Alexander & Dochy (1995)

American Educational Research
Journal
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Conceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs: A Comparison Across Varying

Cultural and Educational Communities
Patricia A. Alexander and Filip J. R. C. Dochy
Am Educ Res J 1995 32: 413
DOI: 10.3102/00028312032002413
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American Educational Research Journal
Summer 1995, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 413-442
Conceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs: A

Comparison Across Varying Cultural and
Educational Communities
Patricia A. Alexander
Texas A&M University
Filip J. R. C. Dochy
Open University ofHeerlen
In this study, we asked adults in the United States (n = 54) and Europe
(n = 66), primarily the Netherlands, to share their views on the concepts of
knowledge and beliefs. Among the 120 participants, there were three levels
of expertise represented. Specifically, there were (a) adults seeking postsec-
ondary degrees, (b) those completing graduate degrees or holding terminal
degrees, and (c) those considered experts in the area of either knowledge or
beliefs. While there were some similarities in the conceptions of knowing
and believing within both cultural groups, differences related to the definition
of and relationship between knowledge and beliefs were identified. For exam-
ple, it was found that the European respondents tended to be more diverse
in their viewpoints than the Americans, particularly those enrolled in under-
graduate programs. However, the experts, particularly those from the United
States, were more diverse and more cautious in their views than those in
the other two educational groups. The implications of such findings for
educational practice and future research are then discussed.
PATRICIA A. ALEXANDER is a Professor and Interim Department Head, Department

of Educational Psychology, College of Education, Texas A&M University, College
Station, TX 77843-4225. Her specializations are learning and instruction, knowledge
and interest, comprehension, and beliefs.
FILIP J. R. C. DOCHY is a Director of the Centre for Educational Technology and
Innovation, Open University, PO Box 2960, 6401 DL Heerlen, The Netherlands. His
specializations are knowledge, learning, and technology.

Alexander and Dochy
ne of the marks of cognitive sophistication among sentient beings is
O their ability to reflect on their own mental creations. The value of self-
reflection is epitomized in Epictetus's declaration that "The beginning of
philosophy is to know the conditions of one's own mind" (First Century
A.D.). We hold that the implicit concepts under which individuals operate
exert a powerful force in their day to day functionings (Gardner, 199D, and
we concur with Olson and Astington (1993) that the words people choose
are critical markers of their implicit theories. Essentially, the present study
is an exploration of self-reflections in that we asked adults to share their
personal understandings of two fundamental concepts—knowledge and
beliefs.
Specifically, our choice of the concepts knowledge and beliefs as the
basis for this exploration was predicated on the powerful role each plays
in current educational research and instructional practice. Since the rise
of cognitive psychology in the 1970s, increased attention has been paid
to the nature and acquisition of knowledge. As suggested by one classic
volume of this period, Schooling and the Acquisition of Knowledge
(Anderson, Spiro, & Montague, 1977), education and knowledge acquisition
were inextricably intertwined. Indeed, stimulated by a cognitive view of
learning, investigations of the structure of knowledge (e.g., Anderson,
1977; Greeno, 1989), its impact on present and future learning (e.g.,
Alexander, in press; Paris & Winograd, 1990; Pressley, Wood, Woloshyn,
Martin, King, & Menke, 1992), and its restructuring or enhancement (e.g.,
Carey, 1985; Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Perkins & Simmons, 1988) have
literally filled volumes. As a consequence, it seems difficult to overestimate
the influence that the study of knowledge has had on learning and
instruction during the past several decades.
Recently, there has also been a renewed appreciation of the potency
of beliefs on individuals' thoughts and actions (Garner & Alexander, 1994).
Beliefs have been shown to permeate individuals' perceptions of the world
around them (e.g., Abelson, 1986; Alvermann & Commeryas, 1994), to influ-
ence the process and outcomes of learning (e.g., Ames & Ames, 1989; Dweck,
1986; Schommer, 1994), and to impact children and adults' reactions to
ambiguous, persuasive, or provocative situations (e.g., Chambliss, 1994; Gar-
ner & Hansis, 1994; Wade, Thompson, & Watkins, 1994). Further, beliefs are
evident in the way teachers define the learning environment or respond to
particular instructional materials or approaches (e.g., Anders & Evans, 1994;
Borko, Davinroy, Flory, & Hiebert, 1994; Gillingham, Young, & Kulikowich,
1994).
Despite the documented power of knowledge and beliefs in theory
and practice, specific understandings of these concepts remain elusive.
For instance, despite the preponderance of references to knowing or
believing in everyday interactions or professional communications, explicit
definitions or explanations of these terms are rarely offered. Consequently,
even though individuals of different cultural or educational communities
may use these exact terms in their written or oral communications, they
414

Knowledge and Beliefs
may intend very different meanings. Do individuals educated in the United

States, for example, hold varied perceptions of knowledge and beliefs
from those educated in other countries? Is it possible, in fact, that the
basic composition of these two fundamental elements of research and
instruction are conceptualized differently by such culturally diverse commu-
nities? Should that be the case, what are the implications for cross-cultural
research and practice?
Of course, one may not need to look cross-culturally to uncover diverse
perspectives on knowledge and beliefs. It may be that individuals from the
same cultural group, but with varied levels of education, hold dissimilar views
of knowledge and beliefs. In essence, the question is whether continued
education alters the way one thinks about knowing or believing or whether
such conceptions remain consistent across years of academic training and
experience? If education does play a role in forming individuals' notions of
knowledge and beliefs, then varied understandings may well be found within
the same classroom. If so, what would the potential impact on learning be
if teachers and students within the same classroom community internalized
the notions of knowing and believing differently?
Further, without some explication of intended meaning, it is unclear
where the boundaries of these two fundamental concepts lie. Are knowledge
and beliefs, in actuality, synonyms marking the same semantic territory, or
are they antonyms denoting orthogonal dimensions of human understanding?
Or, is it possible that the concepts of knowing and believing share a common
ground, while still retaining some unique and unshared terrain? Unless we
probe the interpretations of knowledge and beliefs voiced by diverse cultural
and educational communities, we remain unsure of the meaning individuals
may intend to convey when referencing knowledge or beliefs. Should pat-
terns arise in the way that individuals in certain communities speak of know-
ing and believing, then it is important to examine the implications of those
patterns for subsequent research and ongoing practice. Whereas the present
study cannot offer any surety of meaning for these two complex concepts,
it does, at least, hold promise for enhanced clarity by serving as a catalyst
for explication of understandings that frequently go unvoiced. In addition,
the more we come to understand how those who are members of varied
cultural and educational communities internalize knowledge and beliefs, the
more appropriately and effectively we can communicate our own intentions
when we speak of knowing and believing, both in educational research and
instructional practice.
There were particular assumptions and expectations guiding this inquiry.
First, we operated under the assumption that our adult participants had both
the cognitive and linguistic skills required to respond to our questions about
knowledge and beliefs. As educated individuals, our participants were experi-
enced at framing complex concepts, like knowing and believing, in language.
This is not to say that language is always adequate to the exercise of reflecting
on difficult ideas like knowledge and beliefs. However, words and the accom-
panying graphics we included in our questioning task were our means of
415

Alexander and Dochy
externalizing the often tacit understandings of knowing and believing held
by our participants. At a more optimistic level, Vygotsky (1934/1986) would
suggest that verbally reflecting on deeply held concepts, like knowledge and
beliefs, gives them a greater richness both for those who contemplate the
ideas and for those who are privy to these contemplations. Moreover, we
assumed that the responses that participants shared would be accurate reflec-
tions of their thoughts and views. Even granting the limitations of language,
we felt that our participants would offer honest reflections about knowledge
and about beliefs.
We also began this exploration with the expectation that there would
be similarities in the responses of individuals who belonged to particular
cultural or educational communities. Indeed, part of our interest was in the
potential effects that advanced schooling or expertise would have on the
perceptions of those from a similar geographic region. For instance, would
experts respond similarly regardless of whether they came from North
America, Western Europe, or from the Near or Far East?
In addition, we expected that there would be as much diversity in
the responses of our participants as was apparent in formal philosophical
treatises on knowing and believing. There are those philosophers who
equate knowledge with complete conviction and beliefs with convictions
"somewhat short of complete" (Mill, 1865/1979, p. 78). Likewise, there
are philosophers, like Kant (1781/1965), who associate different grounds
of validation with both knowing and believing. To Kant, knowing is
marked by an objective validity, while subjective validity is deemed
adequate for believing. There are also those who endow beliefs, rather
than knowledge, with certainty and truthfulness (e.g., Laird, 1972). Still,
there are those like Dewey (1910) who would describe one's beliefs as
dimensions of knowledge. Our own perceptions of knowledge and beliefs
approximate those of Dewey in that we see beliefs as components of
one's knowledge (Alexander, Schallert, & Hare, 1991; Dochy, 1992). In
our judgment, "Knowledge encompasses all a person knows or believes
to be true, whether or not it is verified as true in some sort of objective
or external way" (Alexander et al., 1991, p. 371).
We expected that there would be respondents who would distinguish
knowledge from beliefs on the grounds of the holders' personal convictions.
Further, we anticipated that there would be participants who would
distinguish knowing from believing on the basis of one's more objective
versus subjective nature. Still, we expected that there would be adults
among our respondents for whom knowing and believing would either
be indistinguishable entities or, to the contrary, constructs that are unique
and unrelated.
Finally, we assumed that the graphic and verbal tasks we presented
to our participants would provoke the kind of self-reflection we desired
and would, thus, produce responses that would inform us about literate
adults' implicit understandings about knowledge and beliefs. As we trust
416

will be evident in the descriptions that follow, we feel that we succeeded

in this regard and that our expectations were either met or exceeded.
Externalizing Views About Knowledge and Beliefs:

Methodology
The Participants
Our participants came from two broad geographic areas and represented
three educational communities. Specifically, with the exception of the Ameri-
can and European experts, participants came primarily from two institutions,
one in the southwestern United States and the other in the Netherlands.
Further, university-based participants belonged to two educational com-
munities. First, there were 43 individuals who were completing postsecond-
ary (undergraduate) programs. Although their areas of specialization were
varied (e.g., English, chemistry, or mathematics), the 18 American undergrad-
uates were enrolled in an honors section of an educational psychology course
required for teacher certification. The 25 postsecondary students from the
Netherlands were attending an open university. This means that much of their
academic work was delivered by content modules delivered in a distance-
learning format. The specializations represented by these Dutch students
included business and management, economics, and social, cultural, or natu-
ral science.
The second educational community consisted of students seeking gradu-
ate degrees or faculty whose areas of expertise fell outside the area of
knowledge or beliefs. There were 21 members of this community from the
United States and 31 from the Netherlands. Those in this community from
the United States were pursuing degrees or careers in education-related
fields, like school or counseling psychology, whereas the Dutch graduate
students and faculty represented not only the social sciences but also business
and economics.
Our final community was composed of 25 acknowledged experts who
conducted formal study and published in either the domain of knowledge
or beliefs. Fifteen of these experts came from the United States, and 10 came
from European institutions and represented four countries (i.e., Netherlands,
Belgium, France, and Sweden).
The Questions
We elicited adults' conceptions of knowledge and beliefs by providing them
with a graphic catalyst on which to focus their thoughts. Specifically, using
the diagrams displayed in Figure 1, we asked respondents to indicate which
option depicted their understanding of the relationship between knowledge
and beliefs. As an alternative, participants were free to create their own
model of this relationship in the space provided for them. To us, the diagrams
captured certain possible relationships between knowledge and beliefs.
Option 1, for example, shows knowing and believing to be two distinct and
417

2.
5.
DIRECTIONS: Above are various representations of

possible relationships between knowledge and beliefs. KNOWLEDGE
Based on your own understanding of the concepts
"knowledge" and "beliefs" indicate, in the space below, KEY
BELIEFS
which of these representations best captures your
understanding of that relationship. If your understanding
is not represented in any of the drawings marked #1-#5 KNOWLEDGE *
draw your own representation in the box marked #6. BELIEFS
PREFERRED REPRESENTATION
Figure 1. Graphic representations of various relationships between

knowledge and beliefs

unrelated entities. Throughout this article, we refer to this as the separate

option. Option 2 {knowledge subsumptiori), by comparison, suggests that
knowledge is one component of beliefs. In contrast, Option 3 (beliefs sub-
sumption) shows beliefs as embedded within knowledge. The counter to
Option 1 is Option 4 (inseparable), which displays knowing and believing as
completely overlapping and indistinguishable constructs. Finally, we offered
Option 5 (overlapping) in which some dimensions of knowledge are inte-
grated with beliefs, still allowing for some aspects of each construct to remain
separate and distinct.
This visual task was followed by a series of questions that asked partici-
pants to expand on their conceptions of knowing and believing. We began
our questioning by asking participants to tell us what the terms knowledge
and beliefs meant to them. Next, we asked them to defend their preferred
representation of knowledge and beliefs. Related to this question, we then
had our respondents offer examples from their personal experiences that
would support this preference. Finally, we wanted to know if our participants
considered beliefs to be changeable and under what circumstances such a
change might occur.
How Adults Talk About Knowing and Believing

The Relationship Between Knowledge and Beliefs
How did our respondents choose to represent the relationship between
knowing and believing, and did those representations reflect any influence
of culture or education? A summary of the frequencies and percentages of
choices by the cultural and educational communities is displayed in Table
1. First of all, with one noticeable exception, every cultural and educational
community (41% of all respondents) preferred Option 5, overlapping, over
all other possibilities (i.e., provided or self-generated). This suggests that
regardless of whether one's cultural perspective was American or European,
especially Dutch, and whether one had extensive educational experiences
or even expertise in this domain knowledge and beliefs were largely per-
ceived as overlapping and interacting constructs that still retain some unique
and unrelated dimensions.
Cross-cultural distinctions. The one group that deviated from the over-
all representation pattern just described were the Dutch postsecondary stu-
dents whose preferred representation was Option 2, knowledge
subsumption. Forty percent of this community (10 of 25) conceived of knowl-
edge as a subset of beliefs. It is not clear what cultural and educational
circumstances may have contributed to this certain perspective. However,
even among the graduate students and faculty from the Netherlands, there
was a strong tendency to subsume knowledge within the realm of beliefs.
Indeed, for the European respondents, Options 2 and 5 accounted for almost
60% of all selections. While over 50% of the American participants opted for
the overlapping representation (5), others in this cultural community were
similarly drawn to Option 3, beliefs subsumption (19%), or Option 2 (15%).
419

Table 1
Frequencies and Percentages of Respondents' Representation by Cultural and Educational Group
Americans Europeans
UGrad Adv Expert Total UGrad Adv Expert Total
Representation / % / % 7 % / % / % / % 7 % / %
Separate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 i 2 6 9
Knowledge subsumption 5 9 3 6 0 0 8 15 10 15 7 11 i 2 18 27
Beliefs subsumption 4 7 2 4 4 7 10 19 3 5 1 2 i 2 5 8
Inseparable 0 0 1 2 2 9 3 6 1 2 1 2 2 3 4 6
Overlapping 9 17 12 22 7 13 28 52 6 9 11 17 4 6 21 32
Other 0 0 3 6 2 4 5 9 4 6 7 11 1 2 12 18

In other words, beyond Option 5, respondents from the United States were
almost as likely to view beliefs as a subset of knowledge as they were to
conceptualize knowledge as a subset of beliefs.
Three other distinctions between the American and European partici-
pants deserve mention. First, none of the 54 respondents from the United
States selected Option 1 as a viable representation of the relationship between
knowing and believing. This compares to 9% of the Europeans who judged
knowledge and beliefs as two completely divorced constructs. As will become
clearer when we overview the personal evidence provided by the respon-
dents, those selecting this alternative tended to equate knowledge with
truthfulness and beliefs with information that has not been or cannot be veri-
fied.
Second, undergraduates from the United States were a much more homo-
geneous community in terms of their choices than were their European
counterparts. Specifically, the responses of these 18 students were restricted
to only three of the six alternatives (knowledge subsumption, 2; beliefs
subsumption, 3; and, overlapping, 5). It could well be that the cohesion in
the responses of American undergraduates, as contrasted with those of the
Dutch students, was a reflection of a greater homogeneity in these individuals'
cultural and educational backgrounds. Support for this contention will be
seen in the responses offered by these students to the subsequent questions
in our task. It is also possible that the structure of the university experiences
for these students (i.e., didactic classroom instruction versus open, distance
learning) may have been a contributing factor in the similarity of responses
for the United States students. Third, twice the number of European over
American participants chose to produce their own models of the relationship
between knowledge and beliefs. We present several of these creations in
Figure 2a to 2d.
Generated models of the relationship between knowledge and beliefs. A-
cross cultural and educational communities, those generating their own mod-
els seemed to do so for several reasons. As suggested by Figure 2a, some
respondents were concerned about the static nature of the relationship
between knowledge and beliefs that they perceived in the given alternatives.
Therefore, they attempted to depict a relationship between these two con-
structs that was dynamic. As one stated:
To put it simply, the knowledge an individual holds is directly influ-
enced by an individual's belief network and, in turn, one's beliefs
network is influenced by the knowledge one holds and acquires. The
only way to depict such a model is through reciprocal movement
from one entity to the other, as in the diagram I constructed.
For others, it seemed important to generate their own models so as to

capture a developmental aspect to knowing and believing. To these individu-
als (see Figure 2b), the changes that take place in the relationship between
knowledge and beliefs over time were not satisfactorily portrayed in the given
alternatives. Further, some respondents used the opportunity to generate their
421

Alexander and Dochy
Figure 2. Samples (2a-2d) of representations of knowledge and

beliefs generated by American and European respondents
own representations because they wished to interject additional variables

into the relationship between knowledge and beliefs. Questioning and doubt,
for instance, were two factors that the faculty member, producing Figure 2c,
felt were critical in the interplay between knowing and believing. Finally,
there were those who produced their own models of knowledge and beliefs
apparently because they wanted to modify the relative size, proportion, or
position of the two constructs as depicted in the original. This action is seen
in Figure 2d where the postsecondary student wanted to increase the area of
overlap between knowledge and beliefs over what we presented in Option 5.
Educational distinctions. In addition to the similarities and differences
witnessed across various cultural communities, there were two distinctions
that seemed attributable to increasing education or expertise. We summarize
the selections of these educational communities in Table 2. For one, beyond
422

Table 2
Frequencies and Percentages of Representations by
Educational Community
Undergraduate Advanced Expert Total
Representation /(%) /(%) /(%) /(%)
Separate 1(2) 4(8) 1(4) 6(5)

Knowledge subsumption 15(35) 10(19) 1(4) 26(22)
Beliefs subsumption 7(16) 3(6) 5(20) 15(12)
Inseparable 1(2) 2(4) 4(16) 7(6)
Overlapping 15(35) 23(44) 11(44) 49(41)
Other 4(9) 10(19) 3(12) 17(14)
their preference for Option 5, overlapping, experts, followed by those with

advanced or terminal degrees, were less apt to hold strongly or exclusively
to any one perspective. Rather, the experts showed at least some level of
interest in all potential relationships. For instance, Option 4, inseparable,
had little appeal to respondents outside the community of experts who chose
this option 16% of the time, as compared to 2% and 4% for the postsecondary
and graduate/faculty communities, respectively. It would appear, therefore,
that formal study of the phenomenon of knowledge or beliefs contributed
to increased variability—as was evidenced in the philosophical literature.
The other educationally related trend worthy of note pertained to the
production of personal models (Option 6). Of the three educational commu-
nities, it was those with advanced or terminal degrees, followed by the
experts, who more often elected to generate their own representation of the
relationship between knowing and believing. For these individuals, contin-
ued schooling apparently resulted in a greater freedom or a greater willing-
ness to reach beyond the given alternatives in order to propose a personal
model of knowing and believing. Why the community of graduate students
and faculty, more so than the experts, would generate their own option is
unclear. One possibility is that the experts, who offered extended descriptions
and explanations, were able to address dynamic and developmental aspects
of the relationship between knowledge and beliefs in their written
responses—decreasing the need for graphic alternatives.
Defining Knowledge and Beliefs

As the next step in our exploration of adults' conceptions of knowing and
believing, we examined the particular words and phrases that our respon-
dents incorporated in their personal definitions of knowledge and beliefs.
Before proceeding with this discussion, we must recognize that for the vast
majority of our European participants, English was not a first language.
However, Dutch students begin their formal study of English in the elemen-
tary grades. In addition, those Europeans with graduate and terminal degrees
are frequently called on to present and publish in English and are, as a result,
423

Alexander and Dochy
quite proficient in this second language. Despite this potential limitation, we
felt that all our participants had the ability to express their ideas not only in
words, but, more particularly, in English words. As support for this assump-
tion, we found no shortage of words used by respondents from either conti-
nent to define either knowledge or beliefs.
Definitional patterns. Our methodology of unfolding the meanings
within these definitions involved looking for patterns among the many words
or phrases that our adults chose as markers of their implicit theories of
knowledge and beliefs. We looked for these patterns not only in the separate
definitions but also across the two definitions. Our initial impression, and
one that we will explore in greater depth later, was that the definitions
offered by our respondents appeared in concert with their previous graphic
selections. In essence, what separated those who chose one option over
the remaining alternatives was not only their independent definitions of
knowledge or beliefs but also the degree of shared meanings for knowing
and for believing. For example, the Europeans who preferred Option 1
(separate) were very strong in the dichotomy they created verbally between
knowing and believing. For these individuals, there was a virtual absence
of shared attributes for knowledge and beliefs. Most often, they cast knowl-
edge as verifiable, as "truth," whereas they held beliefs to be outside the
realm of truth or to be ideas "the holder only wishes to be true."
Within the definitions offered by the majority of participants from each of
the cultural or educational communities, such complete dichotomization did
not exist. Instead, while differentiations were made between knowledge and
beliefs, there were also similarities drawn between these constructs. Among
the differentiations these participants made between knowledge and beliefs
was the objective/subjective distinction already described, although not to the
degree projected by those who cast knowledge and beliefs as separate. Indeed,
those choosing the overlapping option (5) allowed for thoughts or ideas to
have both objective and subjective characteristics. Some respondents, like the
philosopher Frye (1967), also associated detachment or a personal disregard
with knowledge but not with beliefs. In addition, personal goals, intentions,
or decision making were more apt to be included in the definitions for beliefs
but not knowledge. This suggests that, for many adults, beliefs apparently play
a greater role in actions and behaviors. This response pattern also helps to
explain why beliefs are possessions that individuals hold dear (Abelson, 1986)
and which often become resistant to change.
Over these dissimilarities, one of the characteristics commonly shared
by our respondents was the recognition that both knowledge and beliefs
arise from one's experiences. The distinguishing factor was that knowledge
was often perceived as arising from experiences that were formally con-
structed, as in the case of schooling, while beliefs were seen as the outcomes
of one's everyday encounters. Further, as suggested by Kant, both knowing
and believing were seen as requiring some form of validation or support.
Most concurred with Kant's position that external validation was needed for
knowledge but not for beliefs.
424

We also observed that what tended to differentiate between individuals'

preferences for Options 2 (knowledge subsumption), 3 (beliefs subsump-
tion), 4 (inseparable), or 5 (overlapping) was the relative stock they set in
one form of understanding over the other or in their interpretation of how
such understandings develop. In the former case, participants' definitions
reflected a valuing of either beliefs over knowledge or knowledge over
beliefs. In the latter case, respondents discussed their perceptions of whether
beliefs give rise to knowledge or whether knowing is a precursor to believing.
As noted, we will revisit these issues when we examine the evidence partici-
pants offered in defense of their particular selections.
Key word analysis. In addition to this macroanalysis, we inspected the
written definitions of our participants in a more microanalytic manner. We
did this by sorting the words or phrases participants used in their definitions
of knowledge and beliefs into categories (e.g., learned, subjective, or truth).
We will focus our discussion here on the five categories that emerged as
predominant in these definitions, accounting for 29% to 70% of the words or
phrases used by our cultural and educational communities when constructing
their personal meanings for knowing and believing. What we found was
that there were several patterns that marked these conceptualizations, some
of which were rather consistent across cultural and educational groups. For
example, despite a slight diversity in their leading categories of responses,
we were struck by the great similarity in language chosen by the communities
to convey their personal definitions of the term knowledge. Specifically, our
participants most often described knowledge as "learned," "agreed-upon,"
"factual," and "experiential" in nature. Among American participants, the
notion of knowledge as information rounded out their five categories. For
the European participants, it was knowledge as truth that was also among
their leading definitional categories. Overall, what these word choices sug-
gested to us was that, for both our American and European participants,
knowledge is strongly associated with objectively held, schooled information.
That is, knowledge is factual or objective information that comes about as
a result of formal learning.
Even though there was less cohesion in the definitions our participants
wrote for beliefs and more diversity in key categories across cultural and
within educational communities, certain words or phrases did emerge as
key markers for this construct. Specifically, for American respondents, the
categories that dominated their definitions, in order of their occurrence, were
"subjective," "feelings," "idiosyncratic truth," "personal," and "values." By
comparison, the leading concepts emerging in the definitions of beliefs for
our European respondents, again in order of frequency, were "subjective,"
"unproven," "certain," "thoughts," and "knowledge-related." What we learned
from this categorization process was that beliefs, in opposition to knowledge,
are typically conceived of as personal, subjective understandings. For respon-
dents from the United States, beliefs also carry with them affective valences
and are value-related, while, for the Europeans, there was a greater tendency
to align beliefs with certainty and with thoughts. Further, as they did graphi-
425

Alexander and Dochy
cally, our European participants explicitly identified beliefs with knowledge
to a greater degree than Americans did.
Also, one of the trends we observed was that the term knowledge tended
to evoke more extensive verbal responses from most of the cultural and
educational communities than did beliefs. Only the definitions of Dutch
postsecondary students deviated noticeably from this pattern. For this particu-
lar cultural and educational group, putting the concept of beliefs into words
demanded more elaboration and clarification than did the concept of knowl-
edge. In essence, with the exception of the experts from the United States,
our participants found more words to express their understanding of knowing
than believing. Perhaps these educated adults who participated in our study
have had more opportunities to reflect on the notion of knowing than
believing, thus their greater verbal facility at rendering a definition of knowl-
edge. Or, perhaps the construct of beliefs is just more difficult to put into
words than the construct of knowledge regardless of educational experi-
ences.
Generally, we did observe that an increase in education contributed to
an increase in one's written response. For instance, we found that our experts,
as a whole, offered more extensive definitions of knowledge and beliefs
than did the other two educational groups. One exception to this general
pattern was seen in the definitions of beliefs offered by our European partici-
pants. In this particular case, it was the postsecondary students more than
the graduate/faculty from the Dutch university who wrote more extensive
definitions of the term beliefs. We have no clear explanation for this occur-
rence, although it is possible that the nature of distance learning in which
these students engage makes them more familiar with written tasks of the
kind used in this study. Further, as with their selections of a preferred repre-
sentation, we were surprised by the degree of homogeneity in the responses
of the American undergraduates. More than any other cultural or educational
community, these students shared a perception of knowledge that was sym-
bolized by the common attributes they chose to define that concept. Seventy
percent of all the words chosen by this group to explain knowledge were
subsumed in the five key categories previously described. We see this high
degree of verbal similarity as indicative of these students' shared perceptions
of knowledge.
It is interesting to note that the group displaying the greatest diversity
in their definitions of both knowledge and beliefs were the experts from the
United States. Yet, while the experts from American institutions were quite
varied in their perceptions of knowledge and beliefs, their European counter-
parts evidenced a high degree of agreement in their defining attributes.
Indeed, among the European participants, it was the experts more than the
postsecondary or graduate/faculty communities who were alike in their word
choices. Almost 60% of the words these experts included in their definitions
of knowledge and beliefs fell within the top conceptual categories we
described earlier.
426

Why would American undergraduates and European experts tend to be

more homogeneous in their interpretations of knowledge and beliefs than
other cultural and educational communities? Our explanation is that these
two communities, while removed both in terms of their culture and their
formal study of knowledge or beliefs, projected similar strength in their
convictions. Interestingly, the conceptualizations of knowing and believing
for American undergraduates seemed rather rooted in religious issues.
Related to this, knowledge was little more than declarative information for
these students, memorized and regurgitated in schools, whereas beliefs were
more often cast as important religious truths held with strong convictions.
One undergraduate, for instance, noted that he had knowledge about the
human body and evolution but cared little about the former and did not
even believe the latter. For the European experts, on the other hand, beliefs
were unproven, personally held ideas, whereas knowledge was associated
with scientific or mathematical truths that could be tested and proven. As
one European expert choosing Option 5 wrote:
Knowledge is a representation of facts, concepts, etc. that is gathered

from theory or empirical understanding. Knowledge is what you think
is absolutely true or sure. Knowledge can be "built" by learning and
from experience. Beliefs have a more subjective nature. Beliefs can
be based on parts that can be defined as knowledge (sure). A belief,
however, also implies a part of the "knowledge" that is based on
assumptions.
So, while these two communities, more than the others, were apt to share
perceptions of knowing and believing with other members of their commu-
nity, they were far removed from one another in their perceptions of what
constitutes knowledge or beliefs.
Defending Their Views

Not only did we ask our participants to select a preferred representation and
to define knowledge and beliefs for us, but we also requested that they
defend their choices. Our purpose in asking for this information was twofold.
First, we wanted to see if the selections and the explanations for them were
consistent. Did those who chose the separable option (1), for instance, justify
their decision in a manner that maintained a true separation between one's
knowledge and beliefs? Second, how strong were these individuals in their
convictions? Did their explanations reveal a strength of conviction in their
perceptions or suggest a tentativeness in views about knowing and believing?
Consistency between representation and justification. We found few
instances where the participants put forward a defense of their views that
was in direct conflict with their initial choices. There were several cases,
however, where the explanation they offered was unclear or rambling, mak-
ing evaluation of consistency difficult. In addition, there were certain
instances where the respondents' interpretations of their preferred alternative
were confusing, resulting in a verbal defense that was equally confusing.
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Alexander and Dochy
Yet, such cases were clearly the exception among our adult participants. It
was a relatively easy task for us to ascertain the basic arguments that the
various cultural and educational communities put forward in support of
particular representations. For those preferring Option 1 (separable), for
example, the predominant defense rested on the argument that something
cannot be true and untrue or proven and unproven at the same time; thus,
knowledge and beliefs must exist separately. Although information can
change from knowledge to beliefs, it cannot exist in both states simultane-
ously for these respondents. As one Dutch postsecondary student put it:
"The more I know, the less I believe."
Two qualities distinguished the arguments of those opting for Alternative
2 (knowledge subsumption). First, those preferring the second option fre-
quently talked about the power of one's beliefs. To these participants, beliefs
are the foundation of one's actions and behaviors. Second, a number of
those who preferred Option 2 conveyed the idea that people hold something
to be true even before it is confirmed by others. They also included the
subconscious, imagination, mysticism, and religion under the banner of
beliefs. As such, they concluded that only a small percentage of what one
understands is objective or factual (i.e., knowledge), making knowledge a
subcomponent of beliefs. One graduate student from the Netherlands
defended his choice of knowledge subsumption option by the statement:
"Knowledge comes from a tested belief." In essence, for those who saw
knowledge as a subset of beliefs, one's understandings begin with informal,
personal conceptions that can be confirmed or supported by formal means.
Thus, all understandings are beliefs, but not all that we believe can be or
has been externally verified.
When it came to Option 3 (beliefs subsumption), the focus of arguments
centered around the principle that one cannot believe something one knows
nothing about, even if that knowledge exists at an subconscious or tacit
level. In essence, for the majority of those preferring this option, knowing
is a prerequisite to believing. "Beliefs are born of knowledge," is the way
one graduate student phrased it. "Beliefs cannot stand by themselves." As a
European expert wrote: "Knowledge is the key to beliefs. A lack of knowledge
gives you no opportunity to grow."
What seemed to mark the responses of participants electing Option 4
(inseparable) over the other alternatives was an inability or an unwillingness
to differentiate knowledge from beliefs. This perception is reflected in the
statement of one expert who selected this alternative: "After 40 years of work
in economy, I have found economic theory to be full of romanticism." In
some instances, individuals defended this choice by commenting that knowl-
edge and beliefs are so intricately interwoven as to make any meaningful
distinction impossible. Others claimed that, because one never knows for
sure if something is true or not, trying to explain the interrelationships
between knowing and believing was ill-advised. Of course, it should be
remembered that Option 4 was not a popular option for any of the cultural
or educational communities we questioned.
428

For Option 5 (overlapping), the most frequently selected alternative,

there was an assertion that knowledge impacts one's beliefs and that beliefs,
reciprocally, shape what becomes known. The following statement reflects
this position: "Beliefs are partly influenced by facts you know—what you
know also influences your beliefs since you selectively view the world."
Another form of defense offered by those preferring Option 5 centered on
the argument that aspects of both knowledge and beliefs remain independent
from one another, despite their strongly interactive nature. In other words,
there are those things that individuals know but which they do not really
believe (e.g., "big bang theory"), just as there are things that people believe
which cannot be objectively proven (e.g., "belief in God"). Moreover, as
signified by the intersection between knowledge and beliefs, there are those
things that individuals not only know but also believe (e.g., "Newton's law
of gravity" or "Abused children become abusive adults"). To us, it seemed
that much of the appeal of the overlapping option had to do with the fact
that it gave many participants the opportunity to assume a more moderate,
eclectic position with regard to the relationship between knowledge and
beliefs; that is, knowing and believing are both separate but also related.
Cultural and educational patterns. Just as there were patterns in the
responses of those choosing from among the various options, there were
commonalties in the defenses forwarded by the cultural and educational
communities that participated. In the foregoing discussion, we stated that
experts, particularly those from the United States, were rather diverse and
extensive in their responses. We would also add that this group was more
tentative and less verbally assured in their selections. The following unsolic-
ited remark from one American expert supports this perception:
You do NOT ask easy questions. I've been struggling with the issue
of the distinctions between knowledge and beliefs for several years,
in the work I've been doing with various colleagues. And, I don't
have very coherent answers to the questions you pose. In fact, after
hours of reading and discussion, the team of researchers on one
project, Learning to Teach Mathematics, decided to use the word
"claims" to include both knowledge and beliefs. We did not want to
tackle the distinction in our writing: nor did we feel that the vast
amounts of data we had on participating novice teachers enabled us
to clearly determine the distinctions they made between knowledge
and beliefs. With those caveats, I'll attempt to address your questions.
These responses are best considered to be my current thinking, which
does continue to evolve. . . . My flippant response is that I have chosen
this representation on the basis of beliefs rather than knowledge.
Of course, caution and tentativeness were not restricted to American

experts; they were also evidenced with some frequency in the responses of
those holding advanced or terminal degrees. Rarely, however, were caution-
ary statements apparent in the writings of undergraduate or postsecondary
students. From this, we surmise that continued schooling or extensive knowl-
edge of the field may have made participants, especially the American
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Alexander and Dochy
experts, more cognizant of alternatives or counterarguments, thereby making
them more cautious in their choices and in their justifications of those choices.
Yet, if continued schooling and extensive domain knowledge converted
into increased diversity among American experts, why did it not have the
same effect on the European experts, who manifested greater homogeneity
and assurance than their American counterparts? While there are no clear
reasons for this pattern, at least one plausible explanation can be forwarded.
Perhaps the contrasts between American and European experts are a reflec-
tion of the professional cultures in which these individuals operate.1 For
instance, it may well be that the professional culture in America favors greater
individualism among experts than is true in Europe. It might also be that the
American professional culture demands that these experts establish rather
distinct positions in their research if they are to garner and maintain
national recognition.
Providing Personal Evidence

We have surveyed the preferences of our respondents, and we have consid-
ered their justifications for their particular decisions and preferences. But
what kind of personal experiences did our participants draw on in support
of their perspectives about knowing and believing? To manage the array of
personal experiences shared by our participants, we again categorized their
responses. What we found was that we could capture our participants' per-
sonal evidence in 7 general categories: religious, scientific/mathematical,
environmental/experiential, psychological, political/contemporary, research,
and miscellaneous. Once we had sorted them in this way, several trends
began to emerge across our cultural and educational communities. These
categories are displayed in Table 3. Across these groups, the categories
miscellaneous and environment/experiential were of relatively little inter-
est, while scientific/mathematical, research, religious, psychological, and
political/contemporary experiences were more commonly described. Cer-
tainly, the sharing of personal experiences within the aforementioned catego-
ries is understandable based on the educational backgrounds and career
histories of our participants.
Cultural comparisons. The contrasts we witnessed in the personal evi-
dence shared by our American and European respondents seem best under-
stood in terms of cultural influences. For instance, when we compared the
personal experiences of our American and European participants, we found
that respondents from America were more apt to convey events of a religious
nature (29%), followed by experiences within the scientific/mathematical
category (20%). Evidence of a research and psychological nature was some-
what less frequently mentioned. Under the label of religious evidence, these
participants discussed subjects like faith in Jesus, the Bible, and the Virgin
Birth.
When imparting events of a scientific/mathematical nature, our American
participants wrote about such topics as electricity, the circulatory system,
and mathematical formulas. Concept learning and dealing with controversial
430

Table 3
Frequencies and Percentages of Categories of Evidence by Cultural and Educational Communities
Americans Europeans
UGrad Adv Expert Total UGrad Adv Expert Total All
Categories f % / % 7 % / % / % / % 7% / % / %
Religious 14 18 6 8 2 4 23 29 4 4 5 5 0 0 9 9 32 17
Scientific/mathematical 7 9 4 5 5 6 16 20 8 8 16 15 4 4 28 27 46 25
Environmental/experential 2 3 1 1 0 0 3 4 2 2 3 3 1 1 6 6 9 5
Psychological 4 5 4 5 2 3 10 13 6 6 10 10 3 3 19 18 29 16
Contemporary/political 7 9 5 6 1 1 13 17 9 9 6 6 1 1 16 15 30 16
Research 0 0 5 6 5 6 10 13 10 10 7 7 6 6 23 22 33 18
Miscellaneous 0 0 1 1 3 4 4 3 1 1 3 3 0 0 4 4 8 4

Alexander and Dochy
texts were among the evidence described by American participants under
the category of research, while prejudice, self-help skills, and child-rearing
were examples of their psychological evidence. The Europeans, by compari-
son, shared scientific or mathematical experiences (27%) far more often,
followed by research experiences (22%) and then psychological experiences
(18%). Molecular biology, mathematical generalizations, mass, and velocity
were among the scientific/mathematical evidence shared by these respon-
dents, whereas computer studies, writing research, and economic theory
were presented under the category of research experiences. Some of the
psychological events we categorized for the European participants were such
topics as psychoanalysis, egocentrism in children, and social work.
Perhaps the greatest point of cultural contrast came in the category of
religious evidence. Indeed, 29% of all the personal experiences shared by
American participants fell within this category, as compared to only 9% for
the Europeans. However, only two experiences of a religious nature came
from American experts, who, like their European counterparts, relied far
more on personal evidence that was of a research, psychological, or scientific/
mathematical nature. It was, therefore, the American undergraduate and
graduate/faculty communities who relied more on religious subjects to justify
their views of knowing and believing. This trend in personal evidence leads
us to several speculations and related observations. First, it is quite possible
that the religious orientation among the American undergraduates and
graduates/faculty was strongly associated with their choice of university and
region of the country. In other words, had other institutions or geographic
regions of the United States been the source of participants in these two
communities, less distinction between the American and European communi-
ties may have been evidenced.
Second, the religious orientation of American undergraduates was pres-
ent even in the personal evidence we sorted in other response categories
(e.g., scientific/mathematical). Even when they selected a scientific topic like
the origins of the universe, for example, these American undergraduates
frequently gave it a religious character (e.g., creationism, abortion, homosex-
uality). The strength of religious convictions permeated more than these
undergraduates' personal evidence. It will become the topic of discussion,
again, when these students address our question of whether beliefs are
changeable.
Third, as it pertains to the variability in evidence extended by the three
American educational communities, one plausible explanation is that the
experts from the United States have the same religious orientations as the
less educated, less expert American communities. However, because this
group is immersed in the formal study and research of knowledge and belief
(as with their European counterparts), they were understandably drawn more
to academically related experiences than religious ones. Thus, for the sake
of argument, it is conceivable that a greater percentage of Americans than
Europeans, regardless of educational level, have a religious orientation (e.g.,
visit church regularly, profess to a belief in God) that colors their perceptions
432

of knowledge and beliefs and is understandably reflected in their choice of

evidence. Without more information in this regard, however, this plausible
explanation for the observed pattern in evidence remains highly speculative.
Before turning to other issues about personal experiences, one other
observation about the American undergraduates deserves mention. Only
among these participants was there evidence that schooled knowledge was
judged to be "valueless" information. Rather, it was one's beliefs that were
to be held in esteem. As one of these students wrote:
Although I know that in 1492 Columbus sailed and was searching for
a faster route to India and he discovered islands off of the Americas,
I don't care and rarely consider it. Yet I have a strong belief that Jesus
was God incarnate, and I have the knowledge that He did exist as a
man, but I don't know by historical fact that He is God. I only feel
that because I believe the Bible is true, although I realize many do not.
Some disdain for the educational process was even reflected in the comments
of a few graduate students, like the following:
I believe graduate work is more a series of hurdles rather than knowl-

edge gained. I had heard this but now have personal knowledge and
experiences that have validated this information.
In this regard, the American undergraduates appeared markedly different

from their Dutch counterparts. If their words were accurate reflections, as
we held them to be, then the Dutch postsecondary and graduate students,
while still providing more religious examples than the European experts
(10% each versus 0%), did not project the same negative attitudes toward
schooled learning we observed in the writings of the undergraduates, and
some graduate students, from the United States.
Was there any relationship between the type of experiences participants
shared in their written responses and their initial selection from among the
various alternatives, given or generated? We would say yes—to some extent.
The Europeans who chose Option 1 (separate), for example, most often
turned to evidence from the areas of science or mathematics that offered,
in their estimation, a clear dichotomy between the proven and the unproven,
the verifiable and the nonverifiable. Likewise, those holding to the perception
that knowledge is a subset of one's beliefs and those espousing the reverse
state (i.e., beliefs are a special case of knowledge) also found it effective to
rely on experiences from their own research or academic careers as evidence.
A good example of this kind of pattern is evidenced in the personal experi-
ence of one American expert:
Our flier data show that non-controversial texts can persuade (e.g.,
one on fishing for steelhead and then releasing the fish), whereas
controversial texts (e.g., abortion) are discarded by adult readers who
report not changing their minds after reading them; we argue that
belief systems are engaged by the abortion text, whereas knowledge
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Alexander and Dochy
systems ("I didn't know about catch and release programs") are
engaged by the fish text.
For those professing the view that knowledge is a dimension of beliefs,

evidence was offered of a transformation from information as personal under-
standing to information as public, externally supported understanding. For
those espousing the opposing view (i.e., beliefs are particular cases of knowl-
edge), evidence was presented to show that beliefs are knowledge which
has yet to be, or which cannot be, validated by other than personal means.
In the case of participants preferring to represent knowledge and beliefs as
synonymous terms (Option 4), there was a greater tendency to describe
a situation where knowledge and beliefs were inseparable or intricately
intertwined. Several of these participants also used this opportunity to relay
a past experience in which there was a dramatic or catastrophic shift in what
they knew or believed.
Changing Beliefs
The final question we put to our participants was whether they considered
beliefs to be changeable and under what circumstances. We posed this
question because we were intrigued by the resilience of individuals' beliefs
as reported in the literature on misconceptions (e.g., Perkins & Simmons,
1988) and conceptual change (e.g., Carey, 1985; Chinn & Brewer, 1993).
We also considered the justifications accompanying these decisions useful
information in our exploration of the relationship between knowledge and
beliefs. In essence, would our participants see new and compelling knowl-
edge as a catalyst to changes in beliefs? Because our respondents were
schooled adults, many of whom had chosen careers in the field of education,
we expected that a majority would concur with the judgment that beliefs
are changeable and that knowledge would play a role in that change.
In line with our expectations, we found an overwhelming perception
among our respondents that beliefs are indeed changeable (98%). However,
a number of those holding to this position readily acknowledged how difficult
it is to bring about such a change. There was also a cultural distinction
worthy of note in these judgments. Among the American participants, there
was 100% agreement that beliefs were malleable to some degree. This com-
pares to 95%) of the European respondents. The three individuals who replied
"no" to this inquiry were all postsecondary students. One of these Dutch
students offered no support for this judgment, while the other two stated
that one either believes or not. For these two Dutch students, if one's beliefs
changed then they would become knowledge and would, therefore, cease
to be beliefs.
Change agents. The next thing we did was sort the participants' elabora-
tions on the causes of belief change into categories. In doing so, we found that
these elaborations fit into five general categories: educational/experiential,
personality, information, nature of beliefs, and other. The responses of our
participants frequently included mention of factors within several of these
434

categories. A summary of these categorical responses by cultural and educa-

tional community are shown in Table 4. Educational/experiential causes
included such occurrences as schooling, personal crises, and influential peo-
ple, whereas the personality category entailed causes like the holders' self-
esteem and their moral development. Under the heading of information,
we incorporated discussions about how new or convincing information can
alter beliefs. Likewise, in the category labeled nature of beliefs, we included
participants' statements dealing with ontology, strength of convictions, and
value systems. Some of the topics we classified in the Other category were
discussions about psychotherapy and personal goals.
When it came to the types of conditions or interventions that might lead
to changes in beliefs, the introduction of new or compelling information or
data was the most influential event described by our participants. Thirty-two
percent of the Americans and 42% of the Europeans responding to our task
cited this factor. Almost as potent a variable in belief changes, according to
our participants, is formal instruction or life experiences. Thirty-one percent
of the American respondents and 39% of the European participants presented
situations within this category. Consider the following explanation, from a
Dutch postsecondary student, that emphasizes the important role of
schooling:
When you started [sic] an education after your normal school, and a
lot of the subjects of the new education are the same as in your high
school, the beliefs are low; the study can be boring. On the opposite
side, a study that is totally new will encourage your beliefs.
As seen in the following descriptions, the life events that our respondents
shared were sometimes of a normal, developmental nature:
20 years ago, my mother used to wash the windows every 6 weeks,

because she believed the Dutch people were used to washing them
every 6 weeks and they expected that from her too. So the Dutch
value was her value. Nowadays she doesn't care that much about the
Dutch value anymore (maybe because the Dutch value also changed)
and she has her own value about washing windows (wash your
windows when you think they need to be washed).
In contrast, other experiences were more of an extreme or radical form,

sometimes historical:
Yes. You believe that after World War II, the horrible things that
happened then will never be practices again, at least not in Europe.
Then you see the events taking place in former Yugoslavia: You have
to adapt your beliefs because of this.
Sometimes hypothetical-
Let's say I believe there should be no private ownership of firearms.
Two men with baseball bats kick in my door and beat me senseless,
435

Table 4
Frequencies and Percentages of Change Agents by Cultural and Educational Communities
Americans Europeans
UGrad Adv Expert Total UGrad Adv Expert Total All
Categories / % / % / % / % / % / % / % / % / %
Educational/experiential 3 10 20 45 8 29 31 31 24 51 14 28 5 12 42 39 73 35
Personality 11 38 7 16 3 11 21 21 4 9 1 2 0 0 6 6 27 13
Information 6 21 13 30 13 46 32 32 15 32 26 52 5 42 46 42 78 37
Nature of beliefs 9 31 1 2 1 4 11 11 2 4 9 18 2 17 13 12 24 11
Other 0 0 3 7 3 11 6 6 2 4 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 4

burglarize the house, and kill my entire family. I realize with a firearm,
I may have been able to stop them. I change my belief and become
a proponent of a legally armed citizenry.
The category that provided the greatest point of contrast between the
American and European respondents was the one we labeled personality.
While 21% of the American responses were of this type, only 6% of the
Europeans described factors in this category. On the basis of their given
causes, many Americans saw characteristics within the individual, such as
open-mindedness and emotionalism, as significant forces in belief change.
For the most part, what these individuals convey is that the presence of these
personality characteristics contributes to a potential change in the beliefs held.
However, there were several cases, all within the American undergraduate
community, where personality factors or traits were viewed as important in
one's ability to resist a change in beliefs. What these individuals projected
was a perception that it was a sign of moral character for an individual to
resist information or experiences that would challenge their beliefs or a "faith
that should be not explored or doubted." It would seem that the religious
issues and convictions that we saw in other responses of this community
were evidenced again in this arena.
General Discussion
Our goal in writing this article was to inspect the implicit theories that adults
from the United States and Europe hold about knowing and believing and
to explore the boundaries of these two fundamental constructs. Prior to
restating what we see as key findings of this exploration and their implications
for research and practice, we wish to acknowledge several limitations of this
work. For one, asking adults, even educated ones, to give voice to their
unvoiced understandings of knowledge and beliefs is a difficult and uncertain
venture. While an introspective task, like the one applied in this study,
can promote self-reflection, it cannot eliminate either the complexity or
uncertainty of this process. Further, we acknowledge that having the language
to explain one's conception of knowing or believing may have been particu-
larly demanding for our European respondents for whom English was not
a primary language.
In addition, we have chosen to operate as if conceptions of knowledge
and beliefs within the same individual are consistent and unidimensional
constructs, when in reality we acknowledge their dynamic and multidimen-
sional nature. Take the explanation of the undergraduate discussing his
disbelief in evolution as a case in point. This undergraduate student seemed
to be expressing his lack of belief in this phenomenon, although he may
well have some belief about this theory. Likewise, it is possible for an
individual to have knowledge about evolution, as well as knowledge that it
is a valid theory. These subtle distinctions, which are not specifically
addressed in this research, may well have contributed to the distinctions
between knowledge and beliefs expressed by our participants.
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Alexander and Dochy
Despite these limitations, we feel that we have achieved our goal of
explicating adults' often tacit notions of knowledge and beliefs, providing a
foundation for future research and instructional practice. Such a foundation
is essential if we are to go beyond intellectual voyeurism in any meaningful
way. First, we found that the choices adults make and the words they share
in response to a series of questions about the relationship of knowledge
and beliefs offer insights into their perceptions—perceptions that can vary
depending on community membership. For example, we found that the
majority of our participants perceive knowledge and beliefs to be overlapping
ideas that still retain some unique dimensions. Perhaps by choosing and
justifying this option, our participants were allowing for the dynamic and
multidimensional character of knowledge and beliefs which we refer-
enced earlier.
It also appears that conceptions of knowledge were easier to convey
for our participants than notions of beliefs. Thus, while it is evident that
beliefs are significant forces in the process and outcomes of learning, it seems
harder to explicate what constitutes beliefs and to relate them to one's
knowledge base. One obvious implication of this findings is a call for contin-
ued research on the nature and role of beliefs, particularly research that
examines beliefs both from a cognitive and affective perspective (Garner &
Alexander, 1994). The greater difficulty in espousing one's conceptions of
beliefs might also reflect the limited attention given to beliefs in the instruc-
tional environment. Whether for political or personal reasons, educators may
be better equipped to teach as if beliefs were not a factor in understanding—
that is, as if all that is learned is somehow factual or verifiable. Quite to the
contrary, it appears that undergraduates, particularly those from America,
often sort instructional content into three categories: (a) those ideas which
are believed but not verifiable; (b) information that is learned but not
believed; and (c) those concepts that are both known and believed. Sadly, for
the teacher interacting with such students, outward reactions to information
mentally sorted into these categories may be indistinguishable. Given this
situation, it is perhaps understandable why misconceptions are often difficult
to modify (Chinn & Brewer, 1993) and why the radical restructuring of
concepts is not easily achieved, even under the best of instructional condi-
tions (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). In essence, if undergraduates are much
like those in our study, they may well go through the motions of learning
without achieving the end desired by those who teach them.
From a definitional standpoint, what is the value of uncovering what
members of certain cultural and educational communities intend when they
speak of knowing and believing. Considering the powerful role these con-
structs play in current research and the influence they exert in practice, it
behooves us to recognize the array of interpretations that exist, even among
mature and educated individuals. It is clear that we cannot assume that
those who speak of knowledge or beliefs are communicating from a shared
semantic base. Thus, those who research knowledge or beliefs can immedi-
ately contribute to greater clarity simply by offering explicit definitions of
438

what they mean by knowing or believing. Similarly, those who teach should
take time to explain how they envision knowledge and beliefs to others
who inhabit the classroom community. Teachers may also aid in student
understanding by marking the information they see as more tentative and less
factual or by presenting educational information from multiple perspectives
which might color its interpretation.
In addition, across the graphic and verbal questions in our task, we
found repeated evidence that cultural background and educational experi-
ence shade the way that adults conceive of knowing and believing. Ameri-
cans, for example, particularly those at the postsecondary and graduate/
faculty levels, perceived the relationship between knowledge and beliefs in
terms of religious convictions. European respondents, in contrast, viewed
distinctions between knowing and believing much more in terms of scientific
and mathematical understandings that have an externally verifiable character.
Cultural differences were also present in the personal evidence or justifica-
tions that participants chose to share. Americans, generally, were more inter-
ested in psychological factors when explaining changes in beliefs, whereas
Europeans focused their discussions on informational issues or on the power
of formal instruction.
We also observed differences in the implicit understandings of our parti-
cipants that seem attributable to educational experiences or to a formal study
of knowledge or beliefs. With less educational training or with less expertise,
respondents were more apt to relay their views on knowing and believing
with less tentativeness and greater conviction. It was experts, perhaps some-
what surprisingly, who shared their position on issues with some hesitancy
or with respect for alternative perspectives. On this issue, however, we
observed a culture by education interaction in terms of the responses of
the European experts. Specifically, it was the American experts who most
frequently conveyed variability and caution in their choices and verbaliza-
tions. In contrast, the European experts manifested more homogeneity and
greater assurance in their responses. Our explanation for this difference
focused primarily on the professional socialization that could vary for Ameri-
can and European experts.
This cultural and educational interaction was also evidenced in differ-
ences between the American and Dutch postsecondary students. In addition
to their reliance on religious justifications and evidence to support their
views, American undergraduates offered less extensive responses than the
Dutch postsecondary students. Indeed, the written responses of the Dutch
postsecondary students were among the most extensive we encountered.
Interestingly, it was also the Dutch postsecondary students who were the only
group for whom the overlapping option (5) was not the majority response. It
may well be that education via distance learning may have made these
individuals more comfortable and familiar with expressing their ideas in
written format. Distance learning may also have been a factor in the unique
orientation of this group to the relationship between knowing and believing.
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Alexander and Dochy
Together, these results recommend continued research on knowledge
and beliefs that involves participants drawn from varied cultural and educa-
tional communities and raises questions about the influence of distance
learning on conceptions of knowing and believing. For instance, it is
unknown whether postsecondary, advanced students or faculty, or experts
from other countries of the world would espouse views on knowledge and
beliefs similar to those we reported in this study. Also, would elementary
and secondary students talk about knowing and believing in a way that is
unique from the postsecondary students we targeted in this exploration?
Only future studies can address such questions.
Understandings about knowledge and beliefs are critical to human
growth and development. Even if they remain implicit, conceptions about
knowing and believing are apt to impact the thoughts and actions of individu-
als. As in the present study, means of probing the ideas of individuals and
prompting the externalization of often tacit conceptions, like knowledge and
beliefs, grant us a unique opportunity to explore such important understand-
ings and to consider their implications for instructional practice and educa-
tional research. We concur with Epictetus that the type of self-exploration
our inquiries have prompted in this study is perhaps the rudiment of one's
philosophy. We also hold that such explorations are warranted in education,
in that they can inform and enrich our philosophies of human learning and
development. Further, self-reflections should be engaged in by all of those
who are part of the instructional experience—teacher and student alike.
There is, of course, much more to be described and to be explored in this
domain. We may wish to know how one individual's perception of knowl-
edge or beliefs is shaped or transformed over time. We may also want to
examine how individuals from different cultural groups within the same
geographic region view knowing and believing. Thus, this study is, in many
ways, only a beginning for what we hope to be a long and fruitful journey
that promises many alternative routes and venues. If our investigation has
succeeded in stimulating the cognitive wanderlust of others, then our per-
sonal venture into adults' ways of thinking about knowing and believing has
reached a satisfying end.
Notes
The authors wish to thank Bradford Woods, Jonna Kulikowich, and P. Karen Murphy
for their comments on an earlier version of this manuscript and four anonymous reviewers
for their helpful suggestions.
!
The authors wish to thank James Borland for posing this particular explanation of
the findings and for providing helpful suggestions on the earlier draft of this article.
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Accepted August 31, 1994
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American Educational Research

Conceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs: A Comparison Across Varying

The online version of this article can be found at:

American Educational Research Association

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>> Version of Record - Jan 1, 1995

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Conceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs: A

PATRICIA A. ALEXANDER is a Professor and Interim Department Head, Department

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may intend very different meanings. Do individuals educated in the United

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will be evident in the descriptions that follow, we feel that we succeeded

Externalizing Views About Knowledge and Beliefs:

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DIRECTIONS: Above are various representations of

Figure 1. Graphic representations of various relationships between

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unrelated entities. Throughout this article, we refer to this as the separate

How Adults Talk About Knowing and Believing

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For others, it seemed important to generate their own models so as to

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Figure 2. Samples (2a-2d) of representations of knowledge and

own representations because they wished to interject additional variables

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Separate 1(2) 4(8) 1(4) 6(5)

their preference for Option 5, overlapping, experts, followed by those with

Defining Knowledge and Beliefs

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We also observed that what tended to differentiate between individuals'

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Why would American undergraduates and European experts tend to be

Knowledge is a representation of facts, concepts, etc. that is gathered

Defending Their Views

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For Option 5 (overlapping), the most frequently selected alternative,

Of course, caution and tentativeness were not restricted to American

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Providing Personal Evidence

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of knowledge and beliefs and is understandably reflected in their choice of

I believe graduate work is more a series of hurdles rather than knowl-

In this regard, the American undergraduates appeared markedly different

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For those professing the view that knowledge is a dimension of beliefs,

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categories. A summary of these categorical responses by cultural and educa-

20 years ago, my mother used to wash the windows every 6 weeks,

In contrast, other experiences were more of an extreme or radical form,

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Alexander & Dochy (1995)

Alexander & Dochy (1995)