Political – administrative relations in Romania

Abstract

Political- administrative relations represent one of the most important issues for
the students and practitioner of public administration. At stake is the democratic character
of a polity, the degree to which partisan or bureaucratic interests or values are influencing
the process of policy design and implementation. Each democratic country developed in
time patterns for the political-administrative relations, pattern consisting both of formal
and informal rules and that are specific for each country. With a long history of patronage
and lack of professionalism Romania failed to establish a clear and stable pattern and
what is more important failed to adapt a model consistent with those of democratic
country. The formal settings resemble rules and practices influenced by those of
European Union member states but implementation failed almost completely. Due to the
importance of the subject matter, immediate attention should be paid by the political and
administrative elite and by the academics in order to reach to a desirable and practical
solution.

Bureaucracy from historical perspective

According to one of the simplest and at the same time most known definition “when two
peoples are joining to role a stone that neither could have moved alone” we may speak
about “public administration” (Simon, Thompson, Smithburg, 2000, p.3). That is to say
that the primary role of any administrative system is to coordinate joint efforts of groups
of individuals in order to achieve collective objectives. Another conclusion would be that
public administration is a phenomenon that accompanied the human kind from its very
early stage of development. Administrative history is not a very developed field but we
still have evidences of developed and well structured bureaucracies in many ancient
countries. Indeed if we are looking at the numerous monumental constructions that were
done by our ancestors we may easily understand that a sophisticated bureaucracy was
needed to coordinate their fulfillment. The Great Chinese Wall, the pyramids of Egypt or
the amazing constructions found in Central and South America are few examples among
very many undertakings that are extraordinary even for our modern times.
In his attempt to offer a scientific explanation to the geneses of the human
civilizations, Arnold J. Toynbee explores several possible theories related to the causes
that determined certain ancient populations to abandon what presumably was a
comfortable even if primitive way of living and started to develop sophisticated forms of
social organization that obviously demanded greater efforts and burdens whilst others
preferred to keep the archaic forms of living. In other words, the question is what
determined primitive societies to undertake a shift “in the direction taken by mimesis and
imitation…or from a static condition to a dynamic one” (1946, vol.1, pp. 48-49). In
primitive societies mimesis is oriented towards the past, towards traditions whereas in
“societies in process of civilization mimesis is directed towards creative personalities
who command a following because they are pioneers” (idem, p.49). We must add that this
transition that took place with approximately 6000 years before represented one of the
most important milestones in the history of mankind, a radical progress from primitive
societies to superior forms of social life.
Throughout history there were several theories trying to explain the differences
between the rhythms of development of various populations, . “…some special quality in
the group of people that made the transition or in some special features in the
environment in which transition has taken place or in some interaction between the two”
(idem, p. 51). Both race and environment are rejected by Toynbee. Instead he described a
dramatic climate change created by the movement of the “rain belt” from the actual
tropical regions to north. This forced the populations that lived in those areas to react.
Toynbee is mentioning three different types of responses to the climate changes. Some
groups followed the “rain belt” and reach in the actual northern Africa, in Europe or in
southern Asia. Others migrated to south and are representing the current primitive tribes
living in equatorial zones. But the most important groups took the difficult “ordeal” and
moved to areas with harsh living condition and created evolved societies. The first of
these societies were situated on the sides of large rivers like Nile, Tigris, Euphrates or the
Yellow River. In order to create living conditions these populations developed
sophisticated water management systems that allowed them to transform areas covered
by marshes in comfortable places for living. What Toynbee did not said was that for those
complicated construction projects a well-organized administrative system was needed.
Among the examples of ancient administrative systems Farazmand is mentioning
the long tradition of the Iranian bureaucracy that can be traced back to 6000 B.C. when
the ancient city of Susa “began political life”. Later (approximately 3000 B.C.) it became
the capital of the “of one of the oldest empire of antiquities”. A federation of five
“powerful kingdoms”, the empire of Elam had three distinct administrative layers, and
while the component kingdoms were enjoying autonomy, clear rules and sophisticated
intergovernmental relations were in place in a setting that is very much reminding of a
modern administration. The system developed in Elam was inherited by the empires and
kingdoms that conquered the region during the centuries. The Persians, the Medes, the
Sasanides and the Otomans benefited by the achievements of this ancient administrative
system and in some of the cases even developed it in a very consistent manner. According
to Farazmand “Bureaucracy of the Persian Empire was a formidable institution of
administration and government, and it was both efficient and effective. The
organizational and administrative principles developed under the Persian Achaemenid
Empire had a significant influence on the Roman administration and were almost totally
adopted by the Islamic, the Ottoman and later by the Iranian Safavid rulers. Evidence of
the influence of these principles can be found in almost every contemporary government
in the Midle/Near East, as the Persian Achaemenid legacy affected the entire region.
Further professionalization of bureaucracy took place under the Achaemenid Empire with
various principles that seemed to have remained significant throughout the duration of the
Persian’s rule. These included: 1) recruitment based on merit and knowledge, 2) prior
experience, 3) long term apprenticeship training, 4) adherence to certain professional
rules set by the establishment, 5) constant eagerness and attempt to improve professional
performance and 6) acceptance by the professional association... ”. (Farazmand, 2001,
p.33-44).
Another important achievement of the Persian Empire was the development of
legislation that according to Farazmand had all the characteristics of a modern system of
laws: “...Darius Universal Ordinance of Law and codes were significant measures that
were applied equally throughout the empire. The Universal Law of Darius recognized no
status of favoritism and was enforced by Persian administrators and Persian judges who,
according to Herodotus and other sources, never failed to serve universal justice. And as
stated in the Bible: “The laws of Medes and Persians never changes. Darius borrowed
from the Babylonian law of Hamurabi, but his universal law was distinctive in several
ways: Unlike the previous laws, Darius law’s were both comprehensive and universal;
they covered almost every aspect of political, social, economic, legal, military and
administrative systems and, and the laws applied universally throughout the entire empire
”. (idem., p.53). One may be reluctant at the performances of some regimes that collapsed
or were conquered by other nations, as it was the case with the Persian Empire.
Moreover, among the causes that led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire many authors
are citing the poor condition of its administration. Another observation is that Farazmand
is paying little attention, if any, to the role of religion in the social life of a state (the
Persian Empire) were the emperor was viewed as a character very close to a god.
Nevertheless it is obvious that a well developed administrative system existed in the
ancient Elam, Median and Persian Empire (Yoffee, 2004, pp102-109). We insisted on the
case of the former because it very closely resembles the process of the “routinization of
charisma” described by Weber as a process that was crucial to the development of the
modern states. Cyrus the Great, a character of a modest origin, managed to get in power
and transformed the small Persian state in a great empire, but it was his son, Darius, who
employed in the newly created empire complex systems of legislation and administration
(Bell, in Strauss, Leo, 1987, pp., 94-96).

The bureaucratic character is less present in the ancient Greek or Roman city-
states. Recruitment for official position was more often a process that was carried out
either by election or as it was the case in some period in Athens by random selection.
Professionalism was to some degree a condition but the requirements were elusive and
unstable. Economic and legal training, compulsory for any other types of bureaucracy
were absent in the ancient city-states. But the most important characteristic that
differentiate these administrative systems from the bureaucratic ones including the ideal
model developed by Weber is the absence of a rational, impersonal and stable system of
laws. Legislation was thought to be of divine origin and its main objective was to ensure
the allegiance of the citizens toward some superior values that were praising either the
Gods or the city itself. Both in theory and in practical life individuals were considered
completely subordinate to state. Aristotle is very clear on this: “any individual outside the
state is either god of beast” (Politics, p.12). The idea of ensuring equality among citizens
was only marginal in the legislation of the ancient city-states (Argyriades, pp.62-67).
In the case of the Roman state, the rapid expansion of its territory created a pressure
toward the development of an adequate administrative system. The process was more
consistent after Cezar established the Empire. Emperors felt the need to concentrate
power in their hands and for this purpose several attempts to organize a hierarchical
administration and a stable legislation were undertaken in various moments of the Roman
history. But this type of organization was valid more in theory than in practice. Many
times the sovereigns were those who ignored the administrative hierarchy and preferred
to work directly with officials placed in lower layers of the system. In the mean time,
despite the legislation that was in place, the will of the emperor was considered to be of
superior nature.
The Empire of Byzantium represented a superior stage from the point of view of
bureaucratic organization. Many of the characteristics that we found in the case of the
Western Roman Empire were maintained. But a stronger emphasis was placed on the
professionalization of the officials and the structures benefited by a higher degree of
stability. According to Argyriades the Byzantine bureaucracy played an important role in
keeping the stability, the unity and continuity of the country (idem., pp.67-75).
Forms of bureaucracy, sometimes with a high degree of development are to be find very
often in the history of Chinese Empire. Even in periods that are labeled “feudal” by some
authors (Eberhard) the local nobilities employed persons of humble origin that carried out
tasks of bureaucratic nature. At the side of the emperor there were officials that were
actually holding the real power. They were usually selected among intellectuals like the
groups of “legalist” during the Han dynasty, or “literates” in periods closer to our times.
But these type of Chinese bureaucracy had a peculiar characteristic that was remarked by
many authors (Eberhard, Hall&Ikkenberry). Instead of being a tool for administering and
controlling the entire territory of the empire, they were mostly dealing with the problems
of the imperial court. Kamenka regarded the Chinese post Han dynasty state as being
highly bureaucratized (1989, p.10), but Hall&Ikkenberry noted that the Chinese
bureaucracy prevented in reality the emperors of having a strong control over the entire
territory of their empire (1998, p.57).
Although, as presented above, developed administrative systems existed in
various parts of the world and in different historical periods, the modern administrative
systems are a creation of Western Europe. Evolving from a state of chaos and violence
the monarchs assumed the task of ensuring the public order. They had three means that
were developed over time: a legislative system based on equity, impersonality and
universality, an administrative system based on trained officials to implement the
legislation and a permanent army to support the state institutions. Thus, approximately at
the end of the XVIII century most of the Western European countries had developed
complex and efficient legislative and administrative systems also labeled as public
bureaucracies. The term appears to have a French origin. Heady (2001, p.71-75) is
exploring the different meanings and definition of the concept. First, bureaucracy is seen
“in terms of an organization’s basic structural characteristics”. Robert Hall quoted by
Heady (p.72) identified six characteristics of bureaucratic organizations: “1. a well-
defined hierarchy of authority; 2. a division of labor based on functional specialization; 3.
a system of rules covering the rights and duties of positional incumbents; 4. a system of
procedures for dealing with work situation; 5. impersonality of interpersonal relationship;
6. selection for employment and promotion based on technical competence”.
The second approach is linked to certain patterns of behavior. Critics of the ideal
bureaucratic model designed by Weber are referring to the absence of any consideration
for human behavior, values and skills is a major weakness of the weberian theory. In a
famous book, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1963), the French sociologist Michel
Crozier is analyzing how characteristics of bureaucracy may affect entire societies. Thus
he tries in his study to analyze “the malady of bureaucracy…the maladaptation, the
inadequacies, or to use Merton’s expression ‘the dysfunction’s that necessarily develop in
human organization” (Heady, p.73). Among this dysfunctions Crozier is including lack of
efficiency and weakness, having a chapter named “The paradox of the weakness of an
omnipotent central power” in which he is describing the way in which over
bureaucratization may result in the lack of ability of a public authority to manage a
human community (pp.224-227).
Bureaucracy is not always considered to produce negative behavior patterns.
Authors like Friedrich are mentioning characteristics as objectivity, precision,
consistency and discretion (Heady, p.72). Peter Blau cited by Heady is referring to
bureaucracy “in terms of achievement of purpose, as an ‘organization that maximize
efficiency in administration or an institutionalized method of organized social conduct in
the interests of administrative efficiency” (p.73).
As mentioned above, bureaucracy has an evolution throughout the medieval and
post-medieval era being used by monarchs as a mean to administer their country and to
create an unique public authority. The process was more or less completed at the end of
the XVIII century (Guizot, Davis). According to the principal-agent theory that will be
described later, the principal or the leader was unquestionable the monarch, at least in
theory, and the bureaucrats were agents, that is to say subordinates. In practice, many
times skillful ministers in service of various kings manage to control the relation with
their supposed superiors. But during the XIX century important developments occurred in
the principal-agent relation that was described above: the political power was gradually
transferred from the monarchs to parliaments as representatives of the people. But the
majorities in these parliaments is changing according to the results of the elections. This
evolution led to the appearance and development of an issue that is more and more
important in the study and practice of public administration: the politico-administrative
relations.

The relations between bureaucrats and politicians. Theoretical aspects.

From the classical point of view politicians and bureaucrats represents two totally
distinct categories and are having separate roles in the functioning of the state. In the
constitutions of the vast majority of the country’s career administrators are just a part of
the executive branch of the government. Max Weber, the celebrated author of the “ideal
bureaucratic model” is pointing out the necessity of political leadership over the
bureaucratic organizations which should give the directions for their functioning: “Thus
at the top of a bureaucratic organization, there is necessarily an element which is at least
not purely bureaucratic” (Weber, 1947, p.335). Weber is referring to all types of
organizations: economic, political parties or armies, but we are using his point of view
related to public organizations. Also, an entire set of American authors at the end of
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century (Woodrow Wilson, Luther
Gulick or Frank Goodnow) supported the same opinion regarding the necessity of a
complete separation of the political and administrative spheres. In this sense Wilson
noted: “Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions
are not political questions....The field of administration is a field of business. It is
removed from the hurry and strife of politics...It is part of political life only as methods of
the counting-house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the
manufactured product” (quoted in Aberbach, Putnam, Rockman, 1981, p.4). According to
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, this paradigm of total dichotomy between politics and
administration correspond to what they are labeling “Image I: Policy/Administration...
The earliest theory about the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was in
many ways the simplest: politicians make policies, civil servants administer”. (p.4). In
other words the authors are referring to this dichotomy by using the concept of
“separation of labor” between the two categories of actors: the political field is
responsible with policy formulation and the administrative one with policy
implementation.
The paradigm of political – administrative dichotomy raise in principal two
questions: a. is it possible? and, b. Is it desirable?
To the first question the answer, according to the most scholars is “no”. A sharp
separation between politics and public administration seems impossible for the majority
of the students in public administration. Even Weber was concerned about the potential
power that may be accumulated by bureaucratic ranks: „The power position of a fully
developed bureaucracy is always great, under normal conditions over towering. The
political „master” always find himself, vis-a-vis the trained official, in the position of a
dilettante facing the expert. This holds whether the „master”, whom the bureaucracy
serves, is the „people” equipped with the weapons of legislative initiative, referendum,
and the right to remove the officials; or a parliament elected on a more aristocratic or
more democratic basis and equipped with the right or de facto power to vote a lack of
confidence; or an aristocratic collegiate body, legally or actually based on self-
recruitment; or a popularly elected president or an „absolute” or „constitutional”
hereditary monarch” (Weber, 1978, pp.991-992).
This passage from Weber’s writings on bureaucracy may suggest that the division
of labor that is in accordance with “Image I” was not to be met very often from historical
point of view, irrespective of the type of the political regime. A suggested conclusion
would be that the bureaucracy was indeed a powerful and indispensable tool for creating
modern states, but this modernization was not always a result of the will of the “political
master”, but many times the steps toward modernization were influenced by some
professional guidance coming from the servants of the monarchs.
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman are presenting a historical evolution of the four
images both from practical and theoretical point of view of the above mentioned
“division of labor”. According to the first image, that I already presented politicians and
bureaucrats are having totally separates roles: the formers are taking decisions and the
latter are putting them in practice.
Image II assumes that both sides participate in policy making but have different
approaches. While bureaucrats are driven by “facts and knowledge”, politicians put
forward “interests and values”. That is to say, a political leader will favor a decision
according to a specific ideology or partisan interest, but career official will try to
influence the turnover using his/her neutral competence (pp.6-9). If this distinctiveness is
obvious for anyone some comments, however, have to be made. Throughout history were
not few cases when bureaucracy embedded strong ideological values, sometimes of
religious nature. England was driven to Protestantism not so much by Henric the VIII,
who had far more modest goals, but by his zealous ministers, especially Thomas
Cromwell. Closer to our times, Eduard C. Page is citing the case of German socialist
minister of finance, Rudolph Hilferding, appointed in 1923, who was virtually excluded
from any important decisions by his bureaucrat subordinates long accustomed with
conservative type of policies (Page, p.1). The Swedish right wing party that won the
election in Sweden in 1976, after more than 40 years of socialist government, realized
that most of the leadership positions from the Swedish administrative system were
controlled by the Social Democrat Party (Pierre, 2004). That is to say, bureaucrats are not
always immune to ideology, especially when they have some kind of political affiliation.
On the other hand, in countries like Germany or France legislation allows senior
civil servants to be appointed in political position, and obviously they will promote at
least some bureaucratic values in their new positions.
Image III is presenting us both politicians and bureaucrats engaged in policy making and
having strong interests in it. Here the styles and attitudes differ. Career officials are more
conservatives, more attached to policies and procedures in place, in other words reluctant
to change, to reforms or any other improvements. Politicians on the other hand, especially
in pursuit of their electoral or political programs or some ideologically based objectives
are more interested in reforms or in new policies. This view of the authors is supported
with the opinions of several famous scholars like Richard Rose or Mattei Dogan. But this
type of approach changed significantly after the waves of reforms that were undertaken in
‘80’s and ‘90’s. The classical image of the bureaucrat opposing to any king of change,
fighting in trenches to preserve the old policies and procedures suffered serious
amendments. As Pollitt and Bouckaert noticed: “Alongside executive politicians, senior
civil servants have in almost every case themselves been crucial actors in the reform
programs. Indeed, in some countries they have been the prime moving force. This may
seem strange – there is a stereotype abroad many countries which depicts senior civil
servants – “mandarins” – as instinctively conservative and oppose to change. However,
the record shows that this is not the case. In countries as diverse as New Zeeland, Finland
and France, “mandarins” have been active in generating reform ideas and pushing for
their implementation” (Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2000, p.19). This attitude of the senior
bureaucrats may have a number of explanations. One may be the simple pursuit of power.
Most of the persons that are reaching at the top of a hierarchy are ambitious and
willing to demonstrate their talents. This cannot be done from the position of simple
executant or even more of opponent to any progress. Competition between the leaders of
bureaucracy is another aspect that may stimulate them to accomplish more important
objectives that to simple run the current affairs of their office. Dunleavy, cited by Pollitt
and Bouckaert, elaborated the model of “bureau-shaping”, “in which senior officials
actually gain from reorganizing their subordinates, both by distancing themselves from
certain kinds of operational problems (through decentralization) and by casting
themselves more and more in a high-status and intellectually more interesting role of
institutional design and regulation” (p.19). Other authors pointed that: “Most Western
European governments engaged in civil service reform in recent decades. Many reforms
were politically and budgetary motivated, but there are some cases where civil
themselves played a major role in introducing reform” (van den Meer, Steen, Wille, 2007,
pp.46-47).
On the other hand, politicians may be often against reforms. Cutting public
expenditure may result in loses of votes. Ideological issue may be at stake in case of
important changes in the functioning of public institutions. For instance some may be
against cutting of welfare funds because of strong left wing beliefs.
Image IV: This image is a further evolution in the increasing melting of the roles of
politicians and high ranking civil servants. According to the authors this interaction
between political and administrative field is more important both from quantitative and
qualitative point of view. That is to say more and more politicians or persons with party
affiliation are joining the ranks of the bureaucracy and an increasing number of
bureaucrats are choosing political careers. On the other hand politicians are more
involved in activities formerly belonging to bureaucracy, such as coordinating or even
managing public institutions while career civil servants are having an increasing role in
policy formulation. Thus former prime minister of UK Harold Wilson employed a limited
number of political appointees in the British central government but with a significant
power. On the other hand, a French career civil servant, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, after a
distinguished career in civil service, entered in politics and made it until the position of
President of France. Also, the number of political employees that President of US may
appoint rose with every new mandate at the White House (pp.16-23).
Politico-administrative relations are in general approached from two different
perspectives. On the one hand, many scholars and practitioners are referring at the danger
of excessive political involvement in the functioning of public institutions either by
imposing partisan decisions or policies or by employing political appointees. Thus the
values and principles of public administration are affected. On the other hand the
illegitimate activities of bureaucracy, like manipulating information or delaying the
implementation of policies, that may prevent politician to achieve their goals established
in the electoral programs voted by the citizens. From this point of view in the last two
decades a new tendency was observed by specialists. New Public Management, it is sad,
it is also an attempt to subordinate civil servant to politicians. Rouban is even mentioning
an alliance between politicians and citizens against the “evil” civil service: “From the
first reform steps of the British civil service in the early 1980s to the privatization of
Italian civil service in 1993 or the reform stance of the French Raffarin’s in 2000s, NPM
style have been built upon a series of criticism against a civil service alternatively viewed
as ‘social-democrat’, ‘Welfare proactive’ or ‘conservative’. Civil service became the
“enemy’ from within” (Rouban, 2007, p.265). To manage these complex relation
countries had developed throughout the years pieces of legislation meant both to protect
the merit system and ensure the political control over bureaucracy. The patterns are
specific for every country and there may be significant differences between the formal
provisions of legislation and situation in practice.
Thus, Nordic countries tend to have a lower level of politicization. In Denmark,
although the legislation allows ministers to employ or dismiss civil servants evidences are
showing that political appointments are extremely rare. Even if politicians decide to
undertake changes the staff of the public institution the persons that are replacing other
career bureaucrats are usually recruited from the same department or from inside of the
Civil Service itself. Still, due to the legal provisions that allow ministers to sack the Civil
Servant in case they don’t match the professional expectation of the political leader in
terms of policy advice and implementation we may state that the political responsiveness
of Civil Service it is high in Denmark (Christensen, 2004, 15-36). We may add that the
specific character of the Danish political system may play a role in the nature of politico-
administrative relation in this country. The majority of governments, at least after WW II
were minority governments. As a result changes in public policies were not radical and
potentiality for conflict or divergences between politicians and career civil servants was
low.
In the case of Sweden we may also speak about a low level of politicization.
Detailed legal arrangements were enacted in order to prevent any political interference in
the recruitment and promotion of civil servants. In the central government the percentage
of political employees was never higher than 4%. Consequently most of the policy
decisions are significantly influenced by career bureaucrats. Still responsiveness to
political guidance is high, especially due to the long tradition of state of law that is a
feature of Swedish public administration. The characteristic of the political life of the
country are influencing as well the nature of politico-administrative relations. Sweden
had long term governments with dominance of the social democrat party. As a result
common values and interests were developed in time between politicians and bureaucrats.
Problems occurred when governments changed. In 1932 the Social Democrat party find
difficult to work with a civil service accustomed to cooperate with a conservative
government. In 1976 the Liberal-Conservative coalition coming in power after 40 years
of socialist government faces the similar problem. So, we may speak about a peculiar
form of politicization generated by long periods of cooperation between certain political
parties and the top bureaucrats (Pierre, 2004, 41-52).
The German Federal Administration is distinct to the ones we just discussed. First,
the federal nature of the state has as a result a second chamber of the Parliament, the
Bundesrat. This second chamber may differ from the lower chamber from the point of
view of political composition. The Parliament as a hole is a very active one being labeled
by Aberbach as “the strongest Parliament of Europe”. A strong Parliamentary Committees
system supported by an experienced and numerous technical staff is providing a large
number of policy initiatives, sometimes challenging the Federal Government policies.
The tradition of corporatism and neo-corporatism, although not so strong in the last
decades create the need for senior bureaucrats to involve in negotiation with different
interest groups. Also, the tradition of governmental coalitions obliges the top civil
servants to negotiate with ministers from different parties with different interests. So, the
German senior civil servants are acting in a complex environment, Schroter stating that
they are “exposed to political heat and need to place greater emphasis on political skills
as opposed to technical expertise”(2004, 61). That is to say that politicization in German
federal administration is more a result of the need involve in activities of political nature
like negotiation or building coalition to support public policies. Top bureaucrats are
allowed to leave temporary the civil service and engage in political activities, namely in
offering technical expertise for the parliamentary party groups. On the other hand,
politicians have the possibility to appoint a number of 136 so called “political civil
servants”. However none of the incoming governments dismissed the entire available
number (24 state secretaries and 112 department heads) but the tendency is to increase
the number of those who are replaced. Schroder government dismissed 57%, far higher
than in any case of governmental change (Schroter, 2004, 55-81).
France witnessed dramatic changes in the relations between politicians and bureaucrats.
Charles de Gaulle was responsible for two important measures with tremendous effects
on medium term. In 1945 created ENA (The National School for Public Administration)
entrusted with the training of the future senior civil servants. Ironically, although it was
created to make the access for lower social categories in the top position of the French
administration it ended up by generating a real administrative cast that managed to have a
major influence in social and political life of France. In 1958 a new constitution was
created with the specific aim to “reject partisan politics and to give pre-eminence to the
executive over the parliament” (Rouban, 2004, 83). Politicians and bureaucrats should
closely interact in the process of policy formulation. But very soon the relation became
dominated by the civil service that is huge in France (more than 5 million that represent
22% of the population (Rouban). The government ended up to be dominated by senior
civil servants, especially members of the grand corps. Notably, “every President of the
Republic, with the exception of Francois Mitterand, every Prime Minister and almost
every Minister was recruited from their ranks” (Rouban, 84). The model of politico-
administrative relations was organized on three important assumptions:
1. “Real political appointment , i.e. appointment explicitly referring to party
members are very few….
2. Members of the grand corps are acting as brokers between political and
administrative power centers…
3. Appointments to higher administrative positions (especially department heads) are
made within the inner world of senior civil service” (Rouban, 84-85).
In other words it was a relation totally dominated by bureaucrats that controlled the
recruitment process for almost all the important positions in public administration and
dominated the policy formulation according to their specific interests and values.
The situation changed starting with 1974, with the presidency of Valery Giscard
d’Estaing. He demanded more support for policies resulted from his electoral program.
But the real change came in 1981 with the election of Francois Mitterand. Head of a left
wing coalition that included the Communist Party, coalition that in their first years in
government rejected even the idea of market economy and they rejected the way the Fifth
Republic functioned at that moment. One of their first actions was to dismiss a high
number of heads of ministerial departments and also a large number of prefects
employing instead persons that were closer to coalition from ideological point of view. In
1986 the right wing government led by Jacques Chirac tried to do the same, but the
number of replacements was smaller as Prime Minister Chirac had to negotiate with
President. In other words between 1981 and 1988 the pattern of politico-administrative
model in France changed dramatically. Radical political changes reflected in an
aggressive politicization of the civil service. After 1988 the relations became more
balanced. (Rouban, 2004, 81-101). To my opinion bureaucrats are still in a dominant
position. Many politicians are recruited from their ranks. Civil servants are huge in
number and are capable to influence or even to block political project. One good example
is that of Prime Minister Jospin who tried to promote major fiscal reforms in the year
2000. A strong reaction of the entire French bureaucracy forced him to abandon the
project. Also may be mentioned the total failure of the ambitious reform program
presented by President Sarkozi. Another important advantage for the French bureaucracy
is the extremely complex legislation. Few politicians can ever dream to work with it in a
reasonable manner.
The case of United States is different to a large extent to European countries. The
American political and administrative systems are characterized by a high level of
dispersion of power. Both horizontally, through the “checks and balance mechanism” and
vertically, through federalization and local autonomy. A result of the horizontal division
of power is that “American civil service has two masters: the Congress as well as the
President” (Peters, 2004, p.127). If the latter is an obvious head of the American
administration, the former has powerful committees that oversee the activity of executive
branch. Bureaucracy may find in these committees and in other groups in Congress
support against the potential politicization.
The American parties system is also fragmented and less organized and
disciplined than the European ones. As a result of the primary election system politicians
have stronger ties with voters than with the party hierarchy. Also the interest groups are
numerous and developed sophisticated lobby techniques. These characteristics of
American society are placing the top bureaucrats in a situation similar to some extent to
the one of their German counterparts. Dealing with a large number of political and social
actors they have to develop political skills. Moreover, Long in a celebrated essay is
developing the concept of administrative power: “The lifeblood of administration is
power. Its attainment, maintenance, increase, dissipation and loss are subject the
practitioner and the student can ill afford to neglect” (Long, 2000, p.103). The author is
describing the struggle of administrative institution for power, for support. The power in
not coming only from the provisions of the Constitution or from other documents or court
decisions but also from complicated social, political and administrative networks.
Another distinctiveness of American administrative system is its official politicization.
Unlike in European countries were methods are rather subtle and informal in the of US
there are legal provisions and long established customs that allow a certain number of
political appointments in federal administration. The President may appoint now over
4000 top bureaucrats and that means almost all managing positions in federal
administration. Peters emphasize that political criteria is not the only one that is involved
in the selection of presidential staff but also expertise, connection with interest groups or
think tanks or with the business environment (p.129).
Another mean for politicization is the creation of Senior Executive Service by
Civil Service Reform act (1978). “…in exchange for the opportunities for bonuses and
for additional responsibilities, the Act removed some civil service protection. In addition,
the President became able to appoint 10% of the general SES. Most of the individuals
appointed in these positions were already members of the civil service, but they had to be
willing to accept a political appointment and were to be chosen for political reliability. In
addition, President and cabinet officers were given more capacity to move senior civil
servants around within government and could use in the process appointments to gain
control of program or to punish and reward individual members of SES” (Peters, p.131).
Evidences are showing that politicization is an ongoing process. There is a tendency to
create additional positions subject to political appointment or to transform existing career
positions in political ones.
But as Peters is arguing, from a certain point of view the openness in the
politicization process in US help to protect the merit system in other areas especially at
lower echelons: “The result of the development of administrative system in United States
is an almost paradoxical mixture of overt political selection and control and extreme
commitment to merit and depoliticization. On the one hand, almost all top positions in
government- at present over 4000 positions -. are held by political appointees. On the
other hand, the remaining public employees are selected by a rigorously enforced merit
system and are subject numerous restrictions on their political involvement and activities,
most notably the Hatch Act…”(p.126).
The politico-administrative relations models presented above tried to offer a view
about the main types that were in place in certain countries and certain historical period.
The literature in the field (Peters, Heady, Svara) identified a number of theoretical
models. Of course none of them can be found in practice in pure state. I believe that three
basic models may cover the possible concrete situations: 1. A model in which
bureaucracy have the prevalence in policy formulation and to a large extent are
controlling the recruitment process; 2. A model that is mainly characterized by
cooperation, common values, and common interests; 3. And a model in which the relation
is dominated by politician both in terms of policy formulation and recruitment.
As we could see above France shifted in short time from a situation of almost complete
bureaucratic domination to one with a very strong political control. United States have to
different approaches functioning in parallel: political type of recruitment in the case of
high ranking civil servants and a strict observance of the merit system for the lower
layers. Sweden is probably the best example for the cooperation between politicians and
bureaucrats.
A forth model may be mentioned: the adversial one characterized by
confrontation or even conflicts. This model occurs especially in period of political
changes. The German bureaucracy confronted the socialist government in 1923. Probably
we may consider this model as a transitional one at the end every conflict has to have a
resolution.
Politico-administrative relations are not always took place in a formalized setting,
many times are informal negotiations or are mediated by a third part. As we may observe
above in the same legislative framework two totally different approaches may happened.
Politicians have in this type of relation two divergent interests. On the one hand,
they are forced to delegate competences and authority through the bureaucratic rank due
to the complexity of the modern societies and administrative systems. On the other hand,
they have to hold bureaucratic institutions accountable and to ensure responsiveness.
Career civil servant will want to be more involved in policy formulation and to enjoy
stability.

The principal – agent model

The principal – agent model was developed primarily in economics and in

business administration as more and large companies needed to develop mechanisms to
delegate competences but also means of control over those received the competences.
Recently the concept started to be implemented in the study of comparative politics and
comparative public administration. As Jan Eric Lane stated: “Polities are social systems
that certain actors operate for specific purposes. Political systems are supported by
certain groups of people and sometimes opposed by other groups. Polities give rise for
benefits and costs for the human beings involved which can be best stated as principal –
agent model. The political community in this model would have two kinds of interests:
(1) Peace and security; (2) Control over agents and decent remuneration of them” (Lane,
2008, p.2).
In political science the principal – agent model describes a chain of command and
control composed by successive principals and agents. The first principal is the people
who elect a kind of deliberative and representative body: a parliament, a council or a
board that represent the agent. The people will establish certain task for the parliament by
voting an electoral program or a Constitution or by referendum.
The parliament will appoint an executive structure, namely a government. In this
relation, the parliament will become principal and the government the agent. We should
mention that in practice very often the government exerts a certain level of control over
the parliament due to the party structure. Is the case of many European countries, notably
Great Britain were because it is the leader of the party that has the majority in the
Chamber of Commons is in a superior position in relation with the parliament.
Parliaments may have also other categories of agents like regulatory agencies or auditing
authorities.
Further the government will delegate some competencies to certain kind of
agents: bureaucratic institutions, state authorities in the case of federations or local or
regional authorities that may receive grants and in return should implement certain
policies. Schools and hospitals also may be labeled as agents once they are financed from
the public budget or are carrying out governmental policies. Other types of agents may
NGO’s carrying out welfare policies with subsidies from the government. Or private
companies maintaining road infrastructure or managing public companies.
Lane is presenting a particular principal – agent model. The principal is a community that
is employing a number of agents as guardians to protect their lives and ensure the welfare
of the inhabitants. The relation between principal and agent may have, according to Lane,
four different outcomes:
1. Subjugation and oppression – the agents conquer a certain community and treat
all its values as belonging to them or they install themselves as master of the
community and treat the population as slaves or serfs;
2. Mixed citizenship – part of the population receive better treatment than the other
part (apartheid);
3. Full citizenship – “the entire population is recognized as citizens with certain
rights”;
4. Rule of law – “the agents are bound by law to respect institutions that guarantee
against abuses arbitrariness and secure a large number of rights for the citizens”.
(pp. 2-3).
What is our principal concern is the relation between the government (principal) and
public administration (agent) because is primarily affect our lives. Bureaucracy may
interfere with other actors that may be considered principals in case of parliamentary
monitoring committees or petitions coming from the citizens. But the vast majority of
principal – agent type of relation are happening between politicians in government and
bureaucrats. Politicians are transferring more and more administrative tasks but also the
authority needed to perform them. If initially career administrator had roles mostly in
policy implementation in the last decades increasingly are involved in policy formulation.
The institutional arrangements are very diverse: as permanent secretaries of ministries
or other types of public institution, as heads of departments in ministries, as managers of
government agencies or quangos or having a special assignment like formulation of a
certain policy or conducting program evaluation or policy analysis.
The essential problem in the principal – agent is how the former can obtain bureaucratic
responsiveness and ensures the accountability of the latter. One of possible negative
consequences of the delegation of authority from principal to agent is fewer and weaker
means of control. Meyer and O’Toole are stating that agents, organizations or individuals
often decide to cheat instead of comply with the demands of the principal: “The decision
to cheat rather than comply with the spirit of principal’s demand is not different from any
other decision. An organization cheats because the perceived utility of cheating is greater
than the perceived utility of not cheating”. (Meier, O’Toole, 2006, p.100. The authors
identified six factors that either creates incentives to cheat or lower the cost of cheating
within the organization:
- Performance gap – according to Downs is a disjuncture between an organizational
expected and actual performance; whether an organization is determined to cheat
by the existence of a performance gap depend on the benefits and costs of
cheating per se as compared with other options; a solution for the principal to
avoid cheating in these situations is to establish an appropriate balance between
reward and punishment;
- Prior efforts to bias the score – an organization or an individual may employ some
efforts the will be considered less costly in order to create the impression of
performance; the authors are presenting the case of some schools in Texas were
teachers preferred to train the students the test for exam rather than the usual
curricula; removing the opportunity to cheat, in this case changing the content of
the test often enough may prevent cheating;
- Resource – organizations benefiting of sufficient resources will less willing to
cheat; in case of lack of resources sound management will try either to
supplement them or to adjust the objectives at the level of resources;
- Task demands - organization that have multiple types of clients tend to have more
difficulties in performing their tasks because additional burdens will place by the
variety of demands; the solution would be to organize more homogenous groups
of clients;
- Costs of coordination – may depend on the size of organization and the type of
activities; adapting the size of organization to the type of activity is one possible
solution;
- Organizational norms – some organizational norms may lower the organizational
costs for cheating; the author are presenting the case of students that have some
problems like students for special education LEP (Low Profile English) in similar
groups that eventually will be exempted from exam; assessing and adapting
professional norms would be an appropriate solution;
Mechanisms of control are also considered important. Lane proposes three different
means:
1. Monitoring or surveillance. It is costly and involves the risk of collusion between
the monitors and the agents;
2. Risk-sharing contracts: The principal invites agent to become a partner in sharing
the final output, which is sometimes feasible;
 3. Retaliation: the principal gets rid of the agent and may even try to spoil his/her
reputation, if agent failure depends in his/her negligence.

Political-administrative relations in Romania

Romanian bureaucracy
In what follows we will try to analyze the in which politicians and bureaucrats
interact and possible patterns of the decision-making process from the perspective of
political-administrative relations. The issue is not an easy one due to the fact that very
few data are available. The concept of civil service and an institution to oversee this
category of public employees is relatively new in Romania as we will see below.
One first observation: Romanian bureaucracy is very weak if it ever existed from
the perspective of unity, clearly established hierarchies, professionalism and common
values. At the unification of the country in 1918, Romania inherited three different types
of administrative traditions. Transylvania was between 1699 and 1918 part of Austrian
Empire and benefited of a very effective weberian type of administration. Basarabia was
until 1918 part of the Russian Empire with the administration imposed by the imperial
authorities. The rest of the country known as the Old Kingdom started to build a national
bureaucracy only in the second part of the XIX century. The Old Kingdom was divided in
two separate countries that were under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. In 1859
the two countries unified and received a high level of autonomy. Strong reminiscences
from the Ottoman administration remained, a tradition of bribery, patronage and lack of
professionalism. In 1877 Romania declared its independence and successfully joined the
Russian Empire in the war with the Ottoman Empire. Previously, in 1864 were issued the
first laws regulating the functioning of Romanian public administration, but these laws
paid little attention to the construction of a professional bureaucracy. Only in 1923 a law
concerning the statute of the civil servant was enacted. Considering the time when was
issued we may considered that it was a modern law but unfortunately it was implemented
only for 15 years due to the fact that in 1938 Romania entered in a long period of
dictatorships that lasted until 1989.
After 1990 the democratic institutions were progressively reestablished but it took
almost ten years until a new law concerning the civil service was issued (law 188/1999).
The law was drafted with the support of European Commission and has provision
establishing the merit system with recruitment based on competition and professionalism,
open, transparent and based on merit promotion. The law was amended several times,
improvements being made in 2003 and 2006. In 2009 an emergency ordinance virtually
eliminate the merit system and although the Constitutional Court declared it as being
against the Constitution the negative effects remained in place. In 2010 other
amendments reduced the protection of the civil servant leaving way for an increased
politicization.
The law issued in 1999 established The National Agency for Civil Servants,
NACS and created the conditions for the construction of a professional body of civil
servants. The process was slow but progresses were made until the year 2007. The
amendments made to the law 188 in 2003 raised the level of protection of the civil
servants making their dismissal for political reasons more difficult. As a result more and
more bureaucrats that were fired for political motives regain their position in courts.
Unfortunately data related to their number are not available. The amendments made in
2006 improved the career conditions for civil servants and clarified the status of senior
civil servants. The attempt was to create a professional and neutral body of senior civil
servants.
A major role in the progresses that were made in the construction of a professional
civil service was the process of accession in European Union. The European Commission
provided important funds for the training of civil servants especially for those who were
going to manage the future European structural funds or to work in or with European
institutions. Also a high number of European experts, many of the civil servants in their
countries came to Romania to share their expertise. It was an excellent opportunity for
the Romanian public administrator to get in contact with technical expertise from
developed administrative systems.
The National Institute for Administration that was created in 2001 was
strengthened with European funds. Thousands of civil servants were trained by NIA to
improve their technical skills. Among the programs performed by NIA, together with
Central Unit for Public Administration Reform and NACS, was the Young Professional
Scheme. Designed to promote young skilled professionals in the ranks of Romanian
public administration, the program offered intensive training in Western European
universities and at NIA. Also internships were organized both in European and Romanian
public institution.
The Central Unit for Public Administration Reform coordinate with the support of
European experts programs like Common Assessment Framework (a program design to
help public institutions to implement CAF – a quality assurance program), administrative
simplification and decentralization.
Probably the most successful story was that of Public Policy Unit, later the Public Policy
Department. Established in 2004 at the level of General Secretariat of the Government, it
was meant to coordinate the public policy cycle processes at the level of the central
government. In 2005 started, with the support of a European PHARE fund and a team of
Latvian experts, the development of a legislative framework designed regulate the way
public policy cycle process is carried out. Aside the UPP from General Secretariat similar
units were created in each ministry with the same role to coordinate the design of public
policies.
Training and other types of support like manuals or even equipment was offered to
civil servants from every ministry. Extremely important was the preparation of the staff
that was supposed to administer the post-accession European funds. Seven Management
Authorities received intensive training and five of them were fully operational in 2008, as
result from the minutes and reports of their monitoring committees (see the following
sites:
1. The management authority for the regional operational program:
http://www.inforegio.ro/node/25;
2. The management authority for administrative capacity development:
http://www.fonduriadministratie.ro/Arhiva?cat=Comitet%20de%20monitorizare;
3. The management authority for the environment fund:
http://www.posmediu.ro/Comitet_de_monitorizare%281557%29.html;
 4. The management authority for human resource development:
http://www.fseromania.ro/index.php/posdru/monitorizare-pos-dru#rapoarte;
5. The management authority for technical assistance fund:
http://www.poat.ro/evenimente_1.html?comitetul_de_monitorizare_poat;
Unfortunately the pace of the reforms and the process of building a professional civil
service in Romania slow down beginning with 2007 due to political turmoil that started in
the spring of that year.

Political – administrative relations

Politicization is a major issue for Romanian public administration. Relevant data

are missing for multiple reasons. First, a number of civil servants are accepting
politicization as an inevitable if not necessary phenomenon. Second, there are many civil
servants that obtained their positions due to some political influence. Third, part of those
that get their position on political bases are voluntarily living the job together with their
political master. As a consequence analyzing the number of dismissal after a change in
government is not relevant. Fourth, most of those subject to politicization are reluctant to
offer information about their experience.
Until 1996 elections public employees witnessed a relatively high level of
stability. The parties in power were very much connected with the former communist
regime and the political leaders as well as the civil servants had similar backgrounds. But
in 1996 a right wing coalition won the parliamentary election. The winner of presidential
was also a member of that coalition. Claiming that they want to get rid of the communist
past the new political leaders started a process of changes in the ranks of public
administration, particularly at the top and middle management level. Changing the public
administrator that had connections with the former communist party and moreover they
kept the working patterns and the values inherited from the old regime was seen
legitimate by a large portion of the population. But the negative side of the story is that
no attention was paid to the professional aspects related to public administration. Political
criteria were the only employed when people were dismissed and what is worst at the
employment of the new civil servants. This approach that resembles to a high extent the
“spoil system” was a major factor that caused the failure of the first right wing
government after the revolution.
The elections held at the end of 2000 results offered a comfortable parliamentary
majority to the Social Democrat Party. The new political leaders applied the same policy
in the field of civil servants. The justification was the poor performance of the former
government. According to the press 11.000 public officials were changed with persons
that were members or have close affiliation with the party in power. Because at that
moment the Law for Civil Servant status was in place, new techniques like changing the
name and the internal structure of public institutions or changing the requirements for
certain positions so that the person that was currently employed was no longer
compatible. The positive aspect is that due to the negotiation with European Commission
for the accession in EU gradually the legislation was improved by amendments to the
Civil Service Law and by adopting a new law that established ethical standards for the
public sector. Also, starting with the 1998 when European Commission accepted to
initiate negotiation with Romania for accession in EU, EC issued yearly reports about the
progresses made but also about the problems that still need attention.
Public administration reform and the professionalization and depoliticization of
the civil service were permanent topics and although progresses were gradually reported
the prevalent image is a negative one. The 2001 report mentioned: “All ministries have
been re-structured - but this has been the result of a change in government rather than of a
programme of strategic reform. Certain positions have disappeared while others have had
their responsibilities changed. This has led to the removal of many civil servants, either
through resignations or through redundancies. This process has seriously undermined the
stability of the civil service at all levels of public administration. The number of
secretaries of state (political appointees) has been significantly increased. Most of them
have taken over the responsibilities that were held by director generals (career civil
servants)”(p.18). The European Commision report on the years 2002-2004 are marking
the achievement made in the field of civil service. The 2003 report is praising the
amendment to the Civil Service. Still problems were noticed, especially the poor
implementation of the law.
The elections held at the end of 2004 brought again a change in government. A
right wing coalition took power with an ambitious reform program. The pressure upon
civil service was not so high as after the previous elections. The major reason was the
perspective accession in EU. The EC report on 2005 is placing a lot of criticism related to
civil service reform but there ar no references to politicization. As mentioned situation
worsened in 2007 after the coalition in government broked and minority government with
the same prime minister was installed. The new government was subject to many political
pressures and a fairly large number of replacements of civil servants took place.
The revision of the Constitution in 2003 and the requirements imposed by Romania’s
membership in European Union create a problem that was unexpected for the majority of
citizens as well as politicians: an overwhelming number of elections. If we analyze the
period between 2007 and 2009 we find out that we had: elections for European
Parliament in 2007, local elections in June 2008, parliamentary elections in November
2008, and presidential elections at the end of 2009. Public administration and the civil
service were heavily affected by these never ending elections. The antecedents raised for
every member of the civil service and in the case of every election questions like: what
will happen with me? I will still hold my position after election? Who will be my next
master and how will he treat me?
In 2009 most if not all of these question received negative answers for many civil
servants. The new government was eager to appoint persons with political affiliation in
all the management position from Romanian public administration. They went as far as to
issue a piece of legislation, Emergency Ordinance 37/2009 that specifically cancelled the
merit system and gave unrestricted way for political appointments. A year later an
amendment to the Civil Service Statute established milder condition for accession
management positions. As Andrei et. all stated: “The third period begins in 2009 and
continues to present. During this period, we believe that there was a decline in the de-
politicization of the civil service. This is the period in which the government changed a
series of laws which guaranteed, even if only theoretically, political neutrality of the civil
servants. Through the new legislation adopted by the government, the legal framework
for changing the managerial staff in public administration institutions on political grounds
was ensured. During this period, Emergency Government Ordinance no. 37/2009 has
been adopted. It regards some measures to improve public administration. It is a legal
document that reopens after nearly ten years the possibility of appointing leaders of
decentralized public services based on political reasons. This is a document that initiated
a process of mass rapid change of the managers of the decentralized public services with
the change of the government structure”(Andrei et. all., 2012, p.16). The consequences
will be dire for the current government and especially for the Romanian citizens. The low
rate of absorbtion of the European funds, the poor quality of legislation and the
impression, real or not, of a generalized corruption will undermine the position of the
government and, what is far more important, will affect the future of Romanian citizens.
The reforms in Romanian public administration were stopped in the last two years,
hopefully for a short period.

Conclusion

Establishing a pattern for the Romanian political-administrative relation is a

difficult task. One major difficulty results from the fragmented character of Romanian
bureaucracy. The historical conditions did not allow the establishment of a civil service
with a minimum of common traits and values. On the other hand, the Romanian political
class is also in its childhood after more than sixty years of dictatorships. After six years of
cohabitation due to the fact that both politicians and bureaucrats had common
background in the ranks of communist administration, many politicians including two
Prime Ministers being former clerks in the central apparatus of the communist regime,
the 1996 elections brought a right wing coalition in power that engaged in a radical
change of the civil servants. Claiming the necessity to separate from the communist past
a large number of public employees, particularly at the management level were replaced
with persons with connection to the new political leadership. Unfortunately political
criteria were the only used for selecting the new civil servants. The lack of
professionalism of the newly employed public managers was one of the causes for a
severe defeat in the 2000 election. The Social Democrat Party formed the new
government and in the year that followed undertook another massive replacement in the
ranks of civil service. Official data are not available but the press reported that around
11.000 persons were dismissed. The pattern of changing in government after each
election followed by an important turnover in the civil service ranks was to be found in
2004 and 2008. Due to the EU accession process the politicization was less radical after
the 2004 election but became even more severe after those of 2008. In April 2009, for the
first time after 1990, a Romanian government officially canceled the merit system.
Concluding, politicization is still a problematic issue in Romania. Each changing
in government is followed by important replacement among the top and middle managers
of the administrative institutions. Although Romania has since 1999 a Civil Service
Statute that was improved several time, no clear rules were observed and no clear
distinction between what administrative positions should be assigned to political sphere
and what should be left to professional career bureaucrats. Unless this issue will be
solved by a political agreement between the important political parties, Romanian
administration will have difficulties to adapt to the new requirements raised by the
membership in European Union.
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