IV. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE 38. Tison et al vs. In this case, no casual connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on his license Sps Pomasin to the vehicular collision. “Jitney” Art. 2185: The legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any Note: This term was traffic regulation. (WAS NOT APPLIED) used SC: A causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation interchangeably by (Sanitary Steam Laundry vs. CA) the lower court with Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal the word jeepney consequences unless it iis a contributing cause of the injury (Anonuevo vs. CA) – CONTROLLING DECISION Presumptions in law, though convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. 39. Ocean Builders To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts three elements must be present: (1) duty (2) breach (3) vs. Sps Cubacub injury and proximate causation “Chickenpox case” The issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate court's findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well. This finding is not, however, borne by the records. Nowhere is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened A. Doctrine of While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, Proximate such negligence was not a continuing one. Cause It is an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained 40. Fernando vs. CA unscathed. ”Bodies in the An accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. septic tank” The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. 41. Dyteban vs. Jose There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations Ching infra of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. 42. Bataclan vs. The coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the Medina bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. “Torch” “Bus on The driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could fire” and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, 43. Manila Electric Magno was negligent. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in Co. vs. Remoquillo them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him “Media Agua” SC: Rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries ---prior and remote cause cannot be made “Electric Wire the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the Electrocution” occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury. 44. Taylor vs. SC: We are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents Manila Electric was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the “Boys stealing defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. explosive materials” Plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. He well knew the explosive character of the cap. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away. Note: The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate thenature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligent on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts. A minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. 45. Sanitary Steam It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between laundry vs. CA the vehicles. Petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the “Truck vs. violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Cimarron” He must show that the violation of the statute (i.e driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning “Overloading; one headlight during night time) certainly increases the risk of accident was the proximate or legal cause of the headlight” injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. SC: Proximate cause of the accident was negligence of petitioners’ driver. He was running at a high speed and was tailgating the jeepney ahead of him. With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it, such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence. “Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law.” 46. Mercury Drug Art. 2176: Quasi-delict in relation to Art. 2180 on the solidary liability of the employer for the negligent acts of vs. Baking his employee. There is an automatic legal presumption that there has been negligence on the part of the “Wrong pill” employer. Note: This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. 47. BPI vs. Suarez There is nothing in Suarez’s testimony which convincingly shows that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the “Erroneous marking checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered of DAIF by BPI” humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks, not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. –PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED Hence, Suarez had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the justified dishonor of the checks. In short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence. 48. Ramos vs. C.O.L Art. 2179: “When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he Realty cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of “Violated MMDA the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall prohibition against mitigate the damages to be awarded.” corssing Katipunan Art. 2185: “Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been Avenue from Rajah negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.” Matanda” Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. And since his own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. 49. Vallacar Transit Petitioner-employer (Ceres bus) not liable since the liability of his employee-driver for quasi-delict was never vs. Catubig established. “Motorcycle Liability of employer under Art. 2180, flows from the negligence of their employees. In this case, negligence is overtakes collided attributed solely to the negligence of the motorcycle driver, Catubig. with Ceres bus” The evidence shows that the driver of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving his vehicle along the proper lane, while the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of him as he was approaching a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of the law on reckless driving, at the risk of his life and that of his employee, Emperado. B. Doctrine of NOTE: At the time of the incident, Jabon w as prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed Imputed of his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. Negligence Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor- 50. Tison vs. trailer. There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that Pomasin infra case the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed #38 could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner In hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill. SC: Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio's daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident. We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. Note: Negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. 51. Caedo vs. Yu Art 2184 is indeed the basis of a master’s liability in a vehicular accident. Note however that the 2nd sentence Khe Thai of Art 2184 qualifies before the owner can be made solidarity liable with the negligent driver. This is because “Caratela driver vs. the basis of the master’s liability is not RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR but rather the relationship of PATERFAMILIAS. Cadillac driver” The theory is that, the negligence of the servant is known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by “Hiring of him, reflects the master’s negligence if he fails to correct it order to prevent injury or damage. professional driver” Test of imputed negligence in Art 2184 is necessarily subjective. IMPORTANT: Car owners are not held in a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he can own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed. No negligence can be imputed to Khe Thai because he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. 52. Kapalaran Bus Gen Rule; Vehicles on the national highway has the right of way against a feeder road. Line vs. Coronado “Traffic sign that says ‘YIELD’” 53. Mendoza vs. Soriano “Pedestrian hit by a Tamaraw FX” 54. Anonuevo vs. CA “Non-motorized vehicle: Bicycle” 55. Filipinas Synthetic Fiber v. Delos Santos “Musical Play: Woman of the Year” C. Res Ipsa Loquitor
56. Maao Central
Co. vs. CA “Cargo train derailed: Victim riding in caboose” 57. FF Cruz & Co. vs CA “Fire wall” 58. US vs. Crame “US Army got struck by the car” 59. Africa vs. Caltex “Fire at Caltex Station” 60. Layugan vs. IAC “Repairing the tire of the cargo truck” “Warning device” 61. Perla Compania de Seguros vs. Sps Sarangaya “Super A Bldg” “Car on fire” 62. Carmen, Jr. vs. Bacoy “Family got ran over by a Fuso jeep’ 63. Solidum vs. People “Colostomy gone bad” 64. Rosit vs. Davao Doctors Hospital “Jaw surgery: wrong screws” 65. Cf: Doctrine of Common Knowledge in Borromeo vs. Family Care Hospital “Appendicitis or not?” D. Burden of Proof
66. Alano vs.
Magud Logmao “Organ donor: Fell from overpass”
67. BJDC Construction vs. Lanuzo “Illuminated warning signs” TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE OUTLINE (STUDY GUIDE/MEMORY AID)