JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

LAW OF CRIMES
CASE COMMENT-
VIRSA SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 1958 SC
672

SUBMITTED TO: - DR. SAADIA

SUBMITTED BY: - UMANG DIXIT
BALLB(HONS)(REGULAR)2ND YEAR
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher DR. SAADIA who gave

me the golden opportunity to do this case comment on the case “VIRSA SINGH V. STATE OF

PUNJAB A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 672”, which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came

to know about so many new things, I am really thankful to her. Secondly, I would also like to

thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finalizing this assignment within the

limited time frame.

-Umang Dixit

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
S.NO. TOPIC PAGE NO.

1.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 02

2. TABLE OF CONTENTS 03

3. INTRODUCTION 04
• FACTS
• DECISION

4. ANALYSIS 07
• OFFENCE OF MURDER AND ITS PUNISHMENT
• INTENTION TO CAUSE PARTICULAR INJURY
REQUIRED
• INTENTION AS TO SUFFICIENCY OF INJURY
NOT REQUIRED
• THE INTENT REQUIREMENT
• THE SITUATION BEFORE 1958

5. CONCLUSION 15

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 16

7. END NOTES 17

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 INTRODUCTION

The case is dealing with the Section 300 that includes the ingredients of an offence of murder
and Section 302 that deals with punishment for an offence of murder, if committed by the
accused. Here the appellant, Virsa Singh has been accused of murder by the first court and
further, the decision of High Court of Punjab upheld the decision of the first court. The
appellant was tried with five others under Sections 302/149, 324/149 and 323/149 of the
Indian Penal Code. The appellant was also charged individually under Section 302. The
others were acquitted of the murder charge by the first court but were convicted under
Sections 326, 324 and 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal to the
high court they were all acquitted.

There was only one injury on Khem Singh and both courts are agreed that the appellant
caused it. It was caused as the result of spear thrust and the doctor who examined Khem Sigh,
while he was still alive, said that it was “a punctured wound.”

FACTS
The accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of, he deceased. This injury caused his death. In
the opinion of the doctor the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. The appellant was allegedly guilty of the murder of one Khem Singh. There was only
one injury on his person, which was a result of a spear thrust. The doctor said that the injury
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death It was found by the Sessions
judge that the accused intended to cause grievous.hurt only. In his opinion however the third
clause Of S. 300 Indian Penal Code applied. He accordingly convicted and sentenced the
accused under S. 302 Indian Penal Code. The High Court upheld the conviction. It was
argued that the third clause Of S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code did not apply as it was not
proved that the accused intended to inflict a 1496 bodily injury that was sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature as s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause states,
" If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death Held,
that the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under s. 300 Indian
Penal Code third clause.

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(1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

(2) The nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations.

(3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to
say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was
intended.

(4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three
elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.This
part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferentialand has nothing to do with the intention
of the offender.

The third clause of S. 300 Indian Penal Code consists of two parts. Under the first part it must
be proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and
under the second part it must be proved that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. The words " and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted " are
merely descriptive. All this means is, that it is not enough to prove that the injury found to
be present is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature ; it must in addition
be shown that the injury found to be present was the injury intended to be inflicted.
Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of
inference or deduction from the proved facts about the nature of the injury and has
nothing to do with the question of intention.

Since intention is always a state of mind, it can be proved only by its external manifestations.
When injuries are inflicted on vital parts of the body with sharp edged instruments then the
intention to kill can be attributed to the offenderi.

When a person sets fire to the deceases, after another had poured kerosene on his body, there
cannot be any doubt that the intention of the accused was to kill the deceased.ii

DECISION
The learned Sessions Judge found that the appellant was 21 or 22 years old and said-

" When the common object of the assembly seems to have been to cause grievous hurts only,
I do not suppose Virsa Singh actually had the intention to cause the death of Khem Singh, but
by a rash and silly act he gave a rather forceful blow, which ultimately caused his death.
Peritonitis also supervened and that hastened the death of Khem Singh. But for that Khem

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Singh may perhaps not have died or may have lived a little longer." Basing on those facts, he
said that the case fell under s. 300, 3rdly and so he convicted under s. 302, Indian Penal
Code.

The learned High Court Judges considered that the whole affair was sudden and occurred on a
chance meeting ". But they accepted the finding that the appellant inflicted the injury on Khem
Singh and accepted the medical testimony that the blow was a fatal one. It was argued with
much circumlocution that the facts set out above do not disclose an offence of murder because
the prosecution has not proved that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Section 300,3rdly was quoted:

" If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."

It was said that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to the bodily
injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."

When an accused hit the deceased on a vital part of the body,the chest, with the blade of a
sword, two feet in length with such force as to impair the liver and the aorta, it was held the
offence was plainly oe of murder.iii

When the accused, on seeing the deceased said that he was searching for him everywhere and
stabbed him with the knife, and especially when the knife was drawn downwards as if to cut
the body into two, it was held that the intention to kill the deceased was very clear from the
facts.iv

This is a favourite argument in this kind of case but is fallacious. If there is an intention to
inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the
intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly " would be unnecessary because the act would
fall under the first part of the section, namely- " If the act by which the death is caused is done
with the intention of causing death."

In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to the
offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person."

When the accused pierced a sharp edged weapon in the heart of the deceased and uttered words
of, “doing away with the deceased” before the commissioning of the crime, it was held by the
Supreme Court that the intention to kill can be inferred.v

In Vasanth v State of Maharashtra,vi there was a previous enmity between the accused and the
deceased. The accused and the deceased were seen grappling with each other. Some persons
who were present separated the two. The accused when went running to his jeep, drove it on
the wrong side and towards the deceased in high speed, knocked him down and ran over him,
killing him. The road on which the incident took place was a wide and deserted one. There was
no reason or necessity for the accused to have driven the jeep in the wrong direction. The
Supreme Court held that the accused had deliberately dashed his jeep against the accused and
ran over him with the intention to cause his death.

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 ANALYSIS

OFFENCE OF MURDER AND ITS PUNISHMENT

SEC. 300 deals with the offence of murder and Sec. 302 deals with its punishment. Here, the
Section 300 would be applied to the case as the case has all the ingredients of murder. The
definition of Murder as defined in Sec 300 of the Indian Penal Code is defined as under-

Except in the case hereinafter expected, Culpable Homicide is Murder, if the act by which the
death is caused is done with the intention of causing the death of the person, or-

Secondly- If it is done with the intention of causing such type of bodily injury as the offender
knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm of such injury is
caused, or-
Thirdly- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily
injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-
Fourthly- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause the death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.
The third clause, as stated earlier, views the matter from an objective standpoint. It consists of
two parts. Under the first part, it has to be shown that there was an intention to inflict the
particular injury. The second part requires that the injury intended to be inflicted was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It speaks of an intention to cause
bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The essence
of the clause is the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.vii
It must, of course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury
must be established, that is to say, whether the injury is on the leg or the arm or the stomach,
how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs were cut and so forth. These are purely
objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction: to that extent the enquiry is
objective; but when it comes to the question of intention, that is subjective to the offender and
it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be
present. Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause- " and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The first
part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section, namely, the infliction of bodily
injury with the intention to inflict it, that is to say, if the circumstances justify an inference

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that a man's intention was only to inflict a blow on the lower part of the leg, or some lesser
blow, and it can be shown that the blow landed in the region of the heart by accident, then,
though all injury to the heart is shown to be present, the intention to inflict ail injury in that
region, or of that nature, is not proved. In that case, the first part of the clause does not come
into play. But once it is proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to
be present, then the earlier part of the clause we are now examining " and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted " is merely descriptive. All it means is that it is not enough to prove
that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature;
it must in addition be shown that the injury is of the kind that falls within the earlier clause,
namely, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of
inference or deduction from the proved facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to
do with the question of intention. In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury
found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example,
whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with
sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, of course, not
necessary to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to
have the bowels fall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the
heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for, if
he does not know that there is a heart or a kidney or bowels, be cannot be said to have
intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broad based and
simple and based on common sense: the kind of enquiry that " twelve good men and true
could readily appreciate and understand.

Intention to cause particular injury required

This aspect of the matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Harjinder
Singh v Delhi Administration.viii In this case, the accused was trying to assault one Dalip
Singh and the deceased intervened. The accused finding himself one against two, took out the
knife and stabbed the deceased. At that stage, the deceased happened to be in a crouching
position presumably to intervene and separate the two. The knife pierced the upper portion of
the left thigh. The stab wound was oblique and it cut the femoral artery and vein under the
muscle, which are important min vessels of the body. The cutting of these vessels would
result in great loss of blood and would lead to immediate death or death after a short duration.

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The Supreme Court held that from the evidence, it was not proved that it was the intention of
the appellant to inflict that particular injury on that particular injury on that particular place.
In view of this, it was held that cl (3) of s 300 would not apply. The accused was convicted
under s 300, Pt 1.

To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case
under s. 300, 3rdly " ;

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present ;

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury,
that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was
intended.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three
elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part
of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of
the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the
burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300,3rdly. It does not
matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was Do
intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even
matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once
the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the
enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective
inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a
licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that
kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or
reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.

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Intention as to sufficiency of injury not required

The two parts of clause 3 are disjunctive , the first [part is subjective to the offender: ‘If it si
done with the intention of causing bodly injury to any person’. Once this is established , the
sufficiency of injury is purly an objective fact . It is a matter of inference or deduction from
the proven facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do with the intention. The
term sufficiency used in this clause is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of
nature, and ‘if such sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is
intentional the case falls under cl (3) of s.300 ix.The injury caused should be the cause of the
death. x

That is exactly the position here. No evidence or explanation is given about why the appellant
thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels
and three coils of the intestines came out of the wound and that digested food oozed out from
cuts in three places. In the absence of evidence, or reasonable explanation, that the prisoner
did not intend to stab in the stomach with a degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far into
the body, or to indicate that his act was a regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise,
it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. Once
that intent is established (and no other conclusion is reasonably possible in this case, and in
any case it is a question of fact), the rest is a matter for objective determination from the
medical and other evidence about the nature and seriousness of the injury.

The learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan (1)
where Beaman J. says that- " where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more
difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily injury the offender intended."

The Intent Requirement

The ingredient 'intention' in that Clause is very important and that gives a clue in a given case
whether offence involved is murder or not . Supreme Court also discussed the intent element
required for this section in great detail. The argument that prosecution must prove an
intention to inflict only that kind of injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature was found to be fallacious by the court. It was argued that the intention that
the section requires must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the
clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of

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nature to cause death.? Court totally disagreed with such an argument calling it to be a
fallacious argument. According to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even if the
intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence
would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

For cases to fall within cl(3) , it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death ,so
long as death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature.xi

The court read the clause 3 of section 300 of IPC disjunctively and separating intention
being read as linked to the second part in the following way:
If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be
unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the section, namely - "If the act
by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death."

In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to the
offender : "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person." It must, of
course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be
established. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction
and to that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question of intention, that
is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily
injury that is found to be present.

Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause - "and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The first part of this is
descriptive of the earlier part of the section.

So the crux is that what needs to be proved is not that the accused had an intention to inflict
the injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature but that he had an
intention to cause the same bodily injury that is found to be present on the body of the
deceased. Then it is the later part of the enquiry which is objective in nature to find out that
whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not. Thus,

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intention is only linked up and is restricted to the causing of the bodily injury and not to the
knowledge or intention of causing such bodily injury that is sufficient to cause bodily injury
that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. What needs to be proved is that
the accused had an intention to cause the same bodily injury found to be present on the
person of deceased which was later found to be sufficient to cause death. Such a principle is
based on broad lines of common sense because if intention is considered to be of causing an
injury which is sufficient to cause death; then any person could always plead that he never
had an intention to cause such a injury and it would have been very difficult to prove him
wrong.

That is why the court observed that:

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under s.
300, thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter
that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature. It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of
that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually
found to be proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is
whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of
murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can
only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or
otherwise unintentional.

It is not a correct approach that intent required is linked up with the seriousness of the injury
and that is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate an distinct. The
question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but
whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he
did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the
intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the
fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it.
Whether he know of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor
there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or
to inflict and injury of particular degree of seriousness, but where he intended or inflict the

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injury in the question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it
will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.
But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound
is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distant question
and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in
question.

In Laxman Kalu Nkalje v. State of Maharashtra, xiiThere was a quarrel between the accused
and deceased , and the accused whipped out a knife and stabbed the accused on the chest near
the shoulder .The stab injury was not a vital part of the chest, but since the knife cut the artery
inside, it resulted in death. Even in this case, the Supreme Court held that there was no proof
that the injury caused was the I jury intended, has but for the severing of the artery, death
might not have been in used. It was held that the case would not fall under cl(3)of section
300. Accordingly the accused was convicted under section 304 IPC .xiiiSimilarly , in Addha v.
State of Madhya Pradeshxiv,where in the accused in a sudden fight between the two groups
attacked the deceased with lathi that resulted in his death, the Supreme Court in the absence
of evidence indicating his intention convicted the accused under s.304 and not for murder.

Situation before 1958

Situation before 1958 and attitude of courts in application of s. 300(3) was somewhat
uncertain. In the case of Chamru Budhwa Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh after an exchange of
abuse accused dealt a blow on the head of the deceased with the lathi. After that 2nd
appellant dealt another blow to the deceased, the injury inflicted proved fatal and both the
Courts below came to the conclusion that the Appellant was guilty of the offence under
Section 302 IPC. As per the doctor the injury inflicted on the head was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Supreme Court was of the view that it appears
that the crime was committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion
upon a sudden quarrel thus bringing the case within Exception 4 thereto with the result that
the offence committed was culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In another case of
Willie (William) Slaney vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh , William was on terms of intimacy
with sister of deceased. The brother did not like their intimacy. On the evening of the day of
the occurrence, there was a heated exchange of words. The accused gave one blow on his
head with a hockey stick with the result that his skull was fractured. He died in the hospital
ten days later. The doctor thought that injury was only likely to cause death. In the opinion of

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court, the appellant could hardly be presumed to have had this special knowledge that the
blow was sufficient to cause death at the time he struck the blow. So the offence falls under
the second part of section 304 of IPC. While it has been made clear in Virsa Singh's case that
such knowledge is not necessary.

The approach of the court in the above-mentioned cases seems, that more reliance was placed
on the nature and seriousness of injury rather than the intention to cause such injury. It is very
evident when judge in Slaney's case says that, All blows on the head do not necessarily cause
death. The approach has been to find out whether the ingredient namely the intention to cause
the particular injury is present or not and it is held that circumstances like sudden quarrel in a
fight or when the deceased intervenes in such a fight, would create a doubt about the
ingredient of intention as it cannot definitely be said in such circumstances that the accused
aimed the blow at a particular part of the body.

It could be concluded safely, that earlier the courts first searched the intention to kill and in
its absence the act can be murder only if that injury would be sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death.

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 CONCLUSION
Under Clause Thirdly the intention to cause that particular injury is a subjective inquiry and
when once such intention is established and if the intended injury is found objectively to be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause Thirdly is attracted and it
would be murder unless one of the exceptions to Section 300 is attracted. If on the other hand
this ingredient of 'intention' is not established or if a reasonable doubt arises in this regard
then only it would be reasonable to infer that Clause Thirdly is not attracted and that the
accused must be attributed knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause death
in which case it will be culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

➢ BOOKS
• P.S.A. Pillai
• K.D. Gaur
➢ STATUE
• Indian Penal Code
➢ WEBSITES
• www.lawctopus.com
• www.indiankanoon.com
• www.scconline.com
• www.manupatra.com

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i
Chahat Khan v State of Haryana A.I.R. 1972 S.C.2574, (1972) 3 S.C.C. 408.
ii
Bandampalli Venkateswarlu v State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 S.C.C. 492. Also see Mallella Shyamsunder v
State of Andhra Pradesh (2015) 2 S.C.C. 486.
iii
Rau Bhagwanta Hargude v State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1224, (1979) Cr LJ 1022 (S.C.)
iv
Selvaraj v State of Tamil Nadu (1998) 9 S.C.C. 308
v
Katta Ramudu v State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 2428
vi
A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 699, (1998) Cr LJ 844 (S.C.)
vii
Gudar Dusadh v State of Bihar (1972) 3 S.C.C. 118, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 952; Anda v State of Rajasthan A.I.R. 1966
S.C. 148, (1968) Cr LJ 171(S.C.); Nankaunoo v State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 3 S.C.C. 317.
viii
A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 867, (1968) Cr LJ 1025 (S.C.)
ix
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayaavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382.
x
Dasharath Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2004) 7 S.C.C 408, AIR 2004 SC 4488.
xi
Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharastra A.I.R 2004 S.C. 1966,(2005) 9 S.C.C 71.
xii
AIR 1968 SC 1390.
xiii
See also ,Jagroop singh v. State of Bihar .AIR(1972) S.C 952,1972 Cr Lj 587(S.C); Hardev Singh v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 179,(1975) 3 S.C.C 731;Anda v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R 1966 SC 148,Cr Lj171
xiv
(2001) Cr Lj 4675 (S.C).

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