Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as
insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or
EN BANC [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003] PRESIDENT
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-
NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Facts: -
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the
respondent justices have violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the
assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the
Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution.
“Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on
political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a
judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds,
publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in
other partisan political activities.
” -Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case
that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo.
The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA
452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of
justice and due process
. -According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and
partiality against his client.
-Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she
blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p. 13.) and
1
opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to
grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.)
Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the
Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a
motion for their disqualification.
-The petitioner also asked the Court to include in its Joint
Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last
January 20, 2001 in: ‘a) going to EDSA 2; ‘b) authorizing the
proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground
of ‘permanent disability’ even without proof of compliance with the
corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by
either the President or majority of his cabinet; and ‘c) actually
proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of
permanent disability. -In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum
shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before
the Sandiganbayan.
-Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition assailing the
foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in
substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable
requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. -In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly
warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to
desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar
submissions to this Court or to its Members.
-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court,
Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end. In fact, on the 7th
September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to
say
- “What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s
right to due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs.
Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were
not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when
President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his
fellow justices had already committed to the other party
- GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA
as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?”
Issue: WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Held:
-Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court
would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten
the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed.
(In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguia has not limited
his discussions to the merits of his client’s case within the judicial
forum. Indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both
broadcast and print media.
“Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
member of the bar from making such public statements on any
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the
administration of justice.
2
” -It should be clear that the phrase “partisan political activities,” in
its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success
or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed
certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking
of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic
before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official
function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other
justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from
their appearance in such other official functions as attending the
Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the
Philippines before the Legislative Department.
-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s
faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that
the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives
and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to
impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary
sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at
all take heed
. -WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
ONG V UNTO
FACTS:
The complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent as legal
counsel of one Nemesia Garganian claiming for the support of the alleged
child of the complainant with the latter. A few days thereafter, the
respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an
emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the
alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the
complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take
against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation
to support Ms. Garganian and her son.
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the
complainant’s brother and that the complainant merely assumed his
brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue
them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against
him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City
Fiscal (now Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the
complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation
of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the
complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the
Anti-Dummy Law
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the
complainant before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor
General. According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently
denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
3
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for
disbarment. The records show that the respondent offered monetary
rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the
complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the
latter. The complainant branded the respondent’s tactics as “highly
immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constituting…malpractice of law
and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.”
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of law and
conduct unbecoming of lawyer.
HELD: YES.
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but
within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that “a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case
or proceeding.”
We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted
against the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the
cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the
proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic
is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding and he shall
not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the
highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his
practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity. Public
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act
and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to
this Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a
replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries
or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this
Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for
the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion
was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon
City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25,
1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court,
in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago
thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
4
sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and
lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on
March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and
Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed
the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon
their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu
Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground
that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered
against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that
Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots
which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached
for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that
wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was
rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband
Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in
the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and
which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of
sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new
ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A
situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done,
the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however,
the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued,
and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But
enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon
City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted
but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third
time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining
order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966,
docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit
in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed
on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët We
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they
filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the
petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ
of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-
7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson
filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the
orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not
interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against
the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of
Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a party in one
case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their
conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu
Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for
5
which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is
not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from
the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held
that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to
half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate
court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to
her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides
living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his
business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and
of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even
then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue
until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ
of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with
jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former,
unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ
of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have
supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case,
for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or
of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up
to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San
Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise
the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to
Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her
husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised
for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4)
her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were
sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964
when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the
conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family
house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on
May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the
sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot
be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every
opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore
discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal
infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu
Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a
mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will
ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to
be assets of the community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled
rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise.4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of
its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same
house5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession
Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review
would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house
would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay
in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide
their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of
the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by
their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted
6
the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the
assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly
resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have
tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case.
If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for
purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in
the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the
appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu
proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the
present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but
trial on the merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a
counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where
they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a
motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an
additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this
motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental
complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants
an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint,
supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all
untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon
conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment
to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture
that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether
or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the
same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking
down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction,
the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling
applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959
the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized
and took possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use
thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This
second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to
allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
7
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal
properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not
require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750
(the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale)
despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of
title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the
pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of
P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251;
and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to
require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when
the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been
filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees
Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the
annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of
the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31,
1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action
and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by
the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of
action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding
causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of
action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action
was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to
retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the
Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
possession of the properties to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such
deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of
the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the
complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the
preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident
intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the
sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants
sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that
the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants
mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the
parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank
also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages
caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid
agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring
that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan
Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously
bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while
Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other
parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them
in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a
pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
8
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action
of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint,
the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the
first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no
transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the
properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the
Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The
reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground
that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the
transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already
indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint
is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of
action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set
aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered
dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners'
counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed
against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by
their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a
part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for
complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for
having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943,
which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published
the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted
having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of
the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement
was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at
law by reason thereof. Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378
FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to
or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed
by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
9
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession,
and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of
said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
Isue:
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the
same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent
constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in
the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of
law" as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising
and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw." The contention
of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While
some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will
not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably
clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains
10
the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply
do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as
if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it
will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for
which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that
the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within
the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it
has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of
his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of
his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the
profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify
his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the
practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and
soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case,
however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent
should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
[A.C. No. 2131. May 10, 1985.]
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, Complainant, v. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G.
COLLAS, JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M.
NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., Respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and in his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office
11
for Respondents.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980
verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law
firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using
the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten
lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay
Products International, Inc. to H. E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability
of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the
lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in
using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply,
he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice
law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the
respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero
& Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.chanrobles law
library
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents’ use of the firm name
Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with
the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" (p. 3, respondents’ memo). This is unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the
firm name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting C. J.), Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.
Plana, J., took no part.
Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion Jr., on leave.
A.C. No. 4497 September 26, 2001
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROÑO,1 respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint2 for disbarment of
respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroño filed by spouses Venustiano and
Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants allege that respondent has been
harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, in addition to
committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National
Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a
public school teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate
administrative cases against respondent.
12
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges
of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against
respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of pointing a high-
powered firearm at complainant, who was unarmed at the time, during a
heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the service
with prejudice to reemployment in government but without forfeiture of
retirement benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases
of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps.
Saburnido v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.4 In the first case,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that
respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior
notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido
charged that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled
goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did
not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the goods
were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent
was found guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were
forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has
been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by respondent
against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent
his service firearm to an acquaintance who thereafter extorted money
from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the then
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by respondent against
Venustiano Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that
Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in the case, inserted an
entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through negligence under Article 224
of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano Saburnido, without
permission from his superior, took into custody a prisoner by final
Judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia
Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during
the 1995 elections despite being related to a candidate for barangay
councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against
Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia
Saburnido was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in
retaliation, since they had earlier filed administrative cases against him
that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants assert that
due to the complaints filed against them, they suffered much moral,
mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim that their children had
to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to
their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the
administrative cases in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited
did not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred
therefor. He then argues that none of the complaints he filed against
complainants was manufactured. He adds that he "was so unlucky that
Saburnido was not convicted."9 He claims that the complaint for serious
irregularity against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the
latter was able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating that his
service firearm was lost. He also points out that Venustiano was suspended
when a prisoner escaped during his watch. As for his complaint against
Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that by mentioning this case in
the present complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the
attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against
them were meant only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido
stressed that she served in the BEI in 1995 only because the supposed
chairperson was indisposed. She stated that she told the other BEI
members and the pollwatchers that she was related to one candidate and
that she would desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody
13
objected, she proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She
added that her relative lost in that election while respondent's son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,10 we referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted
that respondent and his counsel failed to appear and present evidence in
the hearing of the case set for January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus,
respondent was considered to have waived his right to present evidence in
his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent submit his
memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that
complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed
committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition
of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree
with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court.11 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all
lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against herein
complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a
lawyer or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in
respondent's dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity
in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one
who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to
exact revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the
legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.x x x
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that
suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court.12 While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence
calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.13 In this case, we find suspension to be a
sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not
primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public
and the legal profession.14
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
with a WARNING that a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Respondent's suspension is effective upon his receipt of
notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's
record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
14
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
BENEDICTO M. JAVIER, Complainant, v. SILVERIO Q.
CORNEJO, Respondent.
The complainant in his own behalf.
The respondent in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CODE OF ETHICS. — The lawyer
owes entire "devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability", to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied (Code of Ethics, adopted by
the American Bar Association and the Philippine bar Association, No. 15; In
re Tionko [1922], 43 Phil., 191, 194).
2. ID.; ID.; COURT’S DISAPPROVAL OF UNJUSTIFIABLE RECRIMINATIONS
BETWEEN ATTORNEYS. — Mutual bickerings and unjustifiable
recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the
legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
The respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practising lawyer of Lipa, Batangas, is
charged with malpractice (a) for trying to collect from a brother attorney a
sum of money by means of threat, and (b) for having instigated Severina
Paz Teodoro to file a complaint against the herein complainant, Attorney
Benedicto M. Javier, for malpractice (Administrative Case No. 757) knowing
fully well that the charges therein preferred were malicious, flimsy and
unfounded.
The complainant in support of his first charge refers to a letter dated
December 2, 1935, in which demand was made upon him by the
respondent for the delivery of P195 representing the amount collected and
received by the said complainant by virtue of a judgment rendered in a
certain civil case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal wherein Severina Paz
Teodoro was the judgment creditor and the herein complainant was her
counsel. In the same letter the complainant was given ten days within
which to turn over the said P195, otherwise a complaint would be filed
against him in this court. He was furthermore urged to settle the matter in
due time for the preservation not only of his good name but also that of
the legal profession.
We find nothing improper in this letter of the respondent to the complaint
which would justify us in taking disciplinary action against the Respondent.
The letter is an extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum of money
which Severina Paz Teodoro had represented to the respondent as owing
to her and which she sought to recover through his professional services. It
was an honest effort on the part of the respondent to serve the interests
of his client. The lawyer owes entire "devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability", to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied (Code of Ethics,
adopted by the American Bar Association and the Philippine Bar
Association, No. 15; In re Tionko [1922], 43 Phil., 191, 194).
As to the second ground, it is alleged that the respondent in connivance
with one Gregorio Tapia, induced Severina Paz Teodoro to accuse the
herein complainant before this court of malpractice. It appears that herein
complainant was respondent in Administrative Case No. 757 of this court
upon a charge of unlawful conversion of a judgment fund amounting to
P195 pertaining to his client, Severina Paz Teodoro. This charge, however,
was dismissed by resolution of this court on July 10, 1936. Now the
complainant comes back against the herein respondent and charges him
with having maliciously instigated the filing of the complaint in the
aforesaid Administrative Case No. 757.
15
We find that Administrative Case No. 757 was instituted in this court on
March 18, 1936 and that respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo intervened as
counsel for the complainant therein on December 2, 1935. But long before
these dates, Severina Paz Teodoro and her son Feliciano Patena had
already been demanding from the herein complainant the return of the
amount alleged to be due them (Exhibits B and C). The last demand letter
(Exhibit C) was made on March 23, 1931, and its receipt acknowledged by
the herein complainant in the same month (Exhibit E). This letter
demanded the payment of the remaining balance of P166.50 from the sum
which the herein complainant had collected and received as judgment fund
of his erstwhile client Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon his
failure to remit the amount demanded, the matter would be brought to
the attention of this court. The complainant in Administrative Case No.
757, therefore, already knew on March 23, 1931, long before the
respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo entered the scene, where to seek relief.
It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and
unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the
dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this
court.
The complaint against the respondent is dismissed for lack of merit. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Recto, JJ.,
concur.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and
Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of
Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and
Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of
Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
FACTS:
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT
WITH BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
1. Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the
total backwages.
i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of
their backwages
a. Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the
orderly presentation of evidence.
b. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.
2. The permission for a non-member does not entitle the
representative to compensation for such representation.
1. Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement
as to fees:

ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
1. Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a
lawyer.
i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services.

a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned Examination.
as follows:
b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a
i. Cipriano person of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in
10% 1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was eligible for 3rd year high
school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan M.
ii. Quintin Publico.
Muning 10%
ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
iii. Atanacio
Pacis 5% iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against
his nephew for falsification of school records or credentials.

3.
iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement
providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers 4.
1. Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the person
representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if
he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the
Roll of Attorneys.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and
reported:
1. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint
on the ground that his witnesses had turned hostile.

16
 i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already
testified.
2. Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll
of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5
and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require completion by a bar
examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-
law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
5. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging
that he had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he
have any knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the
Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
1. He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the
disbarment case against him.
2. He resigned from all his positions in public and private
offices, and transferred to Manila.
3. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into
consideration his exemplary conduct from the time he
became a lawyer, his services to the community the
numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations
he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was
denied by the Court for lack of merit.
4. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High
School in Manila was through the initiative of his uncle,
Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and
enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in
spite of his demonstrations
17
i. Misrepresentation committed was
precipitated by his uncle; that being merely 16 year old, he could not be
expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of his
uncle, who later on caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the
petitions.
ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible
from the backpay of some of its members. YES.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the present
petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for
extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition.
Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
HELD:
ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF
BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST
MUNING.
1. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-
client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or
with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
2. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
 qualifications, for the ethics of the profession and for the
protection of courts, clients and the public.
3. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not
be violated:
1. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both,
2. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an act or an act done in violation of law
3. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in
case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures.
4. In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members:
1. YES because such union or labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial courton
behalf of its members
2. If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union
may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under
Sec 6, RA 875:
i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice
cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may
appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
3. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the
financial burden of litigations.
Cobb-Perez v. Judge Lantin (1968)
18
Doctrine:
1. Accordingly, should there be a conflict between his duty to his
client and that to the court, he should resolve the conflict
against the former and in favor of the latter, his primary
responsibility being to uphold the cause of justice.
2. A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Facts:
Basically, the spouses Perez were involved in a civil case
where a simple money judgment was rendered against them. To
execute the judgment, the court levied upon shares of stock of the
spouses. With the help of the spouses’ counsels Attys. Baizas and
Bolinas, they resorted to a series of actions and petitions for the
sole purpose of delaying the execution of the simple money
judgment which has long been final and executory.
What they did was attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion,
causing the postponement of the execution sale six times. More than
eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same
has yet to be satisfied.
Example of the spouses’ modus operandi: (You can skip the
enumerated part, they’re not really important, but in case sir asks! ☺)
1. After the court issued a writ of execution against them, the
spouses sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to
restrain the execution of the final judgment.
2. Damaso Perez (husband) temporarily bowed out from the
scene. Then here comes his wife Mercedez Cobb-Perez who
files a writ of preliminary injunction with the CFI of Rizal
with full knowledge that the court in Rizal had no jurisdiction
over the matter because the case was originally filed in
Manila.
 3. Mercedez Cobb-Perez simultaneously filed with the CFI of
Manila an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution alleging
as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of
stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment
debt.
4. Mercedez Cobb-Perez, now assisted by her husband who had
staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the CFI of Manila
(not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of
execution), in connection with the still pending case in the CFI
of Rizal. This was denied.
5. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day,
he filed in connection with the original judgment (the money
judgment) an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration” which
denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the
controverted writ of execution. The foregoing motion was far
from seriously seeking the reconsideration because in the first
place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even
a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution" (filed by his wife alone.) This was also denied by
the court.
(Basically, ganyan ginawa nila for 8 years. File dito, file doon, file
kung saan saan. Preliminary injunctions, motions to recall writ of
execution, motions to reconsider – basta lahat. Kahit na alam nila na
irereject lang naman ng court, go lang sila ng go! Pati si SC, napagod
na magkwento.)
Here comes the relevant part: (sorry it took so long! )
In the court’s final (as in final) judgment, the writ of execution
against the spouses Perez was upheld, and in addition, the Supreme
Court assessed treble costs against petitioners, to be paid by their
counsels. Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, while
submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the
19
decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional
conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.
Issue:
1. W/N Attys. Baizas and Bolinas should be made to pay treble costs.
Held:
YES.
Attys. Baizas and Bolinao contends that if there was delay it was
because they happened to be more assertive, a quality of lawyers
which is not to be condemned. The court replied that a counsel's
assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the court
does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite
the patent futility of his client's position. It is the duty of a counsel
to advise his clients if he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to
litigate. Accordingly, should there be a conflict between his duty to
his client and that to the court, he should resolve the conflict
against the former and in favor of the latter, his primary
responsibility being to uphold the cause of justice.
IN RE SOTTO
Facts:

♦Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with the
decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila
Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty.
Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court.
♦ well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the
Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends
that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon
this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional
penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose
fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by
Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in
his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the
utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of
the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended
to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set
forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes
Ratio:
♦ it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for
contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law
and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt
♦ To his effect, I announce that one of the first
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior
statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the
courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this
20
jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after
those of that country.
♦
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not
court in reversing or modifying its decision.
♦
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress,
of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of
this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by
the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not
only erroneously interpreted said law, but that
mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these
last years, I believe that the only remedy to put
an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court.
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. As it is now constituted, a constant
peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that
even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court
very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.

his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence

the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct
the administration of justice.

As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto,
like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. An
attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct.

Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary

imprisonment in

case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he should not be

disbarred.

21