LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO.

OF LDB EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995

FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on
promotion. The parties agreed to submit their respective Position Papers. Atty.
Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper;
LDB, and no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. Without LDB’s Position Paper,
the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision that the Bank has not adhered to the
CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion. Hence,a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to
prohibit her from enforcing the same.

ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC

HELD: YES. The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by RA. 7902, provides that the Court of
Appeals shall exercise:
“(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of RTC s and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities...” The
voluntary arbitrators are comprehended within the concept of a “quasi-judicial
instrumentality. The word “instrumentality,” with respect to a state, contemplates
an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state
function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions
therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the
term “instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the
decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the CA. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from
that award or decision, the CA must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction
with the SC. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court
of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.

Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 102976, October 25, 1995

FACTS: The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD No. 272, to develop
and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Initially, it was created
for a term of 5 years but was extended for another 10 years by another EO. The
National Steel Corporation (NSC), then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is an entity owned by the National Government
embarked on an expansion program including the construction of a steel mill in
Iligan City. A proclamation was issued by the President withdrawing from sale or
settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be used by the NSC. However, certain
portions of the public land were occupied by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Co. (MCFC).
LOI No. 1277 was issued directing NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC for
and on behalf of the Government for the compensation of MCFC’s and further
directed that ISA may exercise the power of eminent domain should the
negotiations fail. Since it failed, ISA commenced expropriation proceedings. While
trial was on-going, the statutory existence of ISA had expired prompting MCFC to
file the dismissal of the case since ISA has ceased to be a juridical person. ISA
urged that the Republic of the Philippines should be allowed to be substituted in
its place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted

for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

HELD: Yes. ISA appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court considers that ISA is
properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with legal
personality. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency
revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the
absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof.
Since ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded
back into the Government of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the
Republic. It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted
in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term
of ISA having expired. The expiration of ISA’s statutory did not by itself require or
justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

Republic v. CA (1991)
G.R. 90482

FACTS: Republic Planters Bank (RPB) filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of
money/delivery of personal property with restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction against Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the National
Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). They asked the court to order PHILSUCOM
and NASUTRA to render a faithful account and inventory of different bank
accounts being held and sugar stocks for the crop. Before PHILSUCOM and
NASUTRA could answer, a compromise agreement was submitted and was
approved by the lower court. EO 18 created SRA to take over the functions of the
defunct PHILSUCOM; however, the latter was to remain a judicial entity for three
more years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits against it. An
appeal by certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, filed by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the SRA and the
RPB.

ISSUE:
1. Whether SRA can bring an action in behalf of the Government?
2. Whether OGCC can bring an action in behalf of the Government?

HELD:

1. NO. SRA may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) and that the OGCC does not have the authority to represent the
petitioner in this case nor the RP. SRA is an administrative agency, a government
body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation. The
charter does not specifically include the power to represent the RP in suits,
having withheld from SRA, it follows that it cannot institute the instant petition.

2. NO. OGCC also cannot represent SRA nor the Republic of the Philippines. OGCC
is the principal law office of all GOCCs including subsidiaries; the president may
not allow it to act as lawyer for a specified GOCC or subsidiary. Since SRA is
neither a GOCC nor a subsidiary, OGCC does not have the authority to represent
it.

Maria Elena Malaga, et al. v. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al. GR No. 86695
September 3, 1992

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its (PBAC) caused the
publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory
Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of prequalification
requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened
on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2
December 1988. They were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of
10 am of 2 December. Petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the
chairman and PBAC members. Respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining
order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project.
Defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court
was prohibited from issuing restraining orders by PD No. 1818, which provides:
“Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order… in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project… of the government… to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project…” Petitioners argue against the applicability of
PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own
charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of
any local political subdivision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such

that it would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.

HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as

follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCC’s. It is clear from
the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered
by PD 1818.

Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)

FACTS: Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute,
applied for a Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the rank, the
CSC passed Resolution No. 93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board
(CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission
(OCES).

ISSUE: Whether or not CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing

the CESB and transferring its budget to OCES .

HELD: CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. Under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-
related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program
coordination.” While CSC has the power to reorganize under Administrative Code
of 1987, CESB is not one of the offices under CSC. CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to CSC. This essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent
Commission.
De La Llana v. Alba

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts
from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA,
unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency
that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the
security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices
and judges as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the
judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the
abolition of their offices. Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does
not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position.
It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Lianga Bay Logging v. Judge Enage
July 16, 1987

FACTS: The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are
adjacent to each other with a common boundary whereby the eastern boundary of
respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. Because of
reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the
Director of Forestry fixed the common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago
Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. In an appeal by respondent
Ago, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, set aside the
decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled another common boundary line of
the licensed areas more favorable to Ago. Petitioner elevated the case to the
Office of the President which affirmed the ruling of the then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. But upon motion for reconsideration reversed
the decision of the then Acting Secretary and affirming in toto and reinstating the
decision of the Director of Forestry. Thereafter, Ago brought the action in the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has authority to hear and decide the case.

RULING: The CFI has no competence nor authority to review anew the decision in
administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of forestry,
secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries
of the Office of the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the
licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms the
established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board or agency or
official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed
except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily
and without regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

Solid Homes, Inc. v. Teresita Payawal

August 29, 1989
FACTS: Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes at
the RTC for failure to deliver the certificate of title despite of repeated demands by
Payawal because defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith. Solid Homes
averred that jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to
PD 957, as amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA. Payawal
contended that RTC has jurisdiction of civil cases on real properties pursuant to BP
129.
ISSUE: Whether or not NHA had jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. The National Housing Authority has the jurisdiction. PD No 957, as
amended by PD No 1344, provided that the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on specific performance on
contractual obligations and claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot owners or condo unit buyers against project owner, developer,
dealer, broker, or salesman. In case of conflict between a general law and a special
law, the latter must prevail, thus PD 1344 prevails over BP 129. As a result of the
growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified
activities.

Tatad vs Department of Energy

Facts:
The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The
deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and the (b) full
deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not
provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when
the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when
the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of power.
RULING
No. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or
not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, to wit: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start
at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on
the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March
1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President.
He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
US VS Barrias
Facts
The defendant, Aniceto Barrias, was caught navigating the Pasig River using a
lighter, which is a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 Circular No. 397 of the Insular
Collector of Customs. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows “No
heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in
the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate
power.” Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows “For the violation of any part of the
foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less
than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.”
This Circular was promulgated through Act No. 1136 which authorized the
Collector of Customes to regulate the business of lighterage. Act No. 1136 provides
that the Collector may promulgate rules for its implementation. It further provides
that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars.
Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two
grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second,
that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing
the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal
delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Collector is authorized to impose a fine of more than
what is fixed by Act No. 1136?
RULING
No. Although the Collector has been authorized to publish rules and
regulations for the implementation of Act No. 1136, he was not allowed to
implement a fine beyond what the legislature has already fixed. Thus, there is an
illegal delegation of power in this case.
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred
upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any
body or authority. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the
matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.
SMART AND PILTEL VS NTC
FACTS
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the
billing of telecommunications services. On August 30 of the same year, the NTC
issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators
which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of
stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities.
Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A.
Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order.
 Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to
the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines.
Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted
by the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies are applicable in this case.
RULING
NO. The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies are not applicable in the case at bar. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. In like manner,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function.
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-
6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-
legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity
of the said issuances.
VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997
Facts:
The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty
(140) hectares to four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public
domain, but the petitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired the
property, have been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for
some time. After acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more
than fifty (50) years.
In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit
Lumber Co.Inc. However, an “Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights” was
entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the
requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property
since then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over
the property to bolster his claim which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on
the same year as proof of an “Order of Award” issued.
In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned
and made several collateral and extraneous claims against the respondent.
However, the Bureau of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner no
longer has any substantial rights to question the validity of acquisition of the
respondent and the subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands.
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of
Natural Resources which likewise dismissed the petition.
On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the trial court for “Declaration
of Nullity of Contract ( Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession
(of two parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages” at about the same
time that he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the
Office of the President. On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioner’s heir
substituted in his behalf to pursue the claim. The trial court in Butuan City who
initially take cognizance of the case ordered the case dismissed, on the grounds
that: (1) petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the contract
and was estopped from proving its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were
unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code, and (3) his causes of
action were barred by extinctive prescription and/or laches.
The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal
by upholding the lower court’s ruling.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court shall rely on the factual findings of the Bureau of
Lands especially those affirmed by the Minister (now Secretary) of Natural
Resources and the trial court.
RULING
Yes. Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in this case,
since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual
qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a
technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with
the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior
judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
Clearly, this issue falls under the primary jurisdiction of the Director of Lands
because its resolution requires "survey, classification, disposition and management
of the lands of the public domain." It follows that his rulings deserve great respect.
As petitioner failed to show that this factual finding of the Director of Lands was
unsupported by substantial evidence, it assumes finality. Thus, both the trial and
the appellate courts correctly relied on such finding.
Miller v. Mardo
GR No. L-15138

FACTS: Gonzales, caliming to be a driver of Miller Motors, filed with the Regional
Office of DOLE a complaint against his employer Miller for allegedly dismissing him
arbitrarily without separation pay. Miller filed before CFI a petition to prohibit
DOLE from proceeding with the case for having no jurisdiction to hear and decide
the subject matter. He questioned the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under RA997 as amended by
RA 1241 in so far as it confers jurisdiction to DOLE in deciding claims of laborers for
wages, overtime and separation pay. RA 1241 was empowered to abolish
departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create
those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service,
activities, and functions. Before Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, DOLE has no power
to settles cases on separation pay and other money claims.

ISSUE: Whether the conferment by RO Plan 20-A to DOLE of jurisdiction to take

cognizance of cases affecting money claims and separation is valid.

RULING: No. Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the
Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's
Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect. The "functions" referred in RA
1241 which could thus be created, are merely to administrative, not judicial
functions which plainly did not include the creation of courts. such conferment can
not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government
Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with
the reorganization of the Executive Branch.

Victoria Milling v. SSC

GR No L-16704 (1962)

FACTS: The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on requiring all
employers in computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all
bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of other media
remuneration. Petitioner protest against the circular as it is contrary to a previous
Circular No. 7 which excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers’ and the employees’ respective monthly premium contributions as per
their interpretation of RA 1161 to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the
approval of the President such rules and regulations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161.

RULING: No. The Commission’s Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation but a
mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general
policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. When an administrative
agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law The Circular purports merely to advise employers-members of
the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law.

People v. Jolliffe
G.R. No. L-9553 (1959)

FACTS:

On Dec. 7, 1953, when appellant was about to board a plane of the Pan American
World Airways, four pieces of gold bullion were found in his body. Appellant was
charged with and convicted of violation of RA 265 because gold bullion and the
traveler’s check were found in his possession. He challenged the validity of Circular
No. 21 of the Central Bank on the ground that it is an undue delegation of powers.
Said circular requiring license and violations thereof refer to consummated
exportation, not to attempted or frustrated exportation. Republic Act No. 265
conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to
licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Circular no. 21 is valid and if there is undue delegation.

HELD:
The grant of authority to the Monetary Board to issue Circular No. 21 does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. RA 265 conferred upon the
Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transaction
in gold and foreign exchange furnishes concrete and definite standards which
sufficiently mark the field within which the Monetary Board is to act in the
enforcement of the law.
Case No. 9
Matienzon vs Abellera
162 SCRA 1
Facts: The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators
in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate “colorum” or
“kabit” taxicab units. On or about the second week of February 1977, private
respondents filed their petitions with the Board of Transportation (BOT) for the
legalization of their unauthorized “excess” taxicabs citing PD No. 101 which was
promulgated on 17 January 1973. Within a matter of days, the respondent Board
promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and granting applicants’
provisional authority to operate their “excess” taxicab units for which legalization
was sought.

Opposing the application and seeking for the annulment and inhibition of the
grant of provisional permits or special authority by the BOT, the petitioners argue
that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the
time of the petition were filed (1977), to legitimize clandestine operations under
PD 101 as the power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after
the promulgation of the Decree. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and
becomes functus officio.

Issue: Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab
operations under PD 101 despite the lapse of six (6) months after the
promulgation of the Decree.

Ruling: Yes. One of the provision of PD 101 shows the power “to grant special
permits of limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in
the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine
operators into legitimate and responsible operators” without the allege time
limitation. There is nothing in the Decree that suggest the expiration of such
powers six (6) months after its promulgation, it only declares when the period of
moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall
end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction under
its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public
convenience to achieved the avowed purpose of PD 101.

Case No. 10
Chung Ka Bio vs IAC
163 SCRA 534, 545-546
Facts: Chung Ka Bio and the other petitioners herein, all stockholders of the old
Philippine Blooming Mill Company, Inc. (PBM). They filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for liquidation of both the old and new
PBM. The allegation was that the former had become legally non-existent for
failure to extend its corporate life and that the latter had likewise been ipso facto
dissolved for non-use of the charter and continuous failure to operate within two
(2) years from incorporation.

PBM was incorporated for a term of 25 years. The members of its board of
directors executed a deed of assignment of all the accounts receivables,
properties, obligations and liabilities of the old PBM in favor of Chung Siong Pek in
his capacity as treasurer of the new PBM, then in the process of reincorporation.
The new PBM was issued a certificate of incorporation by the SEC.
Issue: 1. Whether or not failure to file by-laws within the required period will
automatically operate to dissolve a corporation.
2. Whether or not SEC has no jurisdiction over a petition for suspension of
payments filed by an individual only.
Ruling: 1. No. Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of
the corporation. Under Sec. 6 (1) of PD 910-A, the SEC is empowered to “suspend
or revoked, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of
registration of a corporation” on the ground inter alia of “failure to file by-laws
within the required period. It is clear from this provision that there must first of all
be a hearing to determine the existence of the ground, and secondly, assuming
such finding, the penalty is not necessarily revocation but may only be suspension
of the charter. In fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the
by-laws on time may be penalized merely with the imposition of an administrative
fine without affecting the corporate existence of the erring firm.
2. No. Although SEC, like any administrative agency is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction and, as such, can exercise only those powers which are specifically
granted to them by their enabling statutes. However, the court justifies
assumption by the SEC of jurisdiction over the petition for suspension of payment
filed by an individual on the general principle against multiplicity of suits. Citing
Sec. 5(d) of PD 902-A, such jurisdiction may be exercised only by “corporations,
partnerships or associations” and does not allow a mere individual to file a petition
for suspension of payments.

Case No. 11
GSIS vs Civil Service Commission
202 SCRA 799
Facts: In May 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six
(6) employees as being “notoriously undesirable,” they having allegedly been
found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.
Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merits Systems Board. The
Board found the dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges
having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and
ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary
proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission which then ruled
that the dismissal was indeed illegal and directed to reinstate the employees with
payment of back salaries and benefits due them. Unconvinced, GSIS appealed to
the Supreme Court. The SC modified the payment of back salaries to private
respondents until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.

Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service
Resolution so that back wages can be paid. However, GSIS opposed the motion
arguing that the CSC Resolution was superseded by the SCs decision.
Nevertheless, the CSC granted the motion for execution, directing the GSIS the pay
the compulsory heirs of the 2 deceased dismissed employees.
Thus, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Civil Service has no power to execute its judgments and final
orders or resolutions.
Ruling: Yes. The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional commission invested
by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the
civil service but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it
on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules
should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear
absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious to
decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that was has
been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally
and logically deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the
judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Case No. 12
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative Inc. vs Torres
Facts: Petitioner Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative (CANORECO) is an electric
cooperative organized under the provisions of PD 269 , otherwise known as the
National Electrification Administration Decree, as amended by PD 1645.
CANORECO registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
pursuant to RA 6938. On 1995, the CDA then issued a Certificate of Provisional
Registration to CANORECO effective for two years. On 1995, the CDA extended this
provisional registration until 1997. However, on 1996, CANORECO filed with the
CDA its approved amendments to its Articles of Cooperation converting itself from
a non-stock to a stock cooperative pursuant to the provisions of RA 6938 and the
Omnibus Implementing Rules and Regulations on Electric Cooperatives. On the
same date, the CDA issued a Certificate of Registration of the amendments to
CANORECO Articles of Cooperation certifying that CANORECO is registered as a
full-fledged cooperative.

However, the member of the Board of CANORECO were in an intra-cooperative

dispute which led to the issuance of Memorandum Order 409 by the President of
the Philippines constituting an ad hoc committee to temporarily take over and
manage the affairs of CANORECO.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the President can validly constitute an ad hoc
committee to take over and manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?

Ruling: No. The pertinent laws on cooperative, namely, RA 6938 and 6939 and PD
269 as amended by PD 1645 do not provide for the President or any other
administrative body to take over the internal management of a cooperative.
Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to Sec. 128 of RA 6938 and Sec. 17
of RA 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said laws. Art. 38 of RA
6938 vests upon the board of directors the conduct and management of the affairs
of cooperatives, and Art. 39 provides for the powers of the board of directors.
Memorandum Order 409 clearly removed from the Directors of CANORECO the
power to manage its affairs and transferred such powers to the ad hoc committee.
The President does not have the authority to appoint, much less to remove,
members of the board of directors of a private enterprise including electric
cooperatives.

Therefore, Memorandum Order 409 violates the basic underlying principle

enshrined in Article 4(2) of RA 6938 that cooperatives are democratic
organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or
appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to
the policy set forth in Sec. 1 of RA 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in
said Act, maintain a policy of non-interference in the management and operation
of cooperatives.