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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126

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Accentuation of information processes and biases in group

q
judgments integrating base-rate and case-specific information
a,*
Verlin B. Hinsz , R. Scott Tindale b, Dennis H. Nagao c

a
Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58105-5075, USA
b
Loyola University Chicago, USA
c
Georgia Institute of Technology, USA

Received 30 November 2003; revised 26 December 2005

Available online 12 March 2007
Communicated by Stasser

Abstract

This article investigates differences in the ways that groups and individuals apply information-processing strategies and fall prey to
biases in their judgments. Judgments were made on probabilistic inference problems that involved base-rate and case-specific informa-
tion. Consistent with hypotheses, when individuals neglect base-rate information in their probability judgments, groups accentuate this
tendency. Moreover, when the source of case-specific information is inaccurate, individuals neglect the case-specific information, and
groups accentuate this tendency with the base-rate information dominating their probability judgments. In addition, groups accentuate
the strategies used by individuals to integrate the base-rate and case-specific information. These results provide strong support for a
group accentuation tendency for the application of information-processing biases and the strategies used to integrate information. Dis-
cussion reflects upon the relationship of the results of this experiment with other research on base-rate neglect and group judgment.
Underlying mechanisms and potential moderators of the group accentuation pattern are also discussed.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Groups routinely make judgments and decisions about
the reasons why certain events occur (Forsyth & Kelley,
1994; Laughlin, VanderStoep, & Hollingshead, 1991). In
doing so, they often try to integrate different types of infor-
mation to make the decision (e.g., medical decision mak-
ing; Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Hinsz,
q
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by grants from the
National Science Foundation to the first author (BCS-9905397) and
second author (SES-0136332) and the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research to the first author (F49620-02-1-0234 & F49620-03-1-0353).
Portions of this article were written while the first author held a National
Research Council Senior Research Associateship Award at the Air Force
Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness Directorate. Some of this
research was presented at meetings of the American Psychological
Association, Los Angeles, and the Midwestern Psychological Association,
Chicago. We appreciate the comments of Barry Goettl, Alan Ashworth,
Ernest Park, and several anonymous reviewers on earlier versions of this
manuscript.
*
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Verlin.Hinsz@NDSU.edu (V.B. Hinsz).
Heimerdinger, Henkel, & Spieker, 2005; legal decisions,
Saks & Kidd, 1980; Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman,
2000). For example, a personnel committee may try to
understand why a recent recruit failed to meet expecta-
tions. When doing so, the committee needs to process
and combine information in order to deduce credible infer-
ences for the lack of success. The information the group
has may vary in terms of its reliability (e.g., letters of refer-
ence), validity (e.g., quality of training acquired in college),
and susceptibility to various information-processing biases
(e.g., availability; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This paper
examines how groups and individuals use information that
varies in its reliability (i.e., accuracy of the source of case-
specific details) along with information susceptible to an
information-processing bias (i.e., base-rate neglect) to
make inferences about the reasons an event occurred. In
the process, this paper explores information processing in
groups, base-rate neglect, and biases in group judgment
and decision making.

0022-1031/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.02.013
 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
The ways that information-processing biases influence
judgment and decision making has been studied intensively
at the individual level (Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Plous, 1993), however, less
research has considered the impact of these biases for
group judgment and decision making (Gigone & Hastie,
1997; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Kerr, MacCoun,
& Kramer, 1996). The limited consideration of informa-
tion-processing biases in group judgment is surprising
given that important problems are often assigned to groups
rather than individuals. Research that compares group
judgments to those of individuals often describes three gen-
eral patterns (Hinsz, 2006; Kerr et al., 1996). The default
pattern suggests that biases have the same influence on
group and individual judgment. That is, the pattern of
influence of biases on individual judgment is basically rep-
licated in group judgments.
Alternatively, groups could diminish or attenuate the
influence of the biases that are found for individual judg-
ment. Nisbett and Ross (1980) speculated that group deci-
sions might be less susceptible to such biases because of the
tendency of groups to correct errors of their members (Hill,
1982; Hinsz, 1990, 2006; Kerr et al., 1996). Similarly, Baron
and Bryne (1984) suggested that one way to reduce the
impact of information-processing biases and errors is to
ensure that important decisions are made in group settings.
Inherent in these suggestions, as well as the tendency to
assign important problems to groups, is the general belief
that group interaction involves certain processes (e.g., error
correction, moderation of extreme viewpoints, or increased
creativity; cf., Hastie, 1986) that result in better decisions
relative to individuals.
In contrast, groups may also exaggerate or accentuate
the influence of biases in their judgments compared to indi-
vidual judgment. In a pattern similar to group-induced
shifts (Hinsz & Davis, 1984; Lamm & Myers, 1978; Schk-
ade et al., 2000), research has found that, if a bias or error
is prevalent in individual judgment, group judgments are
influenced to an even greater extent by that bias or error
(Hinsz et al., 1997). If this pattern arises, then group inter-
action may also serve to enhance the biases and errors that
exist among individuals, and result in decisions that reflect
a greater, rather than lesser, degree of bias. To the extent
that the biases lead to erroneous responses, group decisions
are likely to be poorer, rather than better, than individual
decisions if the biases are accentuated in groups. Conse-
quently, the question as to whether groups diminish or
exaggerate biases is of considerable theoretical as well as
practical interest (Hinsz et al., 1997; Kerr et al., 1996; Tin-
dale, 1993).
Kerr et al. (1996) analyzed research on the comparison
of biases in individual and group judgment. They argued
that simple, systematic relationships will not be found.
Rather, Kerr et al. described a number of contingent fac-
tors (e.g., group size, degree of bias in individuals, nature
of the bias, or group decision process) that help determine
whether group judgments would replicate, attenuate, or
117
accentuate the biases observed in individual judgments.
The experiment reported here involves a particular decision
task (probabilistic inference problems that assess base-rate
neglect) that reflects different types of biases as well as illus-
trates strategies that can be used to integrate different kinds
of information. These characteristics of the task can help us
elucidate how information processes and biases may differ
for individual and group judgment.
An important issue to address is why a bias that arises
among individuals might be accentuated or attenuated in
group judgments. Tindale, Smith, Thomas, Filkins, and
Sheffey (1996) argue that a key aspect for understanding
how biases among individuals influence group-level perfor-
mance is whether group members shared a particular rep-
resentation of the task. Following from Laughlin’s work
on demonstrability and group problem solving (Laughlin,
1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986), Tindale et al. argue that
groups will be attracted to response alternatives that ‘‘fit’’
the task representation shared by most of the group mem-
bers. For problem solving tasks with demonstrably-correct
solutions, Laughlin and Ellis argue that one of the reasons
a correct minority can persuade incorrect majority mem-
bers is because the minority shares certain background
knowledge about the task that can be used to demonstrate
that their position is correct. Tindale et al. argue that sim-
ilar processes can emerge when group members share back-
ground knowledge or task representations that have
implications for the response alternatives under consider-
ation. For example, Smith, Dykema-Engblade, Walker,
Niven, and McGough (2000) composed groups with major-
ities favoring the death penalty in a study of group-medi-
ated attitude change. Minority members who used logic
to try and sway the majority toward anti-death penalty sen-
timents were ineffective. However, when minority members
framed their arguments in terms of the students’ dominant
religious beliefs, they often convinced the other group
members to move in the minority direction. These shared
task representations can help us understand why groups
might accentuate or attenuate information processing
biases in our study of responses to ‘‘base rate fallacy’’ prob-
lems (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).
The tendency to neglect base-rate information has
received considerable attention in the judgment and deci-
sion-making literature (see Koehler, 1996; for a review).
Base-rate information was often presented in problem
descriptions with regard to the frequency of two types of
entities (e.g., blue and green cabs). The problems also pro-
vide case-specific information (also called individuating
information) regarding a situation (e.g., eye-witness testi-
mony for a hit-and-run accident) that implicated one of
the two types of entities (e.g., the eye-witness identified a
green cab as being involved in the accident). Research often
reports that, although both the base-rate and case-specific
information are relevant for the judgment, participants
neglect the base-rate information and overemphasize the
case-specific information in their judgments (Bar-Hillel,
1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Koehler, 1996; Lyon
118 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
& Slovic, 1976). Early research suggested that base-rate
neglect was relatively powerful and robust. However, other
research has shown that the use of base-rate information
may be moderated by a variety of factors (Ajzen, 1977;
Bar-Hillel, 1980; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Ginosar &
Trope, 1980; Hinsz, Tindale, Nagao, Davis, & Robertson,
1988; Koehler, 1996; Lynch & Ofir, 1989; Nisbett & Borg-
ida, 1975).
Past research we conducted on probabilistic inference
problems suggested a complex set of processes are involved
in base-rate neglect for individual judgment (Hinsz et al.,
1988; Hinsz & Tindale, 1992). In research involving ‘‘cab
problem’’ type probabilistic inference tasks with base-rate
and case-specific information, we found that one piece of
information often dominated individuals’ judgments
(Hinsz et al., 1988). When the source of the case-specific
information (e.g., witness) was perceived as accurate, it
dominated the judgment, and base-rate information was
neglected. Alternatively, some problems were constructed
in which the source of the case-specific information
was highly inaccurate, suggesting that the source of this
evidence was more often wrong than right. In these condi-
tions, the participants tended to disregard the case-specific
information and the base-rate information dominated their
judgments. Given that case-specific information is still
diagnostic for predictions about the entity responsible for
the incident (Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984), this pattern of
responding reflects a different bias of base-rate domination.
Consequently, with problems having different levels of
accuracy of the source of the case-specific information,
we produced two different biases involving the neglect
and domination of base-rate information in individual
judgments (Hinsz et al., 1988).
Using a shared task representation perspective, we
predict that groups will tend to exacerbate both of the
base-rate neglect and base-rate domination biases. First,
consistent with existing research, we assume that partici-
pants do not attempt to integrate base-rate and case-spe-
cific information in these probabilistic inference problems
in a normative fashion (i.e., Bayes Theorem; Hinsz et al.,
1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Given the absence of
a viable integration strategy, when case-specific informa-
tion is perceived as valid (e.g., accurate, consistent), using
that information to infer probability estimates will appear
plausible to each of the group members to some degree.
Thus, arguments supported by the shared task representa-
tion of using the case-specific information will be persua-
sive and groups will accentuate base-rate neglect. Past
research has produced results consistent with this predic-
tion in that groups exacerbated base-rate neglect in those
conditions where it is prevalent at the individual level
(Argote, Seabright, & Dyer, 1986; Argote, Devadas, &
Melone, 1990). However, when the case-specific informa-
tion is perceived as invalid, the only other piece of informa-
tion available is the base rate, and using it would be
generally perceived as the most plausible option. Thus,
arguments for its use will be consistent with a shared
representation of focusing on the base-rate information
and groups will have an increased use of base-rate informa-
tion relative to individuals. In summary, groups will neglect
base-rate information more than individuals under condi-
tions in which individuals perceive the case-specific infor-
mation as valid (Hypothesis 1), and groups will be more
likely than individuals to have base-rate information
dominate their judgments when individuals view the case-
specific information as invalid (Hypothesis 2).
In addition to our interest in the comparison of response
patterns of groups and individuals that reflect information-
processing biases, we are also concerned with the ways that
groups integrate available information when making judg-
ments. The processes by which groups integrate informa-
tion can be investigated by looking at how they utilize
the base-rate and case-specific information in making their
judgments. Probabilistic inference problems allow an
assessment of the strategies groups use to integrate these
two kinds of information when trying to reach a judgment,
and how these strategies resemble or differ from those of
individuals. One way to address this issue is to focus on
the perceived relevance explanation for base-rate neglect.
Several researchers suggest that it is the respondents’
perceptions of the relevance of the base-rate and case-spe-
cific information that influences the degree the information
is utilized in making judgments (Bar-Hillel, 1980, 1990;
Hinsz et al., 1988; Koehler, 1996). That is, the base-rate
neglect observed in probabilistic inference problems results
from case-specific information being perceived as much
more relevant to the decision task than base-rate informa-
tion. Consequently, individuals might approach these
problems by seeing the base-rate information as generally
irrelevant for the judgment to be made. It is also possible
that, under some conditions (e.g., high inaccuracy of the
source), individuals might see the case-specific information
as irrelevant for the judgment and underutilize it (cf., Hinsz
et al., 1988). Additionally, people might attempt to use a
generally appropriate strategy for combining the base-rate
and case-specific information by seeing both as being about
equally relevant for making the required judgment (e.g.,
apply Bayes Theorem to the problems; Tversky & Kahn-
eman, 1980). These three ways of viewing the relevance
of the base-rate and case-specific information can be seen
as strategies reflecting the ways information is processed
and integrated. If individuals applied these strategies, it
would be possible to examine if groups follow the strategies
of information integration in the same way or differently
from individuals.
Hinsz et al. (1997) argue that the group accentuation
and attenuation patterns of information processing are
applicable to the strategies as well as the biases used in
group judgment. That is, if individuals tend to follow a
particular strategy for integrating information, then groups
will accentuate that pattern. However, if a particular strat-
egy is not prevalent among individuals, groups will attenu-
ate its use when they try to integrate the information. If one
piece of information is seen as much more relevant than
 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
another when integrating the information, then the more
relevant information should dominate the other and accen-
tuation of that tendency would result for groups. More-
over, if the other piece of information was perceived as
much less relevant, it should have less impact in the inte-
gration strategy, and an attenuation of the influence of
the other information should occur for group responses.
Thus, we predict that groups will differ from individuals
in their responses regarding the strategies they use when
integrating base-rate and case-specific information.
In this experiment, groups and individuals will be asked
to answer questions regarding their perceptions of the rel-
evance of base-rate and case-specific information for
responding to probabilistic inference problems. In situa-
tions leading to base-rate neglect when the source of the
case-specific information is highly accurate (e.g., 80%),
the base-rate information should be perceived as more
irrelevant for the probability judgment. We predict that,
under these conditions (Hypothesis 3), groups will accentu-
ate individuals’ tendency to see the accuracy of the case-
specific information as more relevant and the base-rate
information as more irrelevant for the judgment. In con-
trast, when the source of the case-specific information is
highly inaccurate (e.g., 20%), then the source of the case-
specific information will be viewed as more irrelevant and
the base-rate information as more relevant for the judg-
ment. Consequently, we predict for these conditions that
(Hypothesis 4) groups will accentuate the tendency of indi-
viduals to perceive the base-rate information as more rele-
vant for the judgment and to see the source accuracy of the
case-specific information as more irrelevant for the
judgment.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 indicate that the perceived relevance
of the base-rate and case-specific information may have
strong influences on how this information is integrated
for purposes of group and individual judgment. Research
suggests that base-rate information may be used more in
judgment if it is made more causally relevant to the inci-
dent under consideration (Ajzen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980;
Hinsz et al., 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). For exam-
ple, stating the base rate with specificity and in direct rela-
tion to the occurrence of an event. Making the base-rate
information more causally relevant should lead it to have
greater influence on the judgments such that they would
be closer to the value used to specify the base rate. Conse-
quently, (Hypothesis 5) if making a base rate causally rele-
vant leads the base-rate information to be used more in
individual judgments, then a group accentuation tendency
would lead the causally relevant base-rate information to
have even greater influence on group judgment. Although
there is conjecture to support this prediction, our prior
research failed to consistently produce effects of causally
relevant base rates. In Hinsz et al. (1988), an effect for a
causal base rate was observed for one set of responses
but not for another. In another experiment (Hinsz & Tin-
dale, 1992), we found that the base rates that were not
made more causally relevant had greater impact than those
119
that were made causally relevant. So, if making a base rate
causally relevant does not have a strong influence on indi-
vidual decisions (i.e., not very prevalent), then group
accentuation should not occur. Thus, an interesting ques-
tion remains as to whether base rates made more causally
relevant have a prominent influence on individual judg-
ments, and thus have an accentuation effect for group
judgments.
To investigate the set of hypotheses, an experiment was
conducted that involved groups and individuals responding
to a set of probabilistic inference problems that varied in
terms of the accuracy of the source of the case-specific
information. Also, the base-rate information was stated
in a direct or more causally relevant fashion. The respon-
dents were asked to provide probability judgments regard-
ing the likelihood the implicated entity was responsible for
the incident (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 5) and to judge the rel-
evance of the base-rate and case-specific information
(Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5).
Method
Participants and design
Undergraduate students (86 males and 107 females) at a
large midwestern university participated in this experiment
in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course
requirement. The study design was 2 (individual or group
respondent) · 2 (non-causal or causal nature of the base
rate information) · 5 (source accuracy: 20%, 40%, 50%,
60%, or 80%) · 2 (initial or second set of responses to the
problems). The individual/group and causality of the
base-rate were manipulated between subjects and source
accuracy and the two problem sets were within subjects.
Twenty groups and 18 individuals participated in the cau-
sal base-rate condition while 20 groups and 15 individuals
were assigned to the non-causal base-rate condition.
Problems
Five probabilistic inference problems that were a subset
of those constructed by Hinsz et al. (1988) and patterned
after the cab problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) were
used (i.e., colors of cab company vehicles, suppliers of faulty
guided missiles, producers of bad wine, brands of get-away
cars, sirens on ambulances). Each problem described an
incident in which two entities could plausibly be held
accountable for the incident. The two entities varied in terms
of their frequency in the situation of interest, which pro-
vided the base-rate information. In addition, specific infor-
mation was provided by a source that implicated one of
the two entities as being responsible for the incident. The
source of this case-specific information was described as
having a specific, but limited, level of accuracy. There was
one of the five levels of source accuracy (20%, 40%, 50%,
60%, or 80% accurate) included for each of the five problems
in a booklet. In addition, about half the participants
120 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
received a booklet of problems in which the base-rate infor-
mation was made more causally relevant for the incident
that occurred (cf., Bar-Hillel, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman,
1980). The base rate of the entity implicated by the source
was always 15%, so the value used for the base-rate informa-
tion was held constant. A sample problem with a causal base
rate is given below:
In Mason City, there are two cab companies whose cabs
are blue and green respectively. Even though there are even
numbers of blue and green cabs in this city, blue cabs are
involved in about 85% of the accidents in which a cab is
involved while green cabs are involved in 15%.
On the night of August 7th, a cab was involved in a hit-
and-run accident to which there was a witness. The witness
testified in court that the color of the cab involved in the
accident was green. Considering that it was dark on the
night of the accident, and the colors blue and green are
not easy to distinguish, the court subjected the witness to
a discrimination test which consisted of showing the wit-
ness film clips of green and blue cabs under lighting condi-
tions similar to the night in question. Out of 20 trials, the
witness was correct 16 times (80%) making 2 mistakes on
each color cab.
A non-causal depiction of the base-rate information
merely stated the relative frequencies of the two entities
in the general situation (e.g., ‘‘85% of the cabs in this city
are blue while 15% are green.’’ was substituted for the sec-
ond sentence). To manipulate source accuracy, the num-
bers in the last sentence were changed appropriately to
reflect the other values used in this experiment (i.e., 60%,
50%, 40%, and 20%). The presentation order of the prob-
lems and accuracy of the case-specific information were
controlled via a Greco-Latin Square design.
Participants responded to a series of dependent mea-
sures for each of the problems. For example, the probabil-
ity judgment asked: ‘‘What is the probability that the cab
involved in the accident was green?’’ For each of the five
problems, respondents were always asked to identify the
probability, expressed as a percentage, that the entity
implicated by the source (e.g., 15% green cabs) was
involved in the incident. A confidence judgment followed
inquiring about the respondents’ confidence in the proba-
bility judgment. Confidence was rated on a not at all con-
fident (1) to very confident (9) response scale. The next
question asked the respondents to identify which one of
three statements best described how relevant they perceived
the base-rate and case-specific information for making
their probability judgment for that problem (cf., Hinsz
et al., 1988; Lyon & Slovic, 1976). The three alternatives
were stated in terms of the particular problem context
under consideration. One response alternative (a) stated
that, given the case-specific information (e.g., the witness
testimony), the base-rate information (e.g., the proportion
of green and blue cabs in Mason City) was irrelevant
for making the judgment. A second alternative (b) reversed
this statement to indicate that, given the base-rate
information, the case-specific information was irrelevant
for making the judgment. Finally, the third alternative (c)
suggested that both the base-rate and case-specific informa-
tion were about equally relevant for making the probability
judgment.
Procedure
Participants reported to the experiment in groups of
approximately 30–40 individuals. The students were
instructed to consider themselves as members of a grand
jury asked to consider evidence that might be used in an
upcoming trial. The problems were then presented as cases
within the context of this mock grand jury simulation. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to participate either as a
member of a four-person group or as an individual. All
participants first responded to the set of five probabilistic
inference problems as individuals. Subsequently, students
assigned to the group condition then responded as a group
to the same problem set under the general admonition that
the group’s response to the dependent measures should
reflect the opinion of all of its members (i.e., Groups were
not assigned a specific decision rule.). Those students in the
individual condition worked on an unrelated task for a
time before responding again individually to the same set
of problems a second time. At the end of the experimental
session, the students were debriefed regarding their partic-
ipation in the experiment, their questions were answered,
and then they were thanked for their participation.
Results
Probability judgments
Initial analysis of the probability judgments examined
the general trends of the participants’ responses. Based
on prior research on base-rate neglect, we examined the
participants’ initial probability judgments (as individuals
and eventual group members). Base-rate neglect was
observed in conditions similar to those in which it was ini-
tially reported (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). We found
that, when the source of the case-specific information was
80% accurate, 57% of the participants’ probability judg-
ments coincided with the accuracy value (i.e., 80%). This
finding replicates much early research (e.g., Bar-Hillel,
1980; Hinsz et al., 1988; Hinsz & Tindale, 1992; Lyon &
Slovic, 1976). In addition, we found that the value of the
accuracy of the source was the modal response for the
other accuracy conditions: 60% (33.7%), 50% (49.7%),
40% (36.8%), and 20% (33.2%). We also observed that
the value used to indicate the base rate of the entity impli-
cated by the source (15%) was generally the second most
frequent response in the source accuracy conditions: 80%
(8.3%), 60% (10.4%), 50% (18.1%), 40% (17.1%), and
20% (26.4%). These results replicate our earlier findings,
suggesting that a sizeable proportion of the students fell
prey to another bias of being insensitive to the case-specific
 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
information and allowing the base-rate information to
dominate their judgments (Hinsz et al., 1988).
An ANOVA conducted on the initial set of probability
judgments indicates that there was a main effect of the
source accuracy of the case-specific information, F (4,
464) = 85.35, p < .0001, partial g2 = .42. As the accuracy
of the source increased, the probability judgments
increased as well (20% M = 27.32, 40% M = 35.95, 50%
M = 41.60, 60% M = 50.56, and 80% M = 69.08). Post-
hoc comparisons of the five accuracy conditions using the
Tukey HSD procedure indicated that all conditions were
significantly different from each other. These responses
suggest that the participants tended to neglect the base-rate
information when the source was accurate. Moreover, at
lower levels of accuracy, the participants appear to often
consider the base-rate information and disregard the
case-specific information in their judgments.
A similar pattern of effects for source accuracy of the
case-specific information was found for the second set of
probability judgments, F (4, 272) = 130.70, p < .0001, par-
tial g2 = .66 (20% M = 21.41, 40% M = 31.69, 50%
M = 36.60, 60% M = 48.48, and 80% M = 69.63). This
main effect is conditioned by the Group/Individ-
ual · Source Accuracy interaction, F (4, 272) = 4.73,
p < .001, partial g2 = .07. In general, this interaction
reflects differences consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2
(depicted in Fig. 1). Specifically, group judgments were sig-
nificantly higher and closer to the source accuracy value
than the individuals’ second judgments when it was high
(80%: 72.78 vs. 65.82, F (1, 68) = 4.71, p < .05). Addition-
ally, group judgments were significantly lower and closer
to the base rate value than the individual judgments when
source accuracy was relatively low (20%: 17.65 vs. 25.97, F
(1, 68) = 7.12, p < .01; 40%: 26.53 vs. 37.94, F (1,
68) = 10.24, p < .01). The group judgments were approxi-
mately equivalent to the individuals’ second judgments
when accuracy of the case-specific information was at mod-
erate levels (60%; 47.78 vs. 49.33, F (1, 68) = 0.09, p > .76;
50%: 33.80 vs. 40, F (1, 68) = 2.07, p > .15). There were no
significant effects of the causal nature of the base-rate
information for either the initial or second sets of
Individual Group
80
70
Percent Likelihood
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
20% 40% 50% 60%
Accuracy of the Source of the
Case-Specific Information
Fig. 1. Individual and group probability judgments (second set) for
different levels of source accuracy of the case-specific information.
121
probability judgments (ps > .10), providing no basis to test
Hypothesis 5.
These patterns of results are consistent with our hypoth-
eses, but as can be seen in Table 1, a more detailed look at
the individual and group responses shows that groups
tended to choose as their estimate the case-specific infor-
mation only when it was perceived as valid (80% and to
a lesser degree 60%). When the accuracy of the source
dipped to 50% or below, the modal group response moved
to the value of the base-rate information (15%). When the
source of the case-specific information was particularly
inaccurate (20%), 60% of the groups chose the base rate
value as their response. This was not true for the individu-
als. Consistent with a shared task representation idea,
arguments against using the source accuracy value when
it was at, or below, 50% were probably quite persuasive
because group members could understand that the source
of the case-specific information was poor at discriminating
between the target entities in the problem. Although many
individuals continued to use the value of the source accu-
racy for their individual judgments, even a single member
pointing out the invalidity of the source during the group
discussion was probably quite persuasive.
We also compared the initial probability judgments to
the normatively correct responses as defined by Bayes The-
orem (cf., Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). For the 50% accu-
rate source, the Bayesian solution is the base-rate value of
15% because the source is unreliable (correct as often as
wrong). The participants made correct judgments 18.1%
of the time for a 50% accurate source (mean absolute devi-
ation from 15% = 27.12). For the other source accuracy
conditions, none of the initial judgments matched the
Bayesian solution. There was a generally decreasing abso-
lute deviation for the probability judgments relative to
the Bayesian solution across the source accuracy condi-
tions, F (4,464) = 5.67 p < .001: the 80% accurate source
(mean absolute deviation from 41% = 34.54). Similar
results arose for the 60% (mean absolute deviation from
21% = 31.77), 40% (mean absolute deviation from
11% = 25.74), and 20% accurate conditions (mean absolute
deviation from 4% = 23.16). The lower absolute deviations
might arise at lower levels of source accuracy because those
values generally become closer to Bayesian solution at the
lower levels.
Table 1
Percentage of probability judgments at base rate and source accuracy
levels for groups and individuals
Group Individual
Accuracy Base-rate Source Base-rate Source
level (%) (%) accuracy (%) (%) accuracy (%)
80% 20 60 15 18.2 36.4
40 30 10 18.2 39.4
50 32.5 27.5 24.2 42.4
60 5 35 12.1 33.3
80 5 55 12.1 45.5
122 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
Given historical evidence that group judgments are
often more accurate than individuals’ (Hastie, 1986), we
compared the accuracy of the group judgments with the
second individual probability judgments. In general,
groups had lower absolute deviations from the Bayesian
solution (M = 22.69) than individuals (M = 27.26), F (1,
68) = 3.42, p < .07. However, this group versus individual
main effect should be considered in the context of an inter-
action with source accuracy, F (4,272) = 4.83, p < .001,
along with a main effect of source accuracy, F
(4,272) = 22.92, p < .0001. The absolute deviations of the
probability judgments of groups (M = 13.49) and individu-
als (M = 21.75) were significantly different when the source
was 20% accurate, F (1, 68) = 7.05, p < .01, 40% accurate
(M = 16.22 vs. M = 27.44; F (1, 68) = 10.07, p < .01) and
80% accurate (M = 36.07 vs. M = 31.61; F (1, 68) = 4.79,
p < .05). The difference in the absolute deviations between
the group and individual probability judgments were not
significant for the 50% accurate source (M = 19.40 vs.
M = 25.00; F (1, 68) = 1.74, p > .19) and 60% source accu-
racy condition (M = 28.27 vs. M = 30.50; F (1, 68) = 0.30,
p > .58), although group judgments were more accurate
than the individual judgments. In general, with the excep-
tion of the 80% accurate condition, group judgments more
closely approximate the correct solution as defined by
Bayes Theorem than individual judgments.
Confidence judgments
The source accuracy of the case-specific information had
an influence on the participants’ confidence in their initial
probability judgments, F (4, 464) = 8.23, p < .0001, partial
g2 = .07. Confidence generally increased with the accuracy
of the source (20% M = 5.63, 40% M = 5.48, 50%
M = 5.88, 60% M = 5.64, and 80% M = 6.30), however,
it appeared as a peaks and valleys or saw-tooth pattern
(cf., Hinsz et al., 1988). Confidence reached increasing high
points across the 20%, 50%, and 80% conditions (peaks),
but dipped for the 40% and 60% accurate conditions (val-
leys) although confidence also increased over those two
conditions. Hinsz et al. (1988) provided evidence to suggest
that there was less confidence in the 40% and 60% accurate
conditions because the participants were more likely to try
to integrate the base rate and source accuracy values in
these conditions. Moreover, when the students tried to
integrate the information, they were less confident about
the probability judgment they made because no specific
value (e.g., 15%, 80%, 50%) was clearly a viable response.
The similar finding for this experiment suggests that there
is a general trend towards confidence as source accuracy
increases, but that this pattern is moderated by a tendency
for confidence judgments to be lower when participants
attempted some genuine integration of the base rate and
source accuracy values.
A similar pattern of influence of source accuracy of the
case-specific information arose for the confidence ratings
associated with the second set of judgments, F (1,
272) = 11.75, p < .0001, partial g2 = .15 (20% M = 6.15,
40% M = 5.67, 50% M = 6.14, 60% M = 6.01, and 80%
M = 6.84). Additionally, the ratings reflected a change
from the initial confidence that individuals (M = 5.76)
and eventual group members (M = 5.79) had to when they
made their second judgments as individuals (M = 5.94) and
groups (M = 6.31), interaction F (1, 52) = 5.62, p < .05,
partial g2 = .10. That is, there was a general increase in
their confidence ratings, but the groups’ ratings were sub-
stantially higher. This result is consistent with other group
judgment research finding that groups have higher ratings
of confidence than individuals (Hinsz, 1990; Sniezek &
Henry, 1989).
Perceived relevance of base-rate and case-specific
information
The participants were asked to select one of three
statements that best described how irrelevant they saw
the case-specific and base-rate information for making
their probability judgments. The responses were catego-
rized into two dichotomous variables that reflected (1)
whether the respondent felt the case-specific information
was irrelevant for the probability judgment (b vs a + c)
and (2) whether the respondent believed the base-rate
information was irrelevant (a vs b + c) for the probability
judgment (cf., Hinsz et al., 1988). These two dichotomous
variables were then subjected to a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) to determine which of the manipu-
lated variables influenced these relevance responses.
The MANOVA on the initial responses revealed only a
main effect of source accuracy, F (8, 926) = 11.88, p <
.0001, k = .82. As source accuracy increased, the case-spe-
cific information was perceived as less irrelevant (20%
M = 0.40, 40% M = 0.25, 50% M = 0.26, 60% M = 0.11,
and 80% M = 0.08), and the base-rate information was
seen as more irrelevant for making the judgments (20%
M = 0.21, 40% M = 0.24, 50% M = 0.24, 60% M = 0.28,
and 80% M = 0.48). An analysis of the second set of judg-
ments by the individuals and groups reveals the same pat-
tern of relevance responses with a main effect of source
accuracy of the case-specific information, F (8, 542) =
12.82, p < .0001, k = .72.
In support of hypotheses 3 and 4, the group or individ-
ual judges by source accuracy interaction was significant, F
(8, 542) = 2.51, p < .05, k = .93. Fig. 2 reveals that groups
found the base-rate information to be more irrelevant at
higher levels of source accuracy (80%: groups = .58 vs.
individuals = .39; Fisher’s exact p < .03), and compared
to individuals, groups found that the case-specific informa-
tion was more irrelevant when the source had low accuracy
(20% groups = .58 vs. individuals = .33; Fisher’s exact
p < .01). These data are consistent with the pattern of indi-
vidual and group probability judgments reported earlier
and support Hypotheses 3 and 4 suggesting that groups
accentuate strategies of information integration that exist
at the individual level. Again, there was no effect of the
 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
Individual Group
60
50
Percent of Responses
40
30
20
10
0
Base-Rate Irrelevant Case-Specific Irrelevant
Relevance of Information - 80% Accurate Source
60
50
Percent of Responses
40
30
20
10
0 by groups. The factors that Kerr et al. (1996) suggested
Base-Rate Irrelevant Case-Specific Irrelevant
Relevance of Information - 20% Accurate Source
Fig. 2. Individual and group relevance responses (second set) for high and
low levels of source accuracy of the case-specific information.
causal nature of the base-rate information on the relevance
judgments, F (2, 67) = 0.72, p > .49, k = .98, revealing no
support for Hypothesis 5.
Discussion
This experiment investigated differences in the ways that
groups and individuals apply information-processing strat-
egies and biases in their judgments. In particular, the judg-
ments were made on probabilistic inference problems that
involved base-rate and case-specific information. Consis-
tent with hypotheses, when individuals neglected base-rate
information in their judgments, groups accentuated this
tendency and used the base-rate information even less in
their probability judgments. Moreover, for problems that
involved a source of case-specific information that was
inaccurate, some individuals followed a bias to neglect
the case-specific information in their probability judg-
ments, and groups accentuated this tendency with the
base-rate information dominating the case-specific infor-
mation even more in their judgments.
The predicted group accentuation pattern was also
found for responses regarding the relevance of the base-
rate and case-specific information that reflected the ways
the information was integrated. When the source of the
case-specific information was highly accurate, individuals
tended to see the base-rate information as irrelevant, and
groups accentuated this pattern. Alternatively, when
source accuracy was low, individuals tended to see the
123
case-specific information as being irrelevant, and groups
accentuated this tendency by judging the case-specific
information as being even more irrelevant. In conjunction
with the evidence provided by the probability judgments,
these results provide strong support for a group accentua-
tion tendency for strategies used to integrate information
and the application of information-processing biases.
Hinsz et al. (1997) proposed group accentuation as a
pattern that emerges when information processing is con-
sidered in groups. In reviewing the literature, Hinsz et al.
Both Relevant found the group accentuation pattern in a number of
experiments, however, it was not observed as consistently
and for different types of processes as reported in this
experiment. Argote et al. (1986, 1990) also reported results
similar to a group accentuation pattern for problems
involving base-rate information, but the pattern was not
consistently found. It appears that some important factors
moderate when group accentuation of an information pro-
cess occurs (cf., Wright, Luus, & Christie, 1990). Future
research will need to explore the variables that moderate
the occurrence of accentuation in information processes
Both Relevant
as influencing group biases (e.g., decision process, group
size) would be reasonable to initially consider as moderat-
ing variables.
As predicted, in those situations where the source of the
case-specific information was seen as accurate and base-
rate neglect was strongest, groups showed greater levels
of base-rate neglect than individuals. However, when the
source’s accuracy fell to 50% or below, many individuals
still tended to be influenced by the source while groups
tended to switch their responses to the level of the base
rate. This pattern is consistent with the shared representa-
tion framework. When the case-specific information was
seen as valid, it was the dominant representation and indi-
viduals used it in their judgments. Thus, groups accentu-
ated the response tendency consistent with the
representation. However, when the accuracy of the source
was low to the point of being useless, it was easy for a
member or members to point this out, leading groups to
look for different ways to make the judgment. The only
other prominent and shared perspective was the base-rate
information. Thus, under those circumstances, groups used
the base-rate information in their judgment even though
some individuals continued to use the source accuracy for
their judgment. In both high and low source accuracy con-
ditions groups tended to use the most viable shared repre-
sentation available when making their probability
judgment.
The pattern of group responses is also consistent with
Schelling’s (1960) ideas of psychologically prominent
response options. Schelling argued that certain responses
were chosen more often by groups because of their psycho-
logical prominence: their apparent attractiveness or ease of
use. For example, when dividing resources, groups often
split them equally among the group members because it
is easy and generally considered fair (Komorita & Chertk-
124 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
off, 1973). In the present experiment, each problem pre-
sented groups with two values; the base rate and the accu-
racy of the source of the case-specific information. It seems
reasonable, and consistent with empirical findings, that the
psychological prominence of the accuracy of the source
was quite strong when it was high. However, when it was
low, arguments pointing out its invalidity made it a non-
viable option, which left the base rate as the only other
numerical value presented in the problem. Thus, the psy-
chological prominence of the value of the base rate
increased when the accuracy of the source indicated its
value was a poor choice. Although descriptively different,
this idea is quite consistent with the shared representation
explanation.
The group accentuation pattern uncovered in this exper-
iment appears to resemble group polarization (Myers &
Lamm, 1976). However, group accentuation differs in sev-
eral important ways. Group accentuation reflects a pattern
of group responses on cognitive tasks that exaggerates pre-
valent tendencies that underlie individual responses. Group
accentuation involves a group response whereas group
polarization reflects an individual member’s change in opin-
ion from before to after a group discussion. Group polar-
ization reflects differences in individual responses whereas
group accentuation is a pattern of exaggeration of underly-
ing cognitive processes that can be seen in group responses.
Group accentuation could contribute to observed group
polarization, but group polarization does not play a part
in group accentuation, although the patterns appear
similar. Hinsz et al. (1997) also summarize research that
indicates how group accentuation could lead to depolariza-
tion, which is inconsistent with the group polarization
phenomenon. Consequently, although there are similarities
between group accentuation and group polarization,
group accentuation has important characteristics that
differentiate it.
This experiment contributes to the literature on the
influence of base-rate neglect in judgment and extends it
to group judgments on probabilistic inference problems.
The results of this experiment were quite consistent with
those we reported earlier (Hinsz et al., 1988; Hinsz & Tin-
dale, 1992). When the source of the case-specific informa-
tion was accurate, this information dominated base-rate
information in probability judgments. Conversely, when
the source of the case-specific information was inaccurate,
this information tended to be neglected and was dominated
by the base-rate information. The base-rate neglect and
base-rate domination biases were observed for the proba-
bility judgments of both individuals and groups. The ten-
dency of one piece of information to dominate the other
in these judgments is consistent with the pattern we
observed earlier (Hinsz et al., 1988) and is consistent with
the relevance explanations of base-rate neglect (Bar-Hillel,
1980, 1990; Hinsz et al., 1988; Koehler, 1996). The domina-
tion of one piece of information over the other is also con-
sistent with the anchoring-and-adjustment model we had
considered for the use of base-rate and case-specific infor-
mation in individual judgment (Hinsz et al., 1988; Hinsz
& Tindale, 1992). An interesting question for future
research is whether the anchoring-and-adjustment model
is equally, more, or less effective for explaining the judg-
ments of groups.
The findings from this experiment regarding the influ-
ence of information processing biases also agree with the
theoretical analysis of Kerr et al. (1996). Kerr et al. pro-
posed that group judgment might accentuate or attenuate
the biases that are observed in individual judgment. They
argued that a number of factors influence whether the bias
would be accentuated, attenuated, or replicated. Two fac-
tors they suggested which we found relevant for explaining
bias influences on group judgments were the nature and
prevalence of the bias among individuals responding to
the problems. Two different biases were observed in our
experiment, base-rate neglect and base-rate domination.
The nature of these biases was such that, as one became
more prevalent, the other became less frequent. Conse-
quently, when there was a group accentuation of one bias,
there was an accompanying attenuation of the other bias.
For other problems involving multiple biases, this inverse
relationship of bias prevalence might not occur, and it
may be possible for groups to accentuate or attenuate the
biases simultaneously.
The Kerr et al. (1996) analysis suggests that another fac-
tor may influence the relationships between biases in indi-
vidual and group judgments. They suggest that the
decision processes that groups follow when trying to reach
consensus (i.e., social decision schemes; Davis, 1973) also
play an important role in the influence of biases in group
judgment. The replication, accentuation, and attenuation
patterns can each reflect different group decision processes
regarding information-processing biases (Kerr et al., 1996).
It is important to note that the nature of the decision task
the group confronts influences the type of decision process
that emerges (Davis, 1980, 1982; Hinsz, 1990, 1999; Hinsz
et al., 1997; Kerr et al., 1996; Laughlin, 1980, 1999). Con-
sequently, the group accentuation and attenuation of infor-
mation integration strategies and information-processing
biases observed in this experiment may be limited to this
specific type of judgment task, and different patterns may
arise for other types of group judgment tasks (e.g., group
estimation judgments of quantities; Hinsz, 2006). Future
research will hopefully be able to demonstrate the general-
izability of the group accentuation and attenuation pat-
terns in how information is processed by groups.
Consistent with the Kerr et al. (1996) ideas, our results
show that groups following the implications of shared task
representations can lead to both more or less accurate judg-
ments. As shown in the 80% accurate condition, accentua-
tion of the base-rate neglect bias led to more deviation
from the Bayesian solution in group judgments. Alterna-
tively, when the source was found to be invalid, groups
paid much more attention to the base-rate information,
and subsequently, were more accurate than individuals. It
should be noted, however, that groups were closer to the
 V.B. Hinsz et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 116–126
Bayesian solution because they were more likely to use the
base-rate information, not because they were more likely to
integrate the information in a Bayesian manner. Conse-
quently, it is not always that more information processing
bias results in more error in judgment; information pro-
cessing biases influence judgment accuracy indirectly. A
richer understanding of the nature of the relationship
between information processing biases and the subsequent
judgments is necessary to be able to recommend when
judgment tasks should be conducted by groups rather than
individuals. In general, group judgment is superior to that
of individuals (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Hastie, 1986; Hill,
1982; Hinsz, 1990; Kerr et al., 1996), but there are likely
to be exceptions when group accentuation of prevalent
underlying tendencies results in less accuracy.
The results of this experiment failed to demonstrate an
impact of making the base-rate information causally rele-
vant. Moreover, we did not find that making the base-rate
information causally relevant led groups to exaggerate the
impact of the base-rate information in their judgments
compared to individuals as predicted in Hypothesis 5.
Because there was not a prevalent effect of causal relevance
on base-rate information on individual judgments, it was
not possible to truly test the prediction of Hypothesis 5.
The results of the causal base-rate information do demon-
strate again that the ways humans consider information for
their judgments are often complex and do not always fit
our intuitive or theoretical preconceptions.
The results from this experiment suggest that the phe-
nomenon of groups accentuating information processing
biases and strategies prevalent at the individual level
appears to be a general one. While the exaggeration of
response trends was repeatedly demonstrated in the
choice-shift literature (Lamm & Myers, 1978), our results
extend the exaggeration tendency beyond responses to the
information processes that underlie judgment and deci-
sion making. Although we argue that there are modera-
tors and perhaps limits to group accentuation of
information processes, our results suggest that such a
phenomenon may be a fundamental consequence of
grouping. We believe that much more systematic work
oriented towards articulating the underlying mecha-
nism(s) driving the group accentuation phenomenon is
one of many valuable directions for future research efforts
(Hinsz et al., 1997).
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