ASPECTS OF ACCEPTABILITY’

BY

GEORGE MYRO

Ifind myself in a state of a philosophical Dr. Jekyll

and Mr. Hyde. Surmising that my predicament is not entirely idiosyncratic— not
to say: idiotic— I parade it before you in the hope of provoking, ultimately, a
more single vision. My division into Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde arises out of being
bothered by the following question. What makes a theory—particularly, a phil­
osophical one—acceptable: that is, such that, as far as we can tell, it is true?
Merely by way of illustration, let me cite a particular philosophical view which
1 find appealing and ruminate on the question of its acceptability. So let me split
myself into Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.
jekyll believes that, along with various other things, there are, first, such
asbstract entities as “ propositions,” “ attributes,” and the like, and second, states
of consciousness, such as experiences, thoughts, desires, intentions, and the
like. Items of the second sort he regards as cases of standing in one or another,
specially “ mental”, relation to one or another item of the first sort. This is, of
course, very vague and, perhaps, implausible. But my concern is not to articulate
or defend a precise ontological view. Rather, it is to consider how such a view
might be defended: what does or would make it acceptable or not.
Jekyll thinks that his view (about propositions, etc.) is acceptable, ultimately,
in part because of its being incorporated in an acceptable theory of language,
or in what one may make bold to call its Frege-Grice-Schiffer fragment, a part
of which may be sketched with summary crudeness as follows.
Sentences “express” propositions. This is to be explicated in terms of there
being a general expectation (“convention” ?) that speakers generally utter a sen­
tence intending (in a certain manner) to get the audience to have in mind a certain
proposition—the one (or one of those) said to be “expressed” by the sentence,
most often with the intention that the audience take up an attitude (e.g., belief)
towards that proposition or another suitably related one (which is “ implicated”,
perhaps “conversationally” ).
If something like this is to be part of the acceptable theory of language, then
we shall have propositions and “propositional attitudes”, which provide us with
an opening towards states of consciousness (an opening which 1 will not attempt
to widen at present).
Among various objections that one may raise against Jekyll’s line of defense,
there is one that is particularly pertinent to my predicament. This is that there

Pacific PhUosophical Quarterly 62 ( 1981) 107-117. (X).^I -5621 /81/0200-0107$() 1. 10

Copynghl O 1981 by University of Southern California

107
108 PACinC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

are plenty of good looking theories dealing with language which, on the one
hand, do not postulate propositions or do not have recourse to propositional
attitudes, or both, and which, on the other, seem to compete well with the so-
called Frege-Grice-Schiffer fragment.
JekylTs reply to this objection begins by raising an issue which gives rise to
my predicament. There is indeed, Jekyll would say, a welter of variously com­
peting and sometimes unconnected theories dealing with language— a sort of
creative chaos. And this is in part because of a lack of clarity about what makes
a given theory (or thesis) dealing with language acceptable or not.
This is meant to be an epistemological question. So the answer “being true”
is ruled out. In other fields, particularly the natural sciences, we seem to be able
to give epistemological answers, such as— for example, being (part of) the
simplest theory which explains the data.
Jekyll himself is strongly attracted to the view that the epistemological answer
given by way of illustration for the case of the natural sciences is to be accepted
and generalized across the board. Indeed, with a vengeance: it is to be applied,
in the first instance, to our “ total theory” of the world. What is acceptable as
the total theory of the world is the simplest theory which explains the “ totality”
of the data (I should say that I use “theory” throughout somewhat misleadingly
to include both law-like generalizations and plain fact statements such as that
there is a black hole in such and such locus in the sky). Particular theories of
this or that, such as theory of language, and even isolated statements, are ac­
ceptable just in case they are “part” of the acceptable total theory. This is, of
course, a view which is or is rather like Quine’s.
No doubt, further elucidation is welcome. But one point should be made here.
The condition being adumbrated is intended as the condition of ""serious*’ ac­
ceptability: acceptability of theory as “ limning the true and ultimate structure
of reality” (in Quine’s words). It does not preclude other forms of “ acceptability”,
which I shall, by way of chiaroscuro, label summarily: pretended, for practical
purposes, acceptability. An illustration of this might be a case in which, for
certain practical purposes, it is useful, perhaps even indispensable, to treat atoms
as elastic spheres. Another illustration of this might be a case in which talk of
the average American, Swede, etc. is used to abbreviate certain seriously ac­
ceptable talk.
Well, then, Jekyll asks: how do the various competing theories dealing with
language fare when assessed for acceptability? Almost always, it is not clear
what the theories are supposed to do. Is it to explain, perhaps with the assistance
of a further theory, some body of data? What further theory? Which data? What
manner of explanation? Often when one of these questions is answered, another
recedes further into obscurity. For instance, Quine tells us what the data for
“radical translations” are and what theories we may wish to come up with. But
what is the relationship between the theories and the data? Is it one of explanation?
Are “translation-manuals” and “ analytical hypotheses” supposed to prcdict/post-
dict verbal behavior, perhaps with assistance of further theory? Is Davidsonian
“ theory of truth” similarly supposed to predict/postdict displays of “ linguistic
competence” ? Similar questions can be asked about the other competitors.
 ASPECTS OF ACCEPTABILITY 109
To be sure, I am harping on a rather narrow notion of “explaining” (within
an arguably narrow notion of acceptability as being simplest data-explaining).
But what are the alternatives? What is it (not necessarily one the same thing)
which makes generative grammar, logical theory, semantical theory, speech act
theory acceptable?
As we have already seen, Jekyll is inclined to cleave to the narrow notion of
acceptability and, with misgivings, to something like the narrow notion of ex­
plaining. In his view, the data are sayings, writings, and doings—and, on another
level, ultimately thinkings, wantings, and sensings, and certain features of them.
These are to be explained in some manner closely related to predicting/post-
dicting. The simplest theory which will do this, he thinks, is one that incorporates
some compound of theory of language together with psychological theory.
In line with this, he favors the Frege-Grice-Schiffer fragment. For is it not
almost ready to be plugged into psychological theory in order to explain linguistic
behavior and other human functioning by the intentions, beliefs, desires, and
experiences of human beings?
Such, then are (some of) JekylTs views. But the entrance cue for Mr. Hyde
has sounded.

11

Hyde agrees with Jekyll that a theory is (seriously) acceptable just in case it
is the simplest theory which explains the data. He is quite willing to go along
with applying this, in the first instance, to determine what the acceptable total
theory is and with assessing subtheories or isolated theses by whether they are
part of the acceptable total theory. He is willing to go along with JekylTs view
of explaining as something rather like predicting/postdicting. He demurs at some­
thing Jekyll slipped in toward the end about “data”.
If by ‘sayings, writings, and doings’ is meant human behavior properly de­
scribed, Hyde would say, I certainly count these among the data. Of course, we
must not leave out from among the data the doings of non-human material
objects. However, let us not pause for a precise delimitation of data. What I
demur at is the inclusion among data of whatever is supposed to be represented
by the phrase ‘thinkings, sensings, and wantings, and certain features of them’.
For, insofar as I understand the phrase, the items supposed to be covered by
it are surely “theoretical”, postulated by a psychological theory supposed to
explain human behavior. You yourself, Jekyll, said as much, when you defended
propositional attitudes, by maintaining that they will show up in the acceptable
theory of langauge cum psychological theory. So, on your own view, they are
not data. (Obiter dictum: we see here a lineament of the “other minds” problem.)
But, Hyde would continue, 1 shall go further and say that propositional attitudes
and the like, and, along with them, propositions and the like, are not (seriously)
acceptable as postulated “ theoretical” items either. For we have every reason to
think that the simplest theory which explains the behavior of human and non­
human material objects—which is all the data there are— is physical theory,
assisted, to be sure, by set theory. And wc have every reason to think that.
110 PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

whatever advances it may undergo, physical theory cum set theory will talk—
at least, in its primitive notation— about such things as particles, fields, or what­
nots, and sets of these, etc., but certainly not of propositional attitudes or anything
of the sort.
Surely, material objects, including human beings, are assemblages of particles
or what-nots, and “ sayings, writings, and doings” are vibrations of the air
produced by these, ink-tracks left by these, movements of parts of these, and
effects of this upon further assemblages of particles or what-nots. And surely,
all this in most simply explained by interactions among the particles or what­
nots, and there is no room for anything of the sort of propositional attitudes,
etc., to play any explanatory role. So I say that nothing outside physical theory
cum set theory is required to explain all the data there are, and no theory outside
of physical theory cum set theory is seriously acceptable.
Consequently, I view with amusement and amazement your efforts to defend
the “theory of language” you favor against its so-called competitors and the
squabbles among those competitors. For there is no seriously acceptable “theory
of grammar”, “ logical theory”, “semantical theory”, or “ speech act theory”.
There is no seriously acceptable theory other than physical theory and set-theory.
Of course, I don’t deny, Hyde might continue, that such theories might be
acceptable in a way. You yourself, Jekyll, have used the example of a theory
according to which atoms are elastic spheres, which might be useful and even
indispensable for certain practical purposes. And you used an example of talk
of the average American, Swede, etc., used to abbreviate certain seriously ac­
ceptable talk. And you introduced the notion of “pretended acceptability for
practical purposes”. I have no quarrel with this. If psychological theories and
theories of language are needed in some such way, have them. Call them “pretend-
acceptable for practical purposes”. But, for God’s sake, don’t squabble about
them. It doesn’t matter whether such theories postulate sentences, propositons,
or Olympian gods. All that matters is that these theories do whatever job they
are supposed to do and do it as commodiously as possible. After all, they are
not supposed to be “ limning the true and ultimate structure of reality”. Physical
theory and set theory have pre-empted this job. The job(s) of your pretend-
theories must be quite different. And can it matter to the performance of that
job (those jobs) whether a theory postulates “ sentences”— which, as sets con­
structed in a certain way out of ink-marks, are “ real”, as attested by set-theory
cum physical theory— or “propositions”, which are not, or engages in (merely
apparent!) ontological excess and postulates both? Can it matter whether it talks
of “propositional attitudes” or “ sentential attitudes”, neither of which are to be
found in the world? Remember that your atoms-as-elastic-spheres theory would
be no worse off if it postulated little springs attached to the atoms, as long as
it did its job. And your talk of the average American would be no worse off if
it assigned to him, along with his three and a half children, a soul with a post­
mortem survival of 15.2 years, if that did a useful abbreviatory job.
So, I say to you, Jekyll: there are no propositions, there are sentences. But
for theory of language this is of no importance. In it you might (“ pretend”-)
postulate propositions as well as anything else. 1 myself don’t see that you should
 ASPECTS OF ACCEPTABILITY 111

have in it even sentences (though I suppose that’s “natural”). And that is, because,
in a way, I agree with you: It’s quite unclear what job theory of language is
supposed to perform, what practical purpose(s) it’s supposed to serve. If we
became clear about that, then, perhaps, we could see what sort of theory would
do the job commodiously. And it might be one with propositions. But that would
tell us nothing about what’s “ really” the case.
Such, then, is what Hyde thinks.

Ill

One serious difficulty with Hyde’s view is— as the reflective listener may have
noticed—that apparently, Hyde cannot, in all consistency, hold and propound
it as seriously acceptable, as “ limning the true and ultimate structure of reality”,
but at most for some “ practical purpose”. That is, he cannot consistently maintain
his view and further hold that what he thus maintains is seriously acceptable.
To make the matter clearer I shall outline a line of reasoning:

Premise 1: Physical theory cum set theory is the simplest theory which explains the data.
Premise 2: A given thesis t is seriously acceptable (if and) only if t is “part” of the
simplest theory which explains the data. We must infer: Thesis t is seriously acceptable
only if it is “part” of physical theory cum set theory.
Premise 3: Neither Premise 1 or 2 is “part” of physical theory cum set theory.
We must infer: neither Premise 1 nor Premise 2 is seriously acceptable.

Let us, first, observe that the line of reasoning demonstrates that Premises
1, 2, and 3 are such that if all three are true, then not all three are seriously
acceptable, and by contraposition and a triviality, if all three are seriously ac­
ceptable then not all three are true.
So, insofar as Hyde’s view boils down to the combinaton of Premises 1, 2,
and 3, it cannot both be true and seriously acceptable.
1 wish to say that any combination of theses like this—namely, demonstrably
incapable of being (in all consistency regarded as) all true if (supposed to be)
all seriously acceptable— is ''epistemologically self-defeating \
And I wish to propose (call this Proposal A) that no combination of theses
which is epostemologically self-defeating is seriously acceptable.
So, if Proposal A is true, the combination of Premises 1, 2, and 3 is not
seriously acceptable.
I further wish to propose (with certain qualifications that I am unable to spell
out but which seem irrelevant to the present discussion) (call this Proposal B)
that a combination of theses which is not seriously acceptable is—as far as we
can tell— not true.
So, if Proposal B is also true, the combination of Premises 1, 2, and 3 is—
as far as we can tell— not true.
To summarize: 1 am proposing that since the combination of Premises 1, 2,
and 3 could not be both seriously acceptable and true, it is neither seriously
acceptable nor, consequently,—as far as we can tell—true.
112 PACinC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

But then, insofar as Hyde’s view boils down to the combination of Premises
1, 2, and 3, it is neither seriously acceptable, nor— as far as we can tell— true.
It is not “ limning the true and ultimate structure of reality’’, but at most promoting
some “practical purpose”.
But does Hyde’s view boil down to this?

IV2

Well o f course Hyde’s view boils down to the combination of Premises 1, 2,

and 3. I invented Hyde to represent a half of my thinking which eventuates in
that combination. But you are rightly not interested in autobiography, or the
idiosyncrasy of my thinking. I meant to present a view which might have a big
tug of appeal for you too.
I shall discuss Premise 3 first.
It is clear that if we concentrate on the notation, the words and phrases of
Premises 1 and 2, then obviously neither of them is “part” of physical theory
cum set theory in any reasonable primitive notation. So, clearly. Premises 1 and
2 are not primitive-notationally “part” of physical theory cum set theory. It
seems pretty clear that they are notationally part of theory of language cum
psychological theory, which is, in turn, not primitive-notationally part of physical
theory cum set theory.
But one may feel that that does not matter too much: perhaps Premises 1 and
2 are part of physical theory cum set theory in some more recondite way.
They had better not be part in a way analogous to that in which talk of the
average American, Swede, etc. are part of demography. Jekyll and Hyde, both,
have agreed that such talk, being abbreviatory for other talk, is not seriously
acceptable as “ limning the true and ultimate structure of reality” but at most
pretend-acceptable for practical purposes. And this seems to me to be the correct
view of such talk. And if so, and the analogy holds, we can argue as before that
Premises 1 and 2 are not both seriously acceptable and are not both (“really” )
true, so that Hyde’s view faces the same difficulty.
But, perhaps, the two premises are “part” of physical theory cum set theory
in still another way. I think the intuitive idea in such a proposal must be that
Premises 1 and 2 somehow “ say the same thing as”, “express the same facts
as”, somehow “ amount to”, certain remarks in the primitive notation of physical
theory cum set theory.
Now, it seems to me that notions such as these are in a particularly unclear
state nowadays, because, as I suggested earlier, of the creative chaos in theorizing
about language and unclarity about what makes a theory of language acceptable.
But let us explore the idea.
Some options occur to one concerning the putative relationship between Prem­
ises 1 and 2, on the one hand, and certain imagined statements in the (primitive)
notation of physical theory cum set theory, on the other:

(1) The former result from the latter by substitution of expressions (regarded as)
introduced by stipulative/abbreviatory definitions. (Perhaps in the way that number theory
is supposed to arise out of set theory).
(2) The former are analytically synonymous with the latter.
 ASPECTS OF ACCEPTABILITY 113

(3) The former do something like “expressing the same facts’’ as the latter, in some
way explicated by, for example, a “causal’’ theory of language.
(4) The former somehow “amount to’’ the latter in some way to be elucidated by future
inquiries.

The suggestion is that Hyde could reasonably maintain that Premise 3 is false
if he could reasonably maintain something like one or another of these options.
But does this help him?
Let us observe that, apart from the other difficulties, each of the options, when
more fully articulated, is, at least notationally “ part” of theory of language cum
psychological theory and, at least, primitive-notationally not “part” of physical
theory cum set theory.
So it looks as if Hyde could reasonably deny Premise 3 only at the cost of
maintaining a thesis— say, X— with respect to which we could form an analogous
Premise— say, 3*— and argue as before. It looks as if Hyde’s position must
continue to be epistemologically self-defeating.
1 observe in passing that similar considerations apply should Hyde wish to
use with serious acceptability ordinary material object expressions such as ‘chair’
or ‘hand’, and want to hold that these somehow “amount to” primitive notation
of physical theory cum set theory. Or wished to maintain that language-theoretic
and/or psychological terminology “ amounted to” behavioral (and, therefore,
“material-object” ) terminology. In both cases, he would have to be maintaining
a thesis to this effect. And this thesis would be at least notationally part of theory
of language cum psychological theory and, at least, primitive-notationally, not
part of physical theory cum set theory, and then we could form a suitable
Premise— say 3**— and argue as before.
What it looks like is this: Hyde can reasonably maintain that certain remarks
of his (which he intends to be seriously acceptable) which appear not to be part
of physical theory cum set theory “really” are “part” only at the cost of making
a further remark which, in turn, appears not to be “part” of physical theory cum
set theory.
Is this perhaps a harmless infinite regress? (The following idea on behalf of
Hyde was crystallized for me by George Dealer.)
Well, I am supposing that we can get Hyde to settle down on a definite set
(or perhaps several, perhaps infinitely many, sets) of remarks which he wishes
to regard as seriously acceptable. Perhaps each such remark will be either itself
in the primitive notation of physical theory cum set theory or will be “ accom­
panied” by a remark to the effect that the former amounts to some other remark
in such primitive notation. Is Hyde home free?
No. For, by hypothesis, a proper (and deductively closed) subset (perhaps,
an infinity of such proper subsets) of his remarks is sufficient to explain the data
he allows— namely a multitude of remarks in (whatever he regards as) primitive
notation sufficient for describing the data he allows and formulating physical
theory cum set theory. This multitude of remarks is (we may suppose) the simplest
theory which explains the data and so is seriously acceptable. The remainder of
the remarks, being devoid of explanatory power, is (on Hyde’s own view) not
seriously acceptable.
114 PACinC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

But it is pretty clear that (on Hyde’s view) Premises 1 and 2 will be in that
remainder, and we can draw the conclusion, as before, that Hyde’s position is
epistemologically self-defeating, not seriously acceptable, and not— as far as we
can tell— true.
(I observe, by way of concessionary caution that I have assumed, first, that,
in assessing the serious acceptability of a theory, what is to be taken into account
is at least, in the first instance, its '*notationar simplicity—whatever, exactly,
that might mean, and, second, that data need not be described in terminology
which has been declared to “ amount to ” some other terminology.)

But, now, how does Jekyll deal with this problem? How does he avoid ep­
istemological self-defeat?
Well, in the first place, he is inclined to deny Premise 7. For he thinks there
are more data than Hyde allows. He thinks that the data include “thinkings,
wantings, and sensings, and certain features of them’’. (Indeed, he is inclined
to think that, ultimately, these are the only data, and, in all ultimateness, just
one’s own are, for each one of us.) And he thinks that the simplest theory required
for the explanation of the data so conceived is something like a compound of
a theory of propositions, attributes, and the like, physical theory, psychological
theory, and theory of language (the latter being, perhaps, “ reducible’’ to the
others).
And he thinks that if one articulated his view into an analogue of Premise 1—
say, P — then Premise P and Premise 2 would be “part’’ of the compound
theory he favors as seriously acceptable, and so the analogue of Premise 3— say,
3+— would be false, thus freeing him from epistemological self-defeat.
He thinks, incidentally, that considerations such as these might be helpful in
deciding in a reasonable manner what sorts of items are in fact the data.
But he wants to alter Premise 2 as well. For he thinks that the aim to be
“limning the true and ultimate structure of reality” includes the aim to be able
to discern that one is (succeeding in) doing this. That is, the ability to arrive at
seriously acceptable theories should involve the ability to find seriously acceptable
that the former are seriously acceptable.
In line with this, he thinks that in order to be a seriously acceptable “total”
theory of the world (at a given time i, perhaps, for a given individual x) a theory
must be what I shall call epistemologically self-approving*. That is, it is to

(1) contain a specification of conditions under which a theory is seriously acceptable,

(2) contain an assertion to the effect that it itself fulfills these conditions,
(3) in fact fulfill these conditions (discemibly to x at t.)

So Jekyll is inclined to propose a revision of the account of serious accept­

ability— call this Proposal C:

The seriously acceptable “total” theory of the world is the simplest theory which both
explains the data and is epistemologically self-approving. (And if what the data arc is
chosen properly, this may be just the simplest theory which explains the data.)
 ASPECTS OF ACCEPTABILITY 115

In line with this, Jekyll thinks that the theory of the world he favors is the
simplest epistemologically self-approving data-explaining theory, and so the se­
riously acceptable one.
(But JekylFs Proposal C seems to open another round for Hyde. For he could
now maintain that, according to the proposal, what is seriously acceptable as the
“total” theory is physical theory cum set theory cum thesis X and that a con­
sequence of this (notationally) larger theory is that it itself “amounts to” just
physical theory cum set theory, the question now would be whether Hyde’s
(notationally) larger theory is (notationally?) simpler than the theory Jekyll favors
as the seriously acceptable “total” theory. This reflection arises, in part, out of
a point of George Bealer’s earlier alluded to.)

VI

I shall conclude by sketching a somewhat different line of reasoning which

appears to head for the conclusion that theory of language cum psychological
theory must be seriously acceptable in its own right. This is based on consid­
erations of what I shall call “epistemology of language-use” and starts with
reflecting on what the use of language accomplishes and how.
Even very cursory such reflection reveals that one of the main accomplishments
of the use of language, if not the main one, is the conveying of information (or
misinformation) from person to person. Now, it is not merely that on suitable
occasions noises or inscriptions made by a speaker or writer get (cause?) the
audience or readership to accept certain theses. It is that on suitable occasions
noises or inscriptions made by a speaker or writer render certain theses acceptable
to the audience. If I am told with suitable authoritativeness that such and such
tracks have been observed in a bubble-chamber, then not merely do I in fact
accept the thesis that such-and-such tracks have been observed in a bubble-
chamber, but also this thesis becomes acceptable for me.
This phenomenon is not a luxury or a convenience; it is an epistemological
necessity. For, being the limited creatures that we are, if what others report on
suitable occasions did not become acceptable to us in the audience, precious
little would be acceptable for us individually.
For, presumably, that is the real issue of acceptability: under what conditions
is a theory (or thesis) acceptable to an individual (at a time)? My earlier talk
about the best total theory of the world, acceptable because of being the simplest
theory explaining ''the totality of the data”, if not taken as an over-simplification
and idealization, amounts to a Hegelian theory of “objective knowledge” not
known to anyone in particular. The over-simplification and idealization was
advantageous for getting a glimpse of certain truths without getting bogged down
in a mass of details and qualifications. But one must not lose sight of the fact
that acceptability is primarily: for an individual (at a time). Unfortunately, I am
quite unclear about the relationship between the idealized notion of “the ac­
ceptable total theory of the world” and the theories acceptable to individuals
(at times). None of the schemes for this that I have considered seems to work
very well. So I make the transition to acceptability for individuals (at times) with
a bump and a thud.
116 PACinC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

And do we not want to retain the main idea that acceptability— for individuals,
too— is a matter of being (“part of” ) the simplest theory which explains the data
“accessible to one” ? (I am leaving out “epistemological self-approval”, since
it is not our present concern.) I say ‘data accessible to one’ to call attention,
without fuss, to a somewhat complicated point. What renders a theory acceptable
to an individual is its being the simplest theory which explains not only his own
data, say, what he himself has observed, but also the data of others, what they
have observed, when it is acceptable to him that there are such further data. (I
think this is compatible with holding that, in some way, ultimately the theory
acceptable to him is the simplest which explains just his own data.) Let us
consider a physicist. What makes physical theory acceptable to him is that it is
the simplest theory which explains not only his own observations and experi­
mental results but also observations and experimental results of others which
have been in one way or another reported to him. If he were not entitled to accept
the reports of others, the data accessible to thim would be so slim as not to render
acceptable to him any physical theory at all elaborate.
The point I am trying to make is that a physical theory of any interesting
degree of elaborateness is acceptable for a physicist only if various noises and
inscriptions made by fellow physicists render it acceptable for him that various
observations and experimental results have occurred which he himself has not
made or witnessed. So it is an absolute epistemological necessity that noises and
inscriptions people make should render various theses acceptable for us.
Now, how can noises and inscriptions make such theses acceptable?
I suggest that we aim for a unitary view. Confrontation with a certain sort of
rock in certain circumstances renders acceptable for a geologist the thesis that
certain kinds of stress and temperature existed in this or a neighboring location
in the distant past. This comes about because a geological theory is already
acceptable to the geologist such that the thesis in question— about stress and
temperature in the distant past— together with the geological theory explain the
features of the rock he is confronting in those circumstances. In a quite parallel
fashion, witnessing noises or inscriptions in certain circumstances renders ac­
ceptable to a language-using being the thesis that, for example, such-and-such
tracks occurred in a bubble-chamber. In quite parallel fashion, 1 suggest, this
happens because a theory of language cum a psychological theory is already
acceptable to the language-using being such that the thesis in question— about
the tracks in the bubble-chamber—together with the theory of language and
psychological theory explain, in the circumstances, the occurrence of the noises
or inscriptions he is witnessing. In both cases, a phenomenon observed makes
a new thesis, not primarily about the phenomenon, acceptable because a sort of
“background” theory explains the phenomenon observed.
If what I am saying is right, the acceptability of what others report depends
on the possession of an independently acceptable theory. Let us, for brevity’s
sake, call such an independently acceptable theory which renders what others
report acceptable a “decoding theory”. In the normal case, the “decoding theory”
is a theory of language cum a psychological theory.
 ASPECTS OF ACCEPTABILITY 117

Could another theory—for example, physical theory or physiological theory—

play the role of a “decoding theory” ?
I think two points may be made by way of suggesting why neither physical
theory nor physiological theory could play this role.
First, as we are now, we simply do not have acceptable for us enough physical
or physiological information which together with, for example, the thesis that
such-and-such tracks occurred in a bubble-chamber could explain the production
of such-and-such noises or inscriptions.
Second, hopes of increase of our physical or physiological information don’t
help. For such increase can occur only with the aid of reports of others. And
this new information will be acceptable for us only if these reports are acceptable
for us. But these reports are acceptable for us only if our present “decoding
theory” is acceptable for us. Thus the acceptability of future scientific discoveries
depends on the acceptability of our present “decoding theory”. And our present
“decoding theory” is theory of language cum psychology.
Thus, 1 am suggesting, we have a sketch of an argument for the conclusion
that a theory of the world of any interesting degree of elaborateness is acceptable
for us only if theory of language cum psychological theory is antecedently
acceptable for us in its own right.
By this I mean something like the following. If acceptability of thesis i, is
required for acceptability of thesis ti, but not vice versa, then the acceptability
of thesis i, is antecedent to acceptability of thesis ti. And in such a case is not
to be regarded as merely “ amounting to ” ti.
But since we are discussing conditions of acceptability of a “total” theory of
the world, the foregoing is about the serious acceptability of theory of language
cum psychological theory.

University of California
Berkeley, California

NOTES

'Many of the ideas of this paper go back to some even more inchoate formulations in my largely
unreadable Ph.D dissertation. Harvard 1969. A trial run of an earlier version of this paper at Reed
College was made possible by George Bealer. A discussion with Dick Grandy, at Paul Grice’s house,
was made possible by Paul Grice toward whom I feel, and hereby express, deep gratitude for
immeasurable and not easily specified help which he has extended to me in connection with this
paper (as well as in numerous other connections) and which I regard as (with respect in one way
or another to this paper) greater than any which I have received, with the possible exception of
(though unbeknownst to him) Quine’s. I’d better not trace any ideas in this paper (other than those
known to be and expressly said in the paper to be his) to Grice, because during the discussion just
mentioned Paul told me that he disliked both Jekyll and Hyde in so not uncertain terms, that had
I not been used to his disliking what I think, I would have abandoned the project on the spot. Thanks
to many others including particularly Nancy Watson and Neil Thomason.
^Thc need for this section was made clear to me by the comments of Professors Stephen Schiffer,
David Reeve, George Bealer, and Richard Grandy.