ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS v. JOEL R. PEDRO. G.R. No. 173588. April 22, 2009.

FACTS:

Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization from the
COMELEC a day before the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for
Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC granted the quashal

The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec.
8 on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.

The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying
that the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to
the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the
dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the
accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date.

Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated
reopening.

The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his
argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the CA's decision was
reversed.

Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

RULING:

The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate
concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the
Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that
there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a
motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the
basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, et al.

G.R. Nos. 171222 & 174786, 18 February 2015, FIRST DIVISION, (Sereno, C.J.)
The failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law
exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its
officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of
responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-
Hazing Law are not committed.
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to
successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2
May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the
Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned,
the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the
criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material
averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court
questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.
ISSUE:
May the dismissal of the criminal case of the principal accused be invoked as a ground to dismiss the
criminal case of the accomplices, some school authorities herein?
RULING:
No. That the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of
trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s
acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act,
they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the
above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they
consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, the Court rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not
limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions,
clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.
Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-
owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-
trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of
the law.
Nevertheless, the Court finds – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice
to hazing. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the
criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
***

G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
Facts:
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private
respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and
ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private
respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance, never
shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule 65,
questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently contending
that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Did the court commit gave abuse of discretion acquitting the accused?
Held: The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the
defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of
procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict
adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice.
The Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however, actually
charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only
one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous
complaints or information is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him
and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused
two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a
ground78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his
plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this
defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the
Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question
the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts
specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to
speak of.81
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a
total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission
of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape
committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA’s
mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was
not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape
through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
***

Soriano vs People and BSP

G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010
Facts:
Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly securing a
loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact these individuals did not make any loan
in the bank, nor did the bank's officers approved or had any information about the said loan. The state
prosecutor conducted a Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of Special
Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate information against Soriano
for estafa through falsification of commercial documents and violation of DORSI law.
Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground:
that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for the letter transmitted by the BSP to the
DOJ constituted the complaint and was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as statment of address of the
petitioner and oath of subscription and the signatories were not authorized persons to file the
complaint; and
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the commission of estafa uner par. 1(b) of Art.
315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DORSI law (Sec. 83 or RA 337 as
amended by PD 1795), and therefore a person cannot be charged of both offenses.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the mandatory requirements of law.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in an order denying a
Motion to Quash.
Ruling:
Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be the complaint but merely transmitted for
preliminary investigation. The affidavits and not the letter transmitting them initiated the preliminary
investigation and therefore is the complaint which substantially complied with the manadory
requirements of law.
No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after
trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law.
***

Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The instant petition of certiorari under Rule 65 originated from a complaint for unfair competition filed
by petitioner against private respondents Elidad Kho, Violeta Kho, and Roger Kho, before the City
Prosecutors Office of Manila. After due investigation, the City Prosecutors Office of Manila came out
with its May 31, 2000 Resolution recommending the prosecution of private respondents for unfair
competition and dismissing private respondents counterclaim against petitioner. Pursuant to the
Resolution, an Information[6] for unfair competition was filed against private respondents Khos before
the Manila RTC, Branch 24. On July 31, 2002, the Khos filed a supplemental motion insisting that the
case be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.

On August 21, 2002, the trial court issued the second assailed Order,[14]holding that due to its Order
withdrawing the Information, there is no necessity to order the dismissal of the case. The re-filing of
the Information would constitute double jeopardy.[15]
Issue: whether the re-filing or the reinstatement of the Information would constitute double jeopardy.
Held: Court held that would not bar the reinstatement of the Information.
The right against double jeopardy is contained in Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads: No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

For double jeopardy to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a valid complaint or
information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted, acquitted, or the case has been
dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.[23]

Since we have held that the October 24, 2001 Order granting the withdrawal of the Information was
committed with grave abuse of discretion, then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a valid
and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite on the conviction and
acquittal of the accused in the dismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was not
met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIO K. ESPINOSA, respondent.

Facts: On January 22, 2001, Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that
double jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been arraigned in the previous estafa
cases; and (2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had been granted without his express
consent.
In its assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan First Division ruled that jeopardy had attached in the
first instance when Criminal Cases were dismissed upon the prosecutions ex parte motion to
withdraw the information. It noted that the dismissal had been sought and obtained without
respondents knowledge, much less express consent. The anti-graft court dismissed the criminal
cases against Respondent Mario K. Espinosa on the ground of double jeopardy. Hence the recourse
to petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[7]
Issue:
Whether or not [the SBN] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or x x x excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Cases as against Respondent Espinosa.[8]
Held: The Petition is unmeritorious.
First, prior to submitting the instant Petition to this Court, petitioner should have filed a motion for
reconsideration before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[9]
Second, the proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, provides that [d]ecisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by [a] petition for review
on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, likewise provides that a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court via a verified petition for review on certiorari.
Clearly then, the remedy of appeal was available to petitioner. For unexplained reasons, it chose not
to pursue this recourse. Neither has it cited grounds to exempt the Petition from the stringent rule
forbidding a substitution of remedies. Verily, its cavalier disregard of procedural requirements,
especially its erroneous choice of remedy, is indeed enough reason to throw out this Petition
summarily.
***

Jacob vs Sandiganabayan
Facts: From 1993 to 1997, Petron Corporation (Petron), a corporation engaged in the business of
refining, marketing and distribution of petroleum products, received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by
assignment from 18 private firms[4]registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). The TCCs were
issued by the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit & Duty Drawback Center (OSS), an office
under the Department of Finance (DOF), created by virtue of Administrative Order No. 266 dated
February 7, 1992. Petron used the assigned TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities.
The Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman eventually found
that the their transactions involving the TCCs were irregular and violative of the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 29, 1989 between the BOI and the DOF, which implemented Article 21 of
Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. [7]
On April 10, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a total of 62 Informations, were against DOF
Undersecretary Belicena, OSS Deputy Executive Director Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., petitioners and
other Petron officials, and officers of the BOI-registered firms which assigned the TCCs to Petron,
charging them with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division gave the following reasons for overruling Justice Narios
verbal order dismissing the criminal cases against the accused in the alleged tax credit scam. On
February 26, 2002, petitioners, together with four other co-accused Petron officials, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[10] of the February 4, 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
Division. Other accused also filed their motions for reconsideration and motions to quash/dismiss.
In an Omnibus Resolution dated December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division ruled in the
prosecutions favor and denied all the motions filed by the accused
Hence, petitioners come before us via the instant Petition for Certiorari averring grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division
Issue: WON Petitioners have been put into double jeopardy.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Narios dismissal of the
criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced
and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not abuse its discretion in setting aside
Justice Narios verbal order, which dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, for not only was such
order baseless, as we had previously discussed herein; but more importantly, because it is an utter
nullity
Given that Justice Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 is null and void,
and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it follows that petitioners cannot invoke the
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or
termination of the criminal cases against petitioners.
Finally, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion nor
erred in not considering the glaring lack of evidence against petitioners.