Manifestos of BJP, Congress indicate that when it comes to foreign policy,

ambiguity is better than clarity

The problem is not the lack of big ideas within our political class. Few parties
believe foreign policy is of any importance in winning elections.

�Absence of evidence�, former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld had said

famously, is not �evidence of absence�. Rumsfeld was answering questions about the
US inability to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Washington, you might
recall, had cited Iraq�s WMD as the principal justification for ousting Saddam
Hussein�s regime in early 2003. While Rumsfeld was elegant in his evasion, there is
a kernel of truth in his formulation.

Consider the question of Indian foreign policy. Looking at the foreign policy
sections of the election manifestos, you might be forgiven for thinking that the
Indian political class is barely interested in the world beyond its shores. On the
face of it, this seems odd. After all, India�s relative weight has rapidly risen in
the last two decades. India�s aggregate GDP, in nominal terms, is now close to $3
trillion and is ranked fifth in the world. India�s total annual trade, in goods and
services, is now little over $1 trillion. India�s economic exposure has never been
as large as it is today.

India�s role in shaping the global balance of power, shaping global regimes on
areas ranging from trade and environment to the maritime and outer space domains
has also steadily risen. No wonder chancelleries across the world, think tanks and
academia pay lots of attention to the sources and consequences of India�s
international orientation. Yet, Indian political parties seem reluctant to discuss
either the changing world around us or the ways in which India can secure and
advance its interests in it.

There was a time when communists began any national assessment with a discussion of
the �global correlation of forces�. But the CPM manifesto has little analysis of
the changing global situation. It has clear answers though: India should distance
itself from the US, revise the India-US nuclear agreement and defence cooperation
arrangements, promote global nuclear disarmament, multipolarity and reactivate the
SAARC. One can surely disagree with this somewhat static worldview. But there is no
question that it puts across clear positions.

If the CPM is too explicit in what it would like to do with foreign policy, the
Congress and BJP carefully avoid taking definitive positions. As parties seeking to
govern, they think ambiguity is better than clarity. Consider the following: The
Congress says �We will work closely with all countries of the world, and
particularly India�s neighbours and the G-20 countries, in various multilateral
forums and institutions.� You can�t quarrel with that. But what does that mean in
the real world?

The BJP frames the foreign policy section of the manifesto in terms of a rising
India playing a larger role. But it quickly moves on to the comforting
generalisation that �the ancient Indian vision of �Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam� will form
the basis in our global co-operation for progress, prosperity, peace and security,
especially with friendly countries and neighbours�.

Does this mean the leadership of the two main parties is unaware or unwilling to
focus clearly on foreign policy challenges? The lack of evidence, however, is not
evidence of absence. If you give credit where it�s due, you will note that India�s
political classes have successfully navigated the demanding international
environment when the Cold War came to an end in 1991 and the national economy went
broke. While the bureaucracy remained naturally conservative, it was the political
leadership which pushed through a range of initiatives.
The nuclear tests of 1998 and the diplomacy pursued by three successive governments
to end India�s prolonged global nuclear isolation is one example. The effort to
find lasting solutions to the boundary dispute with China and the Kashmir question
with Pakistan was another. Although it did not succeed, it opened the door for some
creative thinking about India�s most difficult strategic legacies. The political
class has also tried to recast India�s engagement with its near and extended
neighbourhoods. It has compelled Delhi�s land-lubbers to start thinking maritime.

BJP fields Sunny Deol from Gurdaspur seat

The problem is not the lack of big ideas within our political class. There are a
host of other reasons that limit public engagement on foreign policy. Few parties
believe foreign policy is of any importance in winning elections. Pakistan might
look like an exception; but then, it is really about domestic politics. Although
general elections are a good moment to reflect on the world, the foreign policy
sections of the manifestos are at best an afterthought and give no guidance on what
the Congress or the BJP might do when in power.

The reluctance to set formal public goals on foreign policy, however, makes it
harder to form an elite consensus within parties and across them. This, in turn,
means suboptimal outcomes in Indian diplomacy. The differences within the Congress,
for example, severely complicated India�s engagement with the US during the UPA
rule.

The BJP led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee had invented the phrase that the US is a
�natural ally� of India, but the party under the leadership of L K Advani began to
undermine the logic of that proposition when it sat in Opposition. Differences
within the BJP and Congress also prevented the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh
governments respectively from pursuing effective negotiations with Pakistan. A more
substantive public debate on foreign policy goals might have expanded popular
support for these initiatives and allowed India to better leverage the external
opportunities that came its way.

The next government in Delhi will confront many challenges, including the
unpredictable trajectories of China and America. Delhi�s responses will be
generated on the run, through improvisation, by the instinct of key personalities
and the quality of bureaucratic advice. That is a recipe for India�s continuing
underperformance on the global stage.

This article first appeared in the print edition on April 9, 2019 under the title
�Diplomacy by stealth�. The writer is director, Institute of South Asian Studies,
National University of Singapore and contributing editor on international affairs
for The Indian Express