Week 4 Discussion Questions

WWII
U.S. Cold War Policy in Asia
Inter-Regional Connections

IR Theory
1. What is the difference between coercive diplomacy and brute force? What kinds of
conditions are necessary for one state to engage in coercive diplomacy with another?
2. Christensen argues that, in a situation of coercive diplomacy, poorly unified and
coordinated alliances can heighten the risks of interstate conflict. How might these
dynamics be present in East Asia today and what does the theory suggest for U.S.
alliance management policies there?

World War II
1. In retrospect, some have criticized the U.S. response to Japanese expansionism prior to
Pearl Harbor as being insufficiently strong. What were some of the reasons the U.S. did
not respond more strongly? What might a U.S. policymaker at the time have done to
create conditions more amenable to halting Japanese expansionism?

U.S. Cold War Policy in Asia

1. Once the challenges of the Cold War became apparent and the development of the
“strongpoint” strategy, the U.S. instituted the so-called “reverse course” in Japan. What
policy changes constituted this reverse course and how might they have changed
Japanese society?
2. In ​Useful Adversaries​, Christensen argues that the U.S. became trapped in its own
anti-Communist rhetoric and was forced to assist Nationalists in China even though it
was not identified as one of the global “strongpoints.” How else, besides appealing to
and drumming up anti-Communist sentiments, might the U.S. administration have sold
its “strongpoint” strategy to the U.S. public and Congress?
3. Perhaps one “puzzle” of the post-War era is that the U.S. established an extensive
multilateral​ alliance structure in Europe (NATO). However, in East Asia, its alliances and
security commitments were all ​bilateral​ (JP-US, ROC-US, ROK-US, PHI-US). Brainstorm
some reasons for why these very different alliance frameworks emerged.

Inter-Regional Connections
1. Why did the U.S., despite their own post-colonial history, come to support France in
their colonial struggle in Vietnam?
2. What was the “dollar gap” and how did it relate to U.S. and British policy toward
Malaya?
3. As described in the readings, the U.S. eventually prioritized Cold War strategic interests
over a stated commitment for decolonization. In lecture, Professor Christensen touched
briefly on some of considerations involved in the U.S. decision to use atomic bombs
against Japanese cities. These examples raise important questions about the role that
values, morality, and emotion should or should not play in foreign policy. How should
states, people, and leaders incorporate these into strategic decisions?