G.R. No.
189476 February 2, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-
MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG),
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian
Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo
Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of
live birth1 shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were
never legally married, respondent filed on
July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez
Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP
No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE
PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO
TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-
LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent
submitted a certification from the National
Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna
Dominique "does not appear in [its] National
Indices of Marriage."2 Respondent also
submitted his academic records from
elementary up to college3 showing that he
carried the surname "Coseteng," and the
birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng"
appears as his surname.4 In the 1998, 2001
and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was
elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd
District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG."5
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City
RTC,6 respondent amended his petition by
alleging therein compliance with the 3-year
residency requirement under Section 2, Rule
103] of the Rules of Court.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on
November 20, 2008 was published in the
newspaper Broadside in its issues of October
31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13,
2008, and November 14-20, 2008.8 And a
copy of the notice was furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been
filed, an order of general default was entered
by the trial court which then allowed
respondent to present evidence ex parte.9
By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial
court granted respondent’s petition and
directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item
24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate
of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space
for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
"COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space
for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo,
Jr." in the space for FATHER of the
[respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring
supplied; capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the trial court by Order of July 2,
2009,11 hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the
present petition for review to the Court on
pure question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this
wise:
I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
NAME…INVOLVES THE CHANGE OF
[RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM
LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND,
THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH
APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDINGS…
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE
DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENT’S
FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.12
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of
the entry on the date and place of marriage
of respondent’s parents from his birth
certificate has the effect of changing his civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence,
any change in civil status of a person must
be effected through an appropriate
adversary proceeding.13
The Republic adds that by ordering the
deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of
marriage and the name of respondent’s
father from the entries in respondent’s birth
certificate,14 the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction, such order not being in accord
with respondent’s prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court
issue an order allowing the change of name
of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court
order the Local Civil Registrar and all other
relevant government agencies to reflect the
said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed
proper under the premises.15 (underscoring
supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding
before the trial court was adversarial in
nature. He cites the serving of copies of the
petition and its annexes upon the Civil
Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar
General, and the OSG; the posting of copies
of the notice of hearing in at least four public
places at least ten days before the hearing;
the delegation to the OSG by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on
behalf of the Republic; the publication of the
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three consecutive weeks; and
the fact that no oppositors appeared on the
scheduled hearing.16
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under
Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid
and meritorious grounds including (a) when
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal
consequence such as legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.17 Respondent’s
reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated
from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines.18
In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein
petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name
that she had been known since childhood in
order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny
her legitimacy, however. She merely sought
to use the surname of her mother which she
had been using since childhood. Ruling in her
favor, the Court held that she was lawfully
entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding
that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In
the present case, however, respondent
denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s
petition goes so far as to affect his legal
status in relation to his parents. It seeks to
change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy.
Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondent’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically
holds that "changes which may affect the
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . .
are substantial and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings . . ."
Since respondent’s desired change affects
his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the
province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which
concerns one’s civil status should be filed in
the civil registry in which the entry is sought
to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati
in the present case, and "all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby" should be made parties to
the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of
respondent was filed not in Makati where his
birth certificate was registered but in Quezon
City. And as the above-mentioned title of the
petition filed by respondent before the RTC
shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati
nor his father and mother were made parties
thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v.
Capote20 in support of his claim that his
change of name was effected through an
appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates,
however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding
change of name and in Rule 108 concerning
the cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry are separate and distinct.
They may not be substituted one for the
other for the sole purpose of expediency. To
hold otherwise would render nugatory the
provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the
change of one’s name or the correction of
entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis,
capitalization and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent
had simultaneously availed of these two
statutory remedies, respondent cannot be
said to have sufficiently complied with Rule
108. For, as reflected above, aside from
improper venue, he failed to implead the civil
registrar of Makati and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a
petition for a substantial correction or
change of entries in the civil registry should
have as respondents the civil registrar, as
well as all other persons who have or claim
to have any interest that would be affected
thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change
of status of a child in relation to his parents
is a substantial correction or change of entry
in the civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of
impleading indispensable parties in a petition
which involves substantial and controversial
alterations. In that case, the therein
petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe
(Emperatriz) filed a petition for the
correction of entries in the birth certificates
of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and
Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged
that her name appearing in the birth
certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname,
but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil
status appearing in the birth certificate of
her daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953
Bulan" are erroneous because she was not
married to Vicente Miclat who was the one
who furnished the data in said birth
certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s
petition and accordingly directed the local
civil registrar to change her name appearing
in her children’s birth certificates from
Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil
status in Victoria’s birth certificate from
"married" to "single" and the date and place
of marriage to "no marriage."
On petition before this Court after the Court
of Appeals found that the order of the trial
court involved a question of law, the Court
nullified the trial court’s order directing the
change of Emperatriz’ civil status and the
filiation of her child Victoria in light of the
following observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General, all other indispensable parties
should have been made respondents. They
include not only the declared father of the
child but the child as well, together with the
paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected
thereby. All other persons who may be
affected by the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained
under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from
her parents would be substantially impaired
if her status would be changed from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she
would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of
an illegitimate filiation that she will bear
thereafter. The fact that the notice of
hearing of the petition was published in a
newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not
change the nature of the proceedings taken.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the
Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making
authority under Section 13, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution, which directs that
such rules "shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were
to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, without observing the proper
proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule
would thereby become an unconstitutional
exercise which would tend to increase or
modify substantive rights. This situation is
not contemplated under Article 412 of the
Civil Code.24 (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and
publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and
any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily
shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two
sets of notices to different "potential
oppositors." The first notice is that given to
the "persons named in the petition" and the
second (which is through publication) is that
given to other persons who are not named in
the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties,
such as creditors. That two sets of notices
are mandated under the above-quoted
Section 4 is validated by the subsequent
Section 5, also above-quoted, which
provides for two periods (for the two types
of "potential oppositors") within which to file
an opposition (15 days from notice or from
the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in
Barco v. Court of Appeals.25 In that case,
Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for
correction of entries in the birth certificate of
her daughter June from June Salvacion
Maravilla to June Salvacion "Gustilo,"
Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina,
her daughter’s real father. Gustilo in fact
filed before the trial court a "CONSTANCIA"
wherein he acknowledged June as his
daughter. The trial court granted the
petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente
Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the Order of the
trial court granting the change of June’s
family name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of
her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo,
filed before the appellate court a motion for
intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a
legal interest in the annulment of the trial
court’s Order as Mary Joy was, by Barco’s
claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for
annulment and complaint-in-intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she
should have been impleaded in Nadina’s
petition for correction of entries of the birth
certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner,
like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively
identify all the affected parties, the
subsequent publication of the notice cured
the omission of Barco as a party to the case.
Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties
referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108.1awphi1
Her interest was affected by the petition for
correction, as any judicial determination that
June was the daughter of Armando would
affect her ward’s share in the estate of her
father. It cannot be established whether
Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence at the
time she filed the petition for correction.
Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to
whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would
know of all the parties whose interests may
be affected by the granting of a petition. For
example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to
be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate
offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x
x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108
is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who
should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x
x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,27 Carlito Kho
(Carlito) and his siblings named the civil
registrar as the sole respondent in the
petition they filed for the correction of
entries in their respective birth certificates in
the civil registry of Butuan City, and
correction of entries in the birth certificates
of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and his
siblings requested the correction in their
birth certificates of the citizenship of their
mother Epifania to "Filipino," instead of
"Chinese," and the deletion of the word
"married" opposite the phrase "Date of
marriage of parents" because their parents ─
Juan and Epifania ─ were not married. And
Carlito requested the correction in the birth
certificates of their children of his and his
wife’s date of marriage to reflect the actual
date of their marriage as appearing in their
marriage certificate. In the course of the
hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought
the correction of the name of his wife from
Maribel to "Marivel."
The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness
stand where she declared that she was not
married to Juan who died before the filing of Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP
the Khos’ petition. Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.

The trial court granted the petition. SO ORDERED.

On the issue of whether the failure to

implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents
rendered the trial of the petition short of the
required adversary proceedings and the trial
court’s judgment void, this Court held that
when all the procedural requirements under
Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the
notice of hearing cures the failure to implead
an indispensable party. In so ruling, the
Court noted that the affected parties were
already notified of the proceedings in the
case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were
the ones who initiated the petition respecting
their prayer for correction of their
citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual
date of his marriage to his wife; and, with
respect to the Khos’ petition for change of
their civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself
took the witness stand declaring that she
was not married to their father.

What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the

mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule
108 to implead the civil registrar and the
parties who would naturally and legally be
affected by the grant of a petition for
correction or cancellation of entries. Non-
impleading, however, as party-respondent of
one who is inadvertently left out or is not
established to be known by the petitioner to
be affected by the grant of the petition or
actually participates in the proceeding is G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
notified through publication.
ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or vs.
correction of an entry in the civil register REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
involves substantial and controversial
alterations including those on citizenship, Martin B. Laurea and Associates for
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or petitioner.
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor.
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated. BARRERA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the
foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc.
January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the No. 433) a petition which reads:
1. That petitioner has been a bona fide
resident of the City of Baguio for the last
three years prior to the date of the filing of
this petition;
2. That petitioner's maiden name is
ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939,
she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that
in a partial decision entered on this
Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in
Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled
'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L.
Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was
given a decree of legal separation from her;
that the said partial decision is now final;
3. That during her marriage to Enrique R.
Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of
her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria; that aside from her legal
separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she
has also ceased to live with him for many
years now;
4. That in view of the fact that she has
been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live
with him for many years, it is desirable that
she be allowed to change her name and/or
be permitted to resume using her maiden
name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed
that after the necessary proceedings are
had, she be allowed to resume using her
maiden name of Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the
same violates the provisions of Article 370
(should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it
is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court
denied the petition for the reason that Article
372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even
after she is decreed legally separated from
her husband, to continue using the name
and surname she employed before the legal
separation. Upon petitioner's motion,
however, the court, treating the petition as
one for change of name, reconsidered its
decision and granted the petition on the
ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated
from her husband, to continue using her
married name would give rise to confusion in
her finances and the eventual liquidation of
the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by
the State.
The contention of the Republic finds support
in the provisions of Article 372 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the
legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the language of the statute is
mandatory that the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed, shall continue
using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation. This is so
because her married status is unaffected by
the separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of
the law that the wife should continue to use
the name indicative of her unchanged status
for the benefit of all concerned.
The appellee contends, however, that the
petition is substantially for change of her
name from Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she
has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea
Laperal, her maiden name, giving as reason
or cause therefor her being legally separated
from the husband Enrique R. Santamaria,
and the fact that they have ceased to live
together for many years.
There seems to be no dispute that in the
institution of these proceedings, the
procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court for change of name has been
observed. But from the petition quoted in full
at the beginning of these opinion, the only
reason relied upon for the change of name is
the fact that petitioner is legally separated
from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to
live with him for many years. It is doubtful,
to say the least, whether Rule 103 which
refers to change of name in general, may
prevail over the specific provisions of Article
372 of the New Civil Code with regards to
married women legally separated from their
husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103
to this case, the fact of legal separation
alone — which is the only basis for the
petition at bar — is, in our opinion, not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name of herein petitioner, for to hold
otherwise would be to provide an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of
Article 372.

It is true that in the second decision which

reconsidered the first it is stated that as the
petitioner owns extensive business interests,
the continued used of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances
and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets. This finding is however without basis.
In the first place, these were not the causes
upon which the petition was based; hence,
obviously no evidence to this effect had been
adduced. Secondly, with the issuance of the
decree of legal separation in 1958, the G.R. No. L-18127 April 5, 1967
conjugal partnership between petitioner and
her husband had automatically been IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGES OF NAME
dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil OF GERTRUDES JOSEFINA DEL PRADO,
Cod). Consequently, there could be no more THRU HER NATURAL GUARDIAN CORAZON
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the ADOLFO CALDERON, petitioner-appellee,
conjugal assets. vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of appellant.
December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is
hereby set aside and the petition dismissed. Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor
Without costs. So ordered. and appellant.
Angeles, Maskariño & Angeles for petitioner
and appellee.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an appeal by the Solicitor General

from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Davao granting the petition of petitioner-
appellee, Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, for a
change of name.

On July 23, 1959, Gertrudes Josefina del

Prado, a minor, through her mother and
natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon,
filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes
Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes
Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the
petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate
child, born on March 17, 1956, out of a
bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del
Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname
"Del Prado" which the petitioner carries is a
stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which
she has become the subject of unfair
comments; that the surname which the
petitioner carries would constitute a
handicap in her life in later years, and would
give cause for constant irritation in her social
relations with other people; that petitioner is
living with her mother who is now married to
Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it is
the desire of the petitioner to have her
surname changed from "Del Prado" to
"Calderon "which is the surname of her
foster father, the husband of her mother.
The publication of the order for the hearing
of the petition was duly made.
On July 11, 1960, the Provincial Fiscal of
Davao, representing the Solicitor General,
filed an opposition to the petition upon the
ground that the change of surname of the
petition is unwarranted, considering that said
petitioner was born out of a bigamous
marriage and as such she has the status of
an acknowledged natural child by legal
fiction and under the law she should bear the
surname of her father Manuel del Prado; and
that the change of the surname of the
petitioner would be prejudicial to the rights
and interest which she has by virtue of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 2272 of the Court
of First Instance of Davao, annulling the
marriage of her mother, Corazon Adolfo, to
Manuel del Prado, and would also be
prejudicial to her rights as conferred upon
her by law. Counsel for the petitioner filed in
reply to the opposition, the provincial fiscal
filed a supplemental opposition, and counsel
for the petitioner filed a reply to the
supplemental opposition.1äwphï1.ñët
After hearing the court a quo issued an
order, under date of July 28, 1960, granting
the petition and ordering the change of the
name of the petitioner from "Gertrudes
Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina
Calderon." The dispositive portion of the
order of the court further states: "This order,
however, shall not operate to deprive the
petitioner of her status, rights and
obligations as recognized by law."
From the above-mentioned order the
provincial fiscal, representing the Solicitor
General, appealed to this Court.
In this appeal the Solicitor General contends
(1) that the lower court erred in finding as
proper and reasonable ground for the change
of the surname of the petitioner the reason
that petitioner's present surname carries the
stigma of illegitimacy, and (2) that the lower
court erred in declaring "that although the
law is specific that petitioner shall principally
use the surname of the father yet it does not
follow that petitioner is prohibited from using
other surnames when justified."1
The issue to be resolved in the present case
is whether the lower court's order granting
the petition is, based upon "proper and
reasonable cause" as required by Section 5
of Rule 103 of the new Rules of Court.
The lower court found that petitioner
Gertrudes Josefina del Prado was born on
March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child of
Manuel del Prado and Corazon Adolfo as a
result of their bigamous marriage which was
annulled on July 18, 1957, after a judgment
of conviction of said Manuel del Prado on the
complaint for bigamy on December 5, 1956;
that subsequently, on December 26, 1957,
Corazon Adolfo, mother of the petitioner, got
married to Romeo C. Calderon; that the
petitioner is living with her mother and her
foster father; and that Romeo C. Calderon
declared in open court his consent to the
petitioner's adopting his surname, especially
so because he is the one supporting her. The
lower court says, "In the opinion of the Court
the reasons adduced by the petitioner are
valid and will redound to the best interests of
said minor who after all is not at fault to
have come to this world as an illegitimate
child."
We agree with the court a quo. A petition to
change the name of an infant, as in this
case, should be granted only where to do so
is clearly for the best interest of the child.
When the mother of the petitioner filed the
instant petition she had in mind what she
believed was for the best interest of her child
considering that her husband Romeo C.
Calderon is the one supporting the child and
that he is agreeable to the child's using his
surname. The mother had considered the
generous attitude of her husband as an
opportunity for her to promote the
personality, and enhance the dignity, of her
daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a
stigma of illegitimacy which her child would
continue to bear if her surname is that of her
illegitimate father.
The Solicitor General, in his brief, avers that
the evident purpose of petitioner in seeking
a change of her surname is to conceal her
status as an illegitimate child and that any
attempt to conceal illegitimacy cannot be
motivated by good faith and an honest
purpose. The Solicitor General further alleges
that to authorize the change of the name of
the petitioner would be to sanction a
misrepresentation because the petitioner
wants to appear as if she is the daughter of
Romeo C. Calderon. We cannot agree with
the view of the Solicitor General. The
Solicitor General seems to support the idea
that since the petitioner has the misfortune
of being born illegitimate she must bear that
stigma of illegitimacy as long as she lives.
That idea should not be countenanced.
Justice dictates that every person be allowed
to avail of any opportunity to improve his
social standing as long as in so doing he
does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.
The Solicitor General also contends that the
status of the petitioner is that of a natural
child by legal fiction and under Article 367 of
the Civil Code she shall principally enjoy the
surname of the father. We agree with the
lower court when it said that "While it is true
that the Code provides that a natural child
by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall
principally enjoy the surname of the father,
yet, this does not mean that such child is
prohibited by law, from taking another
surname with the latters consent and for
justifiable reasons." If under the law a
legitimate child may secure a change of his
name through judicial proceedings, upon a
showing of a "proper and reasonable cause",
We do not see any reason why a natural
child cannot do the same. The purpose of the
law in allowing a change of name, as
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and to
promote his interests. We are satisfied that
the facts and circumstances as borne out by
the record amply justify the change of the
surname of the petitioner, as ordered by the
lower court . We have held that the matter
whether to grant or deny a petition for a
change of name is left to the sound
discretion of the court,2 and in the present
case We believe that the court a quo has
exercised its discretion in a judicious way
when it granted the petition.
The Solicitor General expresses an
apprehension that because the petitioner
here is of tender age, who cannot as yet
understand and appreciate the value of the
change of her name, may be prejudiced in
her rights under the law. This apprehension
is dispelled by the pronouncement of this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Makalintal, as follow:
... But a change of name as authorized
under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or
affect a change in, one's existing family
relations, or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom; nor does it create new family
rights and duties where none before was
existing. It does not alter one's legal
capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is
altered is only the name, which is that word
or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from others and which he
bears as a label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). (In Re Petition
for Change of Name of Joselito Yu, Juan S.
Barrera vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-
20874, May 25, 1966)
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed
from is affirmed, without pronouncement as
to the costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 129846 January 18, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TRADERS ROYAL
BANK, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition, for certiorari seeking to set

aside the resolution,1 dated March 17, 1997,
of the Court of Appeals dismissing
petitioner's appeal from an order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Manila,
which dismissed petitioner's complaint. The
appellate court threw out petitioner's appeal
on the ground that its notice of appeal had
been filed out of time. Petitioner urges a
relaxation of the rules in applying the period
for filing appeals. But even its appeal to this
Court from the resolution of the appellate
court is late. Hence, the dismissal of the
present petition is called for.1âwphi1.nêt

The procedural antecedents are as follows:

On two occasions in January 1986, the Office

of the President issued four type "B"
Treasury Warrants drawn against the Bureau
of Treasury in the aggregate amount of
P151,645,000.00. The treasury warrants
were deposited in private respondent
Traders Royal Bank for collection.

On January 7, 1986, private respondent

presented the warrants to the Bureau of
Treasury for clearing. The warrants were
cleared and private respondent credited the
amounts to the designated payees'
accounts.2 Petitioner subsequently
discovered on April 3, 1986 that the payees'
indorsements on the warrants had been
forged. It demanded reimbursement from
private respondent of the amounts paid on
the warrants but the latter refused to pay.
On October 13, 1987, petitioner, through the
Bureau of Treasury, filed Civil Case No. 87-
42752 for collection against private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Manila. Trial then ensued. After
petitioner had rested its case, private
respondent, with prior leave of court, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence on January 12, 1994.
Among others, it was contended:
. . . The plaintiff does not claim nor alleged
that because of the alleged forgery of the
indorsements of the payees, it (the plaintiff)
had to replace the treasury warrants in
question and thus pay the payees all over
again. Does not the cause of action or right
to relief, then, if any, properly pertain to the
payees whose endorsements were allegedly
forged? And is not such a cause of action or
right to relief properly against the forger/s or
perpetrator of the forgery?
In an order dated September 30, 1994, the
trial court denied the demurrer to evidence.
However, on motion of private respondent,
the trial court, on January 30, 1995,
reconsidered its order and dismissed
petitioner's complaint. Petitioner received
the order of dismissal on February 7, 1995.
Hence, it had up to February 22, 1995 within
which to appeal.
On February 20, 1995, two days before the
last day to file an appeal, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal which interrupted the running of
the period of appeal.
On May 23, 1995, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The
order was received by petitioner on June 2,
1995, so that it had until June 4, 1995 within
which to file the notice of appeal. However,
petitioner filed its notice of appeal only on
June 16, 1995, 12 days beyond the 15-day
reglementary period. As a consequence, the
dismissal became final. For some reason,
this fact was not immediately noticed, so
that the records of the case were elevated to
the Court of Appeals and petitioner was
required to file its appellant's brief. When it
came to its turn to file its brief as an
appellee, private respondent asked for an
extension of time. Its motion was granted,
but instead of filing its brief, private
respondent asked the appellate court to
dismiss petitioner's appeal on the ground
that it was filed out of time. Its motion was
granted and petitioner's appeal was
dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but its motion was denied.
Petitioner received the appellate court's
resolution denying its motion on June 5,
1997, so that it had until June 20, 1997
within which to appeal to this Court by filing
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. Instead, petitioner filed on August 4,
1997, 45 days after the last day to file an
appeal, the present petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, contending that the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing its appeal from the order of the
RTC which dismissed its complaint against
private respondent.
As earlier stated, this petition should be
dismissed.
First. Petitioner's remedy was to appeal to
this Court from the resolutions, dated March
17, 1997 and May 20, 1997, of the appellate
court by filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, it filed this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 only on
August 4, 1997. Apparently, petitioner
resorted to this special civil action because it
had failed to take an appeal within the 15-
day reglementary period which expired on
June 20, 1997. This, of course, cannot be
done. The special civil action of certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal
which petitioner has lost. Nor can it be
contended that the only question raised in
this case is a jurisdictional question.
Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. There is no
reason why the question being raised by
petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitions, could not have been
raised by it on appeal.
In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals,3 we
dismissed a Rule 65 petition on the ground
that the proper remedy for petitioner therein
should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, viz.:
At the outset, this Court notes that the
proper remedy of Petitioner Bernardo should
have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. We have time and again
reminded members of the bench and bar
that a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." Certiorari can
not be allowed when a party to a case fails
to appeal a judgment despite the availability
of that remedy, certiorari not being a
substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive. . . .4
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with
the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court
and in the interest of justice, has the
discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as
having been filed under Rule 45, especially if
filed within the reglementary period for filing
a petition for review.5 In this case, however,
we find no reason to justify a liberal
application of the rules. The petition was
filed well beyond the reglementary period for
filing a petition for review without any
reason therefor.
Second. Even on the grounds invoked by
petitioner we think the present petition
should be dismissed. Time and again, we
have emphasized that the perfection of
appeals in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect
an appeal renders the decision of the trial
court final and executory.6 This rule is
founded upon the principle that the right to
appeal is not part of due process of law but
is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of the law.7 In this case, we
find no reason to depart from this rule.
Petitioner invokes the judicial policy of
allowing appeals, although filed late, when
the interest of justice so requires. Citing
Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr.,8 it
contends that this Court, in meritorious
instances, has allowed the rules on the
periods for perfecting appeals to be
relaxed.9 Unfortunately for petitioner, even
a cursory reading of the very case upon
which it relies for support shows that the
policy invoked is qualified by the
requirement that there must be exceptional
circumstances to justify the relaxation of the
rules. The case cited, which involved an
appeal made five days late, illustrates how
questions of this nature have been resolved
by this Court:
True, in few highly exceptional instances, we
have allowed the relaxing of the rules on the
application of the reglementary periods of
appeal. We cite a few typical examples: In
Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we
excused the delay of four days in the filing of
a notice of appeal because the questioned
decision of the trial court was served upon
appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel
of record was already dead. Her new counsel
could only file the appeal four days after the
prescribed reglementary period was over. In
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453,
we allowed the perfection of an appeal by
the Republic despite the delay of six days to
prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since
the Republic stands to lose hundreds of
hectares of land already titled in its name
and had since then been devoted for
educational purposes. In Olacao vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 577 SCRA 38,
41, we accepted a tardy appeal considering
that the subject matter in issue had
theretofore been judicially settled, with
finality, in another case. The dismissal of the
appeal would have had the effect of the
appellant being ordered twice to make the
same reparation to the appellee.
The case at bench, given its own settings,
can not come close to those extraordinary
circumstances that have indeed justified a
deviation from an otherwise stringent rule.
Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness
of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that
not even this Court can trifle with.10
As in Bank of America, there is no showing in
this case of a factual setting which
approximates any of the extraordinary
circumstances which may justify a deviation
from the rule on timely filing of appeals.
Anyone seeking exemption from the
application of this rule has the burden of
proving that exceptionally meritorious
instances exist which warrant such
departure. In this case, petitioner failed to
discharge this burden. It offered no
explanation at all for the 12-day delay in
filing its notice of appeal. What was said in
Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of
Appeals11 applies with equal force to this
case, as petitioner is likewise represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, viz.:
And, while we understand the OSG's
predicament, its oft-repeated excuse of
being saddled with a huge caseload, which is
resorted to almost everytime it applies for
extension of time for appeal and filing of
comments/replies/briefs, has already lost its
flavor, if not gone stale entirely. Certainly,
by this time the OSG must have already
developed a system for keeping crack of all
its deadlines and monitoring the progress of
work being done on the cases it is handling.
After all, government service really entails
hard work and perennial unceasing pressure
to meet deadlines. Most assuredly, this is not
a ground for the liberal interpretation of the
rules. Only in exceptionally meritorious cases
should the rules be relaxed. Such has not
been shown to be the situation in this case.
After its case was dismissed by the trial
court, all that the OSG had to do was to file
a notice of appeal, which is just a brief
statement of petitioner's intention to appeal
from the court's decision. There is no reason
why the OSG could not have this in two
days. Unlike a record on appeal, a notice of
appeal does not require the extractions of
pleadings and documents from the records
pertinent to the subject of the appeal. In the
absence of any satisfactory explanation, the
OSG's failure to file a timely notice of appeal
simply cannot be excused without defeating
private respondent's right, as a party-
litigant, to benefit from a decision that has
become final executory.
Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that
rules of technicality must yield to the
broader interest of substantial justice.12
While every litigant must be given the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities,13 the failure to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary
period is not a mere technicality. It raises a
jurisdictional problem as it deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction over the
appeal.14 The failure to file the notice of
appeal within the reglementary period is akin
to the failure to pay the appeal fee within the
prescribed period. In both cases, the appeal
is not perfected in due time. As we held in
Pedrosa v. Hill,15 the requirement of an
appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure, but an
essential requirement without which the
decision appealed from would become final
and executory.16 The same can be said
about the late filing of a notice of appeal.
The fact is that petitioner did not only fail to
appeal from the main order of the trial court
dismissing its complaint. It did not only fail
to appeal on time from the order denying
reconsideration. Petitioner likewise failed to
make a timely appeal to this Court from the
resolution of the appellate court dismissing
its appeal.
Nonetheless, it is contended that petitioner
has a meritorious claim against private
respondent and that it stands to lose
P151,645,000.00 if it cannot appeal from the
trial court's order dismissing its complaint
against private respondent. The finality of
the trial court's order as a consequence of
petitioner's failure to appeal on time, first to
the Court of Appeals and, later to this Court,
unfortunately, bars further consideration of
its case. There is simply no explanation
offered for such lapses.
Third. There is another reason why review of
the trial court's order cannot be made.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that, as
observed by the Court of Appeals, its notice
of appeal referred only to the order of the
trial court denying its Motion for
Reconsideration and not the order of
dismissal of its complaint as well.17 Such
failure is fatal. Rule 37, §9 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that an order
denying a motion for reconsideration is not
appealable, the remedy being an appeal
from the judgment or final order. On the
other hand, Rule 41, §1(a) of the same rules
also provides that no appeal may be taken
from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration. It is true the present Rules
of Civil Procedure took effect only on July 1,
1997 whereas this case involves an appeal
taken in February 1995. But Rule 37, §9 and
Rule 41, §1(a) simply codified the rulings in
several cases to the effect that an order
denying a motion for reconsideration is
interlocutory in nature18 and, therefore, is
not appealable.19 These rules, therefore, are
not really new.
The outcome of this petition maybe a bitter
lesson for petitioner, but one mainly of its
own doing. Not only did it file its notice of
appeal well beyond the reglementary period,
it actually failed to appeal from the order
dismissing its case against private
respondent. The inevitable consequence of
such grave inadvertence is to render the trial
court's decision dismissing its case final and
executory. The Court of Appeals thus acted
properly in dismissing petitioner's
appeal.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No.
2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of
the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos
Landingin, a citizen of the United States of
America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3 for
the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 31, 1986;4 Elma
Dizon Ramos, who was born on September
7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was
born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her
petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990,7 the children were left to their
paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos;
their biological mother, Amelia, went to
Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by
Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the
time she left up to the institution of the
adoption; the minors are being financially
supported by the petitioner and her children,
and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away
on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to
adopt the children; the minors have given
their written consent8 to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that
she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of
her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families;
she lives alone in her own home in Guam,
USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back
to the Philippines to spend time with the
minors; her children gave their written
consent9 to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who
earns substantial income, signified his
willingness and commitment to support the
minors while in petitioner’s custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in her favor, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed
to this Honorable Court that after publication
and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing
the adoption of the minor children Elaine
Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and
Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and
ordering that the minor children’s name
follow the family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just
and equitable under the premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case
study as mandated by Article 34 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,
and to submit a report thereon not later than
April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial
hearing of the petition.11 The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance12 but deputized the City
Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed,
petitioner was allowed to present her
evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She
also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of
the adoptees, to testify on the written
consent executed by her and her siblings.15
The petitioner marked in evidence the
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by
her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and
notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA,
as proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social
Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office
III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report,
with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds
minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed
Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the
following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has
voluntarily consented to their adoption by
the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in
view of her inability to provide the parental
care, guidance and support they need. An
Affidavit of Consent was executed by the
mother which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption
have also expressed their willingness to be
adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam,
USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent
is hereto attached. The minors developed
close attachment to the petitioners and they
regarded her as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of
a temporary guardian who has also family to
look after. As young adolescents they really
need parental love, care, guidance and
support to ensure their protection and well
being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby
respectfully recommended that minors Elaine
D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D.
Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt
Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby
further recommended to be dispensed with
considering that they are close relatives and
that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the 3
minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her
interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together
with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3
weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear
for the personal interview concerning the
adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their
paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was
conceived after the death of their paternal
grandmother and guardian. The paternal
relatives including the petitioner who
attended the wake of their mother were very
much concerned about the well-being of the
three minors. While preparing for their
adoption, they have asked a cousin who has
a family to stay with minors and act as their
temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about
the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she
voluntarily consented. She realized that her
children need parental love, guidance and
support which she could not provide as she
already has a second family & residing in
Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
children have been supporting her children
up to the present and truly care for them,
she believes her children will be in good
hands. She also finds petitioners in a better
position to provide a secured and bright
future to her children.18
However, petitioner failed to present
Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove
that Amelia assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding
merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a
decision granting said petition. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that
henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be
freed from all legal obligations obedience
and maintenance from their natural parents
and that they be declared for all legal intents
and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos
Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship
has long been established between the
children and the adoptive parents. Let the
surnames of the children be changed from
"Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him
to effect the corresponding
changes/amendment in the birth certificates
of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the
Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In
its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the
OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE
LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED
ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE
LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY
LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT
SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a
decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It
held that petitioner failed to adduce in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos, the children’s natural mother.
Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the
petitioner’s children could not also be
admitted in evidence as the same was
executed in Guam, USA and was not
authenticated or acknowledged before a
Philippine consular office, and although
petitioner has a job, she was not stable
enough to support the children. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed decision dated November 25, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac
City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which
the CA denied in its Resolution dated August
12, 2004.25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari26 on September 7,
2004, assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT
HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE
OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH
IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED
THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY
CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE
CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their
pleadings are the following: (a) whether the
petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors
without the written consent of their biological
mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not
the affidavit of consent purportedly executed
by the petitioner-adopter’s children
sufficiently complies with the law; and (c)
whether or not petitioner is financially
capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere
to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson
v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and
family in the person of the adopter as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should thus be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the
Court also ruled that the liberality with which
this Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and
perspective. The Court’s position should not
be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with
due regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or
withhold his/her approval of the adoption,
the written consent of the following to the
adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or
over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter, if living
with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if
any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person
adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and
notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and
to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of
the proposed adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right
of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-
established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao
declared that she was able to interview
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines
with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said
Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and
Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is
incredible that the latter would not require
Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent
to the adoption of her minor children.
Neither did the petitioner bother to present
Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the
petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the
written consent of the biological mother is no
longer necessary because when Amelia’s
husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and
never came back. The children were then left
to the guidance and care of their paternal
grandmother. It is the paternal relatives,
including petitioner, who provided for the
children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned
the children. Petitioner further contends that
it was by twist of fate that after 12 years,
when the petition for adoption was pending
with the RTC that Amelia and her child by
her second marriage were on vacation in the
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social
worker, was able to meet her, and during
the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social
worker that she conformed to the adoption
of her three children by the petitioner.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected.
When she filed her petition with the trial
court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the
written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of
the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.
If, as claimed by petitioner, that the
biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to
justify the adoption of his child without his
consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties.33 The
term means neglect and refusal to perform
the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. If a parent withholds presence,
love, care, the opportunity to display filial
affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons
the child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a
time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such an abandonment.35 To dispense with
the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption.36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her
testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove
her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned
her children. Petitioner’s testimony on that
matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three
children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990,
sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for
Italy, was there an instance where she
communicated with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she
reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia
Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already
married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has
children by her second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified,
thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left
for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for
Italy, did your mother communicate with
you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the
DSWD Social Worker also stated the
following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors
siblings had been under the care and
custody of their maternal grandmother.
However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an
uncle, cousin of their deceased father now
serves as their guardian. The petitioner,
together with her children and other
relatives abroad have been supporting the
minor children financially, even during the
time that they were still living with their
natural parents. Their mother also sends
financial support but very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors
Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role
model to her younger siblings. She helps
them in their lessons, works and has fun
with them. She also encourages openness on
their problems and concerns and provides
petty counseling. In serious problems she
already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3
children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that
they had a happy and comfortable life. After
the death of her husband, her in-laws which
include the petitioner had continued
providing support for them. However being
ashamed of just depending on the support of
her husband’s relatives, she decided to work
abroad. Her parents are also in need of
financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents
mortgaged their farm land which she used in
going to Italy and worked as domestic
helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990,
she entrusted her 3 children to the care &
custody of her mother-in-law who returned
home for good, however she died on
November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a
married man from Tarlac. They became live-
in partners since 1995 and have a son John
Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of
them are considered Italian residents.
Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to
file an annulment of his marriage and his
wife is amenable to it. He is providing his
legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging
from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her
parents who share minimal amount of
P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children.
The petitioner and other paternal relatives
are continuously providing support for most
of the needs & education of minors up to
present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not
intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial constraints.
Yet, even while abroad, she did not
surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now
deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by
Elaine herself, she consulted her mother,
Amelia, for serious personal problems.
Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal
amounts as compared to what her affluent
in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the
adoption of the minors herein will have the
effect of severing all legal ties between the
biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees,
and that the same shall then be vested on
the adopter.42 It would thus be against the
spirit of the law if financial consideration
were to be the paramount consideration in
deciding whether to deprive a person of
parental authority over his/her children.
More proof has to be adduced that Amelia
has emotionally abandoned the children, and
that the latter will not miss her guidance and
counsel if they are given to an adopting
parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the
child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that the Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence
is offered must be specified. The offer of
evidence is necessary because it is the duty
of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the
purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight.
Mere identification of documents and the
markings thereof as exhibits do not confer
any evidentiary weight on documents unless
formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence
Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her
children; the authenticity of which she,
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written
consent of petitioner’s children45 was
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam,
USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of
Court in the same way as a document
notarized in this country it needs to comply
with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which
states:
Section 2. An instrument or document
acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign
country shall be considered authentic if the
acknowledgment and authentication are
made in accordance with the following
requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made
before (1) an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, chargé d affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited, or
(2) a notary public or officer duly authorized
by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is
done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him,
and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary
public or an officer mentioned in subdivision
(2) of the preceding paragraph, the
certificate of the notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall be
authenticated by an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, chargé de affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited.
The officer making the authentication shall
certify under his official seal that the person
who took the acknowledgment was at the
time duly authorized to act as notary public
or that he was duly exercising the functions
of the office by virtue of which he assumed
to act, and that as such he had authority
under the law to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where
the acknowledgment was taken, and that his
signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s
legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can at best be
treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by
anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the
makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof
was introduced by petitioner to authenticate
the written consent of her legitimate
children, the same is inadmissible in
evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA
ruled that petitioner was not stable enough
to support the children and is only relying on
the financial backing, support and
commitment of her children and her
siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by
claiming that she is financially capable as
she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has
savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15
an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00
a month. Her children and siblings have
likewise committed themselves to provide
financial backing should the need arise. The
OSG, again in its comment, banks on the
statement in the Home Study Report that
"petitioner has limited income." Accordingly,
it appears that she will rely on the financial
backing of her children and siblings in order
to support the minor adoptees. The law,
however, states that it is the adopter who
should be in a position to provide support in
keeping with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption
is the best interest of the child, it follows
that the financial capacity of prospective
parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered.
Certainly, the adopter should be in a position
to support the would-be adopted child or
children, in keeping with the means of the
family.
According to the Adoption Home Study
Report49 forwarded by the Department of
Public Health & Social Services of the
Government of Guam to the DSWD,
petitioner is no longer supporting her
legitimate children, as the latter are already
adults, have individual lives and families. At
the time of the filing of the petition,
petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a
part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15
an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month.
Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the
children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA.
She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in
Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being
amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the
limited income might be a hindrance to the
adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed
doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of
rearing the three children in the US. She
only has a part-time job, and she is rather of
age. While petitioner claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children
and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating
that the ability to support the adoptees is
personal to the adopter, as adoption only
creates a legal relation between the former
and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that
her siblings and her children are financially
able and that they are willing to support the
minors herein. The Court, therefore, again
sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner
has only the best of intentions for her nieces
and nephew, there are legal infirmities that
militate against reversing the ruling of the
CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented
from filing a new petition for adoption of the
herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 of
the 27 May 2005 Decision2 and 2 August
2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Office of the
President, which in turn affirmed the decision
of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying
petitioner’s request to revert to the use of
her maiden name in her replacement
passport.
The Facts
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a
married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October
2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco
R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in
her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname,
"Maria Virginia" as her given name, and
"Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the
expiry of the validity of her passport,
petitioner, whose marriage still subsists,
applied for the renewal of her passport with
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a
request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport.
Petitioner’s request having been denied,
Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III,
representing petitioner, wrote then Secretary
of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing
a similar request.
On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through
Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied
the request, stating thus:
This has reference to your letter dated 17
August 2000 regarding one Ms. Maria
Virginia V. Remo who is applying for renewal
of her passport using her maiden name.
This Office is cognizant of the provision in
the law that it is not obligatory for a married
woman to use her husband’s name. Use of
maiden name is allowed in passport
application only if the married name has not
been used in previous application. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations for
Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly
defines the conditions when a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name,
that is, only in cases of annulment of
marriage, divorce and death of the husband.
Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these
conditions.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
above-letter resolution was denied in a letter
dated 13 October 2000.5
On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an
appeal with the Office of the President.
On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President
dismissed the appeal6 and ruled that Section
5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or
the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no
leeway for any other interpretation than that
only in case of divorce, annulment, or
declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a
married woman revert to her maiden name
for passport purposes." The Office of the
President further held that in case of conflict
between a general and special law, the latter
will control the former regardless of the
respective dates of passage. Since the Civil
Code is a general law, it should yield to RA
8239.
On 28 October 2004, the Office of the
President denied the motion for
reconsideration.7
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of
Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the
ruling of the Office of the President. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED, and the resolution dated
July 27, 2004, and the order dated October
28, 2004 of the Office of the President in
O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which
the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
dated 2 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals found no conflict
between Article 370 of the Civil Code9 and
Section 5(d) of RA 8239.10 The Court of
Appeals held that for passport application
and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the
instances when a married woman applicant
may exercise the option to revert to the use
of her maiden name such as in a case of a
divorce decree, annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage. Since there was no
showing that petitioner's marriage to
Francisco Rallonza has been annulled,
declared void or a divorce decree has been
granted to them, petitioner cannot simply
revert to her maiden name in the
replacement passport after she had adopted
her husband’s surname in her old passport.
Hence, according to the Court of Appeals,
respondent was justified in refusing the
request of petitioner to revert to her maiden
name in the replacement passport.1avvphi1
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether
petitioner, who originally used her husband’s
surname in her expired passport, can revert
to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of
surnames. In the case of a married woman,
Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and
add her husband’s surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's
surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a
word indicating that she is his wife, such as
"Mrs."
We agree with petitioner that the use of the
word "may" in the above provision indicates
that the use of the husband’s surname by
the wife is permissive rather than obligatory.
This has been settled in the case of Yasin v.
Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court.11
In Yasin,12 petitioner therein filed with the
Shari’a District Court a "Petition to resume
the use of maiden name" in view of the
dissolution of her marriage by divorce under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, and after marriage of her former
husband to another woman. In ruling in
favor of petitioner therein, the Court
explained that:
When a woman marries a man, she need not
apply and/or seek judicial authority to use
her husband’s name by prefixing the word
"Mrs." before her husband’s full name or by
adding her husband’s surname to her
maiden first name. The law grants her such
right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when
the marriage ties or vinculum no longer
exists as in the case of death of the husband
or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code,
the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status
in order to revert to her maiden name as use
of her former husband’s is optional and not
obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p.
725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When
petitioner married her husband, she did not
change her but only her civil status. Neither
was she required to secure judicial authority
to use the surname of her husband after the
marriage as no law requires it. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but
not a duty, to use the surname of the
husband in any of the ways provided by
Article 370 of the Civil Code.13 She is
therefore allowed to use not only any of the
three names provided in Article 370, but also
her maiden name upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her
maiden name once she is married because
when a woman marries, she does not change
her name but only her civil status. Further,
this interpretation is in consonance with the
principle that surnames indicate descent.14
In the present case, petitioner, whose
marriage is still subsisting and who opted to
use her husband’s surname in her old
passport, requested to resume her maiden
name in the replacement passport arguing
that no law prohibits her from using her
maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the
applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not
squarely in point with this case. Unlike in
Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee
whose former husband is already married to
another woman, petitioner’s marriage
remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did
not involve a request to resume one’s
maiden name in a replacement passport, but
a petition to resume one’s maiden name in
view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.
The law governing passport issuance is RA
8239 and the applicable provision in this
case is Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of
Passport. — No passport shall be issued to
an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative is satisfied that
the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has
complied with the following requirements: x
xx
(d) In case of a woman who is married,
separated, divorced or widowed or whose
marriage has been annulled or declared by
court as void, a copy of the certificate of
marriage, court decree of separation, divorce
or annulment or certificate of death of the
deceased spouse duly issued and
authenticated by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General: Provided, That in case of
a divorce decree, annulment or declaration
of marriage as void, the woman applicant
may revert to the use of her maiden name:
Provided, further, That such divorce is
recognized under existing laws of the
Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on
behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
argues that the highlighted proviso in
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 "limits the instances
when a married woman may be allowed to
revert to the use of her maiden name in her
passport." These instances are death of
husband, divorce decree, annulment or
nullity of marriage. Significantly, Section 1,
Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 8239 provides:
The passport can be amended only in the
following cases:
a) Amendment of woman’s name due to
marriage;
b) Amendment of woman’s name due to
death of spouse, annulment of marriage or
divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
c) Change of surname of a child who is
legitimated by virtue of a subsequent
marriage of his parents.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband
subsists, placing her case outside of the
purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to
the instances when a married woman may
revert to the use of her maiden name), she
may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport.15 This prohibition,
according to petitioner, conflicts with and,
thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article
370 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between
Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d)
of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA
8239, including its implementing rules and
regulations, does not prohibit a married
woman from using her maiden name in her
passport. In fact, in recognition of this right,
the DFA allows a married woman who
applies for a passport for the first time to
use her maiden name. Such an applicant is
not required to adopt her husband's
surname.16
In the case of renewal of passport, a married
woman may either adopt her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden
name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s
surname in her new passport, the DFA
additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to
continue using her maiden name, she may
still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from
continuously using her maiden name.17
However, once a married woman opted to
adopt her husband’s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of
her maiden name, except in the cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239.
These instances are: (1) death of husband,
(2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of
marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her
husband subsists, she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.
Otherwise stated, a married woman's
reversion to the use of her maiden name
must be based only on the severance of the
marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the
Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which
is a special law specifically dealing with
passport issuance must prevail over the
provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of
surnames. A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails
over a general law,18 thus:
[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory
construction that to the extent of any
necessary repugnancy between a general
and a special law or provision, the latter will
control the former without regard to the
respective dates of passage.19
Moreover, petitioner’s theory of implied
repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule
that an implied repeal is disfavored. T he
apparently conflicting provisions of a law or
two laws should be harmonized as much as
possible, so that each shall be effective.20
For a law to operate to repeal another law,
the two laws must actually be inconsistent.
The former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconcilable with the latter act.21 This
petitioner failed to establish.1avvphi1
The Court notes that petitioner would not
have encountered any problems in the
replacement passport had she opted to
continuously and consistently use her
maiden name from the moment she was
married and from the time she first applied
for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner
consciously chose to use her husband’s
surname before, in her previous passport
application, and now desires to resume her
maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s
present request, definitely nothing prevents
her in the future from requesting to revert to
the use of her husband’s surname. Such
unjustified changes in one's name and
identity in a passport, which is considered
superior to all other official documents,22
cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of
passport holders will arise. Thus, for
passport issuance purposes, a married
woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage
subsists, may not change her family name at
will.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a

privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicant’s constitutional right to travel.
However, the State is also mandated to
protect and maintain the integrity and
credibility of the passport and travel
documents proceeding from it23 as a
Philippine passport remains at all times the
property of the Government. The holder is
merely a possessor of the passport as long
as it is valid and the same may not be
surrendered to any person or entity other
than the government or its representative.24

As the OSG correctly pointed out:

[T]he issuance of passports is impressed

with public interest. A passport is an official
document of identity and nationality issued
to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries. It is issued by the
Philippine government to its citizens
requesting other governments to allow its
holder to pass safely and freely, and in case
of need, to give him/her aid and protection.
xxx

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is

within respondent’s competence to regulate
any amendments intended to be made
therein, including the denial of unreasonable
and whimsical requests for amendments
such as in the instant case.25

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We

AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2
August 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.

SO ORDERED.
 certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan"
and (2) gender from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

SUPREME COURT
Manila On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer
Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
SECOND DIVISION Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
In her petition, she alleged that she was
Petitioner, born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of
- versus - Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
Respondent. condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female
G.R. No. 166676 characteristics. She further alleged that she
was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy
Present: in her early years and at age six, underwent
an ultrasound where it was discovered that
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had
Carpio Morales, minimized, she has stopped growing and she
has no breast or menstrual development.
Tinga, She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
VELASCO, JR., and she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
BRION, JJ. such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be
Promulgated: changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

September 12, 2008 The petition was published in a newspaper of

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
general circulation for three (3) consecutive
weeks and was posted in conspicuous places
by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor
General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court raising purely questions of
law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1]
dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
which granted the Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth
To prove her claim, respondent testified and
presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent’s
condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally and
she has two sex organs – female and male.
He testified that this condition is very rare,
that respondent’s uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondent’s
condition is permanent and recommended
the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a
Decision dated January 12, 2005 which
reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the
reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear
and convincing proofs for the granting of his
petition. It was medically proven that
petitioner’s body produces male hormones,
and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to
be male. He is a normal person and wants to
be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil
Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered
to make the following corrections in the birth
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon
payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer
Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to
MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school
records, voter’s registry, baptismal
certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of
the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108
OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108
DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR
"GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE,
WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A
"MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial
court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent
to change her sex or gender, from female to
male, on the ground of her medical condition
known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is
fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent’s petition before the court a quo
did not implead the local civil registrar.5 The
OSG further contends respondent’s petition
is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change
of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent’s claimed medical condition
known as CAH does not make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that
although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in
the Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the
Petition, the Order to publish on December
16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings,8
respondent is actually a male person and
hence his birth certificate has to be corrected
to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of
sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10
and respondent substantially complied with
the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to
change his name shall present the petition to
the Regional Trial Court of the province in
which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila,
to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for
change of name shall be signed and verified
by the person desiring his name changed, or
some other person on his behalf, and shall
set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide
resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition
filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy
of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive
weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. The date set for the
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days
prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the
notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person
may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf
of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof
in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as
directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner, adjudge that
such name be changed in accordance with
the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or
orders rendered in connection with this rule
shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing
the same is situated, who shall forthwith
enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. – Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and
any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court
in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and
may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may
either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of
the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is
fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because respondent’s petition did not
implead the local civil registrar. Section 3,
Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceedings. Likewise,
the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the
correction of name in the civil registry. He is
an indispensable party without whom no
final determination of the case can be
had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings,
the same shall be considered as falling much
too short of the requirements of the rules.13
The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar
and all other persons who may have or may
claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.14 Respondent, however,
invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court which states that courts shall construe
the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the
matters brought before it. We agree that
there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil
Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as
clerical or typographical errors are involved.
The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the
civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It
is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in
the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4)
legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations;
(8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination
of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after
birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This
condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A
person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has
a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child
grows older, some features start to appear
male, such as deepening of the voice, facial
hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty.
About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are
born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that
involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the
term "intersexuality" to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either
male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of
a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary
sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. An
organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different
ways by different cultures. In most societies,
intersex individuals have been expected to
conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical
science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia
have had their genitalia surgically modified
to resemble either male or female
genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex
individual is considered as suffering from a
"disorder" which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication
in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright
denial. "It has been suggested that there is
some middle ground between the sexes, a
‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are
neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25]
The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female,
but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
In the instant case, if we determine
respondent to be a female, then there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. But if we determine, based
on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be
other than female, then a change in the
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent
with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent
has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent’s body system naturally produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen). As
a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia
and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual,
like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take
its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to arrest or interfere with what he was born
with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment
and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not.
He chose not to do so. Nature has instead
taken its due course in respondent’s
development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the
Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as
one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to
fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses
of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence
of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent
as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect
to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot
but respect how respondent deals with his
unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances
in this case.
As for respondent’s change of name under
Rule 103, this Court has held that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial
court’s grant of respondent’s change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change
of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that
respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find
merit in respondent’s change of name. Such
a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is

DENIED. The Decision dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33
of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191805 April 16, 2013

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE

WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR
S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT.
GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z.
OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO
M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA,
LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC
under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ,
ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR.
GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W.
SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST
LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE
E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C.
PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN,
Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 15 November 2011, the Court
promulgated its Decision in the present case,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the
Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No.
191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in
G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to
respondents former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos,
Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz,
Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan for
lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the
appropriate action with respect to any
possible liability or liabilities, within their
respective legal competence, that may have
been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor
lbrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen.
Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and
Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and
the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court
the results of their action within a period of
six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no
longer occupy their respective posts, the
directives mandated in this Decision and in
the Court of Appeals are enforceable against
the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions. Failure to comply with the
foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
After a careful examination of the records,
the Court was convinced that the Court of
Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence
proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military abducted petitioner Rodriguez on 6
September 2009, and detained and tortured
him until 17 September 2009.
Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office
of the Ombudsman to take further action,
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales sent
this Court a letter dated 23 May 2012,
requesting an additional two-month period,
or until 24 July 2012, within which to submit
a report. The Ombudsman stated that Noriel
Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his family refused
to cooperate with the investigation for
security reasons.
On 6 January 2012, respondents filed their
Motion for Reconsideration,1 arguing that
the soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military cannot be held accountable for
authoring the abduction and torture of
petitioner. Their arguments revolve solely on
the claim that respondents were never
specifically mentioned by name as having
performed, permitted, condoned, authorized,
or allowed the commission of any act or
incurrence omission which would violate or
threaten with violation the rights to life,
liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent
and his family.2
On 18 January 2013, the Ombudsman
submitted the Investigation Report, as
compliance with the Court’s directive to take
appropriate action with respect to possible
liabilities respondents may have incurred.
The exhaustive report detailed the steps
taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO)
of the Office of the Ombudsman, concluding
that no criminal, civil, or administrative
liabilities may be imputed to the
respondents. It was reflected therein that
the lawyers for the Rodriguezes had
manifested to the FIO that the latter are
hesitant to appear before them for security
reasons, viz:
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization
that provides legal assistance to victims of
human rights violations and their families)
could not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this
writing, the Rodriguezes refused to
participate in the present fact-finding
investigation ‘for security reasons.’ Atty.
Yambot disclosed (through a Manifestation
dated March 30, 2012 that despite efforts to
convince Noriel to participate in the present
proceedings, the latter ‘remains unconvinced
and unwilling to this date.’
Recent information, however, revealed that
Noriel and his family are no longer interested
in participating in the present case.
Instead of appearing before this Office for a
conference under oath, SPO1 Robert B.
Molina submitted an Affidavit dated June 13,
2012 stating that on September 15, 2009, at
around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, Wilma
H. Rodriguez appeared before the Gonzaga
Police Station and requested to enter into
the blotter that her son, Noriel, was allegedly
missing in Sitio Comunal, Gonzaga,
Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered
information relative to Wilma’s report "but
the community residence failed to reveal
anything".3
The other accounts – specifically that of
respondent Antonino C. Cruz, Special
Investigator II of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), as well as the claims of
respondents Mina and De Vera that they had
disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had become
an agent ("asset") of the 17th Infantry
Battalion – have been thoroughly evaluated
and ruled upon in our Decision. The OMB
further laments, "If only he (Noriel) could be
asked to verify the circumstances under
which he executed these subsequent
affidavits, his inconsistent claims will finally
be settled," and that "(I)f there is one
person who can attest on whether detention
and torture were indeed committed by any
of the Subjects herein, it is Noriel Rodriguez
himself, the supposed victim."4
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner
to appear or participate at this stage of the
proceedings due to security reasons does not
affect the rationale of the writ granted by the
CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case,
the issue of the existence of criminal, civil,
or administrative liability which may be
imputed to the respondents is not the
province of amparo proceedings -- rather,
the writ serves both preventive and curative
roles in addressing the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably
leading to subsequent investigation and
action.5 In this case then, the thrust of
ensuring that investigations are conducted
and the rights to life, liberty, and security of
the petitioner, remains.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even
administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence. The totality of evidence
as a standard for the grant of the writ was
correctly applied by this Court, as first laid
down in Razon v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced
in their totality, and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can
be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum
test.6 (Emphasis supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the
grant of the privilege of the writ by the CA,
and the present motion for reconsideration
raises no new issues that would convince us
otherwise.
Respondents’ claim that they were not
competently identified as the soldiers who
abducted and detained the petitioner, or that
there was no mention of their names in the
documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA
rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay7 as a meticulous and
straightforward account of his horrific ordeal
with the military, detailing the manner in
which he was captured and maltreated on
account of his suspected membership in the
NPA.8
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9
September 2009, he noticed a soldier with
the name tag "Matutina," who appeared to
be an official because the other soldiers
addressed him as "sir."9 He saw Matutina
again at 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009,
when his abductors took him to a military
operation in the mountains. His narration of
his suffering included an exhaustive
description of his physical surroundings,
personal circumstances, and perceived
observations. He likewise positively identified
respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col.
Mina to be present during his abduction,
detention and torture.10 These facts were
further corroborated by Hermie Antonio
Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16
September 2009,11 wherein he recounted in
detail the circumstances surrounding the
victim’s capture.
Respondents’ main contention in their Return
of the Writ was correctly deemed illogical
and contradictory by the CA. They claim that
Rodriguez had complained of physical
ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet
nevertheless signified his desire to become a
double-agent for the military. The CA stated:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP
members alleged that petitioner confided to
his military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that
petitioner could no longer stand the
hardships he experienced in the wilderness,
and that he wanted to become an ordinary
citizen again because of the empty promises
of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same
Return, respondents state that petitioner
agreed to become a double agent for the
military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-
NPA, so that he could get information
regarding the movement directly from the
source. If petitioner was tired of life in the
wilderness and desired to become an
ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he
would agree to become an undercover agent
and work alongside soldiers in the mountains
– or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the
hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.12
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents conveniently neglect to address
the findings of both the CA and this Court
that aside from the abduction of Rodriguez,
respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina,
had violated and threatened the former’s
right to security when they made a visual
recording of his house, as well as the photos
of his relatives. The CA found that the
soldiers even went as far as taking videos of
the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on
the wall of the house, and the innermost
portions of the house.13 There is no
reasonable justification for this violation of
the right to privacy and security of
petitioner’s abode, which strikes at the very
heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. More importantly, respondents also
neglect to address our ruling that the failure
to conduct a fair and effective investigation
similarly amounted to a violation of, or
threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty,
and security.14
The writ’s curative role is an
acknowledgment that the violation of the
right to life, liberty, and security may be
caused not only by a public official’s act, but
also by his omission. Accountability may
attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.15 The duty to
investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective.16

The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado,

PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina
conducted a perfunctory investigation which
relied solely on the accounts of the military.
Thus, the CA correctly held that the
investigation was superficial, one-sided, and
depended entirely on the report prepared by
1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were
undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of
the incident, and no witnesses were
questioned regarding it.17 The CA also took
into account the palpable lack of effort from
respondent Versoza, as the chief of the
Philippine National Police.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED
with FINALITY. Let a copy of this Resolution
be furnished the Ombudsman for whatever
appropriate action she may still take under
circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191805 April 16, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR
S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT.
GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z.
OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO
M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA,
LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC
under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ,
ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 193160

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE

WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR.
GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W.
SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST
LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE
E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C.
PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN,
Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 15 November 2011, the Court
promulgated its Decision in the present case,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the
Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No.
191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in
G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to
respondents former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos,
Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz,
Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan for
lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the
appropriate action with respect to any
possible liability or liabilities, within their
respective legal competence, that may have
been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor
lbrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen.
Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and
Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and
the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court
the results of their action within a period of
six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no
longer occupy their respective posts, the
directives mandated in this Decision and in
the Court of Appeals are enforceable against
the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions. Failure to comply with the
foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
After a careful examination of the records,
the Court was convinced that the Court of
Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence
proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military abducted petitioner Rodriguez on 6
September 2009, and detained and tortured
him until 17 September 2009.
Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office
of the Ombudsman to take further action,
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales sent
this Court a letter dated 23 May 2012,
requesting an additional two-month period,
or until 24 July 2012, within which to submit
a report. The Ombudsman stated that Noriel
Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his family refused
to cooperate with the investigation for
security reasons.
On 6 January 2012, respondents filed their
Motion for Reconsideration,1 arguing that
the soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military cannot be held accountable for
authoring the abduction and torture of
petitioner. Their arguments revolve solely on
the claim that respondents were never
specifically mentioned by name as having
performed, permitted, condoned, authorized,
or allowed the commission of any act or
incurrence omission which would violate or
threaten with violation the rights to life,
liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent
and his family.2
On 18 January 2013, the Ombudsman
submitted the Investigation Report, as
compliance with the Court’s directive to take
appropriate action with respect to possible
liabilities respondents may have incurred.
The exhaustive report detailed the steps
taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO)
of the Office of the Ombudsman, concluding
that no criminal, civil, or administrative
liabilities may be imputed to the
respondents. It was reflected therein that
the lawyers for the Rodriguezes had
manifested to the FIO that the latter are
hesitant to appear before them for security
reasons, viz:
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization
that provides legal assistance to victims of
human rights violations and their families)
could not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this
writing, the Rodriguezes refused to
participate in the present fact-finding
investigation ‘for security reasons.’ Atty.
Yambot disclosed (through a Manifestation
dated March 30, 2012 that despite efforts to
convince Noriel to participate in the present
proceedings, the latter ‘remains unconvinced
and unwilling to this date.’
Recent information, however, revealed that
Noriel and his family are no longer interested
in participating in the present case.
Instead of appearing before this Office for a
conference under oath, SPO1 Robert B.
Molina submitted an Affidavit dated June 13,
2012 stating that on September 15, 2009, at
around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, Wilma
H. Rodriguez appeared before the Gonzaga
Police Station and requested to enter into
the blotter that her son, Noriel, was allegedly
missing in Sitio Comunal, Gonzaga,
Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered
information relative to Wilma’s report "but
the community residence failed to reveal
anything".3
The other accounts – specifically that of
respondent Antonino C. Cruz, Special
Investigator II of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), as well as the claims of
respondents Mina and De Vera that they had
disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had become
an agent ("asset") of the 17th Infantry
Battalion – have been thoroughly evaluated
and ruled upon in our Decision. The OMB
further laments, "If only he (Noriel) could be
asked to verify the circumstances under
which he executed these subsequent
affidavits, his inconsistent claims will finally
be settled," and that "(I)f there is one
person who can attest on whether detention
and torture were indeed committed by any
of the Subjects herein, it is Noriel Rodriguez
himself, the supposed victim."4
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner
to appear or participate at this stage of the
proceedings due to security reasons does not
affect the rationale of the writ granted by the
CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case,
the issue of the existence of criminal, civil,
or administrative liability which may be
imputed to the respondents is not the
province of amparo proceedings -- rather,
the writ serves both preventive and curative
roles in addressing the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably
leading to subsequent investigation and
action.5 In this case then, the thrust of
ensuring that investigations are conducted
and the rights to life, liberty, and security of
the petitioner, remains.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even
administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence. The totality of evidence
as a standard for the grant of the writ was
correctly applied by this Court, as first laid
down in Razon v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced
in their totality, and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can
be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum
test.6 (Emphasis supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the
grant of the privilege of the writ by the CA,
and the present motion for reconsideration
raises no new issues that would convince us
otherwise.
Respondents’ claim that they were not
competently identified as the soldiers who
abducted and detained the petitioner, or that
there was no mention of their names in the
documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA
rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay7 as a meticulous and
straightforward account of his horrific ordeal
with the military, detailing the manner in
which he was captured and maltreated on
account of his suspected membership in the
NPA.8
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9
September 2009, he noticed a soldier with
the name tag "Matutina," who appeared to
be an official because the other soldiers
addressed him as "sir."9 He saw Matutina
again at 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009,
when his abductors took him to a military
operation in the mountains. His narration of
his suffering included an exhaustive
description of his physical surroundings,
personal circumstances, and perceived
observations. He likewise positively identified
respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col.
Mina to be present during his abduction,
detention and torture.10 These facts were
further corroborated by Hermie Antonio
Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16
September 2009,11 wherein he recounted in
detail the circumstances surrounding the
victim’s capture.
Respondents’ main contention in their Return
of the Writ was correctly deemed illogical
and contradictory by the CA. They claim that
Rodriguez had complained of physical
ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet
nevertheless signified his desire to become a
double-agent for the military. The CA stated:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP
members alleged that petitioner confided to
his military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that
petitioner could no longer stand the
hardships he experienced in the wilderness,
and that he wanted to become an ordinary
citizen again because of the empty promises
of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same
Return, respondents state that petitioner
agreed to become a double agent for the
military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-
NPA, so that he could get information
regarding the movement directly from the
source. If petitioner was tired of life in the
wilderness and desired to become an
ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he
would agree to become an undercover agent
and work alongside soldiers in the mountains
– or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the
hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.12
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents conveniently neglect to address
the findings of both the CA and this Court
that aside from the abduction of Rodriguez,
respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina,
had violated and threatened the former’s
right to security when they made a visual
recording of his house, as well as the photos
of his relatives. The CA found that the
soldiers even went as far as taking videos of
the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on
the wall of the house, and the innermost
portions of the house.13 There is no
reasonable justification for this violation of
the right to privacy and security of
petitioner’s abode, which strikes at the very
heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. More importantly, respondents also
neglect to address our ruling that the failure
to conduct a fair and effective investigation
similarly amounted to a violation of, or
threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty,
and security.14
The writ’s curative role is an
acknowledgment that the violation of the
right to life, liberty, and security may be
caused not only by a public official’s act, but
also by his omission. Accountability may
attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.15 The duty to
investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective.16
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado,
PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina
conducted a perfunctory investigation which
relied solely on the accounts of the military.
Thus, the CA correctly held that the
investigation was superficial, one-sided, and
depended entirely on the report prepared by
1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were
undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of
the incident, and no witnesses were
questioned regarding it.17 The CA also took
into account the palpable lack of effort from
respondent Versoza, as the chief of the
Philippine National Police.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED
with FINALITY. Let a copy of this Resolution
be furnished the Ombudsman for whatever
appropriate action she may still take under
circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S.
DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an
opportunity to define the evolving metes and
bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an
employee invoke the remedies available
under such writ where an employer decides
to transfer her workplace on the basis of
copies of an anonymous letter posted therein
─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company
and calling for her to leave, which imputation
it investigated but fails to inform her of the
details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as
Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was
posted at the door of the Metering Office of
the Administration building of MERALCO
Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent
is assigned, denouncing respondent. The
letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG
BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the
lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed
about it, respondent reported the matter on
June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the
Philippine National Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008,
petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of
MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing,
directed the transfer of respondent to
MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as
"A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in
light of the receipt of "… reports that there
were accusations and threats directed
against [her] from unknown individuals and
which could possibly compromise [her]
safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008
addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula,
Vice-President and Head of MERALCO’s
Human Resource Administration, appealed
her transfer and requested for a dialogue so
she could voice her concerns and misgivings
on the matter, claiming that the "punitive"
nature of the transfer amounted to a denial
of due process. Citing the grueling travel
from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang
and back entails, and violation of the
provisions on job security of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent
expressed her thoughts on the alleged
threats to her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if
you could have intimated to me the nature
of the alleged accusations and threats so
that at least I could have found out if these
are credible or even serious. But as you
stated, these came from unknown individuals
and the way they were handled, it appears
that the veracity of these accusations and
threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful
or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only,
that the alleged threats exist as the
management apparently believe, then my
transfer to an unfamiliar place and
environment which will make me a "sitting
duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real
intent of management which is contrary to
its expressed concern on my security and
safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on
the rationale for management’s initiated
transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me
that instead of the management supposedly
extending favor to me, the net result and
effect of management action would be a
punitive one.4 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the
deferment of the implementation of her
transfer pending resolution of the issues she
raised.
No response to her request having been
received, respondent filed a petition5 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
213-M-2008.
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’
unlawful act and omission consisting of their
continued failure and refusal to provide her
with details or information about the alleged
report which MERALCO purportedly received
concerning threats to her safety and security
amount to a violation of her right to privacy
in life, liberty and security, correctible by
habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the
issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to
file a written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information
about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the
alleged threat to her safety and security; the
nature of such data and the purpose for its
collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to
ensure the confidentiality of such data or
information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or
information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting
her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of
the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file
their verified written return. And by Order of
September 5, 2008, the trial court granted
respondent’s application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the
petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds
that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of
habeas data was not in order; and the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the case which
properly belongs to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).7
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the
trial court granted the prayers of respondent
including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to
desist from implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that petitioners
comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring
that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas
data should extend not only to victims of
extra-legal killings and political activists but
also to ordinary citizens, like respondent
whose rights to life and security are
jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide
her with information or data on the reported
threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under
Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data9
contending that 1) the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain
MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to
transfer the place of work of its employees,
and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the
parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over what they contend is clearly a labor
dispute, petitioners argue that "although
ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas
data, respondent is essentially questioning
the transfer of her place of work by her
employer"11 and the terms and conditions of
her employment which arise from an
employer-employee relationship over which
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under
Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had
no authority to restrain the implementation
of the Memorandum transferring
respondent’s place of work which is purely a
management prerogative, and that OCA-
Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits
the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in
labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the
issuance of the writ only against public
officials or employees, or private individuals
or entities engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information
regarding an aggrieved party’s person,
family or home; and that MERALCO (or its
officers) is clearly not engaged in such
activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from
complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the Alabang
Sector, under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of
petitioners, does not fall within the province
of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed
to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is
meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational
privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty
and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of
amparo, habeas data was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and
available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to
address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under
prevailing Rules.13
move." Her posture unwittingly concedes
that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the
Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-
M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is,
accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis

laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the
writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT
issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor
are vague or doubtful.16 Employment
constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the
Constitution.17 It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate
concern respecting the terms and conditions
of one’s employment - are what prompted
her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of
habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns
is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from

the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-
a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To
argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received on the
threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes
these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of
her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all."18 And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of
work "betray[s] the real intent of
management]" and could be a "punitive
 The individual's desire for privacy is never
absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual
is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the
desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to
others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the
society in which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners
herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB,
which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne

Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were,
during the period material, graduating high
school students at St. Theresa's College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January
2012, while changing into their swimsuits for
a beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several others,
took digital pictures of themselves clad only
in their undergarments. These pictures were
then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan
(Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T.
2014 Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at
STC’s high school department, learned from
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. her students that some seniors at STC
MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, posted pictures online, depicting themselves
vs. from the waist up, dressed only in
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. brassieres. Escudero then asked her
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents. students if they knew who the girls in the
photos are. In turn, they readily identified
DECISION Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada
(Chloe), among others.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students
logged in to their respective personal
Facebook accounts and showed her photos
of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia
and Julienne along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s
students claimed that there were times when
access to or the availability of the identified
students’ photos was not confined to the
girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the
matter and, through one of her student’s
Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine
Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-
Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC found the
identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the
school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the
school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene
or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages
in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy
behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages, language or
symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading
pictures on the Internet that entail ample
body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela,
and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office
of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr.
Purisima), STC’s high school principal and
ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during
the meeting, they were castigated and
verbally abused by the STC officials present
in the conference, including Assistant
Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda
Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr.
Purisima informed their parents the following
day that, as part of their penalty, they are
barred from joining the commencement
exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23,
2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan
(Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and
Damages before the RTC of Cebu City
against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that
defendants therein be enjoined from
implementing the sanction that precluded
Angela from joining the commencement
exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave
Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined
the fray as an intervenor. On March 28,
2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-
38594 filed their memorandum, containing
printed copies of the photographs in issue as
annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing
the students to attend the graduation
ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC,
nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students
from participating in the graduation rites,
arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted
motion for reconsideration on the issuance
ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8
on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their
undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their
swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s
Facebook accounts was set at "Friends
Only." They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of
education, knew or ought to have known of
laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to
have known that the girls, whose privacy has
been invaded, are the victims in this case,
and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing
the photos, the minors were called
"immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls
and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however,
violated their rights by saving digital copies
of the photos and by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’ children were
intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts,
as well as the copying of information, data,
and digital images happened at STC’s
Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were
extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum
submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the
interplay of the foregoing constitutes an
invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus,
prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe
issued; (b) respondents be ordered to
surrender and deposit with the court all soft
and printed copies of the subjectdata before
or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after
trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced,
spread and used, to have been illegally
obtained inviolation of the children’s right to
privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, the RTC, through an Order dated
July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data.
Through the same Order, herein respondents
were directed to file their verified written
return, together with the supporting
affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the
RTC’s directive and filed their verified written
return, laying down the following grounds for
the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners
are not the proper parties to file the petition;
(b) petitioners are engaging in forum
shopping; (c) the instant case is not one
where a writ of habeas data may issue;and
(d) there can be no violation of their right to
privacy as there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a
Decision dismissing the petition for habeas
data. The dispositive portion of the Decision
pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the
aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove
the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one
of the preconditions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a
quoheld that the photos, having been
uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as
to who may view them, lost their privacy in
some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal
means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and
rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners
now come before this Court pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis
case is whether or not a writ of habeas
datashould be issued given the factual
milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy,
however, is the pivotal point of whether or
not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in
this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability
of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It
is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the
Court aimed to protect an individual’s right
to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas dataas "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age."13 The writ, however,
will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information
about a person.Availment of the writ
requires the existence of a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the
other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s
right to informational privacy and a showing,
at least by substantial evidence, of an actual
or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ
may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first
place to the right to informational privacy, a
habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed
from the perspective of the case at bar,this
requisite begs this question: given the
nature of an online social network (OSN)––
(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time
interaction among millions, if not billions, of
users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging
the gap created by physical space; and (2)
that any information uploaded in OSNs
leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s
databases, which are outside the control of
the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its
users? Before addressing this point, We must
first resolve the procedural issues in this
case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only
confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the
Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely
for the purpose of complementing the Writ of
Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party
may file a petition for the writ of habeas
data. However, in cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, the petition
may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of
the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to
narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of
habeas data situations, would not have been
made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age."17 As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the annotations
to the Rule preparedby the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court, after
explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed
out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be
availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy.
The remedies against the violation of such
right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database
or information or files in possession or in
control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas
data writ may not issue against STC, it not
being an entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party, while
valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would
suggest that the habeas data protection shall
be available only against abuses of a person
or entity engaged in the businessof
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As
provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas
datais a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper
context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the
idea that habeas data is a protection against
unlawful acts or omissions of public officials
and of private individuals or entities engaged
in gathering, collecting, or storing data about
the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family.
Such individual or entity need not be in the
business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from
undertaking a business endeavour. To
"engage" means "to do or take part in
something."19 It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or
entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether
such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour,
for any other reason or even for no reason at
all, is immaterial and such will not prevent
the writ from getting to said person or
entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument,
would mean unduly limiting the reach of the
writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data
gathering and storage, and in the process
decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan
instrument designed to protect a right which
is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and
communications technology––a right which a
great majority of the users of technology
themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the
case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.
The right to informational privacy on
Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time,
greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part
therein. This evolution was briefly recounted
in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20
where he explained the three strands of the
right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or
situational privacy;21 (2) informational
privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the
three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
the right to informational privacy––usually
defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues
for information gathering and data sharing
nowadays, not to mention each system’s
inherent vulnerability to attacks and
intrusions, there is more reason that every
individual’s right to control said flow of
information should be protected and that
each individual should have at least a
reasonable expectation of privacy in
cyberspace. Several commentators regarding
privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of
OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded
in reasonable expectations, but rather in
some theoretical protocol better known as
wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw
the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy.25 In the
same vein, the South African High Court, in
its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26
promulgated on January30, 2013,
recognized that "[t]he law has to take into
account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will
lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x
x It is imperative that the courts respond
appropriately to changing times, acting
cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with
this, the Court, by developing what may be
viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of
habeas data, in effect, recognized that,
generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace
activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent
is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Bear in mind that informational privacy
involves personal information. At the same
time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have
otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to
the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to
give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the
sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services provided
by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
with millions of personal bulletin boards or
"walls," the contents of which are under the
control of each and every user. In his or her
bulletin board, a user/owner can post
anything––from text, to pictures, to music
and videos––access to which would depend
on whether he or she allows one, some or all
of the other users to see his or her posts.
Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the
creation of various social networking sites,
includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which,
according to its developers, people use "to
stay connected with friends and family, to
discover what’s going on in the world, and to
share and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established
through the process of "friending" another
user. By sending a "friend request," the user
invites another to connect their accounts so
that they can view any and all "Public" and
"Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the
request is accepted, the link is established
and both users are permitted to view the
other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts,
among others. "Friending," therefore, allows
the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the
user gives his or her "Facebook friend"
access to his or her profile and shares
certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but
without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed
to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile31 as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the
users to "customize their privacy settings,"
but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states
in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate
the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or "wall," except for the
user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his
or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every
Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s
Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook
friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only
to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be
viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to
Facebook users, designed to set up barriers
to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her
specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of
view. In other words, Facebook extends its
users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice
as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] – and to put others
in the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting
will be based on one’s desire to interact with
others, coupled with the opposing need to
withhold certain information as well as to
regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy
setting becomes more limiting, fewer
Facebook users can view that user’s
particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’
right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’
contention that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in
context, be correct. However, such is not the
case. It is through the availability of said
privacy tools that many OSN users are said
to have a subjective expectation that only
those to whomthey grant access to their
profile will view the information they post or
upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany
Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy inall of his or her
Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of
privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners,manifest the intention
to keepcertain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of these
privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her
right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to
make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post orprofile detail
should not be denied the informational
privacy right which necessarily accompanies
said choice.38 Otherwise, using these
privacy tools would be a feckless exercise,
such that if, for instance, a user uploads a
photo or any personal information to his or
her Facebook page and sets its privacy level
at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the
user or a chosen few can view it, said photo
would still be deemed public by the courts as
if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if
adopted, will not only strip these privacy
tools of their function but it would also
disregard the very intention of the user to
keep said photo or information within the
confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the
images in question were visible to other
Facebook users and whether the disclosure
was confidential in nature. In other words,
did the minors limit the disclosure of the
photos such that the images were kept
within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the
issue of whether the minors carved out a
zone of privacy when the photos were
uploaded to Facebook so that the images will
be protected against unauthorized access
and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about
their children’s privacy right being violated,
insist that Escudero intruded upon their
children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded
copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos
to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the
minors’ privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very
private" or "Only Friends" setting
safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately,
they posit that their children’s disclosure was
only limited since their profiles were not
open to public viewing. Therefore, according
to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred
from accessing said post without their
knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded
the subjectphotos which were only viewable
by the five of them,40 although who these
five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her
affidavit41 that "my students showed me
some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This
student [sic] of mine informed me that these
are senior high school [students] of STC,
who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x
They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook
accounts of these girls. At the computer lab,
these students then logged into their
Facebook account [sic], and accessed from
there the various photographs x x x. They
even told me that there had been times
when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not
confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight
to the minors’ testimonies for one key
reason: failure to question the students’ act
of showing the photos to Tigol disproves
their allegation that the photos were
viewable only by the five of them. Without
any evidence to corroborate their statement
that the images were visible only to the five
of them, and without their challenging
Escudero’s claim that the other students
were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners
disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook
"friends," showed her the photos using their
own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to
viewthe allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and
that it is reasonable to assume, therefore,
that the photos were, in reality, viewable
either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2)
by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for
Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent
any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is
most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the
Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery,
particularly under circumstances suchas
here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would
have controlled access to the Web page or
the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that
"[t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that
is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends
only" does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the
cyber community is agreed that the digital
images under this setting still remain to be
outside the confines of the zones of privacy
in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more
open and connected by giving its users the
tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users
"befriend" other users who are total
strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user
has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49
the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are
not Facebook friends with the former,
despite its being visible only tohis or her own
Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that
setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no
longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the
content. The user’s own Facebook friend can
share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or when a
person is tagged, the respective Facebook
friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook
friends and B has 200. A and B are not
Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend,
tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends,"
the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook
friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s
100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the
public, depending upon B’s privacy setting).
As a result, the audience who can view the
post is effectively expanded––and to a very
large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses,
is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity
towards user interaction and socialization
rather than seclusion or privacy, as it
encourages broadcasting of individual user
posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs
have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization
of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a
profile, or even a post, with visibility set at
"Friends Only" cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be "very private,"
contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in
issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC
can hardly be taken to task for the perceived
privacy invasion since it was the minors’
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to
Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of
what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information
as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the
said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with
the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their
parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images
to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their
contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what
petitioners attributed to respondents as an
act of offensive disclosure was no more than
the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum
submitted to the trial court in connection
with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are
not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights, contrary to
petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the
images in question, or to be more precise,
the photos of minor students scantily clad,
are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of
the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft
of any evidence, other than bare assertions
that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings
to make the photos visible only to them or to
a select few. Without proof that they placed
the photographs subject of this case within
the ambit of their protected zone of privacy,
they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the
photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe
pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact list has
been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the "Custom" setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances,
the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the
one between your children’s ears."53 This
means that self-regulation on the part of
OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral
is the best means of avoiding privacy rights
violations.54 As a cyberspace
communitymember, one has to be proactive
in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is
in this regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail.Responsible social
networking or observance of the
"netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has
been the concern of many due to the
widespreadnotion that teenagers can
sometimes go too far since they generally
lack the people skills or general wisdom to
conduct themselves sensibly in a public
forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and
incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its
students on proper online conduct may be
mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a
number of schools and organizations have
already deemed it important to include
digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin
their respective programs and curricula in
view of the risks that the children are
exposed to every time they participate in
online activities.58 Furthermore, considering
the complexity of the cyber world and its
pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that
these children are wittingly or unwittingly
exposed to in view of their unsupervised
activities in cyberspace, the participation of
the parents in disciplining and educating
their children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these institutions
and organizations. In fact, it is believed that
"to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for
parental involvement and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being
steadfast in its duty of teaching its students
to beresponsible in their dealings and
activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs,
whenit enforced the disciplinary actions
specified in the Student Handbook, absenta
showing that, in the process, it violated the
students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that
they expose themselves to whenever they
engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1
Accordingly, they should be cautious enough
to control their privacy and to exercise sound
discretion regarding how much information
about themselves they are willing to give up.
Internet consumers ought to be aware that,
by entering or uploading any kind of data or
information online, they are automatically
and inevitably making it permanently
available online, the perpetuation of which is
outside the ambit of their control.
Furthermore, and more importantly,
information, otherwise private, voluntarily
surrendered by them can be opened, read,
or copied by third parties who may or may
not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to

exercise due diligence in their online dealings
and activities and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights. Equity serves the
vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts,
as here, requires that claimants themselves
take utmost care in safeguarding a right
which they allege to have been violated.
These are indispensable. We cannot afford
protection to persons if they themselves did
nothing to place the matter within the
confines of their private zone. OSN users
must be mindful enough to learn the use of
privacy tools, to use them if they desire to
keep the information private, and to keep
track of changes in the available privacy
settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for
changing these settings and the site's layout
often.

In finding that respondent STC and its

officials did not violate the minors' privacy
rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and case disposition of the court
a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not

belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.