People vs Mamantak

G.R. No.174659
July 28, 2009

Facts:

At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to
a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked
for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat,
Christopher, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from
his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for
him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the
child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.

The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of
Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a
woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for
P30,000 in exchange for the boy.

On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent
photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when
Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the
mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman
instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the
ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s
Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.

Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was
formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together with the
PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and
proceeded to the designated meeting place.

At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women
came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa
and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a
certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in
Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told
Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to
Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them
that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused.
Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher
was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that
the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes
with Christopher.

Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer
recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was,
the boy gave a Muslim name with “Taurak” as surname.

Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her
niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney
which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the
ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF
team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.

Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other
hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her
third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged
with kidnapping for ransom.

Issue:

Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of
the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?

Held:

After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on November
30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and
accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario
represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited
to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such
restraints necessary for the common welfare.

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the
felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for
the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a decision
dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand
for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty.
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending
the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by
Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and
accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007

FACTS: On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties
involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding
the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing
loans, whether behest or non-behest. Among the accounts referred to the Committee's
Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions,
the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because
of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner
alleges that respondents violated the provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo

recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack
of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense.
Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated
July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999. Petitioner
elevated the case to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
offense leveled against respondents has prescribed.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious. Respondent Ombudsman committed grave

abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII are
charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Amending said law, Section 4,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, increased the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years. The
applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
as amended.In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that
the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time
the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to
question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period
commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans. As to when the
period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326,
as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted 'when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person. Records show that the act complained of was discovered
in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,
or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint
was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.

Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice

G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008

Facts:

Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money
amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for
payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the
closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili
on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation,
only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's
personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued
the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures,
which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only
against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a
letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the
bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the
preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act
No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four
(4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed
the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in
his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying
its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act,
does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it,
and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure
to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner
claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds
and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-
compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own
prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Issue:

Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the
RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

Held:

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation,
the prescription of the offense is halted.

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the
time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to
the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active
prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-
flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.

Pv Patrirca

Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice

G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008

Facts:

Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money
amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for
payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the
closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili
on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation,
only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's
personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued
the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures,
which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only
against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a
letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the
bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the
preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act
No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four
(4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed
the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in
his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying
its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act,
does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it,
and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure
to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner
claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds
and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-
compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own
prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the
RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

Held:

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation,
the prescription of the offense is halted.

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the
time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to
the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active
prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-
flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.

PvT
Ortega vs. People

G. R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008

Facts:

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The
case was pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted
amending among others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old.
At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of majority.

Issue:

Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in
the resolution of the case.
Held:

The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A.
No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is
evidently favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by
petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age
was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner,
at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he
is exempted from criminal liability.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO,

Facts:

Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of the
then 5-year-old victim. The crime was committed when appellant was only 17; Judgment
was rendered when appellant was already 25.

Issue:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344 regarding criminal
liability of an accused who was a minor during the commission of the crime and the
suspension of sentence of one who is no longer a minor during the pronouncement of
verdict.

Held:

The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the straightforward
testimony of the victim and the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.

The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was only 17 during
the commission of the crime since, in view of the circumstances to which accused
committed the felony, it was proved that he acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344).
There was showing that the accused understood the consequences of his action.

Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion perpetua
instead of the death penalty.

As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the decision of the
Court, ordering accused to pay the victim for damages.

However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his sentence
provided in Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an accused found guilty
of a capital offense. The Court stated that what was important was the intent of the Act to
uphold the welfare of a child in conflict with the law. What was to be considered was the
fact that accused committed the crime at a tender age.

The Court held that accused may be confined in an agricultural camp or any training
facility in accordance with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case was remanded to the court of
origin to take appropriate action in accordance to the said provision.