Joyce Lui, HKU

The Terror of Stalin: A Psychoanalytic Explanation

A. Introduction

In the study of Soviet history, the events that occurred during Stalin’s reign have often been
subject to heated debate. The points of discussion – for instance, the question of whether the
early 1930s Ukrainian famine constituted genocide – often focus on the issues of motive and
intention. These issues require us to focus on the mind of Stalin and the way in which he
perceived the world in order to construct a comprehensive understanding of historical events.
In this regard, psychoanalysis may serve as a useful historical tool for such purposes. This
approach has been applied by a number of historians in the past, such as Robert Tucker,
Daniel Rancour-Lafferiere, and Raymond Birt.1 Most notably, E.A. Rees’ examination of
Stalin’s psychological profile, with reference to the Great Terror of 1936-9, provided a
holistic analysis of Stalin’s psyche and concluded that Stalin was a psychopath with paranoid,
narcissistic, and Machiavellian characteristics. Based on Rees’ study, this essay intends to go
further by expanding upon the scope of examination beyond that of The Great Terror to
include Stalin’s early life, as well as his later promotion of the cult of personality. In doing
so, I argue that Stalin was motivated by power and the maintenance of control – two key
characteristics of psychopathy– and that this mental state formed the foundations for the later
development of hubris syndrome.

B. Methodology – The Utility of Psychoanalysis as a Historical Tool?

Although both disciplines involve the exercise of interpretation, psychoanalysis has often
been criticized as irrelevant to the study of history, due to its isolation of the subject of study
from the surrounding circumstances – that is, the relevant historical, cultural, and social
context in which the subject operated. This distinction is crucial, as Alain Besançon explained
that the application of psychoanalysis could supplement our understanding of history only if
completed in context.2

As such is the case, psychoanalysis could be used as an explanatory tool to provide a better
understanding of the rationale behind documented behaviour. As previously noted, the
question of whether Stalin had intended to cause death by starvation during the Ukrainian

1
E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, in James Harris, The Anatomy of Terror, Political Violence under
Stalin (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013), 49 – 65.
2
Alain Besançon, “Psychoanalysis: Auxiliary Science or Historical Method?”, Journal of Contemporary
History, Vol. 3 No. 2 (Sage Publications, 1968), 149 – 162

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famine remains a subject of heated debate.3 Some consider that it would be illogical for Stalin
to murder the Ukrainians, given the vulnerability of the region to invasion, as well as
economic considerations that render the production of grain as one of paramount importance.4
However, these are perspectives of rational, impartial outsiders. Stalin, on the other hand, was
motivated by a need to command power and maintain control.5 Accordingly, it is arguable
that the interests of the Soviet State-party were only important to the extent in which it
consolidated his power and promoted his public image of success as a leader. In light of
Rees’ psychological analysis, such seemingly illogical propositions may nonetheless be
rational explanations of Stalin’s behaviour.

C. Foundations of Psychopathy

Robert Tucker’s Stalin as Revolutionary presents a picture of Stalin as a psychopathic

personality – a conclusion that was similarly supported by Rees through his psychoanalysis
of Stalin in the context of the Great Terror.6 Psychopathy is an Anti-social Personality
Disorder that is shaped by both genetics and upbringing, the latter of which determines the
extent of such behaviour. Therefore, an examination of Stalin’s early life, with a focus on
Georgian culture instead of the limited scope of his family, will offer greater insight in the
process of constructing Stalin’s psychological profile.

Prior to his metamorphosis into Stalin, Iosif Dzhugashvili was born in the town of Gori,
Georgia.7 As a child, Dzhugashvili was often subject to “undeserved, terrible beatings [that]
made the boy as hard and heartless as his father himself”.8 This description by Ioseb
Iremashvili, a boyhood friend of Dzhugashvili, was central to Rancour-Laferriere and Gustav
Bychowski’s psychoanalysis of Stalin. Although Bychowski argued that such beatings had
the effect of causing Dzhugashvili’s “suppressed hatred against his father, [which] transferred
itself to persons in power and to all authority”,9 little is known about whether the beatings

3
J. Arch Getty, “New Sources and Old Narratives”, Contemporary European History: Roundtable on Soviet
Famines (Cambridge University Press, 2018)
4
Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “The Turn Away from Economic Explanations for Soviet Famines”, Contemporary
European History: Roundtable on Soviet Famines (Cambridge University Press, 2018)
5
E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, 57.
6
Robert Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929: A Study in History and personality (New York, 1973).
7
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Beyond Psychohistory: The Young Stalin in Georgia”, Slavic Review Vol. 50 No. 1
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), 48 – 58.
8
Joseph Iremaschwili, Stalin und die Tragodie Georgiens: Erinnerungen von seinem langjahrigen Freund
(Berlin: Verfasser, 1932), 12.
9
Gustav Bychowski, “Joseph V. Stalin: Paranoia and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” in The Psychoanalytic
Interpretation of History, ed., Benjamin B. Wolman (New York: Basic, 1971), 125.

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were consistent with traditional child-raising practices in Georgia.10 In fact, drunkenness and
violence were not unusual for Georgian men, where drinking bouts were part of traditional
male norms that was considered appropriate behaviour for ‘true men’.11 In the absence of
such evidence, less explanatory weight should be placed on these beatings, and instead on
more comprehensive studies relating to Georgian culture – an inextricable part of Stalin’s
identity, as well as a source of insecurity.

i) Georgian Upbringing – The Fear of Failure and Shame

In “Beyond Psychohistory: The Young Stalin in Georgia”, Ronald Grigor Suny explained
that Georgia has been characterised by ethnographers as an ‘honour and shame society’.12
Loss of honour – the value of a person, both in his own eyes and in those of society – is a sin
and form of social death.13 To a Georgian man, failure to fulfil the strict masculine ideals of
loyalty, self-control (including the ability to handle alcohol), and ability to display
magnanimity meant shame.14 Against this cultural context, the influence of Dzhugashvili’s
family is relevant to the extent that his father embodied such shame – he was abusive towards
his wife, an alcoholic, and poor. Stalin’s consequent contempt towards his father was
evidenced by his scornful remembrance of him through a disparaging reference in his 1906–
1907 essay “Anarchism or Socialism?”15, and perhaps his attempts to shed his ties with the
Dzhugashvili name through the adoption of different aliases such as Koba and later, Stalin. It
is the combination of such contempt towards his father, along with the centrality of ‘honour
and shame’ to his cultural values that fueled the desire to dominate and maintain control – he
cannot fail and become the man he despised.

ii) Maintenance of Control – Manipulation and the Cult of Personality

To preserve his honour, Stalin rose to power through manipulation and betrayal of party
members, and later consolidated his power through the promotion of his cult of personality.

10
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Beyond Psychohistory: The Young Stalin in Georgia”, 52.
11
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Beyond Psychohistory: The Young Stalin in Georgia”, 52.
12
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Beyond Psychohistory: The Young Stalin in Georgia”, 53.
13
Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Shame,” in Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 21.
14
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Beyond Psychohistory: The Young Stalin in Georgia”, 53.
15
I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia 1: 314 – 315.

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These actions are indicative of manipulative and narcissistic behaviour, two key
characteristics of psychopathy.

Unlike Lenin, Stalin was driven by power, not ideology. This was demonstrated through
Stalin’s rise to power – a success that occurred as a result of circumstance and his
manipulation of people. Stalin’s betrayal of Kamenev and Zinoviev upon the successful
marginalization of Trotsky, his greatest threat at the time, in favour of the ‘rightist’ bloc
(Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky) illustrates his lack of empathy and remorse, as he viewed
people as disposable pawns. This is a characteristic that allowed for his ideological and social
flexibility. As Rees summarised, Stalin was “a chameleon-like figure who adapted to
circumstances [… and] always sought to maximize his advantages in all situations and to
minimize the risks to himself.”16 By 1928, Stalin had garnered enough support in the Central
Committee to stand atop the pyramid of Soviet power, having removed his strongest
adversaries through such manipulation and betrayal.

With regards to Stalin’s narcissistic traits, Rees noted that this was evident in his adopted
Russian name. Stalin, which translates to ‘man of steel’, is a moniker that reflected his
grandiose sense of self – an indestructible being, incapable of failure. However, greater
significance should be attached to the emergence of Stalin’s cult of personality after his 50th
birthday celebration in 1929.17 The adoration of Stalin among the Soviet masses was a factor
that contributed to his maintenance of power. The promotion of propaganda that portrayed
Stalin as an all-powerful, beloved leader supplemented his reputation and minimised doubt,
which allowed Stalin to successfully absolve himself of responsibility for policy failures. For
instance, Stalin blamed local officials for the debacle of collectivization in ‘Dizzy with
Success’18, whilst the failure of local officials to implement the policies of the party were to
blame for the failures in agriculture in 1933 that resulted in the famine.19 Stalin, like other
narcissistic psychopaths who possess an inflated sense of self-worth, was pathologically
unable to admit error. It is interesting to note, however, that Stalin’s passive encouragement
of his own virtual deification was inconsistent with Leninist tradition of denial of the
importance of self. As a man of the borderlands, Stalin was not guided by ideology, but

E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, 59.

16
17
Graeme Gill, "The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of Leadership in the Soviet
Union", British Journal of Political Science 10 (1980): 167.

18
Stalin, Works, 13 vols. (Moscow, 1952 – 1955), xiii, 200-5
19
Stalin, Works, xiii, 261 - 2

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instead driven by an innate desire to wield power and exercise control. The prioritization of
the maintenance of his pristine image, at the expense of cultural norms of the time, reflects
upon his innate psychopathy and narcissism, which drove his desire to wield power and
exercise control.

D. Hubris Syndrome – The Great Terror

Having established Stalin’s foundations of psychopathy, I now endeavour to provide an

alternative perspective to understanding Stalin’s mental state – that Stalin was likely to have
suffered from hubris syndrome. Hubris syndrome is a personality disorder characterized by
diagnostic features such as:20

 A narcissistic propensity to view the world as a place for self-glorification through the
exercise of power;
 A predisposition to take action primarily to enhance personal image;
 A disproportionate concern with image and presentation;
 A conflation of self with the nation or organization to the extent that the individual
regards his outlook and interests as identical;
 Excessive confidence in the individual’s own judgment and contempt for the advice
or criticism of others;
 Hubristic incompetence as a result of excessive self-confidence that led to disregard
for the nuts and bolts of policy.

The analysis of Stalin’s psychopathology in the previous section of this essay largely
corresponded to the aforementioned symptoms. However, the distinction between hubris
syndrome and psychopathy lies at the point in which hubris syndrome develops. Unlike
psychopathy, which manifests as a result of a combination of both genetics and upbringing,
hubris syndrome arises after the acquisition of power for a period of time.21 In light of this
distinction, Stalin’s actions after his assumption of power in 1928 may be more accurately
explained with reference to hubris syndrome. Accordingly, an assessment of Stalin’s psyche
in relation to the events of the Great Terror of 1936 with reference to hubris syndrome

20
David Owen & Johnathan Davidson, “Hubris syndrome: An acquired personality disorder? A study of US
presidents and UK Prime Ministers over the last 100 years” in Brain: A Journal of Neurology (Oxford
University Press, 2009) 132; 1396 – 1406
21
David Owen et al., “Hubris syndrome: An acquired personality disorder?”, 1397.

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instead of psychopathy (as was applied by Rees in “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”) may
provide new perspectives to our understanding of Stalin’s role and intentions.

i) Stalin’s Perception of Threat – Conflation of self to the State

The concentration of power in Stalin from 1929 onwards highlights the personal factor of the
Great Terror, which requires an analysis of Stalin’s motives and intentions. As Rees opined,
the ‘revolution from above’ saw a “dramatic recourse to repression to enforce collectivization
and ‘dekulakization’, which brutalized the regime, bred a paranoid preoccupation with
enemies, and fed a relentless search for scapegoats.”22 Indeed, official investigations into the
repressions of the Stalin era in the 1990s concluded that the charges to arrested individuals
during the Great Terror were fabricated, with the purges amounting to acts of judicial
murder.23 With the disasters of collectivization, ‘dekulakization’, and Stalin’s scapegoating of
local officials, resentment towards Stalin bred, with evidence of such opposition reflected in
the Riutin platform of 1932.24 When combined with the threat of foreign intervention (as
recognized by Stalin in his report ‘The Results of the First Five Year Plan’ on 7 January
1933), this created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity across the Soviet Union.25

Stalin’s perception of a threat towards the Soviet Union – and by extension, his position of
power – could be explained by his hubristic symptoms in light of the motives that manifested
as a result of his psychopathic behaviour and cultural values. In conflating the threat to state
with the threat to himself, the defeat of the Soviet Union would reflect unfavourably upon his
competence as a leader. Such failure would have amounted to public shame of enormous
proportion – not only would he have disappointed himself by losing power and control, he
would have also disappointed the people who satiated his need for affirmation and respect.
This rationale, when coupled with the psychopathic foundations of Stalin’s paranoia (as
diagnosed in 1927 by neuropathologist V. M. Bekhterev, who interestingly died a day after
the delivery of this diagnosis)26, it is arguable that the events of the Great Terror were hardly
surprising.

22
E. A. Rees, ‘Stalin as Leader, 1937 – 1953: From Dictator to Despot’, in E.A. Rees, The Nature of Stalin’s
Dictatorship (Basingstoke, 2004), 200 – 210.
23
E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, 50.
24
E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, 59.
25
Stalin, Works, xiii, 163, 164, 175, 185
26
Daniel Rancour-Laffereiere, The Mind of Stalin: A Psychoanalytic Study (Ann Arbor, 1988), 122.

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ii) Reaction to the Threat – The Show Trials

Stalin’s belief in a genuine threat to the state led to the culling of people who he identified as
‘objective enemies’ of the state, categories of people who posed potential threats to his
retention of power. Official figures in 1937 and 1938 showed that a total of 1,372,292 people
were arrested.27 Within the atmosphere of fear and insecurity, the undertaking of such public
trials and the execution of people were fraught with great risks. It is debatable whether the
Terror served the interests of the Soviet state-party, but given Stalin’s pathological
prioritization of his self-interests, the argument could be made that his reaction to the threat
was primarily motivated by the threat he felt towards his position of power s.

From the perspective that Stalin acted according to his rational self-interest instead of the
interests of the State, the rationale behind the purge of 1936–9 was two-fold: on one hand, it
was a hubristic demonstration of power that wielded terror as a weapon of control, whilst his
elimination of opposition and potential threats – reminiscent of the power struggle upon
Lenin’s death – ensured the maintenance of his power within the state-party. Thus, although
Stalin’s culling of skilled individuals from all institutions – party, state, economic, security,
and military – at a time of threat may initially be perceived as ludicrous28, an understanding
of his hubristic mentality provides an explanation that, to a certain extent, rationalizes such
action.

E. Conclusion

The atmosphere of repression and terror in the Soviet Union was initiated and directed by
Stalin, ending only upon his death in 1953. Terror as a weapon of power and the maintenance
of control through adoration were integral to his modus operandi, deeply rooted in his
psychology. The lethality of Stalin rested upon his unwavering thirst for power and control,
as explained through his psychological profile of psychopathy-induced hubris syndrome. It is
clear that the terror of the Stalin era was shaped to a considerable degree by the personal
factor, and it is this understanding that supports the application of psychoanalysis as a
historical tool. Much like history, psychoanalysis is an exercise of interpretation, with the
psychoanalyst and historian being their own instrument of understanding. A construction of
the subject matter’s psychological profile thus provides an alternative perspective to

27
E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, 63.
28
E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, 60.

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interpretation of historical events, which would be particularly useful in instances where the
availability of primary sources from the subject matter itself are limited. The new questions
raised as a result of such new perspectives would continue to shape the historiography of
Soviet history, or by extension, our study of history as a whole.

Word Count: 2487

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Reference List

Alain Besançon, “Psychoanalysis: Auxiliary Science or Historical Method?”, Journal of

Contemporary History, Vol. 3 No. 2 (Sage Publications, 1968), 149 – 162

Daniel Rancour-Laffereiere, The Mind of Stalin: A Psychoanalytic Study (Ann Arbor, 1988),
122.

David Owen & Johnathan Davidson, “Hubris syndrome: An acquired personality disorder? A
study of US presidents and UK Prime Ministers over the last 100 years” in Brain: A Journal
of Neurology (Oxford University Press, 2009) 132; 1396 – 1406

E. A. Rees, ‘Stalin as Leader, 1937 – 1953: From Dictator to Despot’, in E.A. Rees, The
Nature of Stalin’s Dictatorship (Basingstoke, 2004), 200 – 210.

E. A. Rees, “Stalin: Architect of the Terror”, in James Harris, The Anatomy of Terror,
Political Violence under Stalin (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013), 49 – 65.

Graeme Gill, "The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of Leadership in the
Soviet Union", in British Journal of Political Science 1(1980), 167.

Gustav Bychowski, “Joseph V. Stalin: Paranoia and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” in
The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History, ed., Benjamin B. Wolman (New York: Basic,
1971), 125.

I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia 1: 314 – 315.

J. Arch Getty, “New Sources and Old Narratives”, Contemporary European History:
Roundtable on Soviet Famines (Cambridge University Press, 2018)

Joseph Iremaschwili, Stalin und die Tragodie Georgiens: Erinnerungen von seinem
langjahrigen Freund (Berlin: Verfasser, 1932), 12.

Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Shame,” in Honour and Shame: The Values of
Mediterranean Society (University of Chicago Press, 1966), 21.

Robert Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929: A Study in History and personality

(New York, 1973).

Ronald Grigor Suny, “Beyond Psychohistory: The Young Stalin in Georgia”, Slavic Review
Vol. 50 No. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 48 – 58.

Stalin, Works, 13 vols. (Moscow, 1952 – 1955), xiii, 200-5

Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “The Turn Away from Economic Explanations for Soviet Famines”,
Contemporary European History: Roundtable on Soviet Famines (Cambridge University
Press, 2018)