VDA. DE APE V.

CA

FACTS:

Petitioner was the wife of Fortunato Ape (deceased). Fortunato was one of the eleven children who inherited 1/11 of a
land owned by his father Cleopas. During the lifetime of Fortunato, Generosa Cawit de Lumayno (private respondent)
instituted an action for specific performance of a deed of sale with damages against Fortunato and his wife, petitioner.

Generosa averred that she entered with a contract of sale with Fortunato regarding his share in the property for
P5,000.00. Fortunato went to her store at the time when their lease contract was about toexpire. He allegedly
demanded the rental payment for his land but as she was no longer interested in renewing their lease agreement,
they agreed instead to enter into a contract of sale which Fortunato acceded to provided private respondent bought
his portion of Lot No. 2319 for P5,000.00. Thereafter, she asked her son-in-law Flores to prepare the aforementioned
receipt. Flores read the document to Fortunato and asked the latter whether he had any objection thereto. Fortunato
then went on to affix his signature on the receipt. The agreement was evidenced by a receipt presented in court.
Fortunato denied the sale and alleged that the signature appearing as his was forged. According to Fortunato, what
was executed between them was a lease contract for five years which was paid annually by Generosa on installment.
On the day that Fortunato and his wife went to collect the payment of rent, he was made to sign a paper by Generosa
without explaining what was written thereon. Petitioner insisted that the entire Lot No. 2319 had not yet been formally
subdivided that on 11 April 1971 she and her husband went to private respondent’s house to collect past rentals for
their land then leased by the former, however, they managed to collect only thirty pesos, that private respondent
made her (petitioner’s) husband sign a receipt acknowledging the receipt of said amount of money and that the
contents of said receipt(prepared by Andres Flores, nephew of Generosa) were never explained to them. She also
stated in her testimony that her husband was an illiterate and only learned how to write his name in order to be
employed in a sugar central. As for private respondent’s purchase of the shares owned by Fortunato’s co-owners,
petitioner maintained that neither she nor her husband received any notice regarding those sales transactions.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a contract of sale existed between the parties?

HELD:

The records of this case betray the stance of private respondent that Fortunato Ape entered into such an agreement
with her.

A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected by mere consent of the parties. It is born from the
moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the sale and upon the price. Upon its
perfection, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee may compel the transferof the
ownership and to deliver the object of the sale while the vendor may demand the vendee to pay the thing sold. For
there to be a perfected contract of sale, however, the following elements must be present: consent, object, and price
in money or its equivalent. The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and
the cause which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must extend to all points that the parties deem
material or there is no consent at all.

To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites:

(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
(b) it should be free; and
(c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation
orundue influence; spontaneity by fraud.

In this jurisdiction, the general rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake in a transaction must substantiate his
allegation as the presumption is that a person takes ordinary care for his concerns and that private dealings have
been entered
into fairly and regularly. The exception to this rule is provided for under Article 1332 of the Civil Code which provides
that “when one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake
or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to
the former.”

In this case, as private respondent is the one seeking to enforce the claimed contract of sale, she bears the burden of
proving that the terms of the agreement were fully explained to Fortunato Ape who was an illiterate. This she failed to
do. While she claimed in her testimony that the contents of the receipt were made clear to Fortunato, such allegation
was
debunked by Andres Flores himself when the latter took the witness stand. As can be gleaned from Flores’s testimony,
while he was very much aware of Fortunato’s inability to read and write in the English language, he did not bother to
fully explain to the latter the substance of the receipt. He even dismissed the idea of asking somebody else to assist
Fortunato considering that a measly sum of thirty pesos was involved. Evidently, it did not occur to Flores that the
document he himself prepared pertains to the transfer altogether of Fortunato’s property to his mother-in-law. It is
precisely in situations
such as this when the wisdom of Article 1332 of the Civil Code readily becomes apparent which is “to protect a party
to a contract disadvantaged by illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or some other handicap.”

멈추지 말고 계속 해나가기만 한다면 늦어도 상관없다

Meomchuji malgo gyesok haenagagiman handamyeon neujeodo sanggwaneopda

KAYA MO YAN/ LAST 2 MINUTES/ 아자 아자/ 1 of 10

 It does not matter how slowly you go as long as you do not stop.
BENJIE B. GEORG v. HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE
GR No. 190408, 2016-07-20

FACTS:

This petition for review seeks to reverse the 17 November 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
89990 and reinstate the 29 November 2006 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15, Tabaco City in
Civil Case No. T-2161.

The Holy Trinity College Grand Chorale and Dance Company (the Group) was organized in 1987 by Sister Teresita
Medalle (Sr. Medalle), the President of respondent Holy Trinity College in Puerto Princesa City. The Grand Chorale and
Dance Company were two separate groups but for the purpose of performing locally or abroad, they were usually
introduced as one entity. The Group was composed of students from Holy Trinity College.

In 2001, the Group was slated to perform in Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany. Edward Enriquez (Enriquez), who
allegedly represented Sr. Medalle, contacted petitioner Benjie B. Georg to seek assistance for payment of the Group's
international airplane tickets. Petitioner is the Filipino wife of a German national Heinz Georg. She owns a German
travel agency named DTravellers Reiseburo Georg. Petitioner, in turn, requested her brother, Atty. Benjamin Belarmino,
Jr. (Atty. Belarmino), to represent her in the negotiation with Enriquez. Enriquez was referred to petitioner by Leonora
Dietz (Dietz), another Filipino-German who has helped Philippine cultural groups obtain European engagements,
including financial assistance.

On 24 April 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement with Deed of Assignment[3] (MOA) was executed between petitioner,
represented by Atty. Belarmino, as first party-assignee; the Group, represented by Sr. Medalle, O.P. and/or its Attorney-
in-Fact Enriquez, as second-party assignor and S.C. Roque Group of Companies Holding Limited Corporation and S.C.
Roque Foundation Incorporated, represented by Violeta P. Buenaventura, as foundation-grantor. Under the said
Agreement, petitioner, through her travel agency, will advance the payment of international airplane tickets
amounting to P4,624,705.00 in favor of the Group on the assurance of the Group represented by Sr. Medalle through
Enriquez that there is a confirmed financial allocation of P4,624,705.00 from the foundation-grantor, S.C. Roque
Foundation (the Foundation). The second-party assignor assigned said amount in favor of petitioner. Petitioner paid for
the Group's domestic and international airplane tickets.

In an Amended Complaint[4] dated 15 August 2001 for a Sum of Money with Damages filed before the RTC, Branch 18,
Tabaco City, petitioner claimed that the second-party assignor/respondent and the foundation-grantor have not paid
and refused to pay their obligation under the MOA. Petitioner prayed that they be ordered to solidarily pay the amount
of P4,624,705.00 representing the principal amount mentioned in the Agreement, moral, exemplary, and actual
damages, legal fees, and cost of suit.

This petition for review seeks to reverse the 17 November 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
89990 and reinstate the 29 November 2006 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15, Tabaco City in
Civil Case No. T-2161.The Holy Trinity College Grand Chorale and Dance Company (the Group) was organized in 1987
by Sister Teresita Medalle (Sr. Medalle), the President of respondent Holy Trinity College in Puerto Princesa City. The
Grand Chorale and Dance Company were two separate groups but for the purpose of performing locally or abroad,
they were usually introduced as one entity. The Group was composed of students from Holy Trinity College.In 2001, the
Group was slated to perform in Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany. Edward Enriquez (Enriquez), who allegedly
represented Sr. Medalle, contacted petitioner Benjie B. Georg to seek assistance for payment of the Group's
international airplane tickets. Petitioner is the Filipino wife of a German national Heinz Georg. She owns a German
travel agency named DTravellers Reiseburo Georg. Petitioner, in turn, requested her brother, Atty. Benjamin Belarmino,
Jr. (Atty. Belarmino), to represent her in the negotiation with Enriquez. Enriquez was referred to petitioner by Leonora
Dietz (Dietz), another Filipino-German who has helped Philippine cultural groups obtain European engagements,
including financial assistance.On 24 April 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement with Deed of Assignment[3] (MOA) was
executed between petitioner, represented by Atty. Belarmino, as first party-assignee; the Group, represented by Sr.
Medalle, O.P. and/or its Attorney-in-Fact Enriquez, as second-party assignor and S.C. Roque Group of Companies
Holding Limited Corporation and S.C. Roque Foundation Incorporated, represented by Violeta P. Buenaventura, as
foundation-grantor. Under the said Agreement, petitioner, through her travel agency, will advance the payment of
international airplane tickets amounting to P4,624,705.00 in favor of the Group on the assurance of the Group
represented by Sr. Medalle through Enriquez that there is a confirmed financial allocation of P4,624,705.00 from the
foundation-grantor, S.C. Roque Foundation (the Foundation). The second-party assignor assigned said amount in favor
of petitioner. Petitioner paid for the Group's domestic and international airplane tickets.In an Amended Complaint[4]
dated 15 August 2001 for a Sum of Money with Damages filed before the RTC, Branch 18, Tabaco City, petitioner
claimed that the second-party assignor/respondent and the foundation-grantor have not paid and refused to pay their
obligation under the MOA. Petitioner prayed that they be ordered to solidarily pay the amount of P4,624,705.00
representing the principal amount mentioned in the Agreement, moral, exemplary, and actual damages, legal fees,
and cost of suit.[5] The corresponding summonses were served.On 14 September 2001, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action against it. On 6 November 2001, petitioner filed a Petition
for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment.On 21 April 2003, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, as
well as the petition for issuance of a writ of attachment against respondent. A Preliminary Attachment against the
foundation-grantor has previously been issued.An Order of Default has been pronounced by the trial court against the
foundation-grantor and its responsible officers for the latter's failure to file its answer despite service of
summons.During the pre-trial, the following facts were stipulated:Sr. Teresita Mcdalle, OP, [placed her thumbmark] in
the subject MO A at the University of Sto. Tomas on 24 April 2001 in Espana, Manila.At the time Sr. Teresita Medalle,
O.P. [placed her thumbmark] in the subject MOA, she was still suffering from stroke.The subject MOA was notarized in
Makati City.[6]and the following issues were submitted for resolution:Whether or not when Sr. Teresita Medalle affixed
her thumbmark in the MOA, she is affixing her thumbmark as President of the Holy Trinity College.Whether or not Holy
Trinity College is in estoppel?Whether or not the Holy Trinity College may be bound by the acts of Sr. Teresita
Medalle.Whether or not the principle piercing the veil of corporate fiction may be applied in this case.Whether or not
KAYA MO YAN/ LAST 2 MINUTES/ 아자 아자/ 2 of 10
Holy Trinity College may be considered a party in the MOA.Whether or not defendant may be held liable to pay the
sum due in the MOA plus damages and litigation expenses.Whether or not [respondent] is entitled to the relief sought
for the Complaint.Whether or not the school is entitled to its counterclaim.[7]

On 4 August 2005, the trial court reconsidered its Order of 21 April 2003 and issued a Writ of Attachment against
respondent.In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondent argued that the MOA on which petitioner based its cause of
action does not state that respondent is a party. Neither was respondent obligated to pay the amount of
P4,624,705.00 for the European Tour of the Group nor did it consent to complying with the terms of the MOA.
Respondent asserted that the thumbmark of Sr. Medalle was secured without her consent. Respondent maintained
that since it was not a party to the MOA, it is not bound by the provisions stated therein. Respondent counterclaimed
for damages.[8]On 29 November 2006, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.

On 9 January 2007, respondent filed a notice of appeal.[10]In a Decision dated 17 November 2009, the Court of
Appeals relieved respondent of any liability for petitioner's monetary claims. The Court of Appeals synthesized the
issues into three, thus:Respondent's privity to the loan extended by petitioner and the MOA sued upon; Sr. Medalle's
capacity and/or authority to act for and in behalf of appellant in respect to the subject MOA; andThe applicability of the
doctrines of apparent authority and/or corporation by estoppel to the factual and legal millieux of the case

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review.

ISSUES:

First, petitioner questions the admission of the alleged deposition conducted upon Sr. Medalle when the same was not
presented in evidence by respondent's counsel. Petitioner adds that there was no order from the trial court allowing
such deposition. Petitioner also claims that the requisite certification that should accompany the deposition is
defective.Second, petitioner insists that Sr. Medalle was in full possession of her mental faculties when she affixed her
thumbmark on the MOA and that the same was read in full to Sr. Medalle. Petitioner asserts that no single witness was
presented to prove that Sr. Medalle's illness had impaired her judgment.Third, petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals merely relied on respondent's assertion that it is not a party to the MOA without considering the evidence
presented by petitioner. Petitioner avers that respondent's counsel had acknowledged during pre-trial that respondent
is deemed to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of the MOA. Thus, respondent cannot be allowed for
the first time on appeal to claim that it is not a party to the MOA.

Fourth, petitioner contends that the Holy Trinity College Grand Chorale and Holy Trinity College Dance Company were
both created by Sr. Medalle in her capacity as President of respondent. These groups were also under the dominion
and control of Sr. Medalle and/or respondent. Petitioner refutes the assertion of respondent that Sr. Medalle was no
longer the President of Holy Trinity College when the MOA was executed in view of the conflicting statements of
respondent's witnesses.Fifth, petitioner opposes the consideration given by the appellate court to the appointment
papers of Sr. Tangan as President of the Holy Trinity College to prove that Sr. Medalle is only allowed to spend
P30,000.00 worth of non-budgeted and extraordinary expenses, thereby proving that she was not authorized by
respondent to enter into an MOA. Petitioner cites instances where Sr. Medalle acted in her capacity as President of
Holy Trinity College without the imprimatur of respondent.Sixth, petitioner claims that the appellate court cannot
absolve respondent from liability while affirming the decision of the trial court with respect to the foundation-grantor
because the liability of the latter is joint and solidary with respondent.

The primordial issue is whether respondent is liable under the MOA. Respondent primarily argues that it is not a party
to the MOA. Petitioner claims otherwise because Sr. Medalle, in her capacity as President of Holy Trinity College, affixed
her thumbmark in the MOA. Two sub-issues necessarily arise therefrom: 1) whether Sister Medalle freely gave her full
consent to the MOA by affixing her thumbmark and 2) whether she is authorized by respondent to enter into the MOA.

RULING:

The issues presented involve questions of fact. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts; and when there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on
appeal,[13] subject to the following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Exception No. 7 obtains in this case. The findings of the RTC are contrary to those of the Court of Appeals. The
essential requisites of a contract under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code are:(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

The validity of the MOA is being assailed for a defect in consent. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, consent may be
vitiated by any of the following: (1) mistake, (2) violence, (3) intimidation, (4) undue influence, and (5) fraud. Under
the same provision, the contract becomes voidable.Petitioner claims that Sr. Medalle knew fully well the import of the
KAYA MO YAN/ LAST 2 MINUTES/ 아자 아자/ 3 of 10
MOA when she affixed her thumbmark therein while respondent alleges that fraud was employed to induce Sr. Medalle
to affix her thumbmark.There is fraud when one party is induced by the other to enter into a contract, through and
solely because of the latter's insidious words or machinations. But not all forms of fraud can vitiate consent. Under
Article 1330, fraud refers to dolo causante or causal fraud, in which, prior to or simultaneous with execution of a
contract, one party secures the consent of the other by using deception, without which such consent would not have
been given

Sr. Medalle claimed that she affixed her thumbmark on the MOA on the basis of Enriquez's representation that her
signature/thumbmark is necessary to facilitate the release of the loan. As intended, the affixing of her thumbmark in
fact caused the immediate release of the loan. Petitioner's claim that the provisions of the MOA were read to Sr.
Medalle was found credible by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals discussed at length how proper care and
caution was taken by Atty. Belarmino to verify what the Groups's trip was all about and the extent of the authority of
Sr. Medalle regarding the project.

It simply defies logic that Atty. Belarmino would employ fraud just so Sr. Medalle could affix her thumbmark to
facilitate the release of the loan coming from Atty. Belarmino himself.

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity and is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents absent any clear and convincing proof to the contrary.[1

Third, respondent claims that Sr. Medalle was not authorized by the corporation to enter into any loan agreement thus
the MOA executed was null and void for being ultra vires. Petitioner invokes, as refutation, the doctrine of apparent
authority.Respondent's denial of privity to the loan contract was based on the following reasons: 1) that respondent's
name does not appear on the MOA; 2) that Sr. Medalle was no longer the President of Holy Trinity College when she
affixed her thumbmark on the MOA; and 3) that Sr. Medalle was not authorized by respondent through a board
resolution to enter into such agreement.

In fine, the school administration of the Holy Trinity College has control and supervision of the Grand Chorale and
Dance Company particularly in the selection and hiring of its trainers but as to their termination as well. A fortiori,
Jearold Loyola and Errol Gallespen were formally severed per April 30, 2001 Letter of Sr. Estrella Tangan. This clearly
shows that indeed, the Holy Trinity College Grand Chorale and Dance Company were both under the power of the
school administration. Moreover, it is also clear that the costumes were likewise financed by the school administration

With the foregoing, the [c]ourt is convinced that the indeed the Holy Trinity College Grand Chorale and Dance
Company do not have a life of its own and merely derive its creation, existence and continued operation or
performance at the hands of the school administration. Without the decision of the school administration, the said
Chorale and Dance Company is completely inoperative.

Sr. Medalle, as President of Holy Trinity, is clothed with sufficient authority to enter into a loan agreement. As held by
the trial court, the Holy Trinity College's Board of Trustees never contested the standing of the Dance and Chorale
Group and had in fact lent its support in the form of sponsoring uniforms or freely allowed the school premises to be
used by the group for their practice sessions. In addition, petitioner was correct in citing snippets of Sr. Navarro's
testimony to prove that the Board of Trustees, the administration, as well as the congregation to which they belong
have consented or ratified the actions of Sr. Medalle

In this case, Sr. Medalle formed and organized the Group. She had been giving financial support to the Group, in her
capacity as President of Holy Trinity College. Sr. Navarro admitted that the Board of Trustees never questioned the
existence and activities of the Group. Thus, any agreement or contract entered into by Sr. Medalle as President of Holy
Trinity College relating to the Group bears the consent and approval of respondent. It is through these dynamics that
we cannot fault petitioner for relying on Sr. Medalle's authority to transact with petitioner.Finding that Sr. Medalle
possessed full mental faculty in affixing her thumbmark in the MOA and that respondent is hereby bound by her
actions, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

PRINCIPLES:

The doctrine of apparent authority applies in this case.

The doctrine of apparent authority provides that a corporation will be estopped from denying the agent's authority if it
knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of an apparent authority, and it holds
him out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts... he existence of apparent authority may be
ascertained through (1) the general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or agent

The existence of apparent authority may be ascertained through (1) the general manner in which the corporation
holds out an officer or agent as having the power to act or, in other words, the apparent authority to act in general,
with which it clothes him; or (2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive
knowledge thereof, whether within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers

어디든 가치가 있는 곳으로 가려면 지름길은 없다.

Eodideun gachiga inneun goseuro garyeomyeon jireumgireun eopda
There are no short cuts to any place worth going.
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners, v
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr. TOPIC: Simulation of contract, intestate proceeding

KAYA MO YAN/ LAST 2 MINUTES/ 아자 아자/ 4 of 10

FACTS:

Petitioner Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio who died intestate. On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of
land in Legazpi City.

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two documents by her daughter Emelinda and her son-in-law Domingo,
respondents in this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in
2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
After trial, RTC held the annulment of the subject documents. CA reversed RTC’s decision. CA held that the RTC erred in
annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio,
considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action.
Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that
has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must be raised in a separate administration or intestate
proceedings.

2. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale can be nullified.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that this case falls under the exception of the rule on separate intestate proceedings.

The general rule is that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action.
However, the Court also ruled that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if
there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.

The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the
issues it defined during the pre-trial.

Similar to the case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being
claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio.

It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the
status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez
admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that
petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land.

Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of
the decedent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that it is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no
intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale
is nothing more than a simulated contract.

Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta: In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has
no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the
apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the
parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what
they may have given under the contract.

In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale is simply to “facilitate the
titling of the subject property,” not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents concede that
petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property and that there is no indication that respondents ever took
possession of the subject property after its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject
property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear
badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.

세상에서 보고싶은 변화가 있다면 당신 스스로 그 변화가 되어라.

Sesangeseo bogosipeun byeonhwaga itdamyeon dangsin seuseuro geu byeonhwaga doeeora.
Be the change you want to see in the world.
ANDREA MAYOR, VERGEL ROMULO VS. LOURDES BELEN

FACTS:

Andrea Mayor was the original owner of the subject land. She sold it to respondent Lourdes Belen for P18,000on
an instalment basis. Lourdes was able to pay P11,445. Lourdes sold it back to Andrea for the same price and a

KAYA MO YAN/ LAST 2 MINUTES/ 아자 아자/ 5 of 10

Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan was executed in favour of Andrea. A few days after, Andrea executed a mortgage
over the same property in favour of a loan obtained from Belen for P12,000. Belen then filed a case against
petitioners alleging fraud employed by Andrea and Romulo. She averred that the petitioners made her believe
that the deed of sale initially executed was void because it did not reflect the true agreement with regard to the
mode of payment. According to petitioners, the deed stated that the sale was paid in cash while the payment
was really in instalment basis. Because of this she was made to believe that she was to lose whatever she has
paid which was 70% of the total price.
Petitioners convinced her to execute a deed of mortgage in favour of Andrea. Believing that this will protect her
right, she executed two documents, the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan at Kasulatan ng Sanglaan. As it turned
out, this was just a scheme made by petitioners in order to recover the property from her, hence she wanted to
annul the said deeds. Petitioners denied the allegations and stated that Belen freely and voluntarily made the
said contracts and the two are binding between them. Judgment was given in favour of Belen.

ISSUE:
Whether the courts correctly found that petitioners employed fraud and undue influence over Belen in executing
the two contracts?

HELD:

ART. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the
other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.

As defined, fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious machination, manipulation,
concealment or misrepresentation to lead another party into error. The deceit employed FOR must be serious. It
must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the
circumstances of each case.

This brings to the fore Lourdes M. Belen’s limited educational attainment. While indeed petitioners point out that
the deeds denominated as Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan and Kasulatan ng Sanglaan were executed in Tagalog ,
a close scrutiny thereof shows that they are practically literal translations of their English counterparts. Thus,
the mere fact that the documents were executed in the vernacular neither clarified nor simplified matters for
Lourdes who admitted on cross-examination that she merely finished Grade 3, could write a little, and
understand a little of the Tagalog language.

The appellate court could not then be faulted when it invoked Article 1332 of the Civil Code which states:

ART. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him,
and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been
fully explained to the former.
As aptly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the principle that a party is presumed to know the import of a
document to which he affixes his signature is modified by the foregoing article. Under the said article, where a
party is unable to read or when the contract is in a language not understood by a party and mistake or fraud is
alleged, the obligation to show that the terms of the contract had been fully explained to said party who is
unable to read or understand the language of the contract devolves on the party seeking to enforce it. The
burden rests upon the party who seeks to enforce the contract to show that the other party fully understood the
contents of the document. If he fails to discharge this burden, the presumption of mistake, if not, fraud, stands
unrebutted and controlling.

In this case, petitioners alleged that Lourdes M. Belen affixed her signature on the questioned contracts freely
and voluntarily. We have assiduously scoured the record but like the appellate court we have not come across
convincing evidence to support their allegations. In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
by a preponderance of evidence. Suffice it to state that such self-serving claims are not enough to rebut the
presumption of fraud provided for in Article 1332 of the Civil Code. As the party claiming affirmative relief from
the court, it is incumbent upon petitioners to convincingly prove their claim. This they failed to do. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof under our Rules. In short, mere allegations
are not evidence.

Concededly, both the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan and the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan are public documents and
there is no dispute that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. In addition, documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. However, the presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. The presumption cannot be made to apply in this case because the
regularity in the execution of the documents were challenged in the proceedings below where their prima facie
validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances pointed out by both trial and appellate courts.
Furthermore, notarization per se is not a guarantee of the validity of the contents of a document.

There are, moreover, other factual circumstances pointed out by both the trial and appellate courts which
militate against the contention of petitioners. The evidence on record shows that the respondents Belens
intended to stay and occupy the subject land for a considerable length of time. As borne out by the records,
respondents bought from Celita Bordeos the house standing on the subject land then owned by Andrea Mayor.
Four years later or on November 27, 1979, respondents bought the subject land from petitioner Andrea Mayor.

They bought the said land through instalments and already paid P11,445.00 of the P18,000.00 purchase price.
They also caused the transfer in their names of the tax declarations over the subject land and house. This they

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did even before they could have completed the payment of the purchase price. In short, their intention and
desire to stay on the property is very evident.
Petitioners’ suggestion,therefore, that respondents made a sudden volte face and decided to resell the property
to them – seven months from the date of the property’s acquisition, after payment of almost two-thirds of the
purchase price and transferring the tax declarations thereof in respondents’ names, borders on the absurd and
the incredible. It simply is contrary to human experience for respondents to have had a hasty change of heart to
dispose of the land on which they intend to make their home and upon which they had invested so much.
Petitioners advance the excuse that respondents wanted to immediately dispose of the subject property
because the area would be soon converted into a park. If this were so, why would Lourdes Belen thereafter
accept the very same property as security knowing fully well that it would revert to the public domain?
A mortgage subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfilment of
the obligation whose security it was constituted. Thus, in case of non-payment, the creditor may proceed against
the property for the fulfilment of the obligation. No creditor would accept property as security for the fulfilment
of the obligation knowing that the property offered as security would soon be out of the commerce of man.

Finally, the non-presentation of petitioner Andrea Mayor on the witness stand is likewise not lost on us and adds
to the weakness of petitioners’ cause. While it is true that the non-presentation of a witness is not a reason for
discrediting a party’s defense, still we are inclined to take this omission against them in view of the numerous
loopholes in their defense.

All told, we see no reason in overturning the findings of the appellate court. As has often been stated, "[t]he
jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a review of questions of
law since the factual conclusions thereon are conclusive. There are of course exceptions to this rule, but none
obtain in the case at bar to warrant a scrutiny of the Court of Appeals’ conclusions which are supported by the
evidence on record and carry more weight, it having affirmed the trial court’s factual conclusions."

MARLENE DAUDEN-HERNAEZ vs. DE LOS ANGELES

G.R. No. L-27010 April 30, 1969

FACTS:

Petitioner Marlene Dauden-Hernaez, a motion picture actress, had filed a complaint against herein private
respondents, Hollywood Far East Productions, Inc., and its President and General Manager, Ramon Valenzuela, to
recover P14,700.00 representing a balance allegedly due said petitioner for her services as leading actress in
two motion pictures produced by the company, and to recover damages. Upon motion of defendants, the
respondent court (Judge Walfrido de los Angeles) ordered the complaint dismissed, mainly because the "claim of
plaintiff was not evidenced by any written document, either public or private", and the complaint "was defective
on its face" for violating Articles 1356 and 1358 of the Civil, Code of the Philippines, as well as for containing
defective allege, petitions.

Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the dismissal and for admission of an amended complaint, attached to the
motion. The court denied reconsideration and the leave to amend on grounds that the complaint is being pro
forma, and further declared the dismissal final and unappealable. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court abused its discretion in ruling that a contract for personal services involving more than
P500.00 was either invalid or unenforceable under the last paragraph of Article 1358 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines?

HELD:

YES. We hold that there was abuse, since the ruling herein contested betrays a basic and lamentable
misunderstanding of the role of the written form in contracts, as ordained in the present Civil Code.

In the matter of formalities, the contractual system of our Civil Code still follows that of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 and of the "Ordenamiento de Alcala" of upholding the spirit and intent of the parties over formalities:
hence, in general, contracts are valid and binding from their perfection regardless of form whether they be oral
or written. This is plain from Articles 1315 and 1356 of the present Civil Code. Thus, the first cited provision
prescribes:

ART. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to
the fulfilment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Concordantly, the first part of Article 1356 of the Code Provides:

ART. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present....

These essential requisites last mentioned are normally:

(1) Consent;
(2) proper subject matter; and
(3) consideration or causa for the obligation assumed (Article 1318).

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So that once the three elements exist, the contract is generally valid and obligatory, regardless of the form, oral
or written, in which they are couched.

To this general rule, the Code admits exceptions, set forth in the second portion of Article 1356:

However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or
that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable....
It is thus seen that to the general rule that the form (oral or written) is irrelevant to the binding effect inter
parties of a contract that possesses the three validating elements of consent, subject matter, and causa, Article
1356 of the Code establishes only two exceptions, to wit:

(a) Contracts for which the law itself requires that they be in some particular form (writing) in order to make
them valid and enforceable (the so-called solemn contracts). Of these the typical example is the donation
of immovable property that the law (Article 749) requires to be embodied in a public instrument in order
"that the donation may be valid", i.e., existing or binding. Other instances are the donation of movables
worth more than P5,000.00 which must be in writing, "otherwise the donation shall be void" (Article 748);
contracts to pay interest on loans (mutuum) that must be "expressly stipulated in writing" (Article 1956);
and the agreements contemplated by Article 1744, 1773, 1874 and 2134 of the present Civil Code.
(b) Contracts that the law requires to be proved by some writing (memorandum) of its terms, as in those
covered by the old Statute of Frauds, now Article 1403(2) of the Civil Code. Their existence not being
provable by mere oral testimony (unless wholly or partly executed), these contracts are exceptional in
requiring a writing embodying the terms thereof for their enforceability by action in court.

The contract sued upon by petitioner herein (compensation for services) does not come under either exception.
It is true that it appears included in Article 1358, last clause, providing that "all other contracts where the
amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a private one." But Article 1358
nowhere provides that the absence of written form in this case will make the agreement invalid or
unenforceable. On the contrary, Article 1357 clearly indicates that contracts covered by Article 1358 are binding
and enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of writing.

ART. 1357. If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in the
following article, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has
been perfected. This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action the contract.

It thus becomes inevitable to conclude that both the court a quo as well as the private respondents herein were
grossly mistaken in holding that because petitioner Dauden's contract for services was not in writing the same
could not be sued upon, or that her complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because
it did not plead any written agreement.

The basic error in the court's decision lies in overlooking that in our contractual system it is not enough that the
law should require that the contract be in writing, as it does in Article 1358. The law must further prescribe that
without the writing the contract is not valid or not enforceable by action.

FALLO:

The order dismissing the complaint was set aside, and the case was ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings not at variance with this decision.

나무를 심는데 가장 좋았던 때는 20 년 전이었다. 두 번째로 좋은 때는 지금이다.

Namureul simneunde gajang joatdeon ttaeneun isipnyeon jeonieotda. Du beonjjaero joeun ttaeneun jigeumida.
The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now.

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