TORBELA VS. RASARIO
ESCUTIN
661 SCRA 633
FACTS:
The spouses Eugenio and Marta Torbela received a parcel of land
from Marta’s sister. Upon the death of the spouses, the Land was adjudicated
in equal shares among their children. These children executed a Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim over the land in favor of their nephew, Dr. Rosario. Another
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim was executed, this time by Dr. Rosario,
acknowledging that he only borrowed the land and was already returning it to
his aunts and uncles. The latter Deed was notarized but was not immediately
annotated on the title of the land, hence, the title was still in the name of Dr.
Rosario. Dr. Rosario mortgaged the land to Banco Filipino for a loan. Dr.
Rosario failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed.
The children then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject land against Dr. Rosario and Banco Filipino. The trial
court ruled in their favor which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether an express trust was created in this case.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that “Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts
of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil
Code, “[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.”62 It is possible to create a trust
without using the word “trust” or “trustee.” Conversely, the mere fact that these
words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The
question in each case is whether the trust or manifested an intention to create
the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial
whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is
called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the
relationship which is called a trust.”
DINAH C. CASTILLO vs. ANTONIO M.
GR No. 171056, 2009-03-13
FACTS:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla
(Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for
properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that
Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla
(Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square
meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was
able to secure an Order[6] dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R.
Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several
agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla K. Mortilla, et
al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and
recreational uses.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713,
and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002.
Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner
learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club
Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation
(Summit Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit
Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that
Orense did not show her any document to prove... ownership of Lot 13713 by
Summit Realty, and even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the
Leviste family, was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.
The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or
interest of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by the
Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil
Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel Buenaventura. The
registered owner, Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its
predecessor-in-interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the said case.
Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them (Consulta No. 1044
and 1119). If ever,... her adverse claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the
judgment debtor who holds no title over the property.
The LRA distinguished between two systems of land... registration:
one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the Property Registration
Decree, and the other is the system of registration for unregistered land under
Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree).
These systems are separate and... distinct from each other. For documents
involving registered lands, the same should be recorded under the Property
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Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an instrument under the
wrong system produces no legal effect.
ISSUE:
WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF
PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT
HELD:
Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that
which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real
or... personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes
a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership
of property.
 Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere... evidence of ownership; it
is not the title to the land itself.
 Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original
Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of
registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title,... issued subsequent to the
original registration.
 Petitioner's reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is
totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a
lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the
cancellation of petitioner's tax declaration.
 As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and
petitioner's title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is
evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title
to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac's
ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's certificate of title is binding upon the
whole world, including respondent public officers and even petitioner
herself.
"curiously, as to how and when petitioner's alleged predecessor-in-interest,
Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1
described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained
utterly silent."... t must be remembered that Summit Realty had already...
acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B,
which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the
said property.
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and
to convincingly explain that they had only acted in accordance therewith in
their dealings with petitioner and/or her documents.
Respondents' actions were only consistent with the recognition... of
the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty,
registered under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates
of title.
Principles:
Transfer Certificate of Title not conclusive evidence of ownership
Dear PAO,
I wanted to buy a certain property owned by my neighbor. He presented to me
a Transfer Certificate of Title or TCT of this property under his name. Is this
TCT sufficient evidence for me to believe that he owns the property?
Sincerely yours,
DJ
Dear DJ,
For your information, the case of Luz Nicolas v. Leonora Mariano (G.R. No.
201070, August 1, 2016), touched on the differentiation of the legal meaning of
Title and Certificate of Title. In this case, the Honorable Supreme Court
Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo said:
“By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land
under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof
can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The
TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.”(Emphasis supplied, citing Lee Tek Sheng v. CA. 354, Phil. 556
[1998])
For emphasis, the Honorable Supreme Court Associate Justice del Castillo
further stated:
“Torrens system of land registration ‘merely confirms ownership and does not
create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose
of transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes
allowed or recognized by law.’” (Emphasis supplied, citing Peralta v. Heirs of
Abalon, G.R. Nos. 83448/183464, 30 June 2014)
Similarly, in the case of Dinah Castillo v. Antonio Escutin (G.R. No.
171056, 12 March 2009), the former associate justice of the Supreme Court,
the Honorable Minita Chico-Nazario, emphasized that “Title” may be defined
briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which
is the foundation of ownership of property. “Certificate of Title,” on the other
hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.
Hence, even if the TCT of a property is named after a certain person, the true
ownership of the same may have already been vested to another through the
execution of a certain deed (like: deed of sale, deed of donation, etc.), which
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necessarily gives the title. Considering this, it would be best for you to first
check on the appropriate Registry of Deeds, whether the said property had
already been transferred to another person and/or an annotation regarding any
transaction/proceeding involving the said property is being undertaken, for
your security.
Again, we find it necessary to mention that this opinion is solely based
on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. The opinion
may vary when the facts are changed or elaborated.
We hope that we were able to enlighten you on the matter.
DE LOS ANGELES vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-19615
FACTS:
On November 21, 1959 an application for registration of title on 12 parcels of
land in Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal,was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
by Leonor De Los Angeles and 7 co-applicants. They alleged that they
are“owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid land.”
The Director of Lands opposed, stating that the land is “a portion of the public
domain.” The Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition, asserting “the
required 3.00 meters strips of public easement” on lots along Ampid River and
the creek.At the initial hearing, an order of general default was issued except
against the Director of Lands, the Director of Lands,the Province of Rizal and
11 private oppositors who appeared therein.
The private oppositors, Julio HIidalgo one among them, filed their written
opposition claiming that they “are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in
question, having acquired homestead patents over said lots”.
The Land Registration Commissioner in its report stated that:
(1) Lot 11 was under patent No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo; and
(2) That the land registration case filed by herein applicants-appellants was set
for hearing but no decision has as yet been received.The court then ordered
the dismissal of the case as regards Lot 11 without prejudice on the part of the
applicants to pursue the corresponding remedy in any ordinary action. Motion
for reconsideration having been denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a
parcel of land for registration of title thereto could be divested of
said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the
issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same
parcel of land.
HELD:
NEGATIVE. It is well-settled that the Director of Lands’ jurisdiction, administrative supervision
and executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to
lands already or private ownership.
Accordingly, a homestead patent issued by him over land NOT of the PUBLIC
DOMAIN is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against the owner. As
contended by the applicants, as of Nov. 21, 1957 – date of application
for registration, they are already “owners pro-indiviso” and in “fee simple”. If
this is the case, then Julio Hidalgo’s homestead patent over Lot 11 makes said
lot no longer public.Since proceedings for land registration in rem
(enforcement is upon the property not against the person), as against a
homestead patent which is NOT, the latter does not therefore finally dispose of
the public or private character of the land.
Hence, applicants should be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot
11.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND NAGUIT,
G.R. NO. 144057
FACTS:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a
parcel of land. The application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
over the land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles
opposed the petition. The court issued an order of general default against the
whole world except as to Angeles and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made
by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of
Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who
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thereupon started occupying the same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator.
The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees in addition to
existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the
corresponding taxes due on the subject land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly
and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or
even the government until she filed her application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was
declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land
was not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.
HELD:
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires
the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section
14(1) had been met by Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared
alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the
property; as well as the tax declarations executed by the original owner
Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide claim of ownership.
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HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179987
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the
property he purchased from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for
more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the
Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC
Judgment. Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the
CA, his heirs elevated the said decision to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. What are the classifications of public lands?
1. Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
HELD:
1. Classifications of land according to ownership.
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it
either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although
of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service
forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part
of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All
lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the
public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them
to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by
a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President
declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service
or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
2. Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession –
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the
land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN / HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411
FACTS:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land
in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D.
Ebio.Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.Respondents assert that the
original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose
5
Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then
on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot.
In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He
also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter,
Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building
permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house
within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land in
favor of Ebio.On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay
of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from
the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road
along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run
from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot
occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and
the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several
officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cuteight
(8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.On March 28, 2005, the
City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate
the area within the next thirty (30) days,or be physically evicted from the said
property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained
unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC
of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.
HELD:
No.It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek.This
being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion
is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in
relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.Art. 457. To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of
the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription.
No matter how long the possession of the properties has been,there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city
or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,the land
which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision
of law.
REPUBLIC VS. CA and Tancinco
GR. No. L-61647
October 12, 1984
Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3 requirements: 1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) through the current of the river;
and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the river bank.
Deposits made by human intervention are excluded.
FACTS:
The respondents (Tancinco’s) were registered owners of a parcel of land in
Bulacan, bordering on the Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an
application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond, but
because of the recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for
the registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the
opposition of the Bureau of Lands.
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They
presented a lone witness (their overseer). The Bureau of Lands argue that the
lands in dispute are not accretions. They assert that what actually happened
was that the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down the
river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any accretion to speak
of, it was man-made.
Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion happened
without human intervention and that the transfer of the dikes occurred only
after.
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ISSUE:
Whether accretion took place
RULING: No. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not
evidence that the addition to said property was made gradually through the
effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in question total almost 4
hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion.
The lone witness testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939,
but the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent
property conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral
Survey of the entire Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-
1960. If the overseer was indeed telling the truth, the accretion was sudden,
not gradual. When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river
beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their
property from the destructive force of the waters of the river. The lots in
question were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore
classified as public property.
Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The lands sought
were not even dry land. The entire area was under one to two meters of water.
GRANDE v. CA
GR. No. L-17652
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from
their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her
parents. In the early 1930’s, the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed
for registration purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as
the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the
river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the
registered area. The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title against the
Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession of the
land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly
trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated that they were
the rightful owners since prior to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the
premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision
was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the
riparian owners?
HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the
adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing
that said land have become imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only
specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and
are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved
that they have been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible
witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single witness who claims that the
Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to
have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is
because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was
Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.
IGNACIO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS and VALERIANO
GR. No. L-12958
May 30, 1960
FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove)
which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel of
land owned by the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of
Lands, Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public
domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that said land
formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES
1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case
because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this
refers to action in the Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea
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2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores
by accretions caused by actions of the sea form part of the pubic domain when
they are no longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive
and the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the
declaration that any said land is no longer necessary for public use. Until such
declaration is made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER VS. CA AND ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS
G.R. NO. L-40912
FACTS:
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, father of the respondent
Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33-
hectare land situated in barrio Libranon, Davao. On January 23, 1934, the
Bureau of Lands through the Davao Land District Officer, accepted the sealed
bids for the purchase of the subjected land. Irineo Jose bidded P20 per
hectare while Dr. Jose Ebro bidded for P100.50 per hectare. The director
annulled the said auction for the reason that sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus
failed to participate in the bid. Another bidding was held on October3, 1934
and Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equaled the bid submitted by
Dr.Jose Ebro at P100.50 and made a deposit of P221 as 10% deposit of the
price of theland at P110.50 per hectare.
That on November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issuedan award
order to Eugenio de Jesus with regards to the said lot stating the coverage of
the land which is located in Davao with an area of 22 hectares at P100.50 per
hectare or P2210 for the whole tract.On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands
amended the sales application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of
the said land is needed by the Philippine Army for military
camp site purposes thereby excluding 12.8081 hectares which is the land in
question.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel Quezon issued
Proclamation No. 85 thereby declaring the said lot to be withdrawn from sale
and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes under the
administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On November 29, 1939,
Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45covering the 8th and 10th installment for the
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the sales application was amended
which did not include the military camp.
Thereafter,on May 15, 1948, the Director of Lands ordered the
issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus for the tract of land having an area of
20.6400 hectares. On the same date, the secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources likewise granted a sales patent to Eugenio de Jesus containing an
area of 20.6400 hectares.On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay
revoked the Proclamation No.85 and declared the disputed lot open to
disposition under the provisions of Public
Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in Davao City. Then on October 9, P
resident Ramon Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation and reserved the same
lot for medical center site under the administration of the Director of Hospital.
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
applied for Torrens registration of the said lot with the Court of First Instance of
Davao, claimed “fee simple” title to the said land on the strength of the
proclamation reserving the area for medical center purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of
Eugenio de Jesus opposed the registration on the ground that his father
acquired a vested right over the said lot by virtue of award order. Likewise a
certain Arsenio Suazo filed his opposition claiming that the 2 hectare portion
on the northeastern part of the said lot belongs to him. After due hearing, the
court rendered judgement in favor of the Mindanao Medical Center. The two
oppositors filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.On July 2, 1974, the
Appellate Court denied the claim of Arsenio Suazo at the same time affirmed
the appeal of Alejandro de Jesus, hereby decreeing the said lot in the name of
the Alejandro and ordered Mindanao Medical Center to relinquish the lot to
said appellant. On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for
reconsideration but the Appellate Court denied the motion on June 17, 1975.
Forthwith,the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court for appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registerable title over the
whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of the Proclamation No.
350 reserving the said land for medical site purposes.
HELD:
Yes, Mindanao Medical Center had a registerable title over the lot with area
of12.8081 hectares by virtue of Proclamation No. 350 reserving such land for
medical site purposes.The Supreme Court held, that:1. Proclamation No. 350
is free from infirmity and it proceeds from the recognized competence of the
President to reserve alienable lands of the public for specific public use or
service. The law authorizes the President to designate tract or tracts of land of
the public domain as reservations for the commonwealth of the Philippines. A
special proprietary right was vested in Eugenio de Jesus when the sales award
was issued to him in 1934 which was for 22 hectares (later found to be
20.6400 hectares upon actual survey). The privilege of occupying public lands
8
confers no contractual or vested rights and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by public, or to reserve them for
public use may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Such proclamation of the
President to reserve lands terminates any rights previously acquired by
persons who settled thereon in order to obtain preferential right of purchase.
Patents previously granted, reserved from sale are void.2. The gratuitous
assumption that the military "camp site" was executed between Eugenio de
Jesus and Secretary Serafin Marabut would be void since he held no
dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In
that year, Proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already withdrew the area
from sale or settlement and reserved it for military purposes. However, the
respondent Appellate Court rationalized that the subject of the donation was
not the land but "the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de
Jesus over it. It is true that the gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a
thing or right. But the term "right" must be understood in a "propriety" sense,
over which the processor has the jus disponendi. In true donations there
results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of
his assets. Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that
"proprietary" right over the whole33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed
12.8081 hectares for at that time this12.8081-hectare lot had already been
severed from the mass of disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and
excluded in the Sales Award.Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a
consequence of such donation is therefore farfetched. In fact if we were to
assume in gratia argumenti that the12.8081-hectare lot was included in the
Sales Award, still the same may not bet he subject of donation. What is
conferred on the applicant is merely the right to take possession of the land. In
other words right granted to the sales awardee is only possessory right not
proprietary right for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the
sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
(represented by Opol National Secondary Technical School),
vs. NICANOR DOLDOL,
G.R. No. 132963
September 10, 1998
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 27, 1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
dismissing herein petitioners complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5,
1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of
land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October
23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area with
the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected
the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis
Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol
Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area
occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to
the site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the
portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National
Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National School). Needing the
area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several
demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.
In view of Doldols refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991
a complaint for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro. The trial court ruled in the schools favor and ordered Doldol to vacate
the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a
quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having
possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing
of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National Schools motion for reconsideration of said decision
having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998,
Opol National School elevated its case to this Court, claiming that the Court of
Appeals erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to the evidence on
record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive
possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years.
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldols favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public
Land Act). Said provision, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as
follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
9
 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Italics
ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a
citizen of the Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he
has possessed the same for thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the
disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that the former had acquired ownership
of the same, thereby negating Opol National Schools claim over the
questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs.
CA[1] where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA
606 (1991) declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
xxxxxxxxx
with the latters proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land.
xxxxxxxxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in
the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed
to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does
not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the
parties had a better right to possess the lot through the erroneous application
of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor
Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that
the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still good law. The
original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by
R.A. No. 1942,[2] which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Italics
ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable
public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by
law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable, in accordance with the District Foresters Certification dated
September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an alienable and
disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land
Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol
had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since
1959.The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the
public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the
disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later
than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol
cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate
the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right
superior to the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved
the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General:
10
 (T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption
confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the
authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or
acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to
the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though
this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them
can be acquired.[3]
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the
land in dispute.
HELD:
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and
Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby
REINSTATED.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. UP
GR. No. L-52518
FACTS:
International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing, and
exportation of plywood. It was granted by the Government an exclusive license
for 25 years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut, collect and remove timber from a
timber land in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna.
Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement, the
President issued Executive Proclamation No. 791. Under this proclamation,
certain parcels of land of the
public domain in Quezon and Laguna were withdrawn from sale or settlement
and were reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as experiment station for
the college.
On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990 was
enacted establishing a central experiment station for UP for the colleges of
agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under RA 3990 theland
described in Proc. 791 was fully cede to UP, subject to any existing
concessions, if any.
On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:
1.Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the License
Agreement to UP, instead of the BIR
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within the land
described in RA 3990 be performed by UP personnel
However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s
demands. International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory
relief seeking a declaration that UP does NOT have the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest
products,
2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from Hardwood
and/or
4. Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its
concession covered by a License Agreement, ceded in full ownership to UP by
RA 3990 Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.
UP filed its Answer:
1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the forest products cut
and felled within the area ceded to UP under RA 3990
CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of
Hardwood:
1. RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut
by International Hardwood within the tract of land and collect the
corresponding charges prescribed by NIRC
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim
CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal
questions.
ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal the
timber cut by Hardwood and collect forestry charges thereon.
HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.
I. Arguments of the Parties
A. UP asserts that:
11
1. Under RA 3990, the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through UP because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that
they be paid to the BIR
2. UP is vested with administrative jurisdiction over and has ownership over
the land in question. Thus, it acquired full control and benefit of the timber and
other resources in the area
3. UP is entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it by RA
3990
4. UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment station
5. Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of Hardwood by UP was
intended by RA 3990
6. BIR and the Bureau Of Forestry issued specific rulings recognizing the
authority of UP to collect royalties and charges
B. Hardwood contends:
1. UP has not been granted by RA 3990 the authority to collect forest charges
or the authority to supervise the operation of the timber concession
2. Cession of the land was expressly made subject to any concession, if any
3. Rulings of BIR and Bureau of Forestry are incorrect
4. It has acquired vested right to operate the timber concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry
II. Discussion on the effect of the laws
A. The laws:
1. Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public domain was withdrawn from
sale or settlement and was reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as
experiment station, subject to private rights, if any
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in Proc. 791 was ceded fully
to UP, subject to
any existing concessions, if any
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and segregated the areas covered by the
timber license from the public forest
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP.
Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession
3. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means that
the right of
Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or diminished;
it must be respected
4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the
license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP
a. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or
from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland,
the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise
terminated
b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and
to collect forestry charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.
III. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other
limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception is made
for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given
the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until February 1985.
A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest
charges or royalties to the new owner, UP
B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
C. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area
covered by R.A. No. 3990
HELD:
Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial court. Thus:
1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to
its License Agreement within the area ceded and transferred to UP pursuant to
R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to UP;
2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging,
felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No.
3990.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. IAC
G.R. NO. 73002
FACTS:
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe 5 parcels of land
 possession of the Infiels over the land dates back before the Philippines
was discovered by Magellan
12
  land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on
land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable
or disposable public land or within the public domain
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth
of improvements
 ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUE:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
 it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law
2. NO
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land
to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares.
REPUBLIC VS. IGLESIA NI CRISTO
G.R. NO. 180067
FACTS:
The subject of the case is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre
located in Ilocos Norte.
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao
G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title
before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were the
sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of
subject lot, the Geodetic Engineers Certificate, Tax Declaration No. (TD)
5080261 covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale
executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City
to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application.
Cadastral Court and Court of Appeals = Rendered in favor of INC.
ISSUE: May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject
property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945?
HELD: No. It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is
indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that
their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has
already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May
16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was
filed by INC.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the
application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of
possession is the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the
property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the
time of the application for registration of title is filed.
In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is
that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that the more reasonable
interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the
13
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and
1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also
tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and
Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he
inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents.
These possessions and occupation from Sabuco, including those of his
parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC had been in the
concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not
been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses
NATIVIDAD VS. CA
GR No. 88233
FACTS:
 six (6) parcels of land which had originally been applied for by Tomas
Claudio Memorial College, Inc.
 applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the New Philippine
Constitution to hold alienable land of the publicdomain (Sec. 11, Art.
XIV,New Constitution)
 TCMC filed a motion forsubstitution (pp. 238-241,Records), praying that it
be substituted by petitioners Oscar Natividad, Eugenio Pascual and
Bartolome Ramos –reason: the parcels of land were sold to them
 the original owners hadpossessed and cultivated theland as owners for
morethan 30 years before they were sold to TCMC
 The Director of Lands appealed the lower court's decision --- substitution
was a circumvention of the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by
private corporations of alienable lands of the public domain
ISSUE: whether or not the character of the parcels of land were still public
land or already private when the registration proceedings were commenced. If
they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against
acquisition by a private corporation would not apply (Director of Landsvs.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood &Veneer Co., Inc., 146
SCRA 509)
HELD:
No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may
any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ...
Xn: parcels of land in question had already beenconverted to private
ownership through acquisitiveprescription by the predecessors-in-interest
Conclusion: the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution did not apply to them
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 83290
FACTS:
In 1912, the Court of Land Registration of Zambales, through Judge James
Ostrand, confirmed the title of Justo de Perio over two parcels of land in
Zambales, namely Parcel No. 1, which consists of an area of 11,697 sq.m.,
and Parcel No. 2, which consists of 340,820 sq.m.
In 1985, herein respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the
decree, alleging that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it
was still within the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in
1961, and as such, cannot be the subject of disposition or alienation as private
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land are forest land.
HELD:
It was held that the lands are agricultural. Act No. 926, known as the Public
Land Act, which was enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect
on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation
of his title to the two parcels of land. A person who had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious session and occupation of public
agricultural land for a period of at least ten years prior to July 24, 1904 could
petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so possessed and
occupied.
*SEC. 54 OF ACT 926
14
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right,
occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been
perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of
July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership
except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
VALENTIN SUSI VS ANGELA RAZON
G.R. NO. 24066
FACTS:
 A complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the
Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole
and absolute owner of the parcel of land; (b) annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that
the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon.
 The Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained
therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was
a property of the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to
Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
 The Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring
the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering
the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her.
 The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold
the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza. After having been in possession thereof for about eight
years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza sold it to Valentin Susi.
 Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already
paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the
firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he
had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza,
and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and
public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said
land.
 Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in
question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of
Lands for the purchase thereof.
 After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of
Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
Angela Razon and issued the proper certificate of title to Angela
Razon.
 Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question.
ISSUE:
 Who is then the rightful owner of the land?
HELD:
 SC in their decision favoured Valentin Susi. According to SC there is,
the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for
he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with
a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant
of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling
the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed
of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
15
 thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.
OH CHO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. NO. 48321
o GR: All lands are acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant.
o EXCEPTION: Lands under private ownership since time immemorial.
o Application for decree of registration is a condition precedent to
acquisition of title. Non-compliance gives rise to mere possessory right.
o An alien cannot acquire title to lands of the public domain by
prescription.
FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in
Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since
1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The
Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land
and also because he was an alien.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Oh Cho had title
o Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration
HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed
under the Land Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession
of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of
the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of
registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration
of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the
Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This
possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an
alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As
an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by
prescription.
MESINA VS. VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-14722
FACTS:
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s action is
already barred by the statute of limitations. The reasons advanced are: the
complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration or issuance
of patent over the property was issued “sometime on September 12, 1958 or
thereabout”, while the transfer certificate of title covering the same was issued
on September 16, 1953.
The present action which calls for the cancellation of said decree and title has,
therefore, been filed after the lapse of more than four years, which cannot be
done, because the title has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with
improvements thereon,situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he has been
in actual possessing thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully, and
against the whole world and up to the present time he is the only one who
benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at present the subject of
registration proceedings.
The Directors of Lands, without exercising due care, and in spite of his
knowledge that defendants had not complied with the requirements of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their favor as a
consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their name by the
16
Register of Deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through fraud,
deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the
plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue
a patent covering said land because it is the private property of plaintiff. For
these reasons, plaintiff prays that said decree and title be cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff has validly acquired the land in question by a State
grant.
HELD:
Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the government are
applied with through actual physical possession, openly, continuously and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter
VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts- an application therefore being
sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 284 (reproduced as
Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141).
If by legal fiction, the possessor is deemed to have acquired the land by a
grant of the State, it follows that the same has ceased to be part of public
domain and has become private property and therefore, is beyond the control
of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title
covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor, of other persons may
be said to be null and void having been issued through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation.
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. NO. L-19535
FACTS:
A parcel of land which had been declared public land in a previous registration
proceeding, was again subject of application by persons claiming an imperfect
title thereto on the basis of their continuous and adverse possession for more
than 30 years. The trial court, however, dismissed the application on the
ground of res judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a land declared to be a public land in a previous registration
case may be the subject of judicial confirmation?
HELD:
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for
registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation
of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession
for at least thirty years.
It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the
judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative,
since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had
constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly
pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the
land in question to be public land.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or
foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in
the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land
is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is
not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the
public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty
years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant.
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO vs. ROD, CITY OF MANILA
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941.
The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the
registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an
alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the
Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that
17
was already of private ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is
applicable at the case at bar?
HELD:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the
provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership
of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental
law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by
way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in this
section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or
otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired
by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be
transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold,
lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land."
In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by
way of reciprocity.
CAMILLO F. BORROMEO vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar.
They fell in love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an
Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that
Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and
the property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted
the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his
properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was
issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of
Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of
real property.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may
not transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents
make his the owner thereof.
HELD:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it
was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in
dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source
of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the
house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name
was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.
Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a
buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of
Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired
during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to
marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still
legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is
only a means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property.
Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in
her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner.
18

REPUBLIC vs. CA AND
SPS. MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA
FACTS:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D,
as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of
the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and
have opted to embrace Canadian... citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic... court a quo rendered a decision
confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question... petitioner submits
that private respondents have not acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor.
It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be
public lands under the... principle that lands of whatever classification belong
to the State under the Regalian doctrine. before the issuance of the certificate
of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land
since it still pertains to the State.
ISSUE:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which
he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor
who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land
Act (CA 141)?
HELD:
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest". Thus, it matters not whether the... vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or
legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.
The respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June
12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest
and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what
could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30
years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property
This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. The Public Land Act requires
that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b)
his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
Torrens system
It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
private... respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid
taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon... certified true
copy... of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was
also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by
vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her
only sister Simplicia... a... report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to
prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone
of the government and that no forestry interest was affected... private
respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights
thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of... owner and
the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the
Public Land Act.
private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.
"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a... transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law."
19
 "Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may
be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the
Batasang Pambansa may provide."
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up
to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the... case of
urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him
as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail
of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the
same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the... maximum herein
fixed. what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-
born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains... to
be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof by... respondents in view of what
the Constitution ordains.
The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive...
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12,
1945 or since 1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a... maximum
area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be
used by him as his residence. It is undisputed that private respondents, as
vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it
is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino... citizens
at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What
is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration
This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the
register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant.
Prior to... the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has
no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
Principles:
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must
be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land,
by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued
As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL vs.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE
FACTS:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a
deed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a
Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal,
known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in
favor of the unregistered religious organization “Ung Siu Si Temple”, operating
through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly
accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the
Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.
CFI upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds. Basis: sections 1 and 5
of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of
land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens
adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila,
the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for
registration.
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the
donee Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the
acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and
20
permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as
follows:
SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or
denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of
other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands
upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable
institutions.
SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the
name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec.
App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of
religion clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].
ISSUE:
whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious
organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens
should be registered or not.
HELD:
The provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be
deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible
therewith. In providing that, —
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines,
the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not
suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its
members are of foreign nationality. To permit religious associations controlled
by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive the opening
wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country.
The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC. V.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY
G.R. NO. L-8451
FACTS:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City
of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city
covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.,(RCADI) is corporation sole organized
and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. Registry of Deeds Davao (RD) required
RCADI to submit affidavit declaring that 60% of its members were Filipino
Citizens.
As the RD entertained some doubts as to the registerability of the deed of sale,
the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) en
consulta for resolution. LRC hold that pursuant to provisions of sections 1 and
5 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitution, RCADI is not qualified to acquire
land in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at leat 60% of the capital,
properties or assets of the RCADI is actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens. LRC also denied the registration of the Deed of Sale in the absence of
proof of compliance with such requisite. RCADI’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the
Philippines, or better still, the corporation sole named the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private
agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of
the Constitution.
HELD:
RCADI is qualified.
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the
Roman Pontiff is the supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the
exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the faithful throughout the
world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican,
yet it cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein.
Neither can it be said that the political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or
acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by that relationship with
the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every country
springs from that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the
21
clergy of this faith derive their authorities and receive orders from the Holy See
do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these branches.
Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of “radiation”.
We have to realize that although there is a fraternity among all the catholic
countries and the dioceses therein all over the globe, the universality that the
word “catholic” implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the
practice and the interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of their belief,
but certainly they are separate and independent from one another in
jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which they are incorporated, and
entirely independent on the others in the management and ownership of their
temporalities. To allow theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the
world follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would
lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the
Catholic faith and become members of that religious society, likewise citizens
of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider that the Pope
himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of the world. The
same thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the
corporation sole created under the laws of the Philippines, which is not altered
by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said
corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries,
if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the
laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with
all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of
that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or
the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which
are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary
corporations which are formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of
only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not
subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage
whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the
owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said
corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of
the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4)
the latter, as such, has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent
Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration
of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with
their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious
that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent
Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under consideration, the framers of
the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular form of corporation.
If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove
it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement of
at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to
corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes
unquestionably immaterial.
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION vs. LUI SHE
G.R. No. L-17587
DOCTRINE:
Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is against a
constitutional prohibition, the same should be considered null and void.
FACTS:
Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the
portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino
Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the
right to withdraw at any time from the agreement.
On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy
the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly
installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the
obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her
household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was
conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was
then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn
when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28,
1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief
that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was
discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to
respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later
date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that
the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and
22
inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the
annulment of the contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
HELD:
No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered
collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the
Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable
period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of
land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of
his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the
arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests
himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to
dispose of it— rights the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be
done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines,
is indeed in grave peril.
MULLER VS. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615
Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00.
The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition.
It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the
equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the
Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds
of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement
for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the
amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
HELD:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the
Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional
prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to
do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule
23
will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because
of public policy, cannot be done directly.
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs.
EDERLINA P. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He is
an electrical engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the New
Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in
business in the country; two years thereafter, he married Teresita Santos, a
Filipino citizen.
In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a
divorce.
In 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King’s
Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a
Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City.
Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to
Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in
Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as a masseuse in the King’s
Cross nightclub.
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working
at King’s Cross, return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome
business of her own. He also proposed that they meet in Manila, to which she
assented. Alfred gave her money for her plane fare to the Philippines. Within
two weeks of Ederlina’s arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred reiterated his
proposal for Ederlina to stay in the Philippines and engage in business, even
offering to finance her business venture. Ederlina was delighted at the idea
and proposed to put up a beauty parlor. Alfred happily agreed.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his
wife in Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that
they should wait a little bit longer.
Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume his work as a pilot.
Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the
Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina’s name would appear in the deed of
sale as the buyer of the property, as well as in the title covering the same.
After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina and he believed that after their
marriage, the two of them would jointly own the property.
When Ederlina left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her father Narciso
Catito and her two sisters occupy the property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. He
returned to Australia and sold his fiber glass pleasure boat to John Reid in
1984. He also sold his television and video business in Papua New Guinea.
He had his personal properties shipped to the Philippines and stored at San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New Guinea, he received a Letter
dated December 7, 1983 from Klaus Muller who was then residing in Berlin,
Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been married on
October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein.
Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlina’s amorous relationship, and
discovered the same sometime in November 1983 when he arrived in Manila.
He also begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her to him, saying
that Alfred could not possibly build his future on his (Klaus’) misfortune.
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close friend of Ederlina. He
inquired if there was any truth to Klaus’ statements and Sally confirmed that
Klaus was married to Ederlina.
When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were,
indeed, married. But she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. Alfred
was appeased. He agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for
the outcome of Ederlina’s petition for divorce. After all, he intended to marry
her. He retained the services of Rechtsanwältin Banzhaf with offices in Berlin,
as her counsel who informed her of the progress of the proceedings. Alfred
paid for the services of the lawyer.
Ederlina often wrote letters to her family informing them of her life with Alfred.
In a Letter dated January 21, 1985, she wrote about how Alfred had financed
the purchases of some real properties, the establishment of her beauty parlor
business, and her petition to divorce Klaus.
In the meantime, Ederlina’s petition for divorce was denied because Klaus
opposed the same. A second petition filed by her met the same fate. Klaus
24
wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he
would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case
against Ederlina.
Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or as an alternative,
the establishment of a corporation, with Ederlina owning 30% of the equity
thereof. She initially agreed to put up a corporation and contacted Atty.
Armando Dominguez to prepare the necessary documents. Ederlina changed
her mind at the last minute when she was advised to insist on claiming
ownership over the properties acquired by them during their coverture.
Alfred and Ederlina’s relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been
able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy
and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid
complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all
contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he
had ruined her life. She admitted that the money used for the purchase of the
properties in Davao were his. She offered to convey the properties deeded to
her by Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo and Rodolfo Morelos, asking Alfred
to prepare her affidavit for the said purpose and send it to her for her
signature. The last straw for Alfred came on September 2,1985, when
someone smashed the front and rear windshields of Alfred’s car and damaged
the windows. Alfred thereafter executed an affidavit-complaint charging
Ederlina and Sally MacCarron with malicious mischief.
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlina’s father, complaining that
Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtually
penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the
properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of
all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had “stolen” and turn over all the
properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.
Alfred filed a Complaint dated October 28, 1985, against Ederlina, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal
properties located in Quezon City and Manila. In his complaint, Alfred alleged,
inter alia, that Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent, managed to
transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account
with the same bank. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the
properties subject of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty parlor in
Ermita was established with his own funds, and that the Quezon City property
was likewise acquired by him with his personal funds.
Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Alfred adduced
his evidence ex-parte.
Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor.
ISSUE:
a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule of In Pari Delicto
since both parties are not equally guilty but rather it was the respondent who
employed fraud when she did not inform petitioner that she was already
married?
b) Whether the intention of the petitioner is not to own real properties in the
Philippines but to sell them as public auction to be able to recover his money
used in purchasing them?
HELD:
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the
three parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court further
stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the properties, he had no cause of
action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as an alien, he
was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines.
The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and void ab
initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was precluded from
recovering the properties from the respondent.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals in which the petitioner
posited the view that although he prayed in his complaint in the court a quo
that he be declared the owner of the three parcels of land, he had no intention
of owning the same permanently.
His principal intention therein was to be declared the transient owner for the
purpose of selling the properties at public auction, ultimately enabling him to
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
On March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of
the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner knowingly violated the
Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the money used in the
purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that to allow the petitioner to
recover the money used for the purchase of the properties would embolden
aliens to violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance, the public
policy.
25
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by
him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the
Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The
petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law
and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or
property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his
own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To him who
moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not
aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where
it finds them.
Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had
spent for the purchase thereof. Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly. Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the
defendant is in the stronger position ... it signifies that in such a situation,
neither a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. The rule is
expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN
PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.
Futile, too, is petitioner’s reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense
of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST” (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield
stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: “The objection that a contract
is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all
times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that
the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy,
which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as
between him and the plaintiff.”
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO vs.
JOAQUIN TENG QUEEN TAN
GR No. L-31956
Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's action for annulment of contract with
damages.
FACTS:
In 1938, petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential
lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving
herein respondents - his widow, To O. Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen
Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing.
Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin,
became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November
18, 1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale,
whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.
On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for
annulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of land to aliens.
Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an answer to the complaint,
respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of
cause of action, the plaintiff being in pari delicto with the vendee, and the land
being already owned by a Philippine citizen; (b) laches; and (c) acquisitive
prescription.
Over the opposition of petitioner, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,
sustaining the first two grounds invoked by the movants. It is this order of
dismissal that is now the subject of this review.
The assailed order must be sustained.
26
Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the
sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was
an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property of
respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is
constitutionally qualified to own land.
"...The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no
longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen,
was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no
more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the
land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the
ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons:
'x x x if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.'" (Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113
SCRA 547, at 553.)
Laches also militates against petitioner's cause. She sold the
disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the action to annul the sale
only on July 15, 1968. What the Court said in the
cited Sarsosa case applies with equal force to the petitioner.
"... it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept
on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long
inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred
from asserting her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs.
Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]).
'Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs.
Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35).' (cited in
Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]).
"Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of
the property." (p. 553.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
A residential lot was sold by petitioner Filomena De Castro to Tan Tai, a
Chinese, who died leaving herein respondents-heirs, his widow and children.
In an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale executed by the respondents
after Tan Tai’s death, the parcel of land in question was allotted in its entirety
to Joaquin, one of Tan Tai’s sons who became a naturalized Filipino before the
latter’s death. Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondents, contending
that the sale be annulled for violation of the 1935 Constitution, to which
respondents moved to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a contract of sale can be annulled on the basis that it is in
violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
HELD: No, independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot
have the sale annulled. While the vendee was an alien at the time of sale, the
land has since become the property, of respondent Joaquin Teng, a
naturalized Philippine citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to own a land.
Republic vs. CA and Gana
G.R. No. 127245
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND DELA ROSA
G.R. NO. L-43938
FACTS:
Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his
own behalf and on behalf of his children. This application was separately
opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge
Corporation (Atok).
The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their parents and
that they have been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok
opposed on the ground that they have mineral claims covering the property
27
and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner.
The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant but subject
to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other
words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet
and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.
HELD:
No, the CA was incorrect.
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to
servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of
the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on
the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the
miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the
farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's
rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface
rights?
It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to
its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and
completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY MINDANAO
MEDICAL CENTER VS. CA AND ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS
G.R. NO. L-40912
FACTS:
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, father of the respondent Alejandro
de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33-hectare
land situated in barrio Libranon, Davao.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands through the Davao Land District
Officer, accepted the sealed bids for the purchase of the subjected land. Irineo
Jose bidded P20 per hectare while Dr. Jose Ebro bidded for P100.50 per
hectare.
The director annulled the said auction for the reason that sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus failed to participate in the bid. Another bidding was held on
October 3, 1934 and Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equaled the
bid submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro at P100.50 and made a deposit of P221 as
10% deposit of the price of the land at P110.50 per hectare.
That on November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued an award order to
Eugenio de Jesus with regards to the said lot stating the coverage of the land
which is located in Davao with an area of 22 hectares at P100.50 per hectare
or P2210 for the whole tract.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands amended the sales application of
Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of the said land is needed by the
Philippine Army for military camp site purposes thereby excluding 12.8081
hectares which is the land in question. On September 7, 1936, President
Manuel Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 thereby declaring the said lot to
be withdrawn from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military
purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On
November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and
10th installment for the 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the sales
application was amended which did not include the military camp. Thereafter,
on May 15, 1948, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of patent to
Eugenio de Jesus for the tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares. On
28
the same date, the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources likewise
granted a sales patent to Eugenio de Jesus containing an area of 20.6400
hectares.
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked the Proclamation
No. 85 and declared the disputed lot open to disposition under the provisions
of Public Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in Davao City. Then on
October 9, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation and
reserved the same lot for medical center site under the administration of the
Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center applied for Torrens registration of the said lot with the Court of
First Instance of Davao, claimed “fee simple” title to the said land on the
strength of the proclamation reserving the area for medical center purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of Eugenio
de Jesus opposed the registration on the ground that his father acquired a
vested right over the said lot by virtue of award order. Likewise a certain
Arsenio Suazo filed his opposition claiming that the 2 hectare portion on the
northeastern part of the said lot belongs to him.
After due hearing, the court rendered judgement in favor of the Mindanao
Medical Center. The two oppositors filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court denied the claim of Arsenio Suazo at the
same time affirmed the appeal of Alejandro de Jesus, hereby decreeing the
said lot in the name of the Alejandro and ordered Mindanao Medical Center to
relinquish the lot to said appellant.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for
reconsideration but the Appellate Court denied the motion on June 17, 1975.
Forthwith, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court for appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registerable title over the
whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of the Proclamation No.
350 reserving the said land for medical site purposes.
HELD:
Yes, Mindanao Medical Center had a registerable title over the lot with area of
12.8081 hectares by virtue of Proclamation No. 350 reserving such land for
medical site purposes. The Supreme Court held, that:
1. Proclamation No. 350 is free from infirmity and it proceeds from the
recognized competence of the President to reserve alienable lands of the
public for specific public use or service. The law authorizes the President to
designate tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the
commonwealth of the Philippines. A special proprietary right was vested in
Eugenio de Jesus when the sales award was issued to him in 1934 which was
for 22 hectares (later found to be 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey). The
privilege of occupying public lands confers no contractual or vested rights and
the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by
public, or to reserve them for public use may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. Such proclamation of the President to reserve lands terminates any
rights previously acquired by persons who settled thereon in order to obtain
preferential right of purchase. Patents previously granted, reserved from sale
are void.
2. The gratuitous assumption that the military "camp site" was executed
between Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Serafin Marabut would be void since
he held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him
in 1936. In that year, Proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
withdrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved it for military purposes.
However, the respondent Appellate Court rationalized that the subject of the
donation was not the land but "the possessory and special proprietary rights"
of Eugenio de Jesus over it. It is true that the gratuitous disposal in donation
may consist of a thing or right. But the term "right" must be understood in a
"propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus disponendi. In true
donations there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or
diminution of his assets.
Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary" right
over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares
for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the
mass of disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the
Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such
donation is therefore farfetched. In fact if we were to assume in gratia
argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still
the same may not be the subject of donation. What is conferred on the
applicant is merely the right to take possession of the land. In other words right
granted to the sales awardee is only possessory right not proprietary right for
the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and
registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State.
29

REPUBLIC VS. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.
GR No. 154953
FACTS:
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed
by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-
04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre. All adjoining owners and all government agencies and
offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.
On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued... an Order [8] of General Default
against the whole world except as against petitioner.
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor
of respondent.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the
trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear
evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with
the period of possession and occupation as... required by law.
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial
court's Decision.
ISSUE:
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept
of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under
the Public Land Act.
HELD:
Respondent Failed to Prove... that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain.
Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part
of the public domain.
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO),
Batangas City,[16] certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre
situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of
596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE
under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925." The... second certification in the form of a memorandum to
the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject
area falls within an alienable and disposable land,... Project No. 30 of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. the CENRO issues certificates of land...
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area
covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The
CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116
square meters which,... as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the
authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do
not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by
their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.
The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582,
the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However,
the certificate on the... blue print plan states that it became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1985.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious Possession and
Occupation in the Concept of an Owner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land
before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. He
admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy
and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community.
30
in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to
prove that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession... of
the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain in this case.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We
DENY the application for... registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
Principles:
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for... registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and... disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO.
In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
REPUBLIC VS. DELA PAZ
G.R. NO 171635
MANOTOK REALTY VS. CLT REALTY
G.R. NO. 123346
ELAND PHILIPPINES VS. GARCIA
G.R. NO. 173289
FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the RTC against Eland Philippines, Inc. claiming ownership in
fee simple title, of a parcel of land by occupation and possession.
Respondents stated that they were not aware of any person or entity that had
a legal or equitable interest or claim on the lot until they requested that the lot
be declared for tax purposes. They found out that a decree of ownership has
been issued to Eland without being notified of the registration case, they
claimed the presence of misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic
fraud and so entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction in order to restrain or
enjoin petitioner, its privies, agents, representatives, and all other persons
acting on its behalf, to refrain from committing acts of dispossession on the
subject lot.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that there’s no cause of action and
were not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Said motion
was denied ruling that the allegations in the complaint established a cause of
action and enjoined petitioner Eland to file its answer to the complaint.
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Meanwhile, respondents filed a
Motion to Declare Eland in Default. The trial court issued an Order declaring
the petitioner in default and allowed respondents to present evidence ex parte.
31
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the trial court's denial of its
motion to dismiss and in declaring it in default.
The trial court denied the former and granted the latter. The trial court also
admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam. Respondents countered by filing a
Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records and filed a Motion to Set
Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte which was granted. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings since it had filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
asking for the nullification of the Order of the trial court and for the affirmation
of its earlier Order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
The petition for certiorari was subsequently denied, hence, the trial court ruled
that the reception of evidence already presented by the respondents remained
as part of the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the right to cross-
examine the witness and to comment on the documentary exhibits already
presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
denied by the trial court in an Omnibus Order.
The trial court’s resolution favored respondents, declaring them as the
absolute owners and rightful possessors of the subject lot, subject to the rights
of occupancy of the farm workers on the one-third area thereof; that the
judgment in land registration in favor of Eland be set aside & decree of
registration is null and void.
Thus, the Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled, as
well as tax declaration covering the subject lot.
ISSUE:
a) WON a summary judgment is proper in an action for quieting of title and is
applicable to the present case.
b) WON the RTC has jurisdiction to cancel petitioner's original certificate of title
(OCT) in an action to quiet title.
HELD:
Any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the sole exception
of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation.
This Court finds that the grant of summary judgment was not proper. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to
raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the
moving party show that such issues are not genuine. It must be remembered
that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting
a motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving
such nonexistence.
The trial court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would
necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case
shows otherwise. By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in
effect annulled its former ruling based on a claim of possession and ownership
of the same land for more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown
trial. The fact that the respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of title
issued to the petitioner on the claim that the former were in possession of the
same land for a number of years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine
issue of a material fact exists.
This, together with the failure of the respondents to show that there were no
genuine issues involved, should have been enough for the trial court to give
the motion for summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant consideration.
Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do
so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites
must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of registration come into
question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.
The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of
absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however,
to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not
later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
32
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase
occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value
DOMINGO VS. REED
G.R. NO. 157701
FACTS:
Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and came
home only for short vacations purchased from the Government Service
Insurance System [GSIS] a 166 square meter property located at MRR Road,
Mangahan, Pasig. Because he was working abroad, it was his wife, Lolita
Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS. On July 9, 1986, TCT No.
58195 covering said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name
of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed. Guillermo Reed had allowed his
brother, Dominador, and the latter’s wife, Luz, to stay in the house constructed
on his property who In December, 1991, were summoned to the barangay in
connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo
Quiteves, who claimed to be the owner of the lot where their house stands.
Dominador and Luz informed Guillermo of the complaint filed against them.
Guillermo accompanied Dominador and Luz to the barangay, where they met
Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo, who both claimed ownership of the
subject property. Guillermo denied having sold his property. Guillermo Reed
made a verification with the Register of Deeds of Pasig.
Guillermo discovered that his title over the subject property had been
cancelled. He discovered that a 1. Special Power of Attorney, dated July 8,
1986, allegedly executed by him authorizing his wife, Lolita Reed, to sell the
subject property or a portion thereof; also there was an Absolute Deed of Sale
of a Portion of Residential Land, executed by Lolita Reed, as vendor and
attorney-in-fact of Guillermo Reed, in favor of Natividad R. Villanera, married to
Ardaniel Villanera, covering 41.50 square meter portion of subject property;
and a Deed of Sale of a Portion of a Residential Land, dated January 10,
1989, executed by Lolita Reed, for herself and as attorney-in-fact, in favor of
Eduardo Quiteves covering 86 square meter portion of subject property; On
March 8, 1994, Guillermo Reed filed a complaint for reconveyance of property
against Lolita Reed, spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo
and Alberta Domingo, Eduardo Quiteves and the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Metro Manila.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether the case for reconveyance filed by respondent against petitioners
sans the trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of Lolita Reed,
an indispensable party, can prosper
HELD:
A document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it
are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public.
The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the
document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature.
Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document.
In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for
notarization be signed in their presence.
Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts a private document
into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity
of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.
All the foregoing circumstances successfully challenge the integrity,
genuineness, and veracity of the questioned document. Petitioners, therefore,
cannot take refuge in the presumption of regularity of public documents, a
presumption that has been clearly rebutted in this case. The final question to
be resolved is whether petitioners were buyers in good faith.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same
property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or
before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are
not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of
title indicates on its face. It is also settled, however, that purchasers cannot
close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on guard.
Thus, the presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then
prompt the vendee to look beyond the vendor’s certificate and investigate the
title appearing on the face of that certificate.
33
A vendee who does not do so cannot be denominated either as an innocent
purchaser for value or as a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit
the protection of the law. The circumstances surrounding this case debunk the
presumption of good faith on the part of petitioners. To begin with, it was clear
to them that, at the time of the sales, Lolita was married to Respondent
Guillermo Reed; and that the property in question was part of their conjugal
partnership.
The Deed of Sale executed between the Domingo spouses and Lolita Reed
clearly stated that what was being sold was her share in the conjugal property.
Despite their knowledge of this fact, the couple did not inquire about her
authority to sell any portion of the property.
Neither was there any mention in the Deed of Sale that Lolita had the authority
to sell the property, and that respondent had consented to the sale. In short,
there was no mention of the SPA that she allegedly possessed. Interestingly,
the statement in the Deed that the subject of the sale corresponded to her
share in the conjugal assets is not equivalent to her claim that she was
authorized by her husband to sell.
VIRGINIA CALALANG VS.
REGISTER OF DEEDS, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ ET AL.
G.R. NO. 76265
FACTS:
This case involves the resolution of the court on the motion for reconsideration
instituted by the petitioners in the de la Cruz vs CA, 187 SCRA 165. In this
case the SC ruled that petitioners cannot raise anew the question of ownership
of Lucia de la Cruz over lot 671 which has been determined by the CA and
affirmed by the supreme court . The court’s ruling has long been final and the
issue on ownership of lot 671 finally disposed of several years ago.
At the core of the controversy is the case of Agustina de la Cruz et al vs. Lucia
de la Cruz, Iglesia ni Kristo and Honorable CA (130 SCRA 666 [1984] ) which
has settled once and for all the question of ownership of Lot 671 of the Piedad
Estate in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City. A portion of these two consolidated
petitions in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
whether or not the de la decision of the SC in the de la Cruz case constitutes a
bar to the petition under the doctrine of Res Judicata
HELD:
Once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much
less, set aside the same; otherwise, endless litigation will result. Thus said the
court “our decision in these two consolidated petitions is an application of this
well-established rule.. To grant a reconsideration of this decision would also
reconsider, reverse, and set aside our 1984 decision which has long becaome
final. For while the 1984 decision declared the reconstituted title RT-58 of
Lucia de la Cruz valid and legal, petitioners would want us to reach 10 years
back and declare the same title null and void; while the 1984 decision declared
the Iglesia ni Kristo a purchaser in good faith and for value, petitioners would
want us to do a complete turn around and find the INC a purchaser in bad
faith”.
The court does not agree with petitioners in saying that the de la Cruz ruling is
not applicable and hence should not have been applied.
The doctrine of Res Judicata actually embraces two different concepts:
(A) bar by former judgment and (B) conclusiveness of Judgment.
The second concept states that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and
cannot again litigated in the future action between such parties or their privies,
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the
same or different cause of action, while judgment remains unreversed by
proper authority.
In order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive it is essential that the
issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies
will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit.
Thus: the issue of validity of the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz over lot
671; the issue of whether or not the INC was an innocent purchaser for value
and in good faith, and the issue of the validity of the reconstituted title of
Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz were Actually, Directly, And
Expressly RAISED, CONTROVERTED, LITIGATED and RESOLVED in the
34
1984 decision. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, these issues
may no longer be relitigated in these present petitions.
ST. DOMINIC CORPORATION VS. IAC
G.R. NO. 70623
BALBIN VS. MEDALLA
G.R. NO. L-46410
CAVILE VS. LINTANIA-HONG
G.R. NO. 179540
FACTS:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari , a Deed of Partition was
entered into by the heirs of the spouses Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina
Galon Subject of the Deed of Partition were several parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Tolong, Negros Oriental, which were then covered by Tax
Declarations No. 5615, No. 5729, No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under
the name of Bernardo. In accordance with the Deed of Partition, the conjugal
properties of Bernardo and Tranquilina were divided into two parts.
The first part, corresponding to Bernardos share, was further divided into six
equal shares The second part, corresponding to Tranquilinas share, was
subdivided only into three shares Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the
sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir, thus, making
Castor the sole owner of the said properties.
Similarly, the Deed of Partition acknowledged the sale by all the legal heirs to
Ulpiano Cavile of their respective shares in the lot covered by Tax Declaration
No. 5729, thus, transferring to the latter absolute ownership of said parcel of
land.
Castor and Susana executed a Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, whereby
Castor recognized and confirmed that the lots covered by Tax Declarations
No. 2039 and No. 2040 were the just and lawful shares of Susana in the
properties left by their deceased parents Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that
Susana was in actual possession of the said properties.
The descriptions of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No.
2040 in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition were strikingly close to those
of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively,
in the Deed of Partition.
Fourteen years after respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for
Reconveyance and Recovery of Property with Damages before the RTC
against Perfecta Cavile Respondents invoked the Confirmation of Extrajudicial
Partition dated 5 August 1960 wherein Castor purportedly recognized Susanas
ownership of the subject lots After Susanas death in 1965, the subject lots
were inherited by her daughters, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who
then assumed the mortgage thereon. However, respondents alleged that
Castor and petitioner spouses eventually intruded upon and excluded
respondents from the subject lots.
Petitioner spouses countered in their Answer to the Complaint that, by virtue of
the Deed of Partition dated 5 April 1937, the heirs of both Bernardo and
Tranquilina took exclusive possession of their respective shares in the
inheritance .
In 1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta the lots covered by Tax Declarations
No. 7421 and No. 7956, which corresponded to the subject lots in the
Complaint. Following the sale, petitioner Perfecta took possession of the
subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for the issuance
of title over the same. The Bureau issued free patent titles over the subject lots
in favor of petitioner Perfecta.
Petitioner spouses asserted that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition
dated 5 August 1960 involving the subject lots was a nullity since said
properties were never owned nor adjudicated in favor of Susana, respondents
predecessor-in-interest. Castor and Susana executed the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition merely to accommodate the latter who then needed
security for the loan she was trying to obtain from the Rural Bank of
Dumaguete City.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses. petitioner spouses evidence was
more worthy of credence in establishing their ownership of the subject lots
RTC further subscribed to the testimony of Perfecta that the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana,
enabling her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral. It noted
that Susana did not bother to apply for the issuance of title to the subject lots in
her name Court of Appeals reversed the RTC.
35
The Court of Appeals agreed in the respondents contention that the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was not a simulated document. The said
document should be entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was
executed by and between parties who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of
Partition of 1937. Moreover, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition
constituted evidence that was of the highest probative value against the
declarant, Castor, because it was a declaration against his proprietary interest.
Perfecta herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the
subject lots in 1993. It was Susana and, later, her children, respondents
Justina and Genoveva, who had been paying for the realty taxes on the
subject lots since 1937
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to the property?
HELD:
It is the petitioners. There being no issue raised on the matter, that the subject
lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 described in the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6111 are the very same lots covered by Tax
Declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421 included in the Deed of Partition, and by
Tax Declarations No. 2040 and No. 2039 subject of the Confirmation
of Extrajudicial Partition.
Nevertheless, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of
evidence against petitioner spouses. It must still be considered and weighed
together with respondents other evidence vis--vis petitioner spouses evidence
the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner
spouses preponderated over that of the respondents In analyzing the two vital
documents in this case, the Court discerns that while the Deed of Partition
clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susanas
ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said
properties wholly pertained to her when her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina
clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance.
At best, tax declarations are indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner.30Conversely, non-declaration of a property for tax purposes does not
necessarily negate ownership.31 Sometime in 1962, petitioner Perfecta
applied for and was granted by the Bureau of Lands free patents over the
subject lots.
Pursuant thereto, Original Certificates of Title No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and
No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, were issued by the Registry of Deeds
the Court pronounces that respondents Complaint for reconveyance of the
subject lots and damages filed only on 23 December 1974 is already barred. A
Torrens title issued on the basis of the free patents become as indefeasible as
one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of
issuance of the patent In the instant case, respondents brought the action for
reconveyance of the subject lots before the
RTC only on 23 December 2004, or more than 12 years after the Torrens titles
were issued in favor of petitioner Perfecta on 9 October 1962.
The remedy is, therefore, already time-barred. the Court would still rule that
respondents failed to satisfactorily prove that they were in possession of the
subject lots prior to the grant of free patents and issuance of Torrens titles over
the same in favor petitioner Perfecta No information was provided as to how
said possession of the subject lots was actually exercised or demonstrated by
Susana.
LACSAMANA VS. CA
G.R. No. 121658
FACTS:
Leon Robles and his niece Amparo Robles were the registered co-owners in
equal share of a lot in Lipa City, covered by an OCT. Subsequently Amparo
sold her 1/2 undivided share to El Dorado Corp. a TCT was issued in the
names of EL DORADO and Leon Robles as co-owners.
On 24 September 1969 Leon Robles died survived by his wife Ester and 2
children as his sole heirs. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 22 July
1971, Leon Robles purportedly with the marital consent of his wife sold his
one-half 1/2 undivided share to one Lacsamana.
9 years later the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the RD of Lipa City
by one Gonzales. Consequently,the TCT in the names of EL DORADO and
Leon Robles was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the names of EL
DORADO and Lacsamana.
On 1980 Lacsamana purportedly sold his one-half 1/2 share to LBJ
Development Corporation represented by its President, Leviste. A certain
Lumanglas registered the deed of sale in the RD resulting in the cancellation of
the TCT of EL DORADO and Lacsamana and the issuance of a new TCT in
the names of EL DORADO and LBJ.
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On 1982 LBJ became the owner of the entire lot when EL DORADO sold to it
its one-half share for a consideration. Consequently, the latest TCT was
cancelled and new TCTs Nos were issued in the name of LBJ.
On 1983 the surviving heirs of Leon Robles, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Lipa City against Lacsamana, EL DORADO, LBJ and Leviste for the recovery
of the one-half undivided share of Leon in the subject lot and the cancellation
of the TCTs in the name of LBJ. The complaint alleged that the signature of
Leon Robles in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Lacsamana was a
forgery as Leon was already dead at the time of the alleged sale.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, holding that defendant LBJ is
not a purchaser in good faith, further ordering the cancellation of all the
present titles covering the subject lot and to reinstate the TCT in the names of
Leon Robles and El Dorado Plantation, Inc.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial court on
appeal by EL DORADO, LBJ and Leviste. The 2 courts differed only insofar as
the issue of prescription was concerned. Instead of the period of four (4) years
for filing actions for reconveyance on ground of fraud cited by the trial court,
respondent CA ruled that the present action had not yet prescribed since
actions to declare the nullity of a void contract was imprescriptible.
ISSUE:
1. WON the action instituted by the private respondents barred by reason of
prescription
2. WON the action instituted by the private respondents barred by reason of
laches
HELD:
The petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of respondent CA affirming
that of the RTC of Lipa City is AFFIRMED.
1. On the issue of prescription, we agree that the present action has not yet
prescribed because the right to file an action for reconveyance on the ground
that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is
virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity,which action does not
prescribe. Hence, the fact that the alleged sale took place in 1971 and the
action to have it declared void or inexistent was filed in 1983 is of no moment.
To reiterate, an action for reconveyance based on a void contract is
imprescriptible.
2. It should be noted that private respondents, upon learning that the relevant
portion of Lot No. 13535 was no longer registered in the name of Leon,
immediately caused an investigation to be made for the purpose of finding out
the author and the circumstances behind the execution of the fictitious 1971
Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, in less than two (2) months after it was
discovered by the NBI that Lacsamana was in fact a fictitious/non-existent
person, private respondents through their attorney-in-fact instituted on 1983,
the present action i.e., barely three (3) years and nine (9) months after the
fraudulent registration on 22 January 1980. Thus, it is said, the concept of
laches is not concerned with the lapse of time but only with the effect of
unreasonable lapse.
NOTES:
1. The rule that a person dealing with registered land has the right to rely on
the Torrens title will not apply when such person has actual knowledge of facts
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make an inquiry.
Given the attendant circumstances, in addition to the defects of the 1971 Deed
of Absolute Sale found, petitioner LBJ cannot claim to be a buyer in good faith.
But even if we concede that petitioner LBJ was innocent of the fraud
perpetrated against private respondents, the records abound with facts which
should have impelled it to investigate deeper into the title of Lacsamana, more
so when such effort would not have entailed additional hardship, nay, would
have been quite easy, since the titled co-owner of Lacsamana is LBJ’s own
sister company EL DORADO.
YUJUICO VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 168661
FACTS:
In1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and
confirmation of her title over a parcel of land with an area of 17,343 square
meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in the Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal (now Paraaque City), in the Pasig-Rizal Court of
First Instance (CFI), The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and by Mercedes Dizon Castro won the case.
He sold it to the petitioner of this case petitioner subdivided the land to two
lots, one for him and the other to petitioner Carpio Annotations at the back of
TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another, mortgaged the
lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank.
Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in
favor of Private Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking
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Corporation (RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure various
loans. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 was enacted. This gave lands in the
offshore and foreshore areas to Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Some of the land included the land of petitioner. Petitioner filed for removal of
cloud or quieting of title. On May 15, 1998the parties entered into a
compromise agreement the parties executed a Deed of Exchange of Real
Property, pursuant to the compromise agreement, where the PEA property
with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to Jesus Yujuico and
petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area of 1.7343
hectares. But the President of PEA did not give his approval, hence filed a
petition for relief from the compromise agreement on the basis of mistake and
excusable negligence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, alleged that when
the land registered to Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3,
1972 and subsequently approved by the LRC on April 23, 1973, the land was
still a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria Hydrographic Map No.
4243, Surveys to 1980.
More significantly, respondent Republic argued that:
First, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be registered in
the name of Fermina Castro.
Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to
Fermina Castro was void.
And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were
likewise void.[9] The CA observed that shores are properties of the public
domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable and their
inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of
private ownership or confer title upon the registrant.
ISSUE:
1. Is a reversion suit proper in this case?
2. Is the present petition estopped by laches?
3. Did the CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata
HELD:
No. The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of
Decree No. N-150912 and its derivative titles was filed onJune 8, 2001with the
Paraaque City RTC. It is clear therefore that the reversion suit was erroneously
instituted in the Paraaque RTC and should have been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. This was not done in this case.
The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Paraaque RTC. It should have
been filed with the CA as required by Rule 47. Evidently, the Paraaque RTC
had no jurisdiction over the instant reversion case.
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in
this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and
the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an
unreasonable length of time.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974,
and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action for reversion was filed,
then said action is now barred by laches .
Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for
value over and above the interests of the government. There is no allegation
that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land fraudulently.
He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good
faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on
the certificate When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001,
27 years had already elapsed from the time the late Jesus Yujuico purchased
the land from the original owner Castro.
After the issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro, no further action was taken by
the government to question the issuance of the title to Castro until the case of
Public Estates Authority, brought up in the oral argument before this Court on
September 6, 2000 Clearly from the above, Firestone is a precedent case. The
Public Estates Authority had become final and thus the validity of OCT No.
10215 issued to Castro could no longer be questioned. On the other hand, the
Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal what portion of Manila
Bay was Castros lot located in 1974.
Moreover, a hydrographic map is not the best evidence to show the nature and
location of the lot subject of a land registration application More so, respondent
Government, through its counsel, admits that the land applied by Fermina
Castro in 1973 was solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that
said land is underwater.
The only conclusion that can be derived from the admissions of the Solicitor
General and Government Corporate Counsel is that the land subject of the
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titles of petitioners is alienable land beyond the reach of the reversion suit of
the state The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners title is fortified
by the manifestation by PEA in the Joint Motion for Judgment based on
Compromise Agreement The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the
land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment
made by PEA in its September 30,2003 letter In sum, the Court finds that the
reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Paraaque RTC.Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of
the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches.
Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already precluded by res judicata
in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein.
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC. vs.
HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ
G.R. NO. 171531
FACTS:
The descendants of Pablo Pascua filed a complaint (in their complaint
respondents alleged that Pablo died intestate sometime in June 1945 and was
survived by his four children, one of whom was the deceased Cipriano)
seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of 23.7229
hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales with Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 404 in the name of Pablo.
In the alternative, the heirs of Valdez prayed that damages be awarded in their
favor. OCT No. 404 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents’
complaint. It contained several annotations in the memorandum of
encumbrances which showed that the property had already been sold by
Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales.
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano,
filed a petition before the RTC of Olongapo City for the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 404. However, the RTC denied the petition and
held that petitioner was already the owner of the land, noting that th failure to
annotate the subsequent transfer of the property to it at the back of OCT No.
404 did not affect its title to the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action
is barred by the Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years having elapsed
from the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 up to the filing of the complaint, and
that the complaint states no cause of action as it is an innocent purchaser for
value, it having relied on the clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court further
held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is an innocent purchaser for
value is contrary to the allegations in respondents’ complaint.
Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
The sole issue before this Court revolves around the propriety of the RTC’s
granting of the motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of the Court of
Appeals’ reversal of the RTC’s ruling.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the
cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action
is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242 in the
name of the spouses Rodolfo, who were petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest,
or any circumstance from which it could reasonably be inferred that petitioner
had any actual knowledge of facts that would impel it to make further inquiry
into the title of the spouses Rodolfo.
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of
Sales executed by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other heirs of
Pablo, is not binding on such other heirs, nevertheless, it has operative effect
under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree (SEC. 44. Statutory
Liens Affecting Title).
Lastly, respondents’ claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper.
Section 101 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall
not be liable for any loss, damage or deprivation of any right or interest in land
which may have been caused by a breach of trust, whether express, implied or
constructive. Even assuming arguendo that they are entitled to claim against
the Assurance Fund, the respondents’ claim has already prescribed since any
action for compensation against the Assurance Fund must be brought within a
39
period of six (6) years from the time the right to bring such action first occurred,
which in this case was in 1967.
The petition is GRANTED.

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