SUPREME STEEL CORPORATION VS.

NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT

UNION (NMS-IND-APL)
G.R. No. 185556 March 28, 2011

Facts:
Supreme Steel (Petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing
steel pipes. Nagkakaisang Manggagawa (Respondent) is the certified bargaining agent of petitioner’s rank
-and-file employees. Respondent filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) against petitioner for alleged violations of their CBA. They failed to settle, so the case was
certified to the NLRC for Compulsory arbitration. One of the allegations was that petitioner violated Art.
2, Sec. 6 of the CBA which prohibited contracting-out labor or the hiring of contractual employees.
Petitioner admitted that it hired temporary employees, due to increase of job orders from abroad, but
claimed that the same was a management prerogative.
NLRC and CA ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari. The
CA further held that management prerogative is not unlimited: it is subject to limitations found in law, a
CBA, or the general principles of fair play and justice. It stressed that the CBA provided such limitation on
management prerogative to contract-out labor, and compliance with the CBA is mandated by the express
policy of the law.
Issue:
WON Supreme Steel violated their CBA.

Ruling:
Yes. A familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties
and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
If the terms of a CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall prevail.
Any doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor should be resolved in favor
of labor
The wording of the CBA on general wage increase cannot be interpreted any other way: The CBA increase should be
given to all employees "over and above" the amount they are receiving, even if that amount already includes an anniversary
increase.
Stipulations in a contract must be read together, not in isolation from one another. CBA must be
construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically. It is the duty of the courts to place a practical
and realistic construction upon the CBA, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated
and the purpose which it is intended to serve. Absurd and illogical interpretations should be avoided. A
CBA, like any other contract, must be interpreted according to the intention of the parties.
 Colegio De San Juan De Letran v. Assoc. of Employees and Faculty of Letran
G.R. No. 141471 September 18, 2001

Facts:
Salvador Abtria, President of respondent union initiated renegotiations of its CBA with petitioner
for the last two years of CBA’s 5 years lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a
new set of officers with private respondents Eleanor Ambas as the newly elected President. Ambas
wanted to continue renegotiation, but petitioner claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing.
The CBA was submitted to a referendum which was rejected by the union members. Later, the union
notified the NCMB of its intention to strike due to petitioners, refusal to bargain. Thereafter, the parties
agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year CBA. The union
submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the union that the same was submitted to its Board
of Trustees. Meanwhile, Ambas work schedule was changed, which she protested and requested to be
submitted to grievance machinery under the old CBA. Due to petitioners’ inaction, the union filed a notice
of strike. Later, the Ambas was dismissed for alleged insubordination. Both parties again discussed the
ground rules for the CBA renegotiations; however petitioner stopped negotiations after allegedly
receiving information that a new group of employees had filed a PCE. The union struck and the Secretary
assumed jurisdiction ordering all striking workers to return to work. All were readmitted except Ambas.
Public respondent declared petitioner quilt of ULP and directed reinstatement of Ambas with back wages.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain within the union when
it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon
mere information that a petition for certification has been filed by another legitimate labor organization.

Ruling:
No. the duty to bargain collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Petitioner failed to make a
timely reply to the unions proposals, thereby violating the proper procedure in collective bargaining as
provided in Article 250. In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there
must be a valid PCE raising a legitimate representation issue, in this case, the petition was filed outside
the 60-dayt freedom period; therefore, there was no legitimate representation issue and the filing of the
PCE did not constitute to the ongoing negotiation.
 Nissan Motors Philippines v. Secretary of Labor
G.R. Nos. 158190-91 Oct 31, 2006

Facts:
A 2000-2001 labor dispute between Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. (Nissan Motors) and BANAL-
NMPI-OLALIA-KMU ("Union" hereafter) triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock resulted in (1) the
filing of four (4) notices of strike, the first filed on December 4, 2000 on account of the alleged suspension
of about 140 employees following a disruption of company operations; and (2) the dismissal from the
service of a number of company employees. On August 22, 2001, the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. In it, the DOLE Secretary
expressly enjoined any strike or lockout and directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any
act that might exacerbate the situation, and for the Union to refrain from engaging in any disruptive
activity.
Eventually, the DOLE Secretary issued, on December 5, 2001, a decision which contained names
of union officers and members whom Nissan Motors dismissed for defying the directives contained in the
assumption order.
On February 7, 2003, in consolidated cases docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69107 and CA-G.R. SP No.
69799, the CA, acting on the separate petitions for certiorari of Nissan Motors and the Union, effectively
affirmed the aforementioned decision, as modified, of the DOLE Secretary. In turn, the Court, in its
Decision of June 21, 2006, affirmed that of the CA insofar as it upheld the DOLE Secretary on the
suspension and dismissal angle of her decision, or to be precise, her order (a) affirming the suspension of
the 140 employees which is the subject of the first notice of strike; (b) sustaining the dismissal of the
Union officers; and (c) downgrading to one-month suspension the penalty of dismissal heretofore
imposed on Union members who joined the striking Union officers in defying the assumption order and
accordingly reinstating said union members having already served the one-month suspension.

Issue:
Whether or not Union officers and members accused of work slowdown in defiance of assumption
of jurisdiction are entitled to due process to determine their individual participation.

Ruling:
The conclusion of the public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, as confirmed by the
CA, is that the Union and its members indeed engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances
in which they were undertaken constitute illegal strike. The defiance came in the form of the continuation
of the slowdown enjoined in the underlying assumption order, by the strike actually staged by the Union,
its officers and members on October 1, 2001, the closure of the company’s offices and plant premises and
the barricading of main gates. In fact, the DOLE Secretary had to ask the intervention of the Laguna
Philippine National Police (PNP) to assist the Company in opening what appeared to be padlocked and
welded gates leading to company premises. But side by side with this determination is the CAs categorical
finding that the Company’s hands were not entirely clean, having contributed to the ensuing deteriorating
impasse between labor and management.
Verily, the DOLEs repeated admonitions against any act that might exacerbate the labor dispute
cut both ways. Accordingly, the Court is not disposed, as Nissan Motor and the Union respectively urge,
to disturb, one way or the other, the factual determination on what eventually led the parties to engage
in a labor-management locking of horns. To be sure, the Company’s act - after the DOLE Secretary had
issued her assumption order - of suspending a very substantial number of Union officers/members with
threat of eventual dismissal and perceived illegal lockout and union busting went against the injunction
against the commission of any act that would add fire to what was already a volatile situation. This is not
to say that the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice, or union busting, to be precise. It cannot be
heard, however, to say that the CA taking stock of the third and fourth notices of strike filed and the
grounds therefor erred in saying that the Company was not entirely without fault for the defiant and
adversarial level into which the tense situation between the parties eventually degenerated. In the same
token, the Union cannot plausibly say, as it does at every turn, that its officers and members desisted from
engaging in what turned out to be a crippling work slowdown.
 Colegio De San Juan De Letran v. Assoc. of Employees and Faculty of Letran
G.R. No. 141471 September 18, 2001

Facts:
Salvador Abtria, President of respondent union initiated renegotiations of its CBA with petitioner for the
last two years of CBA’s 5 years lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set
of officers with private respondents Eleanor Ambas as the newly elected President. Ambas wanted to
continue renegotiation, but petitioner claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing. The CBA
was submitted to a referendum which was rejected by the union members. Later, the union notified the
NCMB of its intention to strike due to petitioners, refusal to bargain. Thereafter, the parties agreed to
disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year CBA. The union submitted its
proposals to petitioner, which notified the union that the same was submitted to its Board of Trustees.
Meanwhile, Ambas work schedule was changed, which she protested and requested to be submitted to
grievance machinery under the old CBA. Due to petitioners’ inaction, the union filed a notice of strike.
Later, the Ambas was dismissed for alleged insubordination. Both parties again discussed the ground rules
for the CBA renegotiations; however petitioner stopped negotiations after allegedly receiving information
that a new group of employees had filed a PCE. The union struck and the Secretary assumed jurisdiction
ordering all striking workers to return to work. All were readmitted except Ambas. Public respondent
declared petitioner quilt of ULP and directed reinstatement of Ambas with back wages.

Issue:
Is petitioner guilty of unfair labor practices when it suspended negotiations?

Ruling:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, this Court finds that petitioner has not
shown any compelling reason sufficient to overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the
findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court and will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.
In this case, the petitioner failed to show any extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from this
established doctrine.
Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively," as
follows:
Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means
the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good
faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements
if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to
make any concession.

Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran
(AEFL) (hereinafter, "union") lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to
petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent
the negotiation.
Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a
timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were
submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of
petitioner prompted the union to file its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only
offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the matter as its
excuse for failing to file its reply.