829 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Did Trump, Kushner, Sessions Have an Undisclosed Meeting With
Russian?, NBC News(June 1, 2016); Julia loffe, Why Did JeffSessions Really Meet With Sergey Kislyak,
The Atlantic (June 13, 2017).
630 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
831 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 14, 21; Boyd 1/24/18 302,at 3-4; Heilbrunn
2/1/18 302, at 6; Statement Regarding President Trump’s April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the
Centerfor the National Interest, CNI (Mar. 8, 2017).
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The Office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either TrumporSessionsafter
the speech, or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing
Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon,°*? and the only witness who accounted for Sessions’s
whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed
for Capitol Hill.*? Saunders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received from a
Campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the
airport.°*4
c. JeffSessions’s Post-Speech Interactions with CNI
In the wake of Sessions’s confirmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about
whether Sessions’s campaign-period interactions with CNI apart from the Mayflower speech
included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters.
With respectto Kislyak contacts, on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended CNI’s Distinguished Service
Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C.°° Sessions attended a pre-dinner
reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event.°° A seating chart prepared by
Saundersindicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have
respondedto the invitation by indicating he would attend the event.°7 Sessions, however, did not
rememberseeing, speaking with, orsitting next to Kislyak at the dinner.® Although CNI board
memberCharles Boydsaid he may haveseen Kislyak at the dinner,°*? Simes, Saunders, and Jacob
Heilbrunn—editorof the National Interest—all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May
23 event.®? Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Office
obtained.
In the summer of 2016, CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington, D.C. for
Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals.' The dinners included CNI-
affiliated individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. ambassadorto
Afghanistan and Iraq and the person whohadintroduced Trumpbefore the April 27, 2016 foreign-
532 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 22; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302,at 7.

633 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 4.
64 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 15.

635 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Saunders 2/15/18 302,at 17.
636 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17; C00004779-80 (5/23/16 Email, Cantelmo to Saunders & Hagberg
(9:30:12 a.m.); C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmoetal. (2:02:32 a.m.).
537 ©00004362 (5/23/16 Email Baumanto Cantelmoetal. (2:02:32 a.m.).
638 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
9 Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 4.
649 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 23; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 18; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7.
641 Simes 3/8/18 302,at 31; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19; Burt 2/9/18 302,at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18
302, at 5.
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policy speech.Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on-one separately from the dinners.°? At
the dinners andin the meetings, the participants addressed U.S. relations with Russia, including
how U.S. relations with NATO and Europeancountries affected U.S. policy toward Russia.But
the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia.* Khalilzad, for example, recalled
discussing “nation-building” and violent extremism with Sessions.In addition, Sessions asked
Saunders (of CNI) to draft two memorandanotspecific to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton’s foreign
policy shortcomings and another on Egypt.”
d. Jared Kushner’s-Continuing Contacts with Simes
Betweenthe April 2016 speech at the Mayflower Hotel andthe presidential election, Jared
Kushnerhad periodic contacts with Simes.*“* Those contacts consisted of both in-person meetings
and phone conversations, which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the
Campaign and how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes
had proposed.Simes recalled that he, not Kushner,initiated all conversations about Russia, and
that Kushnernever asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians.According
to Simes, after the Mayflowerspeech in late April, Simesraised the issue of Russian contacts with
Kushner, advised that it was bad optics for the Campaignto develop hidden Russian contacts, and
told Kushnerboth that the Campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle
any contacts with Russians with care.°' Kushner generally provided a similar account of his
interactions with Simes.5
Amongthe Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17, 2016, at Simes’s request,
in Kushner’s New York office. The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was
providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign’s Russia-related attacks on candidate
642 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 1-2,5.
643 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5-6.

44 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302,at 5.
645 Saunders 2/15/18 302,at 20.
646 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 6.
647 Saunders 2/15/18 302,at 19-20.
648 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27.
6 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27.
650 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27.
651 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. Duringthis period oftime, the Campaignreceived a request for a high-
level Campaignofficial to meet with an officer at a Russian state-owned bank “to discuss an offer [that
officer] claims to be carrying from President Putin to meet with” candidate Trump. NOSC00005653
(5/17/16 Email, Dearborn to Kushner(8:12 a.m.)). Copying Manafort and Gates, Kushner responded,“Pass
on this. A lot of people comeclaimingto carry messages. Very few are ableto verify. For now I think we
decline such meetings. Mostlikely these people go back homeand claim they have special access to gain
importance for themselves. Be careful.” NOSC00005653 (5/17/16 Email, Kushner to Dearborn).
652 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 11-13.
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Trump.°? In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a “Russia Policy Memo”laying out
“what Mr. Trump may wantto say about Russia.”°4 In a cover email transmitting that memo and
a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned “a well-documented story of highly
questionable connections between Bill Clinton” and the Russian government,“parts of [which]”
(according to Simes) had even been “discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and
shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency.”®° Kushner
forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaignofficials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick
Gates, with the note “suggestion only.”°°° Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his
assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.°” (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the
Campaign bythe time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only
with Kushner).
During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information
that he had promised.©® Simes told Kushnerthat,
Simes claimed that he had received this information from former

CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S.
intelligence sources, not from Russians.
Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be ofinterest or use to the
Campaign because it was, in Simes’s words, “old news.”©°! When interviewed by the Office,
Kushnerstated that he believed that there waslittle chance of something new being revealed about
the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes
information that could be “operationalized” for the Trump Campaign.® Despite Kushner’s
953 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269
(8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simesetal.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort
(5:57:15 p.m.)).
$54 €00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum
recommended “downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time” and suggested that “some
tend to exaggerate Putin’s flaws.” The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian-
related questions in the framework of “how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national
interests” and that a Trump Administration “not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” The
memorandumdid not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including
questions about Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea.
§55 €Q0007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)).
$56 TDITFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushnerto S. Milleret al. (11:30:13 a.m.)).
657 DJTFP00023484(8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)).
§58 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 12.
659 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302,at 6.
669 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.
661 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302,at 6.
662 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12.
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reaction, Simesbelieved that he provided the sameinformation at a small group meeting of foreign
policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions.°©
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower
OnJune9, 2016,senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Towerwith

a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the
Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email from Robert
Goldstone,at the request ofhis then-client Emin Agalarov,the son of Russianreal-estate developer
Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the “Crown prosecutor of Russia . . . offered
to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would
incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia”as “part of Russia and its government’s support
for Mr. Trump.” TrumpJr. immediately respondedthat“if it’s what you say I loveit,” and arranged
the meeting through a series of emails and telephonecalls.
TrumpJr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushnerto
attend the meeting, and both attended. Membersof the Campaign discussed the meeting before it
occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an
upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting to
Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has norecollection of
learning of the meetingat the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showingthat he
was made awareof the meeting—orits Russian connection—beforeit occurred.
The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously
workedfor the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout
this period of time. She claimedthat funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided
to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, but
Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turnedto a critique of
the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on
Russianofficials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. TrumpJr.
suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump waselected. After the
election, Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump
Transition Team did not engage.
a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting
i, Outreach to Donald Trump Jr.
Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of
the Russian government, including Russia’s Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika.®* Aras Agalarov
is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian
governmentconstruction contracts and that—as discussed above, VolumeI, Section IV.A.1, supra
663 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.
at 4.
1.0:28/1830,
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—worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a
potential Trump Moscowreal-estate project.%© The relationship continued overtime,asthe parties
pursued the Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchangedgifts andletters in 2016.°°° For
example, in April 2016, Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten
note.°? Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump’s campaign, passed on “congratulations” for
winning in the primary and—according to one email drafted by Goldstone—an “offer” of his
“support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] especially with
reference to U.S./Russianrelations.
On June 3, 2016, Emin Agalarov called Goldstone, Emin’s then-publicist.Goldstoneis

a music and events promoter who represented Emin Agalarov from approximately late 2012 until
late 2016.5” While representing Emin Agalarov, Goldstone facilitated the ongoing contact
between the Trumpsand the Agalarovs—including an invitation that Trump sent to Putin to attend
the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Moscow.*7!
.'* Goldstone understood

73
Russianpolitical connection, and Emin Agalarov indicated that the attorney wasa prosecutor.
Goldstone recalled that the information that might interest the Trumps involved Hillary Clinton
aTeo
665 Kaveladze
11/16/17 302,at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302,at 2-3;
a Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 10;

Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 5-6; 4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone.
667 RG000033-34 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attachment).

668 DJTJROO008 (2/29/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.et al.);
eS Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 6.

6 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-2; IT Beniaminoy 1/6/18 302,
at 3.
671 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-5; DJTJRO0008
(2/29/19 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2;
TRUMPORG_18_001325 (6/21/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG_18_001013 (6/24/13 Email,
Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG_18001014 (6/24/13 Email, Graff to Shugart);
TRUMPORG_18_001018 (6/26/13 Email, Graff to Goldstone); TRUMPORG_18_001022 (6/27/13 Email,
Graff to L. Kelly); TRUMPORG_18_001333 (9/12/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart);
MU000004289 (7/27/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart).
<6: 28/18 302,067

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The peas mentioned by Emin Agalarov was Natalia

Veselnitskaya.°” From approximately 1998 until 2001, Veselnitskaya worked as a prosecutorfor
the Central Administrative District of the Russian Prosecutor’s Office,°”’ and she continued to
perform government-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following her
departure.°”® She lobbied and testified about the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial
sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian officials and which was named for a Russian tax
specialist who exposed a fraud andlater died in a Russian prison.°” Putin called the statute “a
purely political, unfriendly act,” and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S.
officials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens.°°
Veselnitskaya performed legal work for Denis Katsyv,°*! the son of Russian businessman Peter
Katsyv, and for his company Prevezon Holdings Ltd., which was a defendantin a civil-forfeiture
action alleging the laundering of proceeds from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky.°? She also
676 In December 2018, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment
charging Veselnitskaya with obstructing the Prevezonlitigation discussedin the text above. See Indictment,
United States v. Natalia Vladimirovna Veselnitskaya, No. 18-cr-904 (S.D.N.Y.). The indictmentalleges,
among other things, that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the Russian
Prosecutor General’s Office and her involvement in responding to a U.S. document request sent to the
Russian government.
677 aes 11/20/17 Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2; eae]
68 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017)
at 33; Keir Simmons & Rachel Elbaum, Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn’t Give Trump Jr.
Info on Clinton, NBC News(July 11, 2017); Maria Tsvetkova & Jack Stubbs, Moscow Lawyer Who Met
Trump Jr. Had Russian Spy Agency As Client, Reuters (July 21, 2017); Andrew E. Kramer & Sharon
LaFraniere, Lawyer Who Was Said to Have Dirt on Clinton Had Closer Ties to Kremlin than She Let On,
New York Times (Apr. 27, 2018).
679 See Pub. L. No. 112-208 §§ 402, 404(a)(1), 126 Stat. 1502, 1502-1506. Sergei Magnitsky was
a Russian tax specialist who worked for William Browder, a former investment fund managerin Russia.
Browderhired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russianofficials, and Magnitsky was charged with
helping Browder embezzle money. After Magnitsky died in a Russian prison, Browder lobbied Congress
to pass the Magnitsky Act. See, e.g, Andrew E. Kramer, Turning Tables in Magnitsky Case, Russia
Accuses Nemesis ofMurder, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2017); Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before
the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), Exhibits at 1-4; Rosie Gray, Bill Browder’s Testimony
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, The Atlantic (July 25, 2017).
580 Rilen Barry, Russia Bars 18 AmericansAfter Sanctions by US, New YorkTimes (Apr. 13, 2013);
Tom Porter, Supporters of the Magnitsky Act Claim They’ve Been Targets of Russian Assassination and
Kidnapping Bids, Newsweek (July 16, 2017).
68! Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017),
at 21.
682 See Veselnitskaya Decl., United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-cv-6326 (S.D.N.Y.);
see Prevezon Holdings, Second Amended Complaint; Prevezon Holdings, Mem. and Order; Prevezon
Holdings, Deposition of Oleg Lurie.
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appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in
Moscow offering “confidential information” from “the Prosecutor General of Russia” about
“interactions between certain political forces in our two countries.”6
Shortly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. The
email stated:
Good morning
Emin just called:and asked me to contact you with something very interesting. /
‘The Crownprosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this momingandin their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with
someofficial documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father.
This is obviously very high level and sensitive informationbut is part of Russia and its government's support for Mc. Trump - helped along by
Aras and Emin,
What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin aboutit directly?
Ian also send this info to your father via Rhona,bitit is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to youfirst.
Best
Rob Goldstone
Within minutesof this email, Trump Jr. responded, emailing back: “Thanks RobI appreciate that.
I am ontheroad at the momentbut perhapsI just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time
andif it’s what you sayI loveit especially later in the summer. Could we doa callfirst thing next
week when I am back?°8> Goldstone conveyed TrumpJr.’s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing
that TrumpJr. “wants to speak personally on the issue.”°*
On June6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstoneif there was “[a]ny news,” and Goldstone
explained that Trump Jr. waslikely still traveling for the “final elections . .. where [T]rumpwill
be ‘crowned’the official nominee.”**? On the same day, Goldstone again emailed TrumpJr. and
asked when Trump Jr. was“free to talk with Emin aboutthis Hillary info.”°*’ Trump Jr. asked if
683 See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 & 1A (undated one-page document given to congressional
delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the
Russian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation (1992,
amended 2004).
84 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJRO0446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to
Donald TrumpJr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet.
685 DJTIROO446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00)
Tweet; RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone).
°°EE8000062 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone & Trump Jr.).
887 RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to
A. Agalarov).
588 RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to
Trump Jr.).
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they could “speak now,” and Goldstone arranged a call between TrumpJr. and Emin Agalarov.°?
OnJune 6 and June 7, TrumpJr. and Emin Agalarov had multiplebrief calls.°
Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a
meeting in New York with the Trump Organization.”! Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized
U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras
Agalarov.°” Kaveladzetold the Office that, in a second phonecall on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov
asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis
for the meeting and Veselnitskaya’s business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarovsaid
the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to
translate.
ii. Awareness ofthe Meeting Within the Campaign
On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that “Emin asked that I schedule a
meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney whois flying over from Moscow.”6%4
Trump Jr. replied that Manafort (identified as the “campaign boss”), Jared Kushner, and Trump
Jr. would likely attend.Goldstone wassurprised to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner
would attend.°*° Kaveladze Jury “puzzled” by the list of attendees and that he
checked with one of Emin Agalarov’s assistants, Roman Beniaminov, whosaid that the purpose
of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey “negative information on Hillary Clinton.”
Beniaminov, however, stated that he did notrecall having knownorsaid that.”
Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3:00 p.m.
689 DJTJRO0445 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump Jr.); RG000065-67 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone
and TrumpJr.);
6 DJTIRO0499 (Call Records of Donald TrumpJr. FT); Call Records
of Donald Trump Jr. j
692 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302,at 1-2; Beniaminov 1/6/18

302, at 2-3;
63 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302,at6.
94 DJTIROO467 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00)
Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.);
5 DITIROO469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00)
Tweet; RG000071 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); OSC-KAV_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to
Kaveladze);
© Goldstone 2/8/18 302, 7;

7 I ce0 Kavclaize 1/1617 302 at 7; OC.
KAV_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze).
698 Beniaminov 1/6/18 302,at 3.
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meeting the following day with TrumpJr.Later that day, TrumpJr. forwardedthe entirety of
his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under
the subject line “FW: Russia - Clinton — private and confidential,” adding a note that the “[m]eeting
got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices.””° Kushner then sent his assistant a second email,
informing herthat the “[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now.””°! Manafort responded, “See you
then. P.””
Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the
Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announcedat a regular morning meeting of
senior campaignstaff and Trump family membersthat he had a lead on negative information about
the Clinton Foundation.”* Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a
group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group bya friend.” Gates recalled that
the meeting wasattended by TrumpJr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and,joininglate,
Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the
meeting likely would notyield vital information and they should becareful.”° Hicks denied any
knowledgeof the June 9 meeting before 2017,”and Kushnerdid notrecallif the planned June 9
meeting cameupatall earlier that week.”
Michael Cohenrecalled being in Donald J. Trump’s office on June 6 or 7 when TrumpJr.

told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward.”
Cohendid notrecall TrumpJr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.”° From the tenor
of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his
father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.”!° In an interview with the
Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father aboutthe
69 NIOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas).

79 N}OSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort); DJTJIRO0485 (6/8/16
Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort).
7! NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas).
™ 6/8/16 Email, Manafort to TrumpJr.
3 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March 1 302 refers to “June
19,” that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants
occurred on June 6. See NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to TrumpJr. etal.).
74 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarovis originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting
indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. See Neil
MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?,
New York Times (July 16, 2017).
5 Gates 3/1/18 302,at 3-4.

16 Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 6.
77 Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 8.
78 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6.
7 Cohen 8/7/18 302,at 4-5.

79 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16.
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May-Conti Materi l Fed: R-Crimt P-6fe)
emails or the upcoming meeting.”!' Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone
informing candidate Trumpofthe meeting, including TrumpJr.” President Trumphasstated to
this Office, in written answers to questions, that he has “norecollection of learning at the time”
that his son, Manafort, or “Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016
concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton.””!?
b. The Events ofJune 9, 2016
i. Arrangementsfor the Meeting
Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the Prevezon
civil forfeiture litigation.”!* That day, Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S.
— CO whenshe learned that he was in New York, invited him
to lunch.” Akhmetshin told the Office that he had worked onissuesrelating to the Magnitsky
Act and had worked on the Prevezon litigation.” Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a
™! Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29, 84, 94-95
(Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not underoath, but Trump Jr. was advised
thatit is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation.
Id, at 10-11.
72 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10.
713 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.20, 2018), at 8 (Response to QuestionI, Parts (a)-
(c)). We considered whether one sequenceofevents suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous
knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7, 2016 Trump announcedhis intention to give “a major speech”
“probably Monday of next week”—which would have been June 13—about“all of the things that have
taken place with the Clintons.” See, e.g., Phillip Bump, What we know about the Trump Tower meeting,
Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9 meeting, Trump changedthe subjectof his planned
speech to national security. But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was
connectedto the anticipated June 9 meetingor that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that
meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting
on June 12, could well have caused the change. The President’s written answers to our questionsstate that
the speech’s focus was altered “[iJn light of” the Pulse nightclub shooting. See Written Responses, supra.
As forthe original topic of the June 13 speech, Trumphassaid that“he expected to give a speech referencing
the publicly available, negative information about the Clintons,” and that the draft of the speech prepared
by Campaignstaff “was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the
book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer.” Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did
speak extensively aboutallegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the Clinton Cash book. See
Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the Election, politico.com (June 22, 2016).
74 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017)
at 41, 42; Alison Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into U.S. for Trump Tower Meeting?
Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranishet al., Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump Jr. Has Long History
Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11, 2017); see OSC-KAV00113 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to
Kaveladze); RG000073 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; see also
Prevezon Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016).
™ akinesin 111817302, ccc

116
“Work // May-Contain Material Protected
Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitskaya with Magnitsky-related lobbying and the
Prevezon case, also attended the lunch.7!7 Veselnitskaya said she was
meeting and
asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him. According to several participants in the lunch,
Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a documentalleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and
the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in Russia), and those individuals subsequently makin
The group then went to Trump Towerfor the meeting.”!
ii. Conductofthe Meeting
Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze,
Samochornov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya.”” The Office spoke to
every participant except Veselnitskaya and Trump Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntaril
interviewed by the Office
The meeting lasted approximately 20 minutes.””?
Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not
say anything aboutthe subject of the meeting.” Participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that
the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC orthe Clinton
Campaign.”° Sheasserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering
Kaveladze
unt 11/16/17 302, at 7; Samochornov 7/13/17
302,at 2, 4;
ee Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7;

Samochornovdid not recall the planned
subject matter of the Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch. GrandJury
Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her later Senate statement and interactions with the press,
Veselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting.
720
721 Fg., Samochornov 7/12/17 302,at 4.

2 Fg., Samochornov 7/12/17 302,at 4.
”3 Fg, Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302,at 9.
724
725
726
117
Mey-Contai Materi l Fed R-Crint 2
in both the United States and Russia,’2”

8 According to Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow-up
questions about how the alleged payments couldbetied specifically to the Clinton Campaign, but
Veselnitskaya indicated that she could nottrace the money onceit entered the United States.”?
Kaveladzesimilarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became
aggravated and asked “[w]hat are we doing here?””*
Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and
Russia’s response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children.”! Several participants recalled
that Trump Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at
that time.”? Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in
government.”? Notes that Manafort took on his phonereflect the general flow of the conversation,
although notall ofits details.74
At somepointin the meeting, Kushnersent an iMessage to Manafort stating “waste oftime,”

followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companieswith requests that
SS1104/17 302, 1,
730 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8;
731 Samochornov 7/13/17 302,at 3;
™ #g., Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302,at 12-13; Fs

73 Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 12-13; i Samochornov
7/13/17 302, at 3. Trump Jr. confirmed this in a statement he made in July 2017 after news of the June
2016 meeting broke. Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee U.S. Senate
Washington DC, 115th Cong. 57 (Sept. 7, 2017).
734 Manafort’s notesstate:
Bill browder
Offshore - Cyprus
133m shares
Companies
Notinvest - loan
Value in Cyprusas inter
Mllici
Active sponsors of RNC
Browderhired Joanna Glover
Tied into Cheney
Russian adoption by American families
PJM-SJC-00000001-02 (Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee).
118
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they call him to give him an excuseto leave.° Samochornovrecalled that Kushner departed the
meeting before it concluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in
July 2017.7
Veselnitskaya’s press interviewsand written statements to Congressdiffer materially from

other accounts. In a July 2017 pressinterview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection
to the Russian government and had notreferred to any derogatory information concerning the
Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaignofficials.” Veselnitskaya’s November
2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9
meeting was not to connect with “the Trump Campaign”but rather to have “a private meeting with
Donald Trump Jr—a friend of my good acquaintance’s son on the matter of assisting me or my
colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and
interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress.””** In other words, Veselnitskaya
claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however, recalled any
reference to Congress during the meeting. Veselnitskaya also maintained that she “attended the
meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv,” the previously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but
she did not“introduce[her]self in this capacity.””?
Ina July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gaugethe
reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose ofthe meeting,
if “someone has information on our opponent . . . maybethis is something. I should hear them
out.”° TrumpJr. further stated in September 2017 congressionaltestimony that he thought he
should “listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say.”! Depending on what, if any,
information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then “consult with counsel to make an
informed decision as to whetherto give it any further consideration.”
5 NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 9;

Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16
Email, Kushner to Cain).
736 Samochornov 7/12/17 302,at maGrand) Jury Kushner 4/11/18
302, at 9-10; see also Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 48-49
(Sept. 7, 2017).
37 Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn’t Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News
(uly 11, 2017).
38 Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
115" Cong, 10 (Nov 20, 2017).
7° Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
115" Cong. 21 (Nov. 20, 2017). ,
70 Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July 11, 2017).
74 Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017).
™. Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept. 7,
2017).
119
May-Conti Materi l Fed -R-Crint 2
After the June 9 meeting concluded, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr. ™ According to
Goldstone, he told TrumpJr.
744
told Emin Agalarov in a phone call that the meeting was about adoption
Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze to

report in after the meeting, but before Kaveladze could call, Aras Agalarov called him.” With
Veselnitskaya next to him, Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well, but he later told
Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was
not with lawyers and they were “preaching to the wrong crowd.”
c. Post-June 9 Events
Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov madeat least two unsuccessful attempts after the election
to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the
Magnitsky Act.” On November23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstoneaboutsetting up another
meeting “with T people” and sent a documentbearing allegations similar to those conveyed on
June 9.%° Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, stating that “Mr. A,” which Goldstone
understood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting.” ' Goldstone emailed the
document to Rhona Graff, saying that “Aras Agalarov has asked meto pass on this document in
the hopeit can be passed onto the appropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is
™43 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Goldstone 2/8/18 302,

at 9;
5 The weekafter the June 9 meeting, a cybersecurity firm

and the DNC announced the Russian hack of the DNC. See Volume I, Section III.B.2, supra.
(and one text message shows)that, shortly after the DNC

announcement, Goldstone made comments connecting the DNC hacking announcement to the June 9
meeting. OSC-KAV_00029 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.
Agalarov & Kaveladze (10:09 a.m.)). The investigation did notidentify evidence connecting the events of
June 9 to the GRU’s hack-and-dump operation. OSC-KAV_00029-30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.
Agalaroy).
™7 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze i

748 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze
On June 14, 2016 Kaveladze’s teenage daughter emailed asking how the June 9 meeting had gone, and
Kaveladze responded, “meeting was boring. The Russians did not have any bad info on Hilary.” OSC-
KAV._00257 (6/14/16 Email, Kaveladze to A.Kaveladze; ii.
™ Goldstone2/8/18 302,at 11;
750 OSC-KAV_00138 1/23/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); San
1 RG000196 (11/26-29/16 Text Messages, Goldstone & Kaveladze); ET
120
May-Contain-Material Fed R-Crimt P6fe)
in New York currently and happyto meet with any memberofhis transition team.”According
to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but
Goldstone did not make the request.”? The investigation did not identify evidence ofthe transition
team following up.
Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began receiving inquiries from attorneys
representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017. 74 On approximately
June 2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization,
abouthisparticipation in the June 9 meeting.” The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya’s
name to Garten, identifying her as the “woman who wasthe attorney who spoke at the meeting
from Moscow.””*° Later in June 2017, Goldstoneparticipated in a lengthier call with Garten and
Alan Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and, subsequently, personal counsel
for TrumpJr.).?°7 On June 27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject “Trump
attorneys” and stated that he was “interviewed by attorneys” about the June 9 meeting who were
“concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia—which he has always denied
meeting.””°* Goldstonestressed that he “did say at the time this was an awful idea anda terrible
meeting.””5? Emin Agalarovsent a screenshotof the message to Kaveladze.’°
The June 9 meeting becamepublic in July 2017. Ina July 9, 2017 text message to Emin
Agalarov, Goldstone wrote “I made sure I kept you and yourfather outof [t]his story,””°! and “[i]f
contacted I can do a dance andkeep yououtofit.””? Goldstone added, “FBI now investigating,”
and “I hope this favor was worth for your dad—it could blow up.”” On July 12, 2017 Emin
Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, “never listens” to him and that their
7 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11; ES 57700118 (11/28/16

Email, Goldstone to Graff).
756 RG000256 (6/2/17 Email, Goldstone to Garten).
758 RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov).

759 RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov).
760 OSC-KAV_01190 (6/27/17 Text Message, E. Agalarov to Kaveladze).

es87
761 (7/9/17 Text Messages, E. Agalarov & Goldstone);
TR
ai
Atterney-WorkPreduct // Preteeted-Under
May-Contei Materi l Fed R-Crim 2-62}
relationship with “mr T has been thrown down the drain.””' The next month, Goldstone
commented to Emin Agalarov about the volumeofpublicity the June 9 meeting had generated,
stating that his “reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father
insisted on even though Ike and Metold him would be bad newsand not to do.””® Goldstone
added, “I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father. So am painted as some
mysterious link to Putin.”7
After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump
Organizationagain reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Futerfas sent Goldstone an email
with a proposed statement for Goldstoneto issue, whichread:
Asthe person whoarranged the meeting, I can definitively state that the statements I have
read by Donald TrumpJr. are 100% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste oftime
and Don wasnevertold Ms. Veselnitskaya’s nameprior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya
mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted
20 to 30 minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever cameof the
meeting.””
the statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was

68 He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been
asked “by [his] client in Moscow — Emin Agalarov — to facilitate a meeting between a Russian
attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya [sic]) and Donald Trump Jr. The lawyer had apparently stated
that she had someinformation regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr.
TrumpJr. mightfind interesting.””? Goldstone never released either statement.”
Onthe Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say
about the June 9 meeting. Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov—an anti-
Magnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon—offered to pay
$90,000 of Samochornov’s legal fees.””! At Veselnitskaya’s request, the organization sent
Samochornova transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview, and Samochornov understoodthat
the organization would pay his legal fees only if he made statements consistent with
Veselnitskaya’s.””* Samochornov declined, telling the Office that he did not want to perjure
764 OSC-KAV_01197 (7/11-12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze & E. Agalarov); I
787 7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten.

768
769 7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten.

770
™"Samochoenov 713/17 30, ;

"I S20ochorsoy 113/17 302,21
122
1
himself.” The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya’s request to Samochornovstated that he

did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya’s answers but, in hindsight,
recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of
assistance to be conditioned onhis not contradicting Veselnitskaya’s account.’
VolumeII, Section II.G, infra, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr.,
and othersin June and July 2017 regarding the June 9 meeting.
6. Events at the Republican National Convention
Trump Campaignofficials met with Russian AmbassadorSergey Kislyak during the week
of the Republican National Convention. Theevidenceindicates that those interactions were brief
and non-substantive. During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention,
J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed
amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing “lethal” assistance
to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee
personnel revise the proposed amendmentto state that only “appropriate” assistance be provided
to Ukraine. The original sponsorofthe “lethal” assistance amendmentstated that Gordon told her
(the sponsor) that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to
dilute the language. Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he
acknowledgedit was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the
subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the
candidate to make that proposal. Gordonsaid that he sought the change because he believed the
proposed language wasinconsistent with Trump’s position on Ukraine.
a. AmbassadorKislyak’s Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the

Week of the RNC
In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy
event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in
Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or
“Convention”).’ Approximately 80 foreign ambassadorsto the United States, including Kislyak,
wereinvited to the conference,”
On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference.””7 In
his speech, Gordonstatedin pertinent part that the United States should havebetter relations with
7 Samochornov 7/13/17 302,at 1.
5 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Allan Smith, We Now Know More About
why JeffSessions and a Russian AmbassadorCrossed Pathsat the Republican Convention, BusinessInsider
(Mar. 2, 2017).
™™ Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Laura DeMarco, Global Cleveland and Sen. Bob Corker Welcome
International Republican National Convention Guests, Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 20, 2016).
777 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
123
Werk // May
Russia.’”* During Sessions’s speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have
been asked by Kislyak.””- When the speeches concluded, several ambassadorslined upto greet
the speakers.” Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said
in the speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.’”*! Sessions separately spoke with between
six and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak.”? Although Sessions stated during interviews with
the Office that he had nospecific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that
the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said
somethings about U.S.-Russia relations.”
Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference.” Gordon ran
into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food, and they decidedto sit at the sametable to eat.”
They werejoinedat that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump
Campaign advisor Carter Page.”*° As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon
estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant
whathe said in his speech about improving U.S.-Russiarelations.”°”
b. Change to Republican Party Platform
In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign,
working with the Republican National Committee, reviewed the 2012 Convention’s foreign policy
platform to identify divergence betweentheearlier platform and candidate Trump’s positions.”**
The Campaign team discussed toning downlanguagefrom the 2012 platform that identified Russia
as the country’s numberonethreat, given the candidate’s belief that there needed to be better U.S.
relations with Russia.”? The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the
National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its
™8 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9.

7 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3.
789 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3.
781 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9.
782 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3; see also VolumeI, Section 1V.A.4.b, supra
(explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception
held on April 26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel).
783 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
784 Gordon 8/29/17 302,at 9-10.
785 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10.
786 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; see also VolumeI, Section IV.A.3.d, supra (explaining that Page
acknowledged meeting Kislyakat this event).
*87 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.
788 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.
789 Gordon 8/29/17 302,at 10.
124
May-Conti
Were // Proteeted-Under Materi l Fed R-Crim P6fe)
first meeting to propose amendments.””°
Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote onthe platform,
the Trump Campaign could request changes, and members of the Trump Campaign attended
committee meetings.”! John Mashburn, the Campaign’s policy director, helped oversee the
Campaign’s involvementin the platform committee meetings.” He told the Office that he
directed Campaignstaff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach
and only to challenge platform planksif they directly contradicted Trump’s wishes.”
OnJuly 11, 2016, delegate Diana Denmansubmitted a proposedplatform amendmentthat

included provision of armed support for Ukraine.” The amendmentdescribed Russia’s “ongoing
military aggression” in Ukraine and announced “support” for “maintaining (and, if warranted,
increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity are fully
restored” and for “providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine’s armed forces and greater
coordination with NATO on defense planning.””° Gordon reviewed the proposed platform
changes, including Denman’s.”° Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of
Trump’s stated position on Ukraine, which Gordonpersonally heard the candidate say at the March
31 foreign policy meeting—namely,that the Europeansshould take primary responsibility for any
assistance to Ukraine, that there should be improved U.S.-Russiarelations, and that he did not
wantto start World WarIII over that region.” Gordon told the Office that Trump’s statements
on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored thosepositions to the point where
Gordonfelt obliged to object to the proposed platform change and seekits dilution.”
On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform
Subcommittee, Denman offered her amendment.”” Gordon and another Campaign staffer, Matt
Miller, approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendmentto permit further
discussion.®°° Gordon’s concern with the amendment was the language about providing “lethal
7° Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; Hoff 5/26/17 302,at 1-2.

1 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1; Gordon 9/7/17 302,at 10.
792 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 7-8.
73 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.
™ DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 1;
Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2.
75 DENMAN000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22.
6 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10-11.

797 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302,at 11; Gordon 2/14/19 302,at 1-2, 5-6.
78 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 5-6.
9 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; see DENMAN000014.
809 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Hoff
§/26/17 302,at 2.
125
Work // Protected
defensive weapons to Ukraine.”®”! Miller did not have any independentbasis to believe that this
language contradicted Trump’s views and relied on Gordon’s recollection of the candidate’s
‘aye
views. 802
According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they
hadto clear the language and that Gordon was“talking to New York.”8Denmantold othersthat
she was asked by the two Trump Campaignstaffers to strike “lethal defense weapons” from the
proposal but that she refused.®** Denmanrecalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with
candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true.®° Gordon denied having told
Denmanthat he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledgedit was possible that he
mentioned having previously spokento the candidate about the subject matter.*°° Gordon’s phone
records reveal a call to Sessions’s office in Washington that afternoon, but do not includecalls
directly to a number associated with Trump.®” Andaccordingto the President’s written answers
to the Office’s questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the
platform amendment.®°8
Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy advisor, and
Mashburn, the Campaignpolicy director. Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he
could notrecall if by phoneor in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in
the proposed amendment. Gordonrecalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn andthat
all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation (“appropriate assistance”).8°
Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment, but not weighing in because
Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign’s foreign policy stance.5!? Mashburn stated that
Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that
the Campaign should not intervene.®"!
When the amendment cameup again in the committee’s proceedings, the subcommittee
changed the amendmentby striking the “lethal defense weapons” language andreplacing it with
501 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 3.

502 Mf. Miller 10/25/17 302 at 3.
803 Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Denman 6/7/17 302, at2.

54 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2.
895 Denman 6/7/17 302,at 2-3, 3-4; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2.
596 Gordon 2/14/19 302,at 7.
5°7 Call Records of J.D. Gordon . Gordonstated to the Office that
his calls with Sessions were unrelated to the platform change. Gordon 2/14/19 302,at 7.
808 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV,
Part (f)).
809 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6-7; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Gordon 8/29/17 302,at 11.
510 Dearborn 11/28/17 302,at 7-8.
511 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4.
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“appropriate assistance.”®!2 Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately
agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with “appropriate assistance.”*!? The
subcommittee accordingly approved Denman’s amendment but with the term “appropriate
assistance.”®'4 Gordon stated that, to his recollection, this was the only change sought by the
Campaign.*'5 Sam Clovis, the Campaign’s national co-chair and chief policy advisor, stated he
was surprised by the change anddid notbelieveit wasin line with Trump’s stance.*'® Mashburn
stated that when he saw the word “appropriate assistance,” he believed that Gordon hadviolated
Mashburn’s directive notto intervene.®!7
7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak
Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with
responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio—among them Sessions and Gordon—in the weeks
after the Convention. The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination
between the Campaign and the Russian government.
a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador’s

Residence
On August 3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United
States wrote to Gordon “[o]n behalf of’ Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon “to have
breakfast/tea with the Ambassadorat his residence” in Washington, D.C. the following week.*"
Gordon respondedfive dayslater to decline the invitation. He wrote, “[t]hese days are not optimal
for us, as we are busily knocking down a constant stream offalse media stories while also preparing
for the first debate with HRC. Hopeto take a raincheckfor another time when things quiet down
a bit. Please pass along my regards to the Ambassador.”*!? The investigation did not identify
evidence that Gordon madeany other arrangements to meet (or met) with Kislyakafter this email.
b. Senator Sessions’s September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak
Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions’s Senate
office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak.®° At the time, Sessions was a memberof the
812 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3; see Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2-3; Gordon 8/29/17 302,at 11.
813 Gordon 8/29/17 302,at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 12.
514 Hoff 5/26/17 302,at 2-3.
515 Gordon 2/14/19 302,at 6.
516 Clovis 10/3/17 302, at 10-11.
517 Mashburn 6/25/18 302,at 4.

518 DJTFP00004828 (8/3/16 Email, Pchelyakov [embassy@russianembassy.org] to Gordon).
519 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to embassy@russianembassy.org).
820 7uff 1/30/18 302, at 5.
127
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meetwith foreignofficials in that capacity.*"' But
Sessions’s staff reported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests from
ambassadors increased substantially in 2016, as Sessions assumed a prominentrole in the Trump
Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a future
Trump Administration.
On September8, 2016, Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office.*? Sessions said
that he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors,
including Kislyak.°** He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff:
Sandra Luff, his legislative director; and Pete Landrum, whohandled military affairs.°° The
meetinglasted less than 30 minutes.®° Sessions voiced concerns about Russia’s sale of a missile-
defense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian
aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova.’ Kislyak offered
explanations on these issues and complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet-bloc
countries that border Russia.*8 Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential
campaign as “an interesting campaign,”®”? and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the
Russian government wasreceptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign.**°
Noneofthe attendees, though, remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any
request that Sessions convey information from the Russian governmentto the Trump Campaign.™3!
During the meeting, Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U.S.-Russia relations with
him over a mealat the ambassador’s residence.** Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak
extended theinvitation. After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepting the one-
on-one meeting with Kislyak, whom sheassessed to be an “old school KGB guy.”**? Neither Luff
nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up onthe invitation or made any furthereffort to dine
821 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.

822 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 3-5.
823 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 23.
824 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.
825 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5-6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5 (stating he
could not rememberif election was discussed).
826 Tuff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.
827 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302,at 4-5.
88 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302 at 4-5.
829 Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.

839 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. Sessions also noted that ambassadors cameto him for information
about Trump and hoped he wouldpass along information to Trump. Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24.
831 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302,at 5.
832 7uff 1/30/18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4.
833 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.
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or meet with Kislyak before the November2016 election.*4 Sessions and Landrum recalledthat,
after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak.**
Accordingto Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between
Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor of Alabama.*%* Sessions,
however, was in New York onthe dayofthe anticipated meeting and was unableto attend.*°7 The
investigation did not identify evidence that the two men metat any point after their September 8
meeting.
8. Paul Manafort
Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign,including a period as campaign chairman,

from March to August 2016.78 Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for
Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine.
Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin
Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort’s office in Kiev and who
the FBI assesses to haveties to Russianintelligence.
Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign anda longtime employee,**
to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign—including internal polling data,
although Manafort claimsnotto recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to
share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such
polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign.
834 Tuff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302,at 4-5.

835 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 23.
836 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 23.
837 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 23.
838 On August 21, 2018, Manafort was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on eighttax,
Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort
pleaded guilty in the District of Columbiato (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to
commit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness
tampering). Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern
District of Virginia, but as to which the jury hung. The conductat issue in both cases involved Manafort’s
work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended.
OnMarch7, 2019, Manafort was sentenced to 47 months of imprisonmentin the Virginia prosecution. On
March 13, the district court in D.C. sentenced Manafort to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the
Count 1 conspiracy (with 30 of those months to run concurrentto the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on
the Count 1 conspiracy, to be served consecutive to the other two sentences. The twosentences resulted in
a total term of 90 months.
83° As noted in VolumeI, Section III.D.1.b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in
the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He
has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also
Transcript at 16, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514
(“Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript”) (court’s explanation of reasons to credit Gates’s statements in one
instance).
129
Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and
conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in New York
City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych, who wasthen living in Russia. The message was about a peace
plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a “backdoor” means for Russia to
control eastern Ukraine. Several monthslater, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an
email to Manafort expressing the view—which Manafort later said he shared—that the plan’s
success would require U.S. support to succeed: “all that is required to start the process is a very
minor ‘wink’ (or slight push) from [Donald Trump].”*4° The email also stated that if Manafort
were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensurehis
reception in Russia “at the very top level.”
Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four
occasionsaftertheir first discussion ofthe topic on August 2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email
described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. The Office
reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications, and asked President Trump about
the plan in written questions.**! The investigation did not uncover evidence of Manafort’s passing
along information about Ukrainian peace plansto the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or
the Administration. The Office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort’s
electronic communications(in some instances, messages were sent using encryption applications).
And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new
Administration about the peaceplan,he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan
and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was amongthe reasonsthat
the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement.*
The Office could not reliably determine Manafort’s purpose in sharing internal polling data
with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manor aic not see
a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gatesthat his role in the Campaign would
840 The email was drafted in Kilimnik’s DMP email account(in English
541 According to the President’s written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating
to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written
Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 16-17 (Response to Question IV,Part (d)).
82 Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office
determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The
judge presiding in Manafort’s D.C. criminal case found by a preponderanceof the evidence that Manafort
intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning his
interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues), Although the report
refers at times to Manafort’s statements, it does so only whenthose statements are sufficiently corroborated
to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort’s untruthful responses may themselves be of
evidentiary value, or to provide Manafort’s explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to
determine whetherthat explanation was credible.
130
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May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crim- P62)
be “good for business” and potentially a way to be made wholefor work he previously completed
in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with
him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a “disagreement”—areference to
one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort’s credibility and our
limited ability to gather evidence on what happenedto the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik,
the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have givenit to) did with it. The
Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort’s sharing polling data and
Russia’s interference in the election, which hadalready been reported by U.S. mediaoutlets at the
time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise
coordinated with the Russian governmentonits election-interference efforts.
a. Paul Manafort’s Ties to Russia and Ukraine
Manafort’s Russian contacts during the campaign andtransition periods stem from his
consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political
consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company DMPInternational
LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to
communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes
Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort’s communications with Deripaska and
Ukrainian oligarchs.
i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work

In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who
has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and whois closely aligned with
Vladimir Putin.§? A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in
2005 regardingthe post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin andthe benefits
that the work could conferon“the Putin Government.”*“4 Gates described the work Manafort did
for Deripaska as“political risk insurance,” and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install
friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.“ Manafort’s
companyearnedtensof millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and wasloaned millions
of dollars by Deripaska as well.§6
In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners
LP. (“Pericles”), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner
Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.*"”
Deripaska wasthe sole investor.“* Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led
843 Dinchuketal., Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8, 2018).
844 6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothchild.
545 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7.
846 Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year, 2005 — 2015; Manafort Loans from
Wire Transfers, 2005 — 2015.
47 Gates 3/12/18 302,at 5.

848 Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11.
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Attorney-WorkProduet // Proteeted
to a deterioration ofthe relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.*? In particular, when the
fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009,
Manafort’s business relationship with Deripaska had “dried up.”*5° According to Gates, various
interactions with Deripaska andhis intermediaries over the past few years have involvedtrying to
resolve the legal dispute.**! As described below,in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others
engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaskarelationship and resolvethelitigation.
ii. Political Consulting Work

Through Deripaska, Manafort wasintroduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian oligarch
whohired Manafort as a political consultant.” In 2005, Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in
political work supporting the Party of Regions,*® a political party in Ukraine that was generally
understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and
its candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and
trusted political advisor to Yanukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Yanukovych
served in that role until 2014, when hefled to Russia amidst popular protests.
iii. Konstantin Kilimnik
Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a
longtime Manafort employee.*°° Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his
senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort andhisclients, including
Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.*°° Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with
Deripaska’s deputy, Viktor Boyarkin,*°’ a Russian national who previously servedin the defense
attaché office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.*5*
54° Gates 2/2/18 302,at 9.

850 Gates 2/2/18 302,at 6.
851 Gates 2/2/18 302,at 9-10.
852 Manafort 7/30/14 302, at 1; Manafort 9/20/18 302,at 2.
853 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6.
§54 Gates 3/16/18 302, at 1; Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302,at 2-3.
855 atten 5/22/18 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record,U.S.
Department ofState.
856 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8; Gates 1/31/18 302,at 4-5; Gates 1/30/18
302, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302,at 11.
857 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8.

558 Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. DepartmentofState.
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Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian
“spy."859 The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik hasties to Russian intelligence.*° Several
pieces ofthe Office’s evidence—including witness interviews and emails obtained through court-
authorized search warrants—support that assessment:
e Kilimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, then of the Soviet Union,
and attendedthe Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.56! Sam
Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik,’stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a
translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian
armamentindustry selling arms and military equipment.5°
e U.S. governmentvisa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United
States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997.5
e Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Moscow office, where
he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005.While
anotherofficial recalled the incident differently,5 one former associate of Kilimnik’s at
IRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian
intelligence were too strong. The sameindividualstated that it was well knownat IRI that
Kilimnik had links to the Russian government.®”
e Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI
Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After
Hawker’s work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian
§59 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.

560 The Office has noted Kilimnik’s assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings.
E.g., Gov’t Opp. to Mot. to Modify, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec. 4,
2017), Doc. 73, at 2 (“Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov’t Opp. to Mot. to Modify”).
861 12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S, DepartmentofState.
5 Tn August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreementto violating the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld
documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the courseof its investigation of Russian
election interference. Plea Agreement, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,
2018), Doc. 6; Statement of Offense, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,
2018), Doe. 7.
863 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6.
564 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. DepartmentofState.
865 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 1-2.
866 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2.

87 Lenzi 1/30/18 302,at 2.
133
Attertey-WorlPreduet // Preteeted-
government entity on a public-relations project that would promote, in Western and

Ukrainian media, Russia’s position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea.5*
e Gates suspectedthat Kilimnik was a “spy,” a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker,
and Alexander van der Zwaan,*® an attorney who had worked with DMIon reportfor
the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.5”
b. Contacts during Paul Manafort’s Time with the Trump Campaign
i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign
Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March
29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign’s “Convention
Manager.”*?! On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief
strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy
campaign chairman.®”?
ThomasBarrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump.8” In
early 2016, at Manafort’s request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Manafort join the Campaign
to manage the Republican Convention.?” Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately
1980 until the mid-1990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trumpin
1982 when Trump hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm.” Overthe years,
Manafort saw Trumpatpolitical and social events in New York City and at Stone’s wedding, and
Trumprequested VIPstatus at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort.5”
868 Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev.
86° van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to making
false statements to the Special Counsel’s Office. Plea Agreement, United States v. Alex van der Zwaan,
1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2018), Doc. 8.
870 Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan11/3/17 302, at 22, Manafort said in an interview that
Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik’s going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18
302,at 7.
811 Press Release — Donald J. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J. Manafort,
The American Presidency Project — U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016).
8? Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8; Meghan Keneally, Timeline ofManafort’s role in the Trump Campaign,
ABC News(Oct. 20, 2017).
5% Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 1-2; Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3.
8% Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8.
85 Manafort 10/16/18 302,at 6.
876 Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6.
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Horie // Protected
According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in

Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.*”? Manafort agreed to work on the
Campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful incomeatthis point in time, but resuscitating
his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported
that Manafort intended, if Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and
monetizehis relationship with the Administration.*”8
ii, Paul Manafort’s Campaign-Period Contacts
Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review
separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris
Kolesnikov,*” the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc
officials.*8° The memoranda described Manafort’s appointment to the Trump Campaign and
indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates
emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort’s appointmentto Kilimnik for
translation and dissemination.**! Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages
had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown “our friends”
the media coverage of his new role.*® Kilimnik replied, “Absolutely. Every article.” Manafort
further asked: “How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation
seen?” Kilimnik wrote back the same day, “Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor
[Boyarkin, Deripaska’s deputy], who has been forwarding the coveragedirectly to OVD.”58
Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be “good for
business” and increasethe likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million
he was owedfor previouspolitical consulting work in Ukraine.*** Gates also explained to the
Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help “confirm” that Deripaska had
droppedthe Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as
877 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10.

8%8 Gates 1/30/18 302,at 4.
5? Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11.
580 See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort’s Trial Isn’t About Russia, butIt Will Be in the Air, New York
Times (July 30, 2018); Tierney Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in
Ukraine, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, How Pro-Russian Forces Will Take
Revenge on Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018); Sergii Leshchenko, Ukraine’s Oligarchs Are Still
Calling the Shots, Foreign Policy (Aug. 14, 2014); Interfax-Ukraine, Kolesnikov: Inevitability of
Punishment Neededfor Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018); Igor Kossov,
Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7, 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, How
the Kremlin Can Win Ukraine’s Elections, Atlantic Council (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a
Ukraine political party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions.
381 3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.
882 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik.
883 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik.
584 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10.
135
discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against
Manafort.®*5 Gates further stated that Deripaska wanteda visa to the United States, that Deripaska
could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be
helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort’s relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other
ways as well.88° Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what,
if anything, Manafort mightbe offering Deripaska.**”
Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send
Kilimnik Campaigninternal polling data and other updatesso that Kilimnik, in turn, could share
it with Ukrainian oligarchs.*8® Gates understood that the information would also be shared with
Deripaska 58° Gates reported to the Office
that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to sendpolling information, but Gates thoughtit
was a way to showcase Manafort’s work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the
Trump Campaign ended.* Gates said that Manafort’s instruction included sending internal
polling data prepared for the Trump Campaignbypollster Tony Fabrizio.*! Fabrizio had worked
with Manafort for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort. Gates stated that, in
accordance with Manafort’s instruction, he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp;
Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis.*°? Gates further told the Office that, after
Manafort left the Campaign in mid-August, Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and
that the data he sent was morepublicly available information andless internal data.°”?
Gates’s account about polling data is consistent

with multiple emails that
Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts betweenlate July and mid-August of 2016.
Those emails referenced “internal polling,” described the status of the Trump Campaign and
885 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740),at 2.
886 Gates 2/2/18 302,at 12.
887 Gates 2/2/18 302,at 12.
888 Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2. In later interview withthe
Office, Gates stated that Manafort directed him to sendpolling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting
between Manafort and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in VolumeI, Section IV.A.8.b.iii, infra. Gates
11/7/18 302, at 3.
89 Gates 9/27/18 302, Part 11, at 2; a.
890 ‘Gates 2/12/18 302, at 10; Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17.
891 Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/18 302,at 15.
* Gates 1/31/18 302,at 17.
593 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 11-12. According to Gates, his access to internal polling data was more
limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaignat that point.
136
Attorney-WerkPreduet // Protected
Manafort’s role in it, and assessed Trump’s prospects for_victo'

895
Manafort did not
acknowledge instructing Gates to send Kilimnik internaldata,
The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the
communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates’s account. For example, in
response to a July 7, 2016, email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort’s failed Deripaska-
backed investment, Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movementon “this issue
with our friend.”®°7 Gates stated that “ourfriend”likely referred to Deripaska,®”* and Manafort
told the Office that the “issue” (and “our biggest interest,” as stated below) was a solution to the
Deripaska-Pericles issue.*? Kilimnik replied:
Iam carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest.
Ourfriend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in
his boss’ [Deripaska’s] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to
you pretty soon, understandingall the time sensitivity. I am more than sure thatit will be
resolved and wewill get back to the originalrelationship with V.’s boss [Deripaska].
Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin’s “boss,” a reference to
Deripaska, “that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate.”°! Manafort hasalleged to
the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an
example: why Trumpselected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate.” Manafort
said he never gave Deripaska a briefing.°”? Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would
want to use Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and
elsewhere.?™
895 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Schultz; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik
to Marson; 7/27/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to
Jackson; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson; 8/19/16 Email, Kilimnik to Patten.
97 7/7/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.

898 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13.
599 Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 6.
909 7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort.
51 7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort; Gates 2/2/18 302,at 13.
92 Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 6.
3 Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 6.

94 Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 6.
137
iti, Paul Manafort’s Two Campaign-PeriodMeetings with Konstantin Kilimnik

in the United States
Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period—once in May
and again in August 2016. Thefirst meeting took place on May7, 2016, in New YorkCity.In
the days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the
political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from trip that former Party of
Regionsofficial Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow—atrip thatlikely included meetings
between Boykoand high-ranking Russianofficials.Kilimnik then traveled to Washington, D.C.
on or about May 5, 2016; while in Washington, Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State
Department employees.”°”
Late on the evening of May6, Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet
Manafort in New York for breakfast on May 7.According to Manafort, during the meeting, he
and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump
Campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and
elsewhere.Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort’s position on
the Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for anything.?"° Kilimnik spoke about
a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which wasthe base
for the Opposition Bloc.?'' Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the meeting with
Manafort.
Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New YorkCity
on the evening of August 2, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28,
2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow.”!* The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort
requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day} In an
email with a subject line “Black Caviar,” Kilimnik wrote:
I met today with the guy who gave youyourbiggest black caviar jar several years ago. We
spent about 5 hourstalking about his story, and I have several important messages from
him to you. He asked meto go andbrief you on our conversation. I said I have to runit
by youfirst, but in principle I am preparedto doit. . . . It has to do about the future of his
96 4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7;
Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3.
97 5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap & Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email, Kasanofto Kilimnik.
9°8 5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.
°° Manafort 10/11/18 302,at 1.
19 Manafort 10/11/18 302,at 1.
11 Manafort 10/11/18 302,at1.
912 7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to katrin@yana.kiev.ua (2:17:34 a.m.).
913 7/99/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.).
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country, and is quite interesting.”!*
Manafort identified “the guy who gave you yourbiggest black caviar jar” as Yanukovych. He
explained that, in 2010, he and Yanukovychhad lunchto celebrate the recent presidential election.
Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to
$40,000.°!5 Manafort’s identification of Yanukovychas “the guy who gave you yourbiggest black
caviar jar” is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow—where Yanukovych resided—when
Kilimnik wrote “I met today with the guy,” and'with a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik
referred to Yanukovych as “BG,” °16 Manafort replied to Kilimnik’s July 29
email, “Tuesday [August2] is best... Tues or weds in NYC.”?!7
Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow,and on that
same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed “about 2 hours”for their meeting “becauseit is a long
caviar story to tell.”°!8 Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August2 at 7:30 p.m., and
he and Manafort agreed to a late dinnerthat night.?!? Documentary evidence—includingflight,
phone, andhotelrecords, and the timing of text messages exchanged””°—confirmsthe dinner took
place as planned on August 2.77!
Asto the contents of the meetingitself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates—whoarrived
late to the dinner—differin certain respects. But their versions of events, when assessedalongside
available documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate
that at least three principal topics were discussed.
First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoingpolitical problems in
Ukraine by creating an autonomousrepublic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas,””
914 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.).

915 Manafort 9/12/18 302,at 3.
916 7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik; [MV

°18 7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.
920 Kilimnik 8/2/16 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik
a: Call Records of Rick Gates a: 8/2-3/16, Kilimnik Park Lane Hotel
Receipt.
°21 Deripaska’s private planealso flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey onthe evening of August
2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the plane were
Deripaska’s wife, daughter, mother, and father-in-law, and separate records obtained by our Office confirm
that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York.
°2 The Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, which are located in the Donbas region of
Ukraine, declared themselves independentin responseto the popular unrestin 2014 that removed President
Yanukovych from power. Pro-Russian Ukrainian militia forces, with backing from the Russian military,
have occupied the region since 2014. Under the Yanukovych-backed plan, Russia would assist in
withdrawing the military, and Donbas would become an autonomousregion within Ukraine with its own
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and having Yanukovych,the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to headthat republic.”
That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a “backdoor” means for Russia to control
eastern Ukraine.?”* Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would
have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to comeoutin favor of the peace
plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and
Ukraine to support the plan.”° Manafort alsoinitially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik
that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kilimnik askin
Manafort to reconsider the plan after their August 2 meeting.””° Manafort said
that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending—years later—an “urgent”

request when Yanukovych needed him.”?? When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on
or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan
again in that email.°?* Manafort ultimately acknowledged Kilimnik also raised the peace plan in
ase and February 2017 meetings with ‘tan
929
Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort’s
plan to win the election.°?° That briefing encompassed the Campaign’s messaging andits internal
polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of “battleground” states, which
Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.”?! Manafort did not
refer explicitly to “battleground”states in his telling of the August 2 discussion,
prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the
region as prime minister of the republic, and facilitate the reintegration of the = into Ukraine with the
support of the U.S. and Russian presidents. As noted above, according to the written
documentation describing the plan, for the plan to work, both U.S. and Russian support were necessary.
2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, & Fabrizio, at 3-5.
"= Manafot9/11/1832,ccc
95 Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 4.
926 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4.
” CT Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/12/18
302, at 4.
™ Manafort 9/12/18 302, 4SUSE

ae Documentary
evidence confirms the peace-plan discussions in 2018. 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email
from Manafort); 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio.
93 Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 5.

31 Gates 1/30/18 302,at 3, 5.
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Third, according to Gates and whatKilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed
two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort’s previous work in the region. Those consisted
of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the fundsthat the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafortfor
his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment.”
After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik
because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his
connectionsto Kilimnik.?*4
c. Post-Resignation Activities
Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two
weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting abouthis political
consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation,
Manafort continuedto offer advice to various Campaign officials through the Novemberelection.
Manafort told Gates that hestill spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump,’ and some
of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016,
Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the
Campaign makethecase against Clinton “as the failed and corrupt championofthe establishment”
and that “Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible
way — by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members.”?*° Later, in a
November5, 2016 email to Kushnerentitled “Securing the Victory,” Manafort stated that he was
“really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preservingthe victory,” and
that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respondto a loss by “mov[ing] immediately
to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that
the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tamperedwith the results.”37
Trumpwaselected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the
wake of Trump’s victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. Manafort instead
preferred to stay on the “outside,” and monetize his campaign position to generate business given
his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.%* Manafort
appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and
China andwaspaid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail.”
Manafort’s activities in early 2017 included meetingsrelating to Ukraine and Russia. The
33 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7.

934 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 5.
°35 Gates 2/12/18 302,at 12.
936 NOSC00021517-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).
37 NOSC00021573-75 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).
938 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4.
39 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1.
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first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in January 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov.
Oganov, who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior
executive at a Deripaska company and wasbelievedto report directly to Deripaska.“° Manafort
initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledgedit, he claimedthat the meeting
had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit.“! Other evidence,
however, provides reason to doubt Manafort’s statementthat the sole topic of the meeting wasthe
Pericles lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a numberassociated with Kilimnik
suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin—not Manafort’s counsel—had arranged the meeting between
Manafort and Oganov.? Kilimnik’s message states that the meeting was supposed to be “not
about moneyor Pericles”but instead “about recreating [the] old friendship”—ostensibly between
Manafort and Deripaska—‘andtalking about globalpolitics.”°4? Manafort also replied by text that
he “need[s] this finished before Jan. 20,”%* which appearsto be a reference to resolving Pericles
before the inauguration.
On January 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T.
McFarland, who wasat that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was
formally appointed to that position on January 20, 2017." Manafort’s January 15 email to
McFarland stated: “I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my
travels over the last month.”*° Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue
regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month.”*”
Either way, McFarland—who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiry—
appears notto have responded to Manafort."
Manafort told the Office that around the time of the Presidential Inauguration in January,
he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in
Alexandria, Virginia.“? During this meeting, Kilimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace
plan that he had broached at the August 2 meeting andin a detailed December 8, 2016 message
found in Kilimnik’s DMP email account. In that December 8 email, which Manafort
40 Kalashnikova 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Embassy’s Identity Crisis, Washington Post
(Dec. 20, 1991); Georgy S. Oganov Executive Profile & Biography, Bloomberg (Mar. 12, 2019).
41 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7.
°” Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik.
43 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik; Manafort 9/12/18 302,at 5.
44 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik.
45 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn.
46 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn.
47 Manafort 9/11/18 302,at 7.
48 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18-19.
°°) CTT Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7; Manafort 9/21/18
302, at 3; 1/19/17 & 1/22/17 Kilimnik CBP Records, Jan. 19 and 22, 2017; 2016-17 Text Messages,
Kilimnik & Patten, at 1-2.
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acknowledged havingread,’*! Kilimnik wrote, “[a]ll that is required to start the process is a very
minor ‘wink’ (or slight push) from DT”—an apparentreference to President-elect Trump—‘and
a decision to authorize you to be a ‘special representative’ and manage this process.” Kilimnik
assured Manafort, with that authority, he “could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia
[Yanukovych] guarantees yourreception at the very top level,” and that “DT could have peacein
Ukraine basically within a few monthsafter inauguration.””>?
Asnoted above, a and statements to the Office, Manafort soughtto

ualify his engagement on and support forthe plan.
On February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnikin Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from
Moscow.?°* In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik
on his Madrid trip and then—after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kilimnik was
in Madrid at the same time as him—recognized that he met him in Madrid. Manafort said that
Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called “black ledger” payments to
Manafort that was being conducted by Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau.”
Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnikthroughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018.
= anafor9711/18 302, 6
8 a } )
956 9/21/17 Email, Zatynaikoto Kilimnik.

957 Manafort 9/13/18 302,at 1.
*:RR 12 :slving whether Manafort breached
his cooperation plea agreement by lying to the Office, the district court found that Manafort lied about,
among otherthings, his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peaceplan, including the meeting in Madrid.
Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript, at 29-31, 40.
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Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office,’ and
the Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtimepolling firm to craft a draft
poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik, and worked
with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions.*°° The primer sentto the pollsters specifically
called for the United States and President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic of Donbas
with Yanukovych as Prime Minister,”*! and a series of questionsin the draft poll asked for opinions
on Yanukovych’s role in resolving the conflict in Donbas.° (The poll was not solely about
Donbas; it also sought participants’ views on leaders apart from Yanukovychas they pertained to
the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.)
The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to
the attention of the Trump Campaignor the Trump Administration. Kilimnik continued his efforts
to promotethe peaceplan to the Executive Branch(e.g., U.S. Departmentof State) into the summer
of 2018.9%
B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts
Trump waselected President on November 8, 2016. Beginning immediately after the

election, individuals connected to the Russian government started contacting officials on the
Trump Campaign andTransition Team through multiple channels—sometimes through Russian
AmbassadorKislyak andat other times through individuals who soughtreliable contacts through
U.S. personsnot formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The mostseniorlevels of the
Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did not establish that these efforts
reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump Campaign and Russia in its election-
interference activities.
1. Immediate Post-Election Activity
As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President, Russian government
officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
Administration. They appeared not to have preexisting contacts and struggled to connect with
seniorofficials around the President-Elect. As explained below,those efforts entailed both official
contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches—sanctioned at high
levels of the Russian government—throughbusinessrather than political contacts.
%59 Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov’t Opp. to Mot. to Modify, at 2; Superseding Indictment {J 48-51,
United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), Doc. 318.
96 9/12/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort & Ward; 2/16/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort, 2/19/18
Email, Fabrizio to Ward; 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio.
961 9/91/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio (7:16:49 a.m.) (attachment).
982 3/9/18 Email, Ward to Manafort & Fabrizio (attachment).
963
144
a. Outreach from the Russian Government
At approximately 3 a.m. on election night, Trump Campaignpress secretary Hope Hicks

received a telephonecall on her personalcell phone from a person who soundedforeign but was
calling from a number with a DC area code.Although Hicks had a hard time understandingthe
person, she could make out the words “Putin call.”°Hicks told the caller to send her an email.?%
The following morning, on November9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian
Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line,
“Message from Putin.”**? Attached to the email was a message from Putin, in both English and
Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to conveyto the President-Elect.”In the message, Putin
offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he “look[ed] forward to
working with [Trump] on leading Russian-Americanrelations out of crisis.”°°
Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, “Can you look into this? Don’t want to get
duped but don’t want to blow off Putin!”?” Kushner stated in Congressional testimony that he
believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the
Russian Ambassador, whom Kushnerhad previously met in April 2016.°”! Unableto recall the
Russian Ambassador’s name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted
previously about Russia, see VolumeI, Section IV.A.4, supra, and asked, “What is the name of
Russian ambassador?’ Kushner forwarded Simes’s response—which identified Kislyak by
name—to Hicks.” After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned, Hicks conveyed
Putin’s letter to transition officials.?” Five days later, on November 14, 2016, Trump and Putin
spoke by phone in the presence of Transition Team members, including incoming National
Security Advisor Michael Flynn.?”
964 Hicks 12/8/17 302,at 3.

9 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3.
966 Hicks 12/8/17 302,at 3.
67 NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)).
968 NOSC00044381-82 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)).
969 NOSC00044382 (11/9/16 Letter from Putin to President-Elect Trump (Nov. 9, 2016)
(translation)).
9 NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Hicks to Kushner (10:26 a.m.)).
7! Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017).
9 NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (10:28 a.m.)); Statement of Jared Kushner
to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017).
973 NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Hicks (11:05:44 a.m.)).
4 Hicks 12/8/17 302,at 3-4.
75 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-10; see Doug G. Ware, Trump, Russia’s Putin Talk about Syria, Icy
Relations in Phone Call, UPI (Nov. 14, 2016).
145
b. High-Level Encouragementof Contacts through Alternative Channels
AsRussianofficials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team, a
number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make
contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia’s largest commercial bank,
described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might accountfor the
flurry of Russian activity.?”
Aventold the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who
regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as “oligarchs.”?””
Aventold the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter
(Q4) of 2016, shortly after the U.S. presidential election.°”* Aven said that he took these meetings
seriously and understood that any suggestionsor critiques that Putin made during these meetings
were implicit directives, and that there would be consequences for Aven if he did not follow
through.?”Aswastypical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting
with Putin’s chief of staff, Anton Vaino.?®°
According to Aven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,”®! Putin raised the
prospectthat the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russianinterests, including
sanctions against Aven and/or Alfa-Bank.”? Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to
protect himself and Alfa-Bank.®? Avenalsotestified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by
the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration.°*
According to Aven, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and
generally did not know the people around the President-Elect.”*
°76 Aven provided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer,
977 Aven 8/2/18 302,at7.
°? Aven 8/2/18 302, at 2-3.

i and interview with the Office,
Avenreferred to the high-ranking Russian governmentofficials using numbers(e.g., Official 1, Official 2).
Aven separately confirmed through an attorney proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin’s
chief of staff, Vaino. See Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug. 2, 2018) (hard copyonfile).
°8! At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin, Aven was generally aware ofthe press coverage
about Russian interferencein the U.S. election. According to Aven,he did notdiscuss that topic with Putin
at any point, and Putin did not mention the rationale behind the threat of new sanctions. Aven 8/2/18 302,
at 5-7.
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Aven a told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank
shareholders from potential sanctions, and one of those steps would beto try to reach out to the
incoming Administration to establish a line of communication.®° Aven described Putin
responding with skepticism about Aven’s prospect for success.”*” According to Aven, although
Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood
that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised.°8* Aven’s efforts are
described in VolumeI, Section IV.B.5, infra.
2. Kirill Dmitriev’s Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration
Aven’s description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behaviorof Kirill
Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia’s sovereign wealth fund andis closely connected
to Putin. Dmitriev undertookefforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in
the monthsafterthe election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who workedfor the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trumptransition officials,
and Nadereventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a
Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon.”*In addition, the UAE national
security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund managerand friend of Jared Kushner, Rick
Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson
worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev
implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the
inauguration, and Kushnerlater gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
a. Background
Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund,
the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), whenit was founded in 2011.7 Dmitriev reported
directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his “boss.”””!
RDIFhas co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds.””? Dmitriev
regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed
2 eee
ven 8/2/18 302,a +5
°89 Nader provided information to the Office in multiple interviews, all but one of which were
conducted under a proffer agreement . The
investigators also interviewed Prince under a proffer agreement. Bannon wasinterviewed by the Office,
Jury under a proffer agreement.
990 Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at
https://rdif.ru/Eng_person_dmitriev_kirill/. See also Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund,available
at https://rdif.ru/Eng_About/.
591 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. See also, e.g., 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17
Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
147
US. Department ofJustice
AtterneyWerkPreduet // Protected
(Crown Prince Mohammed), in connection with RDIF’s dealings with the UAE.Putin wanted
Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial andthepolitical relationship between Russia and the
Gulfstates, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently.
Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin’s interlocutor in the Gulf region, and would relay
Dmitriev’s viewsdirectly to Crown Prince Mohammed.?*
Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns during the 2016 election,
and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so.° According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his
and the government of Russia’s preference was for candidate Trump to win, and asked Naderto
assist him in meeting members of the Trump Campaign.”””
Nader did not
introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the Trump Campaignbefore the election. 999
Erik Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated
with the Trump Campaign, including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone.!°°
Prince did not have a formalrole in the Campaign,although he offered to host a fundraiser for
°°3 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2; Nader 1/23/18 302, at 2-3; 5/3/16 Email, Nader to Phares; pS
94 Nader 1/22/18 302,at 1-2.
°5 Nader 1/22/18 302,at 3.

Nader 122/18 302, 5
9 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3.
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1-5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.
148
Work-Preduet // Protected
Trump andsent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian
election interference to Bannon.!0% ,
After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at Trump Tower, primarily
to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn and others.'°°? Prince and Bannon
would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy issues and Prince’s recommendations regarding who
should be appointedto fill key national security positions.!°°8 Although Prince was not formall
affiliated with the transition, Nader received assurances CEE
that the incoming Administration considered Prince a trusted associate. !°
b. Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration
Soon after midnight on election night, Dmitriev messaged

who wastraveling to New York to attend the 201 Chess Championship.
Dmitry Peskov, the
1010
Russian Federation’s press secretary, who was also attending the World Chess Championship.
At approximately 2:40 a.m. on November 9, 2016, news reports stated that candidate
Clinton had called President-Elect Trump to concede. At
wrote to Dmitriev, “Putin has won.”
1006 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16
Email, Prince to Bannon.
1007 Flynn 11/20/17 302,at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 5; Flynn 1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302,
at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo.
1008 Drince 4/4/18 302, at 5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.
A 820823, «5
149
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Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who wasin New York,to request a meeting
with the “key people” in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the “[g]reat
results.”!°!© He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that “we want to start
rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. We understandall of the
sensitivities and are not in a rush.”!°!7 Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed Nader
introducing him to the contacts Nader had madewithin the Trump Campaign.'°'* Dmitriev also
told Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States, where he would
be able to speak to mediaoutlets about the positive impact of Trump’s election and the need for
reconciliation between the United States and Russia.!°”
Later that day, Dmitriev flew to New York, where Peskov wasseparately traveling to
attend the chess tournament.!° Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and
noted that, if there was “a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp,” he “would love to start
building for the future.”'°?! Dmitriev also asked Naderto invite Kushner to the event so that he
(Dmitriev) could meet him.!°? Nader did not pass along Dmitriev’s invitation to anyone
connected with the incoming Administration.Although one World Chess Federation official
recalled hearing from anattendee that President-Elect Trump had stopped by the tournament, the
investigation did not establish that Trump or any Campaign or Transition Team official attended
the event.!°4 Andthe President’s written answers denied that he had.!75
Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with transition
officials, and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr.!°6 Dmitriev told Nader that
1027
1016 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (9:34 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302,at 4.
1017 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:58 p.m.).
1018 Nader 1/22/18 302,at 3.
1019 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:06 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to
Nader (10:10 a.m.);
1020 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:08 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to
Nader(3:40 p.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5.
1021 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader(7:10 p.m.).
1022 11/10/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (5:20 a.m.).
13 Nader 1/22/18 302,at 5-6.
1024 Marinello 5/31/18 302, at 2-3; Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6.
1025 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.20, 2018), at 17-18 (Response to Question V,
Part (a).
gO
150
Work // Protected
May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crimt P60)
1028
According to Nader, Dmitriev was very

anxious to connect with the incoming Administration and told Nader that he would try other routes
to do so besides Nader himself.!°° Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone
associated with the incoming Administration during Dmitriev’s post-election trip to New York,!03!
In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming
Administration officials with Nader in January or February.'? Dmitriev sent Nadera list of
publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump “in case they
[were] helpful.’!°3
c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles
i, George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev
Nadertraveled to New Yorkin early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings
with Erik Prince on January 3, 2017.19 Nader and Prince discussed Dmitriev.'°° Nader
informed Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link with the incoming Trump
Administration. !°°° Jury he told Prince that Dmitriev had been pushing Nader to
introduce him to someone from the incoming Administration EE
po SS Nadersuggested,in light of Prince’s
relationship with Transition Team officials, that Prince and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of
mutual concern, !°78 Prince told Nader
that he needed to think further about it and to check with Transition Team officials. 1°
After his dinner with Prince, Nadersent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev,
and sent Dmitriev a messagestating that he had just met “with some key people within the family
and innercircle”—a reference to Prince—andthat he had spoken at length and positively about
1028
1029
1030 Nader 1/22/18 302,at6.

1031 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-7.
1032 19/8/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31 a.m.); Nader1/22/18 302,at 11.
1033 19/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31 a.m.); 12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to
Nader (12:10:57 a.m.).
1034 Prince 4/4/18 302,at 8.
1035 prince 5/3/18 302, at 3;
1036
1037
1038
1039
151
Attorney-WerkPreduet // Proteeted
May-Contei Materi l Fed R-Crimt P-
Dmitriev.!° Nader told Dmitriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev’s bio, and
Dmitriev replied that he would update and send it.!°4! Naderlater received from Dmitriev two
files concerning Dmitriev: one was a two-page biography, and the other wasa list of Dmitriev’s
positive quotes about Donald Trump.!*
The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him
to Prince,!3 Nader wrote to Prince that these documents werethe versions “to be used with some
additional details for them” (with “them” referring to members of the incoming
Administration).!* Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour ofreceiving
them.!°* Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day, he spoke with Kellyanne
Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while waiting to see Bannon.!°*° Cell-site
location data for Prince’s mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Towerfor
approximately three hours.!°4” Prince said that he could not recall whether, during those three
hours, he met with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him,!°*8
Prince booked ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017.'°%° The following day, Nader
wrote to Dmitriev that he had a “pleasant surprise” for him, namely that he had arranged for
Dmitriev to meet “a Special Guest” from “the New Team,”referring to Prince.!°°! Nader asked
Dmitriev if he could cometo the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev
agreed, 102
The following day, Dmitriev sought assurance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting
would be worthwhile.!°°3 SADicey was not enthusiastic about the idea of
meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming
1040 1/4/17 Text Message, Nader to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (5:24 a.m. —
5:26 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at :-: EL
1041 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (7:24:27 a.m.).
1082 1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:25-7:29 a.m.)
1043 1/4/17 Text Messages, Naderto Prince.
1044 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Domeqerand Jury
1045 Drince 5/3/18 302, at 1-3.
1046 Prince 5/3/18 302,at 2-3.
147 Cell-site location data for Prince’s mobile Mumginvestigative Technique
1048 Prince 5/3/18 302,at 3.
1050 1/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince.

1051 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05 — 6:10 p.m.).
1052 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (6:10 — 7:27 p.m.).
1053 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.
152
Administration.'°* Nader wrote to Dmitriev, “This guy [Prince] is designated by Steve [Bannon]
to meet you! I know him andheis very very well connected andtrusted by the New Team. His
sister is now a Minister of Education.”!° According to Nader, Prince had led him to believe that
Bannon wasawareof Prince’s upcoming meeting with Dmitriev, and Prince acknowledgedthatit
was fair for Nader to think that Prince would pass information on to the Transition Team.!%°6
Bannon, however, told the Office that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting
with Dmitriev.!°7
ii, The Seychelles Meetings
Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017, and checked into the
Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed and Naderwere staying.!°°* Prince arrived
that same day.!°® Prince and Dmitriev met for thefirst time that afternoon in Nader’s villa, with
Nader present.!°Theinitial meeting lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. '0°!
Prince described the eight

years of the Obama Administration in negative terms, and stated that he was looking forward to a
new era of cooperation and conflict resolution.'°° According to Prince, he told Dmitriev that
Bannon waseffective if not conventional, and that Prince provided policy papers to Bannon. 1064
055 1/9/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (2:12:56 p.m.); Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13;
1056 Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13; IPrince 5/3/18 302, at 3.

1057 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 25-26.
1058 1/10/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (2:05:54 — 3:30:25 p.m.); 1/11/17 Text Messages,
Dmitriev & Nader (2:16:16 — 5:17:59 p.m.).
1959 1/7/17 Email, Kasboto Prince.
1060 1/11/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (5:18:24 — 5:37:14 p.m.); Cee
"rine 59/1830, cr
1064 Prince 5/3/18 302,at4.
153
topic of Russian interference in the 2016 election did not come up.
Prince added that he would inform Bannon about his meeting with Dmitriev, and that if there was
interest in continuing the discussion, Bannon or someoneelse on the Transition Team would do
Afterwards, Prince returned to his room, where he learned that a Russian aircraft carrier
had sailed to Libya, which led him to call Nader and ask him to set up another meeting with
Dmitriev.!°According to Nader, Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back
home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was “off the table.”!°" Nader wrote to
Dmitriev that Prince had “received an urgent messagethat he needsto convey to you immediately,”
and arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons
property, 1075
At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitriev that the United States could not accept an
Russian involvementin Libya because it would makethe situation there much worse. '°”
1066
1067
1068
1069 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4-5.

1070
1071 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4;

1072
1973 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4; SSIES

Nader 1/20/18 30, st 14;
1a Ce 1/11/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (9:13:54 —
10:24:25 p.m.).
1076
Prince,
however, denied that and recalled that he was making these remarks to Dmitriev notin an official capacity
for the transition but based on his experience as a former navalofficer. Prince 5/3/18 302,at 4.
154
May-Conti
Attorney-WeorkProduet // Protected Materi l Fed R-Crim- P62)
After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had
transpired.!°78 Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two
reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more
authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had.'°Second, he had hoped to have
a discussion of greater substance, such as outlining a strategic roadmap for both countries to
follow.!°° Dmitriev told Nader that Prince’s comments
were insulting
1081
Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the
Seychelles! As described further below,investigators were unableto obtain the content ofthese
or other messages between Prince and Bannon,andthe investigation also did notidentify evidence
of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles.
iii. Erik Prince’s Meeting with Steve Bannonafter the Seychelles Trip
After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannonabouthis
discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was
interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration.'°*? On January 12, 2017,
Prince contacted Bannon’s personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week.’
Several dayslater, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon’s schedule. !°8
Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon’s homeafter returning to the United States in
mid-January and briefed him aboutseveraltopics,including his meeting with Dmitriev.'°8° Prince
told the Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign
wealth fund and wasinterested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.'°87
Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot of Dmitriev’s Wikipedia page dated January 16, 2017,
We Nader 1/2/18 302, st 15; Sa
1089 Nader 1/22/18 302,at 15.
+I Nie1/2218 302,a1,
1082 Call Records ofErik meacrand Jury
1983 Prince 4/4/18 302,at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302,at 4; IIIA
1084 1/12/17 Text Messages, Prince to Preate.
1085 1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate.
1086 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302,at 5.
1087 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.
155
Attorney-WeorkPreduet // Protected
and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon.!*8 Prince also believed he
provided Bannonwith Dmitriev’s contact information.!°® According to Prince, Bannoninstructed
Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a
priority for Bannon.’ Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively
uninterested. 1°?!
Bannon,bycontrast, told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding
Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin.!°%?
Bannonalso stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have rememberedit,
and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place.!°¥
The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently
clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one wasable to produce any ofthe
messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince’s phone
contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and
Bannon exchanged dozensof messages.!°"* Prince denied deleting any messagesbutclaimed he
did not know why there were no messageson his device before March 2017.!°° Bannon’s devices
similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannonalso stated he did not
know why messagesdid not appear on his device.!°° Bannontold the Office that, during both the
months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and
personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no
steps to preserve these work communications.!°7
d. Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.-

Russia Relations
Dmitriev’s contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by
Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced
Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York.!°%8
Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump
188 Prince 5/3/18 302,at 5; 1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone(onfile with the Office).
1089 Prince 5/3/18 302,at 5.
1°Prince 5/3/18 302,at 5.
'°! Prince 5/3/18 302,at 5.
1092 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.
13 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.
'0°4 Call Recordsof Erik Prince i

1095 Drince 4/4/18 302, at 6.
1096 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 36.
157 Bannon 10/26/18 302,at 11.
1098 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1, 3; 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/25/17 Text Message,
Dmitriev to Nader.
156
Atterney-Work // Protected
Campaign other than occasional casual discussions about the Campaign with Kushner.” After
the election, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transition officials with
former UK prime minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed.!!°
When Dmitriev and Gerson met, they principally discussed potential joint ventures
between Gerson’s hedge fund and RDIF.'!°! Dmitriev was interested in improved economic
cooperation between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in
the incoming Administration who would be helpful towardsthis goal.!'°? Gerson replied that he
would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that
confidentiality would be required because ofthesensitivity of holding such meetings before the
new Administration took power, and before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the
Senate.!!°3 Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn whothe “key person or people”
were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economic matters.!!4
Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a
reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. He noted in a text message to Gerson
that if Russia was “approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can
have Major Breakthroughs quickly.”'!®> Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016
about what such a reconciliation plan would include.!'®° Gerson told the Office that the Transition
Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev, and that he did so on his
owninitiative and asa private citizen.!!°”
On January 9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be
worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could “share it with Jared
(or somebodyelse very senior in the team) — so that they know that we are focused from our side
on improving the relationship and my boss asked meto play a keyrole in that.”!!°8 Dmitriev also
asked Gerson if he knew Prince, and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time
1099 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1.

1109 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 21.
1101 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3-4; see, e.g., 12/2/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 12/14/16 Text
Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 1/3/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 12/2/16 Email, Tolokonnikov to
Gerson.
"02 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.

1103 12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.
"04 19/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.
1105 19/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1.
106 19/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.
107 Gerson 6/15/18 302,at 1.
1108 1/9/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.
157
MeyContai Materi l Fed R-Crint 26 )
with.!!After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to
meet with Dmitriev andthat the two had hada positive meeting.!!°
On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that
he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page documentthat listed five main points: (1)
jointly fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; (3)
developing “win-win” economic and investmentinitiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and
continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring proper communication and
trust by “key people” from each country.'!!! On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the
document to Kushner.'''? Kushnerhad not heard of Dmitriev at that time.''!3 Gerson explained
that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev’s being well
connected.'!'4 Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right
people.!!'5 Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex
Tillerson; according to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it.!!! On
January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document,telling him that this was
“a view from our side that J discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our
friends. Please share with them — webelievethis is a good foundationto start from.”!!!7
Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering
it.'8 On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his “boss”—an apparent reference to
Putin—wasaskingif there had been any feedback on the proposal.!!!° Dmitriev said, “[w]e do
not want to rush things and moveat a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to
try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeksif possible.”!'2° He informed Gerson that
Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and notedthat that information
was“very confidential.”!!7!
The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his “boss” again yesterday who
had “emphasizedthatthis is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication
1109 Gerson 6/5/18 302,at 4.

4110 1/18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.
‘111 1/16/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.
112 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2.
‘3 Gerson 6/5/18 302,at 3.
114 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 22.
"15 Gerson 6/5/18 302,at 3.
"16 Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 32.
17 1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:11:56 a.m.).
1118 1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302,at 2.
1119 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
129 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
‘121 1/96/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
158
May-Conti Materil Fed R-Crint P6fe)
channel to avoid bureaucracy.”!!?? On January 28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Naderthat he wanted
“to see if I can confirm to my bossthat your friends may use someof the ideas from the 2 pagerI
sent you in the telephonecall that will happen at 12 EST,”!3 an apparentreference to the call
scheduled between President Trumpand Putin. Nader replied, “Definitely paper was so submitted
to Team by Rick and me. They tookit seriously!”!!*4 After the call between President Trump and
Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that “the call went very well. My boss wants me to
continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and
important.”!!25 Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev
replied that the document they had drafted together “played an importantrole.”!!”
Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately
March 2017, when the investment deal they had been working on together showed no signs of
progressing.!!27
3. Ambassador Kislyak’s Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in

Trump Tower Following the Election
On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to Kushner, received a

request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.!!28 That same day, Vargas sent
Kushner an email with the subject, “MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey
Ivanovich Kislyak ....”!!?° The text of the email read, “RE:setting up a time to meet w/you on
12/1. LMK how to proceed.” Kushnerrespondedin relevantpart, “I think I do this one -- confirm
with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] thatthis is the right guy.”!° After reaching out to a colleague of
Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushnerthat Kislyak was “the best go-to guy for routine
matters in the US,” while Yuri Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for
“more direct/substantial matters.”!!3!
Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previouslytried to transmit
to candidate Trumpan invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, see VolumeI, Section
IV.A.1.d.ii, supra, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. According to
1122 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:04:41 p.m.).

1124 1/28/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (11:11:33 a.m.).
1126 1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
127 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 4; 3/21/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.
128 StatementofJared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees (“Kushner Stmt.”), at 6 (7/24/17)
(written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee).
129 NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (6:44 p.m.)).
139 NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Kushnerto Vargas (9:54 p.m.)).
‘131 11/17/16 Email, Brown to Simes (10:41 a.m.); Brown 10/13/17 302, at 4; 11/17/16 Email,
Vargas to Kushner (12:31:18).
159
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Foresman,at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor
Michael Flynn and his designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman
for his thoughts on Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that, while Kislyak was
an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to Putin.!3? Foresman subsequently
traveled to Moscow,inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from
that source that Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security
advisor.''33 Foresman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake that inquiry in
Russia but told the Office that he nonetheless felt obligated to report the information back to Flynn,
and that he worked to get a face-to-face meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do
so.''34 Email correspondencesuggests that the meeting ultimately went forward,!'5 but Flynn has
no recollection ofit or of the earlier December meeting.''3° (The investigation did not identify
evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakovafter being given his name.!'5’)
In the meantime, although he had already formed the impression that Kislyak was not
necessarily the right point of contact,!!°* Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had
requested on November 16. It took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016.'9 At
Kushner’s invitation, Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend.!!“° During the
meeting, which lasted approximately 30 minutes, Kushner expressed a desire on the part of the
incoming Administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russian relations.'4! Kushner also asked
Kislyakto identify the best person (whether Kislyak or someone else) with whom to direct future
discussions—someone whohadcontact with Putin and the ability to speak for him.!!
The three men also discussed U.S. policy toward Syria, and Kislyak floated the idea of
having Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure communications
line.!!3 After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in the Transition Team offices,
1132 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17.

1133 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17-18.
1134 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 18.
"35 RMF-SCO-00000015 (1/5/17 Email, Foresman to Atencio & Flaherty); RMF-SCO-00000015
(1/5/17 Email, Flaherty to Foresman & Atencio).
1136 9/96/18 Attorney Proffer from Covington & Burling LLP (reflected in email on file with the
Office).
1137 Vargas 4/4/18 302,at 5.
1138 Kushner 11/1/17 302,at4.
39 AKINGUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000016-019 (11/29/16 Email, Vargas to Kuznetsov).
140 Fiynn 1/11/18 302, at 2, NOS00004240(CalendarInvite, Vargas to Kushner & Flynn).
141 Kushner Stmt. at 6.
142 Kushner Stmt. at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 18.
"43 Kushner Stmt. at 7; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2.
160
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Kushner asked Kislyak if they could communicate using secure facilities at the Russian
Embassy.!!#4 Kislyak quickly rejected that idea.'!45
4, Jared Kushner’s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov
On December6, 2016, the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner’s assistant to set up a
second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner.'!#° Kushner declined several proposed meeting
dates, but Kushner’s assistant indicated that Kislyak was very insistent about securing a second
meeting.!!“7 Kushnertold the Office that he did not want to take another meeting because he had
already decided Kislyak was not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia, so he
arranged to haveoneofhisassistants, Avi Berkowitz, meet with Kislyakin his stead.'4* Although
embassy official Sergey Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it “important” to
“continue the conversation with Mr. Kushnerin person,”!!4? Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet
instead with Berkowitz once it became apparent that Kushner wasunlikely to take a meeting.
Berkowitz met with Kislyak on December 12, 2016, at Trump Tower.'!°° The meeting
lasted only a few minutes, during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet
someone who had a direct line to Putin: Sergey Gorkov, the head of the Russian-government-
owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB).
Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov.!!°! The one-on-one meeting tookplacethe next day,
December13, 2016, at the Colony Capital building in Manhattan, where Kushner had previously
scheduled meetings.!5? VEB was (andis) the subject of Department of Treasury economic
sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.'!5? Kushnerdid not, however,
recall any discussion during his meeting with Gorkov aboutthe sanctions against VEBor sanctions
more generally.!'*4 Kushner stated in an interview that he did not engage in any preparation for
144 Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 18.

45 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18.
146 Kushner Stmt. at 7; NOSC00000123 (12/6/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner(12:11:40 p.m.)).
147 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (10:41
p-m.)).
M48 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; Kushner Stmt. at 7; DJTFP_SCO_01442290 (12/6/16 Email,
Berkowitz to
'49 DITEP_SCO_01442290 (12/7/16 EmailTT] to Berkowitz (12:31:39 p.m.)).
150 Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 7; AKIN_-GUMP_BERKOWITZ_000001-04 (12/12/16 Text
Messages, Berkowitz & 202-701-8532).
151 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz).
1152 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushnerto Berkowitz).
1133 Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and Energy
Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine's
Sovereignty, United States Department of the Treasury (Jul. 16, 2014),
1154 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 20.
161
the meeting and that no one on the Transition Team even did a Google search for
Gorkov’s name.!!9>
At the start of the meeting, Gorkov presented Kushner with twogifts: a painting and a bag
ofsoil from the town in Belarus where Kushner’s family originated.'!°°
The accounts from Kushner and Gorkov differ as to whether the meeting was diplomatic
or business in nature. Kushner told the Office that the meeting was diplomatic, with Gorkov
expressing disappointment with U.S.-Russia relations under President Obama and hopes for
improvedrelations with the incoming Administration.''°’ According to Kushner, although Gorkov
told Kushnera little bit about his bank and made somestatements about the Russian economy,the
two did not discuss Kushner’s companiesorprivate business dealingsof any kind.'!** (Atthe time
of the meeting, Kushner Companieshad a debt obligation coming due onthe building it ownedat
666 Fifth Avenue, andthere had beenpublic reporting both about efforts to secure lending on the
property and possible conflicts of interest for Kushnerarising out of his company’s borrowing
from foreign lenders.!'*’)
In contrast, in a 2017 public statement, VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in
Kushner’s capacity as CEO of Kushner Companiesfor the purpose ofdiscussing business, rather
than as part of a diplomatic effort. In particular, VEB characterized Gorkov’s meeting with
Kushneraspart of a series of “roadshow meetings” with “representatives of major US banks and
business circles,” which included “negotiations” and discussion of the “most promising business
lines and sectors,”!!®
Foresman, the investment bank executive mentioned in VolumeI, Sections IV.A.1 and
IV.B.3, supra, told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deputy chairman Nikolay
Tsekhomsky in Moscow just before Gorkovleft for New York to meet Kushner.''6! Accordingto
Foresman, Gorkov and Tsekhomskytold him that they were traveling to New Yorkto discuss post-
election issues with U.S. financial institutions, that their trip was sanctioned by Putin, and that they
would be reporting backto Putin upontheir return.!!
"55 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19. Berkowitz, by contrast, stated to the Office that he had googled
Gorkov’s name and told Kushner that Gorkov appeared to be a banker. Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 8.
"56 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19-20.
57 Kushner Stmt.at 8.
1158 KushnerStmt.at 8.
15 See, e.g., Peter Grant, Donald Trump Son-in-Law Jared Kushner Could Face His Own Conflict-
of-Interest Questions, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 29, 2016).
116Datrick Reevell & Matthew Mosk, Russian Banker Sergey Gorkov Brushes offQuestions About
Meeting with Jared Kushner, ABC News (June 1, 2017).
161 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 14-15.
1162 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 15-16.
162
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The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and
Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushnerstated), focused
on business (as VEB’s public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of
those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did notidentify evidence that Kushner
and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-upafter the meeting.
Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov’s assistant texted Kushner’s assistant, “Hi,
please inform yourside that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!””!'®
Overthe following weeks, the twoassistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts.!!
On February 8, 2017, Gorkov’s assistant texted Kushner’s assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up
another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed."!®> According
to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding
the Russia investigation, and did nottell Kushner about the meeting request.!!%
5. Petr Aven’s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team
In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in VolumeI,
Section IV.B.1.b, supra, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate “all-hands” oligarch
meeting between Putin and Russia’s most prominent businessmen.'!®” As in Aven’s one-on-one
meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 wasthe prospect of
forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions.!!8
After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish a connection to the
Trump team. Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump
Administration. Burt was on the boardof directors for LetterOne (L1), another company headed
by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank.'! Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador
to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one ofhis
primary roles with Alfa-Bank and L1 wasto facilitate introductions to business contacts in the
United States and other Western countries.!!”°
While at a L1 board meeting held in Luxembourgin late December 2016, Aven pulled Burt
aside and told him that he had spoken to someonehigh in the Russian government who expressed
"63 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011 (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz

(9:56 a.m.)).
164 AKINGUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011-15 (12/19/16 — 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko
& Berkowitz).
"65 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000015 (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz
(10:41 a.m.)).
66 Berkowitz 3/22/18 302, at 4-5.
9Aven 208 302, 7

0I 8sen 82/18 302, at 6
1? nn) Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2.
163
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interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition
Team.!!7! Avenasked for Burt’s help in contacting membersofthe Transition Team.!!? Although
Burt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past, Burt viewed Aven’s
request as unusualand outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven.!!3
Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at VolumeI, Section IV.A.4,
supra),!'™ decided to approach CNIpresident Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven’s request,
recalling that Simes had somerelationship with Kushner.!'> Atthe time, Simes was lobbying the
TrumpTransition Team, on Burt’s behalf, to appoint Burt U.S. ambassadorto Russia.’!”°
Burt contacted Simes by telephone and askedif he could arrange a meeting with Kushner
to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming
Administration.'!77 Simes told the Office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such
a channel wasnot a goodideain light of the media attention surrounding Russian influencein the
U.S. presidential election.!!8 According to Simes, he understood that Burt was seeking a secret
channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian
governmentand the incoming Administration.!!” Based on what Simeshad read in the media, he
stated that he already had concerns that Trump’s business connections could be exploited by
Russia, and Simessaid that he did not want CNI to have any involvementor apparent involvement
in facilitating any connection.!!®°
In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with
Simes:
Througha trusted third party, I have reached outto the very influential person I mentioned
in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the
needto establish such a channel. Butthe individual emphasized that at this moment, with
so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber-hacking
(and who ordered what), Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to
discuss it again after the New Year. trust the individual’s instincts on this.
"73 Burt 2/9/18 302,at 4.

174 Burt 2/9/18 302,at 5.
475 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.
476 Burt 2/9/18 302,at 3.
1177 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302,at 4.
78 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302,at 4.
"79 Simes 3/27/18 302,at 5.
1180 Simes 3/27/18 302,at 5.
164
If this is unclear or you would like to discuss, don’t hesitateto call.11*!
According to Burt, the “very influential person” referenced in his email was Simes, and the
reference to a “trusted third party” wasa fabrication, as no such third party existed. “Project A”
was a term that Burt created for Aven’s effort to help establish a communications channel between
Russia and the Trump team,which he usedin light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was
requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia’s influence in the U.S. presidential
election.!!8? According to Burt, his report that there was “interest” in a communications channel
reflected Simes’s views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt
acknowledged that he added some “hype”to that sentence to makeit sound like there was more
interest from the Transition Team than mayhaveactually existed.''®
Avenreplied to Burt’s email on the same day, saying “Thank you. All clear.”!!*4
According to Aven,this statementindicated that he did not wantthe outreach to continue.'!®> Burt
spoke to Aven sometime thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trump team,
explaining to Aven that the current environment made it impossible, aT
186 Burt did not recall discussing Aven’s request with Simes again, nor did
he recall speaking to anyoneelse about the request.''87
In thefirst quarter of 2017, Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials.!'®* At
wascokts ar
that meeting, Putin asked about Aven’s attempt to build relations with the Trum| Administration,
1199 Putin continued to inquire about Aven’s efforts to connect to the Trump
Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings.!!*!
Avenalso told Putin’s chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed bythe FBI.'!? As part
of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked
to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration.''”?
"8! 12/22/16 Email, Burt to Aven (7:23 p.m.).

1182 Burt 2/9/18 302,at 3.
"8 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.
184 19/22/16 Email, Aven to Burt (4:58:22 p.m.).
1185 Aven 8/2/18 302,at 7.
"187 Burt 2/9/18 302,at 3-4.
8082/18 302,07
1192 Aven 8/2/18 302,at 8.
aven 8/2/18 302, t 5
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According to Aven,the official showed no emotion in responseto this report and did not appear
to care.!1%4
6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich
In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump
Campaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page again visited Moscow in_an
attempt to pursue business opportunities.!'
According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort’s

associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his
connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort,
Kilimnik wrote, “Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to
Russia on behalf of DT on a rangeofissues of mutualinterest, including Ukraine.”!!°”
On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and
Andrej Krickovic.''"8 Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town
and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich cameto the restaurant
for a few minutes to meet with Page.''? Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump’s election and
expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia.!2°° Dvorkovich
asked Pageif he couldfacilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in thetransition
to begin a discussion of future cooperation.!2°!
ven 92/18 302,

1195 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302,at 3; Among
other meetings, Page contacted Andrey Baranov,headof investor relations at Rosneft, and they discussed
the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. Jury
1197
1198 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8.

"199 Weber7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302,at 3; [EDINA
1200 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; MIU
201 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; A
166
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Dvorkovich separately discussed working together in the future
7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn
Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn wasthe Transition Team’s primary
conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassadorand dealt with Russia on two sensitive
matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian
government’s reaction to the United States’s imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in
the 2016 election.'2°7 Despite Kushner’s conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside
the Russian government, the Transition Team turned to Flynn’s relationship with Kislyak on
both issues. As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to K.T. McFarland, his incoming deputy,
to prepare for his call to Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior
membersof the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lagoat the time. Althoughtransition officials at Mar-
a-Lago had someconcern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did
not identify evidencethat the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn
asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December29,
2016, and Kislyaklater reported to Flynn that Russia accededto that request.
a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements
On December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security
Council calling on Israel to cease settlementactivities in Palestinian territory.'°* The Security
Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day. 120
There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the
resolution. !2!°
1204
1205
1206
1207 Ag discussed further in VolumeI, Section V.C.4, infra, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false
statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, about these communications with Ambassador
Kislyak. Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc.
3. Flynn’s plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office, and the statements from Flynn in
this report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 2017 and 2018.
1208 Karen DeYoung, How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning Israeli
Settlements, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).
1209 Karen DeYoung, How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution CondemningIsraeli
Settlements, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).
1210 Michelle Nichols & Lesley Wroughton, U.S. Intended to Allow Passage of U.N. Draft Critical
ofIsrael, Reuters (Dec. 21, 2016).
167
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According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and
wanted to support Israel by opposingthe resolution.'?!! On December22, 2016, multiple members
of the Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government
officials to determinetheir views on the resolution andto rally support to delay the vote or defeat
the resolution.'!2. Kushnerled the effort for the Transition Team; Flynn wasresponsible for the
Russian government.!23 Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December
22, Flynncalled Kislyak.''* According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the
Transition Team’s oppositionto the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the
resolution.!2!5 Later that day, President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi about the vote.'?'® Ultimately, Egypt postponed the vote.!?!7
On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the
resolution.!2!8 Throughoutthe day, membersof the Transition Team continuedto talk with foreign
leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian
government through Kislyak.!2!? When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn
that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it.!22° The resolution later
passed 14-0, with the United States abstaining,!”2!
b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia
Flynn wasalso the Transition Team memberwhospokewith the Russian government when
the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President
Obamasigned Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and
211 Blynn 11/16/17 302, at 12; Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 2.

222 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 2.
213 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16
Email, Kushner to Flynn; 12/22/16 Email, McFarland tc Nee et al.
1214 Plynn 11/16/17 302, at 13; Call Records of MichaelT. lyn iii as.
'215 Statement of Offense J 3(d), United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.
1, 2017), Doc. 4 (“Flynn Statement of Offense”); Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-13.
1216 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13.
217 UN. Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed, “Potentially Indefinitely”, Reuters (Dec. 22, 2016).
1218 Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure Over Settlements,
New York Times (Dec. 23, 2016).
219 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/23/16 Email, Flynn to Kushneret
al.
1220 Flynn Statement of Offense § 3(g).
1221 Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International
Law,Security Council Reaffirms, 7853rd Meeting (PM), United Nations Security Council (Dec. 23, 2016).
168
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imposedsanctions on nine Russian individuals and entities.'22* On December29, 2016, the Obama
Administration also expelled 35 Russian government officials and closed two Russian
government-owned compoundsin the United States.'?”?
During the rollout of the sanctions, President-Elect Trump and multiple Transition Team
senior officials, including McFarland, Steve Bannon,and Reince Priebus, were staying at the Mar-
a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida. Flynn was on vacation in the Dominican Republic,'7* but
wasin daily contact with McFarland.!?5
The Transition Team and President-Elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions
would harm the United States’s relationship with Russia.'2° Although the details and timing of
sanctions were unknown on December 28, 2016, the media began reporting that retaliatory
measuresfrom the Obama Administration against Russia were forthcoming.'??” When asked about
imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election,
President-Elect Trump told the media, “I think we ought to get on with our lives,”!228
Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. On the evening of December 28,
2016, Kislyak texted Flynn,“can you kindly call me back at your convenience.”!””? Flynn did not
respond to the text message that evening. Someonefrom the Russian Embassyalso called Flynn
the next morning, at 10:38 a.m., but they did nottalk.'?°°
The sanctions were announced publicly on December29, 2016.'23! At 1:53 p.m.that day,
McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about
the impact the sanctions would haveon the incoming Administration.!?*? At 2:07 p.m., a Transition
Team membertexted Flynn a link to a New York Timesarticle about the sanctions.’*7 At 2:29
222 Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
1223 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
224 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 14; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 3-8; Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 5.
1225 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 1; McFarland 11/22/17 302, at 3-9.
1226 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3.
1227 Christine Wang, US to announce new sanctions against Russia in responseto election hacking,
CNBC (Dec. 28, 2016).
1228 John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: “Get on with our lives”,
Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
1229 SF000006 (12/28/16 Text Message, Kislyak to Flynn).
1230 Call Records of Michael T. FRamerand Jury
1231 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2-3; McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 4-5.
1232 19/29/16 Email, McFarland to O’Brienet al.; 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynnetal.
1233 $F000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flaherty to Flynn).
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p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they did nottalk.!2*4 Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon
discussed the sanctions.'?*° According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would
hurt their ability to have goodrelations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would makethings
more difficult.'!° McFarland believed she told Bannonthat Flynn wasscheduledto talk to Kislyak
later that night.!237 McFarland also believed she may havediscussed the sanctions with Priebus,
and likewise told him that Flynn wasscheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.'?°8 At 3:14 p.m.,
Flynn texted a Transition Team member who wasassisting McFarland, “Time for a call???”!”
The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a
Transition Team seniorofficial, to which Flynn responded,“Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian
AMBO reaching outto me today.””!”4
Flynnrecalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he
had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.'4' He first spoke with Michael Ledeen, '?” a Transition
Team member whoadvised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes.!
Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to
communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.!"* Onthat call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the
sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration’s foreign policy
goals.!*4° McFarland and Flynnalso discussed that Transition Team membersin Mar-a-Lago did
not want Russia to escalate the situation.!4° They both understood that Flynn would relay a
message to Kislyak in hopes of makingsure the situation would notget out of hand.'*7
234 Call Records of K.T. McFarland a

1235 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6.
1236 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 5-6.
1237 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 6.
1238 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 6.
1239 SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynnto Flaherty).
1240 SFQ00001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).
241 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3.
1242 Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate
Hillary Clinton’s missing emails are described in VolumeI, Section III.D.2, supra.
24Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3; Call Records of Michael Ledeen FER a
244 Flyin 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense 13(c); Call Records of K.T. McFarland
Jury Call Records of Michael T. Flynn .
245 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4

246 Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense { 3(c); McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 6-
247 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 6-7.
170
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Immediately after speaking with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak.!2“8
Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video
teleconference between President-Elect Trump and Putin, an upcomingterrorism conference, and
Russia’s views about the Middle East.'7? With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that
Russia notescalate the situation, not get into a “tit for tat,” and only respond to the sanctionsin a
reciprocal manner.!2°°
Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that
day. In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43 p.m., McFarland
sent an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group that “Gen
[F]lynnis talking to russian ambassador this evening.”!°! Less than an hour later, McFarland
briefed President-Elect Trump. Bannon,Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other Transition Team members
were present.!>? During the briefing, President-Elect Trump asked McFarlandif the Russians did
“it,” meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election.'%? McFarland said
yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.McFarland also
discussed potential Russian responses to the sanctions, and said Russia’s response would be an
indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward.!”°° President-Elect Trump opined that the
sanctions provided him with leverageto use with the Russians.McFarlandrecalled that at the
end of the meeting, someone may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was
speaking to the Russian ambassadorthat evening.|?°7
After the briefing, Flynn and McFarland spoke overthe phone.!?°* Flynn reported on the
substance ofhis call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions.’2°? According to
McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be
escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration.'?
McFarlandalso gave Flynn a summaryofherrecentbriefing with President-Elect Trump.'2°!
1248 Flynn Statement of Offense § 3(d).

249 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense { 3(c); 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to
McFarland.
1250 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1; Flynn Statementof Offense { 3(d).
1251 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn etal.
1252 12/29/16 Email, Westerhoutto Flaherty; McFarland 12/22/17 302,at7.
2253 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1254 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
55 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 7.

1256 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1257 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 7.
1258 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 7.
259 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; Flynn Statementof Offense { 3(e).
1260 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 8.
261 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 8.
171
The next day, December30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarkedthat
Russia would respondin kind to the sanctions.'2© Putin superseded that comment two hourslater,
releasing a statement that Russia would nottake retaliatory measures in responseto the sanctions
at that time.!?63 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, “Great move on delay (by V.
Putin).”!2Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizinghis call with
Kislyakfrom the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon,Priebus, and other Transition
Team members.'2°5 The text message and email did not include sanctions as oneof the topics
discussed with Kislyak.!*% Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of
sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration’s
foreign policy.!7°7
On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received
at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen notto retaliate to the sanctions in response to the
request.!6 Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with
Kislyak.! According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better
relationship and that the relationship was back on track.'2”" Flynn also told McFarland that he
believed his phone call had made a difference.!7"" McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in
response.'2” Flynn spoke with other Transition Team membersthat day, but does not recall
whether they discussed the sanctions.?7 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the
next day and that Bannonappeared to know about Flynn’s conversation with Kislyak.“ Bannon,
262 Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of
Russian diplomats, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
(Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.)).
1263 Statement of the Presidentof the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Office of the President (Dec.
30, 2016 (7:15 a.m,)).
264 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41 a.m.) Tweet.
1265 19/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushneretal.
1266 19/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushneretal.
2267 Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 4.
1268 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn a Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1;
Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense { 3(g).
26 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn I: Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 5;
Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.
270 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 10.
271 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.
2 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 10.
23 Elynn 11/17/17 302,at 5-6.
1274 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 5; Flynn Statement
of Offense 7 3(h).
172
AttorneyWorkPreduet // Protected-Under
for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said that he did not remember discussing
sanctions with him.!2”
Additional information about Flynn’s sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak, and the
handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration, is provided
in VolumeIIofthis report.
ORK
In sum,the investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaignofficials and

individuals tied to the Russian government. Those links included Russian offers of assistance to
the Campaign. In someinstances, the Campaign wasreceptiveto the offer, while in other instances
the Campaign officials shied away. Ultimately, the investigation did not establish that the
Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian governmentin its election-interference
activities.
275 Bannon 2/12/18 302,at 9.
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V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel’s Office “to prosecute federal
crimes arising from [its] investigation” of the matters assigned to it. In deciding whether to
exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal
Prosecution set forth in the Justice (formerly U.S. Attorney’s) Manual. In particular, the Office
has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a
federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probablybe sufficient to obtain and sustain
a conviction for such an offense. Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018). Where the answer to those
questionswasyes, the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial
federal interest, the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and
there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. Id.
As explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two sets of
Russian nationals for their roles in perpetrating the active-measures social media campaign and
computer-intrusion operations. EWMmmmrMenef Tire MET
The Office
similarly determined that the contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals
either did not involve the commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-finance
offenses, that our evidence wasnotsufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At the
same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution supported charging
certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making false statements or otherwise
obstructing this investigation or parallel congressional investigations.
A. Russian “Active Measures” Social Media Campaign
On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an
indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities—including the Internet
Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC (Concord)—with
violating U.S. criminal lawsin orderto interfere with U.S. elections andpolitical processes.'?”°
The indictment chargesall of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count
One), three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud (Count Two), and
five defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight). Internet Research
Agency Indictment. Concord, whichis one of the entities charged in the Count Oneconspiracy,
entered an appearancethrough U.S. counsel and movedto dismiss the charge on multiple grounds.
In orders and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district
court denied Concord’s motions to dismiss. United States v. Concord Management & Consulting
LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). United States v. Concord Management & Consulting
LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018). As of this writing, the prosecution of Concord remains
ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The other defendants remain
at large.
276 A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate
memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment.
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Although members of the IRA had contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump
Campaign, the indictment does not charge any Trump Campaignofficial or any other U.S. person
with participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not identify evidence
that any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he or she was
speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the criminal conspiracy. The Office therefore
determined that such persons did not have the knowledgeor criminal purpose required to charge
them in the conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One)or in the separate countalleging
a wire- and bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA andtwo individual Russian nationals (Count
Two).
The Office did, however, charge one U.S. nationalfor his role in supplying false or stolen
bank account numbers that allowed the IRA conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems
by circumventing those systems’ security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded
guilty, pursuant to a single-count information, to identity fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(a)(7) and (b)(1)(D). Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24
(D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2018), Doc. 10. The investigation did not establish that Pinedo was aware of the
identity of the IRA members who purchased bank account numbers from him. Pinedo’s sales of
account numbers enabled the IRA members to anonymouslyaccess a financial network through
which they transacted with U.S. persons and companies. See Gov’t Sent. Mem.at 3, United States
y. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018), Doc. 24. On October 10, 2018, Pinedo
wassentencedto six months of imprisonment,to be followed by six months of home confinement,
and was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service.
B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations
1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy
a. Background
On July 13, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbiareturned an indictment
charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various
U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC,and other U.S. persons,in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit
money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A
and 1956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of
U.S. persons andentities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election,in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count Eleven). Netyksho Indictment.” Asofthis writing,all 12
defendants remain at large.
The Netyksho indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with
others to hackinto the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to
interfere in the election. Netyksho Indictment J 2. The indictmentalso describes how, in staging
277 The Office provided a more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in
meetings with the Office of the Acting Attorney General before the indictment.
175
the releases, the defendants used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through
WikiLeaks. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that
the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. Netyksho Indictment 7 48. In addition, on
October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton
Campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation. Netyksho
Indictment § 49.
|(eeeraro UIE
b. Charging Decision As to GEMM TT Ee
EgHarm to Ongoing Matter
278 The Office also considered, but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing
and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National
Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover
“goods, wares, or merchandise,” and lower courts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to
tangible items since the Supreme Court’s decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). See
United States v. Yijia Zhang, 995 F, Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (collecting cases). One of those
post-Dowling decisions—United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)—specifically held that
the NSPA doesnot reach “a computer program in source code form,” even though that code was stored in
tangible items (7.e., a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Jd. at 1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the
Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) that “would ensure that
the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computeris prohibited in the same way theft
of physical items [is] protected.” S. Rep. 104-357, at 7 (1996). That sequence of events would makeit
difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute
“goods, wares, or merchandise” within the meaning of the NSPA.
176
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Work // Protected
EdaHarm to Ongoing Matter
1279 TAEVa mm Olare loli ate Mueelinela
178
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2. Potential Section 1030 Violation >,
See United States v.

Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the 1986 amendmentsto Section
1030 reflect Congress’s desire to reach “‘iintentional acts of unauthorized access—rather than
mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones’”) (quoting S. Rep. 99-432,at 5 (1986)). In addition, the
computer likely qualifies as a “protected” one underthe statute, which
reaches “effectively all computers with Internet access.” United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854,
859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, however, the Office determined that
prosecutionof this potential violation was not warranted. Those Principlesinstruct prosecutors to
consider, amongotherthings, the nature and seriousnessof the offense, the person’s culpability in
connection with the offense, and the probable sentence to be imposed if the prosecution is
successful. Justice Manual 9-27.230.
179
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C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts
As explained in Section IV above, the Office’s investigation uncovered evidence of

numerous links (i.e., contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or
claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The Office evaluated the contacts underseveral
sets of federal laws, including conspiracy lawsandstatutes governing foreign agents who operate
in the United States. After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges
under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section IV above—with the
exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based ontheir activities on
behalf of Ukraine.
Oneofthe interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals—

the June 9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising
derogatory information on Hillary Clinton—implicates an additional body of law: campaign-
finance statutes. Schemesinvolving thesolicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources
raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions. As explained below, the Office evaluated
those questions in connection with the June 9 MOMHarm Matter
The Office ultimately concluded that, even if the principallegal questions were resolved fayorably
to the government, a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaignofficials or
individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law.
Finally, although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-
affiliated individuals may not havebeensufficient to establish or sustain criminal charges, several
U.S. persons connectedto the Campaign madefalse statements about those contacts and took other
steps to obstruct the Office’s investigation and those of Congress. This Office has therefore
charged someofthose individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice.
1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion
Asaninitial matter, this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the
collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of “collusion,” but through the lens
of conspiracy law. In so doing, the Office recognized that the word “collud[e]” appears in the
Acting Attorney General’s August 2, 2017 memorandum;it has frequently been invoked in public
reporting; and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). But collusionis not a specific offense or
theory ofliability found in the U.S. Code; noris it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the
contrary, even as definedin legaldictionaries, collusion is largely synonymouswith conspiracy as
that crimeis set forth in the general federal conspiracystatute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Black’s Law
Dictionary 321 (10th ed. 2014) (collusion is “[a]n agreement to defraud anotherorto do or obtain
something forbidden by law”); 1 Alexander Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 311 (1871)
(“An agreement between two or more personsto defraud another by the formsoflaw, or to employ
such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object.”); 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 352
180
Werk // Proteeted-Cnder
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(1897) (“An agreement between two or more personsto defraud a person ofhis rights by the forms
oflaw,or to obtain an object forbidden by law.”).
For that reason, this Office’s focus in resolving the question ofjoint criminalliability was
on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term “collusion.” The Office
considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked
individuals couldtriggerliability for the crime of conspiracy—either understatutes that havetheir
own conspiracy language (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1951(a)), or under the general conspiracy
statute (18 U.S.C. § 371). The investigation did notestablish that the contacts described in Volume
I, Section IV, supra, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal
criminal law—including foreign-influence and campaign-finance laws, both of which are
discussed further below. The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the
Trump Campaignwith conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either
undera specific statute or under Section 371’s offenses clause.
The Office also did not charge any campaignofficial or associate with a conspiracy under
Section 371’s defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreementto obstruct a
lawful function of the U.S. governmentorits agencies through deceitful or dishonest means. See
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 2605 U.S.
182, 188 (1924); see also United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38,
46 (D.D.C. 2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officials—
or between such officials and Russia-linked individuals—to interfere with or obstruct a lawful
function of a government agency during the campaignor transition period. And, as discussed in
VolumeI, Section V.A, supra, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign
official or associate knowingly andintentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the
Office charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in VolumeI, Section II, supra.
Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with
conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section
IV above.
2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951)
The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under
federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work donefor, a foreign government.
a. Governing Law
Under 18 U.S.C. § 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a
foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant
mustact on behalf of a foreign government (as opposedto other kinds of foreign entities), the acts
need not involve espionage; rather, acts of any type suffice for liability. See United States v.
Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 581 (7th Cir. 2005). An “agent of a foreign
government” is an “individual” who “agrees to operate” in the United States “subject to the
direction or control of a foreign governmentorofficial.” 18 U.S.C. § 951(d).
181
Thecrime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States
as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. § 951(a). The statute does not require
willfulness, and knowledgeofthe notification requirementis not an element ofthe offense. United
States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008); Duran, 596 F.3d at 1291-94; Dumeisi,
424 F.3d at 581.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) generally makesit illegal to act as an agent
of a foreign principal by engaging in certain (largely political) activities in the United States
without registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621. The triggering agency
relationship must be with a foreign principal or “a person any of whoseactivities are directly or
indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a
foreign principal.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). That includes a foreign governmentorpolitical party
and various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b). A covered relationship exists if
a person “acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant”or “in any other capacity at the
order, request, or underthe [foreign principal’s] direction or control.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). It
is sufficient if the person “agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds
himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign
principal.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(2).
Thetriggering activity is that the agent “directly or through any other person”in the United
States (1) engagesin “political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal,” which
includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public; (2) acts as “public relations counsel,
publicity agent, information-service employeeorpolitical consultantfor or in the interests of such
foreign principal”; (3) “solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or
otherthingsofvalueforor in the interest of such foreign principal”; or (4) “represents the interests
of such foreign principal” before any federal agencyorofficial. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1).
It is a crime to engagein a “[w]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation
thereunder.” 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(1). It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or
omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or supplements. 22 U.S.C.
§ 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximumpenalty of five years of imprisonment and a $10,000
fine. 22 U.S.C. § 618.
b. Application
The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort’s and Richard Gates’s
pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were
charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal
informationsin the District of Columbia prosecution.'*®° The evidence underlying those charges
is not addressedin this report because it was discussed in public court documents andin a separate
1289 Gates Superseding Criminal Information; Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Richard W.
GatesIII, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203; Waiver of Trial by Jury, United States v. Richard
W. Gates LIT, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204; Gates Plea Agreement; Statement of Offense,
United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; Plea Agreement,
United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422; Statement of Offense,
United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:\7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 423.
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prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment
in that case.
In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations involving Michael

Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia (Z.e., Turkey)
and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that
accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge. Statement of Offense, United Statesv.
Michael T. Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 (“Flynn Statement of
Offense”),!28!
The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any
individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agentofa foreign principal within the
meaning of FARA or,in termsof Section 951, subject to the direction or control ofthe government
of Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove
beyond a reasonable doubtthat Campaignofficials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos,
and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian government—orat its direction, control, or
request—during the relevant time period.'2®
Asa result, the Office did not charge any other Trump Campaignofficial with violating
FARA orSection 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian
governmentor a Russian principal.
Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors—George
Papadopoulos—actedas an agentof, or at the direction and controlof, the governmentofIsrael.
While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search
warrants were obtainedin part on that basis), the Office ultimately determinedthat the evidence
wasnot sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA orSection 951.
3. Campaign Finance
Severalareas of the Office’s investigation involvedefforts or offers by foreign nationals to

provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign orto distribute that
information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the
Office considered whether two ofthose efforts in particular—the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump
vuaHarm to Ongoing Matter
1282 On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based
ona finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agentof a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b),
1805(a)(2)(A). The FISC’s probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the
one governing the Office’s decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible
evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the
Russian Federation during the period at issue. Cf United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (explaining that probable cause requires only “a fair probability,” and not “certainty, or proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance ofthe evidence”).
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Woogarm to Ongoing Matter —constituted prosecutable violations of

the campaign-finance laws. The Office determinedthat the evidence wasnot sufficient to charge
either incident as a criminal violation.
a. Overview Of Governing Law
“[T]he United States has a compelling interest... in limiting the participation offoreign
citizens in activities of democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence
over the U.S. political process.” Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011)
(Kavanaugh,J., for three-judge court), aff'd, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). To that end, federal campaign-
finance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations,
expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections,
and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations. As
relevanthere, foreign nationals may not make—and noone may “solicit, accept, or receive” from
them—“a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value” or “an express or implied
promise to makea contribution or donation,in connection with a Federal, State, or local election.”
52 U.S.C. § 30121 (a)(1)(A), (a)(2).!783 The term “contribution,” which is used throughout the
campaign-finance law, “includes” “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or
anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, “the value of [volunteer]
services.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(B)G).
Foreign nationals are also barred from making “an expenditure, independent expenditure,
or disbursement for an electioneering communication.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(C). The term
“expenditure” “includes” “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,deposit, or gift of
moneyor anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, newsstories and
non-partisan get-out-the-vote activities. 52 U.S.C. §30101(9)(B)(i)-(ii). An “independent
expenditure” is an expenditure “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate” and made independently of the campaign. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17). An “electioneering
communication” is a broadcast communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office” and is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate.
52. U.S.C. § 30104(£)(3).
The statute defines “foreign national” by reference to FARA and the Immigration and
Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (cross-referencing 22 U.S.C.
§ 611(b)(1)-(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), (22)). That definition yields five, sometimes-
overlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities
relevant for present purposes—namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals
283 Campaign-finance law also places financial limits on contributions, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a), and
prohibits contributions from corporations, banks, and labor unions, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); see Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). Because the conduct that the Office investigated involved
possible electoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily applicable
provision,
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outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S, entities located
outside of the U.S. ,
A “knowing[] and willful[]” violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a

calendar year is a felony. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(@); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292
(noting that a willful violation will require some “proofof the defendant’s knowledge of the law”);
United States v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d 573, 577 (E.D. Va. 2013) (applying willfulness
standard drawn from Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998)); see also Wagnerv.
FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (same). A “knowing[] and willful[]” violation
involving an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than $25,000, is a
misdemeanor. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(ii).
b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting
The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in
connection with the June 9 meeting described in VolumeI, Section IV.A.5, supra. The Office
concluded that, in light of the government’s substantial burden of proof on issues of intent
(“knowing” and “willful”), and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information,
criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that “the admissible evidence will
probablybesufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.” Justice Manual § 9-27.220.
In brief, the key facts are that, on June 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump
Jr., to pass along from Emin and Aras Agalarov an “offer” from Russia’s “Crown prosecutor” to
“the Trump campaign”of“official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and
her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr.’s] father.” The email described
this as “very high level and sensitive information”that is “part of Russia and its government’s
support to Mr. Trump-helped along by Aras and Emin.” TrumpJr. responded: “if it’s what you
say I love it especially later in the summer.” Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had follow-up
conversations and, within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was
attended by TrumpJr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting and
the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaign
anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from official Russian sources that
could assist candidate Trump’s electoral prospects.
This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on contributions and
donations by foreign nationals, 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A). Specifically, Goldstone passed along
an offer purportedly from a Russian government official to provide “official documents and
information” to the Trump Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election.
Trump Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those
materials. Documentary evidencein the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner
and Manafort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt
of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources.
The Office considered whether this evidence would establish a conspiracyto violate the
foreign contributionsban, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; the solicitation of an illegal foreign-
source contribution; or the acceptance or receipt of “an express or implied promise to make a
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[foreign-source] contribution,” both in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). There are

reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a “thing of value” within the
meaningofthese provisions, but the Office determined that the government wouldnotbelikely to
obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible
evidencelikely to meet the government’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubtthat these
individuals acted “willfully,” i.e., with general knowledge oftheillegality of their conduct; and,
second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminalviolation, see 52
USS.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)G).
i. Thing-of-Value Element
A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign “documents and

information”of the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution. The
foreign contribution ban is not limited to contributions of money. It expressly prohibits “a
contribution or donation of money or other thing of value.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)
(emphasis added). And the term “contribution” is defined throughout the campaign-finance laws
to “include[]” “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value.”
52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
The phrases “thing of value” and “anything of value”are broad andinclusive enoughto
encompassat least someformsof valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these
phrasesserve as “term[s] of art” that are construed “broad[ly].” United States v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d
539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“thing of value”includes “both tangibles and intangibles”);
see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(1), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes); id. § 641 (theft of government
property). For example, the term “thing of value” encompasses law enforcement reports that
would revealthe identity of informants, United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979);
classified materials, United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 1991); confidential
information about a competitive bid, United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1994);
secret grand jury information, United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir. 1985); and
information about a witness’s whereabouts, United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.
1980) (per curiam). Andin the public corruption context, “‘thing of value’ is defined broadly to
include the value which the defendant subjectively attachesto the items received.” United States
vy. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations recognize the value to a campaign ofat
least some forms ofinformation,stating that the term “anything of value” includes“the provision
of any goods or services without charge,” such as “membership lists” and “mailing lists.” 11
C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1). The FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of
activists. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 338
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the FEC’s findings). Likewise, polling data provided to a campaign
constitutes a “contribution.” FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-12 (Strub), 1990 WL 153454 (citing 11
C.F.R. § 106.4(b)). And in the specific context of the foreign-contributions ban, the FEC has
concluded that “election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns,” including “flyers,
advertisements, door hangers,tri-folds, signs, and other printed material,” constitute “anything of
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value,” even though “the value of these materials may be nominalordifficult to ascertain.” FEC
Advisory Opinion 2007-22 (Hurysz), 2007 WL 5172375, at *5.
These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given
to a campaign for the purpose ofinfluencing an election could constitute a contribution to which
the foreign-source ban could apply. A campaign canbeassisted not only by the provision of funds,
but also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaigns
frequently conduct andpay for opposition research. A foreign entity that engaged in such research
and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election, and
a greater tendency to ingratiate the donorto the candidate, than a gift of moneyor tangible things
of value. At the same time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of
uncompensatedopposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount
to a contribution under campaign-finance law. Such an interpretation could have implications
beyond the foreign-source ban, see 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign
contributions), and raise First Amendmentquestions. Those questionscould beespecially difficult
where the information consisted simply of the recounting ofhistorically accurate facts. It is
uncertain how courts would resolve those issues.
ii. Willfulness
Even assuming that the promised “documents and information that would incriminate
Hillary” constitute a “thing of value” under campaign-finance law, the government would
encounterother challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction. Mostsignificantly, the
governmenthasnotobtained admissible evidencethatis likely to establish the scienter requirement
beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove that a defendant acted “knowingly and willfully,” the
government would haveto showthat the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful. U.S. Departmentof Justice, Federal Prosecution ofElection Offenses 123 (8th ed. Dec.
2017) (“Election Offenses’); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation
requires “proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the law”); Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 577
(“knowledge of general unlawfulness”). “This standard creates an elevated scienter element
requiring,at the very least, that application of the law to the facts in question befairly clear. When
there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law appliesto the facts of a particular matter, the
offender is morelikely to have an intent defense.” Election Offenses 123.
On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable
doubtthat the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledgethat their conduct was unlawful.
The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar
with the foreign-contribution banorthe application of federal law to the relevant factual context.
The governmentdoes not have strong evidenceof surreptitious behavior or efforts at concealment
at the time of the June 9 meeting. While the government has evidenceoflater efforts to prevent
disclosure of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a
showing ofscienter, see VolumeII, Section II.G, infra, that concealment occurred more than a
yearlater, involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting, and mayreflect an intention
to avoid political consequencesrather than any prior knowledgeofillegality. Additionally, in light
of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving “documents and information” of the sort
offered here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump Jr. could mount a factual defense that he
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did not believe his response to the offer and the June 9 meetingitself violated the law. Given his
less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar
defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns, the Office has not
developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge oftheselegal issues.
iii, Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information
The Office would also encounterdifficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold for a criminal
violation, as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1).
The type of evidence commonly usedto establish the value of non-monetary contributions—such
as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost
or the cost of distribution—would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting.
Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the
information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. And while value in a conspiracy
may well be measured by whatthe participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement,
see, e.g., United States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1982), Goldstone’s description
of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion of the information’s value—i.e.,
that it would “incriminate Hillary” and “would be very useful to [Trump Jr.’s] father”—was non-
specific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given
Goldstone’s lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be
delivered could be reflected in Trump Jr.’s response (“if it’s what you say I love it”) (emphasis
added).
Accordingly, taking into account the high burdento establish a culpable mentalstate in a
campaign-finance prosecution andthe difficulty in establishing the required valuation, the Office
decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign
officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting.
aoetiiagiarm to Ongoing Matter
RETam omens (ae MiEticie
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ii. Willfulness
As discussed, to establish a criminal campaign-finance violation, the government must

provethat the defendant acted “knowingly and willfully.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(i). That
standard requires proof that the defendant knew generally that his conduct was unlawful. Election
Offenses 123. Given the uncertainties noted above, the “willfulness” requirement would pose a
substantial barrier to prosecution.
iii, Constitutional Considerations
, the First Amendmentcould pose constraints on a prosecution. Harm to

Ongoing Matter
iv. Analysis as to Toa
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4, False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation
The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to
investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken otheractions to interfere with
the investigation. As explained below, the Office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected
to the Campaignwith false statements and obstruction offenses.
a. Overview Of Governing Law
False Statements. The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to

governmentinvestigators is 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As relevant here, under Section 1001(a)(2), it is a
crime to knowingly and willfully “make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement
or representation” “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . branch of the
Government.” An FBIinvestigation is a matter within the Executive Branch’s jurisdiction. United
States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984). The statute also applies to a subset of legislative
branch actions—viz., administrative matters and “investigation[s] or review[s]” conducted by a
congressional committee or subcommittee. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(1) and(2); see United States v.
Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements:
the statement wasfalse, fictitious, or fraudulent; the defendant knew both thatit was false and that
it was unlawful to make a false statement; and the false statement was material. See, e.g., United
States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.27 (9th Cir. 2017) (listing elements); see also Ninth Circuit
Pattern Instruction 8.73 & cmt. (explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in
light of the DepartmentofJustice’s position that the phrase “knowingly andwillfully”in the statute
requires the defendant’s knowledgethat his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C. Circuit, the
government mustprove that the statement wasactually false; a statement that is misleading but
“literally true” does not satisfy Section 1001(a)(2). See United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45
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(D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832-33 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For that
false statementto qualify as “material,” it must have a natural tendencyto influence,or be capable
of influencing, a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to whichit is addressed. See
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
Perjury. Underthe federal perjury statutes,it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath
before a grandjury to knowingly makeany false material declaration. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The
government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under
Section 1623(a): the defendanttestified under oath before a federal grand jury; the defendant’s
testimony was false in one or more respects; the false testimony concerned matters that were
material to the grand jury investigation; and the false testimony was knowingly given. United
States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The general perjury statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1621, also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements, exceptthat it requires
that the witness have acted willfully and that the government satisfy “strict common-law
requirements for establishingfalsity.” See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 & n.6 (1979)
(explaining “the two-witness rule” and the corroboration that it demands).
Obstruction of Justice. Three basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes
pertinent to this Office’s charging decisions: an obstructive act; some form of nexus between the
obstructive act and an official proceeding; and criminal(i.e., corrupt) intent. A detailed discussion
of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in
VolumeII of the report.
b. Application to Certain Individuals
i. George Papadopoulos
Investigators approached Papadopoulos for an interview based on his role as a foreign

policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and his suggestion to a foreign governmentrepresentative
that Russia had indicated that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymousrelease of
information damaging to candidate Clinton. On January 27, 2017, Papadopoulos agreed to be
interviewed by FBIagents, who informed him that the interview waspart of the investigation into
potential Russian governmentinterference in the 2016 presidential election.
During the interview, Papadopoulos lied about the timing, extent, and nature of his
communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Polonskaya, and Ivan Timofeev. With respect to
timing, Papadopoulos acknowledgedthat he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud told him the Russians
had “dirt” on Clinton in the form of “thousands of emails.” But Papadopoulos stated multiple
times that those communications occurred before he joined the Trump Campaign andthatit was a
“very strange coincidence”to be told of the “dirt” before he started working for the Campaign.
This account was false. Papadopoulos met Mifsudforthe first time on approximately March 14,
2016, after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the
Campaign. Mifsud showed interest in Papadopoulos only after learning of his role on the
Campaign. And Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing “dirt” on candidate
Clinton in late April 2016, more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the Campaign and
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been publicly announced by candidate Trump. Statement of Offense J 25-26, United States v.
George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 (“Papadopoulos Statement
of Offense”).
Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to minimize the extent and
importance of his communications with Mifsud. For example, Papadopoulos stated that
“[Mifsud]’s a nothing,” that he thought Mifsud was “just a guy talk[ing] up connections or
something,”andthat he believed Mifsud was “BS’ing to be completely honest with you.” In fact,
however, Papadopoulos understood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russian
governmentofficials and that Mifsud spoke with someofthose officials in Moscow beforetelling
Papadopoulos aboutthe “dirt.” Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a
period of months with Mifsud about foreign policy issues for the Campaign, including efforts to
arrange a “history making” meeting between the Campaign and Russian governmentofficials. In
addition, Papadopoulosfailed to inform investigators that Mifsud hadintroduced him to Timofeev,
the Russian national who Papadopoulos understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, despite being asked if he had met with Russian nationals or “[aJnyone with a
Russian accent” during the campaign. Papadopoulos Statement of Offense {J 27-29.
Papadopoulosalsofalsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the Campaign,

and falsely told the FBI that he had “no”relationship at all with her. He stated that the extent of
their communications was her sending emails—“Just, ‘Hi, how are you?’ That’s it.” In truth,
however, Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24, 2016, after he had joined the Campaign; he
believed that she had connections to high-level Russian governmentofficials and could help him
arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. During the campaign he emailed and spoke with
her over Skype on numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia.
Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ff 30-31.
Papadopoulos’s false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI’s investigation into
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Most immediately, those statements
hindered investigators’ ability to effectively question Mifsud when he wasinterviewedin the lobby
of a Washington, D.C. hotel on February 10, 2017. See Gov’t Sent. Mem. at 6, United States v.
George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017), Doc. 44. During that interview,
Mifsud admitted to knowing Papadopoulos and to having introduced him to Polonskaya and
Timofeev. But Mifsud denied that he had advance knowledge that Russia was in possession of
emails damaging to candidate Clinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed
cybersecurity and hackingas a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstoodtheir
conversation. Mifsud also falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulossince the meeting at
which Mifsud introduced him to Polonskaya, even though emails, text messages, and other
information show that Mifsud met with Papadopoulos onat least two other occasions—April 12
and April 26, 2016. In addition, Mifsud omitted that he had drafted (or edited) the follow-up
message that Polonskaya sent to Papadopoulosfollowing the initial meeting and that, as reflected
in the language of that email chain (““Baby, thank you!”), Mifsud may have been involved in a
personal relationship with Polonskaya at the time. The false information and omissions in
Papadopoulos’s January 2017 interview undermined investigators’ ability to challenge Mifsud
when he madethese inaccurate statements.
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Given the seriousnessof the lies and omissionsandtheir effect on the FBI’s investigation,
the Office charged Papadopoulos with makingfalse statements to the FBI,in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. Information, United States v. George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct.3,
2017), Doc. 8. On October 7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuantto a plea
agreement. On September7, 2018, he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a $9,500 fine,
and 200 hours of community service.
iii. Michael Flynn
Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017, four days after he
had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President. During the
interview, Flynn madeseveralfalse statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian
ambassador.
First, Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian Ambassador
Kislyakin late December 2016, at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia
for interfering with the 2016 presidential election and Russia was considering its response. See
Flynn Statement of Offense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from
escalating the situation in response to the United States’s imposition of sanctions. That statement
wasfalse. On December 29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak to request Russian restraint. Flynn made
the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about
what to communicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland againafter the Kislyak call to
report on the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not
remembera follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate
its response to the U.S. sanctions as a result of Flynn’s request. On December 31, 2016, Flynn in
fact had such a conversation with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the
call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. See Flynn Statement of Offense {| 3.
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Second, Flynn madefalse statements aboutcalls he had previously made to representatives

of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations
Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only asked the
countries’ positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any
of the countries take any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false. On
December22, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak, informed him ofthe incoming Trump Administration’s
opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Flynn
also falsely stated that Kislyak never described Russia’s response to his December 22 request
regarding the resolution. Kislyakin fact told Flynn in a conversation on December 23, 2016, that
Russia would not vote against the resolutionif it came to a vote. See Flynn Statement of Offense
44.
Flynn madethese false statements to the FBI at a time when he wasserving as National
Security Advisor and whenthe FBI had anopen investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election, including the nature of any links between the Trump Campaign and Russia.
Flynn’s false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that
ongoing investigation. Flynn Statement of Offense f{ 1-2. They also came shortly before Flynn
made separate submissions to the Departmentof Justice, pursuant to FARA,that also contained
materially false statements and omissions. Jd. | 5. Based onthetotality of that conduct, the Office
decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a). On December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that
charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA filing. See id.; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3.
Flynn is awaiting sentencing.
iv. Michael Cohen
Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump
Organization when Trump waspresident of the Trump Organization. Information 1, United
States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (“Cohen Information”). From
the fall of 2015 through approximately June 2016, Cohen wasinvolved in a project to build a
Trump-branded tower and adjoining development in Moscow. The project was known as Trump
Tower Moscow.
In 2017, Cohen wascalled to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), both of which were
investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible links between
Russia andthe presidential campaigns. In late August 2017, in advance of his testimony, Cohen
caused a two-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow.
Cohen Information {J 2-3. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First, Cohen
stated that the Trump Moscowproject had ended in January 2016 andthat he had briefed candidate
Trump on the project only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it.
Second, Cohen represented that he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project
and never considered asking Trump totravel for the project. Third, Cohen stated that he did not
recall any Russian government contact about the project, including any response to an email that
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he had sent to a Russian government email account. Cohen Information J 4. Cohen later asked
that his two-page statement be incorporated into his testimony’s transcript before SSCI, and he
ultimately gave testimony to SSCIthat was consistent with that statement. Cohen Information { 5.
Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen’s two-page statement was false and
misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and
included morethan three progress reports from Cohen to Trump. Cohen had discussed with Felix
Sater his owntravel to Russia as part of the project, and he had inquired aboutthe possibility of
Trumptraveling there—both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey
Lewandowski. Cohendid recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian
government spokesman Dmitry Peskov—inparticular, that he received an email reply and had a
follow-up phone conversation with an English-speakingassistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016.
Cohen Information 47. Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time, and
admitted that he made them in an effort (1) to minimize the links between the project and Trump
(who bythis time was President), and (2) to give the false impression that the project had ended
before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process, in the hopesof limiting the ongoing
Russia investigations. Id.
Giventhenature ofthe false statements and the fact that he repeated them duringhis initial
interview with the Office, we charged Cohen withviolating Section 1001. On November29, 2018,
Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him
with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) and (c). Cohen Information. The case was transferred to the
district judge presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District
of New York(after a referral from our Office). On December 7, 2018, this Office submitted a
letter to that judge recommending that Cohen’s cooperation with our investigation be taken into
accountin sentencing Cohen onboththe false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern
District prosecution. On December 12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of
imprisonment on the false-statements count, to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence
imposed on the other counts.
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vi. JeffSessions
Asset forth in VolumeI, Section IV.A.6, supra,the investigation established that, while a
U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted
with Russian AmbassadorKislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July
2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions’s Senateoffice in September 2016. The investigation also
established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump’s
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foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, and that it is
possible that they metbriefly at that reception.
The Office considered whether,in light of these interactions, Sessions committed perjury
before, or made false statements to, Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney
General. In January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response
to a question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had
“been called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I didn’t have — did not have
communicationswith the Russians.” In written responses submitted on January 17, 2017, Sessions
answered “[n]o” to a question asking whether he had “been in contact with anyone connected to
any part of the Russian government about the 2016 election, either before orafter election day.”
And, in a March 2017 supplementto his testimony, Sessionsidentified two of the campaign-period
contacts with Ambassador Kislyak noted above, which had been reported in the media following
the January 2017 confirmation hearing. Sessions stated in the supplemental response that he did
“not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador, or any other representatives of the
Russian government, regarding thepolitical campaign on these occasionsor any other occasion.”
Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kislyak on the
occasions described above and that Kislyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one
occasion, the evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to
Russia-related questions in light of the wording and context of those questions. With respect to
Sessions’s statements that he did “not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador.. .
regarding the political campaign” and he had not been in contact with any Russianofficial “about
the 2016 election,” the evidence concerning the nature of Sessions’s interactions with Kislyak
makesit plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kislyakat the time of
his statements. Similarly, while Sessions stated in his January 2017 oral testimony that he “did
not have communications with Russians,” he did so in response to a question that had linked such
communications to an alleged “continuing exchange of information” between the Trump
Campaign and Russian government intermediaries. Sessions later explained to the Senate and to
the Office that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with
Russiansthat involved the exchange of campaign information, as distinguished from more routine
contacts with Russian nationals. Given the context in which the question was asked, that
understanding is plausible.
Accordingly,the Office concludedthat the evidence wasinsufficient to prove that Sessions

waswillfully untruthful in his answers and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction for
perjury or false statements. Consistent with the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office
therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that
decision in March 2018.
vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation
The Office considered whether, during the course of the investigation, other individuals
interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determined to be false.
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office did not seek criminal charges against
any individuals other than those listed above. In some instances, that decision was due to
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evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others, the Office determined that the witnessultimately
provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability, deterrence, and_resource-
9-27.220, 9-27.230.
gGrand Jury
Grand Jury
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May-Contei Materi l UnderFed-R-Crimt 2-6)
Report On The Investigation Into

Russian Interference In The
2016 Presidential Election
VolumeII ofII
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, IIT
Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c)
Washington, D.C.
March 2019
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TABLE OF CONTENTS —- VOLUMEII
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUMEIT.....
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUMEIT...

I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARYPRINCIPLES .
A. Legal Framework of ObstructionOf JUStiCE.......eesssessecsecsesceesneesessnesneesneesseeenesennecsneens 9

B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations............ccccccccscssssesseseseseeseeeeeeeceeseeteeeneeees 12
II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION..-.cscssceseseseseseseseseseeeeeeeseeeseneneseeaeess 15
A. The Campaign’s Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump ........... ey
1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia.............. 16
2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks’s Release of Hacked Emails........... 17
3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to
Aid Candidate: Trump isisise.iscscivivevsvsssincncsstincsvnrivanreessvavsurstessaesncutctetesesssisuserereass 18
4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or
Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election........0.....::ccseeeeeee 21
B. The President’s Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn.........0...... 24
1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia
with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak .........c cesses ssesseeeeseseseeeeeeneneneaseeenees 24
2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community’s
Assessmentof Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens
Election-Interference Investigations .......ccccccesesceesetseceeseceseseeeeeeeeeeeeeetteseecseseaees 27
3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to
Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI.......c.cccsseeeeeneees 29
4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns AboutFlynn............. 31
5. McGahnhasa Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President
Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Comey.00......cecececeseeseseceseseeeeeeteesesesentens 32
6. Flynn’s Resignation 0... sccsesesceeseesesesseesessssesneessseecesasscaesesseseensaseesseeeenees 36
7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey.........eeceeceeeseneeeenees 38
8. The Media Raises Questions About the President’s Delay in Terminating
9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness

Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn’s Discussions with Kislyak
C. The President’s Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI’s Russia
Investigation... sccseseeesceesseeeesessesesesesseeenesecasacseeenesacsesecateecaseenevaceesesateceetesaeeeseeees 48
1, Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation... 48
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2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia

Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCLI 0... cccceeseesestersseesescensesteeeseeeeeeneee 52
3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public
Statements that he had No Connection to RUSSi@ .....cceesseesseesesseseteseeeteeeseeeeeeee 55
4. The President Asks Comeyto “Lift the Cloud” Created by the Russia
Trvesti gation ......cccececeeeeseeessesssesensesssesesssesseseeesscessenesecesnecesesesanseecesiseeeeeaeeneatieees 57
D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director
1. ComeyTestifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to

Answer Questions About Whetherthe President is Under Investigation............. 62
2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey..........ccccssseseeseeeeeeneees 64
E. The President’s Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel ..........ccceseeseeseseetesesteeseenees 77
1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President’s Reaction.............. 78
2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest............. 80
3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction
of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the
Special Counsel Removed .........cscccssesesesessscseseeseseesessnnasessessesenensnsnensseseseneeneases 84
F. The President’s Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation... 90
1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions
to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation ...........cccccsssesssesescsseeseseeeeeeeneneeees 90
2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski .........:cceeeseseeseeeeeeeeeseseeeeeeee 92
3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York TimesInterview....... 93
4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions’s Resignation .........00000008 94
G. The President’s Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9,
2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials..........0.ceceeee 98
1. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June
9; 2016 ‘Trutip Tower Meeting vise sencuoscescupesssaseiensserninaanananumnnmnerenieaenns 98
2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose
Information About the June 9 Meeting....
3. The President Directs TrumpJr.’s Response to Press Inquiries Aboutthe
June 9 Meeting... eee eeeseeseeteeesseseeseesenssscssseseeersaseeesesssseeesessiseesaeesiaeeeeceaeeees 101
4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting uo... cece 103
H.ThePresident’s Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over
the liWestlPaticocci mmm 107
1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal............:000 107
2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuseor Direct Investigations
Covered by his Recusal......ccecccseecsssesssceseeeesssensseseeessaceeerseseseeceresecscaeenesesseesesers 109
I, The President Orders McGahn to Denythat the President Tried to Fire the
Spécial Counsel........,...:c:ssisnnncmnanemumnnarnnnn anne: 113
1. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel............. 113
2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports.............:c005 114
J. The President’s Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, ea seececeessecaeeeeeereeeeeneeees 120
1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynt .......cceeeeeeeseseeseeseeesesesesseeseeesaesseesesaeeaeeees 120
2.. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort ......cccccsissccssssecsseissiasevvevenesestsdeseseeeeeeeeeee 122
BMHarm Matter 128
K. The President’s Conduct Involving Michael Cohen ............cscccssesessesesneseeessenseeenes 134
1. Candidate Trump’s Awarenessof and Involvementin the Trump Tower
MOSCOW PLOj6Ct yeccsrscesecesezocccwsnimapareeeastuorsresronveannansanacmmaminnneneausreessenesee 134
2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a “Party Line” Distancing Candidate
Trunip roi RUSSi¢..........csraernaaenneaanmnnnrmaia maureen: 138
3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump
Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line. wn 139
4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen.....
5. The President’s Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the
GOVETTINIGNE erresssnsrenemsnnansarnearmn cen cnanerveanvermaasen neers 148
L. Overarching Factual Issues ..........ccecseccssseseesssssneesssenesseeessneaeeesseseneeecsseeneeseeesenecesaeens 156
Ill. LEGAL DEFENSES TO THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES TO THE
PRESIDENT
A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions
to the Conduct UnderInvestigation ........ccccssesesseeeeeesescseesesenesesssenseseasesesscaeaeases 160
1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive
AUS vr wensnananccamewnennarermveanuneniscncssccamnrscescosneansmenonnaeoneniessssusmncinannenecie 160
2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512(c)(2).......cee 162
3. The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does NotJustify Narrowing
Tts Texts... ceccccceceeecceeeesseeseeseeeseeseseseeseessssessssaeseessessosesessteeepessesaaeeesaesenecssenseaeaes 164
4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section
1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conductin this Investigation..............cce 165
5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this
Investigation
B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to
Presidential Conductsccssssscsssarsnisasssvcasevesivessssnovsisevccesveenvvcwassseavievescavevseeusvatavevenwcisees 168
1. The Requirementof a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential
Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes .......c ccc seeeesseeesees 169
iii
2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress

MayValidly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the
President’s Official Powers
a. The Supreme Court’s Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In
This Contexts cscs eveseeneecnancumreuncnmemsssinanviaasiueavescenstotieneesnnesvena nenneaniiterss 172
b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President’s
Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited .............00. 173
c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial
Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source .......ccccsceereeeeeeeees 176
3. Ascertaining Whetherthe President Violated the Obstruction Statutes
Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties 0... 178
TV. CONCLUSION .oseeceeccsesseseseteeseeessececeeeeeeseseseeessesesdsasesecaseesesesseessnsacesaseeseeessaeseeeasiseeeneasieeesanenease 182
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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUMEIT
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which
states that, “[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work, he . . . shall provide the Attorney
General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special
Counsel] reached.”
Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the
ongoing FBI investigation into Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related
matters that raised questions about whetherhe had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the
Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the
FBI’s Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection
with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel’s jurisdiction also covered potentially
obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel’s investigation itself. This Volume of our report
summarizes our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President.
Wefirst describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation,

and then provide an overview of this Volume:
First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to

initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial
judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinionfindingthat“the indictment
or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the
executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions” in violation of “the
constitutional separation of powers.”! Giventhe role of the Special Counselas an attorney in the
Department ofJustice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28 U.S.C. § 515;
28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC’s legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising
prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC’s constitutional view, we recognized that a federal
criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President’s capacity to
govern andpotentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct.”
Second, while the OLC opinion concludesthat a sitting President may not be prosecuted,
it recognizesthat a criminal investigation during the President’s term is permissible? The OLC
opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leavesoffice. And if
individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at
this time. Given those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in
! 4 Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222,
222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.).
2 See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; cf OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationship
between impeachmentandcriminal prosecution ofa sitting President).
3 OLC Op. at 257 n.36 (“A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of
immunity”).
* OLC Op.at 255 (“Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not
preclude such prosecution once the President’s term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by
resignation or impeachment”).
May-Conti Materi l Fed R-Crim-P-6(e)
safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual
* investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary
materials were available.
Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice
Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determinednot to apply
an approachthat could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes. The
threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person’s conduct
“constitutes a federal offense.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice
Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges
can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a
speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An
individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. In
contrast, a prosecutor’s judgmentthat crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought,
affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator.5
The concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case
ofa sitting President, where a federal prosecutor’s accusation of a crime, even in an internal report,
could carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar
concerns aboutsealed indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the President’s term,
OLC reasoned, “it would be very difficult to preserve [an indictment’s] secrecy,” and if an
indictment becamepublic, “[t]he stigma and opprobrium” could imperil the President’s ability to
govern.”6 Although a prosecutor’s internal report would not represent a formal public accusation
akin to an indictment, the possibility of the report’s public disclosure and the absence of a neutral
adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining “that the
person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense.” Justice Manual § 9-27.220.
Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President
clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the
applicable legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we
obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from
conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does
not concludethat the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.
* * #
This report on our investigation consists of four parts. Section I provides an overview of
obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary
considerations. Section II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and
analyzes the evidence. Section III addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. Section IV
states our conclusion.
> For that reason, criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted co-
conspirators in an indictment. See United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (Sth Cir. 1975) (“The courts
have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording
them no forum in which to vindicate themselves.”); see also Justice Manual § 9-11.130.
§ OLC Op.at 259 & n.38 (citation omitted).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYTO VOLUMEII
Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that

related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the President’s conduct towards the
law enforcementofficials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events.
FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
The key issues and events we examined include the following:
The Campaign’s response to reports about Russian supportfor Trump. During the 2016
presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian government’s apparent support for
candidate Trump. After WikiLeaksreleased politically damaging Democratic Party emails that
were reported to have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia
was responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaignofficials privately
sought information about any further planned WikiLeaks
releases. Trumpalso denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though aslate
as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be
built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow.After the election, the President expressed concerns
to advisors that reports of Russia’s election interference might lead the public to question the
legitimacy of his election.
Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017,
incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other
administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
about Russia’s response to U.S. sanctions on Russia forits election interference. On January 27,
the day after the President wastold that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar
statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Comeyto a private dinner at the White
House and told Comey that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the President
requested Flynn’s resignation, the President told an outside advisor, “Now that we fired Flynn,the
Russia thing is over.” The advisor disagreed andsaid the investigations would continue.
Later that afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting
with Comey. Referring to the FBI’s investigation of Flynn, the President said, “I hope you can
see your way clearto letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you canlet this
go.” Shortly after requesting Flynn’s resignation and speaking privately to Comey,the President
sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internalletter stating
that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. McFarland declined
because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel’s Office attorney
thoughtthat the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorshipshehadbeenoffered.
The President’s reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. In February 2017,

Attorney General Jeff Sessions began to assess whetherhe had to recuse himself from campaign-
related investigations becauseofhis role in the Trump Campaign. In early March, the President
told White House Counsel Donald McGahnto stop Sessions from recusing. And after Sessions
announcedhis recusal on March 2, the President expressed anger at the decision andtold advisors
that he should have an Attorney General who would protect him. That weekend, the President
took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to “unrecuse.” Later in March, Comey publicly
disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was investigating “the Russian government’s
efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,” including anylinks or coordination between
the Russian governmentand the Trump Campaign. In the following days, the President reached
out to the Director of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA)to ask them what they could doto publicly dispel
the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort.
The President also twice called Comeydirectly, notwithstanding guidance from McGahnto avoid
direct contacts with the Department of Justice. Comey had previously assured the Presidentthat
the FBI wasnotinvestigating him personally, and the President asked Comey to“lift the cloud”
of the Russia investigation by saying that publicly.
The President’s termination of Comey. On May 3, 2017, Comeytestified in a

congressional hearing, but declined to answer questions about whether the President was
personally underinvestigation. Within days, the President decided to terminate Comey. The
President insisted that the termination letter, which was written for public release, state that Comey
had informed the President that he was not under investigation. The dayof the firing, the White
House maintained that Comey’s termination resulted from independent recommendations from the
Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Comey should be discharged for mishandling
the Hillary Clinton email investigation. But the President had decided to fire Comey before
hearing from the Departmentof Justice. The day after firing Comey, the President told Russian
officials that he had “faced great pressure because of Russia,” which had been “taken offby
Comey’s firing. The next day, the President acknowledgedin a television interview that he was
going to fire Comeyregardless of the Departmentof Justice’s recommendation and that when he
“decided to just doit,” he was thinking that “this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-upstory.”
In responseto a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation,
the President said, “As far as I’m concerned, I wantthat thing to be absolutely done properly,”
adding thatfiring Comey “might even lengthen out the investigation.”
The appointmentof a Special Counselandefforts to remove him. On May17, 2017, the

Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation appointed a Special Counsel to conductthe
investigation and related matters. The President reacted to news that a Special Counsel had been
appointedbytelling advisors that it was “the end of his presidency” and demanding that Sessions
resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, but the President ultimately did not accept it. The
Presidenttold aides that the Special Counsel hadconflicts of interest and suggested that the Special
Counsel therefore could not serve. The President’s advisors told him the asserted conflicts were
meritless and had already been considered by the Departmentof Justice.
On June 14, 2017, the media reported that the Special Counsel’s Office was investigating
whetherthe President had obstructed justice. Press reports called this “a major turning point” in
the investigation: while Comey had told the President he was not under investigation, following
Comey’s firing, the President now was under investigation. The President reacted to this news
with a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the Special Counsel’s
investigation. On June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn at home and directed him tocall
the Acting Attorney Generaland say that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be
removed. McGahndid notcarry outthe direction, however, deciding that he would resign rather
than trigger what he regardedas a potential Saturday Night Massacre.
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Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel’s investigation. Two days after directing McGahn
to have the Special Counsel removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of
the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with
his former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski,a trusted advisor outside the government, and
dictated a message for Lewandowskito deliver to Sessions. The messagesaid that Sessions should
publicly announcethat, notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation, the investigation
was“very unfair” to the President, the President had done nothing wrong,and Sessionsplanned to
meet with the Special Counsel and “let [him] move forward with investigating election meddling
for future elections.” Lewandowskisaid he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do.
One month later, in another private meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the
President asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel
investigation to future election interference. Lewandowskitold the President that the message
would be delivered soon. Hoursafter that meeting, the President publicly criticized Sessions in an
interview with the New York Times, and then issued a series of tweets making it clear that
Sessions’s job was in jeopardy. Lewandowski did not want to deliver the President’s message
personally, so he asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions.
Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through.
Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence. In the summerof 2017, the President
learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between senior campaignofficials, including Donald Trump Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was
said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as “part of Russia and its
government’s support for Mr. Trump.” Onseveral occasions, the President directed aides not to
publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not
leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the emails
became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by deleting a line that
acknowledged that the meeting was with “an individual who [TrumpJr.] was told might have
information helpful to the campaign” and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions
of Russian children. When the press asked questions aboutthe President’s involvement in Trump
Jr.’s statement, the President’s personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any
role.
Further efforts to have the Attorney Generaltake controlof the investigation. \n early
summer 2017, the President called Sessions at home and again asked him to reverse his recusal
from the Russia investigation. Sessionsdid not reverse his recusal. In October 2017, the President
met privately with Sessionsin the Oval Office and asked him to “take [a] look”at investigating
Clinton. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
agreement, the President met with Sessions in the Oval Office and suggested, according to notes
taken by a senior advisor, that if Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia
investigation, he would be a “hero.” The President told Sessions, “I’m not going to do anything
or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly.” In response, Sessions volunteered
that he had never seen anything “improper” on the campaign and told the President there was a
“whole new leadership team” in place. He did not unrecuse.
Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special
Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the President had directed McGahn to
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have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather
than carry out the order. The President reacted to the newsstories by directing White House
officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to
have the Special Counsel removed. McGahntold those officials that the media reports were
accuratein stating that the President had directed McGahnto have the Special Counsel removed.
The President then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the
reports. In the same meeting, the President also asked McGahn whyhe had told the Special
Counsel about the President’s effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahntook notes
of his conversations with the President. McGahnrefused to back away from what he remembered
happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle.
Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, DO. After Flynn withdrew from a joint defense
agreementwith the President and began cooperating with the government, the President’s personal
counsel left a message for Flynn’s attorneys reminding them of the President’s warm feelings
towards Flynn, which he said “still remains,” and asking for a “heads up” if Flynn knew
“information that implicates the President.” When Flynn’s counsel reiterated that Flynn could no
longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President’s personal counsel
said he would makesure that the President knew that Flynn’s actions reflected “hostility” towards
the President. During Manafort’s prosecution and when the jury in his criminal, trial was
deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated
unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the President called
Manafort “a brave man” for refusing to “break” and said that “flipping” “almost ought to be
outlawed.” GET w iEvacre
Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The President’s conduct towards Michael Cohen, a
former Trump Organization executive, changed from praise for Cohen whenhe falsely minimized
the President’s involvement in the Trump Tower Moscowproject, to castigation of Cohen when
he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the
Trump Tower Moscowproject on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate
Trump on the project numeroustimes, including discussing whether Trump shouldtravel to Russia
to advance the deal. In 2017, Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project,
including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed
travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhereto a “party line” that Cohen said was developed to
minimizethe President’s connections to Russia. While preparing for his congressional testimony,
Cohenhad extensive discussions with the President’s personal counsel, who, according to Cohen,
said that Cohen should “stay on message” and not contradict the President. After the FBI searched
Cohen’s home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not
“flip,” contacted him directly to tell him to “stay strong,” and privately passed messagesof support
to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President’s personal counsel and believed that if
he stayed on message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the
governmentin the summerof 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a “rat,” and
suggested that his family members had committed crimes.
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Overarching factual issues. We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about
these facts, but the evidence weobtained supports several general statements about the President’s
conduct.
Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-of-

justice cases. First, the investigation concerned the President, and some of his actions, such as
firing the FBI director, involved facially lawful acts within his Article IT authority, which raises
constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time, the President’s position as the head of
the Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official
proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses—all of which is relevant to a potential
obstruction-of-justice analysis. Second, unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of
justice to cover up a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was
involved in an underlying crimerelated to Russianelection interference. Although the obstruction
statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of
the President’s intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. Third,
manyofthe President’s acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with
the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, took place in public view. That
circumstance is unusual, but no principle of law excludes public acts from the reach of the
obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is to influence witnessesoralter their testimony,
the harm to the justice system’s integrity is the same.
Althoughtheseries of events we investigated involved discrete acts, the overall pattern of

the President’s conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the President’s
acts and the inferences that can be drawn abouthis intent. In particular, the actions we investigated
can be divided into two phases, reflecting a possible shift in the President’s motives. The first
phase coveredthe period from the President’s first interactions with Comey through the President’s
firing of Comey. During that time, the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally
underinvestigation. Soon after the firing of Comey and the appointmentof the Special Counsel,
however, the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an
obstruction-of-justice inquiry. At that point, the President engaged in a second phase of conduct,
involving public attacks on the investigation, non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both
public and private to encourage witnesses notto cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about
the nature of the President’s motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the
evidence.
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES
The President’s counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible

obstruction-of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. We concluded that none of those
legal defenses provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts.
Statutory defenses. Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice’s general
approach tointerpreting obstruction statutes, we concluded that several statutes could apply here.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3), 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus
obstruction-of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or
contemplated official proceedings. Noprinciple of statutory construction justifies narrowing the
provision to cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections
1503 and 1505also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury,
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judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, and they are supplemented by a provision
in Section 1512(b) aimed specifically at conduct intended to preventor hinder the communication
to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime.
Constitutional defenses. As for constitutional defenses arising from the President’s status
as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Departmentof Justice and the courts
have not. definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the
framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. The
Department of Justice and the President’s personal counsel have recognized that the Presidentis
subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury
because that conduct doesnot implicate his constitutional authority. With respect to whether the
President can be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers underArticle II of the
Constitution, we concluded that Congress hasauthority to prohibit a President’s corrupt use of his
authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration ofjustice.
Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and
permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers.
The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including
those of courts and grand juries, from corrupt, obstructive acts regardlessof their source. We also
concludedthat any inroadonpresidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corruptacts
does not undermine the President’s ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term
“corruptly” sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an
intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someoneelse, inconsistent with official duty
and the rights of others. A preclusion of “corrupt”official action does not diminish the President’s
ability to exercise Article Il powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not
demandfreedom for the Presidentto act with a corrupt intention ofshielding himself from criminal
punishment, avoiding financialliability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary,
a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than
hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration ofthe law. It also aligns with the President’s
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. Finally, we concluded that in the rare case in
which a criminal investigation of the President’s conduct is justified, inquiries to determine
whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance
of his constitutionally assigned duties. The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction
laws to the President’s corrupt exercise of the powers of office accords with our constitutional
system of checks and balancesandtheprinciple that no person is abovethe law.
CONCLUSION
Because we determined not to makea traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw
ultimate conclusions about the President’s conduct. The evidence we obtained about the
President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were
making traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a
thorough investigation ofthe facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction ofjustice,
we would so state. Based on thefacts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach
that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a
crime, it also does not exonerate him.
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I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
A. Legal Frameworkof Obstruction of Justice
The May 17, 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this
Office with jurisdiction to investigate “federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent
to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice,
destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.” 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Because of that
description ofourjurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction-of-justice investigation with
the elements of obstruction offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the
elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that
govern a prosecutorial decision underthe Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual
§ 9-27.000 et seq. (2018).
Here, we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction
statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the uniqueconstitutional issues that
arise in an inquiry into official acts by the President. Those issues are discussed in a later section
of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President’s counsel have raised. See
Volume II, Section III.B, infra.
Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes: (1) an
obstructive act; (2) a nexus betweenthe obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3) a corrupt
intent. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(c)(2). We describe those elements as they have
beeninterpreted by the courts. We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering,
see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to
obstruct justice, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512(c)(2).
Obstructive act. Obstruction-of-justice law “reaches all corrupt conduct capable of

producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered, regardless of the means
employed.” United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1503). An “effort to influence” a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct
justice even if the effort was “subtle or circuitous” and “however cleverly or with whatever
cloaking of purpose” it was made. United States v. Roe, 529 F.2d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 1975); see
also United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). The verbs “‘obstruct or impede’
are broad” and“can refer to anything that blocks, makesdifficult, or hinders.” Marinello v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
An improper motive can render an actor’s conduct criminal even when the conduct would
otherwise be lawful and within the actor’s authority. See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620,
631 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming obstruction conviction ofa criminal defense attorney for “litigation-
related conduct”); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) (“any act by any
party—whether lawful or unlawful on its face—may abridge § 1503 if performed with a corrupt
motive”).
Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding. Obstruction-of-justice law

generally requires a nexus, or connection,to an official proceeding. In Section 1503, the nexus
mustbe to pending “judicial or grand jury proceedings.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593,
Arttorney—WorkPreduet // Protected
599 (1995). In Section 1505, the nexus can include a connection to a “pending” federal agency
proceeding or a congressionalinquiry or investigation. Under both statutes, the government must
demonstrate “a relationship in time, causation, or logic” between the obstructive act and the
proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed. Jd. at 599; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. UnitedStates,
544 U.S. 696, 707-708 (2005). Section 1512(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official
proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A). “For
purposes of” Section 1512, “an official proceeding need not be pending or aboutto be instituted
at the time of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). Although a proceeding need notalready bein
progressto trigger liability under Section 1512(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceedingstill must
be shown. United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Petruk, 781
F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). The nexus requirement narrows the
scope of obstruction statutes to ensure that individuals have “fair warning” of what the law
proscribes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an objective matter, a
defendant must act “in a manner thatis /ikely to obstruct justice,” such that the statute “excludes
defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably
be successful.” Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
“(T]he endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due
administration of justice.” Jd. at 599 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a
subjective matter, the actor must have “contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding.”
Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445-446.. A defendant need not directly impede the proceeding. Rather, a
nexusexists if “discretionary actions of a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial
proceedingif it was foreseeable to the defendantthat the third party would act on the [defendant’s]
communication in such a wayasto obstruct the judicial proceeding.” United States v. Martinez,
862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (brackets,ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Corruptly. The word “corruptly” provides the intent element for obstruction ofjustice and
means acting “knowingly and dishonestly” or “with an improper motive.” United States v.
Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 508 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151
(10th Cir. 2013) (to act corruptly means to “act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in
conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct” the
relevant proceeding) (some quotation marks omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (“As used in section
1505, the term ‘corruptly’ means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing
another.”); see also Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (interpreting “corruptly” to mean
“wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil” and holding that acting “knowingly . . . corruptly” in 18
U.S.C. § 1512(b) requires “consciousness of wrongdoing”). The requisite showing is made when
a person acted with an intent to obtain an “improper advantage for [him]self or someone else,
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d
ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Aguilar, 515 U.S. at
616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the
“longstanding and well-accepted meaning”of “corruptly”).
Witness tampering. A morespecific provision in Section 1512 prohibits tampering with a

witness. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (3) (making it a crime to “knowingly use[] intimidation ...
or corruptly persuade[] another person,” or “engage[] in misleading conduct towards another
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person,”with the intent to “influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any personin anofficial
proceeding” or to “hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcementofficer. . .
of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense”). To
establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to
investigators in contemplationof a likely federal investigation into his conduct. UnitedStatesv.
Edlind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Sparks, 791 F.3d 1188, 1191-1192
(10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 23-26 (Ist Cir. 2006); United States v.
LaShay, 417 F.3d 715, 718-719 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 539-540
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 1999). The
“persuasion” need not be coercive, intimidating, or explicit; it is sufficient to “urge,” “induce,”
“ask[],” “argu[e],” “giv[e] reasons,” Sparks, 791 F.3d at 1192, or “coach[] or remind[] witnesses
by planting misleading facts,” Edlind, 887 F.3d at 174. Corrupt persuasion is shown “where a
defendanttells a potential witness a false story asif the story were true, intending that the witness
believe the story and testify to it.” United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1986); see
United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). It also covers urging a witness to recall
a fact that the witness did not know, evenif the fact was actually true. See LaShay, 417 F.3d at
719. Corrupt persuasion also can be shownin certain circumstances when a person, with an
improper motive, urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement. See United States v.
Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cr. 1998) (telling Secretary “not to [say] anything [to the FBI]
and [she] would not be bothered”).
Whenthe chargeis acting with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication
of information to law enforcement under Section 1512(b)(3), the “nexus” to a proceeding inquiry
articulated in Aguilar—that an individual have “knowledge that his actionsare likely to affect the
judicial proceeding,” 515 U.S. at 599—does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the
communication of information to investigators, not at impeding an official proceeding.
Acting “knowingly . . . corruptly” requires proof that the individual was “conscious of
wrongdoing.” Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (declining to explore “[t]he outer limits of
this element” but indicating that an instruction was infirm whereit permitted conviction even if
the defendant“honestly and sincerely believed that [the] conduct was lawful”). It is an affirmative
defensethat “the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct andthat the defendant’s sole intention
was to encourage, induce, or cause the otherperson to testify truthfully.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e).
Attempts and endeavors. Section 1512(c)(2) covers both substantive obstruction offenses
and attempts to obstruct justice. Under general principles of attempt law, a person is guilty of an
attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that
constitutes a substantial step towards that goal. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S.
102, 106-107 (2007). “[T]he act [must be] substantial, in that it was strongly corroborative of the
defendant’s criminal purpose.” United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). While
“mere abstract talk” does not suffice, any “concrete and specific” acts that corroborate the
defendant’s intent can constitute a “substantial step.” United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1198-
1205 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, “soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an
element of the crime” may qualify as a substantial step. Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)(g); see United
States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 781 (8th Cir. 2007).
11
The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 prohibits an “endeavor” to obstruct justice, which
sweeps more broadly than Section 1512’s attempt provision. See United States v. Sampson, 898
F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988)
(collecting cases). “It is well established that a[n] [obstruction-of-justice] offense is complete
when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice; the
prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or
impeded.” United States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations
After the appointment of the Special Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the
following eventsrelating to potential issues of obstruction ofjustice involving the President:
(a) The President’s January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Comey in which
the President reportedly asked for Comey’s loyalty, one day after the White House had
been briefed by the Departmentof Justice on contacts between former National Security
Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador;
(b) The President’s February 14, 2017 meeting with Comeyin which the President reportedly
asked Comeynotto pursue an investigation of Flynn;
(c) The President’s private requests to Comey to make public the fact that the President was
not the subject of an FBIinvestigation and to lift what the President regardedas a cloud;
(d) The President’s outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the Directors of the
National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI’s Russia
investigation;
(ec) The President’s stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, including
statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBI’s Russia
investigation wasa factor in Comey’s termination; and
(f) The President’s reported involvementin issuing a statement aboutthe June 9, 2016 Trump
Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the
meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the
Trump Campaign with derogatory information aboutHillary Clinton.
Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional
principles (discussed below in Volume I], Section III, infra), we determined that there was a
sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues
involving the President.
Manyof the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation turn on an individual’s

actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary
evidence in its possession on the relevant events. We also sought and obtained the White House’s
concurrence in our conductinginterviews of White House personnel who hadrelevant information.
And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge, obtained documents on a
12
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voluntary basis when possible, and used legal process where appropriate. These investigative steps
allowed us to gather a substantial amount of evidence.
Wealso sought a voluntary interview with the President. After more than a year of
discussion, the President declined to be interviewed.
During the course of our discussions,

the President did agree to answer written questions on certain Russia-related topics, and he
provided us with answers. He did not similarly agree to provide written answers to questions on
obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately, while we believed that
wehadthe authority andlegaljustification to issue a grand jury subpoenato obtain the President’s
testimony, we chose not to do so. We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such
an investigative step would likely produce ata late stage in our investigation. We also assessed
that based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President’s actions
and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions, we had sufficient
evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the President’s
testimony. The Office’s decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in
Appendix C, infra, in a note that precedes the President’s written responses.
In assessing the evidence weobtained, we relied on commonprinciples that apply in any

investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. See,
e.g., United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[G]uilty knowledge can
rarely be established by direct evidence. .. . Therefore, mens rea elements such as knowledge or
intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United
States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The government’s case rested on
circumstantial evidence, but the mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can often be proved
through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The principle that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence
is a necessity in criminal cases, given the right of a subjectto assert his privilege against compelled
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and therefore decline to testify. Accordingly,
determinations on intent are frequently reached without the opportunity to interview an
investigatory subject.
Obstruction-of-justice cases are consistent with this rule. See, e.g., Edlind, 887 F.3d at
174, 176 (relying on “significant circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] was conscious ofher
wrongdoing” in an obstruction case; “[b]ecause evidence of intent will almost always be
circumstantial, a defendant may be found culpable where the reasonable and foreseeable
consequencesofheracts are the obstruction of justice”) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and
punctuation omitted); Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 173-174. Circumstantial evidence that illuminates
intent may include a pattern of potentially obstructive acts. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of a
crime, wrong, or other act... may be admissible .. . [to] prov[e] motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”); see, e.g., United
States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648-650 (Ist Cir. 1996); United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d
823, 832-834 (7th Cir. 1985); Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 1000.
Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts and circumstantial
evidence. Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in
13
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assessing credibility. These include whether a witness had a reason notto tell the truth; whether
the witness had a good memory; whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events
about which hetestified; whether the witness’s testimony was corroborated by other witnesses;
and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. See, e.g.,
First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 1.06 (2018); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions
(Criminal Cases) § 1.08 (2012); Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.01 (2012).
In addition to those general factors, we took into account morespecific factors in assessing
the credibility of conflicting accounts ofthe facts. For example, contemporaneous written notes
can provide strong corroborating evidence. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 232 (1975)
(the fact that a “statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report . . . would tend
strongly to corroborate the investigator’s version of the interview”). Similarly, a witness’s
recitation of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness’s
credibility. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (1995) (“A consistent statement that
predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a
consequenceof that motive.”). Finally, a witness’s false description of an encounter can imply
consciousness of wrongdoing. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(noting the “well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence—often strong
evidence—ofguilt”). We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of
our investigation.
14
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II, FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
Thissection of the report details the evidence we obtained. Wefirst provide an overview
of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, and how candidate Trump
responded. Wethen turn to the key eventsthat we investigated: the President’s conduct concerning
the FBI investigation of Michael Flynn; the President’s reaction to public confirmation of the FBI’s
Russia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of FBI Director Comey;
efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel’s
investigation; efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower
meeting between Russians and senior campaignofficials; efforts to have the Attorney General
unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses.
Wesummarize the evidence we found andthenanalyzeit by reference to the three statutory

obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and intent. We focus on
elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has“jurisdiction . . . to investigate . . . federal
crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel’s
investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
witnesses.” 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal
obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and
analyzed them within an elements framework—while refraining from reaching ultimate
conclusions about whether crimes were committed, for the reasons explained above. This section
also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those
defenses are analyzed in VolumeII, SectionIII, infra.
A. The Campaign’s Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump
During the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions abouta possible connection between
the Trump Campaign and Russia.’ The questions intensified after WikiLeaksreleased politically
damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump
responded to questions aboutpossible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement
in Russia—even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late
as June 2016. Trumpalso expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same
time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any
further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questionspersisted about possible
links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any
connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election
interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy ofhis election.*
7 This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information
contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump’s responseto those stories in context. Volume
I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media
during the campaign.
5 As discussed in VolumeI, while the investigation identified numerous links betweenindividuals
with ties to the Russian government andindividuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with
representatives of the Russian governmentto interfere in the 2016 election.
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1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia
On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the
Republican candidate for President.’ By early 2016, he distinguished himself among Republican
candidates by speaking of closer ties with Russia,!° saying he would get along well with Russian
President Vladimir Putin,'! questioning whether the NATOalliance was obsolete,'? and praising
Putin as a “strong leader.”!? Thepress reported that Russian political analysts and commentators
perceived Trumpas favorable to Russia.'*
Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that
several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example, the press reported
that campaign advisor Michael Flynn wasseated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow
in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst.'° The press also
reported that foreign policy advisor Carter Page hadties to a Russian state-run gas company,'° and
that campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the “Russian-backed former Ukrainian
president Viktor Yanukovych.”!” In addition, the press raised questions during the Republican
@realDonaldTrump 6/16/15 (11:57 a.m. ET) Tweet.

© See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (Trump:“I think
it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along”); Presidential Candidate
Donald Trump News Conference, Hanahan, South Carolina, C-SPAN (Feb. 15, 2016) (“You want to make
a good deal for the country, you want to deal with Russia.”).
"| See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN (July 8, 2015) (“I think I get along with [Putin]
fine.”); Andrew Rafferty, Trump Says He Would “Get Along Very Well” With Putin, NBC (July 30, 2015),
(quoting Trump as saying,“I think T would get along very well with Vladimir Putin.”).
"2 See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump Tweet3/24/16 (7:47 a.m. ET); @realDonaldTrump Tweet3/24/16
(7:59 a.m. ET).
'3 See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (“[Putin] is a
strong leader. What am I gonna say, he’s a weak leader? He’s making mincemeatout of our President.”);
Donald Trump CampaignRally in Vandalia, Ohio, C-SPAN (Mar. 12, 2016)(“I said [Putin] was a strong
leader, which heis. I mean, he might be bad, he might be good. But he’s a strong leader.”).
'4 See, e.g., Andrew Osborn, From Russia with love: why the Kremlin backs Trump, Reuters (Mar.
24, 2016); Robert Zubrin, Trump: The Kremlin’s Candidate, National Review (Apr. 4, 2016).
'5 See, e.g., Mark Hosenball & Steve Holland, Trump being advised by ex-U.S. Lieutenant General
whofavorscloser Russia ties, Reuters (Feb. 26, 2016); Tom Hamburgeret al., Inside Trump's financialties
to Russia and his unusualflattery of Vladimir Putin, Washington Post (June 17, 2016). Certain matters
pertaining to Flynn are described in VolumeI, Section IV.B.7, supra.
'6 See, e.g., Zachary Mider, Trump’s New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin’s Gazprom,
Bloomberg (Mar. 30, 2016); Julia Iofee, Who is Carter Page?, Politico (Sep. 23, 2016). Certain matters
pertaining to Page are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.3, supra.
‘Tracy Wilkinson,In a shift, Republican platform doesn’t callfor arming Ukraine against Russia,
spurring outrage, Los Angeles Times (July 21, 2016); Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP's anti-
Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post (July 18, 2016).
16
National Convention about the Trump Campaign’s involvement in changing the Republican
platform’s stance on giving “weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces.”!8
2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks’s Release of Hacked Emails
On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government
hackers hadinfiltrated the DNC’s computer and obtained access to documents."
On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted
thousands of hacked DNC documentsrevealing sensitive internal deliberations.” Soonthereafter,
Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails
and arrangedtheir release in order to help candidate Trump.2! On July 26, 2016, the New York
Times reported that U.S. “intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have ‘high
confidence’ that the Russian government wasbehind the theft of emails and documents from the
Democratic National Committee.”
Within the Trump Campaign, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks.”
discussed with Campaignofficials that WikiLeaks
would release the hacked material.” Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the
possibility of upcoming releases OU. Michael Cohen,then-executive vice president of the
Trump Organization and special counsel to Trump, recalled hearing Harm to Ongoing
iELaCee
Cohen recalled that Trump responded,“oh good,alright,”
'8 Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP’s anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post,
Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6,
supra.
'9 Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15,
2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided by
CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research
on Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016).
2° Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands ofdocuments about Clinton
and internaldeliberations, Washington Post (July 22, 2016).
2! AmberPhillips, Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats’ emails to help Donald
Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016).
» David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C.,
New York Times (July 26, 2016).
3 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302,at 1.
4 Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also VolumeI, Section
T.D.1, supra.
5 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra. According to Cohen, after
WikiLeaks’s subsequent release of stolen DNC emails on July 22, 2016, Trumpsaid to Cohen wordsto the
effect of, Aaa Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen’s role in the candidate’s and later
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Aivaarm to Ongoing Matter 26 Manafort said that shortl after WikiLeaks’s July 22,
2016 release of hacked documents, he spoke to Trump GEMM ohare fyfake METCTs
; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that
Manafort should keep Trumpupdated.” Deputy campaign manager
Rick Gates said that Manafort was getting pressure about mia information and that
Manafort instructed Gates [Ln status updates on upcoming releases.”* Around
the same time, Gates was with Trump on a trip to an .ipor (a
eee. and shortly after the call ended, Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging
information would be coming.” were discussed within the
Campaign,” and in the summerof 2016, the Campaign wasplanning a communications strategy
based onthe possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks.?!
3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid
Candidate Trump
In the days that followed WikiLeaks’s July 22, 2016 release of hacked DNC emails, the
Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump.
On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was “[c]razy” to suggest that Russia was “dealing with
Trump”andthat “[fJor the record,” he had “ZEROinvestments in Russia.”??
In a press conference the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized “this whole thing
with Russia”as “a total deflection” and stated that it was “farfetched”and “ridiculous.”°* Trump
said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven, but stated that it would
give him “no pause” if Russia had Clinton’s emails.*° Trump added, “Russia, if you’re listening,
Thope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded
President’s activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in Volume II, Section ILK,infra, and in
Volume I, Section IV.A.1, supra.
26 Cohen 8/7/18 302,at 8.
a . As explained in footnote 197 of Volume
I, Section III.D.1.b, supra, this Office has included Manafort’s account of these events because it aligns
with those of other witnesses and is corroboratedto that extent.
28 Gates 10/25/18 302, at 4.
2° Gates 10/25/18 302,at 4.

3° Bannon 1/18/19 302,at 3.
3! Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302,at 2 (messaging strategy wasbein
formed in June/July timeframe based on claims by Assange on June 12, 2016, feet
Harm to Ongoing Matter ).
» @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet.
33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet.
34 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
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mightily by our press.”°° Trump also said that “there’s nothing that I can think ofthat I’d rather
do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now,” and in response to a
question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting
sanctions, Trump replied, “We’ll be looking at that. Yeah, we’ll be looking.”?”
During the press conference, Trump repeated “J have nothing to do with Russia” five
times.>® Hestated that “the closest [he] came to Russia” was that Russians may have purchased a
home or condos from him.*? He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in
2013 he had been interested in working with Russian companies that “wantedto put a lot of money
into developmentsin Russia” but “it never worked out.’“° He explained, “[f]rankly, I didn’t want
to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer. . . that wanted to develop
property in Moscow and other places. But we decided notto do it! The Trump Organization,
however, had been pursuing a building project in Moscow—the Trump Tower Moscow project—
from approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly updated
on developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and
by Trumphimself to finalizeit.”
Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump’s denial of
any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue.*? Trump told Cohen that Trump
Tower Moscow wasnota dealyet and said, “Why mentionitif it is not a deal?“ According to
Cohen,at around this time, in response to Trump’s disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign
36 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). Within five hours
of Trump’s remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary
Clinton for possible hacks. See Volume I, Section III, supra. In written answers submitted in this
investigation, the President stated that he made the “Russia, if you’re listening” statement “in jest and
sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer.” Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20,
2018), at 13 (Response to Question II, Part (d)).
37 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). In his written
answers submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that “we’ll be looking” at
Crimea and sanctions “did not communicate any position.” Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.
20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV,Part (g)).
>? Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN(July 27, 2016).
* Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
“| Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
“” The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump’s involvementin it is discussed in detail in
VolumeI, Section IV.A.1, supra, and Volume II, Section IT.K, infra.
*® Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 4.
“4 Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 4-5.
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advisors had developeda “party line” that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections
to Russia.”
In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaignreacted to reports
of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian
contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation
to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak’s residence because the timing was “not optimal” in view
of media reports about Russian interference.“® On August 19, 2016, Manafort was askedto resign
amid media coveragescrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russianpolitical party in Ukraine and links to
Russian business.*” And when the media published stories about Page’s connectionsto Russia in
September 2016, Trump Campaignofficials terminated Page’s association with the Campaign and
told the press that he had played “no role” in the Campaign.*®
On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian
intelligence agency from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.” The sameday,the federal
government announced that “the Russian Governmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails
from USpersonsandinstitutions, including from US political organizations.”°° The government
statementdirectly linked Russian hackingto the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goalofinterfering
with the presidential election, and concluded “that only Russia’s senior-most officials could have
authorized these activities” based on their “scope and sensitivity.”*!
On October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia’s
hacking and said that candidate Trump might have knownin advance thatthe hacked emails were
going to be released.°? Vice Presidential Candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump
4 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3-5. The formation of the “party line” is
described in greater detail in VolumeII, Section ILK, infra.
“6 DITFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to Pchelyakov)(stating that “[t]hese days are not
optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories”). The invitation and
Gordon’s response are discussed in VolumeI, Section IV.A.7.a, supra.
47 See, e.g., AmberPhillips, Paul Manafort’s complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington
Post (Aug. 19, 2016) (“There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into
[Manafort’s]ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine.”); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump
Aide Paul Manafort Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events
involving Manafort are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, supra.
‘8 MichaelIsikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo News
(Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon; 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon
& S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302,at 2.
“© @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet.
°° Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016).
5! Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016).
* John Wagner & Anne Gearan, Clinton campaign chairmanties email hack to Russians, suggests
Trump had early warning, Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016).
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Campaign was“in cahoots” with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information

and responded, “Nothing could befurther from the truth.”°?
4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections

with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election
On November 8, 2016, Trump waselected President. Two dayslater, Russian officials

told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump’s “immediate
entourage” during the campaign.** In response, Hope Hicks, who hadbeen the Trump Campaign
spokesperson, said, “We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with
any foreign entities before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders.”*° Hicks
gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia: “Tt never
happened. There was no communication between the campaign and anyforeign entity during the
campaign.”°°
On December10, 2016, the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had “concluded
that Russia interfered in last month’s presidential election to boost Donald Trump’s bid for the
White House.”°’ Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trumpstated, “I think it’s
ridiculous. I think it’s just another excuse.”°* He continued that no one really knew who was
responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had “noideaif it’s Russia
or China or somebody. It could be somebodysitting in a bed some place.”** The President-Elect
*3 Louis Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14, 2016).
54 Tyan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New
York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkovsaying, “[t]here
were contacts” and “I cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian
representatives”); Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,
Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkovsaying, “I don’t say that all of them, but a whole array
of them supported contacts with Russian representatives”).
5 Tyan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New
York Times (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Hicks).
56 Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,
Associated Press (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she
spoke with Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably Kushner
and Bannonto ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of them. Hicks
12/8/17 302, at 4.
57 Damien Gayle, CIA concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports,
Guardian (Dec. 10, 2016).
58 Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016).
°° Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ
21
also said that Democrats were “putting [] out” the story of Russian interference “because they
suffered oneofthe greatest defeats in the history ofpolitics.”
On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was “distorted by the
Russian intervention” and questioned whether Trump Campaignofficials had been “in touch with
the Russians.”°! The same day, incoming Chiefof Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News
Sunday and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community’s
determination that Russia intervened in the election.°* When asked about any contact or
coordination between the Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, “Even this question is insane. Of
course we didn’t interface with the Russians.”© Priebus added that “this whole thing is a spin job”
and said, “the real question is, why the Democrats . . . are doing everything they can to delegitimize
the outcomeofthe election?’
On December 29, 2016, the Obama Administration announcedthat in response to Russian

cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on
several Russian individuals and entities.When first asked about the sanctions, President-Elect
Trumpsaid, “I think we ought to get on with ourlives.”°° Hethen put out a statementthat said
“It’s time for our country to moveonto bigger and better things,” but indicated that he would meet
with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference.®”
The briefing occurred on January 6, 2017. Following the briefing, the intelligence community
released the public version of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia
had intervened in the election through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton’s
° Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ
6! David Morgan, Clinton campaign: It’s an ‘open question’ if Trump team colluded with Russia,
Reuters BusinessInsider (Dec. 18, 2016).
® Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with Incoming White House ChiefofStaff
Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016).
63 Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with Incoming White House ChiefofStaff
6 Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with Incoming White House ChiefofStaff
6 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, White House (Dec. 29, 2016); see also Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces
measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
6° John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: ‘Get on with our lives,’
Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
57 Missy Ryanet al., Obama administration announces measures to punish Russiafor 2016 election
interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
§§ Comey 11/15/17 302,at3.
22
electability.” The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian
governmenthad developed a clear preference for Trump.”
Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British
intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump’s Russia
connections under the headline “These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia.””! Ina
press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release “an absolute disgrace” and
said, “I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we’ ve
stayed away.... So I have no deals, I have no loans and J have no dealings. We could make deals
in Russia very easily if we wantedto, I just don’t wantto becauseI think that would be a conflict.”
Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian
connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian
interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory.”* Hicks, for example, said that
the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his “Achilles heel” because,
even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking
away from what he had accomplished.“ Sean Spicer, the first White House communications
director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the
legitimacyof his election.” Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack
on the legitimacy of his win.”© And Priebusrecalled that whenthe intelligence assessment came
out, the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win.””
® Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence, Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016
US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).
7 Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence, Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016
US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).
7 Ken Bensingeret al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed (Jan. 10,
2017).
® Donald Trump’s News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, New York Times (Jan. 11,
2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/1 1/us/politics/trump-press-conference-
transcript.html.
® Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 6; Bannon 2/14/18
302, at 2; Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3; see Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of
the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency).
™ Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 18.
5 Spicer 10/17/17 302,at6.
7 Gates 4/18/18 302,at 3.
™ Priebus 10/13/17 302,at 7.
23
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B. The President’s Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn
Overview
During the presidential transition, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had
two phonecalls with the Russian Ambassadorto the United States about the Russian response to
U.S. sanctions imposed because of Russia’s election interference. After the press reported on
Flynn’s contacts with the Russian Ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming Administration officials
by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls. The officials publicly repeated thoselies in
press interviews. The FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters,
interviewed him aboutthe calls in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similarlies
to the FBI. On January 26, 2017, Departmentof Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House
that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been
interviewed by the FBI. The next night, the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James
Comeyin which he asked for Comey’s loyalty. On February 13, 2017, the President asked Flynn
to resign. The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversation with Comey in which
hesaid, “T hope you can see your wayclearto letting this go, to letting Flynn go.”
Evidence
1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with

Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael
Flynnas his National Security Advisor.”® For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on
the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) coordinating policy positions and communicating with
foreign government officials, including Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey
Kislyak.”
On December 29, 2016, as noted in Volume II, Section II.A.4, supra, the Obama
Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian
individuals and entities.2° That day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails aboutthe
sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration, and Flynn informed
members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassadorlater in the day.*!
8 Flynn 11/16/17 302,at 7; President-Elect Donald J. TrumpSelects U.S. Senator JeffSessionsfor

Attorney General, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
U.S. Rep. Mike Pompeo as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, President-Elect Donald J. Trump
Press Release (Nov. 18, 2016); see also, e.g., Bryan Bender, Trump names Mike Flynn nationalsecurity
adviser, Politico, (Nov. 17, 2016).
” Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-14; Priebus 10/13/17 302,at 3-5.
8° Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
81 12/29/16 Email, O’Brien to McFarland etal.; 12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynnetal.; 12/29/16
Email, McFarland to Flynnet al.; SFO00001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty) (“Tit for tat w
Russia not good. Russian AMBO reachingout to me today.”); Flynn 1/19/18 302,at 2.
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Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to
become the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with
the President-Elect and other seniorstaff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should
communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.** McFarland had spoken with incoming
Administration officials about the sanctions and Russia’s possible responses and thought she had
mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak.*8 Based on
those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-a-
Lago did not want Russiato escalate the situation.At 4:43 p.m.that afternoon, McFarlandsent
an email to several officials about the sanctions and informedthe groupthat “Gen [F]lynnis talking
to russian ambassadorthis evening.”®>
Approximately one hourlater, McFarland met with the President-Elect and seniorofficials
and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia’s possible responses.*° Incoming Chief of Staff
Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions
situation could be “cooled down”and not escalated.*” McFarland recalled that at the end of the
meeting, someone may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the
Russian Ambassador that evening.*® McFarland did not recall any response by the President-
Elect.®® Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewedthe sanctions as an attempt by the Obama
Administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election.”
Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland on December29, 2016, Flynn
called Kistyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner,
without escalating the situation.” After the call, Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance.”
Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory
because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration.”? On December 30,
2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would nottake retaliatory measures
% Statement of Offense at 2-3, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec.1,
2017), Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3;
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
83 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-7 (recalling discussions aboutthis issue with Bannon andPriebus).
*4 Flynn Statementof Offense,at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
85 12/29/16 Email, McFarlandto Flynnetal.

86 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
57 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3.
88 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned
Flynn’s scheduled call with Kislyak at this meeting, although he was not certain. Priebus 1/18/18 302,at
3.
* McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 7.
°° Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 3.
°! Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 3-4.
® Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7-8; Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 4.
3 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 8.
25
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in response to the sanctionsat that time and would instead “plan .. . further steps to restore Russian-
US relations based onthe policies of the Trump Administration.”"4 Following that announcement,
the President-Elect tweeted, “Great move on delay (by V. Putin) - I always knew he was very
smart!””>
On December31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn’s request had been
received at the highest levels and Russia had chosennotto retaliate in response to the request.”
Later that day, Flynn told McFarlandaboutthis follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia’s
decision not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn’s request.”” McFarland recalled
that Flynn thought his phone call had made a difference.°* Flynn spoke with other incoming
Administration officials that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions.”
Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming Administration official
Stephen Bannon the next day.'° Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn’s
conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannonagreed thatthey had “stopped the train on Russia’s
response”to the sanctions.'°' On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and
thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific
recollection oftelling the President-Elect aboutthe substanceofhis calls with Kislyak.'
Membersof the intelligence community were surprised by Russia’s decision notto retaliate
in responseto the sanctions.'°? When analyzing Russia’s response, they became aware of Flynn’s
discussion of sanctions with Kislyak.'™ Previously, the FBI had openedaninvestigation of Flynn
based on his relationship with the Russian government.'® Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak became
a key componentofthat investigation.'
* Statement by the President ofRussia, President of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016) 12/30/16.
® @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (2:41 p.m. ET) Tweet.
6 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3.
7 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10; Flynn
Statement of Offense, at 3.
%8 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10; see Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4.
® Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5-6.
!00 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4-5. Bannonrecalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did not
rememberdiscussing sanctions with him. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9.
'l Flynn 11/21/17 302,at 1; Flynn 1/19/18 302,at 5.
102 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 6; Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 6.
193 McCord 7/17/17 302,at 2.
104 McCord 7/17/17 302,at 2.
195 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2-3; Comey 11/15/17 302,at 5.
106 McCord 7/17/17 302,at 2-3.
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2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community’s Assessment

of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-
Interference Investigations
On January 6, 2017, as noted in VolumeII, Section II.A.4, supra, intelligence officials

briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community’s
assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election.'°? When the briefing
concluded, Comey spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally
sensitive allegations compiled by Steele.'"8 According to a memorandum Comey drafted
immediately after their private discussion, the President-Elect began the meeting by telling Comey
he had conducted himself honorably over the prior year and had a great reputation.The
President-Elect stated that he thought highly of Comey, looked forward to working with him, and
hopedthat he plannedto stay on as FBI director.!!° Comey respondedthat he intended to continue
serving in that role.!!! Comey then briefed the President-Elect on the sensitive material in the
Steele reporting.''? Comeyrecalled that the President-Elect seemed defensive, so Comey decided
'°7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at
1-2).
'8 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former
Director of the FBI, at 1-2).
109 Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum,at 1. Comey begandrafting the memorandum summarizing the
meeting immediately after it occurred. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4. He finished the memorandum that
evening and finalized it the following morning. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4.
"© Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum,at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. Comeyidentified several other
occasions in January 2017 when the President reiterated that he hoped Comey would stay on as FBI director.
OnJanuary 11, President-Elect Trump called Comeyto discuss the Steele reports and stated that he thought
Comey was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director.
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ
Cong. Transcripts, at 90. (“[D]uring that call, he asked me again, ‘Hope you’re going to stay, you’re doing
a great job.’ And told him that I intended to.”). On January 22, at a White House reception honoring law
enforcement, the President greeted Comey andsaid he looked forward to working with him. Hearing on
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate SelectIntelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017)
(testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 22. And as discussed
in greater detail in Volume IT, Section II.D, infra, on January 27, the President invited Comey to dinnerat
the White House and said he was glad Comey wanted to stay on as FBI Director.
'! Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum,at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302,at3.
"2 Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum,at 1-2; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. Comey’s briefing included the
Steele reporting’s unverified allegation that the Russians had compromisingtapesofthe President involving
conduct when he wasa private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscowfor the Miss Universe Pageant. During
the 2016 presidential campaign, a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump. On October 30, 2016,
Michael Cohenreceived text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, “Stopped flow of
tapes from Russia but not sure if there’s anything else. Just so you know... .” 10/30/16 Text Message,
Rtskhiladze to Cohen. Rtskhiladze said “tapes” referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be
held by persons associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host
27
to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally.!'? Comeyrecalled he did not
wantthe President-Electto think ofthe conversation as a “J. Edgar Hoover move.”!'*
On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed the President-Elect on
the Steele reporting,''> and BuzzFeed Newspublished information compiled by Steele online,
stating that the information included“specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations
of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives.”''® The next day, the President-Elect
expressed concernto intelligence community leaders aboutthe fact that the information had leaked
and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele
reports.!!7
In the following weeks, three Congressional committees opened investigations to examine
Russia’s interference in the election and whether the Trump Campaign had colluded with
Russia.!!® On January 13, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced
that it would conducta bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election, including any
“links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns.”!!? On January 25,
2017, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) announced thatit had been
conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and possible coordination with the
political campaigns.'”° And on February 2, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee announcedthat
it too would investigate Russian efforts to intervenein the election.'”!
the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia. Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 12. Cohensaid he spoke to Trump
about the issue after receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 13. Rtskhiladze said he
wastold the tapes were fake, but he did not communicate that to Cohen. Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 7.
3 Comey 11/15/17 302,at 3-4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Director of the FBI, at 2).
"4 Comey 11/15/17 302,at 3.
'S See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017; updated Jan. 12, 2017).
‘6 Ken Bensingeret al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed News
(Jan. 10, 2017).
7 See 1/11/17 Email, Clapperto Comey(“He askedif I could put out a statement. He would prefer
of course that I say the documents are bogus, which, of course, I can’t do.”); 1/12/17 Email, Comey to
Clapper (“He called me at 5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation.”); Comey 11/15/17 302, at
4-5,
"8 See 2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (first published Oct. 12, 2017;
updated Mar. 1, 2019) (summarizing starting dates of Russia-related investigations).
"9 Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities, SSCI (Jan. 13, 2017).
120 Joint Statement on Progress ofBipartisan HPSCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures, HPSCI
(Jan. 25, 2017).
"21 Joint Statementfrom Senators Graham and Whitehouse on Investigation into Russian Influence
on Democratic Nations’ Elections (Feb. 2, 2017).
28
3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to

Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI
On January 12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak
communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions.” The
column questioned whether Flynn had said something to “undercut the U.S. sanctions” and
whether Flynn’s communications had violated theletter or spirit of the Logan Act.!73
President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger
aboutit.!24 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked, “What the hell is this all about?”!?°
Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn’s
conversations with Kislyak.'”° Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had
spoken to the “boss” and said Flynn neededto “kill the story.”!*” Flynn directed McFarland to
call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred.'*
McFarland recalled that Flynn said wordsto the effect of, “I wantto kill the story.”!” McFarland
madethecall as Flynn had requested although she knew she wasproviding false information, and
the Washington Post updated the columnto reflect that a “Trumpofficial” had denied that Flynn
and Kislyak discussed sanctions.!°°
When Priebus and other incoming Administration officials questioned Flynn internally
about the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with
Kislyak.'2! Flynnrepeated that claim to Vice President-Elect Michael Pence and to incomingpress
secretary Sean Spicer.'5? In subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus, and
'22 David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia’s hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
"3 David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia’s hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
The Logan Act makesit a crime for “[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he may be” to “without
authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or
intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or
controversies with the United States, or to defeat the nieasures of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 953.
'24 Driebus 1/18/18 302,at6.

25 Priebus 1/18/18 302,at6.
'26 Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 6.

27 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302,at 6.
8 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13.

29 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12.
130 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13; McFarland 8/29/17 302, at 8; see David Ignatius, Why did
Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
'3! Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7-8; S. Miller
8/31/17 302,at 8-11.
'32 Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 1, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7; S. Miller 8/31/17 302, at 10-11.
29
Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their
conversations with Flynn.'*?
The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak
had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials, who were aware that the statements were
not true.'*4 Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues—whoin turn had
unwittingly misled the American public—creating a compromisesituation for Flynn because the
Departmentof Justice assessed that the Russian governmentcould prove Flynnlied.'*° The FBI
investigative team also believed that Flynn’s calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about
discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI’s broader
Russia investigation.!*6
On January 20, 2017, President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as
National Security Advisor. On January 23, 2017, Spicer deliveredhis first press briefing and stated
that he had spoken with Flynn the night before, who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were
about topics unrelated to sanctions.'?’ Spicer’s statements added to the Departmentof Justice’s
concerns that Russia had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory
information to compromisehim.'*8
On January 24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI.'?? During
the interview, which took placeat the White House, Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak
to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the
Obama Administration.'*° Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up
conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those
sanctions as a result of Flynn’s request.'*!
'3 Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Elect Pence, CBS (Jan. 15, 2017); Julie
Hirschfield Davis et al., Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions
Were Imposed, Washington Post (Jan. 13, 2017); Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Jan.
15, 2017).
‘34 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 2-3; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 3-4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5 (DOJ officials
were “really freaked out aboutit”).
'35 Vates 8/15/17 302, at 3; McCord 7/17/17 302,at 4.
'36 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5-6.

'37 Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan. 23, 2017).
'38 Yates 8/15/17 302,at 4; Axelrod 7/20/17 302, at 5.
139 Flynn Statement of Offense,at 2.
'40 Flynn Statementof Offense,at 2.
‘4 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. On December 1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false
statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and
willfully “make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation”to federal law
enforcementofficials. See Volume I, Section IV.A.7, supra.
30
4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn
On January 26, 2017, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel
Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in
person.'42 Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security official at the
Departmentof Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel’s Office
attorney James Burnham.'? Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President
denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynnin a potentially
compromised position because the Russians would know he hadlied.'“* Yates disclosed that Flynn
had been interviewed by the FBI.'*° She declined to answera specific question about how Flynn
had performed during that interview,'*° but she indicated that Flynn’s statements to the FBI were
similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed
sanctions.'47, McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not
pinned Flynn downin lies,'“* but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the
National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn’s FBI interview and
his contacts with Kislyak.'4°
That afternoon, McGahnnotified the President that Yates had come to the White House to
discuss concerns about Flynn.!°° McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President
asked him to repeatit, so he did.'*! MceGahnrecalled that whenhe described the FBI interview of
Flynn, he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there
may not have been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.'°? The President asked about Section
1001, and McGahn explainedthe law to him, and also explained the Logan Act.!°? The President
12 Yates 8/15/17 302,at 6.

43 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6; SCRO15_000198 (2/15/17 Draft
Memorandumtofile from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
44 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4;
SCRO15_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandumto file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
43 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7; Burnham
11/3/17 302, at 4.
146 Vates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302,at 7.

47 SCRO15000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum tofile from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4.
'88 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at5.

49 SCRO15000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandumtofile from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at6, 8.
'8° McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6; SCRO15_000278 (White House Counsel’s Office Memorandum
re: “Flynn Tick Tock”) (on January 26, “McGahn IMMEDIATELYadvises POTUS”); SCRO15_000198
(2/15/17 Draft Memorandumtofile from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
‘5! McGahn 11/30/17 302,at 6.
'52 MeGahn 11/30/17 302,at 7.
‘53 MecGahn11/30/17 302, at 7.
31
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instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed
that they not discuss it with any otherofficials.'°* Priebus recalled that the President was angry
with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White Houseand said, “not again, this guy, this
stuff.”!>°
That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what
they thought about FBI Director Comey.'®* According to Director of National Intelligence Dan
Coats, who wasat the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Comey but the consensus on
him wasnotpositive.'5’ Coats told the groupthat he thought Comeywasa gooddirector.'°8 Coats
encouraged the President to meet Comey face-to-face and spend time with him before making a
decision about whetherto retain him.!°?
5. McGahnhas a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Trump

has Dinner with FBI Director Comey
The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of
Eisenberg’s initial legal research into Flynn’s conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have
violated the Espionage Act, the Logan Act, or 18 U.S.C. § 1001.'° Based onhis preliminary
research, Eisenberg informed McGahnthat there was a possibility that Flynn had violated 18
U.S.C. § 1001 and the Logan Act.'*! Eisenberg notedthat the United States had neversuccessfully
prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act and that Flynn could have possible defenses, and
‘54 MicGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7; SCRO15_000198-99 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandumtofile from the
Office of the Counselto the President).
155 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 8. Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn
for other reasons at this time. Bannon said that Flynn’s standing with the President was not good by
December 2016. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 12. The President-Elect had concerns because President Obama
had warned him about Flynn shortly after the election. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/8/17 302, at
7 (President Obama’s commentsat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said
that the President had become unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke
and had become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings. Priebus
1/18/18 302, at 8. Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgmentand was angeredby tweets
sent by Flynn and his son, and she described Flynn as “being on thin ice” by early February 2017. Hicks
12/8/17 302, at 7, 10.
'56 Coats 6/14/17 302,at 2.
'57 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
58 Coats 6/14/17 302,at 2.

'S? Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
‘69 SCRO15_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8.
‘61 SCRO15_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandumto file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
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told McGahnthat he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge
underthe circumstances.!©
That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn
again.'® In that second meeting, McGahn expressed doubts that the Department of Justice would
bring a Logan Actprosecution against Flynn, but stated that the White House did not wantto take
action that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn.' Yates responded that
Department of Justice had notified the White House so thatit could take action in responseto the
information provided.'® McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying
information the Departmentof Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn’s discussions with Kislyak.'%
Also on January 27, the President called FBI Director Comey and invited him to dinner
that evening.'©” Priebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President somethinglike, “don’t
talk about Russia, whatever you do,” and the President promised he would nottalk about Russia
at the dinner.'®* McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not communicate
directly with the Departmentof Justice to avoid the perceptionorreality of political interference
in law enforcement.'® When Bannonlearned about the President’s planned dinner with Comey,
he suggested that he or Priebus also attend, but the President stated that he wanted to dine with
Comeyalone.'”° Comeysaid that when he arrived for the dinner that evening, he was surprised
and concernedto see that no oneelse had been invited.!”!
'8 SCRO15_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
‘63 SCRO15_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8; Yates 8/15/17 302,at 8.
164 Vates 8/15/17 302, at 9; McGahn11/30/17 302, at8.
165 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5; see SCROIS00199 (2/15/17 Draft
Memorandumtofile from the Office of the Counsel to the President) (“Yates was unwilling to confirm or
deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not
object to the White House taking action against Flynn.”).
'66 Vates 9/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5. In accordance with McGahn’s request, the
Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewedthe information in
early February. Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at | (documenting
2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).
‘67 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6; SCRO12b_000001 (President’s Daily Diary, 1/27/17); Hearing on
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017)
(Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 2-3).
168 Priebus 10/13/17 302,at 17.

169 See McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2; Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 17.
™ Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 17.

'" Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statementfor the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at
3); see Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6.
33
Comeyprovided an accountof the dinner in a contemporaneous memo,an interview with

this Office, and congressional testimony. According to Comey’s account of the dinner, the
President repeatedly brought up Comey’s future, asking whether he wanted to stay on as FBI
director.'”* Because the President had previously said he wanted Comeyto stay on as FBI director,
Comeyinterpreted the President’s comments as an effort to create a patronage relationship by
having Comeyask for his job.'” The President also brought up the Steele reporting that Comey
hadraised in the January 6, 2017 briefing and stated that he wasthinking about ordering the FBI
to investigate the allegations to prove they were false.!”* Comey responded that the President
should think carefully about issuing such an order becauseit could create a narrative that the FBI
was investigating him personally, which wasincorrect.'”? Later in the dinner, the President
brought up Flynn andsaid, “the guy has serious judgmentissues.”!”° Comey did not comment on
Flynn andthe President did not acknowledge any FBIinterest in or contact with Flynn.'””
According to Comey’s account, at one point during the dinnerthe Presidentstated, “I need
loyalty, I expect loyalty.”!”8 Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other
topics, but the President returned to the subject of Comey’s job at the end of the dinner and
repeated, “I need loyalty.”'7? Comey responded,“Youwill always get honesty from me.”!®° The
'2 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum,at 1, 3; Hearing on Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statementfor
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3).
3 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statementfor the Record of James B. Comey, former
Director of the FBI,at 3).
'%4 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum,at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,
formerDirector of the FBI, at 4).
5 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum,at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statementfor the Record of James B. Comey,
formerDirectorof the FBI, at 4).
'%6 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 4; Comey 11/15/17 302,at 7.
7 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum,at 4, Comey 11/15/17 302,at 7.
"8 Comey 1/28/18 Memorandum, at 2; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
'9 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
the Record of James B. Comey, former Directorof the FBI, at 3-4).
180 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
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President said, “That’s what I want, honest loyalty.”'*! Comeysaid, “You will get that from
me 99182
After Comey’s account ofthe dinner becamepublic, the President and his advisors disputed
that he had asked for Comey’s loyalty.'® The President also indicated that he had notinvited
Comeytodinner, telling a reporter that he thought Comey had “asked for the dinner” because “he
wanted to stay on.”!84 But substantial evidence corroborates Comey’s account of the dinner
invitation and the request for loyalty. The President’s Daily Diary confirms that the President
“extend[ed] a dinner invitation” to Comey on January 27.'*° With respect to the substanceof the
dinner conversation, Comey documented the President’s request for loyalty in a memorandum he
began drafting the night of the dinner;'*° senior FBI officials recall that Comey told them about
the loyalty request shortly after the dinner occurred;!*” and Comey described the request while
'81 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum,at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
'82 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
'83 See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey
Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, “[The President] would
never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty”); Ali Vitali, Trump Never Asked for Comey’s
Loyalty, President’s Personal Lawyer Says, NBC (June 8, 2017) (quoting the President’s personal counsel
as saying, “The president also never told Mr. Comey, ‘I need loyalty, I expect loyalty,’ in form or
substance.”); Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (June 9, 2017) (“TI hardly
know the man. I’m not going to say ‘I wantyouto pledge allegiance.’, Who would do that? Who would
ask a manto pledge allegiance under oath?”). In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stated
that he had never asked for Comey’s loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, “Who cares?”
Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 4. The President also told McGahnthat he never said what Comeysaid he had.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17.
18 Interview ofDonald J. Trump, NBC (May11, 2017).
'85 SCRO12b_000001 (President’s Daily Diary, 1/27/17) (reflecting that the President called Comey
in the morning on January 27 and “[t]he purposeofthe call was to extend a dinner invitation”). In addition,
two witnesses corroborate Comey’s accountthat the President reached out to schedule the dinner, without
Comey having asked for it. Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 17 (the President asked to schedule the January 27
dinner because he did not know much about Comeyand intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on
as FBI Director); Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3 (recalling that Comey told him about the President’s dinner
invitation on the day of the dinner).
'86 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 8; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
187 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9-10; Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3. After leaving the White House,
Comeycalled Deputy Director of the FBI Andrew McCabe, summarized what he and the President had
discussed, including the President’s request for loyalty, and expressed shock over the President’s request.
McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9. Comey also convened a meeting with his senior leadership team to discuss what
the President had asked of him during the dinner and whether he had handled the request for loyalty
properly. McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 10; Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3. In addition, Comey distributed his
35
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under oath in congressional proceedingsand in a subsequent interview with investigators subject

to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey’s memory ofthe details of the dinner,
including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout.'**
6. Flynn’s Resignation
On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn’s

calls with Kislyak.'8? Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum aboutcriminalstatutes
that could apply to Flynn’s conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough
information to make a definitive recommendation to the President.'°° Eisenberg and McGahn
discussed that Eisenberg’s review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary
conclusion that Flynn wasunlikely to be prosecutedfor violating the Logan Act.'*! Because White
Houseofficials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could notassess his
exposure to prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.!%
The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the
Oval Office about the negative media coverageofhis contacts with Kislyak.'*? Flynn recalled that
the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations.'"4 Flynnlisted the
specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of
the dates he listed.!°° The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn
responded that he might havetalked about sanctions.'°°
memorandum documenting the dinner to his senior leadership team, and McCabe confirmed that the
memorandum captured what Comey said on the telephone call immediately following the dinner. McCabe
8/17/17 302, at 9-10.
188 There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrote
documentinghis interactions with the President. For example, Comeyrecalled, and his memorandareflect,
that he told the President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April 11,
2017, that the FBI was not investigating the President personally. On May8, 2017, during White House
discussions about firing Comey, the President told Rosenstein and others that Comey had told him three
times that he wasnot under investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058
(Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
'89 Bisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication,at 1 (documenting 2/2/17
meeting with Eisenberg).
‘9° Risenberg 11/29/17 302, at 6.
‘9! Risenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; SCRO15_000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandumtofile from the
Office of the Counsel to the President).
'2 Risenberg 11/29/17 302,at 9.
3 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.
© Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.

'95 Plynn 11/21/17 302,at 2.
'96 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3.
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On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with
Kislyak the month before the President took office.!?’ After the publication of that story, Vice
President Pence learned of the Departmentof Justice’s notification to the White House about the
content of Flynn’s calls.!°® He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the
underlying information about Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak.'” FBI Deputy Director Andrew
McCabe, who provided the White Houseofficials access to the information and was present when
they reviewed it, recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn’s conductviolated the Logan
Act.2° McCabe respondedthat he did not know, but the FBI wasinvestigating the matter because
it was a possibility.2°' Based on the evidence of Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and
Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions
and hadinstead been lying about whathe discussed with Kislyak.” Flynn had also told White
Houseofficials that the FBI had told him that the FBI wasclosingoutits investigation of him,*°
but Eisenberg did not believe him.2 After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn,
McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommendedthat course of
action to the President.?°>
That weekend, Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago.? Flynn recalled that on
February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether
he hadlied to the Vice President.”°’ Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his
calls, but he did not think he lied.2°* The President responded, “Okay. That’s fine. I gotit.”
'7 Greg Miller et al., National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian
ambassador,despite denials, officials say, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017).
'98 $CRO15_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.
‘9 SCRO15_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandumto file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 11-13; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.
200 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.

201 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.
2022 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10;
SCRO15_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandumto file from the Office of the Counselto the President).
203 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 11; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; Priebus 10/13/17 302,at 11.
204 Risenberg 11/29/17 302,at 9.
2°5 SCRO15_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum tofile from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.
206 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at8.

207 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at8.
208 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302,at 9.
2 Flynn 1/19/18 302,at 9.
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OnFebruary 13, 2017, Priebus told Flynn he hadto resign.?'° Flynn said he wanted to say
goodbyeto the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office.”!! Priebus recalled that the
President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, “We'll give you a good recommendation.
You're a good guy. We’ll take care of you.”?!?
Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel’s Office and
distributed to the White House communications team stated that McGahn had advised the
President that Flynn wasunlikely to be prosecuted, and the President had determinedthat the issue
with Flynn wasone oftrust.2!3 Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn wasforcedto resign
“not based on legal issue, but based ona trustissue, [where] a level of trust between the President
and GeneralFlynn had erodedto the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change.”?!4
7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey
On February 14, 2017, the day after Flynn’s resignation, the President had lunch at the
White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.2!> According to Christie, at one point
duringthe lunch the Presidentsaid,“Now thatwefired Flynn,the Russiathingis over.”?!° Christie
laughed and responded, “No way.””!7 Hesaid, “this Russia thing is far from over” and “[w]e’ll be
here on Valentine’s Day 2018 talking aboutthis.”?'* The President said, “[w]hat do you mean?
Flynn met with the Russians. That wasthe problem. I fired Flynn. It’s over.””'? Christie recalled
responding that based on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been
investigated, firing Flynn would not end the investigation.” Christie said there was no way to
makean investigation shorter, but a lot of ways to makeit longer.*!_ The President asked Christie
what he meant, and Christie told the President notto talk about the investigation even if he was
219 Driebus 1/18/18 302, at 9.

211 Driebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 10.
212 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302,at 10.
213 §CRO04_00600 (2/16/17 Email, Burnham to Donaldson).
214 Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017). After Flynn pleaded guilty
to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in December2017, the President tweeted,“I hadto fire General Flynn because
he lied to the Vice President and the FBI.” @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (12:14 p.m. ET) Tweet. The next
day, the President’s personal counsel told the press that he had drafted the tweet. Maegan Vazquezetal.,
Trump’s lawyer says he was behind President’s tweet aboutfiring Flynn, CNN (Dec. 3, 2017).
215 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 2-3; SCRO12b_000022(Presidents Daily Diary, 2/14/17).
216 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
217 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
218 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie said he thought whenthe Presidentsaid “the Russia thing”
he wasreferring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia. Christie thought the
more important thing wasthat there was an investigation. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4.
219 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 3.
229 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
221 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
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frustrated at times.?2 Christie also told the President that he would neverbe ableto get rid of
Flynn,“like gum on the bottom of your shoe.”?”
Towards the endofthe lunch, the President brought up Comey and asked if Christie was
still friendly with him.?** Christie said he was.”° The President told Christie to call Comey and
tell him that the President“really like[s] him. Tell him he’s part of the team.”””6 At the end ofthe
lunch, the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey.”” Christie had no
intention of complying with the President’s request that he contact Comey.** He thought the
President’s request was “nonsensical” and Christie did not want to put Comeyin the position of
having to receive such a phonecall.” Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass
on that message.2°
At 4 p.m. that afternoon,the President met with Comey, Sessions, and other officials for a
homeland security briefing.2! At the end of the briefing, the President dismissed the other
attendees andstated that he wanted to speak to Comeyalone.”** Sessionsand senioradvisorto the
President Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other participants left, but the President
222 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 3-4.

223 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie also recalled that during the lunch, Flynn called Kushner,
who was at the lunch, and complained about whatSpicer had said about Flynn in his press briefing that
day. Kushner told Flynn words to the effect of, “You know the President respects you. The President cares
about you. I’ll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later.” Kushner looked at the
President when he mentioned the tweet, and the President nodded his assent. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
Flynn recalled getting upset at Spicer’s commentsin the press conference and calling Kushnerto say he did
not appreciate the comments. Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.
224 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 4.
225 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4.
226 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 4-5.
227 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 5.
228 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 5.
229 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5.
230 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5.

31 SCRO12b_000022 (President’s Daily Diary, 2/14/17); Comey 11/15/17 302,at 9.
232 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; 2/14/17 Comey Memorandum,at 1; Hearing on Russian Election
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18 (confirming
that everyone was shooedout“like Comey said” in his June testimony).
39
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excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey.?* At somepoint after others
had left the Oval Office, Priebus openedthe door, but the President sent him away.?*4
According to Comey’s accountof the meeting, once they were alone, the President began
the conversation by saying,“I want to talk about Mike Flynn.”?> The Presidentstated that Flynn
had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to be terminated because he
had misled the Vice President.The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified
information, but the President returned to Flynn, saying “the is a good guy and has been through a
lot.”*37 The Presidentstated, “I hope you cansee your waycleartoletting this go,to letting Flynn
go. He is a good guy. I hope you canletthis go.”"°8 Comey agreed that Flynn “is a good guy,”
but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn.”? Comey testified under oath that he
took the President’s statement “as a direction” because of the President’s position and the
circumstances ofthe one-on-one meeting.?”
33 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election
the Record of James B. Comey,former Director of the FBI, at 4). Sessions recalled that the President asked
to speak to Comey alone and that Sessions was one ofthe last to leave the room; he described Comey’s
testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as “pretty accurate.”
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 6. Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Comeyto stay
behind. Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 24.
234 Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18.
35 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum,at 1; Hearing on Russian Election
formerDirector of the FBI, at 5).
37 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2; Hearing on Russian Election
238 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
5); Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2. Comey said he was highly confident that the words in quotations
in his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President. He said he
knew from the outset of the meeting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence, and he
remembered the wordsused by the President and wrote them downsoonafter the meeting. Comey 11/15/17
302, at 10-11.
39 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2.
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 31) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director
of the FBI). Comey furtherstated,“I mean,this is the president of the United States, with me alone,saying,
‘T hope’ this. I tookit as, this is what he wants meto do.” Jd.; see also Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10 (Comey
took the statement as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation).
40
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Shortly after meeting with the President, Comey began drafting a memorandum
documentingtheir conversation.““! Comey also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the
President’s request, and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the
President’s statementsso the officials would notbe influencedby the request.”*? Comeyalso asked
fora menting with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Comeyalone with the President
again.?3
8. The Media Raises Questions About the President’s Delay in Terminating Flynn
After Flynn wasforcedto resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited
more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had
known about Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification.“* The press also
continuedto raise questions about connections between Russia and the President’s campaign.”
On February 15, 2017, the President told reporters, “General Flynn is a wonderful man. I think
he’s beentreated very, very unfairly by the media.”*4° On February 16, 2017, the President held
41 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former
>” Comey LSAT 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4; Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at 1; Hearing on
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June8, 2017)
(Statementfor the record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5-6).
43 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4-5; Rybicki 6/22/17 302,at 1-2; Sessions
1/17/18 302, at 6 (confirming that later in the week following Comey’s one-on-one meeting with the
President in the Oval Office, Comey told the Attorney General that he did not want to be alone with the
President); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 6 (within days of the February 14 Oval Office meeting, Comey told Sessions
he did not think it was appropriate for the FBI Director to meet alone with the President); Rybicki 11/21/18
302, at 4 (Rybicki helped to schedule the meeting with Sessions because Comey wanted to talk about his
concerns about meeting with the President alone); Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statementfor the record of James B.
Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6).
244 See, e.g., Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017) (questions from
the press included, “if [the President] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President,
otherofficials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept
on for almost three weeks?” and “Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian
ambassador]?”). Priebus recalled that the Presidentinitially equivocated on whetherto fire Flynn because
it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisorso early in his term. Priebus 1/18/18
302, at 8.
245 Fg. Sean Sullivan et al., Senators from both parties pledge to deepen probeofRussia and the
2016 election, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2017); Aaron Blake, 5 times Donald Trump’s team denied contact
with Russia, Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2017); Oren Dorell, Donald Trump's ties to Russia go back 30
years, USA Today (Feb. 15, 2017); Pamela Brownet al., Trump aides were in constant touch with senior
Russian officials during campaign, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017); Austin Wright, Comey briefs senators amidfuror
over Trump-Russia ties, Politico (Feb. 17, 2017); Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for
Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017).
246 Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister NetanyahuofIsrael in Joint Press Conference,
White House (Feb. 15, 2017).
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a press conference andsaid that he removed Flynn because Flynn “didn’t tell the Vice President
of the United States the facts, and then he didn’t remember. And that just wasn’t acceptable to
me.”*47 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak, but “it
certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have directed him to doit if I thought
he wasn’t doingit. I didn’t direct him, but I would have directed him because that’s his job.”2"8
In listing the reasons for terminating Flynn,the President did not say that Flynn hadlied to him.”
The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, “I have nothing to do with
Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything.”**° The Presidentalso said he “had
nothing to do with” WikiLeaks’s publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign.”
9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement

Denying that he Directed Flynn’s Discussions with Kislyak
On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that the President wanted her
to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but they suggested to her that the Administration
could make her the ambassador to Singapore.?*? The nextday, the President asked Priebus to have
McFarland draft an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynnto call
the Russian Ambassador about sanctions.*? Priebus said he told the President he would only
direct McFarlandto write such letter if she were comfortable with it.>* Priebus called McFarland
into his office to convey the President’s request that she memorialize in writing that the President
did not direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak.*°° McFarland told Priebus she did not know whetherthe
President had directed Flynn totalk to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no
247 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017).
248 Remarks by President Trumpin Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President
also said that Flynn’s conduct “wasn’t wrong — what he did in terms of the information he saw.” The
President said that Flynn wasjust “doing the job,” and “if anything, he did something right.”
249 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus
1/18/18 302,at 9.
252 KTMF_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302,
at 16-17.
253 See Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11; see also KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum
for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
254 Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 11.
255 KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum forthe Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302,
at 17.
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to the request.2°® Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President’s
request, and he recommendedthatshetalk to attorneys in the White House Counsel’s Office.?*7
McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg.?°* McFarlandtold him that she had been fired
from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore
but that the President and Priebus wanted letter from her denying that the President directed
Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.2? Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the
requestedletter.As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous “Memorandum for the
Record” that she wrote because she was concerned by the President’s request: “Eisenberg . . .
thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea — from myside because the email would
be awkward. Why would I be emailing Priebus to make a statementfor the record? But it would
also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment wasin
some way a quid pro quo.””6! Later that evening, Priebus stopped by McFarland’s office and told
her notto write the email and to forget he even mentionedit.
Around the same time, the President asked Priebusto reach out to Flynn and let him know
that the Presidentstill cared about him.?® Priebus called Flynn and said that he was checking in
and that Flynn was an American hero.” Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying
bad things about him.?
On March 31, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and
congressional investigators in exchangefor immunity, the President tweeted, “Mike Flynn should
ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media & Dems, of
256 IKTMF_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record) (“I said I did not know
whether he did or didn’t, but was in Maralago the week between Christmas and New Year’s (while Flynn
was on vacation in Carribean) and I was not aware of any Flynn-Trump, or Trump-Russian phonecalls”);
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
257 Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 11.

258 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
259 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
269 KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302,
at 17.
261 K TMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); see McFarland 12/22/17
302, at 17.
262 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17; KTMF00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the
Record).
263 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9.
264 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 1/19/18 302,at9.

265 Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 9-10.
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historic proportion!”?®* Tn late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a
messageto Flynntelling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong.?°”
Analysis
In analyzing the President’s conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following
evidenceis relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. According to Comey’s accountof his February 14, 2017 meeting
in the Oval Office, the President told him, “I hope you can see your wayclearto letting this go, to
letting Flynn go. ... I hope youcan let this go.” In analyzing whether these statements constitute
an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey’s accountof the interaction is accurate,
and, if so, whether the President’s statements had the tendency to impede the administration of
justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal
charge.
After Comey’s accountof the President’s request to “let[] Flynn go” became public, the
President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times
that he did not “shoo other people out of the room” when hetalked to Comey and that he did not
rememberhaving a one-on-one conversation with Comey.The President also publicly denied
that he had asked Comeyto “let[] Flynn go” or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop
the investigation ofFlynn.” In private, the President denied aspects of Comey’s account to White
Houseadvisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey
and stated that Flynn was a good guy.””” Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates
Comey’s account.
266 @realDonaldTrump 3/31/17 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet; see Shane Harris at al., Mike Flynn Offers
to Testify in Exchange for Immunity, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017).
267 McFarland 12/22/17 302,at 18.
268 Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks
recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comeyto stay behindin his office. Hicks 12/8/17
302, at 12.
°° Tn a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: “While the President has repeatedly
expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man whoserved andprotected our country, the President
has never asked Mr. Comeyor anyoneelse to end any investigation, including any investigation involving
General Flynn.... This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President
and Mr. Comey.” See Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn
Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); @realDonaldTrump
12/3/17 (6:15 a.m. ET) Tweet (“I never asked Comeyto stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News
covering another Comeylie!”).
2” Priebus recalled that the President acknowledgedtelling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and
he hoped “everything worked out for him.” Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 19. McGahn recalled that the
President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but addedthat he was “allowed
to hope.” The President told McGahnhe did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at
8.
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First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the
samedayit occurred. Comeyalsotold senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President
that day, and their recollections of what Comey told them atthe time are consistent with Comey’s
account.2”!
Second, Comey provided testimony about the President’s request that he “let[] Flynn go”
under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to
penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey’s recollections of the encounter have remained
consistent over time.
Third, the objective, corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to
occur support Comey’s description of the event. Comey recalled that the President cleared the
room to speak with Comeyalone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that
Kushnerand Sessionslingered and had to be shooed out bythe President, and that Priebusbriefly
opened the door during the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away. While the
President has publicly denied those details, other Administration officials who were present have
confirmed Comey’s account of how he ended up in a one-on-one meeting with the President.”
Andthe President acknowledged to Priebus and McGahnthat he in fact spoke to Comey about
Flynnin their one-on-one meeting.
Fourth, the President’s decision to clear the room and,in particular, to exclude the Attorney
General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey, which is
consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls, rather than a more
innocuousconversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General.
Finally, Comey’s reaction to the President’s statements is consistent with the President
having asked him to “let[] Flynn go.” Comey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to
keep the President’s statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn
investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President’s request. Comey also promptly
met with the Attorney General to ask him notto be left alone with the President again, an account
verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who wasthen the Attorney
General’s chief of staff.
A second question is whether the President’s statements, which were not phrased as a direct
order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI’s investigation of Flynn. While the
Presidentsaid he “hope[d]” Comey could “let[] Flynn go,” rather than affirmatively directing him
to do so, the circumstancesof the conversation show thatthe President was asking Comey to close
the FBI’s investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comeysothat
they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the
President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second,
because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he “hopes” a
subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the
President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of“let this go” three times, and Comey
271 Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302,at 13-14.

2? See Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 6.
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testified that he understood the President’s statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the
way Comeyreacted at the time.
b. Nexusto a proceeding. To establish a nexusto a proceeding,it would be necessary

to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the
investigation of Flynn waslikely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution.
Atthe time of the President’s one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas
had been issued aspart of the FBI’s investigation into Flynn. But Flynn’s lies to the FBI violated
federal criminal law, , and resulted in Flynn’s
prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001. By the time the President spoke to Comey about
Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn’s statements
to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had
told the same version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn’s
conduct could violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001. After the Vice President and senior White Houseofficials
reviewed the underlying information about Flynn’s calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that
Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been
lying. In addition, the President’s instruction to the FBI Director to “let[] Flynn go” suggests his
awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and wasatrisk of prosecution.
c. Intent. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a

personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flyan—for example, whether the President
was aware of Flynn’s communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that
the President knew that Flynn hadlied to senior White Houseofficials and that those lies had been
passed onto the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and
content of Flynn’s calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be
relied uponto establish the President’s knowledge. In advance of Flynn’s initial call with Kislyak,
the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have
mentioned that Flynn wasscheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance
of his calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia’s response, and Flynn
recalled talking to Bannonin early January 2017 about how they had successfully “stopped the
train on Russia’s response” to the sanctions. It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have
wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his
request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen notto retaliate
in response to the request, and the President was pleased by the Russian response, calling it a
“[g]reat move.” And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn hadlied to him
about the calls with Kislyak.
But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn’s read-out of his
calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection oftelling the President-Elect
directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn.
Andin February 2017, the President asked Flynn what wasdiscussed onthe calls and whetherhe
had lied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation
accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn’s
discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those
discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise
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possessedinformation damagingto the President that would give the Presidenta personal incentive
to end the FBI’s inquiry into Flynn’s conduct.
Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI’s
broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would
end “the whole Russia thing.” Flynn’s firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress
were raising questions about Russia’s interference in the election and whether members of the
President’s campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President
viewed the Russia investigations as a challengeto the legitimacy of his election. The President
paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when
the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak. Just hours before
meeting one-on-one with Comey, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an endto
the Russia inquiries. And after Christie pushed back,telling the Presidentthatfiring Flynn would
not end the Russia investigation, the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey
that the Presidentliked him and he waspart of “the team.” That afternoon, the President cleared
the room and asked Comeyto “‘let[] Flynn go.”
Wealso sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President’s direction to Comey
was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In public statements the President repeatedly
described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the
President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President “care[d]”
about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior advisors, including Bannon,
Priebus, and Hicks, said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was
forced to resign and that the President wasfrequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed
the President’s initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmednotfrom personalregard, but from concern
about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisorso early
in the Administration. And Priebus indicated that the President’s post-firing expressions of
support for Flynn were motivated by the President’s desire to keep Flynn from saying negative
things about him.
The way in which the President communicated the request to Comeyalso is relevant to
understanding the President’s intent. When the Presidentfirst learned about the FBIinvestigation
into Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebusnotto discuss the matter with anyone else in the
White House. The next day, the President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinner against the
advice of an aide who recommendedthat other White Houseofficials also attend. At the dinner,
the President asked Comeyfor “loyalty” and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned
that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn’s
termination—shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia
investigation—the President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General, so that he
could again speak to Comey alone. The President’s decision to meet one-on-one with Comey
contravened the advice of the White House Counselthat the President should not communicate
directly with the Departmentof Justice to avoid any appearanceofinterfering in law enforcement
activities. And the Presidentlater denied that he cleared the room and asked Comeyto “let[] Flynn
go”—adenial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.
47
Finally, the President’s effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the
President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President’s concern
aboutbeing associated with Flynn’s conduct. The evidence doesnotestablish that the President
was trying to have McFarland lie. The President’s request, however, was sufficiently irregular
that McFarland—whodid not know the full extent of Flynn’s communications with the President
and thus could not makethe representation the President wanted—felt the need to draft an internal
memorandum documenting the President’s request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request
would look like a quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship.
Cc The President’s Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI’s Russia

Investigation
Overview
In early March 2017, the President learned that Sessions was considering recusing from
the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. After Sessions announcedhis recusal on
March 2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked
Sessions to “unrecuse.” On March 20, 2017, Comeypublicly disclosed the existence of the FBI’s
Russia investigation. In the days that followed, the President contacted Comey and other
intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the
President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort in orderto “lift the cloud”
of the ongoing investigation.
Evidence
1. Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation
In late February 2017, the Departmentof Justice began an internal analysis of whether
Sessions should recuse from the Russia investigation based on his role in the 2016 Trump
Campaign.2” On March1, 2017, the press reportedthat, in his January confirmation hearing to
become Attorney General, Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian
Ambassador Kislyak before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls for Sessions
to recuse or for a special counsel to investigate Russia’s interference in the presidential election.?”
Also on March1, the President called Comey and said he wanted to check in and see how
Comey was doing”? According to an email Comeysentto his chief of staff after the call, the
President“talked about Sessionsa bit,” said that he had heard Comey was“doing great,” and said
that he hoped Comey would come by to say hello when he was at the White House.””° Comey
2 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 1; Hunt 2/1/18 302,at 3.

274 Fg, Adam Entousetal., Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he later
did not disclose, Washington Post (Mar. 1, 2017).
275 3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; SCRO12b_000030 (President’s Daily Diary, 3/1/17, reflecting
call with Comey at 11:55 am.)
216 3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; see Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 86) (testimony
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interpretedthecall as an effort by the Presidentto “pull [him] in,” but he did not perceivethe call
as an attemptby the Presidentto find out what Comey was doing with the Flynn investigation.”””
The next morning, the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions totell
him notto recuse himself from the Russia investigation.”’*> McGahn understood the President to
be concerned that a recusal would make Sessions look guilty for omitting details in his
confirmation hearing; leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the
presidency and derail his policy objectives; and detract from favorable press coverage of a
Presidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week?” McGahn
reached out to Sessions and reported that the President was not happy aboutthe possibility of
recusal.2®° Sessions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal.”*! McGahn reported
back to the President aboutthe call with Sessions, and the Presidentreiterated that he did not want
Sessionsto recuse.”** Throughout the day, McGahn continued trying on behalf ofthe President to
avert Sessions’s recusal by speaking to Sessions’s personal counsel, Sessions’s chiefofstaff, and
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and by contacting Sessions himself two moretimes.”
Sessions recalled that other White House advisorsalso called him that day to argue against his
recusal.”*4
That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse “from any existing or future
investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United
States.”28> Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call, given the applicable
of James B. Comey, formerDirector of the FBI) (“[H]e called me one day. . . . [H]e just called to check in
andtell me I was doing an awesome job, and wantedto see how I wasdoing.”).
27 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17-18.
278 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16.
279 MicGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16-17; see SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) (“Just in the
middle of another Russia Fiasco.”).
280 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 3.
281 MceGahn 11/30/17 302,at 17.
782 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17.
283 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 18-19; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 4; Donaldson
11/6/17 302, at 8-10; see Hunt-000017; SC_AD_00121 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes).
284 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3.

285 Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar. 2,
2017) (“During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senior career Department
officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for
President of the United States. Having concluded those meetings today, I have decided to recuse myself
from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaignsfor President
of the United States.”). At the time of Sessions’s recusal, Dana Boente, then the Acting Deputy Attorney
General and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, became the Acting Attorney General for
campaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the
Departmentof Justice. /d. (“Consistent with the succession order for the DepartmentofJustice, . . . Dana
Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from
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language in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear and
decisive.28° Sessions thought that any argumentthat the CFR did not apply to him was “very
thin.”?87 Sessions got the impression, based on calls he received from White Houseofficials, that
the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney
General.?
Shortly after Sessions announcedhis recusal, the White House Counsel’s Office directed
that Sessions should not be contacted aboutthe matter.”®? Internal White House Counsel’s Office
notes from March2, 2017, state “No contact w/Sessions” and “No comms / Serious concerns about
obstruction.”
On March3, the day after Sessions’s recusal, McGahn wascalled into the Oval Office.??!
Other advisors were there, including Priebus and Bannon.” The President opened the
conversation by saying, “I don’t have a lawyer.”””? The President expressed anger at McGahn
about the recusal and brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn washis attorney.?"4
McGahn interpreted this comment as directed at him, suggesting that Cohn would fight for the
which I have recused myself to the extent they exist.”); see Exec. Order No. 13775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10697
(Feb. 14, 2017).
286 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 1-2. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 provides that “no employeeshallparticipate in a
criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personalorpolitical relationship with . . . [any person or
organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution,”
and defines “political relationship” as “a close identification with an electedofficial, a candidate (whether
or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from
service as a principal adviser thereto or a principalofficial thereof.”
287 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 2.
288 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 3.
289 Donaldson 11/6/17 302,at 11;SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). It is not clear whether
the President was aware of the White House Counsel’s Office direction not to contact Sessions about his
recusal.
2% SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahnsaid he believed the note “No comms/
Serious concerns about obstruction” may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team
saying “crazy things” and trying to spin Sessions’s recusal in a way that would raise concerns about
obstruction. McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 19. Donaldson recalled that “No comms”referred to the order that
no one should contact Sessions. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11.
29! MicGahn 12/12/17 302,at 2.
22 MicGahn 12/12/17 302,at 2.
293 McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 2.
254 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. Cohn hadpreviously served as a lawyer for the President during
his career as a private businessman. Priebus recalled that when the President talked about Cohn,he said
Cohn would win cases for him that had no chance, and that Cohn had doneincredible things for him.
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. Bannonrecalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer, someone
whogot things done. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 6.
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President whereas McGahn would not.2% The President wanted McGahntotalk to Sessions about
the recusal, but McGahntold the President that DOJ ethics officials had weighed in on Sessions’s
decision to recuse.2%° The President then brought up former Attorneys General Robert Kennedy
and Eric Holder and said that they had protected their presidents.” The President also pushed
back on the DOJ contacts policy, and said wordsto the effect of, “You’re telling me that Bobby
and Jack didn’t talk about investigations? Or Obamadidn’t tell Eric Holder whoto investigate?”?”*
Bannonrecalled that the President was as mad as Bannonhadeverseen him andthat he screamed
at McGahn about how weakSessions was.?”” Bannonrecalledtelling the President that Sessions’s
recusal was not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would
have to recuse from campaign-related investigations because of his work on the Trump
Campaign.2°
That weekend, Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar-a-Lago to meet with the President.*°!
Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that
Sessions should “unrecuse” from the Russia investigation.°? The President contrasted Sessions
with Attorneys General Holder and Kennedy, whohad developeda strategy to help their presidents
where Sessions had not.2 Sessions said he had the impressionthat the President feared that the
investigation could spin outof control and disrupthis ability to govern, which Sessions could have
helped avert if he werestill overseeing it.
On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel’s Office was informed that the FBI was
asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn—indicating that the FBI wasstill actively
investigating him.On March6,the President told advisors he wantedtocall the Acting Attorney
295 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.

296 McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 2.
297 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. Bannon said the President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder
as Attorneys General who protected the presidents they served. The President thought Holder always stood
up for President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy always had his
brother’s back. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his
entire life he needed to have a great lawyer, a “bulldog,” and added that Holder had been willing to take a
contempt-of-Congress charge for President Obama. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5.
28 McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 3.
299 Bannon 2/14/18 302,at 5.
300 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5.
3°! Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 5; McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 3.
302 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 3-4.
303 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4
34 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4. Hicks recalled that after Sessions recused, the President was angry
and scolded Sessions in her presence, but she could not rememberexactly when that conversation occurred.
Hicks 12/8/17 302,at 13.
395 SC_AD_000137 (Donaldson 3/5/17 Notes); see Donaldson 11/6/17 302,at 13.
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May-ContainMaterial Fed R-Crint P-6fe}
General to find out whether the White Houseor the President was being investigated, although it
is not clear whether the President knewatthat time ofthe FBI’s recent request concerning Flynn.*
2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia

Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI
On March 9, 2017, Comey briefed the “Gang of Eight” congressional leaders about the
FBI’s investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S.
subjects of the investigation.2°” Althoughit is unclear whetherthe President knew ofthatbriefing
at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn’s chief ofstaff, on March 12, 2017,
state, “POTUSin panic/chaos . . . Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related
to Russia.”°* The week after Comey’s briefing, the White House Counsel’s Office was in contact
with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have
received information aboutthestatus of the FBI investigation”
On March 20, 2017, Comey wasscheduledto testify before HPSCI.3'° In advance of

Comey’s testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Comey to provide
information about the ongoing FBIinvestigation.*''! Dana Boente, whoatthat time was the Acting
Attorney General for the Russia investigation, authorized Comey to confirm the existence of the
Russia investigation and agreed that Comey should decline to comment on whetherany particular
individuals, including the President, were being investigated.?!
306 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14; see SC_AD_000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) (“POTUS wants
to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations] / Is investigation / No /
We know something on Flynn / GSA got contacted by FBI / There’s something hot”).
3°? Comey 11/15/17 302, at 13-14; SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et
al.).
398 SC_AD_00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldsonsaid she wasnotpart ofthe conversation
that led to these notes, and must have beentold aboutit from others. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13.
309 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15. On March 16, 2017, the White House Counsel’s Office was
briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of “4-5 targets.” Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15. The “targets”
wereidentified in notes taken by Donaldson as “Flynn (FBI was in—wrapping up)—DOJlooking for phone
records”; “Comey—Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)”; “Carter Page ($
game)”; and “Greek Guy” (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to the FBI). SC_AD_00198 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn
both said they believed these were targets of SSCI. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/12/17 302,
at 4. But SSCIdoes not formally investigate individuals as “targets”; the notes on their face reference the
FBI, the Department of Justice, and Comey; andthe notes track the background materials prepared by the
FBI for Comey’s briefing to the Gang of 8 on March 9. See SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email,
Gauharto Pageet al.); see also Donaldson 1 1/6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had
told McGahnthose individuals were the FBI’s targets).
310 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017).
311 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16; McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302,at1.
312 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16-17.
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In his opening remarksat the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the
Departmentof Justice, Comey stated that he had “been authorized by the Department of Justice to
confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian
government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating
the nature of any links betweenindividuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian
government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts.
As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any
crimes were committed.’?'? Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI
was “doing and whose conduct[it] [was] examining” because the investigation was ongoing and
classified—but he observed that he had “taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the
DepartmentofJustice of briefing this Congress’s leaders . . . in a classified setting in detail about
the investigation.”*'4 Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was “under
investigation during the campaign”or “underinvestigation now.”?'° Comeydeclined to answer,
stating, “Please don’t over interpret what I’ve said as—as the chair and ranking know, we have
briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we’re doing, but I’m not
gonna answer about anybodyin this forum.”3!® Comey was also asked whether the FBI was
investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer.3!7
According to McGahn and Donaldson,the President had expressed frustration with Comey
before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse.!* The President had
previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence
briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comeyof leaking certain information
to the media.*'!? McGahnsaid the President thought Comey wasacting like “his own branch of
government.”220
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James
B. Comey); Comey 11/15/17 302,at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the DepartmentofJustice
authorized Comey’s remarks).
B. Comey).
313, Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell).
B. Comey).
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong.Transcripts, at 143) (testimony by FBI Director James
B. Comey).
318 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.
319 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 6-9.
329 McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 7.
53
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Press reports following Comey’s March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI was
investigating the President, contrary to what Comey hadtold the Presidentat the end of the January
6, 2017 intelligence assessmentbriefing”! McGahn, Donaldson, and senior advisor Stephen
Miller recalled that the President was upset with Comey’s testimony and the press coverage that
followed becauseof the suggestion that the President was under investigation*” Notes from the
White House Counsel’s Office dated March 21, 2017, indicate that the President was “beside
himself? over Comey’s testimony.2” The President called McGahnrepeatedly that day to ask him
to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was“getting
hotter and hotter, get rid?”°** Officials in the White House Counsel’s Office became so concerned
that the President would fire Comey that they began drafting a memorandum that examined
whetherthe President needed cause to terminate the FBI director”
At the President’s urging, McGahn contacted Boente several times on March 21, 2017, to
seek Boente’s assistance in having Comey or the Departmentof Justice correct the misperception
that the President was underinvestigation.>*° Boente did notspecifically recall the conversations,
although he did rememberone conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked
if there was a way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible.” Boente
said McGahntold him the President was undera cloud andit madeit hard for him to govern.?”*
Boente recalled telling McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and
attempting to do so could erode confidence in the investigation’s conclusions.*? Boente said
McGahnagreed and droppedthe issue.??? The President also sought to speak with Boentedirectly,
but McGahntold the President that Boente did not want to talk to the President about the request
1 Fg, Matt Apuzzoetal., FBI. Is Investigating Trump's Russia Ties, Comey Confirms, New
York Times (Mar. 20, 2017); Andy Greenberg. The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump’s Russia Ties Since
July, Wired (Mar. 20, 2017); Julie Borger & Spencer Ackerman, Trump-Russia collusion is being
investigated by FBI, Comey confirms, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2017); see Comey 1/6/17 Memorandum, at2.
322 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-17; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7.
323 SC_AD_00213 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). The notes from that day also indicate that the
President referred to the “Comey bombshell” which “made [him] look like a fool.” SC_AD_00206
(Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
324 §C_AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
325 $CRO16_000002-05 (White House Counsel’s Office Memorandum). White House Counsel’s
Office attorney Uttam Dhillon did notrecall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel’s Office
to begin this research. Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 5. Metadata from the document, which was provided by
the White House, establishes that it was created on March 21, 2017.
326 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7.
7 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.

38 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
39 Boente 1/31/18 302,at 5.

°° Boente 1/31/18 302,at 5.
54
to intervene with Comey.*?! McGahnrecalled Boentetelling him in calls that day that he did not
think it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI director for the next four years, which
McGahnsaid he conveyedto the President.*2? Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or
anyoneelse the idea that Comey should not continue as FBIdirector.*¥4
3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public
Statements that he had No Connection to Russia
In the weeks following Comey’s March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked
intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a
connection to the Russian election-interference effort.
On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and
CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily
Briefing.** According to Coats, the President asked them whetherthey could say publicly that no
link existed between him and Russia.**° Coats respondedthat the Office ofthe Director ofNational
Intelligence (ODNI)has nothingto do with investigations and it was nothis role to make a public
statement on the Russia investigation.33° Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind
after the March 22 briefing, but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the
word out that he had not done anything wrongrelated to Russia.**”
Coats told this Office that the President never asked him to speak to Comey about the FBI
investigation.°® Some ODNIstaffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats
described the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNIofficial Michael
Dempsey, Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought upthe Russia investigation
and asked him to contact Comeyto see if there was a wayto get past the investigation, get it over
with, end it, or words to that effect.?? Dempsey said that Coats described the President’s
comments as falling “somewhere between musing abouthating the investigation” and wanting
Coats to “do something to stop it.4° Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get
involved with an ongoing FBI investigation“! Edward Gistaro, another ODNIofficial, recalled
331 $C_AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17
302,at 19.
332 MecGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Burnham 11/03/17 302, at 11.
333 Boente 1/31/18 302,at 3.

334 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2.
335 Coats 6/14/17 302,at 3.
336 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.
337 Pompeo 6/28/17 302,at 1-3.
338 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.
339 Dempsey 6/14/17 302,at 2.
340 Dempsey 6/14/17 302,at 2-3.
341 Dempsey 6/14/17 302,at 3.
55
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that right after Coats’s meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Office back to the
Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behindto ask
him what he could do to “help with the investigation.”Another ODNI staffer who had been
waiting for Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minuteslater and recalled Gistaro
reporting that Coats wasupset because the President had asked him to contact Comeyto convince
him there wasnothingto the Russia investigation.*
OnSaturday, March 25, 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval Office, the President
called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying wordsto the effect of,
“I can’t do anything with Russia, there’s things I’d like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS,
they’re all over me with this.”°4* Coats told the Presidentthat the investigations were going to go
on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course.>*° Coats later testified in a
congressional hearing that he had “never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and
shape—with shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship . . . to an ongoing
investigation.”°4°
On March 26, 2017, the day after the President called Coats, the President called NSA
Director Admiral Michael Rogers.47 The President expressed frustration with the Russia
investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult.>*® The President told
Rogers“the thing with the Russians [wa]s messing up”his ability to get things done with Russia.*°
The President also said that the newsstories linking him with Russia were not true and asked
Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories.°’ Deputy Director of the NSA Richard
Ledgett, who waspresentfor the call, said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40
years of governmentservice.**' After the call concluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that
he and Rogers both signed documenting the content of the conversation and the President’s
request, and they placed the memorandum in a safe.°? But Rogers did not perceive the President’s
request to be an order, and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia
3# Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 2.

343 Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2-3.
34 Coats 6/14/17 302,at 4.
345 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4; Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked
several times what Coats could doto help “get [the investigation] done,” and Coats had repeatedly told the
Presidentthat fastest way to “get it done” wastolet it run its course).
346 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, 115 Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 25) (testimony by Daniel Coats, Director
of National Intelligence).
347 Rogers 6/12/17 302,at 3-4.
348 Rogers 6/12/17 302,at 4.
349 7edgett 6/13/17 302,at 1-2; see Rogers 6/12/17 302,at4.
350 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4-5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2.
35! edgett 6/13/17 302,at 2.
352 Tedgett 6/13/17 302, at 2-3; Rogers 6/12/17 302,at 4.
56
investigation itself.**? Rogerslater testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he

had “never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or
inappropriate” and did “notrecall ever feeling pressured to do so.”3°4
In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President
spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia
investigation andstatedthatit interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.*°° Onat least
two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no
collusion with Russia and he hoped press statementto that effect could be issued.°* Pompeo
recalled that the President vented aboutthe investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that
there wasno evidence against him andthat nobody would publicly defend him.*°’ Rogers recalled
a private conversation with the President in which he “vent[ed]” about the investigation, said he
had done nothing wrong, and said somethinglike the “Russia thing has got to go away.”?** Coats
recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coatssaid hefinally
told the President that Coats’s job was to provide intelligence and not get involved in
investigations.>?
4. The President Asks Comey to “Lift the Cloud” Created by the Russia
Investigation
On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comeydirectly about the
Russia investigation“ According to Comey’s contemporaneousrecord of the conversation, the
President said “he was trying to run the country andthe cloud of this Russia business was making
353 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302,at 2.

354 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, 115'" Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral Michael
Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency).
355 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1, 3; Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2-3.
356 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1.
357 Pompeo 6/28/17 302,at 2.

358 Rogers 6/12/17 302,at 6.
359 Coats 6/14/17 302,at 3-4.
369 SCRO12b_000044 (President’s Daily Diary, 3/30/17,reflecting call to Comey from 8:14 - 8:24
a.m.); Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1 (“The President called me on my CMS phoneat8:13 am today.
... The call lasted 11 minutes (about 10 minutes when he was connected).”; Hearing on Russian Election
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI,at 6).
57
that difficult.°35' The President asked Comey what could be doneto “lift the cloud.”*°? Comey
explained “that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great
benefit, if we didn’t find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do
our work.”°? Comeyalso told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI
wasnotinvestigating the President personally.°* The President said several times, “We need to
get that fact out."The President commented thatif there was “somesatellite” (which Comey
took to mean anassociate of the President’s or the campaign) that did something, “it would be
good to find that out” but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Comey
“would find a way to get out that we weren’t investigating him.”3© After the call ended, Comey
called Boente and told him about the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond,and said
he was uncomfortable with direct contact from the President aboutthe investigation.*”
On the morning of April 11, 2017, the President called Comey again.*** According to
Comey’s contemporaneousrecord of the conversation, the President said he was“following up to
see if [Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time—getting out that he personally is not
under investigation.”°°? Comey responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard
back, and he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to
361 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum,at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress aboutthis
conversation and described it to our Office; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum.
Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong.
(June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, formerDirector of the FBI, at 6); Comey
11/15/17 302, at 18.
36 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum,at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302,at 18.
363 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum,at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302,at 18.
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statementfor the Record of James B. Comey,
former Director of the FBI, at 6).
former Director of the FBI, at 6).
former Director of the FBI, at 6-7).
367 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum,at 2; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 6-7; Hearing on Russian Election
368 SCRO12b_000053 (President’s Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:27-8:31
a.m.); Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1 (“I returned the president’s call this morning at 8:26 am EDT.
Wespoke for about four minutes.”).
36 Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum,at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this
conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. Hearing on Russian Election
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI,at 7).
58
have the White House Counsel contact DOJ leadership.>”” The President said he would take that
step.°”! The President then added, “BecauseI have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that
thing, you know.”3”? In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon, the President was
asked if it was too late for him to ask Comeyto step down; the President responded,“No,it’s not
too late, but you know,I have confidence in him. We’ll see what happens. You know,it’s going
to be interesting.”?’? After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President’s
comment about Comey should be removed from the broadcast ofthe interview, but the President
wanted to keepit in, which Hicks thought was unusual.>”
Later that day, the President told senior advisors, including McGahn and Priebus, that he
had reached out to Comey twice in recent weeks.>”? The President acknowledged that McGahn
would not approve of the outreach to Comey because McGahn hadpreviously cautioned the
President that he should nottalk to Comeydirectly to prevent any perception that the White House
was interfering with investigations.?”° The President told McGahn that Comey hadindicated the
FBI could make a public statementthat the President wasnot under investigation ifthe Department
of Justice approved that action.3”” After speaking with the President, McGahn followed up with
Boente to relay the President’s understanding that the FBI could make a public announcementif
the Department of Justice cleared it?”* McGahnrecalled that Boente said Comey had told him
there was nothing obstructive about the calls from the President, but they made Comey
uncomfortable”? According to McGahn, Boente responded that he did not want to issue a
statement about the President not being under investigation because of the potential political
ramifications and did not want to order Comey to do it because that action could prompt the
370 Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum,at1.

371 Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum,at1.
372 Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum,at 1. Ina footnote to this statementin his memorandum, Comey
wrote, “His use of these wordsdid not fit with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away
from any request of me, but I have recordedit here as it happened.”
373 Maria Bartiromo, Interview with President Trump, Fox Business Network (Apr. 12, 2017);
SCRO12b_000054 (President’s Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30 - 12:55
p.m.).
3% Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13.
33 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9.
36 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9; see McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9;
Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2 (stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to
contact the FBI Director directly becauseit could create a perception he wasinterfering with investigations).
Later in April, the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel’s Office that he had called
Comey even though he knew they had advised against direct contact. Dhillon 11/21/17 302,at 2 (recalling
that the Presidentsaid, “I know you told menotto, but I called Comey anyway.”).
377 McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 9.
378 McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 9.
379 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9; see Boente 1/31/18 302, at 6 (recalling that Comey told him after
the March 30, 2017 call that it was not obstructive).
59
May-Conti
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appointment of a Special Counsel.**° Boente did notrecall that aspect of his conversation with
McGahn,but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from the President to Comey
were a problem.*®! Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do whathe could to
address that issue.>*
Analysis
In analyzing the President’s reaction to Sessions’s recusal and the requests he made to
Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of
obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. The evidence shows that, after Comey’s March 20, 2017
testimony, the President repeatedly reached outto intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI’s
investigation. But witnesses had different recollections ofthe precise content of those outreaches.
Some ODNIofficials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office
meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and “stop”the investigation. But
the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no
memory of the specific meeting, but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the
word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the
President asked that Coatsstate publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia, but
did not ask him to speak with Comeyorto help endthe investigation. The other outreaches by the
President during this period were similar in nature. The President asked Rogers if he could do
anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to
make a public statement that would “lift the cloud” of the ongoing investigation by making clear
that the President was not personally underinvestigation. These requests, while significant enough
that Rogers thought it important to documentthe encounter in a written memorandum, were not
interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the
investigation.
b. Nexusto a proceeding. At the time of the President’s outreaches to leaders of the

intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the FBI’s Russia investigation did not
yet involve grand jury proceedings. The outreaches, however, cameafter and werein response to
Comey’s March 20, 2017 announcementthat the FBI,as a part ofits counterintelligence mission,
was conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.
Comeytestified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign
officials and would “include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.”
c. Intent. As described above, the evidence does notestablish that the President asked
or directed intelligence agency leadersto stop or interfere with the FBI’s Russia investigation—
and the President affirmatively told Comey that if “some satellite” was involved in Russian
election interference “it would be good to find that out.” But the President’s intent in trying to
prevent Sessions’s recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comeyfollowing
389 MceGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9-10.

381 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 9.
382 Boente 1/31/18 302,at 7.
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Comey’s public announcement of the FBI’s Russia investigation, is nevertheless relevant to

understanding what motivated the President’s other actions towards the investigation.
The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation’s
implications for his presidency—and,specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under
investigation or had links to Russia. In early March,the President attempted to prevent Sessions’s
recusal, even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After
Sessions recused, the White House Counsel’s Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions
about the matter, althoughit is not clear whetherthat direction was conveyedto the President. The
President continuedto raise the issue of Sessions’s recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he
pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse. The Presidentalso told advisors that he wanted
an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric
Holderto haveprotectedtheir presidents. The President madestatements about beingable to direct
the course of criminal investigations, saying wordsto the effect of, “You’re telling me that Bobby
and Jack didn’t talk about investigations? Or Obamadidn’t tell Eric Holder who to investigate?”
After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBI’s Russia investigation on March
20, 2017, the President was “beside himself’ and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a
statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was underinvestigation. The
President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to
contact Boente to request that Comey makea clarifying statement. The President then asked other
intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the
President had links to Russia, but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the
investigation. On March 30 and April 11, against the advice of White House advisors who had
informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interferencein
an ongoinginvestigation, the President madepersonal outreaches to Comey asking him to “lift the
cloud” of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President wasnot personally
underinvestigation.
Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia
investigation and the public reporting that he was underinvestigation, which he knew wasnottrue
based on Comey’s representations. The President complainedto advisors that if people thought
Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished.
Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia
investigation on his ability to govern. The President complained that the perception that he was
under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with Russia.
The President told Coats he “can’t do anything with Russia,” he told Rogers that “the thing with
the Russians” was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that
“he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making thatdifficult.”
61
D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director

Comey
Overview
Comey was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that
testimony, the President continuedto tell advisors that he wanted Comey to make public that the
President was not underinvestigation. At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about
the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was
not under investigation. Two days later, on May 5, 2017, the President told close aides he was
going to fire Comey, and on May9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public
that Comey had on three occasions informed the President that he was not underinvestigation.
The President decided to fire Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the
DepartmentofJustice, but he approvedan initial public account of the termination that attributed
it to a recommendation from the Departmentof Justice based on Comey’s handling of the Clinton
email investigation. After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing
to his recommendation, the President acknowledgedthat he intended to fire Comey regardless of
the DOJ recommendation and wasthinking of the Russia investigation when he madethe decision.
The Presidentalso told the Russian Foreign Minister, “I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was
crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off..... I’m not
underinvestigation.”
Evidence
1. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to

Answer Questions About Whetherthe President is Under Investigation
On May 3, 2017, Comey wasscheduledto testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.**? McGahnrecalled that in the week leading up to the hearing, the
Presidentsaid that it would bethelast straw if Comeydid not take the opportunity to set the record
straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation.*+ The President
had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was
hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.**° At the
hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating
“{t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation]
exists,” but that he was “not going to say another word about it” until the investigation was
completed.>® Comeyalso declined to answer questions about whetherinvestigators had “ruled
383 Hearing on Oversightof the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3,
2017).
381 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 10-11.
385 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahnbelieved that two foreign leaders had expressed
sympathy to the President for being under investigation); SC_AD_00265 (Donaldson 4/11/17 Notes) (“P
Called Comey — Day we told him not to? ‘You are not under investigation’ NK/China/Sapping
Credibility”).
386 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (CQ Cong.
Transcripts, at 70) (May 3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Comey). Comey repeated this point
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out anyonein the Trump campaignaspotentially a target of th[e] criminalinvestigation,” including

whether the FBI had “ruled outthe president of the United States.”?*”
Comey wasalso asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the
presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.** Comey stated
that it made him “mildly nauseousto think that we might have had some impacton the election,”
but addedthat “evenin hindsight” he “would make the same decision.”Helater repeated that
he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had “done the
right thing at each turn.”?°
In the afternoon following Comey’s testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions,
and Sessions’s Chief of Staff Jody Hunt.2?! At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how
Comey. had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Comey had declined to answer
questions about whether the President was under investigation.*” The President became very
upset anddirected his anger at Sessions.*”? Accordingto notes written by Hunt, the Presidentsaid,
“This is terrible Jeff. It’s all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important
appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed Holder. T appointed you and you
recused yourself. You left me on an island. I can’t do anything.”?** The President said that the
recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his
authority with foreign leaders.*°° Sessions respondedthat he had had no choicebutto recuse, and
it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision.*° Huntrecalled that Sessionsalso stated at
several times during his testimony. See id. at 26 (explaining that he was “not going to say another peep
about[the investigation] until we’re done”); id. at 90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about
the status of investigation “before the matter is concluded”).
387 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017)
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 87-88) (questions by Sen. Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James B.
Comey).
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 15) (question by Sen. Feinstein).
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 17) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).
3° Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017)
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).
391 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8.
32 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000021 (Hunt5/3/17 Notes); McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 6.
3%3 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 8-9.
34 Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). Huntsaid that he wrote down notes describing this meeting
and others with the Presidentafter the events occurred. Hunt 2/1/17 302, at 2.
395 Hunt-00002 1-22 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes) (“I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being
investigated.”); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President
that he wassorry the President was underinvestigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his
authority); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8.
3% Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes).
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some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the
President should consider replacing Comey as FBIdirector.*°’ According to Sessions, when the
meeting concluded, it wasclear that the President was unhappy with Comey, but Sessions did not
think the President had madethe decision to terminate Comey.?”*
Bannonrecalledthat the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May
3 and May 4, 2017.3 According to Bannon,the President said the same thing each time: “He
told methree times I’m not under investigation. He’s a showboater. He’s a grandstander. I don’t
know any Russians. There was no collusion.”“°? Bannontold the President that he could notfire
Comey because“that ship had sailed’“°! Bannonalso told the Presidentthat firing Comey was
not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he could fire the FBI director but could not
fire the FBI.4°?
2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey
The weekend following Comey’s May 3, 2017 testimony, the President traveled to his
resort in Bedminster, New Jersey.“ Ata dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by the President and
various advisors and family members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller,
the President stated that he wanted to remove Comeyandhadideasfor a letter that would be used
to make the announcement.’ The President dictated arguments and specific language for the
letter, and Miller took notes.*°° As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter
should start, “While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation
concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russiarelationship —
pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informedthat I, and I believe the American
public — including Ds and Rs — havelostfaith in you as Director of the FBI.“ Following the
dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to
support the President’s arguments.*°” Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of
3°7 Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes).

38 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9.
3° Bannon 2/12/18 302,at 20.
409 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20.
491 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20.
402 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21; see Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28.
403 § Miller 10/31/17 302,at 4-5; SCRO25_000019 (President’s Daily Diary, 5/4/17).
44'S. Miller 10/31/17 302,at 5.
405 § Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5-6.
406 § Miller 5/5/17 Notes, at 1; see S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8.
“07'S. Miller 10/31/17 302,at 6.
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edits on the draft letter.4°* Miller said the President was adamantthat he nottell anyoneat the
White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks.4°
In his discussions with Miller, the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open
with a reference to him not being under investigation.*'° Miller said he believed that fact was
important to the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such
investigation.*!! According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that
Comey had been undera “review period” and did not have assurance from the Presidentthat he
would be permitted to keep his job.”
The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President beganin a
way that closely tracked whatthe President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner: “Dear
Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, thatI
am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a
Trump-Russiarelationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that
I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have
lost faith in youas the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated.”*'? The four-pageletter
went on to critique Comey’s judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling ofthe Clinton email investigation, andhis failure to hold
leakers accountable.4!* The letter stated that Comey had “asked [the President] at dinner shortly
after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director’s role, and [the President] said that [he]
would considerit,” but the President had “concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to find new
leadership for the Bureau — leader that restores confidence andtrust.’*!°
In the morning of Monday, May8, 2017, the President met in the Oval Office with senior
advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, and informed them he had decidedto terminate
Comey.*!® The President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with
408 §. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 6-8.

409 § Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7. Miller said he did not wantPriebusto be blindsided, so on Sunday
night he called Priebusto tell him that the President had been thinking about the “Comeysituation” and
there would be an important discussion on Monday. S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7.
410 § Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8.
411 § | Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8.
412 § Miller 10/31/17 302, at 10.
‘13 SCRO13c_000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).
“4 §CRO13c_000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). Kushnersaid that the
terminationletter reflected the reasons the President wantedto fire Comey and wasthetruest representation
of what the President had said during the May 5 dinner. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 25.
415 SCRO13c_000003 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).
416 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 24; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon
11/21/17 302, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13.
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Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and wasnot up for discussion.‘'’ The
President told the group that Miller had researchedthe issue and determined the President had the
authority to terminate Comey without cause.*'® In an effort to slow down the decision-making
process, McGahntold the President that DOJ leadership was currently discussing Comey’s status
and suggested that White House Counsel’s Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod
Rosenstein, who had recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General.4'? McGahnsaid
that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity
to find out whatthey thought aboutfiring Comey.”°
At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel’s
Office attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House.*7! McGahnsaid that the President had decided
to fire Comey and asked for Sessions’s and Rosenstein’s views.” Sessions and Rosenstein
criticized Comey anddid not raise concerns aboutreplacing him.’?? McGahn and Dhillon said the
fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Comey gave them peace of mind
that the President’s decision to fire Comey was not an attempt to obstruct justice.* An Oval
Office meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the
issue with the President.*?°
At around 5 p.m., the President and several White Houseofficials met with Sessions and
Rosenstein to discuss Comey.*”° The President told the group that he had watched Comey’s May
417 §_ Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11 (observing that the Presidentstarted the meeting by saying, “I’m
going to read you a letter. Don’t talk me outofthis. I’ve made my decision.”); Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 6
(the President announcedin an irreversible way that he was firing Comey); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13
(the President did not leave whether or not to fire Comey up for discussion); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 25;
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11-12.
“18 Dhillon 302 11/21/17, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13; McGahn12/12/17 302, at 11.
419 MeGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7.
Because of the Attorney General’s recusal, Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia
investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) (“In case of a
vacancyin the office of Attorney General, or of his absence ordisability, the Deputy Attorney General may
exercise all the duties of that office’).
“20 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12.
#2! Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17
Notes); see Gauhar-000056-72 (2/11/19 MemorandumtoFile attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) (“Ms.
Gauhardetermined that she likely recordedall these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May
16, 2017.”).
2 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
#23 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7-9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 13.
424 MeGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 9.
“25 Hunt-000026 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes); see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
426 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14; see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar5/16/17
Notes).
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3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was “not right” with Comey.” The
President said that Comey should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their
views./”8 Hunt, who was in the room, recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously
recommended that Comey bereplaced.4?? McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his
concerns about Comey’s handling of the Clinton email investigation.*?°
The President then distributed copies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller,
and the discussion turned to the mechanics of how to fire Comey and whether the President’s letter
should be used.43! McGahn and Dhillon urged the President to permit Comeyto resign, but the
President was adamantthat he befired.*? The groupdiscussedthe possibility that Rosenstein and
Sessions could provide a recommendation in writing that Comey should be removed.? The
President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, butsaid he wantedto receiveit first
thing the next morning.“** Hunt’s notesreflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his
recommendation the fact that Comey had refused to confirm that the President was not personally
under investigation.*° According to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein’s
description of his meeting with the President, the President said, “Put the Russia stuff in the
memo.”436 Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigation was not the basis of his
recommendation, so he did not think Russia should be mentioned.*7? The President told
Rosenstein he would appreciate it if Rosenstein putit in his letter anyway.** When Rosenstein
27 Hunt-000026-27 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).

428 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 10; see Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (“POTUS to AG: What
is your rec?”’).
“29 Funt-000027 (Hunt5/8/17 Notes).
430 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14; Dhillon 11/21/17 302,at 7.
‘3! Hunt-000028 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).
432 McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 13.
433 Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).
434 MoCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar5/16/17
Notes) (“POTUS tells DAG to write a memo”).
“35 Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) (“POTUSasked if Rod’s recommendation would include
the fact that although Comeytalks aboutthe investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under
investigation. ... So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Comey
refuses to say public[ly] what he said privately 3 times.”).
436 Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
437 Sessions 1/17/18 302 at 10; McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17
Notes).
438 Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); McCabe 5/16/17 Memorandum 1; McCabe 9/26/17
302, at 13.
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left the meeting, he knew that Comey would beterminated, and he told DOJcolleagues that his
own reasonsfor replacing Comey were “not[the President’s] reasons.”*°
On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House letter from Sessions recommending
Comey’s removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled
“Restoring Public Confidence in the FBI.’“*° McGahnrecalled that the President liked the DOJ
letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new coverletter from the President
accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey.“'! Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9
reflected the view of the White House Counsel’s Office that the President’s original termination
letter should “[n]ot [see the] light of day” and thatit would bebetter to offer “[n]o other rationales”
for the firing than what was in Rosenstein’s and Sessions’s memoranda.” The President asked
Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had
informed the President three times that he was not under investigation.“*?7 _McGahn, Priebus, and
Dhillon objected to including that language, but the President insisted that it be included.“
McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that languageto be the most importantpart of the letter to
439 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (“DAG reasonsnot their
reasons [POTUS]”); Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (“1* draft had a recommendation. Tookit out
b/c knew decision had already been made.”).
440 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 15; 5/9/17 Letter, Sessions to President
Trump (“Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the
attached memorandum,I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBI.”); 5/9/17
Memorandum,Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, “The way the Director handled the conclusion of
the email investigation was wrong. Asa result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressionaltrust
until it has a Director who understandsthe gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having
refused to admithis errors, the Director cannotbe expected to implementthe necessary corrective actions.”).
“41 § Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000031 (Hunt5/9/17 Notes).
“2 SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes). Donaldson also wrote “[i]s this the beginning of the
end?” because she was worriedthat the decision to terminate Comeyand the mannerin whichit wascarried
out would bethe end ofthe presidency. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25.
“43S Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt5/9/17 Notes).
444 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 10;
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 27; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 14-15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).
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the President.“45 Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to
resign, but the President refused.“
Around the time the President’s letter was finalized, Priecbus summoned Spicer and the
press team to the Oval Office, where they weretold that Comey hadbeen terminated for the reasons
stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions.“4” To announce Comey’s termination, the White
Housereleased a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President.“* In full,
the statement read: “Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comeythat
he has been terminated and removed from office. President Trump acted based on the clear
recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff
Sessions.”“?
That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the
Presidentat the White House.*° The President told McCabethat he had fired Comey because of
the decisions Comey had madein the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons.**!
The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comeyhad told the President three times that
he was not underinvestigation.*? The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the
FBIdisliked Comey and whether McCabe waspart of the “resistance” that had disagreed with
Comey’s decisions in the Clinton investigation.“*? McCabetold the President that he knew Comey
had told the President he was not underinvestigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively
about Comey, and that McCabe worked “very closely” with Comey and waspart of all the
decisions that had been madein the Clinton investigation.“
45 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 10; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 15 (providing the view that the
President’s desire to include the language about not being underinvestigation was the “driving animus of
the whole thing”); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 16 (Burnham knew the onlyline the President cared about was
the line that said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under
investigation). According to Hunt’s notes, the reference to Comey’s statement would indicate that
“notwithstanding” Comey’s having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the
President was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the
President wanted the language included so that people would notthink that the President had terminated
Comeybecause the President was underinvestigation. MceGahn 12/12/17 302,at 15.
#46 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25; see SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson
5/9/17 Notes) (“Resign vs. Removal. — POTUS/removal.”).
47 Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302,at 16.
“48 Priebus 10/13/17 302,at 28.
“49 Statementofthe Press Secretary, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (May 9, 2017).
450 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 4; SCRO25_000044(President’s Daily Diary, 5/9/17); McCabe 5/10/17
Memorandum, at 1.
451 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
452 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum,at1-2.
453 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2.
454 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum,at1-2.
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Later that evening, the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the
press coverage of Comey’s termination and ordered them to go out and defend him.> The
President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting “killed” in the
press over Comey’s termination.4°° The President asked what he should do.” Christie asked,
“Did you fire [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?”, and the President responded,
“Yes.458 Christie said that the President should “get Rod out there” and have him defend the
decision.“*° The President told Christie that this was a “good idea” and said he wasgoingtocall
Rosenstein right away.4°°
That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the
White House wantedto put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein’s idea to fire Comey.**!
Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would notparticipate in putting out a “false story.“
The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the
coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.“ Rosenstein
respondedthat this was not a good idea becauseif the press asked him, he wouldtell the truth that
Comey’s firing was not his idea.“** Sessions also informed the White House Counsel’s Office that
evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum wasbeing portrayed as the reason for
Comey’s termination.*°
In an unplanned press conferencelate in the evening of May 9, 2017, Spicer told reporters,
“Tt wasall [Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision.“ That evening
and the next morning, White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the
455 Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 11; Hicks 12/8/17, at 18; Sanders 7/3/18 302,at 2.
456 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 6.
457 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6.
458 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6.
5° Christie 2/13/19 302,at6.
460 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 6.
461 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); Page Memorandum,at3 (recording events of 5/16/17),
McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 14.
462 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
463 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
464 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). DOJ notes from the week of Comey’s firing indicate
that Priebus was “screaming” at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press
conference, and the DOJpublic affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not
doing it. Gauhar-000071-72 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
46° McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26-27; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11.
466 Jenna Johnson, After Trump fired Comey, White House staff scrambled to explain why,
Washington Post (May 10, 2017) (quoting Spicer).
70
President’s decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President
received from Rosenstein and Sessions.*”
In the morning on May 10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office.8 The media
subsequently reported that during the May 10 meeting the President brought up his decision the
prior day to terminate Comey,telling Lavrov and Kislyak: “T just fired the head of the F.B.I. He
wascrazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off.... I’m not
underinvestigation.”*© The President never denied making those statements, and the White House
did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: “By grandstanding and
politicizing the investigation into Russia’s actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on
ourability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued,
and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it. Once again, the real story is
that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified
information.”*”° Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with
Lavrov, he did not look concerned andsaid of Comey,“he is crazy.”*”! When McGahn asked the
President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey wasfired
because that took the pressure off by makingit clear that he was not underinvestigation so he
could get more work done.*”
That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe.‘ According to a
memorandum McCabewrote following thecall, the President asked McCabe to comeoverto the
White Houseto discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speechto
467 See, eg, Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017);
SCRO13_001088 (5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheunget al.) (internal White House email describing
comments on the Comey termination by Vice President Pence).
468 SCRO8_000353 (5/9/17 White House Document, “Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov of Russia”); SCRO8_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.). The meeting had been
planned on May 2, 2017, during a telephone call between the President and Russian President Vladimir
Putin, and the meeting date was confirmed on May 5, 2017, the same day the President dictated ideas for
the Comey termination letter to Stephen Miller. SCRO8_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et
al.).
46° Matt Apuzzoet al., Trump Told Russians That Firing “Nut Job” Comey Eased Pressure From
Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017).
4 SCRO8_002117 (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi (CBS News)); see Spicer 10/16/17 302,at 13
(noting he would have been told to “clean it up”if the reporting on the meeting with the Russian Foreign
Minister was inaccurate, but he wasnevertold to correct the reporting); Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19 (recalling
that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the
President had said similar things about Comeyin an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May 18, 2017,
calling Comey a “nut job” and “crazy”).
471 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19.
42 MeGahn 12/12/17 302, at 18.
43 SCRO25_000046 (President’s Daily Diary, 5/10/17); McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum,at1.
a
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employees.’ The President said he had received “hundreds” of messages from FBI employees
indicating their support for terminating Comey.*”” The President also told McCabe that Comey
should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington, D.C. on the FBI’s airplane after he
had been terminated and that he did not want Comey “‘in the building again,” even to collect his
belongings.” When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President, without
prompting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80% of
the FBI had voted for him, and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential
election.4””
In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the
President about his decision to fire Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press
conference.*”8 Sanders told reporters that the President, the Department ofJustice, and bipartisan
members of Congress had lost confidence in Comey, “[a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of
the FBI had lost confidence in their director. Accordingly, the President accepted the
recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position.’”*””
In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said that Rosenstein decided “on his own” to
review Comey’s performance and that Rosenstein decided “on his own” to come to the President
on Monday, May8 to express his concerns about Comey. When a reporter indicated that the “vast
majority” of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said, “Look, we’ve heard from countless
members of the FBI that say very different things.’“®° Following the press conference, Sanders
spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job anddid not point out any inaccuracies in
her comments.*®! Sanderstold this Office that her reference to hearing from “countless members
of the FBI” was a “slip of the tongue.”"*? Shealso recalled that her statement in a separate press
interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made
“in the heat of the moment” that was not founded on anything.**
Also on May 10, 2017, Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed
concern that the White House wascreating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to
474 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum,at 1.

“5 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum,at 1.
476 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum,at 1; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Comey hadbeenvisiting the
FBI’s Los Angeles office when he found out he had been terminated. Comey 11/15/17 302,at 22.
47” McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum,at 1-2. McCabe’s memorandum documenting his meeting with
the President is consistent with notes taken by the White House Counsel’s Office. See SC_AD_00347
(Donaldson 5/10/17 Notes).
478 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4; Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017).
49 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4.
489 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017).
481 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4.
“®Sanders 7/3/18 302,at 4.
483 Sanders 7/3/18 302,at 3.
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fire Comey.**4 The White House Counsel’s Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that
the Departmentof Justice had initiated Comey’s termination,“*> and McGahn asked attorneys in
the White House Counsel’s Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative.**
The next day, on May 11, 2017, the Presidentparticipated in an interview with Lester Holt.
The President told White House Counsel’s Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the
communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what
really happened.*®” During the interview,the Presidentstated that he had madethe decisionto fire
Comeybefore the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, “I was
going to fire regardless of recommendation .... [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. But
regardless of recommendation, I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no goodtimeto do
it.”488 The President continued, “And in fact, whenI decidedto just doit, I said to myself—Isaid,
you know,this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. It’s an excuse by the
Democrats for having lost an election that they should’ve won."
In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia
investigation, the President said, “As far as I’m concerned,I wantthat thing to be absolutely done
properly.’°° The President addedthathe realized his termination of Comey “probably maybewill
confuse people” with the result that it “might even lengthen out the investigation,” but he “ha[d]
to do the right thing for the American people” and Comey was“the wrong manforthat position.’”4?!
The President described Comey as “a showboat” and “a grandstander,” said that “[t]he FBI has
been in turmoil,” and said he wanted “to have a really competent, capable director.”°?_ The
President affirmedthat he expected the new FBIdirector to continue the Russia investigation.“”?
On the evening of May 11, 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President
tweeted, “Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a
Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election.’”4°* The same day, the media reported that the
President had demanded that Comeypledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly
484 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26; see Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at
11.
485 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 27.
486 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17.
“87 Dhillon 11/21/17 302,at 11.
488 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May11, 2017) Transcript,at 2.
489 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2.
‘2 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 1, 5.
“94 @realDonaldTrump 5/11/17 (4:34 p.m. ET) Tweet.
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after being sworn in.4?> Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, “Again, the
story that there was collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems
as an excusefor losing the election.”4°° The President also tweeted, “James Comey better hope
that there are no ‘tapes’ of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!” and “When
James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there
is no collusion, when doesit end?”
Analysis
In analyzing the President’s decision to fire Comey,the following evidence is relevant to

the elements of obstruction ofjustice:
a. Obstructive act. The act of firing Comey removed the individual overseeing the
FBI’s Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the
investigation based on Comey’s briefing of the Gang of Eight, Comey’s March 20, 2017 public
testimony aboutthe investigation, and the President’s one-on-one conversations with Comey.
Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect
ofinterfering with or impeding the investigation—for example,if the termination would have the
effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity
to appoint a director who wouldtake a different approach to the investigation that the President
perceived as moreprotective of his personalinterests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that
issue include whetherthe President’s actions had the potential to discourage a successordirector
or other law enforcementofficials in their conduct of the Russia investigation. The Presidentfired
Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building,
and criticized him publicly, calling him a “showboat”and claiming that the FBI was “in turmoil”
underhis leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements that were
highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after firing Comey, the President
referred to the investigation as a “witch hunt” and asked, “when doesit end?” Those actions had
the potential to affect a successor director’s conductof the investigation.
The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to
prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI
investigations run underthe operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director.
Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director, but
could notfire the FBI. The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey wasfired
that said, “The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of
Comey would not have endedit.” In addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the
Presidentstated that he understood when he madethe decision to fire Comey that the action might
prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even
495 Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred., New
York Times (May 11, 2017).
“96 @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51 a.m. ET) Tweet.
497 @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:54 a.m. ET)
Tweet.
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though McCabetold the President he had worked “very closely” with Comey and waspartof all
the decisions made in the Clinton investigation.
b. Nexus to a proceeding. The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing

that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was
objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminated Comey.
Several facts wouldbe relevant to such a showing. Atthe time the Presidentfired Comey,
a grand jury had not begun to hear evidencerelated to the Russia investigation and no grand jury
subpoenas had been issued. On March 20, 2017, however, Comey had announced that the FBI
wasinvestigating Russia’s interference in the election, including “an assessment of whether any
crimes were committed.” It was widely knownthat the FBI, as part of the Russia investigation,
wasinvestigating the hacking of the DNC’s computers—aclear criminal offense.
In addition, at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew
that Flynn wasstill under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the
President’s February 14, 2017 request that Comey “let[] Flynn go.” On March 5, 2017, the White
House Counsel’s Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records
relating to Flynn—indicating that the FBI wasstill actively investigating him. The same day, the
President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney General for the
Russia investigation, to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated.
On March 31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remainedin legal jeopardy by
tweeting that “Mike Flynn should ask for immunity” before he agreed to provide testimonyto the
FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a
message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong,
further demonstrating the President’s awareness of Flynn’s criminal exposure.
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President’s decision
to fire Comey was Comey’s unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally
under investigation, despite the President’s repeated requests that Comey make such an
announcement. In the week leading up to Comey’s May 3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee
testimony, the President told McGahnthatit wouldbe the last straw if Comey did notset the record
straight and publicly announcethat the President wasnot under investigation. But during his May
3 testimony, Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being
investigated. Comey’s refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him
isolated and exposed, saying “You left me on an island.” Two days later, the President told
advisors he had decided to fire Comey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a
reference to the fact that the President wasnot being investigated: “While I greatly appreciate you
informing me that I am notunder investigation concerning whatI have often stated is a fabricated
story on a Trump-Russia relationship ....” The President later asked Rosenstein to include
“Russia” in his memorandum and to say that Comeyhadtold the President that he was not under
investigation. And the President’s final termination letter included a sentence, at the President’s
insistence and against McGahn’s advice, stating that Comey had told the President on three
separate occasions that he was not underinvestigation.
The President’s other stated rationales for why he fired Comeyare not similarly supported
by the evidence. Thetermination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster
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cited Comey’s handling of the Clinton email investigation, and the President told McCabe he fired
Comey for that reason. But the facts surrounding Comey’s handling of the Clinton email
investigation were well knownto the President at the time he assumedoffice, and the President
had madeit clear to both Comey and the President’s senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted
Comeyto stay on as director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Comey’s handling of the
Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to fire Comey. The President’s draft
termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI wasat an all-time low and Sanderstold the
press after Comey’s termination that the White House had heard from “countless” FBI agents who
had lost confidence in Comey. Butthe evidence does not support those claims. The President told
Comeyat their January 27 dinner that “the people of the FBI really like [him],” no evidence
suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Comey, and Sanders
acknowledgedto investigators that her comments were not founded on anything.
Wealso considered why it was important to the President that Comey announcepublicly
that he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the
erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and
foreign affairs, particularly in dealings with Russia. The President told Comey that the “cloud” of
“this Russia business” was makingit difficult to run the country. The President told Sessions and
McGahnthat foreign leaders had expressed sympathyto him for being underinvestigation and that
the perception he wasunderinvestigation washurtinghis ability to address foreign relationsissues.
The President complained to Rogers that “the thing with the Russians [was] messing up” his ability
to get things done with Russia, and told Coats, “I can’t do anything with Russia,there’s things I'd
like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they’re all over me with this.” The President also
may have viewed Comeyasinsubordinate for his failure to makeclear in the May 3 testimony that
the President wasnot under investigation.
Other evidence, however, indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an
investigation into his campaign. The day after learning about the FBI’s interview of Flynn, the
President had a one-on-one dinner with Comey,against the advice ofsenior aides, and told Comey
he needed Comey’s “loyalty.” When the President later asked Comey for a second time to make -
public that he was not underinvestigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying “Because I have
been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know.” After the President learned of
Sessions’s recusal from the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an
Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder
to have protected their presidents. The Presidentalso said he wantedto beabletotell his Attorney
General“whoto investigate.”
In addition, the President had a motive to put the FBI’s Russia investigation behind him.
The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a
conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in VolumeI, the evidence
uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were
involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the
President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official. But the evidence does
indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the
President personally that the President could have understoodto be crimesor that would give rise
to personaland political concerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the
election that he had no connection to Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen,
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waspursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump
was repeatedly briefed on the progress ofthose efforts.’ _In addition, some witnesses said that
naecmeararm to Ongoing Matter
at a time when public reports stated that Russianintelligence officials were behind the
hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.”? More
broadly, multiple witnesses described the President’s preoccupation with press coverage of the
Russia investigation and his persistent concern thatit raised questions aboutthe legitimacy of his
election?
Finally, the President and White Houseaidesinitially advanced a pretextual reasonto the
press and the public for Comey’s termination. In the immediate aftermath of the firing, the
President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ
recommendations, and White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had
decided to fire Comey before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the
President ultimately acknowledged that he wasgoing to fire Comey regardless of the Department
of Justice’s recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials madeclear to him that they would
resist the White House’s suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Comey’s
termination. The initial reliance on a pretextualjustification could support an inference that the
President had concerns about providingthe real reason forthe firing, although the evidence does
not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both.
E. The President’s Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel
Overview
The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting
the Presidentto state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had
failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President
ultimately did not accept. The Presidenttold senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts
of interest, but they respondedthat those claims were “ridiculous” and posed no obstacle to the
Special Counsel’s service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special
Counsel’s service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally
investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets
48 See VolumeII, Section II.K.1, infra.

499 See Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra.
50 Th addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI
investigation could uncover, we considered whetherthe President’s intentin firing Comey was connected
to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBI’s Russian-interference investigation. In
particular, Michael Cohen wasa potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump
Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia
investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York,ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District of New York for campaign-finance
offenses related to payments he said he madeatthe direction of the President. See VolumeII, Section
ILK.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not establish that when the President fired Comey, he was
considering the possibility that the FBI’s investigation would uncover these paymentsorthat the President’s
intent in firing Comey was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters comingtolight.
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criticizing the Special Counsel’s investigation. That weekend, the President called McGahn and
directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest.
McGahn did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggering another Saturday
Night Massacre and instead prepared to resign. McGahn ultimately did not quit and the President
did not follow up with McGahnonhis request to have the Special Counsel removed.
Evidence
1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President’s Reaction
On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller, IIT as
Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose
from the investigation.°°! The President learned of the Special Counsel’s appointment from
Sessions, who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI
Director.Sessions stepped out of the Oval Office to take a call from Rosenstein, who told him
about the Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned to inform the President ofthe
news.°? According to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special
Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, “Oh my God. This
is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I’m fucked.”°** The President became angry and
lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation, stating, “How
could youlet this happen, Jeff”°> The President said the position of Attorney General washis
most important appointment and that Sessions had “let [him] down,” contrasting him to Eric
Holder and Robert Kennedy.°°° Sessions recalled that the President said to him, “you were
supposedto protect me,” or wordsto that effect.°°’ The President returned to the consequences of
the appointmentandsaid, “Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counselsit ruins
your presidency. It takes years and years and I won’t be able to do anything. This is the worst
thing that ever happened to me.”5°8
°°! Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment ofSpecial Counsel
to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17,
2017).
5 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039
(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
53 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039
(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
54 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).

> Hunt-000039 (Hunt5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 13-14.
5% Hunt-000040; see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
5°? Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
598 Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. Early the next morning,
the President tweeted, “This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!”
@realDonaldTrump 5/18/17 (7:52 a.m. ET) Tweet.
78
ThePresidentthen told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General.>Sessions agreed

to submithis resignation andleft the Oval Office.*'° Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions
departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel’s
appointment.*'' Hickssaid that she had only seen the Presidentlike that one other time, when the
Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.>!?
The next day, May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that
discussed an investigation related to Comey’s termination and directed the White House to
preserve all relevant documents.*'? When hereceived the letter, McGahnissued a documenthold
to White House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while
he sorted things out.>"4
Also on May 18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, “Pursuant to our
conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation.”°' Sessions,
accompanied by Hunt, broughttheletter to the White House and handedit to the President.°'° The
President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he
wanted to continue serving as Attorney General.°'” Sessions ultimately told the President he
wantedto stay, but it was up to the President.*!® The President said he wanted Sessionsto stay.”'®
At the conclusion of the meeting, the President shook Sessions’s hand but did not return the
resignationletter.>”°
When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions’s
resignation letter, they became concerned that it could be used to influence the Department of
Justice?! Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter becauseit
599 Hunt-000041 (Hunt5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 14.

510 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
3! Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21.
512 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, as
discussed in VolumeI, Section III.D.1, supra.
53 MeGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; SCRO15_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House
Staff).
54 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; SCRO15_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House
Staff). The White House Counsel’s Office had previously issued a document hold on February 27, 2017.
SCRO15_000171 (2/17/17 Memorandum from McGahnto Executive Office of the PresidentStaff).
515 Hyunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning as
Attorney General).
516 Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 14.
517 Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
>18 Hunt-000048-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 14.
519 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
°29 Hunt-000049 (Hunt5/18/17 Notes).
21 FTunt-000050-51 (Hunt5/18/17 Notes).
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would function as a kind of “shockcollar” that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus
said the President had “DOJ by the throat.”°?? Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would
attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting
Sessions’s resignation.°”
On May 19, 2017,the Presidentleft for trip to the Middle East.Hicksrecalled that on
the President’s flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions’s resignation
letter from his pocket, showedit to a group ofsenior advisors, and asked them what he should do
aboutit.?° During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to
Sessions, but the Presidenttold him that the letter was back at the White House, somewherein the
residence.> It was not until May 30, three daysafter the President returned from thetrip, that the
President returnedthe letter to Sessions with a notation saying, “Not accepted.”*?’
2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest
In the days following the Special Counsel’s appointment, the President repeatedly told
advisors, including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn,that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of
interest.028 The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director
position shortly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had workedfor a law firm that
represented peopleaffiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating
to his membership in a Trumpgolf course in Northern Virginia.°”? The President’s advisors pushed
522 Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302,at 21.
53 Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).
54 SCRO26_000110 (President’s Daily Diary, 5/19/17).
°8 Hicks 12/8/17 302,at 22.
526 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt’s notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus
told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him theletter, but when he asked forit, the
President “slapped the desk” and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes,
undated).
527 Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump(resignation
letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the
President returned from the Middle Easttrip, the President took Sessions’s letter out of a drawerin the Oval
Office and showedit to Porter. Porter 4/13/18 302,at 8.
528 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn
12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
529 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. In October 2011, Mueller resigned his
family’s membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia,in a letter that noted that “we
live in the District and find that we are unable to makefull use of the Club” and that inquired “whether we
would beentitled to a refund ofa portion ofourinitial membership fee,” which was paid in 1994. 10/12/11
Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weekslater, the controller of the club responded
that the Muellers’ resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be “placed on a
waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis” in accordance with the club’s legal
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back on his assertion of conflicts, telling the President they did not count as true conflicts.°
Bannonrecalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were “ridiculous” and that none
of them wasreal or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special
Counsel.°3! As for Mueller’s interview for FBI Director, Bannonrecalled that the White House
had invited Mueller to speak to the Presidentto offer a perspective on the institution of the FBI.”
Bannonsaid that, although the White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become Director
again, he did not come in looking for the job.Bannonalso told the President that the law firm
position did not amountto a conflict in the legal community.*** And Bannontold the President
that the golf course dispute did notrise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was“ridiculous
and petty.”°3> The President did not respond when Bannonpushed back on the stated conflicts of
interest.°*°
On May 23, 2017, the DepartmentofJustice announcedthatethics officials had determined

that the Special Counsel’s prior law firm position did not barhis service, generating media reports
that Mueller had been cleared to serve.°?? McGahnrecalled that around the same time, the
President complained about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahnto reach out to Rosenstein
about the issue.°?® McGahn said he responded that he could not make such call and that the
President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White House issue.>”
Contemporaneous notes of a May 23, 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President
reflect that McGahntold the Presidentthat he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest
that the President not make such call either“? McGahnadvised that the President could discuss
the issue with his personal attorney but it would “looklike still trying to meddle in [the]
investigation” and “knocking out Mueller” would be “[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of
documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further
contact with the club.
530 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 3; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13 (confirming that he, Priebus, and McGahn
pushed backonthe asserted conflicts).
331 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12-13.
>” Bannon 10/26/18 302,at 12.
533 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
34 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
535 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13.
6 Bannon 10/26/18 302,at 12.
537 Matt Zapotosky & Matea Gold, Justice Departmentethics experts clear Mueller to lead Russia
probe, Washington Post (May 23, 2017).
538 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 12.
539 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. McGahn and Donaldsonsaid thatafter the appointment of the Special
Counsel, they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that
inquiries related to the investigation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/14/17 302,at
7; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5.
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just[ice].”°"! McGahntold the President that his “biggest exposure” was not his act of firing
Comeybuthis “other contacts” and “calls,” and his “ask re: Flynn.”* By the time McGahn
provided this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the President’s
request for Comey’s loyalty, which the President publicly denied; his request that Comey “let[]
Flynn go,” which the President also denied; and the President’s statement to the Russian Foreign
Ministerthat the termination of Comey hadrelieved “great pressure” related to Russia, which the
President did not deny.5
On June 8, 2017, Comeytestified before Congress abouthis interactions with the President
before his termination, including the request for loyalty, the request that Comey“let[] Flynn go,”
and the request that Comey “lift the cloud” over the presidency caused by the ongoing
investigation.*4* Comey’s testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President
had obstructed justice.” OnJune 9, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Office informed the White House
Counsel’s Office that investigators intendedto interview intelligence community officials who had
allegedly been askedbythe Presidentto push back against the Russia investigation.”
On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive of Newsmax Media
and a longtimefriend of the President’s, met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon.>*”
Ruddyrecalled that they told him the President wasstrongly consideringfiring the Special Counsel

°8 See, e.g, Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey
Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017); Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump
Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzoetal., Trump Told
Russians That Firing ‘Nut Job’ Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19,
2017).
5-6). Comeytestified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14, 2017
meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12,
2017, that stated “James Comeybetter hope that there are no ‘tapes’ of our conversations before he starts
leaking to the press!,” and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter “might prompt the
appointmentof a special counsel.” Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 55) (testimony by James B.
Comey, former Director of the FBI).
545 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Comey lays out the case that Trump obstructedjustice, Washington
Post (June 8, 2017) (“Legal analysts said Comey’s testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the
president obstructed justice.”).
546 6/9/17 Email, Special Counsel’s Office to the White House Counsel’s Office. This Office made
the notification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the
interviews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Office interviewed Admiral Rogers in the presence of
agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 1. On June 13, the Special Counsel’s Office interviewed Ledgett.
Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1. On June 14, the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office.
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 1; Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1; Culver 6/14/17 302,at 1.
47 Ruddy 6/6/18 302,at5.
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and that he would do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administration
officials.“* Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about the discussion they had about
the Special Counsel, and Priebus said he could.°”? Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up
like the one that followed the termination of Comey did not happen.Later that day, Ruddy
stated in a televised interview that the President was “considering perhaps terminating the Special
Counsel” based on purported conflicts of interest.°°! Ruddy later told another newsoutlet that
“Trump is definitely considering” terminating the Special Counsel and“it’s not something that’s
being dismissed.”**? Ruddy’s commentsled to extensive coverage in the media thatthe President
wasconsidering firing the Special Counsel.>
White House officials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard from
friends that the President was upset with him.*** On June 13, 2017, Sanders asked the President
for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special
Counsel.5*> The President dictated an answer, which Sandersdelivered, saying that “[w]hile the
presidenthas every right to” fire the Special Counsel, “he has no intention to do so.956
Also on June 13, 2017, the President’s personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel’s
Office and raised concerns about possible conflicts.**’ The President’s counsel cited Mueller’s
previous partnership in his law firm, his interview for the FBI Director position, and an asserted
personal relationship he had with Comey.°°* That same day, Rosenstein had testified publicly
before Congress and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special Counsel,
including for conflicts of interest.°? Two days later, on June 15, 2017, the Special Counsel’s
548 Ruddy 6/6/18 302,at 5-6.

4 Ruddy 6/6/18 302,at 6.
55° Ruddy 6/6/18 302,at 6.
551 Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has “real conflicts” as special counsel, PBS
(June 12, 2017); Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman,Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing Mueller
as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017).
552 Katherine Faulders & Veronica Stracqualursi, Trumpfriend Chris Ruddy says Spicer’s ‘bizarre’
statement doesn’t deny claim Trump seeking Muellerfiring, ABC (June 13, 2017).
553 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing
Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017).
554 Ruddy 6/6/18 302,at 6-7.
555 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6-7.
556 Glenn Thrushet al., Trump Stews, StaffSteps In, and MuellerIs Safefor Now, New York Times
(June 13, 2017); see Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6 (Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to
the press on Air Force Oneandthe answer she gave is the answer the Presidenttold herto give).
°°? Special Counsel’s Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes.
558 Special Counsel’s Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes.
559 Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Department Budget before the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, 115th Cong. (June 13, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at
14) (testimony by Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General).
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Office informed the Acting Attorney General’s office about the areas of concern raised by the
President’s counsel and told the President’s counselthat their concerns had been communicated to
Rosenstein so that the Departmentof Justice could take any appropriate action.°°°
3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of
Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special
Counsel Removed
Onthe evening of June 14, 2017, the Washington Post published anarticle stating that the
Special Counsel wasinvestigating whetherthe President had attempted to obstruct justice.” This
was the first public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special
Counsel’s Office, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report.* The Post story
stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders, including Coats
and Rogers, about what the President had asked them to do in response to Comey’s March 20,
2017 testimony; that the inquiry into obstruction marked “a major turning point” in the
investigation; and that while “Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director
James B. Comeystarting in January that he was not personally under investigation,” “[o]fficials
say that changedshortly after Comey’s firing.”°*? That evening, at approximately 10:31 p.m., the
President called McGahn on McGahn’s personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15
minutes.°& McGahn did not have a clear memory of thecall but thought they might have discussed
the stories reporting that the President was underinvestigation.
Beginning early the next day, June 15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets
acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. He wrote: “They
made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for
obstruction ofjustice on the phony story. Nice”;** “Youare witnessingthe single greatest WITCH
HUNTin American political history—led by some very bad and conflicted people!”;°°” and
“Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, ‘bleached’ emails, & had husband meet w/AG days
56 Special Counsel’s Office Attorney 6/15/17 Notes.

56! Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction ofjustice,
officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017).
562 CNN,for example, began running a chyron at 6:55 p.m.that stated: “WASH POST: MUELLER
INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.” CNN, (June 14, 2017, published
online at 7:15 p.m. ET).
58 Devlin Barrett et al., Special counselis investigating Trumpfor possible obstruction ofjustice,
officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017).
564 SCRO26_000183 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/14/17) (reflecting call from the President to
McGahnon 6/14/17 with start time 10:31 p.m. and end time 10:46 p.m.); Call Records of Don McGahn.
565 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-2. McGahn thought he andthe President also probably talked about
the investiture ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, which was scheduled for the following
day. MeGahn 2/28/18 302,at 2.
566 @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (6:55 a.m. ET) Tweet.
567 @realDonaldTrump6/15/17 (7:57 a.m. ET) Tweet.
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before she was cleared—& they talk about obstruction?”The next day, June 16, 2017, the
President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: “After 7 months of investigations
& committee hearings about my ‘collusion with the Russians,’ nobody has been able to show any
proof, Sad!”;*°and “I am being investigated forfiring the FBI Director by the man whotold me
to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt.”°”°
On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the
Special Counsel removed.5”' McGahn wasat homeand the President was at Camp David.°” In
interviews with this Office, McGahnrecalled that the President called him at home twice and on
both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded
him from serving as Special Counsel.°”
Onthefirst call, McGahnrecalled that the President said somethinglike, “You gotta do
this. Yougotta call Rod.”°’* McGahnsaid he told the President that he would see what he could
do.575 McGahnwasperturbedbythecall and did not intend to act on the request.*”* He and other
advisors believed the asserted conflicts were “silly” and “not real,” and they had previously
communicated that view to the President.°’? McGahnalso had madeclearto the Presidentthat the
White House Counsel’s Office should not be involvedin any effort to presstheissue of conflicts.°”8
McGahnwasconcerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney Generalto fire the
Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge
568 @realDonaldTrump6/15/17 (3:56 p.m. ET) Tweet.

> @realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53 a.m. ET) Tweet.
51 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10.
5 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1, 3; SCRO26000196 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (records
showingPresident departed the White House at 11:07 a.m. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp David at
11:37 a.m.).
573 MeGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. Phone records show that the President
called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes.
SCRO026_000196 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on
6/17/17 with start time 2:23 p.m. and endtime 2:46 p.m.); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records
do not show another call between McGahnandthe President that day. Although McGahnrecalled receiving
multiple calls from the President on the same day, in light of the phone records he thoughtit was possible
that the first call instead occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was
underinvestigation for obstruction ofjustice. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. While McGahn wasnotcertain
of the specific dates of the calls, McGahn wasconfident that he had at least two phone conversations with
the President in which the. President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special
Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3.
574 McGahn3/8/18 302,at 1.

573 McGahn3/8/18 302,at 1.
576 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at1.
577 MeGahn 3/8/18 302,at 1-2.
578 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 1-2.
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Robert Bork and not “Saturday Night Massacre Bork.”°”? McGahn considered the President’s
request to be an inflection point and he wantedtohit the brakes.°®°
Whenthe President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the
Departmentof Justice, McGahnrecalled that the President was moredirect, saying somethinglike,
“Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can’t be the Special Counsel.”°*' McGahn
recalled the Presidenttelling him “Mueller has to go” and “Call me back when you doit.”*
McGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by
Rosenstein? To end the conversation with the President, McGahnleft the President with the
impression that McGahn would call Rosenstein.°** McGahn recalled that he had already said no
to the President’s request and he was worn down, so he just wanted to get off the phone.
McGahnrecalled feeling trapped because he did notplan to follow the President’s directive
but did not know what he would say the nexttimethe President called.>** McGahndecided he had
to resign.°8” Hecalled his personal lawyerandthencalled his chief of staff, Annie Donaldson,to
inform herof his decision.°88 He then droveto the office to pack his belongings and submit his
resignation letter.’ Donaldson recalled that McGahntold her the President had called and
demandedhecontact the Department of Justice andthat the President wanted him to do something
that McGahndid not wantto do.*°? McGahntold Donaldsonthatthe President hadcalled at least
twice and in one ofthe calls asked “have you done it?”°?!__McGahndid nottell Donaldson the
specifics of the President’s request because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the
5 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 2.

58 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at2.
58! McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
582 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2, 5; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3.
583 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2, 5.
> McGahn3/8/18 302,at 2.
585 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; McGahn3/8/18 302,at 2.
586 MeGahn 3/8/18 302,at 2.
587 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 2.
588 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2-3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4; Call Records
of Don McGahn.
58° McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2; Donaldson 4/2/18 302,at 4.
5° Donaldson 4/2/18 302,at 4.
59! Donaldson 4/2/18 302,at 4.
86
investigation, but Donaldson inferred that the President’s directive was related to the Russia
investigation.°? Donaldsonpreparedto resign along with McGahn.°”
That evening, McGahn called both Priebus and Bannonand told them that he intended to
resign.°** McGahnrecalled that, after speaking with his attorney and given the nature of the
President’s request, he decided not to share details of the President’s request with other White
Housestaff.5%> Priebus recalled that McGahnsaid that the President had asked him to “do crazy
shit,” but he thought McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President’s request because
McGahnwastrying to protect Priebus from whathe did not need to know.*’° Priebus and Bannon
both urged McGahn not to quit, and McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and
remained in his position.°°’ He had nottold the President directly that he planned to resign, and
whenthey next saw eachotherthe President did not ask McGahn whetherhe had followedthrough
with calling Rosenstein.°”8
Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephone call with the President in which
the President asked what Christie thought about the President firing the Special Counsel.*”
Christie advised against doing so because there was no substantive basis for the Presidentto fire
the Special Counsel, and because the President would lose support from Republicans in Congress
if he did so.%°
Analysis
In analyzing the President’s direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed,
the following evidenceis relevant to the elements of obstruction ofjustice:
a. Obstructive act. As with the President’s firing of Comey, the attempt to remove
the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the
5° McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4-5. Donaldson said she believed
McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag her into the
investigation. Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5; see McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3.
5%3 Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5.

54 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Call Records of Don McGahn; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4;
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6-7.
595 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 4. Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did nottell them the
specific details of the President’s request. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10.
5% Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7.
97 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3; McGahn 2/28/19 302,at 3-4.
598 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3.

599 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Christie did not recall the precise date ofthis call, but believed it was
after Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to be the new FBI director, which was on June 7,
2017. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Telephone records show that the President called Christie twice after that
time period, on July 4, 2017, and July 14, 2017. Call Records of Chris Christie.
699 Christie 2/13/19 302,at 7.
87
investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. Even ifthe removal
of the lead prosecutor would not preventthe investigation from continuing under a new appointee,
a factfinder would needto consider whetherthe act hadthe potential to delay further action in the
investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the
investigation.
A threshold question is whether the President in fact directed McGahnto have the Special
Counsel removed. After newsorganizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered
McGahnto have the Special Counsel removed,the President publicly disputed these accounts, and
privately told McGahnthat he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the
Department of Justice’s attention. See VolumeII, Section III, infra. Some of the President’s
specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation.
Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President wentfurther andin fact
directed McGahnto call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed.
First, McGahn’s clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein
not only that conflicts existed but also that “Mueller has to go.” McGahnis a credible witness
with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.®! McGahn
spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times, makingit
unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President’s request. In response to that request,
McGahndecided to quit because he did not want to participate in events that he described as akin
to the Saturday Night Massacre. He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packeduphis
office, prepared to submita resignation letter with his chiefofstaff, told Pricbus that the President
had asked him to “do crazy shit,” and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those
acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Departmentof
Justice.
Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn,the President, through his counsel, had
already broughtthe asserted conflicts to the attention of the Departmentof Justice. Accordingly,
the President had no reason to have McGahncall Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues
that already had beenraised.
Third, the President’s sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate
action on a weekend—*Yougotta do this. You gotta call Rod.”—support McGahn’s recollection
that the President wanted the Departmentof Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel.
Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted
conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethicalbar, it would have been unnecessary to set the
process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn.
Finally, the President had discussed “knocking out Mueller”and raised conflicts of interest
in a May 23, 2017 call with McGahn,reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan
to remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June 17, 2017, the President made
clear to Priebus and Bannon, whothen told Ruddy,that the President was considering terminating
691 When this Office first interviewed McGahnabout this topic, he was reluctant to share detailed
information about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning. See McGahn 12/14/17
302 (agent notes).
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the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his
thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence showsthatthe President wasnotjust seeking
an examination of whetherconflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a
wayto terminate the Special Counsel.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would

be necessary to establish a nexus between the President’s act of seeking to terminate the Special
Counsel and a pendingor foreseeable grandjury proceeding.
Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was
under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a
grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his “biggest exposure”
wasnot his act of firing Comey but his “other contacts” and “calls,” and his “ask re: Flynn.” By
early June, it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury
subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn
investigation.On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Office informed the White House that
investigators would be interviewing intelligence agencyofficials who allegedly had been asked by
the Presidentto push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, newsoutlets began
reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on
widespreadreporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for
Comey’s loyalty; his request that Comey “let[] Flynn go”; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and
his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had
relieved “great pressure” related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the day before he directed
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his
conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, “I am being investigated for
firing the FBI Director by the man whotold meto fire the FBI Director!”
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s attempts to remove the
Special Counselwerelinked to the Special Counsel’s oversight of investigations that involved the
President’s conduct—and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated
for potential obstruction ofjustice.
Before the President terminated Comey,the President consideredit critically important that
he was not underinvestigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated.
As described in Volume II, Section II.D, supra, advisors perceived the President, while he was
drafting the Comey terminationletter, to be concerned more than anything else aboutgetting out
that he wasnot personally underinvestigation. When the President learned of the appointment of
the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern aboutthe investigation, saying
“Tt]his is the end of my Presidency.” The Presidentalso faulted Sessions for recusing, saying “you
were supposed to protect me.”
On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was
investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted
62 See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI's Russia
investigation, CNN (May9, 2017); Matt Ford, Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn GrandJury,
The Atlantic (June 2, 2017).
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to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject of widespread media
attention. The evidenceindicates that newsof the obstruction investigation prompted the President
to call McGahn andseek to have the Special Counsel removed. By mid-June, the Departmentof
Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel’s service and the President’s advisors had told him
that the claimed conflicts of interest were“silly” and did not provide a basis to remove the Special
Counsel. On June 13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good
cause for removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a press statement to
Sanders saying he had nointention of firing the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media
reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special
Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction—spurring the
President to write critical tweets about the Special Counsel’s investigation. The President called
McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David. The evidence
accordingly indicates that news that an obstruction investigation had been opened is whatled the
President to call McGahnto have the Special Counsel terminated.
Therealso is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made thosecalls to
McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the
President that the White House Counsel’s Office—and McGahn himself—could not be involved
in pressing conflicts claims and that the President should consult with his personal counsel if he
wishedto raise conflicts. Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims,
the President soughtto usehis official powers to remove the Special Counsel. And after the media
reported on the President’s actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special
Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in
Volume II, Section ILI, infra. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the
President’s awarenessthat the direction to McGahn couldbe seen as improper.
F. The President’s Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation
Overview
Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the
President made another attemptto affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017,
the President met one-on-one with Corey Lewandowskiin the Oval Office and dictated a message
to be delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have hadthe effect of limiting the Russia
investigation to future election interference only. One monthlater, the President met again with
Lewandowski and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia
investigation. Lewandowski told the President the message would be delivered soon. Hourslater,
the Presidentpublicly criticized Sessions in an unplannedpress interview, raising questions about
Sessions’s job security.
1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to

Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation
On June 19, 2017, two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special
Counsel removed, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign
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manager Corey Lewandowski. Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a

“devotee” of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was
“close,
During the June 19 meeting, Lewandowski recalled that, after some small talk, the
President brought up Sessions andcriticized his recusal from the Russia investigation.The
President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had knownabout the
likelihood of recusal in advance, he would not have appointed Sessions.°® The President then
asked Lewandowskito deliver a messageto Sessions andsaid “write this down.”°” This wasthe
first time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wroteas fast
as possible to make sure he captured the contentcorrectly.°
The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing:
I knowthat I recused myself from certain things having to do with specific areas. But our
POTUS. .. is being treated very unfairly. He shouldn’t have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel
b/c he hasn’t done anything wrong. I was on the campaign w/ him for nine months, there
were no Russians involved with him. I know it for a fact b/c I was there. He didn’t do
anything wrong excepthe ran the greatest campaign in American history.
The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit
his jurisdiction to future election interference:
Now a group of people wantto subvert the Constitution of the United States. I am going
to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special
Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that
nothing can happenin future elections.°'
63 |ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2; SCRO26 000201 (President’s Daily Dia
54 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 1 (describing Lewandowski as a “comfort to

the President” whoseloyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he was ChiefofStaff and the President
had meetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the
residence to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7.
695 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302,at 2.
66 Lewandowski4/6/18 302,at 2.
698 Tewandowski4/6/18 302,at 3.
609 |ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2-3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 1-2.
619 |ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes,at 3.
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ThePresidentsaid that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the “most popular guy in
the country.”°!! Lewandowskitold the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions
to do.5!?
Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the
phone.°'? He did not want to meetat the Departmentof Justice because he did not want a public
log of his visit and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what
Lewandowski described as Sessions’s turf.5'* Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a
meeting for the following evening at Lewandowski’s office, but Sessions had to cancel due to a
last minute conflict.°'> Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, D.C., without having
had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President’s message.°'® Lewandowski
stored the notes in a safe at his home, which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive
items.°!”
2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski
Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn,
then a senior White Houseofficial, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions.‘'®
Dearborn agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowskilater confirmed that
Dearborn would meet with Sessionsfor dinnerin late July and could deliver the message then.°!
Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked him to pass the message because the
President knew Lewandowski could betrusted, but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a
better messenger because he had a longstandingrelationship with Sessions and because Dearborn
was in the government while Lewandowski was not.”
OnJuly 19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowskialonein the Oval Office.*!
In the preceding days, as described in Volume II, Section II.G, infra, emails and other information
about the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner,
and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski, the
611 T ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes,at 4.

612 1ewandowski 4/6/18 302,at 3.
613 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3-4.
615 |ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4.
616 |ewandowski 4/6/18 302,at 4.
617 Tewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4.
618 Tewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4; see Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
619 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4-5.
0 1ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, 6.
8 Tewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; SCRO29b_000002-03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special
Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information).
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President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions.°
Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon.Lewandowski
recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should
tell Sessions he wasfired.°*
Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearbornin the
anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of the messagethe President
had dictated to be delivered to Sessions.°° Lewandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the
messagethey had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message
was from the President.The message “definitely raised an eyebrow” for Dearborn, and he
recalled not wanting to ask where it came from orthink further about doing anything withit.”
Dearborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him
uncomfortable.* He recalled later telling Lewandowski that he had handledthe situation, but he
did not actually follow through with delivering the message to Sessions, and he did not keep a
copyofthe typewritten notes Lewandowski had given him."
3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions ina New York Times Interview
Within hours of the President’s meeting with Lewandowskion July 19, 2017, the President
gave an unplanned interview to the New York Timesin which hecriticized Sessions’s decision to
recuse from the Russia investigation.“° The President said that “Sessions should have never
recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he tookthe
job, and I would have picked somebodyelse.”®?' Sessions’s recusal, the Presidentsaid, was “very
unfair tothe president. How do you take a job and then recuse yourself? Ifhe would have recused
himself before the job, I would have said, ‘Thanks, Jeff, but I can’t, you know, I’m not going to
822 Tewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5.

83 Tewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5.
64 T ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in
approximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions’s resignation.
Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like, “What can I do? I’m not an
employee of the administration. I’m a nobody.” Priebus 4/3/18 302,at 6.
5 1ewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. Lewandowski said he asked Hope Hicksto type the notes when
he went in to the Oval Office, and he then retrieved the notes from her partway through his meeting with
the President. Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5.
626 Tewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
87 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
628 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
9 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3-4.

630 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
631 Deter Bakeret al., Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
93
take you.’ It’s extremely unfair, and that’s a mild word, to the president.”**? Hicks, who was
present for the interview, recalled trying to “throw [herself] between the reporters and [the
President]”to stop parts ofthe interview, but the President “loved the interview.”°*
Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President’s New York
Times interview.°* Lewandowskirecalledtelling Hicks about the President’s request that he meet
with Sessions and joking with her aboutthe ideaof firing Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions
would not meet with him.%> As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowskitold her the
President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a messagethat he needed to
do the “right thing” and resign.° While Hicks and Lewandowski were together, the President
called Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview
criticizing Sessions was playing out.°*”
4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions’s Resignation
Three days later, on July 21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence
intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian
ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had said publicly.°* That evening, Priebus called Huntto
talk about whether Sessions might be fired or might resign.Priebus had previously talked to
Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and, after
speaking to Sessions, Hunt had told Priebus that the President would haveto fire Sessions if he
wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quit.“ According to Hunt, who
took contemporaneousnotes of the July 21 call, Hunt told Priebus that, as they had previously
discussed, Sessions had nointention of resigning.®4' Hunt asked Priebus what the President would
632 Deter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
63 Hicks 12/8/17 302,at 23.
634 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10; Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6.
635 Tewandowski 4/6/18 302,at 6.
636 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess
appointmentof a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/13/18 302,
at 10. Lewandowski recalled that in the afternoon of July 19, 2017, following his meeting with the
President, he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President.
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 7.
637 |ewandowski 4/6/18 302,at 6.
638 Adam Entous et al., Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian
ambassador, U.S. intelligence intercepts show, Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying events
concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in VolumeI, Section IV.A.4.c, supra.
639 Hunt2/1/18 302,at 23.
640 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23.
61 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1.
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accomplish by firing Sessions, pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be
an investigation after.°?
Early the following morning, July 22, 2017, the President tweeted, “A new
INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G. Jeff Sessions.
These illegal leaks, like Comey’s, must stop!”°3 Approximately one hourlater, the President
tweeted, “So many people are asking whyisn’t the A.G. or Special Council looking at the many
Hillary Clinton or Comey crimes. 33,000 e-mails deleted?”°Later that morning, while aboard
Marine One on the way to Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions
to resign immediately.°> The Presidentsaid that the country had lost confidence in Sessions and
the negative publicity wasnottolerable.“ According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus,
the President told Priebusto say that he “need[ed]a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately”
and that Sessions had “no choice” but “must immediately resign.”*’ Priebus replied that if they
fired Sessions, they would never get a new Attorney General confirmed andthat the Department
of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President, but the President suggested he
could make a recess appointmentto replace Sessions.©*
Priebus believed that the President’s request was a problem, so he called McGahn and
asked for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was “all
wrong.”°9 Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions’s negative
press and poor performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President’s
desire to replace Sessions was driven by the President’s hatred of Sessions’s recusal from the
Russia investigation.°° McGahntold Priebus not to follow the President’s order and said they
should consult their personal counsel, with whom they had attorney-client privilege.°' McGahn
2 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes,at 1-2.

64 @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:44 a.m. ET) Tweet. Three minuteslater, the President tweeted,
“What aboutall of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal, Russian Reset,
big dollar speechesetc.” @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:47 a.m. ET) Tweet.
65 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 13-14.
646 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5; see RP_000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes).
547 RP_000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes).

48 Priebus 4/3/18 302,at 5.
649 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5.
650 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at5.
651 RP000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes); McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 14.
Priebus followed McGahn’s advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President’s request
because he thought it was the type of thing about which one would needto consult an attorney. Priebus
1/18/18 302, at 14.
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and Priebusdiscussed the possibility that they would both haveto resign rather than carry out the
President’s orderto fire Sessions.
That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions’s
resignation, using wordsto the effectof, “Did you get it? Are you working on it?”°°? Priebus said
that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions,
although the President did not directly say so.Even thoughPriebus did not intend to carry out
the President’s directive, he told the President he would get Sessionsto resign.°* Laterin the day,
Priebuscalled the President and explained thatit would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because
Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand wouldalso resign
and the President would be unable to get anyoneelse confirmed.®* The President agreed to hold
off on demandingSessions’s resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to preventthe
showsfrom focusing on the firing.°”
Bythe end of that weekend, Pricbusrecalled that the President relented and agreed not to
ask Sessionsto resign.® Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On
the morning of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to
investigate Clinton andcalled him “beleaguered.”On July 25, the President tweeted, “Attorney
General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weakposition on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-
mails & DNCserver) & Intel leakers!”®° The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, “Why
didn’t A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who wasin
charge of Clinton investigation.”©! According to Hunt,in light of the President’s frequent public
attacks, Sessions prepared another resignationletter and forthe rest of the year carried it with him
in his pocket every time he wentto the White House.°
652 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) (“discuss resigning
together’).
653 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.
64 Priebus 4/3/18 302,at 4.

655 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
656 Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 15.
57 Priebus 1/18/18 302,at 15.
658 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
59 @realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet (“So why aren’t the Committees and
investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia
relations?”).
660 @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:12 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly
before this one asking “whereis the investigation A.G.” @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet.
$62 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 24-25.
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Analysis
In analyzing the President’s efforts to have Lewandowski deliver a message directing

Sessions to publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future
election interference, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction ofjustice:
a. Obstructive act. The President’s effort to send Sessions a message through

Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation
and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry.
The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President “shouldn’t have a
Special Prosecutor/Counsel” and that Sessions was going to “meet with the Special Prosecutorto
explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election
meddling for future elections so that nothing can happenin future elections.” The President wanted
Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ
ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew “for a fact” that “there were no Russians
involved with the campaign” becausehe “was there.” The President further directed that Sessions
should explain that the President should not be subjectto an investigation “because he hasn’t done
anything wrong.” Taken together, the President’s directives indicate that Sessions was being
instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his
campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to “move forward with investigating election
meddling for future elections.”
b. Nexusto an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President’s

initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19, 2017, the existence of a grand jury
investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. By the time of the
President’s follow-up meeting with Lewandowski,
See Volume II, Section II.G, infra. To satisfy the nexus requirement,
it would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel’s investigation would have the
natural and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding.
c. Intent. Substantial evidenceindicates that the President’s effort to have Sessions

limit the scope of the Special Counsel’s investigation to future election interference was intended
to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President’s and his campaign’s conduct.
As previously described, see Volume II, Section II.B, supra, the President knew that the
Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian
interference to cast doubton the legitimacy of his election. The President further knew that the
investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he hadobstructed justice.
Thoseinvestigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel’s jurisdiction werelimited to future
election interference only.
The timing and circumstancesof the President’s actions support the conclusion that he
soughtthat result. The President’s initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special Counsel’s
investigation came just two days after the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special
Counsel removed, whichitself followed public reports that the President was personally under
97
investigation for obstruction of justice. The sequenceofthose eventsraises an inferencethat after

seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign’s
conduct from the investigation’s scope. The President raised the matter with Lewandowskiagain
on July 19, 2017, just days after emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between
Russians and senior campaignofficials had been publicly disclosed, generating substantial media
coverage and investigative interest.
The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence ofhis intent. Rather
than rely on official channels, the President met with Lewandowskialonein the Oval Office. The
President selected a loyal “devotee” outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting
an inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had
previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President
also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, whohad justtestified publicly that there was no
cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the Presidenttried to use Sessionsto restrict and
redirect the Special Counsel’s investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly
take any action on it.
The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the President’s intent. The President
followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one monthafterhefirst dictated
the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after
Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the
President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked
Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the
President directed Priebusto obtain Sessions’s resignation. That evidence could raise an inference
that the President wanted Sessionsto realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated
whether to comply with the President’s direction that Sessions publicly announce that,
notwithstanding his recusal, he was goingto confine the Special Counsel’s investigation to future
election interference.
G. The President’s Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 2016
Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials
Overview
By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting
between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary
Clinton as “part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump.” On multiple occasions
in late June and early July 2017, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails,
and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald TrumpJr. describing
the meeting as about adoption.
Evidence
1. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9
2016 Trump Tower Meeting
In mid-June 2017—the same weekthat the Presidentfirst asked Lewandowski to pass a

message to Sessions—senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during
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the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald TrumpJr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and
a Russian attorney.“ As described in VolumeI, Section IV.A.5, supra, the emails stated that the
“Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia” had offered “to provide the Trump campaign with someofficial
documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia”as part
of “Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump.”°* TrumpJr. responded,“[I]f it’s what
you say I loveit,”°® and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several
other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016.% At the meeting, the Russian attorney
claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and
other Democrats, and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute
that imposedfinancial andtravel sanctions on Russianofficials and that had resultedin a retaliatory
ban in Russia on U.S. adoptionsof Russian children.°
According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this
Office, the President had norecollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the
time the meeting occurred or at any othertime before the election.°
The Trump Campaign had previously received a documentrequest from SSCTthat called
for the production of various information, including, “[a] list and a description of all meetings”
between any “individual affiliated with the Trump campaign” and “any individual formally or
informally affiliated with the Russian governmentor Russian business interests which tookplace
between June 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017,” and associated records.% Trump
Organization attorneys became aware ofthe June 9 meeting nolaterthan the first week of June
2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization
attorneys providedthe emails setting up the meeting to the President’s personal counsel.°” Mark
Corallo, who had been hired as a spokesmanfor the President’s personal legal team, recalled that
he learned aboutthe June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22, 2017.97! Priebusrecalled learning about
the June 9 meeting from Fox Newshost Sean Hannity in late June 2017.5? Priebus notified one
663 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2.

564 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 a.m.
ET) Tweet.
665 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 am.
ET) Tweet.
666 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4.
667 See VolumeI, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail).
668 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts (a)
through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9 meeting or
other events after the election.
669 DJTFP_SCO_PDF_00000001-02 (5/17/17 Letter, SSCI to Donald J. Trumpfor President, Inc.).
67 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone & Garten; Raffel 2/8/18 302,
at 3; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 2.
6 Corallo 2/15/18 302,at 3.
6” Priebus 4/3/18 302,at7.
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of the President’s personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working oni t.5By late
674
June, several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could relate to the June 9 meeting.
2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose

Information About the June 9 Meeting
Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared
Kushner and Ivanka Trumpthat the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked.®”
Hicks and Raffel advised that the best strategy wasto proactively release the emails to the press.”
On or about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the
President, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump.°”” According to Hicks, Kushnersaid that he wantedtofill
the President in on something that had been discovered in the documentshe was to provideto the
congressional committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort, and Trump Jr.678 Kushner
brought a folder of documents to the meeting andtried to show them to the President, but the
President stopped Kushner andsaid he did not want to know aboutit, shutting the conversation
down.”
On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner’s attorney’s office.*° She recalled
being shocked by the emails because they looked “really bad.”°*! The next day, Hicks spoke
privately with the President to mention her concern about the emails, which she understood were
soon going to be shared with Congress.” The President seemed upset because too many people
knew about the emails and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter.The
President indicated that he did not think the emails would leak, but said they would leak if everyone
had accessto them.°**
§73 Priebus 4/3/18 302,at7.

64 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 3.
575 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at2.
6% Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3, 5; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8.
6" Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 6-7; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at1.

68 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 1.
679 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. Counsel for Ivanka Trumpprovided an attorney
proffer that is consistent with Hicks’s account and with the other events involving Ivanka Trumpsetforth
in this section of the report. Kushnersaid that he did notrecall talking to the President at this time about
the June 9 meeting or the underlying emails. Kushner 4/11/18 302,at 30.
68 Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 1-2.
68 Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 2.
682 Hicks 12/7/17 302,at8.
683 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 8.
684 Hicks 12/7/17 302,at8.
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Later that day, Hicks, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump wenttogetherto talk to the President.*°
Hicksrecalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting wasnot a big deal and was about
Russian adoption, but that emails existed setting up the meeting.®** Hicks said she wanted to get
in front of the story and have TrumpJr. release the emails as part of an interview with “softball
questions.”®*’ The President said he did not want to know aboutit and they should notgo to the
press.°*8 Hicks warned the President that the emails were “really bad” and the story would be
“massive” when it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not wantto talk about it and
said he did not want details.’ Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document
production was due.®° Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President
said, “then leaveit alone.”©?! Hicksalso recalled that the President said Kushner’s attorney should
give the emails to whomever heneeded to give them to, but the President did not think they would
be leaked to the press.Raffel later heard from Hicksthat the President had directed the group
not to be proactivein disclosing the emails because the President believed they would not leak.°™
3. The President Directs Trump Jr.’s Response to Press Inquiries About the
June 9 Meeting
The following week, the President departed on an overseastrip for the G20 summit in
Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump, amongothers.°*
On July 7, 2017, while the President was overseas, Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York
Times was working ona story about the June 9 meeting.”° The next day, Hickstold the President
about the story and he directed her not to comment.® Hicks thought the President’s reaction was
odd because heusually considered not respondingto the press to be the ultimate sin.” Later that
day, Hicks and the President again spoke aboutthe story.*”* Hicksrecalled that the President asked
685 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 2.

686 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 9.
687 Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 2-3.
688 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 9.
58Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 9.
50 Hicks 3/13/18 302,at3.
1! Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 3.
6 Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 9.
53 Raffel 2/8/18 302,at 5.
54 Raffel 2/8/18 302,at 6.
65 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6-7; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 3.
66 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at3.
697 Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 10.
68 Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 3.
101
her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about
Russian adoption.® The President responded,“then just say that.”7°°
Ontheflight home from the G20 on July 8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about
the meeting to be released by Trump Jr. and broughtit to the President.’ The draft statement
began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the
meeting: “I was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe
pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign.”””
Hicks again wanted to disclose the entire story, but the Presidentdirected that the statement notbe
issued becauseit said too much.”°? The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief
meeting and it was about Russian adoption.”™ After speaking with the President, Hicks texted
TrumpJr. a revised statementon the June 9 meeting that read:
It was a short meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about
the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years
ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issueat
that time and there was no follow up.”
Hicks’s text concluded, “Are you ok with this? Attributed to you.””° Trump Jr. responded by
text message that he wanted to add the word “primarily” before “discussed” so that the statement
would read, “Weprimarily discussed a program aboutthe adoption of Russian children.”?°? Trump
Jr. texted that he wanted the change because “[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which wasbs
and some other nonsense which we shot downfast.””°8 Hicks texted back,“I think that’s right too
but boss man worriedit invites a lot of questions[.] [U]Itimately [d]efer to you and [yourattorney]
on that word Be I know it’s important and I think the mention of a campaign issue adds something
to it in case we have to go further.””” TrumpJr. responded, “If I don’t haveit in there it appears
as thoughI’m lying later when they inevitably leak something.””!? Trump Jr.’s statement—adding
699 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10.

0 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; see Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10.
®! Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4.
™ Hicks 7/8/17 Notes.

3 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11.
74 Hicks 12/7/17 302,at 11.
5 SCRO11a_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to TrumpJr.).
76 SCRO11a_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to TrumpJr.).
7 SCROI 1a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, TrumpJr. to Hicks).
708 SCRO11a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks).
7° SCRO11a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to TrumpJr.).
719 SCRO11a_000006 (7/8/17 Text Message, TrumpJr. to Hicks).
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the word “primarily” and making other minor additions—was then provided to the New York
Times.”!! The full statement provided to the Timesstated:
It was a short introductory meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily
discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular
with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government,butit
was not a campaign issue atthe time and there was no follow up. I was asked to attend the
meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting
with beforehand.”!
The statement did not mentionthe offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion
of the Magnitsky Act or U.S. sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as
described in VolumeI, Section IV.A.5, supra.
A short while later, while still on Air Force One, Hicks learned that Priebus knew about
the emails, which further convincedherthat additional information aboutthe June 9 meeting would
leak and the White Houseshould be proactive and get in front of the story.”'3 Hicks recalled again
going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June 9 meeting,
but he again said no,telling Hicks, “You’ve given a statement. We’re done.”7"4
Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President’s cabin, where the President was on
the phone with one of his personal attorneys.’!> At one point the President handedthe phone to
Hicks, and the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa Newson a separate story,
and that she should not talk to the New York Times.7!®
4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting
Before the President’s flight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published
its story about the June 9, 2016 meeting.’!” In addition to the statement from TrumpJr., the Times
story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President’s legal team suggesting that
the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that producedthe Steele
reporting.”'® Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hourlater that
7 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; see Jo Beckeret al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin
During Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 2017).
712 See Jo Beckeret al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New
York Times (July 8, 2017).
713 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 9-10.
™4 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 12; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10.
15 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7.
6 Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 7.
7!7 See Jo Beckeret al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New
York Times (July 8, 2017); Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10.
718 See Jo Beckeret al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New
York Times (July 8, 2017).
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questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9 meeting to create the
appearance of improper connections between Russia and Trump family members.’!? Hicks was
upset about Corallo’s public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not
approved the statement.’”°
The next day, July 9, 2017, Hicks and the President called Corallo together and the
President criticized Corallo for the statement he had released.””! Corallo told the President the
statement had been authorized and further observed that TrumpJr.’s statement was inaccurate and
that a documentexisted that would contradictit.”? Corallo said that he purposely used the term
“document” to refer to the emails setting up the June 9 meeting because he did not know whatthe
President knew about the emails.” Corallo recalled that when he referred to the “document” on
the call with the President, Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said “it
will never get out.”’** Corallo took contemporaneous notes of the call that say: “Also mention
existence of doc. Hopesays‘only a few people haveit. It will never get out.””””> Hickslater told
investigators that she had no memory of making that commentandhad always believed the emails
would eventually be leaked, but she might have been channeling the President on the phonecall
becauseit was clear to her throughout her conversations with the President that he did not think
the emails would leak.”
On July 11, 2017, Trump Jr. posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June 9
meeting on Twitter; the New York Timesreported that he did so “[a]fter being told that The Times
was aboutto publish the content of the emails.””” Later that day, the media reported that the
President had been personally involved in preparing Trump Jr.’s initial statement to the New York
Times that had claimed the meeting “primarily” concerned “a program about the adoption of
Russian children.”’”8 Over the next several days, the President’s personal counsel repeatedly and
719 See Donald Trump Jr. gathered members of campaign for meeting with Russian lawyer before
election, Circa News (July 8, 2017).
20 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 8; Corallo 2/15/18 302,at 6-7.
| Corallo 2/15/18 302,at 7.
2 Corallo 2/15/18 302,at 7.
3 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7-9.
™4 Corallo 2/15/18 302,at8.
5 Corallo 2/15/18 302,at 8; Corallo 7/9/17 Notes (“Sunday 9""— Hope calls w/ POTUSonline”).
Corallo said he is “100% confident” that Hicks said “It will never get out” on the call. Corallo 2/15/18 302,
at 9.
6 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 9.
27 @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 a.m. ET) Tweet; Jo Beckeret al., Russian Dirt on Clinton?
‘I Love It,’ Donald Trump Jr. Said, New York Times (July 11, 2017).
8See, e.g., Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses to
Let the Page Turn, New York Times (July 11, 2017) (reporting that the President “signed off’ on Trump
Jr.’s statement).
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inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr.’s statement.”° After
consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the
media that the President “certainly didn’t dictate” the statement, but that “he weighed in, offered
suggestions like any father would do.””° Several monthslater, the President’s personal counsel
stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel’s Office that “the President dictated a
short but accurate response to the New York Timesarticle on behalf of his son, Donald Trump,
Jr.”73! The Presidentlater told the press that it was “irrelevant” whetherhe dictated the statement
andsaid, “It’s a statement to the New York Times. . . . That’s not a statement to a high tribunal of
judges.””°?
On July 12, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Olic Trump Jr.

ae related to the June 9 meeting and those who attended the
June 9 meeting.
On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowskiand then
met with reporters for the New York Times. In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times
interview, the President addressed the June 9, 2016 meeting andsaid he “didn’t know anything
about the meeting”at the time.” The President added, “As I’ve said—most other people, you
know, whenthey call up and say, ‘By the way, we have information on your opponent,’ T think
most politicians — I was just with a lot of people, they said... , ‘Who wouldn’t have taken a
meeting like that?”””*
Analysis
In analyzing the President’s actions regarding the disclosure of information aboutthe June
9 meeting, the following evidenceis relevantto the elements ofobstruction ofjustice:
a. Obstructive act. On at least three occasions between June 29, 2017, and July 9,
2017, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June
9 See, e.g., David Wright, Trump lawyer: President was aware of “nothing”, CNN (July 12, 2017)
(quoting the President’s personal attorney as saying, “I wasn’t involved in the statementdrafting at all nor
was the President.”); see also Good Morning America, ABC (July 12, 2017) (“The President didn’t sign
off on anything. . .. The President wasn’t involvedin that.”); Meet the Press, NBC (July 16, 2017) (“I do
want to be clear—the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement.”).
730 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 9
(the President told Sanders he “weighed in, as any father would” and knew she intendedtotell the press
whathesaid).
731 1/29/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counselto Special Counsel’s Office, at 18.
732 Remarks by President Trumpin Press Gaggle (June 15, 2018).
734 Peter Bakeret al., Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
735 Deter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
105
9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks
warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were“really bad” and the story
would be “massive” when it broke, but the President told her and Kushnerto “leave it alone.”
Early on July 8, after Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about
the June 9 meeting, the President directed her not to comment, even though Hicks said that the
President usually considered not respondingto the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the
Presidentrejected Trump Jr.’s draft statement that would have acknowledgedthat the meeting was
with “an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign.” The
President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption
(which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated
by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton.
Eachof these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was directed
at the press. They would amountto obstructive acts only if the President, by taking these actions,
soughtto withhold information from or mislead congressionalinvestigators or the Special Counsel.
On May 17, 2017, the President’s campaign received a document request from SSCIthat clearly
covered the June 9 meeting and underlying emails, and those documents also plainly would have
beenrelevantto the Special Counsel’s investigation.
But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or
other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special
Counsel. The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and
preventtheir public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy. The only
evidence we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congressor the
Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29, 2017, when Hicks recalled the President
acknowledging that Kushner’s attorney should provide emails related to the June 9 meeting to
whomever he needed to give them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed
with his own lawyersat that time.
bs Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time ofthe President’s

attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding the June 9 meeting, the existence of
a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge, and the
President had been told that the emails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the
nexus requirement, however, it would be necessary to showthat preventing the release of the
emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury
proceeding or congressional inquiries. As noted above, the evidence does notestablish that the
President sought to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings.
c. Intent. The evidence establishes the President’s substantial involvementin the

communications strategy related to information about his campaign’s connections to Russia and
his desire to minimize public disclosures about those connections. The President became aware
of the emails no later than June 29, 2017, when he discussed them with Hicks and Kushner, and
he could have been aware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the Trump
Organization began interviewing witnesses whoparticipated in the June 9 meeting. The President
thereafter repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks andotherstaffers to publicly release information
about the June 9 meeting. The President expressed concern that multiple people had accessto the
emails and instructed Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And the President
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dictated a statement to be released by TrumpJr. in response to thefirst press accounts of the June
9 meetingthat said the meeting was aboutadoption.
But as described above, the evidence does not establish that the President intended to
prevent the Special Counsel’s Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June 9
meeting or other information about that meeting. The statement recorded by Corallo—that the
emails “will never get out”—can be explained asreflecting a belief that the emails would not be
made public if the President’s press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to
Congress and the Special Counsel.
H. The President’s Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Overthe
Investigation
Overview
From summer 2017 through 2018, the President attempted to have Attorney General
Sessions reverse his recusal, take control of the Special Counsel’s investigation, and order an
investigation of Hillary Clinton.
Evidence
1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal
After returning Sessions’s resignation letter at the end of May 2017, but before the
President’s July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in whichhepublicly criticized Sessions for
recusing from the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse
his recusal. In particular, at somepointafter the May 17, 2017 appointmentofthe Special Counsel,
Sessions recalled, the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would “unrecuse”
himself.”2° According to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions
could direct the Departmentof Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the “gist”
of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from “allofit,” including
the Special Counsel’s Russia investigation.’ Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did
not reverse his recusal or order an investigation of Clinton.”*
In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of
Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand.” Porterrecalled that the President asked him ifBrand
was good, tough, and “on the team.””° The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was
interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel’s investigation and whether she would want
76 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessionsto
reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations. See Volume II, Section II.C.1, supra (describing
President’s March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessionsto unrecuse).
37 Sessions 1/17/18 302,at 15.

738 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15.
®9 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6.
™ Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6.
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to be Attorney General one day.”! Because Porter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound
her out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney General.”?
Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show thatthe President told Porterto “Keep in touch with
yourfriend,” in reference to Brand.” Later, the President asked Porter a few times in passing
whetherhe had spokento Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable
with the task.”“4 In asking him to reach out to Brand, Porter understood the President to want to
find someone to end the Russia investigation or fire the Special Counsel, although the President
never said so explicitly.° Porter did not contact Brand because he wassensitive to the
implications of that action and did not wantto be involvedin a chain of events associated with an
effort to end the investigation orfire the Special Counsel.”4°
McGahn recalled that during the summer of 2017, he and the President discussed the fact
that if Sessions were no longerin his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a non-
recused Attorney General.’ McGahntold the President that things might not change much under
a new Attorney General.”48 McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017, the President
frequently brought up his displeasure with Sessions.” Hicks recalled that the President viewed
Sessions’s recusal from the Russia investigation as an act of disloyalty.’°° In additiontocriticizing
Sessions’s recusal, the President raised other concerns about Sessions and his job performance
with McGahnand Hicks.’*!
™ Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. Because of Sessions’s recusal, if Rosenstein
were no longerin his position, Brand would, by default, become the DOJofficial in charge of supervising
the Special Counsel’s investigation, and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed, Brand would be
next in line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 508.
™ Dorter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6.
743 SC_RRP000020 (Porter 7/10/17 Notes).
™4 Dorter 4/13/18 302,at 11-12.
5 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11-12.
™6 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11-12. Brand confirmed that no oneever raised with her the prospect of
taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General. Brand 1/29/19 302, at 2.
7 McGahn 12/14/17 302,at 11.
™8 McGahn 12/14/17 302,at 11.
™9 McGahn 12/14/17 302,at 9.
0 Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 10.
1 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; Hicks 3/13/18 302,at 10.
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2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations Covered

by his Recusal
Later in 2017, the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from
campaign-related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who
would notbe recused.
On October 16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the
Departmentof Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the
Departmentshould be investigating.””? According to contemporaneousnotes taken by Porter, who
wasat the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton’s emails and said, “Don’t havetotell us, just
take [a] look.””°? Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the
Department of Justice would comply with that request.’** Two days later, on October 18, 2017,
the President tweeted, “Wow, FBI confirms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating
Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed,
including Clinton herself. Comey stated under oath that he didn’t do this-obviously a fix? Where
is Justice Dept?””*° On October 29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was “ANGER &
UNITY” over a “lack of investigation” of Clinton and “the Comey fix,” and concluded: “DO
SOMETHING!”
On December6, 2017, five days after Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with
the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Office at the end
of a cabinet meeting.”"’ During that Oval Office meeting, which Porter attended, the President
again suggested that Sessions could “unrecuse,” which Porterlinked to taking back supervision of
the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.”* According to
contemporaneous notestaken by Porter, the President said, “I don’t know if you could un-recuse
yourself. You’d be a hero. Nottelling you to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get
involved. Can order AG to investigate. I don’t wantto get involved. I’m notgoing to get involved.
I’m not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly.””*
According to Porter’s notes, Sessions responded, “We are taking steps; whole new leadership
752 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10.

3 §C_RRP000024 (Porter 10/16/17 Notes); see Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10.
74 Porter 5/8/18 302,at 10.
755 @realDonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:21 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:27 a.m.
ET) Tweet.
756 @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (9:53 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:02 a.m.
ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:17 a.m. ET) Tweet.
757 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6; see SC_RRP000031 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) (“12:45pm With the
President, Gen. Kelly, and Sessions (who | pulledin after the Cabinet meeting)”); SC_RRP000033 (Porter
12/6/17 Notes) (“Post-cabinet meeting — POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. Asked meto stay. Also
COSKelly.”).
8 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12; Porter 4/13/18 302,at 5-6.
759 SC_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6; Porter 5/8/18 302,at 12.
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team. Professionals; will operate according to the law.””°° Sessions also said, “I never saw
anything that was improper,” which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did notfit with the
previous discussion about Clinton.”°! Porter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President
that he wason the President’s team.’
At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was “too bad” that
Sessionshad recused himself from the Russia investigation.’ When asked whether Holder had
been a moreloyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, the President
said, “I don’t wantto get into loyalty, but I will tell you that, I will say this: Holder protected
President Obama. Totally protected him. When youlookatthe things that they did, and Holder
protected the president. And I have greatrespect for that, ’ll be honest.””** Later in January, the
President broughtup the idea of replacing Sessions and told Porter that he wantedto “clean house”
at the DepartmentofJustice.” In a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on
January 27, 2018, Porter recalled that the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the
past with successful win records, such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his
biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing
Sessions as an example.”° The President raised Sessions’s recusal and brought up andcriticized
the Special Counsel’s investigation.”
Over the next several months, the President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and
media interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in
the Russia investigation despite his recusal.”* On June 5, 2018, for example, the President
7 SC_RRPO000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302,at 6.

761 §C_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); Porter 4/13/18 302,at 6.
762 Porter 4/13/18 302,at 6-7.
763 Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. ‘Look Very
Bad”, New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017).
764 Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. “Look Very
Bad”, New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017).
785 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 14.
766 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15. Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state, “Roy
Cohn (14-0) / Jay Goldberg (12-0).” SC_RRP000047 (Porter 1/27/18 Notes).
187 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15-16.
768 See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump 2/28/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet(“Why is A.G. Jeff Sessions asking
the Inspector Generalto investigate potentially massive FISA abuse. Will take forever, has no prosecutorial
power and already late with reports on Comey etc. Isn’t the I.G. an Obama guy? Whynot use Justice
Department lawyers? DISGRACEFUL!”); @realDonaldTrump 4/7/18 (4:52 p.m. ET) Tweet (“Lawmakers
of the House Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the DepartmentofJustice of missing the Thursday
Deadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Comey, Lynch,
McCabe, Clinton Emails and much more. Slow walking — what is going on? BAD!”); @realDonaldTrump
4/22/18 (8:22 a.m. ET) Tweet (““GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Comey and Hillary
Clinton.’ @FoxNews Goodluck with that request!”); @realDonaldTrump 12/16/18 (3:37 p.m. ET) Tweet
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tweeted, “The Russian Witch Hunt Hoaxcontinues,all because Jeff Sessions didn’t tell me he was
going to recuse himself. ... I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time and money
wasted, so many lives ruined . . . and Sessions knew better than most that there was No
Collusion!”” On August 1, 2018, the President tweeted that “Attorney General Jeff Sessions
should stop this Rigged Witch Huntright now.”’”° On August 23, 2018, the President publicly
criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of
Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted but Democrats had
not.’””! The President said, “I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice
Department, Jeff Sessions.”””? That day, Sessionsissueda press statementthatsaid, “I took control
of the Departmentof Justice the day I was sworn in.... While I am Attorney General, the actions
ofthe DepartmentofJustice will not be improperly influencedbypolitical considerations.”””3 The
next day, the President tweeted a response: “‘Department of Justice will not be improperly
influenced bypolitical considerations.’ Jeff, this is GREAT, what everyone wants, so look into
all of the corruption on the ‘other side’ including deleted Emails, Comey lies & leaks, Mueller
conflicts, McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse, Christopher Steele & his phony and corrupt
Dossier, the Clinton Foundation,illegal surveillance of Trump campaign, Russian collusion by
Dems — and so much more. Open up the papers & documents without redaction? Come onJeff,
you can doit, the country is waiting!”””
On November7, 2018, the day after the midterm elections, the President replaced Sessions
with Sessions’s chiefofstaff as Acting Attorney General.””
Analysis
In analyzing the President’s efforts to have Sessions unrecuse himself and regain control
of the Russia investigation, the following considerations and evidenceare relevant to the elements
of obstruction ofjustice:
a. Obstructive act. To determine if the President’s efforts to have the Attorney General
unrecuse could qualify as an obstructive act, it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether
those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation. That inquiry would take into
accountthe supervisory role that the Attorney General, if unrecused, would play in the Russia
investigation. It also would have to take into account that the Attorney General’s recusal covered
(“Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first
place!”).
™ @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet.
7| Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News(Aug. 23, 2018).
7 Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News(Aug. 23, 2018).
73 Sessions 8/23/18 Press Statement.
74 @realDonaldTrump8/24/18 (6:17 a.m. ET) Tweet; @ realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6:28 a.m. ET)
Tweet.
™5 @realDonaldTrump 11/7/18 (2:44 p.m. ET) Tweet.
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other campaign-related matters. The inquiry would not turn on what Attorney General Sessions
would actually do if unrecused, but on whether the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally
havehadthe effect of impeding the Russia investigation.
On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his
recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and
prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017, Sessionsrecalled the
President asking him to unrecuse, but Sessions did nottake it as a directive. When the President
raised the issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, “Nottelling
you to do anything. ... I’m not going to get involved. I’m not going to do anything or direct you
to do anything. I just wantto be treated fairly.” The duration of the President’s efforts—which
spanned from March 2017 to August 2018—and thefact that the President repeatedly criticized
Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would haveto recuse is
relevant to assessing whetherthe President’s efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as
obstructive acts.
b. Nexusto an official proceeding. As described above, by mid-June 2017, the existence

of a grandjury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. In addition,
in July 2017, a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the
District of Columbia, and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August
2017.7 Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on
those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the
obstructive-act element.
c. Intent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President’s conduct toward
Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a
way that wouldrestrictits scope. By the summer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special
Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice. And in the wake ofthe
disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the
campaign, see Volume II, Section II.G, supra, it was evident that the investigation into the
campaign now included the President’s son, son-in-law, and former campaign manager. The
President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announcethat the
Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions
remained recused. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the President spoke to
Sessionsin the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if
he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President’s desire that Sessions take back
supervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. The
President said in that meeting that he “just want[ed] to be treated fairly,” which could reflect his
perception that it was unfairthat he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a
principal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the
Attorney General—aposition that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by
someonelike Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their
6 &g., Del Quentin Wilbur & Byron Tau, Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington
Grand Jury in Russia Probe, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 3, 2017); Carol D. Leonnig et al., Special Counsel
Mueller using grandjury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation, Washington Post
(Aug. 3, 2017).
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presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President’s actions is that the
President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could
shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation.
I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the
Special Counsel
Overview
In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered
McGahn to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported conflicts of interest but McGahn
had refused, saying he would quit instead. After the story broke, the President, through his
personal counsel and two aides, sought to have McGahn denythat he had been directed to remove
the Special Counsel. Each time he was approached, McGahnresponded that he would notrefute
the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President’s effort to have the
Special Counsel removed. The President later personally met with McGahnin the Oval Office
with only the ChiefofStaff present and tried to get McGahnto say that the President never ordered
him to fire the Special Counsel. McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President’s
direction to remove the Special Counsel was accurate. In that same meeting, the President
challenged McGahnfor taking notes of his discussions with the President and asked why he had
told Special Counsel investigators that he had been directed to have the Special Counsel removed.
Evidence
1. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel
On January 25, 2018, the New York Times reported that in June 2017, the President had
ordered McGahnto havethe DepartmentofJustice fire the Special Counsel.””” Accordingto the
article, “[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible
obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that
disqualified him from overseeing the investigation.”””* The article further reported that “[a]fter
receiving the president’s orderto fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel .. . refused to askthe
Justice Departmentto dismiss the special counsel, saying he would quit instead.”””? The article
stated that the president “ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to
resign rather than carry out the directive.””*° After the article was published, the President
77 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018).
78 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered MuellerFired, but Backed Off When
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dismissed the story when asked aboutit by reporters, saying, “Fake news, folks. Fake news. A
typical New York Times fake story.””*!
The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same eventbut added that McGahn had
nottold the Presidentdirectly that he intendedto resign rather than carry out the directive to have
the Special Counsel terminated.”*? In that respect, the Post story clarified the Times story, which
could be read to suggest that McGahn had told the President ofhis intention to quit, causing the
President to back down from the order to have the Special Counselfired.”
2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports
On January 26, 2018, the President’s personal counsel called McGahn’s attorney and said
that the President wanted McGahnto put out a statement denying that he had been askedtofire
the Special Counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest.”** McGahn’s attorney spoke with
McGahnabout that request and then called the President’s personal counselto relay that McGahn
would not makea statement.’”*> McGahn’s attorney informed the President’s personal counselthat
the Times story was accurate in reporting that the President wanted the Special Counsel
removed.” Accordingly, McGahn’s attorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some
other respects, McGahn could not comply with the President’s request to dispute the story.’*”
Hicks recalled relaying to the President that one of his attorneys had spoken to McGahn’s attorney
aboutthe issue.”**
781 Sophie Tatum & Kara Scannell, Trump denies he calledfor Mueller’s firing, CNN (Jan. 26,
2018); Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2018).
782 The Postarticle stated, “Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert that Mueller had
unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position. ... In response, McGahn
said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move. ... McGahn did not
deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave.” Rosalind S.
Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump movedto fire Mueller in June, bringing White House counselto the
brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018).
783 Rosalind S. Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump movedto fire Mueller in June, bringing White
House counselto the brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018); see McGahn 3/8/17 302, at 3-4.
784 MicGahn 3/8/18 302,at 3 (agent note).
785 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 3 (agent note).
786 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 3-4 (agentnote).
787 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4 (agent note).
788 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Hicks also recalled that the President spoke on the phone that day
with Chief of Staff John Kelly and that the President said Kelly told him that McGahnhadtotally refuted
the story and was going to put out a statement. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. But Kelly said that he did not
speak to McGahn whenthearticle came out and did nottell anyone he had done so. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at
1-2.
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Also on January 26, 2017, Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact
McGahnaboutthe story.”° McGahntold Sandersthere wasno need to respond and indicated that
someofthe article was accurate.” Consistent with that position, McGahn did not correct the
Times story.
On February 4, 2018, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had notheard the
President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired.”' After Priebus’s appearance, the
President called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press.””? The Presidentalso told
Priebus that the President had “neversaid any of those things about”the Special Counsel.’
The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to
Porter.” The President told Porter that the article was “bullshit” and he had not sought to
terminate the Special Counsel.” The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make
himself look good.”° The President then directed Porter to tell McGahnto create a record to make
clear that the President never directed McGahnto fire the Special Counsel.’ Porter thoughtthe
matter should be handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he
wanted McGahnto write a letterto the file “for our records” and wanted something beyond a press
statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.’”° The President referred to McGahn
as a “lying bastard” andsaid that he wanted a record from him.”” Porter recalled the President
789 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Sanders did notrecall whether the President asked her to speak to
McGahnorif she did it on her own. Sanders 7/23/18 302,at 2.
79 Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 1-2.
79\ Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Feb. 4, 2018).
™Driebus 4/3/18 302,at 10.
™3 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10.
™ Porter 4/13/18 302, at 16-17. Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the
President. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. Evidence indicates it was February 5, 2018. On the backof a pocket
card dated February 5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion:
“COS: (1) Letter from DM — Neverthreatened to quit — DJT nevertold him to fire M.” SC_RRP000053
(Porter Undated Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February 5. Porter
4/13/18 302, at 17. But Porter also said that “COS” referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of
Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17, and Kelly took notes dated February 5, 2018, that state “POTUS —
Don McGahnletter — Mueller + resigning.” WH000017684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes). Kelly said he did not
recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have “mused” about having McGahn write a
letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 3. McGahnrecalled that Porter spoke with him about the President’s request
about two weeks after the New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion
taking place on or about February 5. McGahn3/8/18 302,at 4.
® Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
6 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
77 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
8 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302,at 18.
7Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302,at 18.
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saying something to the effect of, “If he doesn’t write a letter, then maybeI'll haveto get rid of
him.”
Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahnto deliver the President’s message.®”! Porter told
McGahnthat he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate the Special
Counsel. McGahn shruggedoff the request, explaining that the media reports were true.”
McGahntold Porter that the President had been insistent on firing the Special Counsel andthat
McGahnhadplanned to resign rather than carry outthe order, although he had not personally told
the Presidenthe intendedto quit.®* Porter told McGahnthatthe President suggested that McGahn
would befired if he did not write the letter.8°> McGahndismissedthe threat, saying that the optics
would be terrible if the President followed through with firing him on that basis.°°° McGahnsaid
he would notwrite the letter the President had requested.8’ Porter said that to his knowledgethe
issue of McGahn’s letter never came up with the President again, but Porter did recall telling Kelly
about his conversation with McGahn.®®
The next day, on February 6, 2018, Kelly scheduled time for McGahn to meet with him
and the President in the Oval Office to discuss the Times article.8°’ The morning of the meeting,
the President’s personal counsel called McGahn’s attorney and said that the President was going
to be speaking with McGahn and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the
meeting.*!°
The President began the Oval Office meeting bytelling McGahn that the New York Times
story did not “look good” and McGahn neededto correctit.!' McGahn recalled the President
said, “I neversaid to fire Mueller. I never said ‘fire.’ This story doesn’t look good. You needto
correct this. You’re the White House counsel.”*!?
800 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.

80! Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 4.
802 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn3/8/18 302,at 4.
803 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
804 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 4.
805 Dorter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
5°6 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17-18; McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 4.
5°7 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 4.
808 Porter 4/13/18 302,at 18.
809 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). McGahnrecalled that, before
the Oval Office meeting, he told Kelly that he wasnotinclined to fix the article. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at4.
810 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to Special
Counsel’s Office (confirming February 6, 2018 date ofcall from the President’s personal counsel).
511 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302,at 2.
812 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302,at 2.
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In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he
plannedto resign, butsaid that the story was otherwise accurate.*'? The President asked McGahn,
“Did I say the word ‘fire’?”8'* McGahn responded, “What yousaid is, ‘Call Rod [Rosenstein],
tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can’t be the Special Counsel.’”*'® The President responded,
“I never said that.’8'® The President said he merely wanted McGahntoraise the conflicts issue
with Rosenstein andleaveit to him to decide whatto do.*!7 McGahntoldthe President he did not
understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, “Call Rod. There are conflicts.
Mueller has to go.”8!8 The President asked McGahn whether he would “do a correction,” and
McGahnsaid no.®!? McGahnthought the President wastesting his mettle to see how committed
McGahnwasto what happened.*° Kelly described the meeting as“a little tense.”*?!
The President also asked McGahnin the meeting whyhe hadtold Special Counsel’s Office
investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed.? McGahn
responded that he had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by
attorney-client privilege.5? The President then asked, “What about these notes? Why do youtake
notes? Lawyers don’t take notes. I never had a lawyer whotook notes.”** McGahn responded
that he keeps notes becauseheis a “real lawyer” and explained that notes create a record and are
not a bad thing.2 The Presidentsaid, “I’ve had lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. He did not
take notes.’®”
After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahntelling him that McGahn
and the President “did have that conversation” about removing the Special Counsel.” McGahn
recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed outto the President after the Oval Office that McGahn
513 MeGahn 3/8/18 302,at 4.

814 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302,at 2.
815 McGahn3/8/18 302, at 5.
816 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
817 McGahn3/8/18 302,at 5.
518 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
819 McGahn3/8/18 302,at 5; Kelly 8/2/18 302,at2.
820 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
821 Kelly 8/2/18 302,at 2.
822 MicGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
83 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
824 NacGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. McGahn said the President wasreferring to Donaldson’s notes, which
the President thought of as McGahn’s notes. McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
825 McGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
826 MicGahn 3/8/18 302,at 5.
#27 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2.
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had not backed down and would not budge.®”8 Following the Oval Office meeting, the President’s
personal counsel called McGahn’s counsel and relayed that the President was “fine” with
McGahn.*”?
Analysis
In analyzing the President’s efforts to have McGahndeny that he had been ordered to have
the Special Counsel removed, the following evidenceis relevant to the elements of obstruction of
justice:
a. Obstructive act. The President’s repeated efforts to get McGahn tocreate a record
denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an
obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahnfrom testifying truthfully or to
undermine his credibility as a potential witnessif he testified consistently with his memory, rather
than with what the record said.
There is some evidencethat at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories
werepublishedin late January 2018, the Presidentbelieved the stories were wrong andthat he had
never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly
understood that McGahnhadnottold the President directly that he planned to resign. In addition,
the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and
in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the Presidentsaid, “I never said to fire Mueller. I never
said ‘fire.”” That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade
McGahnto changehis story but wasinstead offering his own—but different—recollection of the
substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn’s reaction to them.
Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President’s conduct. As previously
described, see VolumeII, Section ILE, supra, substantial evidence supports McGahn’s account
that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed,including the timing and
context of the President’s directive; the manner in which McGahnreacted; and the fact that the
President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department
of Justice, and should be raised with the President’s personal counsel rather than broughtto
McGahn. In addition, the President’s subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the
Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. Whenfirst asked about the New York Times
story, the President said, “Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Timesfakestory.”
And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had
used the word“fire,” saying, “I never said to fire Mueller. I never said ‘fire’” and “Did I say the
word ‘fire’?” The President’s assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed
McGahn to havethe Special Counsel removed thus runs counterto the evidence.
In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn’s memory of the June
17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office
828 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with the
Presidentafter the fact. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, “Don[:] Mueller
discussion in June. - Bannon Priebus - came out okay.” WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes).
829 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note).
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meeting that McGahn’s accountdiffered and that McGahn wasfirm in his views. Shortly after the
story broke, the President’s counsel told McGahn’s counselthat the President wanted McGahnto
make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded
through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply
with the President’s request. .The President then directed Sandersto tell McGahnto correct the
story, but McGahn told her he would not do so becausethe story was accurate in reporting on the
President’s order. Consistent with that position, McGahnneverissued a correction. More than a
week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made commentsindicating the
President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahncreate a
record denying that the President hadtriedto fire the Special Counsel. At that point, the President
said he might “haveto get rid of’ McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and
told Porter, as he had told Sanders andas his counsel hadtold the President’s counsel, that the
President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence
indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahndid not
think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying
facts that McGahnbelieved to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahnto
repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. By January 2018, the Special Counsel’s use of a

grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also
was aware that the Special Counsel wasinvestigating obstruction-related events because, among
other reasons, on January 8, 2018, the Special Counsel’s Office provided his counsel with a
detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President.° The President knew that
McGahnhad personal knowledgeof manyofthe events the Special Counsel wasinvestigating and
that McGahn hadalready beeninterviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval
Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel’s
Office about the President’s effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged
McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating
unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the President’s awareness that the June 17,
2017 events were relevantto the Special Counsel’s investigation and any grand jury investigation
that might grow outofit.
Toestablish a nexus, it would be necessary to showthat the President’s actions would have
the natural tendencyto affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication ofinformation to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel
investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seekingto influencehis prior
statements in those interviews. But because McGahnhadrepeatedly spoken to investigators and
the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would beinterviewed again
on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking
to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further
investigative interviews would not be shown. Butthe President’s efforts to have McGahn write a
letter “for our records” approximately ten daysafter the stories had come out—well pastthe typical
830 1/29/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 1-2 (“In our
conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with
the Presidentin order to complete yourinvestigation on the subjects ofalleged collusion and obstruction of
justice”; listing 16 topics).
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time to issue a correction for a news story—indicates the President was not focused solely on a
press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings
arising from it.
©; Intent. Substantial evidenceindicates that in repeatedly urging McGahnto dispute

that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of
influencing McGahn’s accountin order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President’s
conduct towards the investigation.
Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get
McGahn to changehis story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence
suggests that the President had beentold on multiple occasions that McGahnbelieved the President
had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahninterpreted his encounter with
the Presidentin the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed he wasto
his memory of what had occurred. The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing
McGahn to alter his accountbytelling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did
not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the
President’s intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the
prospect of the President’s meeting with McGahnthat he called McGahn’s counseland said that
McGahncould notresign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President’s
counsel was well aware of McGahn’s resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account
of events despite the President’s request. Finally, as noted above, the President broughtup the
Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahnand criticized him for
telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The President’s statements reflect his
understanding—andhis displeasure—that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice
inquiry.
J. The President’s Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, SO
Overview
In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other
actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel’s investigation, including Flynn,
Manafort, Gea and as describedin the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint
defense agreementwith the President, the President’s personal counsel stated that Flynn’s actions
would be viewed asreflecting “hostility” towards the President. During Manafort’s prosecution
and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort wasbeing treated
unfairly and madeit known that Manafort could receive a pardon. BETUMCMOn YT STy ETC
Evidence
1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn
Aspreviously noted, see VolumeII, Section II.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn’s
resignation on February 13, 2017. Following Flynn’s resignation, the President made positive
public commentsabout Flynn, describing him as a “wonderful man,” “a fine person,” and a “very
120
good person.”*?! ThePresidentalso privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying
that the Presidentstill cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.*?
In late November 2017, Flynn beganto cooperate with this Office. On November 22, 2017,
Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreementhe had with the President.*°? Flynn’s counseltold
the President’s personal counsel and counsel for the White Housethat Flynn could no longer have
confidential communications with the White House or the President.83* Later that night, the
President’s personal counselleft a voicemail for Flynn’s counsel that said:
I understand your situation, but let me see if I can’t state it in starker terms. ... [I]t
wouldn’t surprise me if you’ve gone on to make a deal with... the government.... [I]f
... there’s information that implicates the President, then we’ve got a national security
issue, ... so, you know, ... we need somekind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of
protecting all our interests if we can. ... [R]emember what we’vealwayssaid about the
Presidentandhis feelings toward Flynn and,thatstill remains ... 8°
On November 23, 2017, Flynn’s attorneys returned the call from the President’s personal
counsel to acknowledgereceipt of the voicemail.5*° Flynn’s attorneysreiterated that they were no
longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege.*°’ According to Flynn’s
attorneys, the President’s personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.* The
President’s personal counsel said that he interpreted whattheysaid to him as a reflection of Flynn’s
331 See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2018)
(stating that “Flynn is a fine person” and “I don’t think [Flynn] did anything wrong. If anything, he did
something right ... You know, he wasjust doing his job”); Interview ofDonald J. Trump, NBC (May11,
2017) (stating that Flynn is a “very good person”).
832 See Priebus 1/18/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was
terminated to convey that the Presidentstill cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him;
Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/17 302,
at 18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with
Flynn andtell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the Presidentfelt bad for him); Flynn
1/19/18 302,at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additionalcall from Hicks whosaid she wanted to
relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3
(describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynnthe day after Flynn wasfired where Kushner
said, “You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I’ll get the President to send
out a positive tweet aboutyoulater,” and the President noddedhis assent to Kushner’s comment promising
a tweet).
833 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302,at 1.
835 1 1/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President’s Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn.
856 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302,at1.
838 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302,at |.
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hostility towards the President and that he plannedto inform his client of that interpretation.*?
Flynn’s attorneys understoodthat statement to be an attempt to make them reconsidertheir position
because the President’s personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such
a message would be conveyedto the President.*°
On December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a

cooperation agreement.**! The next day, the President told the press that he was not concerned
about what Flynn mighttell the Special Counsel.*? In response to a question about whetherthe
Presidentstill stood behind Flynn, the President responded, “We’ll see what happens.”*Over
the next several days, the President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and
indicating he had not beentreated fairly.““* On December 15, 2017, the President responded to a
press inquiry about whether he wasconsidering a pardon for Flynn by saying,“I don’t wanttotall
about pardons for Michael Flynn yet. We’ll see what happens. Let’s see. I can say this: When
you look at what’s gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very
angry.”*45
2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort
On October 27, 2017, a grandjury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former
deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a
grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony
839 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 2. Because ofattorney-client privilege issues, we did not seek
to interview the President’s personal counsel about the extent to which he discussed his statements to
Flynn’s attorneys with the President.
841 Information, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, |:17-cr-232 (D.D.C.Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 1; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doe. 3.
842 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn’s Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec.2,
2017).
843 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec.2,
2017).
844 See @realDonaldTrump12/2/17 (9:06 p.m. ET) Tweet (“So General Flynn lies to the FBI and
his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBI holiday ‘interrogation’ with
no swearing in and no recording, lies many times . . . and nothing happens to her? Rigged system, or just
a double standard?”); President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dec. 4, 2017) (“Well, I feel badly
for General Flynn. I feel very badly. He’s led a very stronglife. And I feel very badly.”).
845 President Trump White House Departure, C-SPAN (Dec. 15, 2017).
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counts.*46 The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as
2005 and continued through 2018.84”
In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President’s personal counsel
and they were “going to take care of us.”*4* Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that
he hadbeen in touch with the President’s personal counsel and repeating that they should “sit tight”
and “we’ll be taken care of.’*4? Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and
Manafort said no one used that word.
As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court, the President told Porter that he
neverliked Manafort and that Manafort did not know whathe wasdoing on the campaign.®*! The
President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the
Special Counsel’s investigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would be
harmful to the President.*>?
In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that
Manafort wasbeing treated unfairly. On June 15, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day
on whether Manafort’s bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered
with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, “I feel badly about a lot of them
846 Indictment, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, \:\7-cr-201 (D.D.C.
Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 (“Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment”); Indictment, United States v. Paul J.
Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. GatesIII, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Doc. 9 (“Manafort and Gates
E.D. Va. Indictment’)
847 Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment; Manafort and Gates E.D. Va. Indictment.
848 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea
agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit
multiple offenses(i.e., tax fraud,failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent
of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our
Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb.
23, 2018), Doc. 195; Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, |:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb, 23,
2018), Doc. 205. Gates has provided information andin-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be
reliable.
549 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4.
850 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to
the President’s personal counselor suggested that they would be taken care of. Manafortalso said he hoped
for a pardon but never discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President’s public
comments about pardons. Manafort 10/1/18 302, at 11. As explained in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, supra,
Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia determined that he breached the agreementby being untruthfulin proffer sessions and before the
grand jury. Order, United States v. Manafort, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 503.
851 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11. Priebus recalled that the Presidentnever really liked Manafort. See
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 11. Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort’s judgment while he worked
on the Campaign, but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort. Hicks 3/13/18
302, at 16.
552 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 14.
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because I think a lot ofit is very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12
years. Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so—Itell you,I feel little
badly about it. They went back 12 yearsto get things that he did 12 years ago? ... I feel badly
for some people, because they’ve gone back 12 yearsto find things about somebody, and I don’t
think it’s right.”8°? In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for
Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel’s investigation, the Presidentsaid,
“T don’t wantto talk about that. No, I don’t wantto talk about that. ... But look, I do want to see
people treated fairly. That’s whatit’s all about.” *°* Hourslater, Manafort’s bail was revoked and
the President tweeted, “Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented
Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn’t know
Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all the others?
Very unfair!””®°>
Immediately following the revocation of Manafort’s bail, the President’s personal lawyer,
Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which heraised the possibility of a pardon for
Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily Newsthat “[w]hen the whole thing is over, things
might get cleaned up with somepresidential pardons.”®°° Giuliani also said in an interview that,
although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel’s investigation was
ongoing, “when the investigation is concluded, he’s kind of on his own, right?”*? In a CNN
interview two dayslater, Giuliani said, “T guess I should clarify this once and for all.... The
president has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons
in this investigation. ... When it’s over, hey, he’s the president of the United States. He retains
his pardon power. Nobodyis taking that away from him.”*°* Giuliani rejected the suggestion that
his and the President’s comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a
criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were “certainly not
intended that way.”®°? Giuliani said the comments only acknowledgedthatan individual involved
in the investigation would not be “excluded from [a pardon], if in fact the president andhis advisors
. cometo the conclusion that you have beentreated unfairly.”*°° Giuliani observed that pardons
were not unusualin political investigations but said, “That doesn’t mean they’re going to happen
853 Remarks by President Trumpin Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018).
854 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018).
855 @realDonaldTrump 6/15/18 (1:41 p.m. ET) Tweet.
856 Chris Sommerfeldt, Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe ‘might get cleaned up’ with ‘presidential
pardons’ in light ofPaul Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 2018).
857 Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New Obstruction
Charges, New York Times (June 15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani).
858 State ofthe Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karoun Demirjian,
Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafortafter Mueller’s probe, Washington Post (June 17, 2018).
859 State ofthe Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018).
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here. Doesn’t mean that anybody should rely on it. . . . Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned
yet.86!
On July 31, 2018, Manafort’s criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia,
generating substantial news coverage.*The next day, the President tweeted, “This is a terrible
situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Huntright now,before
it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Muelleris totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry
Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!”*? Minuteslater, the President
tweeted, “Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent
and respectedpolitical leaders. He worked for me for a very short time. Why didn’t government
tell me that he was underinvestigation. These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion—a
Hoax!”8* Later in the day, the President tweeted, “Looking back on history, who wastreated
worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and ‘Public Enemy Number One,’ or Paul
Manafort, political operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement—although
convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion?”*° The President’s tweets about the
Manafort trial were widely covered by the press.*° When asked about the President’s tweets,
Sanders told the press, “Certainly, the President’s been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort’s been
treated unfairly.”®%
On August16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began.
Atthat time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation
neededto be “donein the next two or three weeks,”8°* and mediastories reported that a Manafort
acquittal would addto criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and
expense, whereasa conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature.®?
862 See, e.g., Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from day one ofthe Paul Manaforttrial, CNN (July 31,
2018); Frank Bruni, Paul Manafort’s Trial Is Donald Trump's, Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31,
2018); Rachel Weineret al., Paul Manaforttrial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagantclothingpurchases,
home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018).
863 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked
about the President’s tweet, she told reporters, “It’s not an order. It’s the President’s opinion.” Sarah
Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug.1, 2018).
866 See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort prosecution “a hoax,” says Sessions
should stop Mueller investigation “right now”, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018); Louis Nelson, Trump
claims Manafort case has “nothing to do with collusion”, Politico (Aug. 1. 2018).
867 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug.1, 2018).
868 Chris Strohm & Shannon Pettypiece, Mueller Probe Doesn’t Need to Shut Down Before
Midterms, Officials Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018).
86 See, e.g, Katelyn Polantz et al., Manafortjury endsfirst day ofdeliberations without a verdict,
CNN (Aug. 16, 2018); David Voreacos, What Mueller’s Manafort Case Meansfor the Trump Battle to
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On August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on thetrial from
the South Lawn of the White House. In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted
approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel’s investigation a
“rigged witch hunt.”*”° When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the
President said, “I don’t talk about that now. I don’t talk about that.”®7! The President then added,
without being asked a further question,“I think the whole Manaforttrial is very sad when you look
at what’s going on there. I thinkit’s a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very
short period of time. But you know what, he happens to be a very good person. And I thinkit’s
very sad whatthey’ve done to Paul Manafort.”*”? The President did nottake further questions.”
In response to the President’s statements, Manafort’s attorney said, “Mr. Manafort really
appreciates the support of President Trump.”®”
On August 21, 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on
August 21, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance
violation that he said had occurred “in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for
federal office.”8”> The President reacted to Manafort’s convictions that day bytelling reporters,
“Paul Manafort’s a good man” and “it’s a very sad thing that happened.”*”* The President
described the Special Counsel’s investigation as “a witch hunt that ends in disgrace.”®”” The next
day, the President tweeted, “I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. ‘Justice’
took a 12 year old tax case, among otherthings, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike
Michael Cohen, he refused to ‘break’—makeup stories in order to get a ‘deal.’ Such respect for
a brave man!”878
In a Fox Newsinterview on August 22, 2018, the President said: “[Cohen] makes a better
deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons I respect Paul Manafort so
muchis he went through thattrial—you know they makeupstories. People make up stories. This
Come, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2018); Gabby Morrongiello, What a guilty verdict for Manafort would mean
for Trump and Mueller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18, 2018).
870 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018).
87! President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018).
874 Trump calls Manafort “very goodperson,”All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018)(transcript);
Manafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump’s support, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018)
(https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/08/17/paul-manafort-attorney-trump-jury-deliberations-
schneider-lead-vpx.cnn).
875 Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018), Doc.
7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript).
876 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018).
577 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug.21, 2018).
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whole thing aboutflipping, they call it, I know all about flipping.”*”? The President said that
flipping was “not fair” and “almost ought to be outlawed.”*®° In response to a question about
whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the Presidentsaid, “I have great respect for
whathe’s done, in terms of what he’s gone through. ... He worked for many, many people many,
many years, and I would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every
consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.”**! Giuliani told journalists that the
President “really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated” and that he and the President had
discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort.*** The next day, Giuliani told
the Washington Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a
pardon for Manafort and otheraides, and had been counseled against considering a pardon until
the investigation concluded.**
On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia
and signed a plea agreementthat required him to cooperate with investigators.“ Giuliani was
reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the
President following Manafort’s guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort’s
attorneys regularly briefed the President’s lawyers on the topics discussed and the information
Manafort had providedin interviews with the Special Counsel’s Office.*®° On November26, 2018,
the Special Counsel’s Office disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breachedhis plea
agreementby lying about multiple subjects.**° The next day, Giuliani said that the President had
been “upset for weeks” about what he considered to be “the un-American, horrible treatment of
579 Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded
the previous day).
the previous day).
the previous day).
882 Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, “How Did We End Up Here?” Trump Wonders as the White
House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug. 22, 2018).
883 Carol D. Leonnig & Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought his lawyers’ advice on possibility of
pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2018).
884 Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018),
Doc. 422.
885 Karen Freifeld & Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller
interviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt et al., Manafort’s Lawyer Said to Brief Trump
Attorneys on What He Told Mueller, New York Times(Nov. 27, 2018); Dana Bash, Manafort team briefed
Giuliani on Mueller meetings, CNN, Posted 11/28/18, available at
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/20 18/1 1/28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-giuliani-
updated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx.cnn; see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News
(Sept. 14, 2018) (Giuliani: “[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea
agreement has, and cooperation agreementhas, nothing to do with the Trump campaign. ... Now, I know
that because I’ve beenprivy to lot offacts I can’t repeat.”).
886 Joint Status Report, United States vy. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455.
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Manafort.”®8” In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was “very
brave” that Manafort did not “flip”:
If you told the truth, you goto jail. You know this flipping stuff is terrible. You flip and
youlie and you get—the prosecutorswill tell you 99 percentof the time they can get people
to flip. It’s rare that they can’t. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi—l don’t know
Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded.*** Manafort, coi It’s
actually very brave.*®
In response to a question abouta potential pardon for Manafort, the Presidentsaid, “It was never
discussed, but I wouldn’t takeit off the table. Why would I take it off the table?”*”°
eweHarm to Ongoing Matter

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887 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge, CNN
(Nov. 29, 2018).
888 “Corsi” is a reference to Jerome Corsi, Le who wasinvolvedin efforts
to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and whostated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea
offer from the Special Counsel’s Office because he was “not going to sign a lie.” Sara Murray & Eli
Watkins, [oar says he won't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018).
889 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
pardonfor Paul Manafortstill a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). That same day, the President
tweeted: “While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their powernotto reportit that way,
at least 3 majorplayers are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Demsis viciouslytelling witnesses
to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!” @realDonaldTrump 11/28/18
(8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet.
859 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump:
Trump says pardon for Paul Manafortstill a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
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Analysis
In analyzing the President’s conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, Roa. the following
evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. The President’s actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel’s
investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to preventparticular
witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing,
delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement.
With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging
him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to
cooperate with the government. When Flynn’s attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense
agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the
government, the President’s personal counsel initially reminded Flynn’s counsel ofthe President’s
warm feelings towards Flynn andsaid “thatstill remains.” But when Flynn’s counsel reiterated
that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President’s
personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn’s hostility
towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn’s
decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues,
however, we could not determine whether the President waspersonally involved in or knew about
the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn’s counsel.
With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President’s actions had the potential to
influence Manafort’s decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President andhis
personalcounsel made repeatedstatements suggesting that a pardon wasa possibility for Manafort,
while also makingit clear that the President did not want Manafort to “flip” and cooperate with
the government. On June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort’s D.C. case was
considering whether to revokehis bail, the President said that he “felt badly” for Manafort and
stated, “I think a lot ofit is very unfair.” And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the
President said, “I do want to see people treated fairly. That’s whatit’s all about.” Later that day,
after Manafort’s bail was revoked, the President called it a “tough sentence” that was “Very
unfair!” Two dayslater, the President’s personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the
Special Counsel’s investigation could receive a pardon“if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors
... come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly”’—using language that paralleled
how the President had already described the treatment of Manafort. Those statements, combined
with the President’s commendation ofManafort for being a “brave man” who“refusedto “break’,”
suggested that a pardon was a morelikely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with
the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
agreement, he was foundto have violated the agreementbylying to investigators.
The President’s public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury
deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second dayoftrial, for
example,the President called the prosecution a “terrible situation” and a “hoax”that “continues to
stain our country” and referred to Manafort as a “Reagan/Doledarling” who was“servingsolitary
confinement” even though he was “convicted of nothing.” Those statements were widely picked
up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read newsstories about the case and
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are presumed to follow those instructions, the President’s statements during the trial generated
substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happenedto see the statements
or learned about them from others. And the President’s statements during jury deliberations that
Manafort “happens to be a very good person” and that“it’s very sad what they’ve done to Paul
Manafort” had thepotentialto influence jurors who learnedofthe statements, which the President
madejust as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President’s actions towards Flynn, Manafort,

appearto have been connected to pendingor anticipated official proceedings involving
each individual. The President’s conduct towards Fyn LOL principally occurred when both
were undercriminal investigation by the Special Counsel’s Office and press reports speculated
about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel’s investigation. And the President’s
conduct towards Manafort wasdirectly connectedto the official proceedings involving him. The
President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort’s criminal
trial. And the President’s comments about the prospect of Manafort “flipping” occurred whenit
wasclear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings.
c. Intent. Evidence concerning the President’s intent related to Flynn as a potential

witnessis inconclusive. As previously noted, becauseof privilege issues we do not have evidence
establishing whether the President knew aboutor wasinvolvedin his counsel’s communications
with Flynn’s counsel stating that Flynn’s decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement
and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting “hostility” towards the
President. And regardless of whatthe President’s personal counsel communicated, the President
continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
agreement, stating that Flynn had “led a very strong life” and the President “fe[It] very badly”
about what had happenedto him.
Evidence concerning the President’s conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President
intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was
convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One dayafter
Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges andpotentially faced a lengthy prison term, the
President said that Manafort was“a brave man”forrefusing to “break” and that“flipping” “almost
oughtto be outlawed.” At the sametime, although the President had privately told aides he did
not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort “a good man”andsaid he had a “wonderfulfamily.”
And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the
President did not respond directly and instead said he had “great respect for what [Manafort]’s
done, in terms of what he’s gone through.” The President addedthat “someof the charges they
threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.” In light of the
President’s counsel’s previous statements that the investigations “might get cleaned up with some
presidential pardons” and that a pardon would be possible if the President “come[s] to the
conclusion that you have been treated unfairly,” the evidence supports the inference that the
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President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make
cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.
Wealso examined the evidenceofthe President’s intent in making public statements about
Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports
a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated
widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal
would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel’s investigation. By publicly stating on the second
day of deliberations that Manafort “happens to be a very good person”andthat“it’s very sad what
they’ve done to Paul Manafort” right after calling the Special Counsel’s investigation a “rigged
witch hunt,” the President’s statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to
engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that the President
intendedthat result. But there are alternative explanations for the President’s comments, including
that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to
influence public opinion. The President’s comments also could have been intended to continue
sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President
made his comments about Manafort being “a very good person” immediately after declining to
answera question about whether he would pardon Manafort.
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K. The President’s Conduct Involving Michael Cohen
Overview
The President’s conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our
investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscowproject on behalf
of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times,
including discussing whether Trumpshould travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media
began questioning Trump’s connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a “party line” that publicly
distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere
to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its
Russia investigation. In an attempt to minimize the President’s connections to Russia, Cohen
submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower
Moscowprojectthree times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia, that Cohen
had notreceived a responseto an outreach he madeto the Russian government,and that the project
ended in January 2016, before the first Republican caucus or primary. While working on the
congressional statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President’s personal counsel,
who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the
statement short and “tight.” After the FBI searched Cohen’s home and office in April 2018, the
President publicly asserted that Cohen would not “flip” and privately passed messages of support
to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President’s personal counsel and believed that if
he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the President would do “something else” to make
the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with the governmentin July 2018, the
President publicly criticized him, called him a “rat,” and suggested his family members had
committed crimes.
Evidence
1. Candidate Trump’s Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower

Moscow Project
The President’s interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of
the President’s involvementin the Trump Tower Moscow project.
As described in detail in VolumeI, Section IV.A.1, supra, from September 2015 until at
least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscowproject in Russia, with
negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and
special counsel to Donald J. Trump.%? The Trump Organization had previously and
°° In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception,
including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscowproject, as described later
in this section. When Cohenfirst met with investigators from this Office, he repeated the same lies he told
Congress about the Trump Tower Moscowproject. Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 12-17. But after Cohen pleaded
guilty to offenses in the Southern District ofNew York on August 21, 2018, he met with investigators again
and corrected the record. The Office found Cohen’s testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be
consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office’s investigation.
The Office’s sentencing submission in Cohen’s criminal case stated: “Starting with his second meeting with
the [Special Counsel’s Office] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for
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unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow.”!° According to Cohen,in approximately

September 2015 he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump
Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscowthatlicensed the Trump name
and brand.°'! Cohen thereafter had numerousbrief conversations with Trump aboutthe project.?”?
Cohen recalled that Trump wantedto be updated on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow
and on several occasions brought the project up with Cohen to ask what was happening onit."
Cohen also discussed the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka
Trump.?!4
In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project that specified highly
lucrative terms for the Trump Organization.?'> In December 2015, Felix Sater, who was handling
negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation, asked Cohen for a copy of his and
Trump’s passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with governmentofficials and possible
financing partners.?'© Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of
Trump’s passport from Trump’s personal secretary, Rhona Graff?!”
By January 2016, Cohen had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with
Russian government officials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry
his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but also his broader efforts through
public statements and testimony before Congress to minimizehisrole in, and what he knew about, contacts
between the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign.... The
information provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is
consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel’s
Office’s] investigation. ... The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel’s Office], also
corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerninghis outreach to and contacts
with Russian officials during the course of the campaign.” Gov’t Sentencing Submissionat 4, United States
y, Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018), Doc. 14. At Cohen’s sentencing, our Office further
explained that Cohen had “provided valuable information . . . while taking care and being careful to note
what he knows and what he doesn’t know.” Transcript at 19, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018), Doc. 17 (Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript).
910 See Volume I, Section IV.A.1, supra (noting thatstarting in at least 2013, several employees of
the Trump Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Trump
Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties).
911 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15.
912 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2, 4.

913 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 4.
914 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4, 10.
5 MDC-H-00061 8-25 (10/28/15 Letter ofIntent, signed by Donald J. Trump, Trump Acquisition,
LLC and Andrey Rozov,I.C. Expert Investment Company); Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3; Written Responses
of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g)).
916 MDC-H-000600 (12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen).

17 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 5.
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Peskov, who was Putin’s deputy chiefofstaff and press secretary.°'* On January 20, 2016, Cohen
received an email response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov’s personal assistant, and phonerecords
confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohendescribed the
Trump Tower Moscowproject and requested assistance in movingthe project forward.?!? Cohen
recalled briefing candidate Trump aboutthe call soon afterwards.°”° Cohen told Trump he spoke
with a womanheidentified as “someone from the Kremlin,” and Cohen reported that she was very
professional and asked detailed questions about the project."' Cohenrecalled telling Trump he
wished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman from the
Kremlin?”
Cohenthoughthis phone call renewedinterest in the project.“ The day after Cohen’s call
with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to “[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat
... It’s about Putin they called today.”°4 Sater told Cohen that the Russian governmentliked the
project and on January 25, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow “for a working
visit.”°2> After the outreach from Sater, Cohenrecalledtelling Trumpthat he was waiting to hear
back on moving the project forward.”
After January 2016, Cohen continuedto have conversations with Sater about Trump Tower
Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status
of the project.°?” Cohenrecalled that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and
that Trump never discouraged him from working on the project because of the campaign.?* In
March or April 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia.” Cohen also
518 See FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater), TRUMPORG_MC_000233 (1/11/16
Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru); MDC-H-000690 (1/14/16 Email, Cohen to
info@prpress.gov.ru); TRUMPORG_MC_000235 (1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru).
919 1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen;Call Records ofMichael Cohen. (Showing a 22-minute call
on January 20, 2016, between Cohenand the numberPoliakova provided in her email); Cohen 9/12/18 302,
at 2-3. After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova’s contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook
contactlist. 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.).
920 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 5.
*! Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5-6; Cohen 11/12/18 302,at 4.
2 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 5.
3 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.
4 FS§00011 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen).
25 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5; 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (attachment).
6 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
227 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6. In later congressional testimony, Cohenstated that he briefed Trump
on the project approximately six times after January 2016. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump
Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, 116" Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong.
Transcripts, at 24) (testimony of Michael Cohen).
28 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6.
9 Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 4.
136
recalled briefing Donald TrumpJr. in the spring—a conversation that Cohen said was not “idle
chit chat” because Trump Tower Moscow waspotentially a $1 billion deal.”°
Cohen recalled that around May 2016, he again raised with candidate Trumpthepossibility
of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project.”*' At that time, Cohen had
received severaltexts from Sater seeking to arrangedates for such a trip.” On May4, 2016, Sater
wrote to Cohen, “I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMINGthe trip does happen the question is
beforeor after the convention. .... Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime
you want but the 2 big guys[is] the question. I said I would confirm and revert.”’*? Cohen
responded, “My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the
convention.”**4 On May 5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably
read to Trump:
Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum whichis
Russia’s Davos it’s June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly
introduceyouto either Putin or Medvedev. ... This is perfect. The entire business
class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you wantto discuss including
dates and subjects are on the table to discuss.”
Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with
candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be
there.Cohen remembered that Trumpsaid that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen
could “lock and load” on the deal.’ In June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg
Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formalinvitation for Cohen from Peskov.?**
Cohensaid he had a quick conversation with Trump atthat time butdid nottell him that the project
was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it
were revived.”
During the summer of 2016, Cohenrecalled that candidate Trump publicly claimedthat he
had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen aboutthe
status of the Trump Tower Moscowproject, which Cohen found “interesting.”°4° At some point
3° Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 10.

3! Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
%2 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
933 F§00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen).
934 F§00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohento Sater).
535 F§00016-17 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen).
36 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
37 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
°°8 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 7-8.
°° Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 8.
4 Cohen 3/19/19 302,at 2.
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that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohensaid the
Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company
had not secured a piece of property for the project.! Trumpsaid that was “too bad,” and Cohen
did notrecall talking with Trumpaboutthe project after that.” Cohensaid thatat no time during
the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be
abandoned.”
2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a “Party Line” Distancing Candidate Trump
From Russia
Aspreviously discussed, see VolumeII, Section II.A, supra, when questions aboutpossible
Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump
denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described
as the “party line”or “message”to follow for Trump andhis senior advisors.*"
After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in
advanceofthe inauguration.”4° Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow wasonthelist of deals
to be closed out.“ In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the
media about Trump Tower Moscow,and herecalled speaking to the President-Elect when those
inquiries came in.*” Cohen was concernedthattruthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow
project might not be consistent with the “message” that the President-Elect had no relationship
with Russia.“*
In an effort to “stay on message,” Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump
Tower Moscowdeal wasnotfeasible and had ended in January 2016.Cohenrecalled that this
waspart of a “script” or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trumpandothers to
941 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could notrecall the precise timing of this conversation, but said
he thoughtit occurred in June or July 2016. Cohenrecalled that the conversation happened at some point
after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at
2:
2 Cohen 3/19/19 302,at 2.
43 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2.
4 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 9.
45 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2; see also Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 8-9.
6 Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 1-2.

47 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3.
948 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
49 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5. The article was published on February 19, 2017, and reported that
Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow “as recently as the fall of 2015”
but had cometo a halt because of the presidential campaign. Consistent with Cohen’s intendedparty line
message,thearticle stated, “Cohen said the Trump Organization hadreceiveda letter of intent for a project
in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not
feasible.” Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Planfor Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy ofTrump
Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017).
138
dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.” Cohen said that he
discussed the talking points with Trump butthat he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they
were untrue because Trumpalready knew they were untrue.”°! Cohen thoughtit was importantto
say the deal was donein January 2016, rather than acknowledgethat talks continued in May and
June 2016, because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a
relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign, before Trump had become the party’s
presumptive nominee.’
3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower
MoscowProject in Accordance with the Party Line
In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and
documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016
election? At that time, Cohen understood Congress’s interest in him to be focused on the
allegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russianofficials
in Prague during the campaign.?* Cohen had nevertraveled to Prague and was not concerned
aboutthose allegations, which he believed were provably false.°°° On May 18, 2017, Cohen met
with the President to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that
he should cooperate because there was nothing there.?>°
Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement (JDA)with the President and other
individuals who were part of the Russia investigation.” In the months leading up to his
congressional testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the President’s personal counsel.** Cohen
950 Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 5-6.

>! Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 6.
952 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10.
933 P_§CO-000000328 (5/9/17 Letter, HPSCI to Cohen); P-SCO-000000331 (5/12/17 Letter, SSCI
to Cohen).
954 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 2-3.
5 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 2-3.
956 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 11/20/19 302,at 3.
957 Cohen 11/12/18 302,at 2.
8 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18, at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about his
conversations with the President’s personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this
Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any otherprivilege,
including communications protected by a joint defense or commoninterest privilege. As a result, most of
what Cohentold us about his conversations with the President’s personal counsel concerned what Cohen
had communicated to the President’s personal counsel, and not what wassaid in response. Cohen described
certain statements made by the President’s personal counsel, however, that are set forth in this section.
Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected
those statements because they had knowledge of the scope oftheir joint defense agreement and access to
privileged communications that may have provided contextfor evaluating the statements they shared. After
interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President’s personal counsel if he wished to provide
information to us about his conversations with Cohenrelated to Cohen’s congressional testimony about
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May-Contei Materi l Fed R-Crim P-6fe}
said that in those conversations the President’s personal counsel would sometimes say that he had
just been with the President.Cohen recalled that the President’s personal counseltold him the
JDA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on
message the investigations would come to an end soon.At that time, Cohen’s legal bills were
being paid by the Trump Organization,*®! and Cohen was told not to worry because the
investigations would be over by summeror fall of 2017.Cohen said that the President’s
personal counselalso conveyed that, as part ofthe JDA, Cohen wasprotected, which he would not
be if he “went rogue.”* Cohenrecalled that the President’s personal counsel reminded him that
“the President loves you”and told him that if he stayed on message, the President had his back.°™
In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscowto submit
to Congress along with his document production.” The final version of the statementcontained
several false statements aboutthe project.°First, although the Trump Organization continuedto
pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said, “The proposal was under
consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By
the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business
reasons and should not be pursued further. Based on my business determinations, the Trump
Organization abandoned the proposal.”°6” Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had
discussed possible travel to Russia by Trumpto pursue the venture, the statementsaid, “Despite
overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking Mr. Trumpto travel to Russia in connection with
this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a
definitive agreementin place.”* Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump onthestatus
Trump Tower Moscow. The President’s personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated
that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained
from other parties in the JDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen’s counsel to withhold
communications that could be covered by privilege, the President’s personal counsel’s uncertainty about
the provenanceofhis own knowledge, the burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support
a claim ofprivilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements
Cohen provided in this report. If the statements were to be used in a context beyondthis report, further
analysis could be warranted.
59 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 6.
96 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 2, 4.
61 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 4.
962 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 8; Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 3-4.
583 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 4.
964 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 2.
565 P-_SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael Cohen’s
Counsel to Cohen). Cohensaid it was nothis idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow.
Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 7.
6 P-_SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen,Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
7 P_§CO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
968 P_SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017).
140
of the project and had numerous conversations aboutit, the statement said, “Mr. Trump was never
in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a
non-bindingletter of intent in 2015.”Fourth, although Cohen’s outreach to Peskov in January
2016 had resulted in a lengthy phonecall with a representative from the Kremlin, the statement
said that Cohen did “not recall any response to my email [to Peskov], nor any other contacts by
me with Mr. Peskovor other Russian governmentofficials about the proposal.”°”°
Cohen’s statement was circulated in advance to, and edited by, members of the JDA.7”!
Before the statement wasfinalized, early drafts contained a sentencestating, “The building project
led me to makelimited contacts with Russian governmentofficials.”” In the final version ofthe
statement, that line was deleted.””? Cohen thoughthe wastold that it was a decision of the JDA to
take out that sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion.2’* Cohen recalled that he told the
President’s personal counselthat he would not contest a decision of the JDA.””
Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress, he spoke with the
President’s personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia:
Cohen’s efforts to set up a meeting between Trump andPutin in New York during the 2015 United
Nations General Assembly.?”° In September 2015, Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump,
who told Cohento reach out to Putin’s office aboutit.°”” Cohen spoke and emailed with a Russian
official about a possible meeting, and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on
the proposed meeting with Putin.°”® When Cohencalled the Russian official a second time, she
told him it would not follow properprotocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohenrelayed that
> P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).

9” P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
9°! Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. Cohen alsotestified in Congress that the President’s counsel
reviewed and edited the statement. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House
Oversight and Reform Committee, 116" Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong.Transcripts, at 24-25) (testimony
by Michael Cohen). Because of concerns about the commoninterest privilege, we did not obtain or review
all drafts of Cohen’s statement. Based on the drafts that were released through this Office’s filter process,
it appears that the substance ofthe four principal false statements described above were containedin an
early draft prepared by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17
Email and Attachment, Cohen’s counsel to Cohen).
®® P.SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Draft Statement of Michael Cohen); Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
573 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. A differentline stating that Cohen did “notrecall any response to my
email [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian
governmentofficials about the proposal” remainedin the draft. See P-SCO-0000009478 (Statement of
Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
° Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
°° Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 5.
6 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10-11.
97 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 4.
8 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5.
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message to Trump.?”? Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump-
Putin meeting when hetestified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting
on Sean Hannity’s radio show.°®° Cohenrecalled explaining to the President’s personal counsel
the “whole story” of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump’s role
in it.°8! Cohen recalled that he and the President’s personal counsel talked about keeping Trump
out of the narrative, and the President’s personal counsel told Cohen the story wasnot relevant and
should not be includedin his statement to Congress.?*
Cohen said that his “agenda” in submitting the statement to Congress with false
representations about the Trump Tower Moscowproject was to minimizelinks betweenthe project
and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential
primaries, and shut downfurther inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow,with the aim oflimiting the
ongoing Russia investigations.”*? Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and beloyal to
him by not contradicting anything the President had said.?** Cohenrecalled he was concernedthat
if he told the truth aboutgetting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about
travel to Russia to pursue the project, he would contradict the message that no connection existed
between Trumpand Russia, and herationalized his decision to provide false testimony because
the deal never happened.?® He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by
individuals who knewit was false because he wassticking to the party line adhered to by the whole
group.°%° Cohen wanted the support of the President and the White House, and he believed that
following the party line would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional
investigations.?*”
Between August 18, 2017, when the statement wasin aninitial draft stage, and August 28,
2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone recordsreflect that Cohen spoke with
the President’s personal counsel almost daily.?8* On August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen
9 Cohen 11/12/18 302,at 5.

989 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11.
%8! Cohen 3/19/19 302,at2.
982 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2; see Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11 (recalling that he was told that if he
stayed on messageand kept the President out of the narrative, the President would havehis back).
583 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8; Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (Cohen Information).
°84 Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 4.

85 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4; Cohen 11/12/18 302,at 2-3, 4, 6.
86 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 9.
°87 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 8-9.
88 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen
(Reflecting three contacts on August 18, 2017 (24 seconds; 5 minutes 25 seconds; and 10 minutes 58
seconds); two contacts on August 19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds); three contacts on August 23
(8 seconds; 20 minutes 33 seconds; and 5 minutes 8 seconds); one contact on August 24 (11 minutes 59
seconds); 14 contacts on August 27 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; 1 minute 16 seconds; 1 minutes 35
142
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submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President’s personal counsel had numerous
contacts by phone, includingcalls lasting three, four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes.8? Cohen
recalled telling the President’s personal counsel, who did not havefirst-hand knowledge of the
project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement,
including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with
candidate Trump than the statement reflected.°” Cohen stated that the President’s personal
counsel respondedthat it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project
did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statementshort and “tight” and the matter would
soon come to an end.””! Cohen recalled that the President’s personal counsel said “his client”
appreciated Cohen,that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President, that there
wasno need to muddythe water, and that it was time to move on.”? Cohensaid he agreed because
it was what he was expected to do.After Cohenlater pleaded guilty to making false statements
to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Office sought to speak with the
President’s personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing
potential privilege concerns.°*
At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a
source for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017, that reported in depth for the
first time that the Trump Organization was “pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower
in Moscow” at the same time as candidate Trump was“runningfor president in late 2015 and early
2016.”° Thearticle reported that “the project was abandonedat the end of January 2016,just
before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said.””°° Cohen
recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased
in January 2016.”
seconds; 6 minutes 16 seconds; 1 minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4

minutes 56 seconds; 11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds).
89 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting 14 contacts on August
27, 2017 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; | minute 16 seconds; | minutes 35 seconds; 6 minutes 16
seconds; 1 minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 minutes 56 seconds; 11
minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds)).
°° Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 5.

99 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. Cohen also vaguelyrecalled telling the President’s personal counsel
that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President’s personal counsel respondedto the
effect of “so what?” because the deal never happened. Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
” Cohen 11/20/18 302,at 5.
93 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
94 9/8/19 email, Counsel for personal counselto the President to Special Counsel’s Office.
95 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump
Towerin Moscow while he ran for president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017).
°°6 Carol D. Leonnig etal., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he
ran for president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017).
97 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7.
143
On August 28, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow
project to Congress.”* Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the specifics of what
the statement said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow.” He
recalled speaking to the President more generally about how he plannedto stay on message in his
testimony.' On September 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen
orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, whichcriticized the allegations
in the Steele material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscowproject “was terminated in
January of 2016; which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first
primary.”!°°! Cohensaid the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative
and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow
the same message.'? Cohen said his decision was meantto mirror Jared Kushner’s decision to
release a statement in advance of Kushner’s congressional testimony, which the President’s
personal counsel had told Cohen the President liked.!°°? Cohen recalled that on September 20,
2017, after Cohen’s opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President’s personal
counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscowstatementthat had
gone out, !0%
On October 24 and 25, 2017, Cohentestified before Congress and repeated the false
statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow.!°° Phone
records show that Cohen spoke with the President’s personal counsel immediately after his
testimony on both days.!°°%
4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen
In January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130,000 paymentduring
the campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had
98 P_S§CO-000009477 - 9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to SSCI).

9° Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 9.
1009 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 9.
100! Cohen 9/18/18 302,at 7; see, e.g., READ: Michael Cohen’s statementto the Senateintelligence
committee, CNN (Sept. 19, 2017).
1002 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7.
1003 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6.
1004 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. Phone records show that the President’s personal counsel called
Cohen on the morning of September20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 11 minutes, and that they
had two morecontacts that day, one of which lasted approximately 18 minutes. Call Records of Michael
Cohen. (Reflecting three contacts on September 20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11 minutes 3 seconds; 2
seconds; and 18 minutes 38 seconds).
1095 Cohen Information, at 4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S.
Houseof Representatives, Interview of Michael Cohen (Oct. 24, 2017), at 10-11, 117-119.
1096 Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting two contacts on October 24, 2017 (12 minutes 8
seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds) and three contacts on October 25, 2017 (1 second; 4 minutes 6 seconds;
and 6 minutes 6 seconds)).
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with the Presidentbefore he ran for office.'°” This Office did not investigate Cohen’s campaign-
period payments to women.'°? However, those events, as described here, are potentially relevant
to the President’s and his personal counsel’s interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began
to cooperate with the government.
On February 13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, “In a
private transaction in 2016, I used my own personalfunds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to
[the woman]. Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the
transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or
indirectly.”In congressional testimony on February 27, 2019, Cohen testified that he had
discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed
Cohen to say that the President “was not knowledgeable . . . of [Cohen’s] actions” in making the
payment.'°!© Qn February 19, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story
attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohenas the President’s “fixer,” Cohen received
a text message from the President’s personal counsel that stated, “Client says thanks for what you
do.7!0l!
On April 9, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District ofNew York executed search warrants on Cohen’s home,hotel room, and office.'°'? That
day, the President spoketo reporters andsaid that he had “just heard that they broke into the office
of one of my personal attorneys—a good man.”'°'3 The President called the searches “a real
disgrace” and said, “It’s an attack on our country, in a true sense. It’s an attack on what weall
1007 See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Arranged $130,000 Paymentfor
Adult-Film Star’s Silence, Wall Street Journal (Jan. 12, 2018).
1098 The Office was authorized to investigate Cohen’s establishment and use of Essential
Consultants LLC, which Cohencreated to facilitate the $130,000 payment during the campaign, based on
evidencethat the entity received funds from Russian-backedentities. Cohen’s use of Essential Consultants
to facilitate the $130,000 payment to the woman during the campaign waspart of the Office’s referral of
certain Cohen-related matters to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
1009 See, e.g., Mark Berman, Longtime Trump attorney says he made $130,000 payment to Stormy
Daniels with his money, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2018).
1010 Fearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform
Committee, 116" Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 147-148) (testimony of Michael Cohen).
Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately five
minutes on January 19, 2018, and for approximately seven minutes on January 30, 2018, and that Cohen
called Melania Trump’s cell phone several times between January 26, 2018, and January 30, 2018. Call
Records of Michael Cohen.
1011 9/19/18 Text Message, President’s personal counsel to Cohen; see Jim Rutenbergetal., Tools
of Trump's Fixer: Payouts, Intimidation andthe Tabloids, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2018).
1012 Gov’t Opp. to Def. Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order, In the Matter of Search Warrants
Executed on April 9, 2018, 18-mj-3161 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2018), Doc. 1 (“On April 9, 2018, agents from
the New York field office of the Federal Bureauof Investigation . . . executed search warrants for Michael
Cohen’s residence, hotel room, office, safety deposit box, and electronic devices.”).
1013 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House
(Apr. 9, 2018).
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stand for.”!°'* Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was “an open book,”
that he did not want issues arising from the payments to womento “come out,” and that his false
statements to Congress were ‘‘a big concern.”!°!°
A few daysafter the searches, the President called Cohen.'"! According to Cohen, the
President said he wanted to “checkin” and askedif Cohen wasokay, andthe President encouraged
Cohen to “hangin there”and“stay strong.”!°'? Cohen also recalled that following the searches he
heard from individuals who werein touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President’s
support for him.'°!* Cohenrecalled that a. a friend of the President’s, reached out
to say that he was with “the Boss” in Mar-a-Lago and the President had said “he loves you” and
not to worry.'°!? Cohenrecalled that for the Trump
Organization, told him, “the boss loves you.” , a friend
of the President’s, told him, “everyone knowsthe boss has your back.”
On orabout April 17, 2018, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who
had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of the President’s personal lawyers. idee
Costello told Cohen that he had a “back channel of communication” to Giuliani, and that Giuliani
had said the “channel” was“crucial” and “must be maintained.”!°On April 20, 2018, the New
York Timespublished anarticle aboutthe President’s relationship with and treatment of Cohen.'™
The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not“flip”:
The New York Times anda third rate reporter . . . are going out of their way to destroy
Michael Cohenandhis relationship with mein the hope thathe will ‘flip.’ They use non-
existent ‘sources’ and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a
wonderful family. Michaelis a businessmanfor his own account/lawyer whoI have always
liked & respected. Most people willflip if the Governmentlets them out of trouble, even
1014 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House
(Apr. 9, 2018).
1015 Cohen, 10/17/18 302,at 11.
1016 Cohen 3/19/19 302,at 4.
1017 Cohen 3/19/19 302,at 4.
1018 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at I1.
119 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 11.
1020 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 11.
121 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 11.
1022 4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen; MC-SCO-001 (7/7/18
redactedbilling statement from Davidoff, Hutcher & Citron to Cohen).
1023 4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen.
1024 See Maggie Habermanetal., Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump.
Maybe Not Anymore., New York Times (Apr. 20, 2018).
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if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don’t see Michael doing that despite the
horrible Witch Hunt andthe dishonest media!"
In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani.'© Costello told
Cohenthe conversation was “Very Very Positive[.] You are ‘loved’. . . they are in our corner. .. .
Sleep well tonight[], you have friends in high places.”!°77
Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White
House if he continued to toe the party line, and he determinedto stay on messageand be part of
the team.!°28 At the time, Cohen’s understoodthat his legal fees werestill being paid by the Trump
Organization, which he said was importantto him.'°? Cohen believed he needed the powerof the
Presidentto take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message.'©
Cohenalso recalled speaking with the President’s personal counsel about pardons after the
searches of his home andoffice had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon
discussions were occurring at the White House.'°3! Cohen told the President’s personal counsel
he had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in an
uncomfortable position and wanted to know what wasin it for him.'%? According to Cohen, the
President’s personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation
was a witch hunt, and that everything would be fine.'? Cohen understood based on this
conversation and previous conversations about pardonswith the President’s personal counsel that
as long as he stayed on message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a
pardonorthrough the investigation being shut down.'°*
1025 @realDonaldTrump 4/21/18 (9:10 a.m. ET) Tweets.

1026 4/91/18 Email, Costello to Cohen.
1927 4/91/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. ETMCM ehteemETyg
1028 Cohen 9/12/18 302,at 11.

1029 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10.
1030 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10.
'031 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 7. Ata White Housepressbriefing on April 23, 2018, in responseto a
question about whether the White House had “close[d] the door one way or the other on the President
pardoning Michael Cohen,” Sanderssaid,“It’s hard to close the door on something that hasn’t taken place.
I don’t like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen. I would
refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case, but we don’t have
anything at this point.” Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Apr. 23, 2018).
'032 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 7; Cohen 3/19/19 302,at 3.
1033 Cohen 3/19/19 302,at 3.
1034 Cohen 3/19/19 302,at 3-4.
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On April 24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter’s inquiry whether he would
consider a pardon for Cohen with, “Stupid question.”'> On June 8, 2018, the President said he
“hadn’t even thought about” pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued,“It’s far too early to
be thinking about that. They haven’t been convicted of anything. There’s nothing to pardon.”!°*°
And on June 15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a
press interview and said, “I feel badly about a lot of them, because I think lot of it is very
unfair.”!37
5. The President’s Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government
OnJuly 2, 2018, ABC Newsreported based on an “exclusive” interview with Cohen that
Cohen “strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and
federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York—evenif that puts President Trump in
jeopardy.”'°35 That week, the media reported that Cohen had addedan attorney to his legal team
whopreviously had workedasa legal advisor to President Bill Clinton.'°°
Beginning on July 20, 2018, the media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had
made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman
who said she had had an affair with Trump.'°4? On July 21, 2018, the President responded:
“Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer’s office (early in the morning}—
almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client—totally unheard
of & perhapsillegal. The good newsis that your favorite President did nothing wrong!”""' On
July 27, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen waswilling to inform investigators that Donald
TrumpJr.told his father about the June 9, 2016 meeting to get “dirt” on Hillary Clinton,'the
President tweeted: “[S]o the Fake News doesn’t waste my time with dumb questions, NO,I did
NOTknowof the meeting with my son, Don jr. Soundsto me like someone is trying to make up
1035 Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted Bilateral
Meeting, The White House (Apr. 24, 2018).
1036 President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departingfor the G-7 Summit, CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts (June 8, 2018).
1037 Remarks by President Trumpin Press Gaggle, The White House (June 15, 2018).
1038 EYCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his ‘first
loyalty’, ABC (July 2, 2018). Cohensaid in the interview, “To be crystal clear, my wife, my daughter and
myson, and this country have myfirst loyalty.”
1039 See e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis,
Politico (July 5, 2018).
1040 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzoet al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to
Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018).
1002 See, e.g., Jim Sciutto, Cuomo Prime Time Transcript, CNN (July 26, 2018).
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eete
stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill
and Crooked Hillary’s lawyer. Gee, I wonderif they helped him makethe choice!”
On August 21, 2018, Cohenpleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight
felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he
had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women whosaid they had affairs with the
President.!°* During the plea hearing, Cohenstated that he had worked“at the direction of” the
candidate in making those payments.'“° The next day, the President contrasted Cohen’s
cooperation with Manafort’s refusal to cooperate, tweeting, “I feel very badly for Paul Manafort
and his wonderful family. ‘Justice’ took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied
tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to ‘break’—make up stories
in orderto get a ‘deal.’ Such respect for a brave man!”!%°
On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the President that
included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen’s written
statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President.'°*’ Among otherissues,
the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance ofdiscussions he had with
Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the
President“at any time direct[ed] or suggest[ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscowproject
should cease,” or whether the President was “informed at any time that the project had been
abandoned.”!%48
On November20, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those
questions about Trump Tower Moscowdirectly and did not provide any information about the
timing of the candidate’s discussions with Cohen aboutthe project or whetherhe participated in
any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued.'*? Instead, the
President’s answers stated in relevantpart:
I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. AsI recall, they were brief, and
they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do notrecall any
discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not rememberdiscussing it with
1043 @realDonaldTrump7/27/18 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET)
Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. Atthe time of these tweets, the press had
reported that Cohen’s financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators.
See, e.g., Matt Apuzzoet al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model,
NewYork Times (July 20, 2018).
104 Cohen Information.
1045 Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23.
!046 @realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet.
1047 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel (attaching written
questions for the President, with attachments).
'48 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel (attaching written
questions for the President), QuestionIII, Parts (a) through(g).
1049 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018).
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anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware
at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian
governmentofficial regarding the Letter of Intent.!°
On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress
based onhis statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.'®!' Ina plea agreementwith this
Office, Cohen agreed to “provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which
this Office deems relevant.”!°** Later on November29, after Cohen’s guilty plea had become
public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscowproject, saying:
I decided notto do the project... . I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have
been nothing wrongif I did doit. If I did doit, there would have been nothing wrong. That
was my business... ._It was an optionthat I decided not to do... . I decided notto doit.
The primary reason... I was focused on runningfor President... . I was running my
business while I was campaigning. There was a good chancethat I wouldn’t have won, in
which case I would’ve gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of
opportunities?!°
ThePresidentalso said that Cohen was “a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people
that you watch—he is a weak person. And whathe’s trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So
he’s lying about a project that everybody knew about.”!°* The President also brought up Cohen’s
written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscowproject: “So here’s the story:
Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before hetestified in the House and/or
Senate. It talked about his position.”!°°° The President added, “Even if [Cohen] wasright, it
doesn’t matter because I was allowed to do whateverI wanted during the campaign.”!°°6
In light of the President’s public statements following Cohen’s guilty plea that he “decided
not to do the project,” this Office again sought information from the President about whether he
participated in any discussions about the project being abandonedor no longer pursued, including
whenhe “decided notto do the project,” who he spoke to aboutthat decision, and what motivated
1050 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to QuestionIII, Parts
(a) through (g)).
1051 Cohen Information; Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript.
'052 Blea Agreementat 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018).
'053 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President’s
remarks following Cohen’s guilty plea, Cohen’s August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen,
not the President, “decided to abandon the proposal” in late January 2016; that Cohen “did not ask or brief
Mr. Trump.. . before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal”; and that the decision
to abandon the proposal was “unrelated” to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D.
Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
1054 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN(Nov.29, 2018).
1055 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).
1056 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).
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the decision.'°’ The Office also again asked for the timing of the President’s discussions with
Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify “what period of the campaign” he
was involved in discussions concerning the project.'8 In response, the President’s personal
counsel declined to provide additional information from the Presidentandstated that “the President
has fully answered the questionsat issue.”!°°?
In the weeks following Cohen’s plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office,
the President repeatedly implied that Cohen’s family members were guilty of crimes. On
December 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted,
““Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.’ You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE,
unrelated to Trump, things having to do with fraud, big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long
prison term? He makesupstories to get a GREAT & ALREADYreduced dealfor himself, and
get his wife andfather-in-law (who has the money?) off Scott Free. He lied for this outcome and
should, in my opinion,serve a full and complete sentence.”!° EMM eTatereTiite ETT
On December 12, 2018, Cohenwassentenced to three years of imprisonment.'° The next

day, the President senta series of tweets that said:
I never directed Michael Cohento break the law. ... Those charges were just agreed to by
him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he
did—including the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook. As a lawyer,
Michaelhasgreatliability to me!!°
On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted, “Remember, Michael Cohen only becamea ‘Rat’
after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable & unheard ofuntil the Witch Hunt
wasillegally started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY’S OFFICE! Whydidn’t they break
into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked’s office?”!°™
In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony ina
congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen’s
'057 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel.

1058 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel.
1059 9/6/19 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office.
1969 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24 a.m. ET and 10:29 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis added).
1062 Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript.
1063 @realDonaldTrump 12/13/18 (8:17 a.m. ET,8:25 a.m. ET,and 8:39 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis
added).
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family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President
was asked whether he was worried about Cohen’s testimony and responded:
[{]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says “I have anidea,I'll ah, tell—I’Il give
you some information onthe president.” Well, there is no information. But he should give
information maybeonhis father-in-law because that’s the one that people wantto lookat
because where does that money—that’s the money in the family. And I guess he didn’t
want to talk about his father-in-law, he’s trying to get his sentence reduced. So it’s ah,
pretty sad. You know,it’s weak andit’s very sad to watcha thinglike that.'°°
On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, “Kevin Corke, @FoxNews ‘Don’t forget,
Michael Cohen hasalready been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the
Wall Street Journal has suggested that he mayhavestolen tens of thousandsofdollars. . . .”- Lying
to reduce hisjail time! Watchfather-in-law!”|°°¢
On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony,citing threats against
his family.'°%7 The nextday, the President tweeted,“Sointeresting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen,
whosadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of CrookedHillary Clinton
to represent him—Gee, how did that happen?”!°%
Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen’s
accountthat the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscowproject well past January
2016. Giuliani stated that “it’s our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow
project] went on throughout 2016. Weren’t a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can’t be
sure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversations with him aboutit.
The president also remembers—yeah, probably up—could be up to as far as October,
November.”!°® In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the Presidentas saying
that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were “going on from the day I
announcedto the day I won.”!°7? On January 21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statementthat said: “My
recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and
candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow ‘project’ were hypothetical and not
based on conversations I had with the president.”!07!
165 Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump, Fox News(Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added).
1066 @realDonaldTrump 1/18/19 (10:02 a.m. ET) Tweet (emphasis added).
1067 Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen’s personal counsel(Jan. 23, 2019).
1069 Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani, NBC (Jan. 20, 2019).
1070 Mark Mazzetti et al., Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continued Through “the Day I Won,” Trump
Is Said to Acknowledge, New York Times (Jan. 20, 2019).
‘07! Maggie Haberman, Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were “Hypothetical”,
New York Times (Jan. 21, 2019). Ina letter to this Office, the President’s counsel stated that Giuliani’s
public comments “were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge ofthe existence or timing
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Analysis
In analyzing the President’s conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant
to the elements of obstruction of justice.
a. Obstructive act. We gathered evidence of the President’s conduct related to Cohen

on two issues: (i) whether the Presidentor others aided or participated in Cohen’s false statements
to Congress, and (ii) whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to
prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government.
i. First, with regard to Cohen’s false statements to Congress, while there is

evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress
about the Trump Tower Moscowproject, the evidence available to us does not establish that the
President directed or aided Cohen’s false testimony.
Cohensaid that his statements to Congress followed a “party line” that developed within
the campaignto align with the President’s public statements distancing the President from Russia.
Cohenalsorecalled that, in speaking with the President in advanceoftestifying, he madeit clear
that he would stay on message—which Cohen believed they both understood would require false
testimony. But Cohen said that he and the Presidentdid not explicitly discuss whether Cohen’s
testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or wasfalse, and the President did
not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohenalso said he did nottell the President about the
specifics of his planned testimony. During the time whenhis statement to Congress was being
drafted and circulated to members of the JDA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about
the statement, but rather communicated with the President’s personal counsel—as corroborated by
phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President’s personal
counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and whenhetestified before Congress.
Cohenrecalled that in his discussions with the President’s personal counsel on August 27,
2017—the day before Cohen’s statement was submitted to Congress—Cohensaid that there were
more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the
statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concernatthat time. According to Cohen,
the President’s personal counsel—who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project—
responded by sayingthat there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include
those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short
andtight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen’s recollection
of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen’s
draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JDA. For example, Cohen omitted
any reference to his outreach to Russian governmentofficials to set up a meeting between Trump
and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohenbelieved it was a decision of
of conversations beyond that contained in the President’s [written responses to the Special Counsel’s
Office].” 2/6/19 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office.
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the JDAto delete the sentence, “The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian
governmentofficials.”
The President’s personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his
conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President
was awareofthe information Cohen provided to the President’s personal counsel. The President’s
conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-clientprivilege,
and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence of evidence
about the President and his counsel’s conversations about the drafting of Cohen’s statement
precludes us from assessing what, if any, role the President played.
ii. Second, we considered whether the President tookactions that would have
the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal
investigators or to Congress.
Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately
urged Cohento stay on message and not “flip.” Cohen recalled the President’s personal counsel
telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go “rogue.” In the days and weeks
that followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen’s homeandoffice, the Presidenttold reporters that
Cohenwasa “good man”and said he was“a fine person with a wonderful family ... who I have
always liked & respected.” Privately, the President told Cohen to “hang in there” and “stay
strong.” People who wereclose to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that
“the President loves you,”“the boss loves you,” and “everyone knowsthe boss has your back.”
Throughthe President’s personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen “thanks
for what you do” after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to womenthat,
according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew wasfalse. At that time, the Trump
Organization continued to pay Cohen’s legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohenalso
recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President’s personal counsel, who told him
to stay on message and everything wouldbe fine. The Presidentindicated in his public statements
that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that “[m]Jost people will flip if the
Governmentlets them out of trouble” but that he “d[idn’t] see Michael doing that.”
After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the
President accused Cohen of “mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam
(Taxi cabs maybe?),” called Cohen a “rat,” and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that
Cohen’s family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events
could support an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages
in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks andintimidation to deter the
provision of information or undermine Cohen’s credibility once Cohen began cooperating.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President’s relevant conduct towards Cohen

occurred whenthe President knew the Special Counsel’s Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen’s conduct. The President
acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate
with the governmentinvestigations.
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c. Intent. In analyzing the President’s intent in his actions towards Cohen as a

potential witness, there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to
discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen’s information would shed
adverse light on the President’s campaign-period conduct and statements.
i. Cohen’s false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow

project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit
the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations—a goal that wasin the President’s interest, as
reflected by the President’s own statements. During and after the campaign, the President made
repeated statements that he had “no business” in Russia and said that there were “no deals that
could happen in Russia, because we’ve stayed away.” As Cohen knew, and asherecalled
communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen’s pursuit of the Trump Tower
Moscowproject cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements.
In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with
candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscowproject, that the
conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trumppossible
travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand, according to Cohen,
because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from
Cohen and other records further establish that Cohen’s efforts to advance the project did not end ~
in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016, Cohen wasconsidering the timing for possible
trips to Russia by him and Trumpin connection with the project.
The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the
time of Cohen’s false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the Presidentin
early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after
he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress—whichsaid the project “was terminated
in January of 2016”—the President’s personal counsel told him the President was pleased with
what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. Andafter Cohen’s guilty plea, the President
told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference
that he remained aware ofhis own involvementin the project and the period during the Campaign
in which the project was’ being pursued.
ii. The President’s public remarks following Cohen’s guilty plea also suggest
that the President may have been concerned about what Cohentold investigators about the Trump
Tower Moscowproject. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from
this Office about the project and other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating
with the government but Cohenhadnot yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress.
Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided
to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing
and substanceof his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had
decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly
stated that he had personally madethe decision to abandonthe project. The Presidentthen declined
to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and
timing of the President’s provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the
Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concernedaboutthe
information that Cohen could provide as a witness.
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iii. The President’s concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed
at the Southern District of New Yorkinvestigation into other aspects of the President’s dealings
with Cohenrather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence
that the President’s concern about Cohen cooperating was based onthe President’s stated belief
that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser
sentencefor his unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen,
refused to “break” and “makeupstories in order to get a ‘deal.’” And after Cohenpleaded guilty
to making false statements to Congress, the President said, “what [Cohen]’s trying to do is get a
reduced sentence. So he’s lying about a project that everybody knew about.” But the President
also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saying, “Even if [Cohen] wasright, it doesn’t
matter because I was allowed to do whateverI wanted during the campaign.” As described above,
there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump
Tower Moscowproject and that Cohendid so to protect the President and minimizethe President’s
connections to Russia during the campaign.
iv. Finally, the President’s statements insinuating that members of Cohen’s

family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the governmentcould be viewed as
an effort to retaliate against Cohen andchill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen
or others. It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen “ma[d]e[]
up stories” in order to get a deal for himself and “get his wife and father-in-law .. . off Scott Free.”
It also is possible that the President’s mention of Cohen’s wife and father-in-law were notintended
to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting
Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. But the
President’s suggestion that Cohen’s family members committed crimes happened morethan once,
including just before Cohen wassentenced(at the same timeas the President stated that Cohen
“should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence”) and again just before Cohen was
scheduledto testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inferencethat they
wereintendedatleast in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation.
L. Overarching Factual Issues
Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination
decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts
concerning the President’s course of conduct.
1. Three features of this case renderit atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-of-
justice prosecutions brought by the Departmentof Justice.
First, the conduct involved actionsby the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate
the President’s constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues.
Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President’s Article II authority, which
raised constitutional issues that we address in VolumeII, Section III-B, infra. A factual analysis
of that conduct would have to take into accountboth that the President’s acts were facially lawful
and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful
means of influencingofficial proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses.
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Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying
crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper
obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), or that
he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d
558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense.
See United States v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017)(stating, in applying the obstruction
sentencing guideline, that “obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the
prosecutionis ultimately unsuccessfulor even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying
crime”). Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal
interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area,
or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same
regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong.
In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an
underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range
of other possible personal motives animating the President’s conduct. These include concernsthat
continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential
uncertainty about whether certain events—such as advance notice of WikiLeaks’s release of
hacked informationorthe June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaignofficials and Russians—
could be seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family.
Third, many of the President’s acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of

cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public
view. While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a
corrupt intent, the President’s powerto influence actions, persons, and events is enhanced by his
uniqueability to attract attention through use of mass communications. And no principle of law
excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to
intimidate witnessesoralter their testimony,the justice system’s integrity is equally threatened.
2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts—e.g., the President’s

statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to
removethe Special Counsel—itis important to view the President’s pattern of conduct as a whole.
That pattern shedslight on the nature of the President’s acts and the inferences that can be drawn
about his intent.
a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting
undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and
obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in
which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions
ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney
General’s recusal; to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to
direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influencetheir testimony. Viewing
the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example, the President’s
direction to McGahnto have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by
his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia
investigation to prospective election-interference only—a temporal connection that suggests that
both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation.
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The President’s efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is
largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede
to his requests. Comeydid not endthe investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn’s
prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahndid nottell the Acting Attorney General
that the Special Counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President’s
order. Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President’s message to Sessions that he
should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahnrefused to
recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President’s direction to have the Special
Counsel removed, despite the President’s multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that
pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the
President’s aides and associates beyond thosealreadyfiled.
b. In considering the full scope of the conduct weinvestigated, the President’s actions can
be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President’s motives. In the
first phase, before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not
opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make
public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination
letter to Comeyafter other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful.
Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were
conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a
significant change in the President’s conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The
President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could
possess evidence adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of
targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the
Special Counsel; he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the
investigation; he sought to prevent public disclosure of information aboutthe June 9, 2016 meeting
between Russians and campaignofficials; and he used public forumsto attack potential witnesses
who might offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the
government. Judgments about the nature of the President’s motives during each phase would be
informed by thetotality of the evidence.
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Ill. LEGAL DEFENSES TO THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES TO

THE PRESIDENT
The President’s personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory and
constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of-justice statutes to the
President’s conduct.!° As a statutory matter, the President’s counsel has argued that a core
obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), does not cover the President’s actions.'°”
As a constitutional matter, the President’s counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice
by exercising his constitutional authority to close DepartmentofJustice investigations or terminate
the FBI Director.'°* Under that view, any statute that restricts the President’s exercise of those
powers would impermissibly intrude on the President’s constitutional role. The President’s
counsel has concededthat the President may be subject to criminal lawsthat do not directly involve
exercises of his Article II authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning
perjury.'°> But counsel has made a categorical argument that “the President’s exercise ofhis
constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot
constitutionally constitute obstruction ofjustice.”!°”
In analyzing counsel’s statutory arguments, we concluded that the President’s proposed

interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2) is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of
Justice and is not supported by principles of statutory construction.
As for the constitutional arguments, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the
courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the
President’s position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation
of powers. Under that framework, we concluded, Article II of the Constitution does not
categorically and permanently immunize the President from potentialliability for the conduct that
weinvestigated. Rather, our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of-justice statutes can
'072 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office; see also 1/29/18
Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office; 2/6/18 Letter, President’s Personal
Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office; 8/8/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s
Office, at 4.
1073 9/6/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 2-9. Counsel has
also noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1505, protect only
pending proceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 7-8.
Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the
person contemplated. See VolumeII, Section III.A, supra.
1074 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office,at 1 (“[T]he President
cannot obstruct . . . by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers.”).
1075 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 2 n. 1.
1076 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 2 n.1 (dashes
omitted); see also 8/8/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 4 (“[T]he
obstruction-of-justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potentialliability based on facially
lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article II discretionary authority to
removeprincipal officers or carry out the prosecution function.”).
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validly prohibit a President’s corrupt efforts to use his official powersto curtail, end, or interfere
with an investigation.
A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to

the Conduct Under Investigation
Theobstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c) provides:
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or

attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for
use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes anyofficial proceeding, or attempts

to do so,
shall be fined under thistitle or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 1512(c)(2) states a broad,
independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice.’ While defendants have
argued that subsection (c)(2) should be read to’cover only acts that would impair the availability
or integrity of evidence because that is subsection (c)(1)’s focus, strong arguments weigh against
that proposedlimitation. The text of Section 1512(c)(2) confirms that its sweep is not tethered to
Section 1512(c)(1); courts have so interpreted it; its history does not counsel otherwise; and no
principle of statutory construction dictates a contrary view. On its face, therefore, Section
1512(c)(2) applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contemplated—
including by improperexercises ofofficial power. In addition, other statutory provisions that are
potentially applicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of
proceedings that are pending before courts, grand juries, and Congress. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503,
1505. Congress has also specifically prohibited witness tampering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts
Several textual features of Section 1512(c)(2) support the conclusion that the provision
broadly prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more specific
prohibitions in Section 1512(c)(1), which focus on evidence impairment.
First, the text of Section 1512(c)(2) is unqualified: it reaches acts that “obstruct[],
influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding” when committed “corruptly.” Nothing in Section
1512(c)(2)’s text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of
evidence for use in an official proceeding. In contrast, Section 1512(c)(1) explicitly includes the
requirement that the defendantact “with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability
1077 See U.S. Br., United States v. Kumar, Nos. 06-5482-cr(L), 06-5654—cr(CON)(2d Cir. filed
Oct. 26, 2007), at pp. 15-28; United States v. Singleton, Nos. H-04-CR-514SS, H-06-cr-80 (S.D. Tex. filed
June 5, 2006).
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for use in an official proceeding,” a requirement that Congressalso included in twoother sections
of Section 1512. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(2)(B)(ii) (use of physical force with intent to cause a
person to destroy an object “with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use
in an official proceeding”); 1512(b)(2)(B) (use of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, or
misleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object “with intent to impair the
integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding”). But no comparableintent
or conduct element focused on evidence impairment appears in Section 1512(c)(2). The intent
element in Section 1512(c)(2) comes from the word “corruptly.” See, e.g., United States v.
McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The intent element is important because the word
‘corruptly’ is what serves to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). And the conduct element in Section 1512(c)(2) is “obstruct[ing],
influenc[ing], or imped[ing]” a proceeding. Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in
the disparate inclusion and exclusion of evidence-impairment language. See Loughrin v. United
States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (“[W]hen ‘Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another’—let alone in the very next provision—this Court ‘presume[s]’
that Congress intended a difference in meaning”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23 (1983)); accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018).
Second, the structure of Section 1512 supports the conclusion that Section 1512(c)(2)
defines an independentoffense. Section 1512(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different
elements from Section 1512(c)(1)—and each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own
“attempt” prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections
of Section 1512(c) are connected by the conjunction “or,” indicating that each provides an
alternative basis for criminalliability. See Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357 (“ordinary use [of ‘or’] is
almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Loughrin, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the use
of the word “or” to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344(2) therefore should not be
interpreted to contain an additional element specified only in subsection 1344(1). Jd; see also
Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 465-469 (2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the
bank fraud statute “overlap substantially” but identifying distinct circumstances covered by
each).'°78 And here, as in Loughrin, Section 1512(c)’s “two clauses have separate numbers, line
breaks before, between, and after them, and equivalent indentation—thus placing the clauses
visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings.” 573 U.S. at 359.
Third, the introductory word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2) signals that the provision
covers obstructive acts that are different from thoselisted in Section 1512(c)(1). See Black’s Law
Dictionary 1101 (6th ed. 1990) (“otherwise” means“in a different manner; in another way, or in
other ways”); see also, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary Online (“1. In another way;
1078 The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles in
concluding that language that appearedin the first clause of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, restricting its
prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to “any sporting event or contest,” did not apply
to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. See
Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling (Nov. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying
on plain language); id. at 11 (finding it not “tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier ‘on any
sporting event or contest’ that appearsin the first clause”); id. at 12 (relying on Digital Realty).
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differently; 2. Under other circumstances”); see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128
(1936)(characterizing “otherwise” as a “broad term” and holding that a statutory prohibition on
kidnapping “for ransom or reward or otherwise” is not limited by the words “ransom” and
“reward” to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits); Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 200 (2d
Cir. 2004) (construing “otherwise” in 28 U.S.C. § 2466(1)(C) to reach beyond the “specific
examples”listed in prior subsections, thereby covering the “myriad means that human ingenuity
might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court”); cf Begay v. United States,
553 US. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that “otherwise” is defined to mean “in a different way or
manner,” and holding that the word “otherwise” introducing the residual clause in the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily, “refer to a crime
thatis similar to the listed examples in somerespects butdifferent in others”).!°” The purpose of
the word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2) is therefore to clarify that the provision covers
obstructive acts other than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its
integrity or availability, which is the conduct addressed in Section 1512(c)(1). The word
“otherwise” does not signal that Section 1512(c)(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive
conduct than the language of the provision implies.
2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512(c)(2)
Courts have not limited Section 1512(c)(2) to conduct that impairs evidence, but instead
have readit to cover obstructive acts in any form.
As one court explained, “[t]his expansive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover

‘otherwise’ obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document
destruction, whichis listed in (c)(1).” United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir.
2014) (some quotation marks omitted). For example, in United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d
195 (D.D.C. 2009), the court rejected the argumentthat “§ 1512(c)(2)’s reference to conduct that
‘otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes anyofficial proceeding’ is limited to conductthatis
similar to the type of conduct proscribed by subsection (c)(1)—namely, conduct that impairs the
integrity or availability of ‘record[s], documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an official
proceeding.” Jd. at 224. The court explained that “the meaning of § 1512(c)(2) is plain onits
face.” Jd. (alternations in original), And courts have upheld convictions underSection 1512(c)(2)
that did not involve evidence impairment, but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly
thwarted arrests or investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir.
2017) (police officer tipped off suspects about issuance of arrest warrants before “outstanding
warrants could be executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury
proceeding”); United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310, 1324-1326 (10th Cir. 2012) (officer
disclosed existence of an undercoverinvestigation to its target); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d
1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) (defendantdisclosed identity of an undercoverofficer thus preventing
him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine dealers). Those cases illustrate
that Section 1512(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts—including by public officials—that frustrate the
1979 Tn Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15 (2011), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned
Begay’s readingofthe residual clause, and in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Court
invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Begay’s analysis of the word “otherwise” is
thusoflimited value.
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commencementor conduct of a proceeding, and notjust to acts that make evidence unavailable or
impairits integrity.
Section 1512(c)(2)’s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus
clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which covers anyone who “corruptly . . . obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.” That clause of
Section 1503 follows two morespecific clauses that protect jurors, judges, and court officers. The
omnibusclause has nevertheless been construed to be “far more general in scope than the earlier
clausesofthe statute.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). “The omnibusclause
is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due
administration ofjustice.” United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts
have accordingly givenit a “non-restrictive reading.” United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 620
(2d Cir. 2010); id, at 620 n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibusclause “prohibits acts that are similarin result,
rather than manner, to the conduct described in the first part of the statute.” United States v.
Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978). While the specific clauses “forbid certain means
of obstructing justice . . . the omnibus clause aims at obstruction ofjusticeitself, regardless of the
means usedto reach that result.” Jd. (collecting cases). Giventhe similarity of Section 1512(c)(2)
to Section 1503’s omnibus clause, Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts
that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairmentprovisions—i.e., the result of obstructing
justice—rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section
1512(c)(2) serves a distinct function in the federal obstruction-of-justice statutes: it captures
corrupt conduct, other than document destruction, that has the natural tendency to obstruct
contemplated as well as pending proceedings.
Section 1512(c)(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render them
superfluous. Section 1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial
proceedings, and Section 1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional
proceedings, reach “endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede” the proceedings—a broadertest
for inchoate violations than Section 1512(c)(2)’s “attempt” standard, which requires a substantial
step towards a completed offense. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“[E]fforts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an ‘endeavor’ yet fall short of an ‘attempt’
cannot be prosecuted under § 1512.”); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th
Cir. 1988) (collecting cases recognizing the difference between the “endeavor” and “attempt”
standards). And 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which prohibits destruction of documents or recordsin
contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the “nexus” showing under
Aguilar, which Section 1512(c)(2) demands. See, e.g., United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688,
712 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The requisite knowledgeandintent [under Section 1519] can be present even
if the accused lacks knowledgethat heis likely to succeed in obstructing the matter.”); United
States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 376-377 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]n enacting § 1519, Congress rejected
any requirementthat the government prove a link between a defendant’s conduct and an imminent
or pendingofficial proceeding.”). The existence of even “substantial” overlap is not “uncommon”
in criminal statutes. Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 359 n.4; see Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 458-469; Aguilar, 515
USS. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The fact that there is now some overlap between § 1503 and
§ 1512 is no moreintolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause
of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503 itself.”). But given that Sections 1503, 1505, and
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1519 each reach conductthat Section 1512(c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reasonto give
Section 1512(c)(2) an artificially limited construction. See Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 469.1%
3. The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Its
Text
“Given the straightforward statutory command”in Section 1512(c)(2), “there is no reason

to resort to legislative history.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). In any event, the
legislative history of Section 1512(c)(2) is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its
reach.
Congressenacted Section 1512(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, Tit. XI, § 1102, 116 Stat. 807. The relevant section of the statute was entitled
“Tampering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding.” 116 Stat. 807
(emphasis added). Thattitle indicates that Congress intended the twoclauses to have independent
effect. Section 1512(c) was added as a floor amendmentin the Senate and explained asclosing a
certain “loophole” with respect to “document shredding.” See 148 Cong. Rec. $6545 (July 10,
2002) (Sen. Lott); id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen: Hatch). But those explanations do notlimit the enacted
text. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) (“[I]t is not the law that a
statute can have no effects whichare not explicitly mentionedin its legislative history.”); see also
Encino Motorcars, LLC y. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018) (“Even if Congress did not
foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason notto give the statutory text a fair
reading.”). The floor statements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text. See
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (“Floor statements from two Senators
cannot amendthe clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reasonto give greater
weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are
memorialized in the unambiguousstatutory text.”). That principle has particular force where one
of the proponents of the amendment to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only “briefly
elaborat[ing] on some of the specific provisions containedin this bill.” 148 Cong. Rec. $6550
(Sen. Hatch).
Indeed, the language Congress used in Section 1512(c)(2)—prohibiting “corruptly . . .

obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding” or attempting to do so—
parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen
protections against witness tampering and obstruction ofjustice. While the earlier provision is not
a direct antecedent of Section 1512(c)(2), Congress’s understanding of the broad scope of the
1089 The Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018), does not
support imposing a non-textuallimitation on Section 1512(c)(2). Marinello interpreted the tax obstruction
statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), to require “a ‘nexus’ between the defendant’s conduct and a particular
administrative proceeding.” Jd. at 1109. The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar
interpretation given to “other obstruction provisions,”id. (citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen), as well as
considerationsof context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. Jd.
at 1106-1108. The type of “nexus” element the Court adopted in Marinello already applies under Section
1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do notjustify reading into Section 1512(c)(2)
languagethatis not there. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)(the Court “ordinarily resist[s]
reading wordsor elements into a statute that do not appearonits face.”).
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earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that “the proper administration of justice may be
impeded or thwarted” by a “variety of corrupt methods . . . limited only by the imagination of the
criminally inclined,” S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1982), Congress considered a
bill that would have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime, inter alia, when a person
“corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes. . . [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal
law,” “administration of a law under which anofficial proceeding is being or may be conducted,”
or the “exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry.” Jd. at 17-19 (quoting S. 2420).
The Senate Committee explained that:
[T]he purpose of preventing an obstruction of or miscarriage of justice cannot befully

carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses.
There mustalso be protection against the rare type of conductthat is the product of the
inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice.
Id. at 18. The report gave examples of conduct “actually prosecuted under the current residual
clause [in 18 U.S.C. § 1503], which would probably notbe covered in this series [of provisions]
without a residual clause.” Jd. One prominent example was “[a] conspiracy to cover up the
Watergate burglary andits aftermath by having the Central Intelligence Agency seek to interfere
with an ongoing FBI investigation of the burglary.” Id. (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The report therefore indicates a congressional awareness notonly that
residual-clause language resembling Section 1512(c)(2) broadly covers a wide variety of
obstructive conduct, but also that such language reaches the improper use of governmental
processes to obstruct justice—specifically, the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House
officials including the President himself. See Haldeman, 559 F.3d at 51, 86-87, 120-129, 162.'°8!
4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section

1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation
The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process
concerns in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do notjustify narrowing the reach of
Section 1512(c)(2)’s text.'%
a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has “exercised restraint” in interpreting
obstruction-of-justice provisions, both out of respect for Congress’s role in defining crimes andin
the interest of providing individuals with “fair warning” of what a criminal statute prohibits.
Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703;
'08! The Senate ultimately accepted the House version ofthe bill, which excluded an omnibus
clause. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 382-383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (tracing history of the
proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). During the floor debate on thebill,
Senator Heinz, one ofthe initiators and primary backersofthe legislation, explained that the omnibusclause
was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely “duplicative” of other
obstruction laws, 128 Cong. Rec. 26,810 (1982) (Sen. Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and
1505.
1082 Tn a separate section addressing considerations uniqueto the presidency, we considerprinciples
of statutory construction relevant in that context. See VolumeII, Section III.B.1, infra.
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Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-602. In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that
requires that the wrongful conducttargeted by the provision be sufficiently connectedto anofficial
proceedingto ensure the requisite culpability. Marinello, 138 S, Ct. at 1109; Arthur Andersen,
544 US. at 707-708; Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600-602. Section 1512(c)(2) has been interpreted to
require a similar nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d
1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). To satisfy
the nexus requirement, the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted
“én a mannerthatis likely to obstruct justice,” such that the statute “excludes defendants who have
an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful.”
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 599 (“the endeavor
must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The government must also show as a subjective matter that
the actor “contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding.” Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445. Those
requirementsalleviate fair-warning concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close
enough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the
obstruction laws and that the individual actually has the obstructive result in mind.
b. Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness concerns. See, e.g.,
McDonnell y. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358,
368, 402-404 (2010). Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a crime “with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conductis prohibited” and “in a mannerthat
does not encouragearbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Jd. at 402-403 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The obstruction statutes’ requirement of acting “corruptly” satisfies thattest.
“Acting ‘corruptly’ within the meaning of § 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper
purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert,
impedeor obstruct” the relevant proceeding. United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th
Cir. 2013) (some quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the
defendant’s vagueness challenge to the word “corruptly,” 515 U.S. at 600 n. 1, but Justice Scalia’s
separate opinion did reach that issue and would haverejected the challenge, id. at 616-617 (Scalia,
J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Statutory
language need not be colloquial,” Justice Scalia explained, and “the term ‘corruptly’ in criminal
laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes an act done with anintent to give
some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.” Jd. at 616 (internal
quotation marks omitted; citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries). Justice Scalia added
that “in the context of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is
incredible.” Jd. at 617. Lower courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word
“corruptly.” See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 869 F.3d 490, 501-502 (7th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280-1281 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d
1331, 1336 n.9 (Sth Cir. 1978). This well-established intent standard precludes the needto limit
the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds of inherently wrongful conduct.!°8
1083 In United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the court of appeals found the
term “corruptly” in 18 U.S.C. § 1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to
Congress. After suggesting that the word “corruptly” was vague onits face, 951 F.2d at 378, the court
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c. Finally, the rule of lenity does notjustify treating Section 1512(c)(2) as a prohibition on
evidence impairment, as opposed to an omnibus clause. Therule of lenity is an interpretive
principle that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of the less-severe construction.
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000). “[A]s [the Court has] repeatedly emphasized,”
however, the rule of lenity applies only if, “after considering text, structure, history and purpose,
there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply
guess as to what Congress intended.” Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The rule has been cited, for example, in adopting a narrow
meaningof“tangible object” in an obstruction statute when the prohibition’s title, history, andlist
of prohibited acts indicated a focus on destruction of records. See Yates v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting “tangible object” in the phrase “record,
document, or tangible object” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 to mean an item capable of recording or
preserving information). Here, as discussed above, the text, structure, and history of Section
1512(c)(2) leaves no “grievous ambiguity” about the statute’s meaning. Section 1512(c)(2)
defines a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction of official proceedings.
5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conductin this Investigation
Regardless whether Section 1512(c)(2) coversall corrupt acts that obstruct, influence, or
impede pending or contemplated proceedings, other statutes would apply to such conduct in
pending proceedings, provided that the remaining statutory elements are satisfied. As discussed
above, the omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) applies generally to obstruction of pending
judicial and grand proceedings.! See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598 (noting that the clause is “far
more general in scope” than preceding provisions). Section 1503(a)’s protections extend to
witness tampering and to other obstructive conduct that has a nexus to pending proceedings. See
Sampson, 898 F.3d at 298-303 & n.6 (collecting cases from eight circuits holding that Section
1503 covers witness-related obstructive conduct, and cabining prior circuit authority). And
Section 1505 broadly criminalizes obstructive conductaimed at pending agency and congressional
proceedings." See, e.g., United States v. Rainey, 757 F.3d 234, 241-247 (Sth Cir. 2014).
concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the “core”
conduct to which Section 1505 could constitutionally be applied was onepersoninfluencing another person
to violate a legal duty. Jd. at 379-386. Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by
providing that “[a]s used in [S]ection 1505, the term ‘corruptly’ means acting with an improper purpose,
personally or by influencing another, including by making false or misleading statement, or withholding,
concealing,altering, or destroying a documentor other information.” 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Other courts
have declined to follow Poindexter either by limiting it to Section 1505 and the specific conductat issue in
that case, see Brenson, 104 F.3d at 1280-1281; reading it as narrowly limited to certain types of conduct,
see United States vy. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629-630 (D.C. Cir. 1996); or by noting that it predated Arthur
Andersen’ s interpretation of the term “corruptly,” see Edwards, 869F.3d at 501-502.
'984 Section 1503(a) provides for criminal punishmentof:
Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration ofjustice.
‘985 Section 1505 provides for criminal punishmentof:
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Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) criminalizes tampering with witnesses to prevent the

communication of information about a crime to law enforcement. The nexus inquiry articulated
in Aguilar—that an individual has “knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial
proceeding,” 515 U.S. at 599—does not apply to Section 1512(b)(3). See United States v. Byrne,
435 F.3d 16, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2006). The nexus inquiry turns instead on the actor’s intent to prevent
communications to a federal law enforcementofficial. See Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668,
673-678 (2011).
In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512(c)(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an
argumentthat the conductat issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction -
laws lacks merit.
B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to

Presidential Conduct
The President has broaddiscretion to direct criminal investigations. The Constitution vests
the “executive Power”in the President and enjoins him to “take Care that the Lawsbe faithfully
executed.” U.S. Const. ARTII, §§ 1, 3. Those powers and duties form the foundation of
prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney
General and United States Attorneys“have this latitude because they are designated by statute as
the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that
the Lawsbe faithfully executed.’”), The President also has authority to appoint officers of the
United States and to remove those whom hehas appointed. U.S. Const. ARTII, § 2, cl. 2 (granting
authority to the President to appointall officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, but
providing that Congress mayvest the appointmentofinferior officers in the President alone, the
heads of departments, or the courts of law); see also Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 492-493, 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as
flowing from the President’s “responsibility to take care that the lawsbe faithfully executed”).
Although the President has broad authority under Article II, that authority coexists with
Congress’s Article I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings, federal
investigations, the courts, and grand juries against corrupt efforts to underminetheir functions.
Usually, those constitutional powers function in harmony, with the President enforcing the
criminal laws underArticle IT to protect against corrupt obstructive acts. But when the President’s
official actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes, any
constitutional tension is reconciled through separation-of-powersanalysis.
Whoevercorruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavorsto influence,

obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending
proceedingis being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due
and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is
being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the
Congress.
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The President’s counsel has argued that “the President’s exercise of his constitutional
authority . . . to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations . . . cannot constitutionally
constitute obstruction of justice.”'°8° As noted above, no Department of Justice position or
Supreme Court precedent directly resolved this issue. We did not find counsel’s contention,
however, to accord with our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation-of-
powers issues. Applying the Court’s framework for analysis, we concluded that Congress can
validly regulate the President’s exerciseofofficial duties to prohibit actions motivated by a corrupt
intent to obstructjustice. The limited effect on presidential powerthatresults from thatrestriction
would not impermissibly undermine the President’s ability to perform his Article IT functions.
1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement _to Apply Statutes to Presidential

Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes
Before addressing Article II issues directly, we consider one threshold statutory-

construction principle that is unique to the presidency: “The principle that general statutes must
be read as not applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would
arguably limit the President’s constitutional role.” OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to
Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 352 (1995). This “clear
statementrule,” id., has its source in twoprinciples: statutes should be construedto avoid serious
constitutional questions, and Congress should not be assumedto have altered the constitutional
separation of powers without clear assurancethatit intended that result. OLC, The Constitutional
Separation ofPowers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996).
The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statementrule in several cases. In one leading
case, the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 ef seq., not to apply
to judicial review ofpresidential action. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992).
The Court explained that it “would require an express statement by Congress before assumingit
intended the President’s performanceof his statutory duties to be reviewedfor abuse of discretion.”
Id. at 801. In another case, the Court interpreted the word “utilized” in the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App., to apply only to the use of advisory committees
established directly or indirectly by the government, thereby excluding the American Bar
Association’s advice to the Departmentof Justice aboutfederal judicial candidates. Public Citizen
vy. United States DepartmentofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 455, 462-467 (1989). The Court explained
that a broaderinterpretation of the term “utilized” in FACA would raise serious questions whether
the statute “infringed unduly on the President’s Article II power to nominate federal judges and
violated the doctrine of separation of powers.” Jd. at 466-467. Another case found that an
established canonof statutory construction applied with “special force” to provisions that would
impinge on the President’s foreign-affairs powers if construed broadly. Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application
to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect
“foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility”). See Application
1086 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 2 n. 1.
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of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 353-354

(discussing Franklin, Public Citizen, and Sale).
The Departmentof Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain
statutes as not applying to the Presidentatall, similar to the approach taken in Franklin. See, e.g.,
Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman,
Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's
Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974) (criminal conflict-of-interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 208,
does not apply to the President). Other OLC opinionsinterpret statutory text not to apply to certain
presidential or executive actions because of constitutional concerns. See Application of28 U.S.C.
§ 458 to Presidential Appointments ofFederal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350-357 (consanguinity
limitations on court appointments, 28 U.S.C. § 458, found inapplicable to “presidential
appointments of judges to the federal judiciary”); Constraints Imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1913 on
Lobbying Efforts, 13 Op. O.L.C. 300, 304-306 (1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds
for certain lobbying programs foundinapplicable to certain communications by the President and
executive officials).
But OLChasalso recognized that this clear-statement rule “does not apply with respect to
a statute that raises no separation of powers questions wereit to be applied to the President,” such
as the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential
Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11. OLC explained that “[a]pplication
of § 201 raises no separation of powers question, let alone a serious one,” because [t]he
Constitution confers no powerin the Presidentto receive bribes.” /d. In support ofthat conclusion,
OLCnoted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President’s compensation while
in office, “which is what a bribe would function to do,” id. (citing U.S. Const. ART. II, § 1, cl. 7),
and the express constitutional powerof “Congress to impeach [and convict] a Presidentfor, inter
alia, bribery,” id. (citing U.S. CONST. ARTII, § 4).
Under OLC’s analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct
by the President, such as suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating evidence,
becausethose prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers questions. See Application of28 U.S.C.
§ 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 nll. The
Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct, and those actions would
transgress the President’s duty to “take Care that the Lawsbefaithfully executed.” U.S. Const.
ART II, §§ 3. In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the
President, Franklin’s holding that the President is entirely excluded from statute absenta clear
statement would not apply in this context.
A morelimited application of a clear-statementrule to exclude from the obstruction statutes

only certain acts by the President—for example, removing prosecutors or ending investigations
for corrupt reasons—would be difficult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is
not obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section
1512(c)(2) to exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only whencarried outin the President’s
conductofoffice. No statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning. For example, the
word “corruptly” has a well-established meaning that does not exclude exercisesof official power
for corrupt ends. Indeed, an established definition states that “corruptly” means action with an
170
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intent to secure an improper advantage “inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.”
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added). And it would be contrary
to ordinary rules of statutory construction to adopt an unconventional meaningofa statutory term
only when applied to the President. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008)
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting proposal to “giv[e] the same word,in the same statutory
provision, different meanings in different factual contexts”); cf Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462-
467 (giving the term “utilized” in the FACA a uniform meaningto avoid constitutional questions).
Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive
presumption, such as the presumption againstextraterritoriality applied in Sale. The principle that
courts will construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional questions “is not a license for the
judiciary to rewrite language enacted bythe legislature.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52,
59-60 (1997). “It is one thing to acknowledge and accept . . . well defined (or even newly
enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumedlegislative intent. It is quite
another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly
as they are written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions.” Brogan v. United States, 522 US.
398, 406 (1998).
Whena proposed construction “would thus function as an extra-textual limit on [a statute’s]

compass,” thereby preventing the statute “from applying to a hostof cases falling within its clear
terms,” Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357, it is doubtful that the construction would reflect Congress’s
intent. That is particularly so with respect to obstruction statutes, which “have been given a broad
and all-inclusive meaning.” Rainey, 757 F.3d at 245 (discussing Sections 1503 and 1505) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, since no established principle of interpretation would
exclude the presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503, 1505,
1512(b), and 1512(c)(2), we proceed to examine the separation-of-powers issues that could be
raised as an Article II defense to the application of thosestatutes.
2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May

Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President’s
Official Powers
When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article IT powers, the limitation’s
validity depends on whetherthe measure“disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches.”
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). “Even when branch does
not arrogate powertoitself, . . . the separation-of-powersdoctrine requires that a branch not impair
another in the performance of its constitutional duties.” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
757 (1996). The “separation of powers does not mean,” however, “that the branches ‘ought to
havenopartial agency in, or no controul overthe acts of each other.’” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681, 703 (1997) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326(J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(emphasis omitted)). In this context, a balancing test applies to assess separation-of-powersissues.
Applying that test here, we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice
statutes applicable to corruptly motivated official acts of the President without impermissibly
undermining his Article Ifunctions.
171
a. The Supreme Court’s Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies

In This Context
A congressionally imposedlimitation on presidential action is assessed to determine “the

extent to whichit prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishingits constitutionally assigned
functions,” and, if the “potential for disruption is present[,] . .. whether that impactis justified by
an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.”
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,753-
754 (1982); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-707 (1974). That balancingtest applies to
a congressional regulation of presidential powerthrough the obstruction-of-justice laws. 108?
Whenan Article II power has not been “explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution
to be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within
the general grant to the President of the ‘executive Power,’” the Court has balanced competing
constitutional considerations. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, J.). As Justice Kennedy noted in Public
Citizen, the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on “the President’s power to remove
Executive officers, a power[that]. . . is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the
Constitution (as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant
of the ‘executive Power.’” Jd. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988), and Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-116 (1926)). Consistent with that statement, Morrison sustained
a good-cause limitation on the removal of an inferior officer with defined prosecutorial
responsibilities after determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the
President’s ability to perform his Article II functions. 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696. The Court
has also evaluated other general executive-powerclaims through a balancing test. For example,
the Court evaluated the President’s claim of an absoluteprivilege for presidential communications
abouthis official acts by balancing thatinterest against the Judicial Branch’s need for evidence in
acriminal case. United States v. Nixon, supra (recognizing a qualified constitutional privilege for
presidential communications onofficial matters). The Court has also upheld a law that provided
for archival access to presidential records despite a claim of absolute presidential privilege over
the records. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443-445, 451-455. The analysis in
those cases supports applying a balancing test to assess the constitutionality of applying the
obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential exercises of executive power.
Only in a few instanceshas the Court applied a different framework. When the President’s
poweris “both ‘exclusive’ and ‘conclusive’ on the issue,” Congress is precluded from regulating
its exercise. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). In Zivotofsky, for example, the
Court followed “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite framework” in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and held that the President’s
1087 OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminal
prosecution while in office, relying on many of the same precedents discussed in this section. See A Sitting
President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 237-238, 244-245
(2000) (relying on,inter alia, United States v. Nixon, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and Clinton v. Jones, and quoting
the legal standard from Administrator of General Services v. Nixon that is applied in the text), OLC
recognized that “[t]he balancing analysis” it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President is
immunefrom prosécution had “been adopted as the appropriate mode ofanalysis by the Court.” /d. at 244.
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authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. Jd. at 2083, 2094. See also Public Citizen 491
U.S. at 485-486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the powerto grant pardons under
U.S. Consr., ART. Il, § 2, cl. 1, and the Presentment Clausesfor legislation, U.S. CONST., ART. I,
§ 7, Cls. 2, 3, as examples ofexclusivepresidential powers by virtue of constitutional text).
But even when a poweris exclusive, “Congress’ powers, andits central role in making
laws, give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and
follow” the President’s act. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087. For example, although the President’s
powerto grant pardons is exclusive and notsubject to congressional regulation, see United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-148 (1872), Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt
use of“anything of value” to influence the testimony of anotherperson in a judicial, congressional,
or agency proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)—which would include the offer or promise of a
pardon to induce’a person totestify falsely or not to testify at all. The offer of a pardon would
precede the act of pardoning and thus be within Congress’s powerto regulate even if the pardon
itself is not. Just as the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 6, cl.1, absolutely protects
legislative acts, but not a legislator’s “taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a
certain way . . . for it is taking the bribe, not performanceoftheillicit compact, that is a criminal
act,” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (emphasis omitted), the promise of a
pardon to corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. The
application of obstruction statutes to such promises therefore would raise no serious separation-
of-powersissue.
b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President’s

Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited
Under the Supreme Court’s balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the
first task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential
actions affects the President’s ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. Administrator of
General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. As discussed above, applying obstruction-of-justice statutes
to presidential conduct that does not involve the President’s conduct of office—such as influencing
the testimony of witnesses—is constitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right
than othercitizens to impedeofficial proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony. The
conduct would be equally improper whether effectuated through direct efforts to produce false
testimony or suppress the truth, or through the actual, threatened, or promised use ofofficial
powersto achieve the same result.
The President’s action in curtailing criminal investigations or prosecutions, or discharging

law enforcementofficials, raises different questions. Each typeof action involves the exercise of
executive discretion in furtherance of the President’s duty to “take Care that the Lawsbefaithfully
executed.” U.S. Const., ART. II, § 3. Congress may not supplant the President’s exercise of
executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remove officers who occupy law enforcement
positions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-727 (1986) (“Congress cannot reserve for
itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment. . . . [Becauset]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute
the laws, . . . [t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws . .°. is
constitutionally impermissible.”). Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not aggrandize power
in Congress or usurp executive authority. Instead, they impose a discrete limitation on conduct
173
only whenit is taken with the “corrupt” intent to obstruct justice. The obstruction statutes thus
would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstructofficial
proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume IIT, Section
TIH.A.3, supra.
The direct effect on the President’s freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited
one. A preclusion of“corrupt” official action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers. For
example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the Presidentto act
with the intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or
preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action
undertaken for such personal purposesfurthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded
administration of the law. And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have
unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever,in order to
carry out his Article II functions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (“Congress
may limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement powerif it wishes, either by setting substantive
priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s powerto discriminate among issues or cases
it will pursue.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (“[t]o read the Art. I] powers of the
President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications from a
criminal trial]... would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable government’ and gravely
impair the role of the courts underArt. IIT”).
Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove all Executive Branch officials
involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitution establishes that Congress haslegislative
authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive
departments and officer positions and to specify how inferior officers are appointed. E.g., U.S.
Consr., ART. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); ART. II, § 2, cl. | (Opinions Clause);
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 499. While the
President’s removal power is an important meansof ensuringthat officers faithfully execute the
law, Congress has a recognized authority to place certain limits on removal. Id. at 493-495.
The President’s removal powers are at their zenith with respectto principal officers—that
is, officers who must be appointed by the President and whoreport to him directly. See Free
Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493, 500. The President’s “exclusive and illimitable power of
removal” of those principal officers furthers “the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.” Jd. at 493, 498 (internal quotation marks omitted); Myers, 272 U.S. at 627.
Thus, “there are some ‘purely executive’ officials who must be removable by the Presidentat will
if he is able to accomplish his constitutional role.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690; Myers, 272 U.S. at
134 (the President’s “cabinet officers mustdo his will,” and “[t]he momentthat he loses confidence
in the intelligence, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the powerto
remove him without delay”); cf Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(Congresshas the powerto create independent agencies headedby principal officers removable
only for good cause). In light of those constitutional precedents, it may be that the obstruction
statutes could not be constitutionally applied to limit the removalof a cabinet officer such as the
Attorney General. See 5 U.S.C. § 101; 28 U.S.C. § 503. In that context, at least absent
circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting to thwart accountability for
personal conduct while evading ordinary political checks and balances, even the highly limited
174
regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply on the President’s
freedom to select and supervise the membersof his cabinet.
The removalof inferior officers, in contrast, need not necessarily beat will for the President
to fulfill his constitutionally assignedrole in managing the Executive Branch. “[I]nferior officers
are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other officers appointed by
the President with the Senate’s consent.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 510 (quoting Edmond
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted), The Supreme
Court has long recognized Congress’s authority to place for-cause limitations on the President’s
removal of “inferior Officers” whose appointment maybe vested in the head of a department. U.S.
Const. ART. II, § 2, cl. 2. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (“The
constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment[ofinferior officers in the heads
of departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as
Congress may enactin relation to the officers so appointed”) (quoting lower court decision);
Morrison, 487 US. at 689 n. 27 (citing Perkins); accordid. at 723-724 & n.4 (Scalia,J., dissenting)
(recognizing that Perkins is “established” law); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493-
495 (citing Perkins and Morrison). The category ofinferiorofficers includes both the FBI Director
and the Special Counsel, each of whom reports to the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509,
515(a), 531; 28 C.F.R. Part 600. Their work is thus “directed and supervised” by a presidentially-
appointed, Senate-confirmedofficer. See In re: Grand Jury Investigation, _ F.3d __, 2019 WL
921692, at *3-*4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an “inferior officer”
for constitutional purposes).
Wherethe Constitution permits Congress to impose a good-causelimitation on the removal

of an Executive Branch officer, the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal
for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. Limiting the.range of permissible reasons for
removal to exclude a “corrupt” purpose imposesa lesser restraint on the President than requiring
an affirmative showing of good cause. It follows that for such inferior officers, Congress may
constitutionally restrict the President’s removal authority if that authority was exercised for the
corrupt purposeofobstructing justice. And evenif a particular inferior officer’s position might be
of such importance to the execution of the laws that the President must have at-will removal
authority, the obstruction-of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid
removal for a corrupt reason.!°88 A narrow and discrete limitation on removal that precluded
corrupt action would leave ample room forall other considerations, including disagreement over
policy or loss of confidence in the officer’s judgment or commitment. A corrupt-purpose
prohibition therefore would not undermine the President’s ability to perform his Article II
functions. Accordingly, because the separation-of-powers question is “whether the removal
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his
constitutional duty,” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, a restriction on removing an inferiorofficer for a
1088 AIthough the FBIdirectoris an inferior officer, he is appointed by the President and removable
by him at will, see 28 U.S.C. § 532 note,andit is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the
FBI director with good-cause tenure protection. See OLC, Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the
Term ofthe FBI Director, 2011 WL 2566125, at *3 (O.L.C. June 20, 2011) (“tenure protection for an officer
with the FBI Director’s broad investigative, administrative, and policymaking responsibilities would raise
a serious constitutional question whether Congress had ‘impede[d] the President’s ability to perform his
constitutional duty’ to take care that the laws befaithfully executed”) (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691).
175
corrupt reason—a reason grounded in achieving personal rather than official ends—does not
seriously hinder the President’s performanceof his duties. The President retains broadlatitude to
supervise investigations and remove officials, circumscribed in this context only by the
requirementthat he notact for corrupt personal purposes.'°
c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and

Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source
Where a law imposes a burden on the President’s performance of Article II functions,

separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure “is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.”
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. Here, Congress enacted the obstruction-of-
justice statutes to protect, among other things, the integrity of its own proceedings, grand jury
investigations, and federal criminaltrials. Those objectives are within Congress’s authority and
serve strong governmental interests.
i. Congress has Article I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it
to all persons—including the President. Congress clearly has authority to protect its own
legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and
lawmaking efforts. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957); Chapman
v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, 130 (1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system
of federal courts, which includes the powerto protect the judiciary against obstructive acts. See
U.S. ConsT. ArT. I, § 8, cls. 9, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court” and “To makeall Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers”). The long lineage of the obstruction-of-justice
statutes, which can be traced to at least 1831, attests to the necessity for that protection. See An
Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts ofCourt, 4 Stat. 487-488 § 2 (1831) (making
it a crime if “any personor personsshall corruptly . . . endeavorto influence, intimidate, or impede
any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or
shall, corruptly . . . obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration
ofjustice therein”).
ii. The Article III courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against
obstructive acts, whatever their source. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon,
a “primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch” is “to do justice in criminal prosecutions.”
418 US. at 707; accord Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542
U.S. 367, 384 (2004). In Nixon, the Court rejected the President’s claim of absolute executive
privilege because “the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
'089 The obstruction statutes do not disqualify the President from acting in a case simply because
he has a personalinterest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue. As the DepartmentofJustice
has madeclear, a claim ofa conflict of interest, standing alone, cannot deprive the Presidentof the ability
to fulfill his constitutional function. See, e.g, OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential
Appointments ofFederal Judges, 19 O.L.C. Op. at 356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office
of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict ofInterest Problems
Arising out ofthe President's Nomination ofNelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendmentto the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974)).
176
relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due processof law and gravely
impair the basic function of the courts.” 407 U.S. at 712. As Nixon illustrates, the need to
safeguardjudicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest. See id. at 709 (noting that the
denial of full disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens
“(t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system”).
iii. Finally, the grand jury cannotachieve its constitutional purpose absentprotection from
corrupt acts. Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article III courts based on an
indictment issued by a grand jury. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (“The
Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process.”). And the grand jury’s
function is enshrinedin the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. (“[n]o person shall be held
to answer” for a serious crime “unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury”). “[T]he
whole theory of [the grand jury’s] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional
government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,”
UnitedStates v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), “pledged to indict no one because ofprejudice
and to free no one becauseof special favor.” Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
If the grand jury were not protected against corruptinterference from all persons, its function as
an independent charging body would be thwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to
determine whether probable causeexists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process.
* * ES
The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separation-
of-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority
notwithstanding the potential impact on Article II functions. See Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696; United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. at 711-712. In the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, our assessment of the
weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited
restrictions contained in those statutes on the President’s official conduct to protect the integrity
of important functions of other branches of government.
A general ban on corrupt action does not unduly intrude on the President’s responsibility
to “take Carethat the Lawsbefaithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. ARTIT, §§ 3.!°° To the contrary,
the conceptof “faithful execution” connotes the use of powerin the interest of the public, not in
the office holder’s personal interests. See 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English
Language 763 (1755) (“faithfully” def. 3: “[w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance”). And
immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt
obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress’s power to enact laws “to
promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority,” Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. at 425—i.e., protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article IIT
courts and grand juries.
1099 As noted above, the President’s selection and removalofprincipal executive officers may have
a unique constitutional status.
177
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May-Conti eral Fed R-Crint P_6fe)
Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argumentthat the
President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct
justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article IT powers. '°!
3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would

Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties
Applying the obstruction statutes to the President’s official conduct would involve
determining as a factual matter whether he engaged in an obstructive act, whether the act had a
nexus to official proceedings, and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent. But applying those
standards to the President’s official conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article IT
duties. Cf Nixonv. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752-753 & n.32 (taking into accountchilling effect on
the President in adopting a constitutionalrule of presidential immunity from private civil damages
action based on official duties). Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect: the existence
of settled legal standards, the presumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions, and the existence
of evidentiary limitations on probing the President’s motives. Andhistorical experience confirms
that no impermissible chill should exist.
a. As an initial matter, the term “corruptly” sets a demanding standard. It requires a

concrete showingthat a person acted with an intentto obtain an “improper advantage for [him]self
or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.” BALLENTINE’S LAW
DICTIONARY276 (3d ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That standard
parallels the President’s constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. And
virtually everything that the President does in the routine conduct of office will have a clear
governmentalpurpose and will not be contrary to his official duty. Accordingly, the President has
no reason to be chilled in those actions because, in virtually all instances, there will be no credible
basis for suspecting a corrupt personal motive.
That point is illustrated by examples of conduct that would and would not satisfy the
stringent corrupt-motive standard. Direct or indirect action by the President to end a criminal
investigation into his own or his family members’ conduct to protect against personal
embarrassmentorlegalliability would constitute a core example of corruptly motivated conduct.
So too would action to halt an enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected the
President’s financial interests for the purpose of protecting those interests. In those examples,
105! A possible remedy through impeachmentfor abuses of power wouldnot substitute for potential
criminalliability after a President leaves office. Impeachment would remove a President from office, but
would not address the underlying culpability of the conductor serve the usual purposesof the criminal law.
Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independentrole in
addressing an official’s conduct, distinct from the political remedy of impeachment. See U.S. CONST. ART.
I, § 3, cl. 7. Impeachmentis also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy, and Congress is not restricted to
relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC
has recognized. A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C.
at 255 (“Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such
prosecution once the President’s term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or
impeachment.”).
178
official power is being used for the purpose of protecting the President’s personal interests. In
contrast, the President’s actions to serve political or policy interests would not qualify as corrupt.
The President’s role as head of the government necessarily requires him to take into account
political factors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcementactions and proceedings.
For instance, the President’s decision to curtail a law-enforcement investigation to avoid
international friction would not implicate the obstruction-of-justice statutes. The criminal law
does not seek to regulate the consideration of such political or policy factors in the conduct of
government. And whenlegitimate interests animate the President’s conduct, those interests will
almost invariably be readily identifiable based on objective factors. Because the President’s
conduct in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone of obstruction law, no chilling
concern should arise.
b. There is also no reason to believe that investigations, let alone prosecutions, would
occur except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe that
obstruction occurred. Prosecutorial action enjoys a presumption of regularity: absent “clear
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official
duties.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). The presumptionof prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater
protection to the President than exists in routine cases given the prominence and sensitivity of any
matter involving the President andthelikelihood that such matters will be subject to thorough and
careful review at the most senior levels of the Departmentof Justice. Under OLC’s opinion that a
sitting President is entitled to immunity from indictment, only a successor Administration would
be able to prosecute a former President. But that consideration does not suggest that a President
would haveanybasis for fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office. There
are “obviouspolitical checks”againstinitiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former
President. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 448 (considering political checks
in separation-of-powers analysis). And the Attorney General holds “the power to conductthe
criminal litigation of the United States Government,” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 516), which provides a strong institutional safeguard against politicized
investigations or prosecutions. !°
1092 Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prosecutors
against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts. Prosecutors are generally barred from
participating in matters implicating their personal interests, see 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, and are instructed not to
be influenced by their “own professional or personal circumstances,” Justice Manual § 9-27.260, so
prosecutors would not frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and
personally motivated. And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible
officials at the DepartmentofJustice, who can be presumedto refrain from pursuing an investigation absent
a credible factual basis. Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the common-law rule of
prosecutorial immunity, which protects against the threat of suit by “a defendant [who] often will transform
his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions.” Jmbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity
does notjustify criminal immunity. See O'Sheay, Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (“Whatever may be
the case with respect to civil liability generally, .. . we have never held that the performance ofthe duties
of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise
criminaldeprivation ofconstitutional rights.”) (citations omitted).
179
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These considerations distinguish the Supreme Court’s holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that,
in part because inquiries into the President’s motives wouldbe “highly intrusive,” the Presidentis
absolutely immunefrom private civil damagesactions based onhis official conduct. 457 U.S. at
756-757. As Fitzgerald recognized, “there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages
than, for example, in criminal prosecutions.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37; see Cheney, 542
U.S. at 384. Andprivate actions are not subjectto the institutional protections of an action under
the supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity. Armstrong,
517 US. at 464.
c. In the rare cases in which a substantial and credible basis justifies conducting an
investigation of the President, the process of examining his motivations to determine whether he
acted for a corrupt purpose need not have a chilling effect. Ascertaining the President’s
motivations would turn on any explanation he provided to justify his actions, the advice he
received, the circumstances surrounding the actions, and the regularity or irregularity of the
process he employed to make decisions. But grand juries and courts would not have automatic
access to confidential presidential communications on those matters; rather, they could be
presented in official proceedings only on a showingof sufficient need. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712; In
re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 754, 756-757 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. at 448-449 (former President can invoke presidential communications privilege,
although successor’s failure to support the claim “detracts from [its] weight’).
In any event, probing the President’s intent in a criminal matter is unquestionably

constitutional in at least one context: the offense of bribery turns on the corrupt intent to receive
a thing of value in return for being influencedin official action. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). There can
be no serious argument against the President’s potential criminal liability for bribery offenses,
notwithstanding the need to ascertain his purpose and intent. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 3; ART. II,
§ 4; see also Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19
Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11 (“Application of § 201[to the President] raises no separation of powers
issue, let alone a serious one.”’).
d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies
exempting the President from the obstruction laws. As a historical matter, Presidents have very
seldom been the subjects of grand jury investigations. And it is rarer still for circumstances to
raise even the possibility of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obstructive action throughthe
President’s use of official power. Accordingly, the President’s conduct of office should not be
chilled based on hypothetical concerns aboutthe possible application of a corrupt-motive standard
in this context.
In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President’s counsel, we concluded that, in
light of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues, we had a valid basis
for investigating the conductat issue in this report. In our view, the application of the obstruction
statutes would not impermissibly burden the President’s performance of his Article II function to
supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. And the
protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person—including the
President—accords with the fundamental principle of our government that “[n]Jo [person] in this
180
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country is so high that he is above the law.” United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); see
also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 697; United States v. Nixon, supra.
181
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we determined not to makea traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw
ultimate conclusions about the President’s conduct. The evidence we obtained about the
President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were
making traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a
thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction ofjustice,
we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach
that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a
crime, it also does not exonerate him.
182
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Appendix A
Office of the Beputy Attorney General

Aushirgtan, B.C. 20530
ORDER NO, 3915-2017
APPOINTMENTOF SPECIAL COUNSEL

TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE
2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS
Byvirtue of the authority vested in me as Acting Attorney General, including 28 U.S.C.

§§ 509, S10, and 515, in order to discharge my responsibility to provide supervision and
managementofthe Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thoroughinvestigationof the

Russian government's efforts to interfere in (he 2016 presidential election, { hereby order as
follows:
(a) Robert S. Mueller IIL is appointed to serve as Special Counsel for the United States
Departmentof Justice.
(b) The Special Counselis authorized to conductthe investigation confirmed by then-FBI

Director James B. Comeyin testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on March 20, 2017, including:
(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian governmentand individuals
associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and
ii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600,4(a).
(c) If the Special Counsel believesit is necessary and appropriate, the Special Counselis
authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters.
(dd) Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations are
applicable to the Special Counsel.
Sfizfg
Date
A-1
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Appendix B
U.S, Departmentof Justice
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APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
The following glossary contains names andbrief descriptions of individuals and entities
referencedin the two volumesofthis report. It is not intended to be comprehensiveand is intended
only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report.
Referenced Persons
Agalarov, Aras Russian real-estate developer (ownerof the Crocus Group); met Donald
Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageantand helpedarrange
the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
and Trump Campaignofficials.
Agalarov, Emin Performer, executive vice president of Crocus Group, and son of Aras
Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaignofficials.
Akhmetov, Rinat Former memberin the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafortto
conduct work for Ukrainianpolitical party, the Party of Regions.
Akhmetshin, Rinat US. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya whoattended the
June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump
Campaignofficials.
Aslanovy, Head of U.S. department of the Internet Research Agency, which
Dzheykhun (Jay) engaged in an “active measures” social media campaign to interfere in
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Assange, Julian Founder of WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents
stolen from entities and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party.
Aven, Petr Chairman of the board of Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the
Presidential Transition Team in connection with anticipated post-election
sanctions.
Bannon, Stephen White House chief strategist and senior counselor to President Trump
(Steve) (Jan. 2017 — Aug. 2017); chief executive of the Trump Campaign.
Baranov, Andrey Director of investor relations at Russian state-owned oil company,

Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page.
Berkowitz, Avi Assistant to Jared Kushner.
Boente, Dana Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 — Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy
Attorney General (Feb. 2017 — Apr. 2017).
Bogacheva, Anna Internet Research Agency employee who worked on “active measures”
social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014.
Bossert, Thomas Former homeland security advisor to the President whoalso served as a
(Tom) seniorofficial on the Presidential Transition Team.
B-1
Boyarkin, Viktor Employee of Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska.
Boyd, Charles Chairmanofthe board of directors at the Centerfor the National Interest,
a U.S.-based think tank with operations in and connections to Russia.
Boyko, Yuriy Memberof the Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc and member of
the Ukrainian parliament.
Brand, Rachel Associate Attorney General (May 2017 — Feb. 2018).
Browder, William Founderof Hermitage Capital Management who lobbied in favor of the
(Bill) Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian
officials.
Bulatov, Alexander Russian intelligenceofficial who associated with Carter Page in 2008.
Burchik, Mikhail Executive director of the Internet Research Agency, which engagedin an
“active measures” social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
presidentialelection.
Burck, William Personalattorney to Don McGahn, White House Counsel.
Burnham, James Attorney in the White House Counsel’s Office who attended January
2017 meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn.
Burt, Richard Former U.S. ambassador who had done work Alfa-Bankand wasa board
memberof the Center for the National Interest.
Bystrov, Mikhail General director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an
“active measures” social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.
Calamari, Matt Chief operating officer for the Trump Organization.
Caputo, Michael Trump Campaign advisor.
Chaika, Yuri Prosecutor general of the Russian Federation who also maintained a
relationship with Aras Agalarov.
Christie, Chris Former Governor of New Jersey.
Clapper, James Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2010 — Jan. 2017).
Clovis, Samuel Jr. Chief policy advisorand national co-chair of the Trump Campaign.
Coats, Dan Director of National Intelligence.
Cobb, Ty Special Counsel to the President (July 2017 — May 2018).
Cohen, Michael Former vice president to the Trump Organization and special counsel to
Donald Trump who spearheaded an effort to build a Trump-branded
property in Moscow. He admitted to lying to Congress about the project.
Comey, JamesJr. Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 4, 2013 — May9,
2017).
Conway, Kellyanne Counselor to President Trump and managerof the Trump Campaign.
Corallo, Mark Spokesmanfor President Trump’s personallegal team (June 2017 — July
2017).
Corsi, Jerome Author and political commentator who formerly worked for
WorldNetDaily and InfoWars. BETNCM OTT METTS
Costello, Robert Attorney who represented he had a close relationship with Rudolph
Giuliani, the President’s personal counsel.
Credico, Randolph Radio talk show host who interviewed Julian Assange in 2016.
(Randy) Harm to Ongoing Matter
Davis, Richard Partner with Pegasus Sustainable Century Merchant Bank, business
(Rick) Jr. partner of Paul Manafort, and co-founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying
firm,
Dearborn, Rick Former White House deputy chief of staff for policy who previously
served as chief of staff to Senator Jeff Sessions.
Dempsey, Michael Office of Director of National Intelligence official who recalled
discussions with Dan Coats after Coats’s meeting with President Trump
on March 22, 2017.
Denman, Diana Delegate to 2016 Republican National Convention who proposed a

platform plank amendmentthat included armed support for Ukraine.
Deripaska, Oleg Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin who hired Paul
Manafort for consulting work between 2005 and 2009.
Dhillon, Uttam Attorney in the White House Counsel’s Office (Jan. 2017 — June 2018).
Dmitriev, Kirill Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF); met with Erik
Prince in the Seychelles in January 2017 and, separately, drafted a U.S.-
Russiareconciliation plan with Rick Gerson.
Donaldson, Annie Chiefof staff to White House Counsel Donald McGahn (Jan. 2017 — Dec.
2018).
Dvorkovich, Arkady Deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairmanof the
board of directors of the New Economic School in Moscow. He metwith
Carter Page twice in 2016.
Dvoskin, Evgeney Executive of Genbank in Crimea andassociate of Felix Sater.
Eisenberg, John Attorney in the White House Counsel’s Office and legal counsel for the
National Security Council.
Erchova, Lana Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce
(a/k/a Lana Klokov to the Trump Campaignin thefall of 2015.
Alexander)
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Fabrizio, Anthony Partnerat the research and consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates.
(Tony) He was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul
Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the election.
Fishbein, Jason Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent
WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on
September 20, 2016.
Flynn, Michael G. Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 — Feb.
(a/k/a Michael 13, 2017).
Flynn Jr.)
Flynn, Michael T. National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 — Feb. 13, 2017), Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012 — Aug. 7, 2014), and Trump
Campaign advisor. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about
communications with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December2016.
Foresman, Robert Investment banker who sought meetings with the Trump Campaign in
(Bob) spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the election met
with Michael Flynn.
Futerfas, Alan Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal
counsel for Donald Trump Jr.
Garten, Alan General counsel of the Trump Organization,
Gates, Richard Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural
(Rick) TI Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort.
Hepleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate
USS. laws, as well as making false statements to the FBI.
Gerson, Richard New York hedge fund managerand associate of Jared Kushner. During
(Rick) the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for
reconciliation between the United States and Russia.
Gistaro, Edward Deputy Director of NationalIntelligence forIntelligence Integration.
Glassner, Michael Political director of the Trump Campaign whohelped introduce George
Papadopoulosto others in the Trump Campaign.
Goldstone, Robert Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald Trump Jr. to arrange
the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Towerbetween Natalia Veselnitskaya
and Trump Campaignofficials.
Gordon, Jeffrey National security advisor to the Trump Campaign involved in changes to
(J.D.) the Republican party platform and who communicated with Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyakat the Republican National Convention.
Gorkov, Sergey Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank,
who met with Jared Kushnerduring the transition period.
Graff, Rhona Senior vice-president and executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the
Trump Organization.
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Hawker, Jonathan Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis
Manafort International LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine.
Heilbrunn, Jacob Editor of the National Interest, the periodical that officially hosted
candidate Trump’s April 2016 foreign policy speech.
Hicks, Hope White House communications director (Aug. 2017 — Mar. 2018) and
press secretary for the Trump Campaign.
Holt, Lester NBC News anchorwho interviewed President Trump on May 11, 2017.
Hunt, Jody Chiefofstaff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 — Oct. 2017).
Ivanov,Igor President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former
Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that
Ivanoyadvised on arranging a “Moscowvisit” for the Trump Campaign.
Ivanov, Sergei Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime
minister, and former FSB deputy director. In January 2016, Michael
Cohen emailed the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov.
Kasowitz, Mare President Trump’s personal counsel (May 2017 — July 2017).
Katsyv, Denis SonofPeter Katsyv; owner of Russian company Prevezon Holdings Ltd.
and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya.
Katsyv, Peter Russian businessman and father of Denis Katsyv.

Kaveladze, Irakli Vice president at Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov’s deputy in the United
(ike) States. He participated in the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaignofficials.
Kaverzina, Irina Employee ofthe Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an “active
measures” social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
Kelly, John White Housechiefof staff (July 2017 — Jan. 2019).
Khalilzad, Zalmay U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and former U.S. ambassador.
He met with Senator Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put
together through the Center for the National Interest.
Kilimnik, Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time employee of Paul

Konstantin Manafort assessed by the FBI to haveties to Russianintelligence.
Kislyak, Sergey Former Russian ambassador to the United States and current Russian
senator from Mordovia.
Klimentov, Denis Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-ranking
Russian governmentofficials of Carter Page’s July 2016 visit to Moscow.
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Klimentov, Dmitri Brother of Denis Klimentov who contacted Kremlin press secretary
Dmitri Peskov about Carter Page’s July 2016 visit to Moscow.
Klokov, Dmitry Executive for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System
and formeraide to Russia’s minister of energy. He communicated with
Michael Cohen abouta possible meeting between Vladimir Putin and
candidate Trump.
Kobyakov, Anton Advisor to Vladimir Putin and member of the Roscongress Foundation
who invited candidate Trump to the St. Petersburg International
Economic Forum.
Krickovic, Andrej Professor at the Higher School of Economics who recommended that
Carter Page give a July 2016 commencementaddress in Moscow.
Krylova, Internet Research Agency employee who worked on “active measures”

Aleksandra social media campaigntointerfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election;
traveled to the United States underfalse pretenses in 2014.
Kushner,Jared President Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisorto the President.

Kuznetsov, Sergey Russian governmentofficial at the Russian Embassy to the United States
who transmitted Vladimir Putin’s congratulations to President-Elect
Trump forhis electoral victory on November 9, 2016.
Landrum, Pete Advisor to Senator Jeff Sessions who attended the September 2016
meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
Lavrov, Sergey Russian minister of foreign affairs and former permanent representative
of Russia to the United Nations.
Ledeen, Barbara Senate staffer and associate of Michael Flynn who sought to obtain
Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign
period.
Ledeen, Michael Member of the Presidential Transition Team who advised on foreign
policy and national security matters.
Ledgett, Richard Deputydirector of the National Security Agency (Jan. 2014 — Apr. 2017);
present whenPresident Trump called Michael Rogers on March 26, 2017.
Lewandowski, Campaign managerfor the Trump Campaign (Jan. 2015 — June 2016).
Corey
Luff, Sandra Legislative director for Senator Jeff Sessions; attended a September 2016
meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
Lyovochkin, Serhiy Member of Ukrainian parliament and member of Ukrainian political

party, Opposition BlocParty.
Magnitsky, Sergei Russian tax specialist who alleged Russian government corruption and
died in Russian police custody in 2009. His death prompted passage of
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the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on

Russian officials.
Malloch, Theodore Chief executive officer of Global Fiduciary Governance and the
(Ted) Roosevelt Group. He was a London-basedassociate of Jerome Corsi.
Manafort, Paul Jr. Trump campaign member (March 2016 — Aug. 2016) and chairman and
chiefstrategist (May 2016 — Aug. 2016).
Mashburn, John Trump administration official and former policy director to the Trump
Campaign.
McCabe, Andrew Acting director of the FBI (May 2017 — Aug. 2017); deputy director of
the FBI (Feb. 2016 — Jan. 2018).
McCord, Mary Acting Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 2016 — May 2017).
McFarland, Deputy White HouseNational Security Advisor(Jan. 2017 — May 2017).

Kathleen (K.T.)
McGahn, Donald White House Counsel (Jan. 2017 — Oct. 2018).
(Don)
Medvedev, Dmitry Prime Minister of Russia.
Melnik, Yuriy Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., who
connected with George Papadopoulos onsocial media.
Mifsud, Joseph Maltese national and former London-based professor who, immediately
after returning from Moscowin April 2016, told George Papadopoulos
that the Russians had “dirt” in the form of thousands of Clinton emails.
Miller, Matt Trump Campaign staff member who waspresentat the meeting of the
National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016.
Miller, Stephen Senior advisorto the President.
Millian, Sergei Founder of the Russian American Chamber of Commerce who met with
George Papadopoulos during the campaign.
Mnuchin, Steven Secretary of the Treasury.
Harm to Ongoing Matter .
Miiller-Maguhn, Memberof hacker association Chaos Computer Club and associate of

Andrew Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks,
Nader, George Advisor to the United Arab Emirates’s Crown Prince who arranged a
meeting betweenKirill Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition
period.
Netyksho, Viktor Russian military officer in command ofa unit involved in Russian hack-
and-release operations to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
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Oganov, Georgiy Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board memberof investment company
Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early 2017.
Oknyansky, Henry Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory
(a/k/a Henry information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in
Greenberg) May 2016.
Page, Carter Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated pro-
Russian views and made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow.
Papadopoulos, Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who received information
George from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had“dirt” in the form of thousands of
Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI abouthis contact
with Mifsud.
Parscale, Bradley Digital media director for the 2016 Trump Campaign.
Patten, William Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik.
(Sam) Jr.
Peskov, Dmitry Deputy chief of staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential
administration.
Phares, Walid Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general
of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG).
Pinedo, Richard U.S. person whopleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity
fraud.
Podesta, John Jr. Clinton campaign chairman whose email account was hacked by the
GRU. WikiLeaks released his stolen emails during the 2016 campaign.
Podobnyy, Victor Russian intelligence officer who interacted with Carter Page while
operating inside the United States; later charged in 2015 with conspiring
to act as an unregistered agent of Russia.
Poliakova, Elena Personalassistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen’s

outreach about the Trump Tower Moscowprojectin January 2016.
Polonskaya, Olga Russian national introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud

as an individual with connections to Vladimir Putin.
Pompeo, Michael U.S. Secretary of State; directorof the Central Intelligence Agency (Jan.
2017 — Apr. 2018).
Porter, Robert White House staff secretary (Jan. 2017 — Feb. 2018).
Priebus, Reince White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 — July 2017); chair of the
Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011 — Jan. 2017).
Prigozhin, Yevgeniy Head of Russian companies Concord-Catering and Concord Management

and Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency,
which engaged in an “active measures” social media campaign to
interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
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Prikhodko, Sergei First deputy head of the Russian GovernmentOffice and former Russian
deputy prime minister. In January 2016, he invited candidate Trump to
the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
Prince, Erik Businessman and Trump Campaignsupporter who met with Presidential
Transition Team officials after the election and traveled to the Seychelles
to meet with Kirill Dmitriev in January 2017.
Raffel, Josh White House communications advisor (Apr. 2017 — Feb. 2018).
Rasin, Alexei Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to possess

derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton.
Rogers, Michael Directorof the National Security Agency (Apr. 2014 — May 2018).
Rosenstein, Rod Deputy Attorney General (Apr. 2017— present); Acting Attorney General
for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017 — Nov.
2018).
Rozoy, Andrei Chairman of LC. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate
development corporation that signed letter of intent for the Trump
Tower Moscowproject in 2015.
Rtskhiladze, Giorgi Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic Alliance, LLC who
communicated with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal.
Ruddy, Christopher Chief executive of Newsmax Media and associate of President Trump.
Rybicki, James FBI chief of staff (May 2015 — Feb. 2018).
Samochornov, Translator who worked with Natalia Veselnitskaya and attended a June
Anatoli 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump
Campaign officials.
Sanders, Sarah White House press secretary (July 2017 — present).
Huckabee
Sater, Felix Real-estate advisor who worked with Michael Cohento pursue a Trump
Tower Moscow project.
Saunders, Paul J. Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on
outlines and logistics of candidate Trump’s April 2016 foreign policy
speech.
Sechin, Igor Executive chairman of Rosneft, a Russian-stated owned oil company.
Sessions, Jefferson Attorney General (Feb, 2017 — Nov. 2018); U.S. Senator (Jan. 1997 —
Il (Jeff) Feb, 2017); head of the Trump Campaign’s foreign policy advisory team.
Shoygu, Sergey Russian Minister of Defense.
Simes, Dimitri President and chief executive officer of the Center for the National
Interest.
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Smith, Peter Investment banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain
Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign
period.
Spicer, Sean White Housepress secretary and communications director (Jan. 2017 —
July 2017).
Matter
Stone, Roger Advisor to the Trump Campaign EMIS) Ongoing
Tillerson, Rex USS. Secretary of State (Feb. 2017 — Mar. 2018).
Timofeev, Ivan Director of programsat the Russian International Affairs Council and
program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in
2016 with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting
between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign.
Trump, Donald Jr. President Trump’s son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump
Organization; helped arrange and attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at
Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign
officials.
Trump, Eric President Trump’s son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump
Organization.
Trump, Ivanka President Trump’s daughter; advisor to the President and former
executive vice president of the Trump Organization.
Ushakov,Yuri Aide to Vladimir Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United
Viktorovich States; identified to the Presidential Transition Team as the proposed
channel to the Russian government.
Vaino, Anton Chiefofstaff to Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Van der Zwaan, Formerattorney at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP; worked
Alexander with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates.
Vargas, Catherine Executive assistant to Jared Kushner.
Vasilchenko, Gleb Internet Research Agency employee who engaged in an “active

measures” social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
Veselnitskaya, Russian attorney who advocated for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act and
Natalia was the principal speaker at the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
with Trump Campaignofficials.
Weber, Shlomo Rector of the New Economic School (NES) in Moscow whoinvited
Carter Page to speak at NES commencementin July 2016.
Yanukovych, Viktor Formerpresident of Ukraine who had worked with Paul Manafort.
Yates, Sally Acting Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2017— Jan. 30, 2017); Deputy
Attorney General (Jan. 10, 2015 — Jan. 30, 2017).
Yatsenko, Sergey Deputy chieffinancial officer of Gazprom, a Russian state-owned energy

company,and associate of Carter Page.
Zakharova, Maria Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Information and
Press Department whoreceived notification of Carter Page’s speech in
July 2016 from Denis Klimentov.
Zayed al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander ofthe
Mohammedbin United Arab Emirates (UAE) armedforces.
Entities and Organizations
Alfa-Bank Russia’s largest commercial bank, which is headed by Petr Aven.

Center for the National U.S.-based think tank with expertise in and connections to Russia.
Interest (CNI) CNI’s publication, the National Interest, hosted candidate Trump’s
foreign policy speech in April 2016.
Concord Umbrella term for Concord Management and Consulting, LLC and
Concord Catering, which are Russian companies controlled by
Yevgeniy Prigozhin.
Crocus Group or A Russian real-estate and property development company that, in

Crocus International 2013, hosted the Miss Universe Pageant, and from 2013 through 2014,
worked with the Trump Organization on a Trump Moscow project.
DCLeaks Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen
documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period.
Democratic Political committee working to elect Democrats to the House of
Congressional Representatives; hacked by the GRU in April 2016.
Campaign Committee
Democratic National Formal governing body for the Democratic Party; hacked by the GRU
Committee in April 2016.
Duma Lower Houseofthe nationallegislature of the Russian Federation.
Gazprom Russian oil and gas company majority-owned by the Russian
government.
Global Energy Capital, Investment and managementfirm founded by Carter Page.

LLC
Global Partners in Event hosted in partnership with the U.S. DepartmentofState and the
Diplomacy Republican National Convention. In 2016, Jeff Sessions and J.D.
Gordondelivered speeches at the event and interacted with Russian
AmbassadorSergey Kislyak.
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U.S, Departmentof Justice
; ND £42)
FHT otey
May-Contain Material Protected
WorkProduet // May-Contain Pret ted-HrderF ed 8,
Under Fed R-G
Guccifer 2.0 Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen
documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period.
LC. Expert Investment Russian real-estate and developmentcorporation that signeda letter of
Company intent with a Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump
Moscow property.
Internet Research Russian entity based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that
Agency (IRA) engaged in an “active measures” social media campaignto interfere in
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
KLSResearch LLC Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter
Smith to further Smith’s search for Hillary Clinton emails.
Kremlin Official residenceofthe president of the Russian Federation; it is used
colloquially to refer to the office of the president or the Russian
government.
LetterOne Company that includes Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members.
During a board meeting in December 2016, Aven asked for Burt’s help
to make contact with the Presidential Transition Team.
Link Campus University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was
University introduced to Joseph Mifsud.
London Centre of International law advisory organization in London that employed

International Law Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos.
Practice (LCILP)
Main Intelligence Russian Federation’s military intelligence agency.
Directorate of the
General Staff (GRU)
New Economic School Moscow-basedschool that invited Carter Page to speakatits July 2016
in Moscow (NES) commencement ceremony.
Opposition Bloc Ukrainian political party that incorporated members of the defunct
Party of Regions.
Party of Regions Ukrainian political party of former President Yanukovych. It was

generally understoodto align with Russian policies.
Pericles Emerging Company registered in the CaymanIslands by Paul Manafort and his
Market Partners LLP business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund.
Prevezon Holdings Ltd. Russian companythat was a defendantin a U.S. civil action alleging
the laundering of proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky.
Roscongress Russian entity that organized the St. Petersburg International
Foundation Economic Forum.
Rosneft Russian state-owned oil and energy company.

Russian Direct Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in 2011
Investment Fund and headed byKirill Dmitriev.
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Attorney-WorkProduet // May-Contei Fed R-Crint
Under Fed 60}
P-6(e}
R-Crint P-
Russian International Russia-based nonprofit established by Russian government decree. It

Affairs Council is associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its members
include Ivan Timofeev, Dmitry Peskov, and Petr Aven.
Silk Road Group Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing
agreement to build a Trump-brandedhotel in Georgia.
St. Petersburg Annual event held in Russia and attended by prominent Russian
International Economic politicians and businessmen,
Forum
Tatneft Russian energy company.
Transatlantic European group that sponsored a summit between European
Parliamentary Group Parliament lawmakers and U.S. persons. George Papadopoulos, Sam
on Counterterrorism Clovis, and Walid Phares attended the TAG summitin July 2016.
Unit 26165 (GRU) GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political,
governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia.
It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations,
as well as the subsequentreleaseofthe stolendata, in orderto interfere
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Unit 74455 (GRU) GRU military unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber
operations. It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and
organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in
orderto interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Valdai Discussion Club Group that holds a conference attended by Russian government
officials, including President Putin.
WikiLeaks Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online,
including data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government
entities, Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S.
Work-Preduet // Pr Materi l
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Fed R-Crit P-6{e)
ecte
Index of Acronyms
CNI Center for the NationalInterest
DCCC Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

DNC Democratic National Committee
FBI Federal Bureauof Investigation
FSB Russian Federal Security Service
GEC Global Energy Capital, LLC

GRU Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
HPSCI U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HRC Hillary Rodham Clinton
TRA Internet Research Agency
LCILP London Centre of International Law Practice

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NES New Economic School
NSA National Security Agency
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

PTT Presidential Transition Team
RDIF Russian Direct Investment Fund

RIAC RussianInternational Affairs Council
SBOE State boardsof elections
Sco Special Counsel’s Office

SIC U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
SSCI USS. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
TAG Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism
Vnesheconombank
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Appendix C
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Attorney-Werk // Protected
APPENDIX C
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The President provided written responses through his personal counsel to questions
submitted to him by the Special Counsel’s Office. Wefirst explain the process that led to the
submission of written questions and then attach the President’s responses.
Beginning in December 2017, this Office sought for more than a year to interview the
President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction-of-justice. We
advised counsel that the President was a “subject” of the investigation underthe definition of the
Justice Manual—“a person whoseconductis within the scope of the grand jury’s investigation.”
Justice Manual § 9-11.151 (2018). We also advised counselthat “[a]n interview with the President
is vital to our investigation” and that this Office had “carefully considered the constitutional and
other argumentsraised by... counsel, and they d[id] not provide us with reason to forgo seeking
an interview.”! We additionally stated that “it is in the interest of the Presidency and the public
for an interview to take place” and offered “numerous accommodationsto aid the President’s
preparation andavoid surprise.” After extensive discussions with the DepartmentofJustice about
the Special Counsel’s objective of securing the President’s testimony, these accommodations
included the submissionsof written questions to the President on certain Russia-related topics.?
Wereceivedthe President’s written responsesin late November 2018.’ In December 2018,
weinformed counselofthe insufficiency of those responsesin several respects.° We noted, among
other things, that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he “does not ‘recall’ or
‘remember’ or have an ‘independentrecollection’” of information called for by the questions.°
Other answers were “incomplete or imprecise.”” The written responses, we informed counsel,
“demonstrate the inadequacy of the written format, as we have had no opportunity to ask follow-
up questions that would ensure complete answersandpotentially refresh your client’s recollection
or clarify the extent or nature of his lack of recollection.”® We again requested an in-person
interview, limited to certain topics, advising the President’s counsel that “[t]his is the President’s
15/16/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 1.
2 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsels’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 1; see 7/30/18
Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 1 (describing accommodations).
3 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 1 (submitting
written questions).
4 11/20/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel’s Office (transmitting
written responses of Donald J. Trump).
5 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 3.
6 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel,at 3.

7 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 3; see (noting,
“for example,” that the President “did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that
discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease . . . but he has since made public comments
aboutthat topic”).
8 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 3.
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opportunity to voluntarily provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context ofall of
the evidence we have gathered.”® The President declined. '°
Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily, we considered

whetherto issue a subpoenaforhis testimony. We viewed the written answers to be inadequate.
Butat that point, our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial
evidence for our report. We thus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutionallitigation,
with resulting delay in finishing our investigation, against the anticipated benefits for our
investigation and report. As explained in Volume Il, Section II.B., we determined that the
substantial quantity of information wehad obtained from other sources allowedus to draw relevant
factual conclusionson intent and credibility, which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence
and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation.
° 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President’s Personal Counsel.

10 12/12/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel’s Office, at 2.
aa
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WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower
a. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner
was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially
negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the
information from and the substance of the discussion.
b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016

between, among others, Donald Trump,Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the
emails reflected in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with
Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016.
Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these
communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with
you, when, and the substanceof the discussion(s).
When did you first see or learn aboutall or any part of the emails reflected
in Exhibit A?
When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was
described as being part of Russia and its government’s support for your
candidacy?
Did you suggestto or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or
any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you
communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and
why you took that action.
c. OnJune 9, 2016, Donald Trump,Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a
meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer,
Natalia Veselnitskaya (the “June 9 meeting”).
Other than as set forth in your answersto I.a and |.b, what, if anything,
were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the
scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this with,
when, and what you wereinformed about the meeting.
When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9
meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian
government? Describe who you learned this information from and the
substance of the discussion(s).
What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting?
Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was
discussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when it
occurred, and the substance of the statements they made about the
meeting.
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iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part,
adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that
discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion.
d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day
were you in Trump Tower?
i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared
Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those
conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June
9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the
conversation.
e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of

the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when,
and the substance of the communication.
f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort,
or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family,
Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took
place after June 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to
assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information from,
when, and the substance of what you learned.
g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part, “lam going to give
a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we’ re going to be discussing
all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons.”
i. Why did you make that statement?
ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
iii. What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be?
iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9
meeting?
v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you werereferring to? If so, who?
vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7,
2016?
h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or
the Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of
Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were
informed, and the content of such discussion(s).
i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign
government or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided,
wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your campaign,
including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If
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yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you wereinformed, and the
content of such discussion(s).
I. Russian Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks
a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated
the computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that
Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June
14, 2016, were you provided any information about any potential or actual
hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton,
or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided
this information, when, and the substanceofthe information.
On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by
Democratic party officials.
i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that
WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had
possession of or planned to release emails or information that could help
your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you
discussed this issue with, when, and the substanceof the discussion(s).
ii. After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told
that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that
could be released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this
information, when, and what you weretold.
Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly,
between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a)
WikiLeaks, (b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer
2.0, (e) representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes,
describe who provided you with this information, when you learned of the
communications, and what you know about those communications.
On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: “Russia, if you’re listening, |
hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. | think you will
probably be rewarded mightily by our press.”
i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country,
entity, or individual?
ii, In advance of making that statement, what discussions,if any, did you have
with anyone else about the substance of the statement?
iii. Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that
Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email
accounts ofHillary Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided
this information, when, and what you weretold.
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e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were
released by WikiLeaks.
j,. Where were you on October 7, 2016?
ii. Were you told at any time in advanceof, or on the day of, the October 7
release that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John
Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this, when, and what you were
told.
iii, Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including
Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an
intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and
describe the substanceof the conversations or contacts.
f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0,
or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes,
describe who had such contacts, how you became awareof the contacts, when
you became awareof the contacts, and the substanceof the contacts.
g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you
communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s)
with Mr. Stone.
i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making
to assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr.
Stone?
ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware,
with anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you
weretold, from whom, and when.
iii. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks
or any intermediary of Wikileaks, or about forthcoming releases of
information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when.
h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential
pardon or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had
the discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s).
i. Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those
in Russia, to assist your campaign through the useof social media postings or the
organization ofrallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with,
when, and the content of the discussion(s).
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The Trump Organization Moscow Project
In October 2015, a “Letter of Intent,” a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was

signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the “Trump
Moscow project”).
i. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow
project? By whom? What were you told about the project?
ii. Did you sign the letter of intent?
In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated:

“To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about
this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding
letter of intent in 2015.” Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or
anyone else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow
project, including who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the
discussion(s).
Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and
any Russian governmentofficials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov,
regarding the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this
information to you, when, and the substance of what you learned.
Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a
potential trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the
Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the
Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow
project should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been
abandoned? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the
discussion(s), and why that decision was made.
Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided
publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual
investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the
Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the
Aside from the Trump Moscowproject, did you or the Trump Organization have
any other prospective or actual businessinterests, investments, or arrangements
with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If
yes, describe the businessinterests, investments, or arrangements.
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Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign
Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to
the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information
from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort’s
connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your
decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role.
Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your
campaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this information
from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you understood the
purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you
respondedto learning this information.
Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your
campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to
any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or
Russian governments? If yes, identify who provided you with this information,
when, the substance of the discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was
of sharing the internal campaign information, and how you respondedto learning
this information.
Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions

Ukraine or Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he
communicated those positions to you and the substance of those
communications.
During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with
you or senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had
conversations with on this topic, when, and what you weretold.
What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform
regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to
the convention, what information did you have about this platform provision?
After the platform provision was changed, who told you about the change, when
did they tell you, what were you told about why it was changed, and who was
involved?
On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize
Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: “We'll be looking
at that. Yeah, we'll be looking.” Did you intend to communicate by that statement
or at any other time during the campaign a willingness tolift sanctions and/or
recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea if you were elected?
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i. What consideration did you give tolifting sanctions and/or recognizing

Russia’s annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you
spoke with about this topic, when, the substance ofthe discussion(s).
Vv. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition
a. Wereyou asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10,
2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you
told about about why your presence was requested?
i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you
had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the
event.
Following the Obama Administration’s imposition of sanctions on Russia in

December 2016 (“Russia sanctions”), did you discuss with Lieutenant General
(LTG) Michael Flynn, K.T. McFarland, Steve Bannon, Reince Priebus, Jared Kushner,
Erik Prince, or anyone else associated with the transition what should be
communicated to the Russian government regarding the sanctions? If yes,
describe who you spoke with about this issue, when, and the substance of the
discussion(s).
On December 29 and December 31, 2016, LTG Flynn had conversations with
Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about the Russia sanctions and Russia’s
responseto the Russia sanctions.
i. Did you direct or suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions with anyone from
the Russian government about the Russia sanctions?
ii. Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn’s December 29, 2016 conversation
that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, describe
who told you this information, when, and what you weretold. If no, when
and from whom did you learn of LTG Flynn’s December 29, 2016
conversation with Ambassador Kislyak?
iii. When did you learn of LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak’s call on
December 31, 2016? Who told you and what were you told?
iv. When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29 and
December 31, 2016 calls between LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak?
Who told you and what were you told?
At any time between December 31, 2016, and January 20, 2017, did anyone tell
you or suggest to you that Russia’s decision not to impose reciprocal sanctions
was attributable in any way to LTG Flynn’s communications with Ambassador
Kislyak? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, and the
substance of what you weretold.
Adtterney-WerkPreduet // Protected
e. On January 12, 2017, the Washington Post published a column that stated that
LTG Flynn phoned Ambassador Kislyak several times on December 29, 2016. After
learning of the column, did you direct or suggest to anyone that LTG Flynn should
deny that he discussed sanctions with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, who did you
make this suggestion or direction to, when, what did you say, and why did you
take this step?
i. After learning of the column, did you have any conversations with LTG
Flynn about his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016?
If yes, describe when those discussions occurred and the content of the
discussions.
Were you told about a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that
took place in December 2016?
i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the
discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting.
Were you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev
or any other representative from the Russian government that took place in
January 2017?
i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the
discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose ofthe meeting(s).
Prior to January 20, 2017, did you talk to Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, or any
other individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an unofficial
line of communication with Russia? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when,
the substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of
such an unofficial line of communication.
Attorney-WerkPreduet // Mey
RESPONSES OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower
Whendid you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was
considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
information about Hillary Clinton? Describe whoyoulearned the information from and the
substanceofthe discussion.
Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between,
amongothers, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected in,
Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin
Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016.
i, Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these
communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you,
when, and the substanceofthe discussion(s).
ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in
Exhibit A?
iti. When did youfirst learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as
being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy?
iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any
portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you
communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you
took that action.
On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump,Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushnerattended a meeting
at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia
Veselnitskaya (the “June 9 meeting”).
i, Otherthan as set forth in your answers to I.a and I.b, what, if anything, were you
told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a
meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed
about the meeting.
ii. Whendid youlearn that someof the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were
Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe
whoyoulearned this information from andthe substanceof the discussion(s).
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ili. Whatwereyoutold about what wasdiscussedat the June 9 meeting? Describe each
conversation in which you weretold about what wasdiscussed at the meeting, who
the conversation was with, whenit occurred, and the substance of the statements
they made aboutthe meeting.
iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, adoption
and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who youhad that discussion with, when,
and the substanceofthe discussion.
For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day were you
in Trump Tower?
i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner
on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings
include any reference to any aspectofthe June 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you
spoke with and the substance of the conversation.
Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member orrepresentative of the
Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the
substance of the communication.
Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared
Kushner and any member orrepresentative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya,
Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9, 2016 and
concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign? If yes, describe
who youlearned this information from, when, and the substance of what you learned.
OnJune 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which yousaid, in part, “I am going to give a major
speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things
that have taken place with the Clintons.”
i, Why did you makethat statement?
ii. Whatinformation did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
iii. Whatdid you believe the source(s) of that information would be?
iv. Did youexpect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting?
v. Did anyonehelp draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who?
vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016?
Did any person orentity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
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government supported your candidacy or opposedthe candidacy ofHillary Clinton? If yes,

describe the source(s) ofthe information, when you were informed, and the content of such
discussion(s).
i. Did any person orentity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or
foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or
offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to
provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the
information, when youwere informed, and the content ofsuch discussion(s).
Response to Question I, Parts (a) through (c)
I have norecollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared
Kushner wasconsidering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
information about Hillary Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9,
2016 meeting had takenplace, that the referenced emails existed, or that Donald J. Trump, Jr., had
other communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone between June 3, 2016 and June
9, 2016.
Response to Question I, Part (d)
I have no independentrecollection of whatportion of these four days in June of 2016 | spent in

Trump Tower. This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced campaign, as the primary
season was ending and we werepreparing for the general election campaign.
I am now aware that my Campaign’s calendar indicates that | was in New York City from June 6
—9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Toweroffice reflect that I had variouscalls and meetings
scheduled for each of these days. While those calls and meetings may or may notactually have
taken place, they do indicate that I was in Trump Towerduring a portion of each of these working
days, and I have no reason to doubt that [ was. When | was in NewYork City, I stayed at my
Trump Towerapartment.
My Trump Organization desk calendar also reflects that | was outside Trump Tower during
portions of these days. The June 7, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower
in the early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks after winning the California, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that day. The June 8,
2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at my son’s
school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates | was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a
fundraising luncheonat the Four Seasons Hotel. At this point, | do not remember on what dates
these events occurred, but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as
scheduled on my calendar.
Widely available media reports, including television footage, also shed light on my activities
during these days. For example, | am aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump
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National Golf Club in Briarcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media.|
remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening.
At this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul
Manafort, or Jared Kushneron June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates | was scheduled to meet
with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place. It was
more than twoyears ago,at a time when | had many calls and interactionsdaily.
Response to Question I, Part (e)
I have no independent recollection of any communications | had with the Agalarov family or
anyone I understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016 and before
the end of the campaign. While preparing to respond to these questions, I have become aware of
written communications with the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and
largely authored by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you.
In general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories, emails about a
painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to Trump Toweras a birthday
present, and emails regarding delivery of a book written by Aras Agalarov. The documentsreflect
that the deliveries were screened by the SecretService.
Response to Question I, Part(f)
I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr.,
Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any memberor representative of the Agalarov family, Robert
Goldstone, Natalia Veselnitskaya (whose name | wasnot familiar with), or anyone I understood
to be a Russianofficial.
Response to Question I, Part (g)
In remarks [ delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and
South Dakota Republican primaries, I said, “I am going to give a major speech on probably
Monday of next week and we're goingto be discussingall of the things that have taken place with
the Clintons.” In general, I expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative
information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton’s failed policies, the
Clintons’ use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton
Foundation, Mrs. Clinton’s improper use of a private server for State Department business, the
destruction of 33,000 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton’s temperamental unsuitability for the
office of President.
In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that the Campaign
documentsalready producedto youreflect the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for
the speech I expected to give “probably” on the Monday following my June 7, 2016 comments.
These documents generally show that the text of the speech wasinitially drafted by Campaign staff
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with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including,
in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer.
The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 12,
2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more specifically to national security and
terrorism than to the Clintons. That speech wasdelivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of
Politics in Manchester, New Hampshire, and, as reported, openedwith the following:
This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President,
especially in these times of Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her
former Secret Service Agent, who hasseen her underpressure and in times of stress,
hasstated that she lacks the temperamentand integrity to be president. There will
be plenty of opportunity to discuss these important issuesat a later time, and I will
deliver that speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the growing
threat of terrorism inside of our borders.
[ continued to speak about Mrs. Clinton’s failings throughout the campaign, using the information
preparedforinclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7, 2016.
Response to Question I, Part (h)
I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
government “supported” my candidacy or “opposed”the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However,
I was aware of somereports indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements
about me.
Response to QuestionI, Part(i)
I have norecollection of being told during the campaign that any foreign governmentor foreign
leader had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign.
Il. Russian Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks
a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the
computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian
intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 2016, were you
provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or
email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC),
the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with the Clinton
campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and the substanceof the
information.
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On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaksreleased nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic
party officials.
i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks,
Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians hador potentially had possession ofor planned
to release emails or information that could help your campaign orhurt the Clinton
campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when, and the
substance ofthe discussion(s).
ii. After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that
WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be
released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information,
when, and what youweretold.
Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, between
Roger Stone, Donald Trump,Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a) WikiLeaks, (b)
Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer 2.0, (e) representatives
of Guccifer2.0, or(f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with
this information, when you learned of the communications, and what you knowabout those
communications.
On July 27, 2016, youstated at a press conference: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope
you’ re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded
mightily by our press.”
i. Whydid you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity,
or individual?
ii. In advance of making that statement, whatdiscussions, if any, did you have with
anyone else about the substance of the statement?
iii. Were youtold at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was
attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary
Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and
what you were told.
On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by
WikiLeaks.
i. Where were you on October 7, 2016?
ii. Were you told at any time in advanceof, or on the day of, the October7 release that
WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes,
describe whotold you this, when, and what you weretold.
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iii. Are you aware of anyoneassociated with you or your campaign, including Roger
Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks,either directly or through an intermediary, on or
about October 7, 2016? Ifyes, identify the person and describe the substanceofthe
conversations or contacts.
f. Were you told of anyoneassociated with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone,
having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks
regarding the contentor timing ofrelease of hacked emails? If yes, describe who had such
contacts, how you became awareofthe contacts, when you became awareofthe contacts,
and the substance of the contacts.
g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, howfrequently did you communicate
with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
i, During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to assist
your campaign, and whatrequests, if any, did you make of Mr. Stone?
ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with
anyoneelse associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you weretold, from
whom, and when.
iii. Did Mr. Stone at anytimeinform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks orany
intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of information? If yes,
describe what Stone told you and when.
h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon or
other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who youhadthe discussion(s) with,
when, and the content of the discussion(s).
i, Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in
Russia, to assist your campaign throughthe use ofsocial media postings or the organization
of rallies? [f yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, when, and the content
of the discussion(s).
Response to Question II, Part (a)
I do not rememberthe date on whichit was publicly reported that the DNC had been hacked, but
mybest recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or shortly after the time it became the subject
ofmedia reporting. I do notrecall being provided any information during the campaign about the
hacking of any ofthe namedentities or individuals before it became the subject of media reporting.
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Response to QuestionII, Part (b)
I recall that in the months leadingup to the election there was considerable media reporting about
the possible hacking and release of campaign-related information and there wasa lot of talk about
this matter. At the time, I was generally awareofthese media reports and may have discussed these
issues with my campaign staffor others, but at this point in time — more than two yearslater — I
havenorecollection of any particular conversation, whenit occurred, or whothe participants were.
Response to Question II, Part (c)
I do notrecall being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals
named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative of WikiLeaks or any of
the other individuals or entities referred to in the question.
Response to Question II, Part (d)
I made the statement quoted in Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any
objective observer. The context ofthe statementis evident in the full reading or viewing of the
July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer youto the publicly available transcript and video of
that press conference. I do notrecall having any discussion about the substance of the statementin
advance of the press conference. I do notrecall being told during the campaign of any efforts by
Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
campaignprior to them becoming the subject of media reporting and I have no recollection of any
particular conversationin that regard.
Response to Question II, Part (e)
I was in Trump Towerin New York City on October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told
that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of
Mr. Podesta’s emails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of being told
that RogerStone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone, or anyoneassociated with my
campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October7, 2016.
Response to Question II, Part(f)
I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my
campaign had discussions with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or
timing of release of hacked emails.
Response to Question II, Part (g)
I spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. | have no
recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1, 2016 and
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November 8, 2016. I do notrecall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of
Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign, althoughI
was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussionat
the time.
Response to Question II, Part (h)
I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon oraction to
benefit Julian Assange.
Response to Question II, Part (i)
I do not recall being aware during the campaign of specific efforts by foreign individuals or
companiesto assist my campaign through the use ofsocial media postings or the organization of
rallies.
Il. The Trump Organization Moscow Project
a. In October 2015, a “Letter of Intent,” a copy of whichis attached as Exhibit B, was signed
for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the “Trump Moscowproject”).
i. When wereyou first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscowproject?

By whom? Whatwere youtold about the project?
ii. Did you sign theletter of intent?
b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohenstated: “To the

best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal
other than meonthree occasions, including signing a non-bindingletter of intent in 2015.”
Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump
Organization, about the Trump Moscowproject, including who you spoke with, when, and
the substance of the discussion(s).
c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any
Russian governmentofficials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding
the Trump Moscowproject? If so, identify who provided this information to you, when,
and the substance of what youlearned.
d. Did youhave any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip
to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohenfor reasons related to the Trump Moscowproject?
If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
é Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project
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should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned? If
yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and why that
decision was made.
f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or
in responseto investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals
the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow project? If yes,
describe who youspoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any other
prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements with Russia or any
Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the business
interests, investments, or arrangements.
Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g)
Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump Organization project
in Moscow. AsI recall, Mr. Cohen described this as a proposed project of a general type we have
donein the past in a variety of locations. I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your
questions as Exhibit B which required no equity or expenditure on our end and wasconsistent with
our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world.
I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. AsI recall, they were brief, and they were
not memorable. I was not enthused aboutthe proposal, and I do not recall any discussion oftravel
to Russia in connection with it. | do not rememberdiscussing it with anyone else at the Trump
Organization, althoughit is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications
between Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian governmentofficial regarding the Letter of
Intent. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that Mr.
Cohen sent an email regarding the Letter of Intent to “Mr. Peskov” at a general, public email
account, which should show there was no meaningful relationship with people in power in Russia.
I understand those documentsalready have been provided to you.
I vaguely rememberpress inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about whether the
Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia. I may have spoken with campaignstaff or
Trump Organization employees regarding responses to requests for information, but I have no
current recollection of any particular conversation, with whom I may have spoken, when, or the
substance of any conversation. AsI recall, neither [ nor the Trump Organization had any projects
or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the Letter of Intent.
IV. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign
a. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the
Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and
the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or
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Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If
yes, describe thatrole.
Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to
Oleg Deripaska? [f yes, describe who youlearned this information from, when, the
substance of what you were told, what you understood the purpose was of sharing such
information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you respondedto learning this information.
Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyoneelse associated with your campaign
sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located
in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If yes,
identify who provided youwith this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s),
what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information, and
how yourespondedto learning this information.
Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions Ukraine or
Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated those
positions to youand the substance of those communications.
During the campaign, were youtold aboutefforts by Russianofficials to meet with you or
senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with onthis
topic, when, and what you weretold.
Whatrole, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding
arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what
information did you have aboutthis platform provision? After the platform provision was
changed, who told you about the change, when did theytell you, what were youtold about
why it was changed, and who was involved?
OnJuly 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as
Russianterritory and lift sanctions on Russia, yousaid: “We'll be looking at that. Yeah,
we'll be looking.” Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time
during the campaign a willingnessto lift sanctions and/or recognize Russia’s annexation
of Crimea if you were elected?
i. Whatconsideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia’s

annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you spoke with aboutthis
topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s).
~ Response to Question IV, Parts (a) through (d)
Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate workfor prior presidential candidates,
including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole. I knew that Mr.
Manafort had doneinternational consulting work and, at some time before Mr. Manafort left the
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campaign, I learned that he was somehowinvolved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do
not rememberthe specifics of what I knew at the time.
I had no knowledge of Mr. Manafort offering briefings on the progress of my campaign to an

individual named Oleg Deripaska, nor do I remember being aware of Mr. Manafortor anyone else
associated with my campaign sending or directing others to send internal Trump Campaign
information to anyone I knew to be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or to anyone I understood to
be a Ukrainian or Russian government employee or official. | do not remember Mr. Manafort
communicating to me any particular positions Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to
support.
Response to Question IV, Part(e)
I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts by Russian officials to meet with me or
with senior members of my campaign. In the process of preparing to respond to these questions,I
became aware that on March 17, 2016, my assistant at the Trump Organization, Rhona Graff,
received an email from a Sergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of
the Russian Federation, Foundation Roscongress, inviting me to participate in the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016. The documents show that Ms. Graff
prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation. I understand these documents
already have been produced to you.
Response to Question IV, Part(f)
I have no recollection of the details of what, when, or from what source | first learned about the
change to the platform amendmentregarding arming Ukraine, but I generally recall learning of the
issue as part of media reporting. I do not recall being involved in changing the language to the
amendment.
Response to Question IV, Part (g)
My statement did not communicate any position.
Vv. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition
a, Wereyouaskedto attend the World Chess Championship gala on November10, 2016? If

yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you told about about
[sic] why your presence was requested?
i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you had with
any Russians or representatives of the Russian governmentat the event.
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Response to Question V, Part (a)
I do not rememberhaving been asked to attend the World Chess Championshipgala, and I did not
attend the event. During the course of preparing to respond to these questions, | have become
aware of documentsindicating that in March of 2016, the president of the World Chess Federation
invited the Trump Organization to host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess Championship
Match to be held in New York in November 2016. I have also become aware that in November
2016, there were press inquiries to my staff regarding whetherI had plansto attend the tournament,
which was not being held at Trump Tower. I understand these documents have already been
provided to you.
Executed on Novemsern20. 2018
DONALD J. TRUMP
President of the United States
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Appendix D
APPENDIX D.
SPECIAL COUNSEL’S OFFICE TRANSFERRED, REFERRED, AND COMPLETED CASES

This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the Special Counsel’s Office, as
well as cases prosecuted by the Office that are now completed.
A. Transfers
The Special Counsel’s Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination
between the Russian governmentandindividuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain
matters assigned to the Office by the Acting Attorney General havenot fully concluded as of the
date of this report. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office
has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Departmentof Justice
and the FBI. Those transfers include:
1. United States v. Bijan Rafiekian and Kamil Ekim Alptekin
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia

(Awaiting trial)
The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other
things, possible criminal conduct by Michael Flynn in acting as an unregistered agent for the
Governmentof Turkey. See August 2, 2017 Memorandum from RodJ. Rosenstein to Robert S.
Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel’s authority to
investigate Rafiekian and Alptekin because they “may have been jointly involved” with Flynn in
FARA-related crimes. See October 20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney
General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein.
On December1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making
false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States.
As part of that plea, Flynn agreed to a Statement of the Offense in which he acknowledgedthat
the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) documents hefiled on March 7, 2017 “contained
materially false statements and omissions.” Flynn’s plea occurred before the Special Counsel had
madea final decision on whether to charge Rafiekian or Alptekin. On March 27, 2018,after
consultation with the Office ofthe Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel’s Office referred
the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin to the National Security Division (NSD)for any action
it deemed appropriate. The Special Counsel’s Office determined the referral was appropriate
because the investigation of Flynn had been completed, and that investigation had provided the
rationale for the Office’s investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin. At NSD’s request, the Eastern
District of Virginia continued the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin.
2. United States v. Michael Flynn
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia

(Awaiting sentencing)
D-1
3. United States v. Richard Gates
U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia

4. United States v. Internet Research Agency,et al. (Russian Social Media Campaign)

National Security Division
(Post-indictment, pre-arrest & pre-trial’)
5. United States v. Konstantin Kilimnik

(Post-indictment, pre-arrest)
6. United States v. Paul Manafort
U.S, Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
(Post-conviction)
7. United States v. Viktor Netyksho, et al. (Russian Hacking Operations)
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District ofPennsylvania

National Security Division
(Post-indictment, pre-arrest)
8. United States v. William Samuel Patten
U.S. Attorney's Office for the District ofColumbia

The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of
Patten’s conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Office. The
investigation uncovered evidence of a crime; the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of
Columbia handled the prosecution ofPatten.
CweHarm to Ongoing Matter
(Investigation ongoing)
The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counselto investigate, among other
things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received from the Ukrainian
governmentbefore and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych. See August 2, 2017
Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General
' One defendant, Concord Management & Consulting LLC, appeared through counsel andis in pre-
triallitigation.
D-2
later confirmed the Special Counsel’s authority to investigate GEMMMTMenretsiys)
On October 27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of
Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they performed for
Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. On February 22, 2018, Manafort and Gates were
charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the
payments they received for work performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine.
During the course of its , the Special Counsel’s Office developed substantial
evidence with respect to individuals and entities that wer Harm to Ongoing Matter
? On February 23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multi-
object conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were
dismissed. Thereafter, in consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special
Counsel’s Office closed the and referred them po for further
investigation as it deemed appropriate. The Office basedits decision to close those matters onits
mandate, the indictments of Manafort, Gates’s plea, and its determination as to howbestto allocate
its resources, among other reasons;
aHarm to Ongoing Matter continued
the investigation of those closed matters.
10, United States v. Roger Stone
U.S. Attorney’s Officefor the District ofColumbia

(Awaitingtrial)
ipeHarm to Ongoing Matter
(Investigation ongoing)
B. Referrals
During the course of the investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of
potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel’s jurisdiction
established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcementauthorities,
principally other components of the Departmentof Justice and the FBI. Thosereferrals, listed
3 Manafort wasultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty
in the District of Columbia. See Vol. I, Section IV.A.8. Thetrial and plea happened after the transfer
decision described here.
D-3
Attorney-Werk // Protected
alphabetically by subject, are summarized below.
—
2. Michael Cohen
During the course of the investigation, the Special Counsel’s Office uncovered evidence
of potential wire fraud and FECA violations pertaining to Michael Cohen. That evidence was
referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the FBI’s New
York Field Office.
5; Cri Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
During the course of the FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the Special
Counsel’s Office uncovered evidenceof potential FARA violations pertaining to
Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Skadden), and their work on behalf
of the government of Ukraine.
After consultation with the NSD,the evidence regarding Craig HOM was
referred to NSD, and NSD elected to partner with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York and the FBI’s New YorkField Office. NSD later elected to partner on the
Craig matter with the U.S. Attomey’s Office for the District of Columbia. NSD retained and
handledissuesrelating to Skaddenitself.
.
D-4
5
FamOmelire ditt Miieliccis
D-5
May-Conti
Work // Protected Materi l Fed R--Crint P_6e)
C. Completed Prosecutions
In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel’s Office, the defendants have completed
or are about to complete their terms of imprisonment. Because no further proceedingsarelikely
in any case, responsibility for them has not beentransferred to any other office or component.
1. United States v. George Papadopoulos
Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (December7, 2018)

2. United States v. Alex van der Zwaan
Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (June 4, 2018)
3. United States v. Richard Pinedo
Post-conviction, Currently in Residential Reentry Center (release date May 13, 2019)
D-6

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U.S.

Report On The Investigation Into

Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, II

TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUMEI

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME F cssssssesseseneveesvescssnsinsstevncsnesaenkensenesvesi on ccvvexvenansonienianianensesearteventsrersives t

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c. The GRU’s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks.........ccssssseeseseeneees 45

d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has “Dirt” in the Form of

i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work

B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations ...........:cssesessesesneeereeeeeseeeeneseneneneneeetneee 175

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The Russian governmentinterfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and

Below wedescribe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the

In evaluating whether evidence aboutcollective action of multiple individuals constituted

The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I

RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

In mid-2014, the IRA sent employees to the United States on an intelligence-gathering

RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS

WikiLeaks began releasing

RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN

The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the

Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government

OnJanuary 6, 2017, membersoftheintelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump

President Trumpreacted negatively to the Special Counsel’s appointment. He told advisors

THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S CHARGING DECISIONS

Section V of the report providesdetailed explanationsof the Office’s charging decisions,

I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION

(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).

II. RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter

A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency

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B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin

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C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections