LABOR SD
February 7, 2019
Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division v. Calleja
[G.R. No. 82914. June 20, 1988.]
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
Topic: Extent and Scope of Right
Petitioner: KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION (TUPAS Local Chapter
No. 1027)
Respondent: THE HONORABLE BLR DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA, MEAT
AND CANNING DIVISION UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION and MEAT AND
CANNING DIVISION NEW EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNITED LABOR
ORGANIZATION ,
Facts
1. From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division of the Universal
Robina Corporation, with a 3-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which was
to expire on November 15, 1987.
2. Within the freedom period of 60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed
an amended notice of strike as a means of pressuring the company to extend, renew,
or negotiate a new CBA with it.
3. On October 8, 1987, the NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the
IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect, registered as a labor union.
4. On October 12, 1987, the TUPAS staged a strike. ROBINA obtained an injunction
against the strike, resulting in an agreement to return to work and for the parties to
negotiate a new CBA.
5. The next day, NEW ULO, claiming that it has "the majority of the daily wage rank
and file employees numbering 191," filed a petition for a certification election at the
BLR
6. TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the
members of the NEW ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which
three (3) years previous refused to affiliate with any labor union. It also accused the
company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS' bargaining rights
7. Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election within 20 days
8. TUPAS appealed to the BLR. the meantime, it was able to negotiate a new 3-year
CBA with ROBINA
9. Respondent BLR Director Calleja dismissed the appeal. TUPAS' motion for
reconsideration was denied
Issue: W/N public respondent acted in excess of her jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order for a certification election – NO
Ratio
1. This Court's decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, upholding the
right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being
contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming
their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the
tenets of the sect . . . should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization
granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation."
2. The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-
day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union,
NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for
certification election.
As pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a "certification election is the best forum
in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers
themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot."
Since it has not been shown that this order is tainted with unfairness, the Court will
not thwart the holding of a certification election
G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992
ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138
others, petitioners,
vs.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations,
Med. Arbiter PATERNO ADAP, and TRI-UNION EMPLOYEES UNION, et
al., respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano)
sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one
(141) members of the "Iglesia ni Kristo" (INK), all employed in the same company, at
a certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were contesting the right to
be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. That denial is
assailed as having been done with grave abuse of discretion in the special civil action
of certiorari at bar, commenced by the INK members adversely affected thereby.
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20,
1987. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of
the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to
be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the
provision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their
votes were 141 members of the INK.
The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of
course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b)
1
TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, for (c) a third
choice: "NO UNION."
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
TUPAS 1
TUEU-OLALIA 95
NO UNION 1
SPOILED 1
CHALLENGED 141
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were
segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement
between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that
the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not
members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification
elections."
The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes.
They filed f a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result
thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-
OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal
personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of
either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious
grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . ."
1
The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees petition. By Order dated
December 21, 1987, he certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. In that Order he decided the fact
that "religious belief was (being) utilized to render meaningless the rights of the non-
members of the Iglesia ni Kristo to exercise the rights to be represented by a labor
organization as the bargaining agent," and declared the petitioners as "not possessed
of any legal personality to institute this present cause of action" since they were not
parties to the petition for certification election.
The petitioners brought the matter up on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
There they argued that the Med-Arbiter had "practically disenfranchised petitioners
who had an overwhelming majority," and "the TUEU-OLALIA certified union cannot
be legally said to have been the result of a valid election where at least fifty-one
percent of all eligible voters in the appropriate bargaining unit shall have cast their
votes." Assistant Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the appeal in his Decision of July 22, 1988. He
opined that the petitioners are "bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged
disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union,
hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive
bargaining representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate
in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious
beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations."
It is this Decision of July 22, 1988 that the petitioners would have this Court annul and
set aside in the present special civil action of certiorari.
The Solicitor General having expressed concurrence with the position taken by the
petitioners, public respondent NLRC was consequently required to file, and did
thereafter file, its own comment on the petition. In that comment it insists that "if the
workers who are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their religious
belief opted not to join any labor organization as a consequence of which they
themselves can not have a bargaining representative, then the right to be
representative by a bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the
bargaining unit."
Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form,
join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining." This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of
2 3
the Philippines. Article 243 of the Code provides as follows:
ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. —
All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural
enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational
institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to
self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural
workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among
others, to "interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization." Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization . . . "
The same legal proposition is set out in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, as amended, as might be expected Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions),
4
Book V (Labor Relations) of the Omnibus Rules provides as follows;
Sec. 1. Who may join unions; exception. — All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including
employees of government corporations established under the
Corporation Code as well as employees of religious, medical or
educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, except
managerial employees, shall have the right to self-organization and
to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective
bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and without any definite
employers people, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and
protection.
 xxx xxx xxx
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor
union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to
engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and
interests.
5 represented by any union. 8 And where only one union was involved, the ballots were
Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or
resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or
assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor
organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said
right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right
granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred
right. The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does
6
not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.
As early as 1974 this Court had occasion to expatiate on these self-evident
7
propositions in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al., viz.:
. . .What the Constitution and Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding
the different theories propounded by the different schools of
jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right," it can
be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or
freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee
may act for himself being prevented by law; second, power,
whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from
joining an association. It is therefore the employee who should
decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and
should he choose to join; and even after he has joined, he still
retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time (Pagkakaisa
Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery vs. Enriquez, et
al., 108 Phil. 1010, 1019). It is clear, therefore, that the right to join
a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union (Abo, et
al. vs. PHILAME [KG] Employees Union, et al., L-19912, January
20, 1965, 13 SCRA 120, 123, quoting Rothenberg, Labor
Relations). Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the
Industrial Peace Act have recognized, the guaranteed to the
employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would
be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath,
upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not
enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refuse to join or be represented by any labor organization is recognized
not only by law but also in the rules drawn up for implementation thereof. The original
Rules on Certification promulgated by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations
required that the ballots to be used at a certification election to determine which of
two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an
alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to which of
two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an
alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to be
required to state the question — "Do you desire to be represented by said union?" —
as regards which the employees voting would mark an appropriate square, one
indicating the answer, "Yes" the other, "No."
To be sure, the present implementing rules no longer explicitly impose the
requirement that the ballots at a certification election include a choice for "NO
UNION" Section 8 (rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules) entitled "Marketing and
canvassing of votes," pertinently provides that:
. . . (a) The voter must write a cross (X) or a check (/) in the square
opposite the union of his choice. If only one union is involved, the
voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES"
or "NO."
xxx xxx xxx
Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules
expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is
doubtful if the employee's alternative right NOT to form, join or assist any labor
organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be
consequently coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be
represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f
only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square
indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility
that the "NO" votes may outnumber the "YES" votes — indicating that the majority of
the employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union — in
which case, no union can represent the employees in collective bargaining. And
whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by considerations of religious belief or
discipline or not is beside the point, and may not be inquired into at all.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of
the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be
represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular
labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the
workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be
respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of
the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees — who
wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining — can do nothing but
wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that
the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to
impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a union certified as the
exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit — upon the plea that they, the
minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective
bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the
right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse
right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union.
That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense
of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as
well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit
should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-
organization, albeit in its negative aspect.
The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they
"are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" — "but members of the INK
which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor
organization" — and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole
and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule
nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization
may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible
intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the
bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not. As held
9
in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja:
In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is
clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the
"labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of
the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the
certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all
rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative.
The Code makes no distinction as to their employment for
certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the
bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is
to belong to the "bargaining unit".
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote
because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for
the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor
organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent
prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in
past certification elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these
egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion
whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED; the Decision of the then
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated December 21, 1987
(affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated July 22, 1988) is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE; and the petitioners are DECLARED to have legally exercised their right to
vote, and their ballots should be canvassed and, if validly and properly made out,
counted and tallied for the choices written therein. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION, INC. v. TRAJANO
July 31, 1987 | Paras, J. | Self-Organization - Covered Employees - All Employees
SUMMARY: Respondent union AFW filed a petition for consent and/or certification
election before the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petitioner employer
opposed this on the ground that it was anon-stock, non-profit medical institution, thus
AFW employees were prohibited from unionizing as per Article 244, LC. However BP
70 was passed, amending Article 244 granting employees of non-stock, non-profit
institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions. Thus AFW filed another
petition for certification election. Petitioner opposed this again on the ground that the
first petition was still pending. The Med Arbiter, Director, and SC all held that BP 70’s
amending of Article 244 indeed allowed the employees to unionize, and that the 2nd
petition was not barred by res judicata as Article 244, though still invoked in the 2nd
petition, was already amended.
DOCTRINE: Employees of non-stock, non profit institutions now have the right to
form, join and organize labor unions, as per the amendment of Article 244, LC.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc.,
has a work force of about 350 rank and file employees, majority of whom are
members of private respondent Alliance of Filipino Workers.
• Public respondent is Director Trajano (Trajano) and private respondent is Far
Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation Alliance of Filipino
Workers (AFW).
• In 1986, AFW filed a Petition for Consent and/or Certification Election with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petitioner opposed the petition on the
ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and the same parties is
pending resolution before the Supreme Court.
• AFW admitted that in 1976, it filed a similar petition for certification election but
was denied by the Med Arbiter and Secretary on Labor on appeal, on the ground
that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore, its
employees may not form, join, or organize a union pursuant to Article 244, LC.
• AFW filed a petition for certiorari with SC, assailing the constitutionality of Art.
244, LC.
• Pending resolution of the aforesaid petition, or on May 1, 1980, Batas Pambansa ground to dismiss a case, there must be, between the action under consideration
Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even and the other action: (1) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form, join and organize same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
labor unions of their choice. Thus, in the exercise of such right, AFW filed another the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the Identity on the two
petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on
• Thus, in 1986, the Med Arbiter issued an Order granting the (2nd) petition, the other action wig, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
declaring that a certification election be conducted to determine the exclusive the action under consideration.
bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the petitioner. Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division v. Calleja (supra)
• Trajano dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, holding that the petitioner’s challenge TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED v
against Art. 244’s constitutionality has been rendered moot and academic by virtue TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO
of BP 70, which amended Art. 255, which thus allows employees of non-profit G.R. No. 142000 | January 22, 2003
medical institutions to unionize.
• Thus petitioner filed a petition to the SC contending that Trajano gravely abused Carpio-Morales, J. | Protacio
his discretion in granting the petition for certification election, despite the
pendency of a similar petition before the Supreme Court, which involves the same
parties for the same cause. Summary

RULING: Petition denied. Respondent labor organization filed with the DOLE Mediation-Arbitration unit a
petition for certification election, which petitioner company opposed to – one of the
Whether Director Trajano gravely abused his discretion – NO, thus he was grounds being that some of the members in the list included supervisors. THIGCI
correct in conducting a certification election to ascertain the bargaining submitted a list of signatories whose membership in the union was being questioned
as disqualified. The Supreme Court upheld the certification granted to the labor
representative of the employees.
organization, with a ruling that the certification of registration cannot be subject to
collateral attack. As for the alleged supervisory employees, it wasn’t enough that the
• The amended Article 2441 undoubtedly permits rank and file employees of non- company just place the job titles, because a description of what they actually do is
profit medical institutions to for, organize or join labor unions of their choice for important to show that they are truly supervisory, with effective recommendatory
purposes of collective bargaining. powers.
• As to the pendency of another SC petition as invoked by the petitioner, it was held
that such would not constitute res judicata for the 2nd petition, as in the former,
AFW questioned the constitutionality of Article 244 before its amendment, while in Doctrine
the latter, AFW instead invokes the same article as already amended.
• Despite petitioner’s argument that Trajano should not have declared the petition Nothing was mentioned about the alleged supervisors’ respective duties, powers, and
moot and academic himself, as it is sub-judice and only the SC can decide such prerogatives that would show that they can effectively recommend managerial
matter, it was held that Trajano could not be faulted for he had to make a decision. actions. Citing Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v Sec. of Labor (another case in
the syllabus), “The mere fact that an employee is designated manager doesn’t
necessarily make him one.”
NOTES:

• As held in Quimpo v. Dela Victoria, 46 SCRA 139, in order that the pendency of FACTS
another action between the same parties for the same cause may be availed of as a
-­‐ THEU and PTGWO (respondents), a legitimate labor organization said to

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  represent majority of the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI (petitioner) filed a
1 Art. 244. Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. — All persons employed petition for certification before the DOLE Mediation-Arbitration Unit (October
in commercial, industrial and charitable, medical or educational institutions whether 16, 1997)
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organizations of their own o THIGCI opposed this petition on the following grounds that the list of
choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant intermittent and itinerant union members was defective and fatally flawed
§ Included names and signatures of supervisors, resigned,
workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers
terminated and AWOL employees
may form labor organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their
interests and for their mutual aid and protection.
 § Also included employees of The Country Club, Inc, a
corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI
§ Alleged that some of the signatories were secured through
fraudulent and deceitful means, and that they actually denied
and withdrew membership
-­‐ THIGCI submitted a list of names of the only 71 actual rank-and-file employees
o Incorporated a tabulation showing the number of signatories to the
petition whose membership was being questioned
§ “13 Supervisors of THIGCI (reason for disqualification)”
-­‐ THEU, in its reply, asserted that it had complied with all the requirements for
valid affiliation
o It was duly granted a Certification of Affiliation by DOLE (October 10,
1997)
o Sec. 5, Rule V of DO No. 9 provides that legitimacy of its registration
cannot be subject to collateral attack
-­‐ DOLE Med-Artiber ordered the holding of certification election among the rank-
and-file employees
o Held that THIGCI’s allegation on disqualification of members should be
properly raised in the exclusion-inclusion proceedings at the pre-
election conference
o As for allegation of fraud and deceit, it should be coursed through an
independent petition for cancellation of union registration
o THIGCI failed to submit the job descriptions of the questioned
employees to bolster its claim that they are disqualified
-­‐ THIGCI appealed to DOLE Secretary (THEU seeks to represent two separate
bargaining units – supervisory and rank-and-file)
o Dismissed the petition for certification election on the ground of absence
of community or mutuality of interest
o However, upon MR of THEU, DOLE Undersecretary set aside the
previous resolution
§ Being a local chapter, the 20% membership requirement is not
necessary to acquire legitimate status
§ Names of alleged disqualified supervisory employees should
simply be removed from the roster
o Records remanded to Office of the Med-Arbiter for conduct of
certification elections
-­‐ THIGCI filed a petition for certiorari which was referred to the Court of Appeals
o CA denied petition and affirmed DOLE Resolution
-­‐ Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45
o Petitioner argues that jurisprudence provides that “a labor organization
composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor
organization at all.”
§ “It is necessary to the granting of an order allowing a
certification election, to inquire into the composition of any
labor organization whenever the status of the labor
organization is challenged”
o That without resolving the status of THEU, DOLE Undersecretary
conveniently deferred the resolution on the serious infirmity in the
membership of THEU
ISSUE
W/N the petition for certification election of respondent can continue despite the
allegations of petitioner. – YES
RATIO (most relevant to our topic is the part on lack of mutuality of interest)
-­‐ Statutory authority for exclusion of supervisory employees in a rank-and-file
union is Art. 255 [245]
o “xxx Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in the
collective bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate collective bargaining units and/or legitimate
labor organizations of their own. xxx”
-­‐ While the provision expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a
rank-and-file union, it does not provide what would be the effect if a rank-
and-file union counts supervisory employees among its members, or vice
versa
-­‐ Petition fails.
-­‐ After a certification of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality
cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It may be questioned
-­‐ Sec. 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides
for the effect of registration
o “The labor organization/workers’ association shall be deemed registered
and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be
subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.”
-­‐ The grounds for cancellation of union registration are provided for under Art. 247
[239]
o The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the
grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c)
-­‐ THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
considered to have already acquired juridical personality, which may not be
assailed collaterally
-­‐ For the allegation of signatures acquired through fraud, false statement and
misrepresentation
o Proper procedure is a petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration, not to intervene in a petition for certification election
-­‐ For the allegation of withdrawal of union members from participating in
certification election
o Best forum is the certification election itself – so that they can freely
express their choice in a secret ballot
-­‐ For the allegation on the lack of mutuality of interest
o THIGCI failed to present substantial evidence that the assailed
employees are actually occupying supervisory positions
o While they submitted a list of employees with their corresponding job
titles and ranks, there is nothing mentioned about the supervisors’
respective duties, powers, and prerogatives that would show that
they can effectively recommend managerial actions which require
the use of independent judgment
 o Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines Inc v Secretary of Labor
§ The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does
not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an
absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be
deprived of the right to be a member of the union
§ What is essential is the nature of the employee’s function
and not the nomenclature or title given
RULING
Petition denied.
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-ARBITER NAPOLEON V.
FERNANDO & PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION-UOEF
August 10, 1999 | Purisima, J. | Supervisory Employees
SUMMARY: The Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition
for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining
agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI). The Med-Arbiter granted
the Petition. Pepsi filed with the BLR a petition to Revoke Charter Affiliation of the
Union on the ground that (a) members of the Union were managers, and (b) a
supervisors' union CANNOT affiliate with a federation whose members include the
rank and file union of the same company.
DOCTRINE: The prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local union of
rank and file is replete with jurisprudence. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is
not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national
federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The
intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be
co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining
unit.
RELEVANT DOCTRINES/PROVISIONS:
Labor Code, Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own. (As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)
FACTS:
• Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification
election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of
supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI);
• The Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement that it was an
affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (federation) together with two
(2) rank and file unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees
Union of the Philippines (PEUP).
• PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or
Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, on the grounds that (a) the members of the
Union were managers and (b) a supervisors union cannot affiliate with a federation
whose members include the rank and file union of the same company.
ISSUES:
1. W/N a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two rank and file
unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code. NO
2. W/N confidential employees may join a rank and file employees union. NO
HOLDING:
1. In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma,
The prohibition against a supervisors’ union joining a local union of rank and file is replete with
jurisprudence. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case
of supervisors’ wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition extends
to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership in a national federation
the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The
intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors
will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their
own bargaining unit.
2. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property. While Art. 245 of the
Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication,
confidential employees are similarly disqualified.
Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez: if these managerial employees would belong to or
be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interests. Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to
see to it that its interest are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if
these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a
situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled this Court
to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the
disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential
employees were written in the provision.
As to the particular positions being argued as managerial:
The Court finds merit in the submission of the OSG that Route Managers, Chief Checkers and
Warehouse Operations Managers are supervisors while Credit & Collection Managers and
Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees.
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject
employees. A careful scrutiny of their job description indicates that they don't
lay down company policies. Theirs is not a final determination of the company
policies since they have to report to their respective superior. The mere fact
that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one.
Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be
deprived of the right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel Corporation v.
Laguesma, G.R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996, it was stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employee's function and not the nomenclature
or title given to the job which determines whether the employee has rank and file or
managerial status, or whether he is a supervisory employee.
WHEREFORE, the petitions under consideration are DISMISSED but subject Decision, dated
October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is MODIFIED in that Credit and
Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees not eligible
for membership in a supervisors' union. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MERALCO v Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 91902 May 20, 1991
Petitioner:. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Repondent: THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, STAFF
AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF MERALCO, and FIRST LINE
ASSOCIATION OF MERALCO SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES,
Ponente: MEDIALDEA J.
Facts:
• November 22, 1988, the Staff and Technical Employees Association of
MERALCO (hereafter "STEAM-PCWF") a labor organization of staff and
technical employees of MERALCO, filed a petition for certification election,
seeking to represent regular employees of MERALCO
o non-managerial employees with Pay Grades VII and above
o non-managerial employees in the Patrol Division, Treasury Security
Services Section, Secretaries who are automatically removed from
the bargaining unit
o employees within the rank and file unit who are automatically
disqualified from becoming union members of any organization
within the same bargaining unit.
• The petition was premised on the exclusion/disqualification of certain
MERALCO employees pursuant to Art. I, Secs. 2 and 3 of the existing
MEWA CBA
• MERALCO moved for the dismissal of the petition on the following grounds:
o managerial who are prohibited by law from forming or joining
supervisory union
o security services personnel who are prohibited from joining or
assisting the rank-and-file union
o secretaries who do not consent to the petitioner's representation
and whom petitioner can not represent
o rank-and-file employees represented by the certified or duly
recognized bargaining representative of the only rank-and-file
bargaining unit in the company, the Meralco Employees Workers
Association (MEWA), in accordance with the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement with the latter.
• As regards those in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service
Section, MERALCO maintains that since these employees are tasked with
providing security to the company, they are not eligible to join the rank and
file bargaining unit, pursuant to Sec. 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the then
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (1988)
o Sec. 2. Who may file petition. — The employer or any legitimate
labor organization may file the petition.
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer
unit unless circumstances otherwise require, and provided, further:
that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank and file employees
shall not include security guards (As amended by Sec. 6,
Implementing Rules of EO 111)
• Med-Arbiter ruled that having been excluded from the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement for rank and file employees, these employees have
the right to form a union of their own, except those employees
performing managerial functions.
• MEWA and the First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees.
(hereafter FLAMES) filed petitions for intervention, the latter seeking to
represent those employees with Pay Grades VII to XIV, since "there is no
other supervisory union at MERALCO."
• With the enactment of RA 6715 and the rules and regulations implementing
the same, STEAM-PCWF renounced its representation of the employees in
Patrol Division, Treasury Security Services Section and rank-and-file
employees in Pay Grades I-VI.
• On November 3, 1989, the Secretary of Labor affirmed, MR denied
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order appealed from is
hereby affirmed but modified as far as the employees covered by
Section 3, Article I of the exist CBA in the Company are concerned.
Said employees shall remain in the unit of the rank-and-file already
existing and may exercise their right to self organization as above
enunciated.
o Further, the First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory
Employees (FLAMES) is included as among the choices in the
certification election.
• This petition seeks to review the Resolution of respondent Secretary of
Labor and Employment Franklin M. Drilon dated November 3, 1989 which
affirmed an Order of Med-Arbiter Renato P. Parungo (Case No. NCR-O-D-
M-1-70), directing the holding of a certification election among certain
employees of petitioner
Issues: W/N STEAM-PCWF or FLAMES can represent supervisory units in
bargaining? Yes.
W/N Security Guards should be included in the bargaining unit? Yes.
Ratio:
st
1 Issue
• The Secretary of Labor's Resolution was obviously premised on the
provisions of Art. 212, then par. (k), of the 1988 Labor Code defining
"managerial" and "rank and file" employees, the law then in force when the
complaint was filed. At the time, only two groups of employees were
recognized, the managerial and rank and file.
• However, pursuant to the Department of Labor's goal of
strenghthening the constitutional right of workers to self-organization,
RA 6715 was subsequently passed which reorganized the employee-
ranks by including a third group, or the supervisory employees, and
laying down the distinction between supervisory employees and those of
managerial ranks in Art. 212, renumbered par. [m], depending on whether
the employee concerned has the power to lay down and execute
management policies, in the case of managerial employees, or merely to
recommend them, in case of supervisory employees.
• MERALCO has admitted that the employees belonging to Pay Grades VII
and up are supervisory. The records also show that STEAM-PCWF had
"renounced its representation of the employees in Patrol Division, Treasury
Security Service Section and rank and file employees in Pay Grades I-VI";
while FLAMES, on the other hand, had limited its representation to
employees belonging to Pay Grades VII-XIV, generally accepted as
supervisory employees
• It is clear that the employees from Pay Grades VII and up have been
recognized and accepted as supervisory. On the other hand, those
employees who have been automatically disqualified have been directed by
the Secretary of Labor to remain in the existing labor organization for the
rank and file, (the condition in the CBA deemed as not having been written
into the contract, as unduly restrictive of an employee's exercise of the right
to self-organization).
• STEAM-PCWF, and FLAMES would therefore represent supervisory
employees only. In this regard, the authority given by the Secretary of Labor
for the establishment of two labor organizations for the rank and file will have
to be disregarded
nd
2 Issue (More important)
• In questioning the Secretary of Labor's directive allowing security guards
(Treasury/Patrol Services Section) to be represented by respondents,
MERALCO contends that this contravenes the provisions of the recently
passed RA 6715 and its implementing rules (specifically par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule
II, Book V) which disqualifies supervisory employees and security guards
from membership in a labor organization of the rank and file
o Both rules, barring security guards from joining a rank and file
organization, appear to have been carried over from the old
rules which implemented then Art. 245 of the Labor Code, and
which provided thus:
o Art. 245. Ineligibility of security personnel to join any labor
organization.—Security guards and other personnel employed for
the protection and security of the person, properties and premises
of the employer shall not be eligible for membership in any labor
organization.
• Pres. Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 111 which eliminated the
above-cited provision on the disqualification of security guards. What
was retained was the disqualification of managerial employees
• With the elimination, security guards were thus free to join a rank and
file organization.
• On March 2, 1989, the present Congress passed RA 6715
o Section 18 thereof amended Art. 245, to read as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees.—Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees
but may join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their
own.
• As will be noted, the second sentence of Art. 245 embodies an
amendment disqualifying supervisory employees from membership in
a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. It does not include
security guards in the disqualification.
• The implementing rules of RA 6715, therefore, insofar as they
disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file organization are
null and void, for being not germane to the object and purposes of EO
111 and RA 6715 upon which such rules purportedly derive statutory
moorings.
• While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining
a labor organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now
freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory
union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees,
the Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to
security guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor
organization, whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their
constitutional right to self-organization.
Judgment:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. We AFFIRM with modification
the Resolution of the Secretary of Labor dated November 3, 1989 upholding an
employee's right to self-organization. A certification election is hereby ordered
conducted among supervisory employees of MERALCO, belonging to Pay Grades VII
and above, using as guideliness an employee's power to either recommend or
execute management policies, pursuant to Art. 212 (m), of the Labor Code, as
amended by Sec. 4 of RA 6715, with respondents STEAM-PCWF and FLAMES as
choices.
Other:
We are aware however of possible consequences in the implementation of the law in
allowing security personnel to join labor unions within the company they serve. The
law is apt to produce divided loyalties in the faithful performance of their duties.
Economic reasons would present the employees concerned with the temptation to
subordinate their duties to the allegiance they owe the union of which they are
members, aware as they are that it is usually union action that obtains for them
increased pecuniary benefits.
Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security personnel may neglect
or outrightly abandon their duties, such as protection of property of their employer and
the persons of its officials and employees, the control of access to the employer's
premises, and the maintenance of order in the event of emergencies and untoward
incidents.
It is hoped that the corresponding amendatory and/or suppletory laws be passed by
Congress to avoid possible conflict of interest in security personnel.1âwphi1
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Hon. Laguesma & Pepsi-Cola Products PH
G.R. No. 122226 | 25 Mar 1998 | Mendoza, J. | Castillo, A.R.L.
Facts:
PET, a union of supervisory employees, filed a petition for certification election on
behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products PH, but was denied (Med-Arb
and, on appeal, SOLE) because route managers, being managerial employees are
ineligible for union membership under Art. 245, LC. Hence, this petition on certiorari
(Rule 65) challenging the validity of the SOLE’s order and the constitutionality of Art.
rd
245. After SC 3 Div. denied the petition, case was referred to SC en banc.
Issue:
1. W/N route managers are managerial employees. YES.
2. W/N Art. 245 violates Art. III, Sec. 8, 1987 Const. NO.
Ratio:
[ISSUE 1] Types of managerial EEs
• Manager: anyone who is responsible for subordinates and other organization
resources
• They constitute 3 levels of the pyramid
o Top Mgmt: comparatively small group of executives, it is responsible for
the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating
policies and guides the organizations interactions with its
environment. Typical title: CEO, president, senior VP. Actual titles vary
and are not reliable for classification
o Middle Mgmt: can refer to more than one level in an
organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers
and sometimes also those of operating EEs. Its principal responsibilities
are to direct the activities that implement their organizations policies and
to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their
subordinates
o First Line/First Level Mgmt: lowest level in an organization at which
individuals are responsible for the work of others. First-line managers
direct operating EEs only; they do not supervise other managers (aka
supervisor)
o (Bottom: operating EEs)
• Distinctions exist bet. those with authority to devise, implement and control
strategic and operational policies (top & middle) and those whose task is simply
to ensure that such polices are carried out by the rank-and-file EEs (first line)
• Managerial employees may be said to fall into two categories: (1) the
managers per se and (2) the supervisors
o The question now is W/N route managers are managers or supervisors
SOLE & SC previously determined this question
• SOLE: only route managers and accounting managers are managerial EEs
under Art. 212(m), LC; the rest like warehouse operations manager and quality
control manager are supervisory EEs
• To qualify as managerial EE, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of
managerial attributes under Art. 212(m)
• Workers Alliance Trade Unions v. Pepsi Cola: route manager = managerial EE
and hence ineligible to join, form, or assist a union
• SOLE’s finding that route managers are managerial EEs supported by
substantial evidence
o “Route Manager Position Description” pamphlet shows that the work of
route managers sets them apart from supervisors in general because
they are responsible for the success of the company’s main line of
business through management of their respective sales teams; this
requires responsibilities which the work of supervisors does not entail
o Memo from the director of metro sales operations to one of the route
managers shows gave an idea of the role of route managers as
managers per se
§ “You have proven in the past that your capable of
achieving your targets thru better planning, managing
your group as a fighting team, and thru aggressive
selling. I am looking forward to your success and I expect
that you just have to exert your doubly best in turning
around our operations from a losing to a profitable one!
Happy Selling!!”
o Countering J. Vitug’s separate opinion: plasticized card is only a
summary of performance standards; it doesn’t show W/N they are
supervisors
• Supervisory EEs’ only power is to recommend under Art. 212(m); route
managers more than merely recommend effective mgmt.. action but perform
operational, HR, financial, and marketing functions
[ISSUE 2] Art. 245 is constitutional in light of Art. III, Sec. 8, Const.
• Art. III, Sec. 8: The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged
• Managers are EEs either way; nonetheless, supervisors have no right to form
unions in the US (as J. Puno points out)
• They are excluded from the definition of “employee” in the Taft-Hartley Act
• US jurisprudence: wrong to subject supervisory EEs, who have demonstrated
their initiative, their ambition and their ability to get ahead, to the leveling
processes of seniority, uniformity and standardization that the SC recognizes as
being fundamental principles of unionism
Right of self-organization of managerial EEs under Industrial Peace Act
• Sec. 2: "Supervisor" means any person having authority in the interest of an
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign,
 recommend, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, and to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such acts, if, in connection
with the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routinary or
clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgment
• Right of supervisors to form their own orgs. was affirmed in Sec. 3
• The Act didn’t define “manager;” but, using the commonly-understood concept of
"manager,” it is apparent that the law used the term "supervisors" to refer to the
sub-group of "managerial EEs" known as front-line managers. The managers per
se were not covered.
• Even If Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Assoc. v. CIR upheld the right
of all managerial EEs, the ruling actually applied to supervisory EEs only; yet…
Right of self-organization of managerial EEs under the LC
• The dictum in the Caltex case which allowed at least for the theoretical
unionization of top and middle managers by assimilating them with the
supervisory group under the broad phrase "managerial personnel," provided the
lynchpin for later laws denying the right of self-organization not only to top and
middle mgmt. EEs but to front line managers or supervisors as well
o Following the case, LC, promulgated in 1974 under martial law, dropped
the distinction between the two
o The law lumped “manager” and “supervisor” together and called them
"managerial employees"
• Art. 212(k), LC: "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to
effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within
this definition are considered rank and file employees for purposes of this Book.
o The definition shows that it is actually a combination of the commonly
understood definitions of both groups of managerial employees,
grammatically joined by the phrase "and/or"
• This general def’n was perhaps legally necessary because (1) LC denied
supervisors their right to self-organize; and (2) it reversed the Caltex dictum
o The practical effect is shown in the Omnibus Rules, Bk. V, Rule 11:
§ Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease
operation. - All existing supervisory unions and unions of
security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to
operate as such and their registration certificates shall be
deemed automatically cancelled. However, existing collective
agreements with such unions, the life of which extends beyond
the date of effectivity of the Code, shall be respected until their
expiry date insofar as the economic benefits granted therein
are concerned.
xxx
• DOLE continued to use "supervisory unions" despite the new definition
apparently because these were the unions of front line managers which were
then allowed under the Industrial Peace Act
o If DOLE wanted to ban unions of top and middle managers which may
have been formed following the dictum in Caltex, it obviously would
have done so. Yet it did not, apparently because no such unions then
existed
Real intent of the 1986 ConComm; Lerum proposal
• Comm’r Lerum proposal: amend what was going to be Art. III, Sec. 8 to read as
follows: “The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged”
o Reason: (1) government employees, supervisory employees, and
security guards, who had the right to organize under the Industrial
Peace Act, had been denied this right by the Labor Code, and (2) there
was a need to reinstate the right of these employees
• Amended proposal read as follows: “The right of the people INCLUDING THOSE
EMPLOYED IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS to form associations,
unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged”
o In proposing that amendment Lerum asked to make of record that he
wanted Arts. 245-246, LC, automatically abolished. ACCEPTED
§ Lerum meant to restore the right of supervisory EEs to
organize. For even though he spoke of the need to "abolish"
Art. 246, he repeatedly referred to "supervisory EEs" whose
right to organize had been taken away
§ Lerum never referred to the term “managerial EEs” as in Art.
212(m); his repeated use of the term "supervisory EEs," when
such term then was no longer in the statute books, suggests a
frame of mind that remained grounded in the language of the
Industrial Peace Act; he also never referred to the Caltex
dictum
• Hence, Lerum's proposal to amend Art. III, Sec.8 of the draft Constitution by
including labor unions in the guarantee of organizational right should be taken in
the context of statements that his aim was the removal of the statutory ban
against security guards and supervisory employees joining labor organizations
• The approval by the ConComm can only mean that the Comm intended the
absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and
security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar
absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to
have been granted to top-level and middle managers
Constitutionality of Art. 245
• Art. 245, on the ineligibility of managerial EEs to join any labor org & the right of
supervisory EEs is a result of the amendment of the LC in 1989 by the Herrera-
Veloso Law, which provides separate definitions of the terms “managerial” and
“supervisory EEs”
o Art. 212(m), LC. "managerial employee" is one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the
interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees
not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-
file employees for purposes of this Book.
• Although the definition of "supervisory EEs" seems unduly restricted to the last
phrase of the definition in the Industrial Peace Act, the legal significance given to
 the phrase "effectively recommends" remains the same; in fact, the distinction
between managers per se and front line mgmt. is articulated here
• Read with Art. 212(m), Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the ConComm
• Organizational right is not infringed by a ban against managerial EEs forming a
union because the right is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for
purposes not contrary to law
o The rationale of Art. 245 is “if these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of
their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The
Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership” (Ponente cited Philips
Industrial v. NLRC, which was penned by J. Davide, who wrote a
dissenting opinion for this case)
o Though the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing with the right of
confidential EEs to organize, it’s the same reason for the ban on
managerial EEs. In fact, all the more reason for such ban. After all,
those who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who
receive from their ERs information that not only is confidential but also is
not generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to other
EEs
Petition DISMISSED.
Davide, concurring and dissenting:
• Route managers are managerial EEs, but Art. 245 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
• Sec. 7, Art. IV, 1973 Const. The right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
• Bernas’s sponsorship speech: It strictly does not prepare the old provision
because it adds the word UNION, and in the explanation we received from
Commissioner Lerum, the term envisions not just unions in private corporations
but also in the government. This preserves our link with the Malolos Constitution
as far as the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law is concerned
• Lerum in his proposal intended that the amendment "automatically abolish" Arts.
245 and 246, LC
• Intent of the ConCommwas to abrogate the law prohibiting managerial
employees from joining, assisting, or forming unions or labor organizations
o No need to decipher the intent of the framers re: Art. 245 (originally Art.
246), LC, there being no ambiguity or vagueness in the wording of the
present Art. III, Sec. 8
• All EEs—meaning rank-and-file, supervisory and managerial—whether from the
public or the private sectors, have the right to form unions for purposes not
contrary to law
• Herrera-Veloso Law then amended the new Art. 245; but with the abrogation of
the former Art. 246, LC, and Art. III, Sec. 8, the first sentence then of the present
Article 245 of the Labor Code must be struck down as unconstitutional
• However, due to an obvious conflict of interest - being closely identified with the
interests of management in view of the inherent nature of their functions, duties
and responsibilities -- managerial employees may only be eligible to join, assist
or form unions or labor organizations of their own rank, and not those of the
supervisory employees nor the rank-and-file employees
• ITC, Pet’r by its very name is a union of supervisory EEs; the route managers
who are managerial employees, cannot join or assist UPSU. Accordingly, the
Med-Arbiter and public respondent Laguesma committed no error in denying the
petition for direct certification or for certification election
Puno, concurring: Art. 245 was not repealed by Art. III, Sec. 8
• Under Art. 212(m), LC, the test of "managerial" or "supervisory" status depends
on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his ER and
whether such authority is not routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. The rank-and-file EE performs work that is routinary and
clerical in nature.
• Historical roots in the US
o NLRA (Wagner Act) was the first law that regulated labor relations in the
US and embodied its national labor policy
o Purpose: (1) eliminate obstructions to the free flow of commerce
through the practice of collective bargaining; (2) protect the workers' full
freedoms of association, self-org, and designation of reps of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the T&Cs of their employment
or other mutual aid and protection
o What the Act did: (1) established the right of EEs to organize, (2)
required ERs to bargain with EEs collectively through EE-elected reps,
(3) gave employees the right to engage in concerted activities for
collective bargaining purposes or other mutual aid or protection, and (4)
created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as the regulatory
agency in labor-mgmt matters
o LMRA (Taft-Hartley Act) amended NLRA, seeking to lessen industrial
disputes and placed employers in a more nearly equal position with
unions in bargaining and labor relations procedures
o LMRA took away the collective bargaining rights of supervisors. The
sponsors of the amendment feared that their unionization would break
down industrial discipline as it would blur the traditional distinction
between management and labor. They felt it necessary to deny
supervisory personnel the right of collective bargaining to preserve their
loyalty to the interests of their employers.
• Historical dev’t in the PH
o Industrial Peace Act (1953; aka Magna Carta of Labor) modelled after
NLRA and LMRA
o This is significant because we have ruled that where our labor statutes
are based on statutes in foreign jurisdiction, the decisions of the high
courts in those jurisdictions construing and interpreting the Act are given
persuasive effects in the application of Philippine law
o Industrial Peace Act did not define a manager or managerial
employee. It defined a "supervisor" but not a "manager."
 o LC changed existing jurisprudence when it prohibited supervisory and
managerial employees from joining labor organizations. Supervisory
unions were no longer recognized nor allowed to exist and operate as
such
o Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Sanchez affirmed the changes made in LC
§ SC applied Art. 246 and held that managerial EEs are the very
type of EEs who, by the nature of their positions and functions,
have been decreed disqualified from bargaining with mgmt.
§ Rationale: (1) if managerial EEs were to belong or be affiliated
with a union, the union might not be assured of their loyalty in
view of evident conflict of interest or that the union can be
company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in the union memship; and (2) in the collective
bargaining process, managerial EEs are supposed to be on the
side of the ER, to act as its rep, and to see to it that its
interests are well protected. The ER is not assured of such
protection if these EEs themselves become union mems
• With due respect, the resort by J. Davide to the deliberations of the ConComm
does not suffice. It is generally recognized that debates and other proceedings in
a ConCon are of limited value and are an unsafe guide to the intent of the
people.
Freedom of association
• The right of association flows from freedom of expression. Like the right of
expression, the exercise of the right of association is not absolute. It is subject to
certain limitations.
• Art. 243 reiterated this right; Art. 244 set out limits for EEs in civil service (may
only form associations but may not collectively bargain on terms and conditions
fixed by law); and jurisprudence clarified limits for other EEs
o EE of a cooperative who is a mem and co-owner thereof cannot invoke
the right of collective bargaining and negotiation vis-a-vis the
cooperative
o Owner cannot bargain with himself or co-owners
o EEs in foreign embassies or consulates or in foreign int’l orgs granted
int’l immunities are also excluded
o Confidential employees have also been denied the right
• DQ extends only to labor orgs.
o Art. 245 deprives managerial EEs of their right to join labor orgs, as
defined in Art. 212(g), LC
§ A labor organization has two broad rights: (1) to bargain
collectively and (2) to deal with the employer concerning T&Cs
of employment
o Art. 245 does not absolutely DQ managerial EEs from exercising their
right of association; managerial EEs may form assocs. or orgs. so long
as they are not labor orgs.
• (Puno drama) To declare Art. 245 unconstitutional cuts deep into our existing
industrial life and will open the floodgates to unionization at all levels of the
industrial hierarchy
o Such a ruling will wreak havoc on the existing set-up between mgmt and
labor. If all managerial EEs will be allowed to unionize, then all who are
in the payroll of the company, starting from the pres., VP, GMs and
everyone, with the exception of the directors, may go on strike or picket
the ER. Company officers will join forces with the supervisors and rank-
and-file. Mgmt and labor will become a solid phalanx with bargaining
rights that could be enforced against the owner of the company. The
basic opposing forces in the industry will not be mgmt. and labor but the
operating group on the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder
group on the other. The industrial problem defined in the LC comes
down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts of industry
between these two groups. And this will certainly bring ill-effects on our
economy.
o The framers of the Constitution could not have intended a major
upheaval of our labor and socio-economic systems. Their intent cannot
be made to override substantial policy considerations and create absurd
or impossible situations.
Vitug, dissenting: votes to grant petition but not on constitutional grounds. Not really
being managerial EEs in the true sense of the term, the mems of the petitioning union
are not DQ’d fom forming or joining labor orgs.
____________________________________________________________________
A.D. Gothong Mfg. Corp. v. Hon. Nieves Confessor
G.R. No. 113638 | November 16, 1999
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Topic: Excluded Employees/Workers; Managerial Employees
Petitioner: A. D. GOTHONG MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU
Respondents: HON. NIEVES CONFESOR, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and A. D. GOTHONG MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Subangdaku, Mandaue City
Facts:
• A.D. Gothong Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union-ALU filed a
petition for certification election in its bid to represent the unorganized
regular rank-and-file employees of A. D. Gothong Manufacturing Corporation
excluding its office staff and personnel
o The company opposed the petition bc it excluded office personnel
who are rank and file employees
• In the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, the parties agreed to the inclusion of
Romulo Plaza and Paul Michael Yap in the list of eligible voters on condition
that their votes are considered challenged on the ground that they were
supervisory employees
• The certification election was conducted as scheduled and yielded the
following results: YES – 20; NO – 19; Spoiled – 0; Challenged – 2; Total
votes cast – 41
• Both Plaza and Yap argued that they are rank-and-file employees
o Plaza claimed that he was a mere salesman based in Cebu
o Yap argued that he is a mere expediter whose job includes the
facilitation of the processing of the bills of lading of all intended
company shipments
 • The union maintains that both Plaza and Yap are supervisors who are
disqualified to join the proposed bargaining unit for rank-and-file employees
o Submitted affidavits alleging: that Yap is a supervisory employee
and can effectively recommend for suspension/dismissal; that the
two used to attend the quarterly meeting of the staff employees of
the company; that Plaza was the acting OIC of GT Marketing in
Davao; that Yap was mentioned in the minutes of a meeting as a
shipping assistant and a newly hired member of the staff
• Med-Arbiter: Yap and Plaza are rank-and-file employees
• Union appealed to SOLE; SOLE affirmed Med-Arbiter
o MR denied
• Thus, this case
Issue:
W/N Plaza and Yap may join the proposed bargaining unit for rank-and-file
employees – YES, it was not proven that they are managerial employees,
thus, may join bargaining unit for rank-and-file employees
Judgment:
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
Ratio:
• The issue raised in this case is basically one of fact: w/n Plaza and Yap are
managerial employees or rank-and-file employees
o SC is not a trier of facts
o In the determination of whether or not certain employees are
managerial employees, SC accords due respect and sustains
the findings of fact made by quasi-judicial agencies which are
supported by substantial evidence considering their expertise
in their respective fields
• Med-Arbiter: the union failed to present concrete and substantial evidence to
establish the fact that the challenged voters are either managerial or
supervising employees
o The affidavits submitted (aside from being inadmissible in evidence
bc not properly identified) merely tagged the challenged voters as
supervisors; nothing is mentioned about their respective duties,
powers and prerogatives as employees which would have indicated
that they are supervisory employees; no statement about an
instance where the challenged voters effectively
recommended such managerial action which required the use
of independent judgment
o SOLE: nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the union
shows that Yap and Plaza are actually conferred or actually
exercising the said managerial/supervisory attributes
• Even if Plaza was to be designated as OIC of the Davao City Branch, such
branch did not actually materialize
• Even if Yap was designated as shipping assistant/expediter, this is of no
moment bc titles or nomenclatures attached to the position is not controlling
 5,
 1990,
 petitioner
 union
 filed
 before
 the
 Department
 of
 Labor
• Also, the job descriptions extant on records vividly exhibit no trace of
the performance of managerial or supervisory functions
 Employment
 (DOLE)
 a
 Petition
 for
 Direct
 Certification
 or
 Election
• The Labor Code recognizes 2 principal groups of employees: (1)
managerial and (2) rank-and-file
• Article 212 (m), LC: “Managerial employee is one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the
interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions
if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling
within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
• Rule I, Section 2 (c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code provides that to be a member of managerial staff, the following
elements must concur or co-exist:
o Primary duty consists of the performance of work directly
related to management policies
o Customarily and regularly exercises discretion and
independent judgment in the performance of his functions
o Regularly and directly assists in the management of the
establishment
o Does not devote more than 20% of his time to work other than
those described above
• Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano: “The test of
supervisory or managerial status depends on whether a person
possess authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter
specified in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its
Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary
or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. Thus,
where such recommendatory powers as in the case at bar, are subject
to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and
other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are
not exercise of independent judgment as required by law.”
G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND
ERNESTO L. PONCE, President, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA IN HIS CAPACITY AS
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE DANILO L.
REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
• October
and
Certification
 • Med-­‐Arbiter
 Danilo
 L.
 Reynante
 issued
 an
 Order
 ordering
 the
 conduct
  employees
 in
 Union
 membership."
 
of
 certification
 election
 among
 the
 supervisors
 and
 exempt
 employees
 
• On
 January
 18,
 1991,
 respondent
 San
 Miguel
 Corporation
 filed
 a
 Notice
  Golden
 Farms,
 Inc.
 v.
 Ferrer-­‐Calleja:
 confidential
 employees,
 by
 the
 very
 
of
 Appeal
 with
 Memorandum
 on
 Appeal,
 pointing
 out,
 among
 others,
  nature
 of
 their
 functions,
 assist
 and
 act
 in
 a
 confidential
 capacity
 to,
 or
 
the
 Med-­‐Arbiter's
 error
 in
 including
 supervisory
 levels
 3
 and
 above
  have
 access
 to
 confidential
 matters
 of,
 person
 who
 exercise
 managerial
 
whose
 positions
 are
 confidential
 in
 nature.
  functions
 in
 the
 field
 of
 labor
 relations.
 
• Undersecretary
 Laguesma,
 granted
 respondent
 company's
 Appeal
 and
 
ordered
 the
 remand
 of
 the
 case
 to
 the
 Med-­‐Arbiter
 for
 determination
 of
  • An
 important
 element
 of
 the
 "confidential
 employee
 rule"
 is
 the
 
the
 true
 classification
 of
 each
 of
 the
 employees
  employee's
 need
 to
 use
 labor
 relations
 information.
 
 
• Laguesma
 directed
 the
 conduct
 of
 separate
 certification
 elections
  • Thus,
 in
 determining
 the
 confidentiality
 of
 certain
 employees,
 a
 key
 
among
 the
 supervisors
 ranked
 as
 supervisory
 levels
 1
 to
 4
 (S1
 to
 S4)
  question
 frequently
 considered
 is
 the
 employees'
 necessary
 access
 to
 
and
 the
 exempt
 employees
 in
 each
 of
 the
 three
 plants
  confidential
 labor
 relations
 information.
 
• San
 Miguel
 Corporation
 filed
 a
 Motion
 for
 Reconsideration
 with
 Motion
  • It
 is
 the
 contention
 of
 respondent
 corporation
 that
 Supervisory
 
to
 suspend
 proceedings.
  employees
 3
 and
 4
 and
 the
 exempt
 employees
 come
 within
 the
 
meaning
 of
 the
 term
 "confidential
 employees"
 primarily
 because
 they
 
ISSUE:
  answered
 in
 the
 affirmative
 when
 asked
 "Do
 you
 handle
 confidential
 
data
 or
 documents?"
 in
 the
 Position
 Questionnaires
 submitted
 by
 the
 
Whether
 Supervisory
 employees
 3
 and
 4
 and
 the
 exempt
 employees
 of
 the
  Union.
 
company
 are
 considered
 confidential
 employees,
 hence
 ineligible
 from
 joining
 a
  o In
 the
 same
 questionnaire,
 however,
 it
 was
 also
 stated
 that
 the
 
union.
 NO.
  confidential
 information
 handled
 by
 questioned
 employees
 
relate
 to
 product
 formulation,
 product
 standards
 and
 product
 
specification
 which
 by
 no
 means
 relate
 to
 "labor
 relations."
 
Ratio:
 
• "If
 access
 to
 confidential
 labor
 relations
 information
 is
 to
 be
 a
 factor
 in
 
the
 determination
 of
 an
 employee's
 confidential
 status,
 such
 
• confidential
 employees
 are
 those
 who
 (1)
 assist
 or
 act
 in
 a
 confidential
  information
 must
 relate
 to
 the
 employer's
 labor
 relations
 policies.
 
capacity,
 (2)
 to
 persons
 who
 formulate,
 determine,
 and
 effectuate
  o Westinghouse
 Electric
 Corporation
 v.
 National
 Labor
 Relations
 
management
 policies
 in
 the
 field
 of
 labor
 relations.
 
  Board:
 
• The
 two
 criteria
 are
 cumulative,
 and
 both
 must
 be
 met
 if
 an
 employee
 is
  o "an
 employee
 may
 not
 be
 excluded
 from
 appropriate
 
to
 be
 considered
 a
 confidential
 employee
 —
 that
 is,
 the
 confidential
  bargaining
 unit
 merely
 because
 he
 has
 access
 to
 confidential
 
relationship
 must
 exist
 between
 the
 employee
 and
 his
 supervisor,
 and
  information
 concerning
 employer's
 internal
 business
 
the
 supervisor
 must
 handle
 the
 prescribed
 responsibilities
 relating
 to
  operations
 and
 which
 is
 not
 related
 to
 the
 field
 of
 labor
 
labor
 relations.
  relations."
 
• The
 exclusion
 from
 bargaining
 units
 of
 employees
 who,
 in
 the
 normal
  • In
 the
 case
 at
 bar,
 supervisors
 3
 and
 above
 may
 not
 be
 considered
 
course
 of
 their
 duties,
 become
 aware
 of
 management
 policies
 relating
  confidential
 employees
 merely
 because
 they
 handle
 "confidential
 data"
 
to
 labor
 relations
 is
 a
 principal
 objective
 sought
 to
 be
 accomplished
 by
  as
 such
 must
  first
 be
 strictly
 classified
 as
 pertaining
 to
 labor
 relations
 
the
 "confidential
 employee
 rule."
  for
 them
 to
 fall
 under
 said
 restrictions.
 
o The
 broad
 rationale
 behind
 this
 rule
 is
 that
 employees
 should
  • Since
 the
 employees
 are
 not
 classifiable
 under
 the
 confidential
 type,
 
not
 be
 placed
 in
 a
 position
 involving
 a
 potential
 conflict
 of
  this
 Court
 rules
 that
 they
 may
 appropriately
 form
 a
 bargaining
 unit
 for
 
interests.
  purposes
 of
 collective
 bargaining.
 
• There
 have
 been
 ample
 precedents
 in
 this
 regard
  • Furthermore,
 even
 assuming
 that
 they
 are
 confidential
 employees,
 
o Bulletin
 Publishing
 Company
 v.
 Hon.
 Augusto
 Sanchez:
 "if
 these
  jurisprudence
 has
 established
 that
 there
 is
 no
 legal
 prohibition
 against
 
managerial
 employees
 would
 belong
 to
 or
 be
 affiliated
 with
 a
  confidential
 employees
 who
 are
 not
 performing
 managerial
 functions
 
Union,
 the
 latter
 might
 not
 be
 assured
 of
 their
 loyalty
 to
 the
  to
 form
 and
 join
 a
 union.
 
Union
 in
 view
 of
 evident
 conflict
 of
 interest.
 The
 Union
 can
 also
 
become
 company-­‐
 dominated
 with
 the
 presence
 of
 managerial
  WHEREFORE,
 the
 assailed
 Order
 of
 March
 11,
 1993
 is
 hereby
 SET
 ASIDE
 and
 
the
 Order
 of
 the
 Med-­‐Arbiter
 on
 December
 19,
 1990
 is
 REINSTATED
  o Found that the voters are rank-and-file employees holding positions not
confidential in nature, and who are not, or used to be, members of
Ilocos Monthlies Union (IMU) due to the reclassification of their positions
Coca-Cola Bottlers PH, Inc. v. IPTEU by CCBPI and have been excluded from the CBA entered into by IMU
G.R. No. 193798 | September 9, 2015 | Peralta, J. and CCBPI from 1997 to 2005.
• Challenged votes were opened and canvassed. IPTEU was proclaimed as the
PETITIONER: Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI)
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file exempt workers in
RESPONDENT: Ilocos Professional and Technical Employees Union (IPTEU) CCBPI Ilocos Norte Plant (garnering 14 of the 16 votes cast)
TOPIC: Excluded Employees/Workers | Confidential Employees
• CCBPI elevated the case to the SOLE. Its appeal was denied.
o As shown by the certification of the IMU President and the CBAs forged
FACTS
between CCBPI and IMU from 1997 to 2007, the 22 employees sought
• This is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) which seeks to reverse and set
to be represented by IPTEU are not part of IMU and are excluded from
aside the March 17, 2010 Decision and the Sept. 16, 2010 Resolution of the CA,
its CBA coverage.
which affirmed the May 6, 2008 Resolution of the SOLE, dismissing petitioner’s
o even if the 16 challenged voters may have access to information which
appeal that assailed the Decision and Proclamation of the Winner of the
are confidential from the business standpoint, the exercise of their right
Mediator-Arbiter.
to self-organization could not be defeated because their common
• Petitioner CCBPI is a domestic corporation duly organized and operating under functions do not show that there exists a confidential relationship within
the Philippine laws. It is primarily engaged in the beverage business, which the realm of labor relations
includes the manufacture of carbonated soft drinks. IPTEU is a registered • CCBPI filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and writ of
independent labor organization with address at CCBPI Ilocos Plant.
preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition on March 17, 2010. It denied their
• July 9, 2007: IPTEU filed a verified Petition for certification election seeking to MR on Sept. 16, 2010.
represent a bargaining unit consisting of approximately 22 rank-and-file • CCBPI contends that the CA Decision and Resolution are based on a
professional and technical employees of CCBPI Ilocos Norte Plant.
misapprehension of facts relative to the proceedings before the M-A; its
o CCBPI prayed for the denial and dismissal of the petition; argued that
pronouncement consists of inferences that are manifestly mistaken and w/o
the employees were ineligible for inclusion as members of the IPTEU:
factual/legal basis.
§ Sales Logistics Coordinator and Maintenance Foreman as
o Orders of SOLE and M-A were issued in patent disregard of established
supervisory employees facts and existing jurisprudence, thus tainted with grave abuse of
§ 8 Financial Analysts, 5 Quality Assurance Specialists, discretion
Maintenance Manager Secretary, Trade Promotions and
§ In considering IPTEU the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
Merchandising Assistant (TPMA), Trade Asset Controller and
of the purported rank-and-file exempt employees in the Ilocos
Maintenance Coordinator (TACMC), Sales Information Analyst
Plant
(SIA), Sales Logistics Assistant, Product Supply Coordinator,
§ In not declaring the certification election improper and void
Buyer, Inventory Planner, and Inventory Analyst as confidential
§ In disregarding the fact that IMU is the sole existing bargaining
employees
agent of the rank-and-file professional and technical
§ Also argued that IPTEU failed to comply with the 20%
employees of the Ilocos Plant
membership requirement based on all the supposed § In ruling that the concerned employees should not be
employees in the bargaining unit it seeks to operate prohibited by joining any union
• The possibility of a voluntary recognition or consent election was not acceded to
by the CCBPI. ISSUE: W/N the employees are confidential employees: NO
• Mediator-Arbiter Florence Marie A. Gaccad-Ulep granted IPTEU’s petition, JUDGMENT: Petition DENIED; CA Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
convinced the union members are rank-and-file employees and not occupying
positions that are supervisory or confidential in nature. HELD
• Sept. 10, 2007: Pre-election Conference. CCBPI and IPTEU mutually agreed to
conduct the certification election on Sept. 21. On election day, only 16 of the 22 Re: IMU membership
employees in the IPTEU list voted. No votes were canvassed.
• CCBPI filed and registered a Protest questioning the conduct and mechanics of • As proven by the certification of the IMU President and the CBAs executed
the election and a Challenge to Votes on the ground that the voters are between IMU and CCBPI, the 22 employees sought to be represented by IPTEU
supervisory and confidential employees. are not IMU members and are not included in the CBAs due to reclassification of
their positions.
• Sept. 26, 2007: Parties met by agreement for the opening and counting of the
• If they were false, the M-A should have manifested its vigorous opposition.
challenged votes.
• Oct. 22, 2007: M-A denied CCBPI’s challenge to the 16 votes. • M-A noted that
 o The most tenacious resistance to the granting of the Petition and the
holding of the Certification Election has been management; existing
unions at CCBPI, especially the IMU of which most of the IPTEU
members were once part (until they were considered outside the ambit
of its existing bargaining unit), never once opposed the aforementioned.
o Between the Management and IMU, the latter has more to lose; the
creation of a separate bargaining unit would reduce the scope of IMU’s
bargaining unit. Yet, there has been substantial moral support extended
to [IPTEU] by the other Unions of CCBPI. They were even willing to be
present during the Certification Election.
Re: Confidential employees [Main topic]
• As to whether the 16 voters sought to be excluded from the appropriate
bargaining unit are confidential employees, such query is a question of fact,
which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules. This holds more true in the present case in view of the consistent findings
of the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE, and the CA.
• The office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC requires
that it shall raise only questions of law.
o Factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the DOLE, when
supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view
of their expertise in their respective fields.
o Not Court’s function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence
adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of
both the TC and the appellate court on the matter coincide.
o The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision of
errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence.
o Absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment,
and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate
court be amply demonstrated, the Court may not disturb such factual
findings.
• The determination of factual issues is vested on the Mediator-Arbiter and the
Department of Labor and Employment. Pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from resolving such controversies unless
the case falls under recognized and well-established exceptions.
o The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
• ITC, organizational charts, detailed job descriptions, and training programs were
presented by CCPI before the M-A, SOLE, and CA.
• M-A ruled that employees who encounter or handle trade secrets and
financial information are not automatically classified as confidential
employees.
o Subject employees encounter and handle financial as well as
physical production data and other information considered vital
and important from the business operations’ standpoint.
o Such information is not the kind of information relevant to
collective bargaining negotiations and settlement of grievances as
would classify them as confidential employees.
o SOLE, which CA affirmed, likewise held that the questioned voters
do not have access to confidential labor relations information.
• Certainly, access to vital labor information is the imperative consideration.
An employee must assist or act in a confidential capacity and obtain
confidential information relating to labor relations policies. Exposure to
internal business operations of the company is not per se a ground for the
exclusion in the bargaining unit.
• The Court sees no need to belabor the effects of the unresolved notice of appeal
and motion to suspend proceedings filed by CCBPI in September 2007. Suffice it
to say that the substantial merits of the issues raised in said pleadings are the
same as what were already brought to and passed upon by the Mediator-Arbiter,
the SOLE, and the CA.
CENECO v. SEC. OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
G.R. No. 94045 | September 13, 1991 | Regalado, J.
Petitioner: CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO)
Respondents: HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and CENECO
UNION OF RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE)
FACTS:
August 15, 1987: CENECO entered into a CBA with CURE, a labor union
representing its rank-and-file employees, providing for a term of three years from
April1, 1987 to March 31, 1990.
• Dec. 28, 1989: CURE wrote CENECO proposing that renegotiations be
conducted for a new CBA.
• CENECO denied the proposal on the ground that “employees who at the
same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or
join a union for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an
owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners”, as per SC ruling
Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. Romeo A. Young.
However, even prior to CURE’s proposal for CBA negotiations, the CURE General
Assembly already approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that “all union
members shall withdraw, retract, or recall the union members' membership from
CENECO in order to avail of the full benefits under the existing CBA, and the
supposed benefits that our union may avail of under the renewed CBA.”
• Ratified by 259 of 362 union members; CENECO and DOLE- Bacolod were
furnished copies.
Withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO "for the reason that the basis
of withdrawal is not among the grounds covered by Board Resolution 5023 and that
said request is contrary to Board Resolution 5033.”
CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification election, supported by
282 or 72% of the 388 rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit of CENECO.
• CENECO filed a Motion to Dismiss citing Batangas I Electric Cooperative
Labor Union vs. Romeo A. Young.
Med-Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio granted CURE’s petition for certification election,
directing the holding of a certification election between CURE and No Union.
CENECO appealed to Acting SOLE Bienvenido E. Laguesma who issued the However, SOLE’s Order of direct certification of CURE as the exclusive
assailed Order modifying M.A. Serapio’s Order by directly certifying CURE as the bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of CENECO is not proper.
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of CENECO. • EO 111: The direct certification originally allowed under Art.257, LC has
apparently been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive
Hence, this petition. bargaining agent of the workers, in affirmation of the superiority of the
certification election over a SOLE’s direct certification.
ISSUE:
• The mere fact that no opposition is made on a union’s petition for
W/N employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative
are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a CBA- YES certification election does not warrant a direct certification as the most
effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the
RATIO: working force is by certification election.
CENECO’s argument that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the SC ruling in the
BATANGAS case is without merit. RULING:
The questioned Order by SOLE for the direct certification of CURE as the bargaining
• The case merely declared that employees who are at the same time
representative of the employees of CENECO is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for purposes of
collective bargaining. However, nowhere in said case is it stated that The med-arbiter is hereby ordered to conduct a certification election among the rank-
member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing their membership and-file employees of CENECO with CURE and No Union as the choices therein.
in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.
Int’l Catholic Migration Comm’n v. Calleja
SOL. GEN.: Art. I, Sec. 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of CENECO
G.R. No. 85750 and 89331; September 28, 1990; Melencio-Herrera, J.
provides that "any member may withdraw from membership upon compliance with
such uniform terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe."
Facts
• Same section provides that upon withdrawal, the member is merely required Two consolidated cases involving the validity of the claim of immunity by the Int’l
to surrender his membership certificate and he is to be refunded his Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the Int’l Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
membership fee less any obligation that he has with the cooperative. from the application of Philippine labor laws.
SC: There appears to be no other condition or requirement imposed upon a
withdrawing member. Hence, there is no just cause for CENECO’s denial of the The ICMC Case
withdrawal from membership of its employees who are also members of the • By virtue of an Agreement between the Phil. Government and the UN High
union. Commissioner for Refugees, an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese
refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was established in
2
The alleged board resolutions relied upon by petitioner in denying the withdrawal of Bataan .
the members concerned were never presented nor their contents disclosed either • ICMC was one of those accredited by the Phil. Government to operate the
before the med-arbiter or the Secretary of Labor if only to prove the ratiocination for refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York
said denial. as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian work.
• Furthermore, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis. Hence, • The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed a
withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by
organization necessarily includes the equivalent right not to join the same. ICMC.
• ICMC opposed on the ground that it is an international organization registered
The employees’ right to self-organization is a compelling reason why with the UN and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
withdrawal from the coop must be allowed. • The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the
• CURE: The resignation of the member-employees is an expression of their Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) reversed and ordered
preference for union membership over that of membership in the immediate conduct of the certification election.
cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to labor • Subsequently, however, the Phil. Government, through DFA, granted ICMC the
and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the status of a specialized agent with corresponding diplomatic privileges and
employees' right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining immunities.
be accorded the highest consideration.
• SC: Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the The IRRI Case
member a right to vote during the annual meeting becomes too trivial and
insubstantial vis-a-vis the primordial and more important constitutional right
of an employee to join a union of his choice.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2

 This
 is
 in
 response
 to
 the
 crisis
 involving
 the
 plight
 of
 Vietnamese
 refugees
 fleeing
 
from
 South
 Vietnam’s
 communist
 rule
 after
 the
 Vietnam
 War.
 
 
 • The Phil. Government and the Ford and Rockefeller signed a memorandum
establishing the IRRI which was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic,
tax-free, non-profit, non-stock organization designed to conduct research on the
rice plant, rice production, etc.
• IIRI was initially organized and registered with the SEC as a private corporation
subject to all laws and regulations. By virtue, however, of PD No. 1620, IRRI
was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges, and immunities of an
international organization.
• The Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI (Kapisanan) filed a Petition for
Direct Certification Election which was opposed by IRRI invoking PD No. 1620
granting it immunity from all civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings under
Philippine Laws.
• The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition. On appeal, the BLR Director reversed
the Order and authorized the calling of a certification election. However, the
SOLE dismissed the Petition for Certification Election holding that the grant of
the specialized agency to the IRRI bars DOLE from assuming and exercising
jurisdiction over IRRI.
Issue/Held/Ratio
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC and
IRRI extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws — YES it
does.
• There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international
immunities to international organizations:
1. International institutions should have a status which protects them
against control or interference by any one government in the
performance of functions for effective discharge of which they are
responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which
all the nations concerned are represented.
2. No country should derive any national financial advantage by levying
charges on common international funds
3. The international organization should be accorded facilities for the
conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its
individual member States.
• The raison d’ etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded
performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.
• The exercise of jurisdiction by the DOLE in these instances would defeat the
very purposes of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure
or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
• ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity, however, does deprive labor of its basic rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
a. For ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are
disputes to be settled. Sec. 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the UN provides that each
specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of disputes. Furthermore, the Government is free to withdraw
the privileges and immunities accorded whenever there is any abuse of
privilege by ICMC (pursuant to the MOA between ICMC and PH Gov’t.)
b. For employees of IRRI, there had been organized a forum for better
management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of
the Council of IRRI Employees and Management wherein “both
management and employees were and still are represented for
purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between
IRRI and its employees.”
[ICMC] BLR Order SET ASIDE. [IRRI] SOLE Decision AFFIRMED.
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Drilon
G.R. No. 91307 | January 24, 1991
Gutierrez, J.
Topic: Excluded Employees/Workers; Non-employees
Petitioner: SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY
Respondents: HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, MED-ARBITER FELIX B. CHAGUILE,
JR., and SINGER MACHINE COLLECTORS UNION-BAGUIO (SIMACUB)
Facts:
• Singer Machine Collectors Union-Baguio (SIMACUB) filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of the
Singer Sewing Machine Company, Baguio City branch
• Such was opposed by Singer, mainly on the ground that the union members are
not employees but are independent contractors as evidenced by the collection
agency agreement which they signed
• Med-Arbiter: granted SIMACUB’s petition for certification election; there exists an
ER-EE relationship between the union members and the Company
• Singer appealed to SOLE; SOLE affirmed Med-Arbiter
o MR denied
• Thus, this case
• Singer’s allegations:
a) DOLE has no jurisdiction over the case bc the existence of ER-EE relationship
is at issue;
b) the right of petitioner to due process was denied when the evidence of the
union members' being commission agents was disregarded by the Labor
Secretary;
c) the public respondents patently erred in finding that there exists an employer-
employee relationship;
d) the public respondents whimsically disregarded the well-settled rule that
commission agents are not employees but are independent contractors
• SIMACUB’s arguments: the provisions of the Collection Agency Agreement show
that the union mems are employees, not independent contractors; the union
members “perform the most desirable and necessary activities for the continuous
and effective operations of the business of the petitioner Company" (citing Art.
280, LC); the termination of the agreement by Singer, pending the resolution of
the case before the DOLE, shows the weakness of Singer’s stand and was for
the purpose of frustrating the constitutionally mandated rights of the members of
private respondent union to self-organization and collective organization; under
Section 8, Rule 8, Book No. III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code which defines job-contracting, they cannot legally qualify as independent
contractors who must be free from control of the alleged employer, who carry
independent businesses and who have substantial capital or investment in the
form of equipment, tools, and the like necessary in the conduct of the business
Issue/s:
W/N the collection agents of the company have the right to form a labor
organization for purposes of collective bargaining – NO bc they are not
employees of the company
Judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated June 14,1989 of Med-Arbiter Designate Felix B.
Chaguile, Jr., the Resolution and Order of Secretary Franklin M. Drilon dated
November 2, 1989 and December 14, 1989, respectively are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petition for certification election is ordered dismissed and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on December 21, 1989 is made
permanent.
Ratio:
• SC: The union members are not employees, thus, no right to organize for
purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as such bargaining agent can
ever be recognized
o There is no constitutional and legal basis for their "union" to be granted
their petition for direct certification
o The question of whether ER-EE relationship exists is a primordial
consideration before extending labor benefits; it is important in the
determination of who shall be included in a proposed bargaining
unit because, it is the sine qua non, the fundamental and essential
condition that a bargaining unit be composed of employees
§ Failure to establish this juridical relationship between the
union members and the employer affects the legality of
the union itself; it means the ineligibility of the union members
to present a petition for certification election as well as to vote
therein
• Elements considered to determine the existence of ER-EE relationship:
o Selection and engagement of the employee
o Payment of wages
o Power of dismissal
o Power to control the employee's conduct
• The Collection Agency Agreement stipulate the ff:
o A collector is designated as a collecting agent who is to be
considered an independent contractor and not employee of the
Company
o Collection of all payments on installment accounts are to be made
monthly or oftener
o An agent shall utilize only receipt forms authorized and issued by the
Company and shall submit and deliver at least once a week or as often
as required a report of all collections made using report forms furnished
by the Company
o An agent is paid his compensation for service in the form of a
commission of 6% of all collections made and turned over plus a bonus
on said collections and is required to post a cash bond to assure the
faithful performance and observance of the terms and conditions under
the agreement
o The agent is subject to all the terms and conditions in the agreement
o The agreement is effective for one year from the date of its execution
and renewable on a yearly basis
o An agent’s services shall be terminated in case of failure to satisfy the
minimum monthly collection performance required, failure to post a cash
bond, or cancellation of the agreement at the instance of either party
unless the agent has a pending obligation or indebtedness in favor of
the Company
• SIMACUB argues that stipulations in the agreement shows that the company
exercises control over the means by which an agent is to perform his services
(such as required monthly collection quota, required utilization of receipt forms
authorized and issued by Singer, and required regular submissions of reports of
all collections made using forms furnished by Singer)
• SC: the nature of the relationship between a company and its collecting
agents depends on the circumstances of each particular relationship
o Not all collecting agents are employees and neither are all collecting
agents independent contractors
• HERE, the aside from the agreement explicitly stating that the collecting
agents are independent contractors, the provisions permit them to perform
collection services for the company without being subject to the control of
the latter except only as to the result of their work
o The requirement that collection agents utilize only receipt forms and
report forms issued by Singer and that reports shall be submitted at
least once a week: not necessarily an indication of control over the
means by which the job of collection is to be performed; even if the
requirements are to be called control measures, such is only with
respect to the end result of the collection since the requirements
regulate the things to be done after the performance of the collection job
or the rendition of the service
§ Receipt forms were used to avoid co-mingling of personal
funds of the agent with the money collected on behalf of the
company
 § The use of standard report forms and the regular time within
which to submit a report of collection were intended to facilitate
order in office procedures
o The monthly collection quota is a normal requirement found in similar
contractual agreements and is stipulated to encourage a collecting
agent to report at least the minimum amount of proceeds
• It is clear that the company and each collecting agent intended that the
former take control only over the amount of collection, which is a result of
the job performed
• Also, the following facts show the non-existence of ER-EE relationship between
the parties:
o The collection agents are not required to observe office hours or
report to Singer's office everyday except for the purpose of remitting
their collections
o The collection agents do not have to devote their time exclusively
for Singer; no prohibition from working elsewhere nor are the agents
required to account for their time and submit a record of their activity
o The manner and method of effecting collections are left solely to
the discretion of the collection agents without any interference on
the part of Singer
o The collection agents shoulder their transportation expenses incurred in
the collections of the accounts assigned to them
o The collection agents are paid strictly on commission basis; the
amounts paid are based solely on the amounts of collection each of
them make and they do not receive any commission if they do not effect
any collection even if they put a lot of effort in collecting
o The commissions earned by the collection agents are directly deducted
by them from the amount of collections they are able to effect; the net
amount is what is remitted to Singer
• Art. 280, LC is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an
employment relationship because it merely distinguishes between kinds of
employees for purposes of determining the right of an employee to certain
benefits, to join or form a union, or to security of tenure
o Any agreement may provide that one party shall render services for and
in behalf of another for a consideration even without being hired as an
employee such as in cases of an independent contractorship and an
agency agreement
• Sec. 8, Rule 8, Book III of the Omnibus Rules does not apply
o There is no showing that a collection agent needs tools and machineries
o Also, such provision must be viewed in relation to Art. 106
§ The provisions are relevant only in determining whether the
employer is solidarily liable to the employees of an alleged
contractor and/or sub-contractor for unpaid wages in case it is
proven that there is a job-contracting situation
Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz, President, Cebu Shipyard & Engineering
Works, Inc.
G.R. L-30241 | June 30, 1972
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
-­‐ Defendant corporation Cebu Shipyard &Engineering Works Inc. in Lapulapu
city is employing laborers ad employees belonging to rival labor unions. 72
laborers or employees whose name appears in the complaint, belong to
Mactan workers Union, and the rest belong to Interbenor Associated Labor
Union.
-­‐ November 28, 1964: defendant corporation and the Associated Labor Union
entered into a CBA,
o Art XIII: The Company agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its
employees and laborers to be taken from ten per cent (10%) of its
net profits or net income derived from the direct operation of its
shipyard and shop in Lapulapu City and after deducting the income
tax and the bonus annually given to its General Manager and the
Superintendent and the members of the Board of Directors and
Secretary of the Corporation
o Payable in two installments: March and June.
o Only the income derived by the Company from the direct operation
o its shipyeard and shop in Lapulapu (commencing from 1964)
shall be included in the computation
o It shall be the duty of the Associated Labor Union to furnish and
deliver to the company the corresponding receipts duly signed by
the laborers and employees entitled to receive the profit-sharing
bonus within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt by it
from the company of the profit-sharing bonus.
o If a laborer or employee of the company does not want to accept
the profit-sharing bonus which the said employee or laborer is
entitled under this Agreement, it shall be the duty of the Associated
Labor Union to return the money received by it as profit-sharing
bonus to the Company within a period of sixty (60) days from the
receipt by the Union from the Company of the said profit-sharing
bonus.
-­‐ The defendant delivered o the ALU the profit-sharing bonus corresponding
to the first installment for the year 1965. Again in June 1965 the defendant
corporation delivered to the Associated Labor Union the profit-sharing bonus
corresponding to the second installment for 1965.
-­‐ The members of the Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their shares in
the second installment of bonus because they did not like to go to the office
of the ALU to collect their shares. In accordance with the terms of the
collective bargaining after 60 days, the uncollected shares of the plaintiff
union members was returned by the ALU to the defendant corporation.
-­‐ At the same time the defendant corporation was advised by the ALU not to
deliver the said amount to the members of the Mactan Workers Union unless
ordered by the Court, otherwise the ALU will take such step to protect the
interest of its members ... . Because this warning given by the intervenor
union the defendant corporation did not pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P4,035.82 which was returned by the Associated Labor Union, but instead,
deposited the said amount with the Labor Administrator.
-­‐ Mactan Workers Union filed a money claim (P4,035.82) representing the
second installment of a profit-sharing agreement under a collective
 bargaining contract entered into between such business firm and intervenor
labor union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of its
workers.
o Successful in both in the City Court of Lapulapu as well as in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (February 22, 1968)
o Ordered the defendants to deliver to the Associated Labor Union
the sum of P4,035.82 for distribution to the employees of the
defendant corporation who are members of the Mactan Workers
Union; and ordering the intervenor Associated Labor Union,
immediately after receipt of the said amount, to pay the members of
the Mactan Workers Union their corresponding shares in the profit-
sharing bonus for the second installments for the year 1965.
-­‐ This appeal was interposed by intervenor Associated Labor Union.
RATIO:
W/N the intervenor ALU & defendant company violated the terms and
conditions of the CBA – YES
-­‐ The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute
the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can
invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not
fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress. Nor does
it suffice as a defense that the claim is made on behalf of non-members of
intervenor Associated Labor Union, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the
benefits of a collective bargaining agreement extend to the laborers and
employees in the collective bargaining unit, including those who do not
belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. Any other view would be
a discrimination on which the law frowns. It is appropriate that such should
be the case.
-­‐ United Restauror's Employees and Labor Union v. Torres: "the right to be
the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit is vested in the labor union 'designated or selected' for such
purpose 'by the majority of the employees' in the unit concerned." (Sanchez,
J)
-­‐ If it were otherwise, the highly salutory purpose and objective of the
collective bargaining scheme to enable labor to secure better terms in
employment condition as well as rates of pay would be frustrated insofar as
non-members are concerned, deprived as they are of participation in
whatever advantages could thereby be gained. The labor union that gets
the majority vote as the exclusive bargaining representative does not
act for its members alone. It represents all the employees in such a
bargaining unit. It is not to be indulged in any attempt on its part to
disregard the rights of non-members.
W/N there were procedural lapses – NO
-­‐ Intervenor Associated Labor Union, laboring under such a predicament had
perforce to rely on what it considered procedural lapses. It would assail the
alleged lack of a cause of action, of jurisdiction of the City Court of Lapulapu
and of personality of the Mactan Workers Union to represent its members.
There is no merit to such an approach.
-­‐ Anent the lack of cause of action: How can the allegation of a lack of a
cause of action be taken seriously when precisely there was a right violated
on the part of the members of plaintiff Mactan Workers Union, a grievance
that called for redress?
-­‐ Anent the jurisdiction of the City Court of Lapulapu: The amount
claimed by plaintiff Mactan Workers Union on behalf of its members was
P4,035.82 and if the damages and attorney's fees be added, the total sum
was less than P10,000.00.
o Section 88 of the Judiciary Act in providing for the original
jurisdiction of city courts in civil cases provides: "In all civil actions,
including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two (now
Rules 57 and 60) of the Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or
city, and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance,
the municipal judge and the judge of a city court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the value of the subject
matter or amount of the demand does not exceed ten
thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs.”
o It is true that if an element of unfair labor practice may be discerned
in a suit for the enforcement of a collective bargaining contract,
then the matter is solely cognizable by the Court of Industrial
Relations. It is equally true that as of the date the lower court
decision was rendered, the question of such enforcement had been
held to be for the regular courts to pass upon.
o Seno v . Mendoza (Makalintal, J.): "As the issue involved in the
instant case, although arising from a labor dispute, does not refer to
one affecting an industry which is indispensable to the national
interest and certified by the President to the Industrial Court, nor to
minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law, nor to hours of
employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, nor to an unfair labor
practice, but seeks the enforcement of a provision of the collective
bargaining agreement, ..., jurisdiction pertains to the ordinary courts
and not to the Industrial Court."
-­‐ Anent Mactan Workers Union personality to represent its workers:
There was only a half-hearted attempt, if it could be called that, to lend
credence to the third error assigned, namely that plaintiff Mactan Workers
Union could not file the suit on behalf of its members. That is evident by
intervenor Associated Labor Union devoting only half a page in its brief to
such an assertion. It is easy to see why it should be thus. On its face, it
certainly appeared to be oblivious of how far a labor union can go, or is
expected to, in the defense of the rights of its rank and file. There was an
element of surprise, considering that such a contention came from a labor
organization, which under normal condition should be the last to lay itself
open to a charge that it is not averse to denigrating the effectiveness of labor
unions.
W/N the intervenor ALU only reprsents its members and not the entire
workforce of the defendant company – NO
 -­‐ The Labor union hat gets the majority vote s the exclusive bargaining
representative does not act for its members alone it represents all the
employees in such a bargaining unit. What is entitled to constitutional
protection is labor, or more specifically the working men and women, not
labor organizations. The latter are merely the instrumentalities through which
their welfare may be promoted and fostered. That is the raison d'etre of labor
unions. The utmost care should be taken then, lest in displaying an
unyielding, intransigent attitude on behalf of their members, injustice be
committed against opposing labor organizations. In the final analysis, they
alone are not the sole victims, but the labor movement itself, which may well
be the recipient of a crippling blow. Moreover, while it is equally
understandable that their counsel would take advantage of every legal
doctrine deemed applicable or conjure up any defense that could serve their
cause, still, as officers of the court, there should be an awareness that resort
to such a technique does result in clogged dockets, without the least
justification especially so if there be insistence on flimsy and insubstantial
contentions just to give some semblance of plausibility to their pleadings.
Certainly, technical virtuosity, or what passes for it, is no substitute for an
earnest and sincere desire to assure that there be justice according to law.
That is a creed to which all members of the legal profession, labor lawyers
not excluded, should do their best to live by.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of February 22, 1968 is affirmed. Costs
against Associated Labor Union.