CHAPTER III

KANT ON SPACE AND TIME

Immanuel Kant, the great German thinker of the eighteenth

century, with his new methodical approach to philosophical

investigation, exerted such an influence upon his contemporaries and

successors, that subsequently a standard of demarcation developed by

which philosophers come to be grouped as pro-Kantian and anti Kantian

depending upon their line of thinking either as supporting or as

criticising Kant. Barlingay and Kulkarni have very rightly described

Kantian influencesaying, "Kant's philosophy proved itself to be

prolegomena to every future m etaphysic"1. The spirit of the new Kantian

method being critical analysis, his philosophy has been named the

Critical p h ilosop h y .'

Kant's critical philosophy developed out of the careful and

penetrating study of the two rival theories dominating the philosophical

field at that time. Empiricism with its theory of mind as 'tabula rasa'

tried to explain all knowledge in terms of its experienciability and

consequently declared universality and necessity unattainable in the field

of knowledge, while rationalism upheld the superiority of reason arid

declared that nothing was beyond the reach of human reason. Being a

follower of rationalistic tradition himself, Kant never questioned aid

suspected the a b ility of reason until Hume, by h is denial of certainty in

human knowledge aroused him (Kant) from his 'dogmatic slum ber'.

1. S.S. Barlingay 8 P.B. Kulkarni : A Critical Survey of Western

Philosophy p . 252.
 73

Reacting against the Humean declaration Kant started

philosophising all over again, recognising the due claims of both

ecperience and reason and at the same time denouncing their one-sided

assertion about the nature of knowledge. Both empiricism ard

rationalism were dogmatic and uncritical since they started with their

own dogma and, in a bid to establish it, underestimated all that did

not comply with it.

It is then not surprising that Kant's new phase of

philosophical career was dominated mainly by the problem of knowledp

vis a vis the capability of human reason. Having been awakened from

his dogmatic slumber Kant jumped into the activity of analysing

knowledge intoits constituent factors and arrived at such conclusions

that stunned the thinking - world. In the preface to the first edition of

his great work 'Critique of Pure Reason,' Kant refers to his new task

saying, "It is a call to reason to undertake anew the most diffcullt of

d l its tasks, namely that of self-knwledge and to institute a tribunal

which will assure to reason its lawful claims and dismiss all groundless

pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own

eternal and unalterable laws. This tribunal is no other than the Critiqie
2
<f Pure Reason."

This declaration brings out clearly the scheme of Kantian

investigation as to the effect that he will endeavour to find out the

jpnuine claims and also the groundless pretensions of reason, and this

2. Immanuel Kant : Critique of Pure Reason; preface to 1st edition,

AXII,
 74

he will do with the help of the laws of reason themselves. Recognising

the importance of experience in human knowledge Kant says, "There can

be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience;" but the

rationalist in him adds immediately, "But it does not follow that it all

arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical

knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of

what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely

3
as the occasion) supplies from its e lf."

Kant cla rifies his point of investigation by asserting that

our knowledge is a composite entity constituted of impressions coming

from without and forms and concepts supplied from within. In his

endeavour to d iscover 'What our own foculty of knowledge supplies from

its e lf Kant effects an isolation of factors of knowledge by way of

analysing it into its constituent elements.

This analysis of knowledge by Kant has resulted in some

wonderful d iscoveries. In the first place, it has been found that

knowledge is a joint product of experience and reason, that is to mean,

that, knowledge is not entirely derived from experience in the form of

external impressions, nor from reason in the form of a p riori ideas and

concepts. On the contrary, knowledge ex h ib its a unique combination of

both a posteriori and a p riori elements. What is supplied from outside

has to be moulded in our subjective forms and to be conceived according

to the principles o f understanding.

3. Ibid B 1
 75

Further analysis of that which is given reveals that what

we call the impressions are always the impressions of spatio-temporal

facts. This implies that without spatio-temporal reference nothing given

can be received .Kant here offers his own theory of space and time as

sabjective forms in which alone we can receive anything that affects us

either externally or internally.

But to receive impressions does not amount to attaining

knowledge of o b je cts. Our mind not only receives but also conceives or

understands. Kant here d iscovers another formal element of human

knowledge namely, the pure concepts of understanding. The impressions

that affect us are received in the two subjective forms of space aid

time just in order to put the discrete sensations in ord er. But this

order by itse lf conveys nomeaning unless it is conceived ty

inderstanding in accordance with its concepts.

These discoveries of Kant make it very d e a r that mind is

not a passive receptor in knowledge, rather it actively participates in

the act of producing knowledge from sensations. Kant says, "There are

two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding.

....T h rough the former, objects are given to us; through the latter,
4
they are thought," Sensibility is the faculty which receives tbB

sensations that affect the mind. Space and time in which sensations are

received belong to sen sibility. Understanding is the other faculty of

mind by which the received sensations are conceived with the help of

the pure concepts. Anything known must conform to these forms ard

4. A 16 = B30
 76

concepts of mind. From this it follow s that the object as known is

always modified and conditioned by the laws of mind. These laws

(space, time and the pure concepts) are what Kant calls the a priori

elements without which no objective knowledge is ever p ossible. To say

in other words,only those sensations which conformto these mental

laws can constitute objective knowledge.

This declaration of Kant with regard to the dominance of

the rules of mindover those of the objects consists inestablishing that

instead of mind conforming to the rules of the objective world, it is

dbject which has to conform to the laws of mind, if and when the

question of attaining knowledge arises. This is the copernican Revolution

that Kant claims to have effected in philosophy.

Kant regards the role of a p riori elements in knowledge to

be vital enough to dedicate the entire philosophical speculation in tie

Critique of Pure Reason in solving the problem of the p ossib ility of

synthetic a priori knowledge which, according to him, entertains the

characteristic of being universal, necessary and at the same time novel.

Kant has no doubt regarding the existence of such knowledge in

mathematics and p h ysics; but his endeavour is to find out whether

metaphysics possesses such knowledge or not. A synthetic proposition,

according to Kant, is that in which the connection of the predicate with

the subject " is thought without id e n tity .' It adds "to the concept of tbe

subject a predicate which has not been in anywise thought in it, and
5
which no analysis could possibly extract from it ." In the synthetic

5. A7 = B ll
 77

proposition which is also ap riori, the synthesis between the subject

concept and the new predicate concept is achieved in an a priori manner

ie . without the help of experience. In the p ossibility of such

propositions therefore, the a priori elements of knowledge have a very

important role to play. It is in this context that the theory of space

and time assumes a significant position in Kantian philosophy.

Kantian doctrine of space and time has been exclusively

expounded in the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements,

named as Transcendental Aesthetic. In the Aesthetic Kant starts with two

hypotheses about space and tim e— 1) that space and time arise from

the nature of human sensibility and 2) that they are the necessary

conditions under which alone objects can be given to us. Throughout the

Aesthetic we find Kant arguing for establishing space and time as

recessary rules of human sen sibility.

The arguments put forward by Kant in support of his view

of space and time exh ibit their force when discussed in the

background of Kantian attitude towards the two other theories of space

and time referred to by Kant himself in the Critique. Pa ton thinks that

the question 'What are space and time ?' suggests three possible

answers - Space and time are real entities 2) They are determinaticn

cr relations of real things and 3) They are subjective forms of human

sen sib ility . J Of these, Newton, the scientist subscribes to the first

view, Leibnitz, the philosopher-mathematician to the second and Kant to

the th ird .6

6. H.J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, V ol.I. p.107.

 78
Newtonian theory of space and time treating them as real

entities composed of points and instants resp ectively has been summarify

discarded by Kant. This is indeed true that Kant did not take this view

very seriously; may be assuming it to be a theory of physics and rot

cf much metaphysical significance. In his discussion about space Kant

has not referred to the Newtonian view, but while putting forward his

own view about time Kant finds occasion to react against the absolutistic

theory of Newton. There he manifestly proclaims .that time is rot

something which ex ists of itself To quote his words, " Were it s e lf-

subsistent, it would be something which would be actual and yet not an

7
actual o b je c t .”

In the section named Elucidation Kant says that in the view

of mathematical students of nature (obviously refering to Newtonian view)

qpace and time have to be regarded as "eternal and infinite s e lf-

subsistent non-entities which are there (yet without there being anything
8
real) only in order to contain in themseles all that is re a l." Such a

theory, Kant thinks, 'Keep the field of appearance open far

mathematical propositions' but finds itse lf in emharassing situation when

it endeavours 'to go out beyond this fie ld ' with the help of

mderstanding.

Kant refutes this absolutistic theory even from a theological

standpoint. He argues that if space and time are regarded as real in tiro

sense of being forms of things-in-them selves, they would condition not

7. A 33 = B50.

8. A 39 = B56
 79

only the existence of worldly objects, but also that of God. „ Kant

says, . " As conditions of all existence in general, they must also be

conditions of the existence of God, If we do not thus treat them as

objective forms of all things, the only alternative is to view them as

g
subjective forms of our inner and outer intuition."

Commenting on Kant's treatment of Newtonian theory Paton

writes, "When Kant asserts that on the Newtonian hypothesis space ard

time are non-entities, he implies that the very concept of them

contradicts it s e lf." 10 Though Kant is up on his toes while arguing

against Newtonian theory it may be shown that Kantian expositions of

space and time are not incompatible with Newton's theory of space ard

time as real things. Paton observes, refering to Kant, "He apparently

admits that if space and time were real things, our knowledge of space

and time would be a priori knowledge of objects in space and time.

This may mean that the Newtonian theory is compatible both with tlB

existence of pure mathematics and with its ap p licability to the physical

11
w orld."

As against the Absolutistic view of Newton there is the

relational view of space and time upheld by Leibnitz. Both these views

have been the target of criticism of Kant, but his arguments are

primarily directed against Leibnitzian doctrine. Korner supports such

assertion when he says, "In the controversy between the Newtonians and

9. B 72

10. H.J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, V ol.I. p.174.

11. Ibid, p . 176.

 80
the Leibnitzians Kant sided with the former . . . . The view that 'space1

and 'time' designate particulars, and not classes of relations between

12
particulars, is one which Kant never saw any reason to change."

Kantian criticism against Leibnitzian doctrine consists in

showing that if space and time are regarded as relations cf

appearances, mathematics will lose its universal validity and apodeictic

certainty. Kant says that those who "regard space and time as relations

cf appearances alongside or in succession to one another - relations

abstracted from experience, and in this isolation confusedly represented

- they are obliged to deny that a priori mathematical doctrines have

any validity in respect of real things, or at least to deny their

13
apodeictic certainty "

Being the upholder of extreme rationalism Leibnitz thinks

that genuine knowledge must always be conceptual and what senses

reveal is nothing but the confused representation of the real. Ideas of

space and time acquired through the experience of co-existence arri

succession of perceptions of monads are less distinct and less clear and

so, are confused perceptions.

Kant points out that Leibnitz has erred in declaring the

distinction between the sensible and the intelligible as logical whereas

it is a transcendental distinction. They not only differ in origin, th^y

differ in content too.Their difference is not one of degree, but of kind.

12. S. Korner : Kant, pp. 33 - 34.

13. A 40 = B57
 81
Therefore, between the sensible and the in te llig ib le the question is not

o f confused and clear perceptions.

Acknowledging the merit of both these theories Kart

maintainsthat while Newtonian view has the merit of being able to

explain the a p p lica b ility of mathematical truths to the world of

appearances, Leibnitzian view has the merit that it can explain such

concepts which are beyond spatio-temporal sphere.

Kant claims that his view of space and time enjoys the

merit of both Newtonian and Leibnitzian view s but is not at a ll affected

by th eir disadvantages. Space and time as universal forms of human

sensibility can account for the elementwhich grants the mathematical

certainty in experience in so far as its form (both actual and possible)

is concerned. Kant's theory also provides an explanation about the non-

spatial and the non-temporal — from the point of view of sensible

intuition n egatively, and from that of intellectual intuition, p o s itiv e ly .

Let us now take up Kant's own theory of space and time

which actually centres round the exposition of the statement -'s p a c e and

time are a p rio ri intu ition .' Though simple looking, this statement

contains within its e lf a vast storage of ideas which when brought ait

with full implication released e n tirely newideas into the fie ld of

philosophical speculation.

The two terms 'a p r io r i' and 'intuition' have been of

immense importance in Kantian thought specially in connection with his

discussion in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Before venturing into the tad<

 82

o f co m p re h e n d in g K a n t 's d o c t r in e o f s p a c e and tim e , it w o u ld , th e r e fo r e ,

be u sefu l to h a v e a d is c u s s io n on th e m eaning and im p o rt of th ese two

te rm s, a p r i o r i and in t u itio n .

A p r io r i g e n e r a lly m eans th a t w h ic h i s in d e p e n d e n t of

e x p e r ie n c e in resp ect of o r ig in and w h ich can be co n tr a s te d w ith that

w h ich is e m p ir ic a lly d e r iv e d , t e c h n i c a lly know n as a p o s te r io r i, Kant

m a k es a d is t in c t io n w ith in th e a p r io r i (in th e g e n e r a lly a cce p te d

sense) its e lf by d e c la r in g th a t, w h ich th ou gh its e lf not d e r iv e d

im m e d ia te ly from e x p e r ie n c e , is b a sed on a u n iv e r s a l r u le w h ich has

been e s t a b lis h e d by m eans o f e x p e r ie n c e , is not a p r io r i in th e s tr ic t

sen se of th e te r m . O n ly th at w h ic h is a b s o lu t e ly in d e p e n d e n t of

e m p ir ic a l e le m e n ts may be tr e a te d as a p r io r i fo r w h ic h Kant c o in s a

new term 'p u r e ' m eaning un m ixed w ith th e e m p ir ic a l. To q u ote K:ant,

'T h e e x p r e s s io n 'a p r io r i' does n o t, h ow ever, in d ic a t e w ith s u ffic ie n t

p r e c is io n th e fu ll m eaning o f our q u e s tio n . F o r i t h a s b een cu s to m a ry to

sy, even of m uch k n o w le d g e that is d e r iv e d fro m e m p ir ic a l sou rces,

th a t we h a v e it or a re c a p a b le o f h a v in g it a p r io r i, m eaning th e r e t y

that we do not d e r iv e it im m e d ia te ly from e x p e r ie n c e , but from a

u n iv e r s a l r u le - a r u le w h ic h is its e lf, h ow ever, borrow ed by us from

14
e x p e r ie n c e ," He fu r t h e r e x p la in s , "....W e s h a ll u n d ersta n d by a

p r io r i k n o w le d g e , not k n o w le d g e in d e p e n d e n t of th is or that

e x p e r ie n c e , but k n o w le d g e a b s o lu t e ly in d e p e n d e n t o f a ll e x p e r ie n c e ..........

A p r i o r i m o d e s o f k n o w le d g e a r e e n t it le d p u re w hen th e r e i s no
15
a im ix tu re of a n y th in g e m p i r i c a l ." T hu s fo r K ant, th e a p r io r i when

14. B 2 .

1 5 . B 3.
 83

fo u n d to be m ix e d up w ith e m p ir ic a l e le m e n ts , th o u g h r e m o te ly , does

not bear th e p r e c is e m e a n in g .

K a n t ia n a n a ly s is of th e n a tu re of a p r io r i (p u r e ) s u p p lie s

us th e tw o -fo ld c r ite r io n of u n iv e r s a lity and n e c e s s ity fo r te s tin g th e

p u r ity of con cep ts. A n y th in g o b ta in e d in th e a p o s te r io r i m anner is

dw ays of c o n t in g e n t n a tu re. K ant c la r ifie s , "E x p e r ie n c e tea ch es us th a t

16
a t h in g is so and so, but not th a t it ca n n ot be o th e r w is e . " But th e a

p r io r i in v o lv e s b oth n e c e s s ity and u n iv e r s a lity . If a n y th in g can n ot b e

th ou g h t tobe o th e r w is e th en it m u st be a p r io r i. N e c e s s ity im p lie s

u n iv e r s a lity . In d u c tio n p r o v id e s g e n e r a lis e d sta te m e n ts but su ch

sta te m e n ts are not u n i v e r s a l in th e tru e o r s tr ic t sen se of th e te r m ,

ra th er th ey em body "a n a r b itr a r y e x te n s io n of a v a lid ity h o ld in g in

m ost cases to one w h ic h h o ld s in a ll." K ant th in k s th e re fo re th a t s tr ic t

in iv e r s a lity m ust h a v e a s p e c ia l sou rceo f k n o w le d g e w h ic h h e c a lls

th e fa c u lty of a p r io r i k n o w le d g e . To q u ote h im , "N e c e s s ity and s tr ic t

u n iv e r s a lity are th u s su re c r ite r ia of a p r i o r i k n o w le d g e and are

17
in s e p a r a b le fr o m o n e a n o t h e r ." K a n t, h o w e v e r , e x p la in s th a t th o u g n

in s e p a r a b le fro m one a n oth er each o f th e tw o c r ite r ia is in fa llib le on

its ow n, so m ay be u sed s e p a r a te ly too, a c c o r d in g to s itu a tio n s . In the

Igh t of th is d is c u s s io n about c r ite r ia of a p r io r ity (p u r ity ) it w ill be

e a s ie r to e s ta b lis h th e a p r io r ity of sp ace and t im e a n d ,o n th e b a s is of

th a t, th e ir s u b je c tiv it y .

The oth er te rm o f im p o r ta n c e in K a n t ia n th eory of sp a ce and

36. B 4.

17. Ib id .
 84
time is 'intuition'. Kant makes ambiguous use of terms and never seems
to be bothered about the difficulties faced by his reader while pursuing
the Critique with all the ambiguities. Kant starts his discussion in
Transcendental Aesthetic with a number of definitions of some important
terms used throughout the Aesthetic. The very first term defined is
intuitioni and the definition runs as follows. "In whatever manner and
by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition
is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which
1 fi
aLl thought as a means is directed." It has also been said that
intuition, i.e ., the immediate relation between the mode of knowledge
aid objects takes place only when latter is given to us.

Two other definitions following from that of intuition i are

those of sensation and appearance. Sensation has been defined as, "the
tffect of an object upon the faculty of representation so far as we are
19
affected by it." The definition of appearance is preceded by that of
anpirical. "That intuition which is in relation to the object through
sensation is entitled empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical
20
intuition is entitled appearance."

If we closely analyse the above definitions related to the

term 'intuition' it becomes clear that Kant Kant uses the term in
different senses in different occasions. The principal definition (the
first one) is vague and does not clarify the nature of intuition. Intuiticn

18. A 19.
39. A 20 = B 34
20. Ibid
 85

is 'that' through which a mode of knowledge gets immediately related to

ob jects. Now what the 'th a t' signifies has not been made clear. Kent

has not stated whether it im plies a means, a way of establishing

relation between sensibility and object or a function of sen sibility. If

intuition means a function of sensibility then how are we to connect it

with the statement that 'sen sib ility y ie ld s intuition'.

Kant says something more about intuition when he asserts

that empirical intuition is that 'intuiton' which is in relation to the

object through sensation. The difficu lty arises when we try to reconcile

tie first definition of intuition with the definition of empirical

intuition. In the former, intuition is that through which objects . gef

related to the mode of knowledge and in the latter intuition (Of course

em pirical) is in relation to the object through sensation. Obviously,

this exem plifies Kant's careless use of terms rendering them ambiguous.

In this case, perhaps Kant uses 'intuition' in the sense of some

mediating element in the formerdefinition and the product of such

mediation in the latter.

We may here refer to C assirer's comment upon the meaning

cf intuition in Kant.According to him Kant's view that intuition is

immediately related to objects and that intuition takes place when we

are affected by objects im plies that awarenes of objects arises in the

level of mere sensation which is against Kantian theory of knowledge.

Cassirer interpretes Kant's contention that intuition (sensuous) results in

the subject on being affected by the object as implying the subsistence

cf causal relationship between the object and the perceiving subject.

But such a view he thinks is indefensible, both on general

 86
philosophical grounds, and because it cannot be reconciled with Kant's
21
own account of causal relatedness.

For a meaningful reading of Kant, therefore, either we have

to accept him with all his unintelligibilities and try to follow him by

putting ourselves in his position or as Cassirer has suggested we are

to reformulate his problem and to state his case in terms very different

from those he himself em ploys.

That space and time are two a p riori forms of sensibility

has been established by Kant in his own masterly way by leading the

reader gradually through successive steps of descriptive analysis of the

im ctions of human mind in respect of acquisition of knowledge. First of

all he analyses appearance into its form and matter by maintaining that

which in it corresponds to sensation as its matter and that which

determines the matter by imparting order as its form — the matter being

a posteriori and the form being a p rio ri, since that 1 in which alone

the sensation can be posited and ordered in a certain form cannot itself

be sensation'
22

In order to arrive at space and time as a p riori forms in

which sensations are ordered Kant affects two types of isolation -

ir s tly between the two faculties of mind, sensibility and understanding

and secondly between the pure and the a posteriori elements within

sensibility. When from a given appearance i . e . , the undetermined object

21. H.W. Cassirer : Kant's First Critique, p . 28.

22. A 20 = B 34.
 87
of empirical intuition, everything that is traceable to something affecting

the mind as, given eith er-ex tern a lly or intern ally is> removed,therd remains

4iat which sensibility supplies from within itse lf. This is the a p riori

element of sen sibility, the form in which sensations are

aranged and thereby made ready for conception. Space and time are the

two forms of sensibility which 'serv e as principles of a pricri

knowledge*. This tw o-fold isolation within the elements of knowledge has

made Kant the target of many criticism s about which we shall discuss in

a later occasion.

Kant terms his discussion of space and time as exposition

which again is tw o-fold. By exposition Kant means "Clear, though not

necessarily exhaustive, representation of that which belongs to a

concept: the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that whicft

23
ec hi bits the concept as given a p r io r i." The other type of exposition

is transcendental by which Kant understands, "the explanation of a

concept, as a principle from which the p o ssib ility of other a p riori

r* j

synthetic knowledge can be understood." It is to be expected,

therefore, that Kant's exposition would reveal a clear representation of

that which belongs to the concepts of space and time as a p riori and

would explain the p ossib ility of some other synthetic a p riori

principles.

The metaphysical exposition of space starts with an

explanatory statement about outer sense which Kant regards as a

3 . A 23 = B 38

24. A 25 = B 3B
 88

property of mind. It is the particular mental property by means of

which "we represent to ourselves objects as outside us and all without

25
exception in sp a ce .” That space is a form of outer sense is a natural

conclusion, because it is only in and through space that we conceive

fie existence of bodies outside us. Inner sense is the other mental

property "by means of which the mind intuits itse lf or its inner
26
d ate." in tu ition of the inner states is possible in the determination

of time alone and so time is to be treated as the form of inner sense.

The metaphysical exposition of space contains four

arguments forwarded in favour of a p riori and intuitive character of

space — the first two being in support of a priority and the other two

ii that of its inuitive character. The first of the two arguments both

for a priority and intuitive character is negative, while the second is

positive.

The negative argument for a p riority of space consists in

showing that space is not an empirical concept. It is argued that since

whatever we experience as existing outside us must be experienced as

occupying a different spatial position than ours, space must be a

precondition of experience. Without assuming a spatial distinction among

objects of perception and also between the subject and the object vte

cannot have any experience. So space has to be presupposed, and it is

logically true that whatever is presupposed by exeprienoe cannot itself

be derived from experience. To reproduce in Kant's language, "The

S . A 23 = B 38

26. Ibid .
 89
representation of space, cannot therefore, be empirically obtained from

the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experienoe

27
is itself possible at all only through that representation."

Though negative in appearance this argument may be treated

as a positive step forward in favour of possibility of universality and

necessity in human experience. As has been shown-earlier the concept of

a priori possesses the characteristics of universality and necessity. So

f space can be proved to be non-empirical in its origin, Kant hopes,

it would be easy to find the explanation regarding the universal and

necessary element in experience.

Kant's positive argument for a priority of space stands as

follows. "Space is a necessary a priori representstion which underlies

all outer intuitions.- We can never represent to ourselves the absence of

28
space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects." No

external experience is possible without the representation of space as a

priori. This necessity associated with space as a precondition of

experience proves a priority of space too. In simple language Kant's

argument is this - space must be a priori, because it is necessary,

and the necessary is not attainable through experience. This is the

reason, Kant believes, behind the fact that space without objects can be

thought, but not objects without space.

Refuting the possiblility of interpreting the Kantian

27. Ibid.

28. A 24 = B 39.
 90.
assertion in the form that we can think away objects of experience from

space and time, and still have space and time left as amounting to the

perception of empty space and empty time, Paton says that perception

of space and time is always in terms of objects perceived in space and

time-. says, "However much we can think of space or time as empty

of any particular objects, there must be some sort of reference at least

to possible ob jects; and we can know particular spaces and times only
29
by knowing the objects which they contain".

In the first edition of the Critique a third argument in

support of a p riority of space was there, though it is dropped in the

second edition. This argument is based on the nature of geometric

proposition as possessing apodeictic certainty. The geometrical

propositions can be obtained a p rio ri, and this is possible because th^?

are grounded on a p riori representation of space. Had space been a

posteriori the propositions of geometry would not have been certain. The

reason behind the non-inclusion of this argument in the second edition

has not been stated by Kant, but it seems that Kant thought it to be

appropriate for transcendental exposition. We find Kant holding such

view in respect of an argument for a p riority of time, though, however

rot regarding space.

The negative argument in favour of the intuitive character

of space states that, "Space is not a discursive or as we say, general

30
concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition".

29. H.J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, V olI.P . 114.

30. A 25 = B 39
 91
Connecting intuitiveness with individuality of space Kant argues that

space is always represented as one and not many. The many spaces vie

apeak of belong to one unique space just as parts belong to a whole.

Denying that space is a general concept Kant says that there exists a

very important distinction between intuition and concept. In intuition the

whole precedes the parts which may be found to belong to it, whereas

in the case of a concept, it is the parts which come first and the

whole is constructed out of them. "Space is essentially one; the manifold

in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on

31
{the introduction of) lim itations." As an a p riori intuition spa®

underlies all concepts of space relation existing among objects.

That space is an intuition has been supported by a positive

argument which starts with the following statement, "Space is

32
represented as an infinite given magnitude". Space is thought of as

containing infinite number of space representations within itse lf. Spa®

is so conceived because all part of space co-ex ist ad infinitum. But no

concept can be thought as containing an infinite number of

representations. On the contrary the concept representing the common

character of infinite number of representations is contained in them and

S3 it may be said of the concept that it contains infinite number of

representations 'under itse lf' but not 'within its e lf which is true of

qpace intuition.

Transcendental exposition considers the same problem of

a. Ib id .

32. B. 40.
 92
space from a different standpoint. The task here is to show space as a

principle which guarantees the p ossibility of synthetic a pricrl

judgments of Geometry. Two points are to be made clear in this

connection - firstly that geometrical statements are based on space and

secondly that the synthetic a p riori judgements of Geometry are possible

only on the assumption that space is an a p riori intuition

As regards the first point Kant clearly asserts that.

"Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space

33
synthetically and yet a p r io r i." The geometrical statements are bo to

strictly universasl and necessary where new concepts are added to the

given one not through experience, but through a priori intuition. Had it

not been so, Geometry would not have been ranked as a science

possessing apodeictic certainty.

As regards the second point, Kant is clear enough to state

that geometrical statements are necessary because space is an apriori

intuition. If space were empirical, Geometry would have been rendered a

body of contingent statements. Again it being a concept, the synthetic

nature of geometrical propositions would be an im possibility, for, as

Kant says, " ........ from a mere concept no propositions can be obtained
34
which go beyond the concept - as happens in Geometry. The Kantiai

argument is simply th is, since geometrical propositions are both

synthetic and a p riori, space, as the basis of the science of Geometry,

must be an apriori intuition.

33* B 41.

34 . B 41
 93

This two-fold exposition of space entitles Kant to draw two

important conclusions regarding the nature of space. The firs t is

negative and denies that space represents any property of things in

themselves or that it represents the things in their relation to ere

another. This denial amounts to saying that space is not at a ll inherent

in the objects in the outside world. Had it been so, it would have beat

impossible to intuit space a p rio ri. But space is intuited a p rio ri. So

neither to things in themselves, nor to the world outside, space belongs

as a p roperty.

The second conclusion which is p ositive asserts that "space

is nothing but the form of a ll appearances of outer sense. It is thB

subjective condition of sen sib ility, under which alone outer intuition is
35
possible for us." As a formal condition it exists in mind p rior to

ell inuitions of objects and so contains a p rio ri the principles which

determine the relations of the objects outside.

Space, thus reduced to a formal condition of mind, is

significant only from human standpoint. Representation of space assumes

significance only on the condition of our lia b ility to be affected ty

dbjects. Human sen sib ility applies its form of space only after it gets

affected by something given. Describing space as a predicate Kant says.

'This predicate can be ascribed to things only in so far as they

appear to us, that is, only to objects of s en sib ility. The constant form

d this r e c e p tiv ity , which we term sen s ib ility , is a necessary

condition of a ll the relations in which objects can be intuited as outside

35. A 26 = B 42
 94

us; and if we abstract from these objects, it is a pure intuition apd

36
bears the name of space" . Sensibility being a human faculty, the

cbjects appeparing to it can not be said to be the objects in their true

nature. Sensibility cannot be a condition of the possibility of things and

as such space as a form of sensibility can not be valid in case of

things in their real nature. Hence follows Kant's famous statement that

space is only empirically real, but transcendentally ideal. In his own

words, "our exposition, therefore, establishes the reality, that is, the

objective validity, of space in respect of whatever can be presented to

us outwardly as object, but also at the same time the ideality of

gsace in respect of things when they are considered in themselves

through reason, thatis without regard to the constitution of oir

37
ssnsibility."

Another significant statement of Kant about space is that it

is the only subjective representation that refers to something outer,

which can be entitled at the same time both objective and a priori.No

other subjective representation belongs to the bodies to the intuition of

which it is attached, as for examples, colour, taste etc. are not

properties of the bodies, but only modifications of the senses of sight

aid taste which are affected in a certain manner by the objective

stimuli. But space as a condition of outer objects 'necessarily belong

to their appearance or intuition'. Therefore there is no scope for

confusing the ideality of space with that of other subjective ideas.

§pace is a pure intuition and is the source of synthetic a priori

35. A 27 = B 43.

37. A 28 = B 44
 95

knowledge; the representations of colour, taste etc. are mere sensations

and cannot of themselves yield knowledge of an object, not to speak of

a priori knowledge. Moreover, these sense qualities are treated as

belonging to a thing in itself by our empirical understanding. But, Kant

reminds saying, "The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on

the other hand, is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is

a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in

themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are

quite unknown to us and that what we call outer objects are nothing

but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which is

38
qaaee." Kant concludes his discussion of space by declaring the

unknowability of the thing in itself through the representations of

rensibility and also that "in experience no question is ever asked in

39
regard to it" .

The metaphysical exposition of time starts directly with

the arguments in support of apriority and intuitive character of time. Of

the five arguments the first three, are for a priority and the other two

ijr intuitive character. The nature of the arguments is primarily similar

to those forwarded in support of space and this can be easily traced.

The first argument is negative and denies that ■time .-ts an

empirical concept derived from experience of co-existence and succession

among events. The idea of time has to be presupposed for any such

ecperience, therefore time must exist in us a priori, Kant writes, "Only

38. A 30 + B 45.

39. Ibid.
 96
on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of

things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at

40
different times (su ccessiv ely )" . If follow s then that time can not be

em pirically derived. That which is presupposed by experience can not

t s e lf be derived from it.

The second argument arrives at the apriority of time on the

ground of its necessity and is positive in nature. Time is the necesssary

representation which underlies all intuitions. Kant explains the necessity

of time in these words - "We can not, in respect of appearances in

gsneral, remove time itself though we can quite well think time as void

of appearances".41 Again he says, "Appearances may, one and all,

vanish; but time (as the universal condition of their p o ssib ility ) cannot
42
itself be rem oved." Kant regards necessity as a criterion.-of a

priority. So time being necessarily involved in all appearances its a

p riority is automatically established.

In the fourth antinomy which is concerned with the

existence of an absolutely necessary being Kant speaks of time’ s

objective a priority and that it is not so subjectively. He says, "Time

as the formal condition of the p ossib ility of changes, is indeed

objectively p rior to them; subjectively however, in actual conciousness,

tie representation of time, lik e any other, is given only in connection

43
with perceptions." It appears that by objective Kant wants to mean

40. A 30 = B 46.

41. A 31 = B 46

42. Ibid*

43. A 452.
 97

here that which is common to all perceptions of change and is only

ideal or formal while by subjective he refers to the particular cases of

change perceived actually.

The third argument argues from the fact of "p o ssib ility of

apodeictic principles concerning the relations of time, or of axioms of

tme in general", to the a p riori necessity of time as their ground.

The principles such as, 'time has only one dimension', different times

are not simultaneous but successive' possess apodeictic certainty and so

are not derived from experience. From this Kant draws the conclusion

fiat time, upon which these principles are grounded, cannot be an

empirical concept but must be a p rio ri. These principles are self-

evident and they make experience p ossib le. This is definitely a proof

for tim e's a p riority.

The fourth argument is for tim e's intuitive character but in

a negative form .It states that time is not a disct$3ive or general

concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition.Time represents one sigle

whole and the idea of many divisions of time we come to know through

experience is nothing but the idea of parts belonging to one individual

time, "The representation which can be given only through a single

44
object is intuition"- so says Kant. Representation of time is so given,

tierefore it is an intuition. The proposition 'different times cannot be

simultaneous' is a synthetic one and it would not be so if time were a

concept. This proposition is "immediately contained in the intuition and

representation of time"and stands as an evidence for time being an

44. A 32 = B47
 98 -
intuition.

The fifth argument too is fo r intuitive character of time and

starts with the following statement, "The infinitude of time signifies

nothing more than that every determinant magnitude of time is possible

only through limitations of one single time that underlies it. The
45
original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited."

Kant argues that such an infinite representation of which parts are

obtained by limitations, cannot be a concept, for a concept is formed on

the basis of experience of parts, but time is not a concept so formed,

on the contrary, the partial representations of time are obtained from

the original representation of time as one whole. Kant goes a step

further and holds that the concepts 'must themselves rest an immediate

intuition'.

The transcendental exposition of time endeavours to explain

that description of time as a p riori intuition alone makes possible

certain other a p riori synthetic propositions. Kant here refers to the

h ird argument under metaphysical exposition and says that that

argument is actually transcendental in character. The a p riori synthetic

principles concerning the relations of time and also the axioms of time

obviously stand in favour of a priority and intuitive nature of time.

Besides, the concept of alteration and also of motion, about which

synthetic a p riori principles are there, also rest ‘on time. Without

refering to time as the ground we can comprehend neither alteration nor

motion. Alteration or change which means a combination of contradictorily

45. A 32 = B 48.
 99
opposed predicates in one and the same object, and motion which is a

species of alteration in the sense that it signifies nothing else than the

change of place or position, become possible only on the presupposition

of time. Two contradictorily opposed attributes, such as being and not

being may be predicated of one and the same thing in one and the same

place only when described as occuring one after the other, that is, with

reference to time. So Kant concludes transcendental exposition of time

saying, "Thus our concept of time explains the possibility of that body

cf a p riori synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general

46
doctrine of motion, and which is by no means unfruitful" .

From this tw o-fold exposition Kant draws certain conclusions

concerning time as he had done in case of space.In the first place

comes the negative conclusion which Kant states in the following

®ntence,"Time is not something which exists of its e lf,o r which inheres

in things as an objective determination, and it does not therefore remain

47
when abstraction is made of all subjective condition of its intuition" .

This sentence is loaded with a few important ideas. F irstly time is not

self subsistent, because this will amount to mean that it is something

actual and still not an actual object.Secondly time is not even a

determination or order inherent in objects and events, because if it be

so, time can not precede the objects etc.a s their condition, and this

will render its a priori intuition impossible.But time can be intuited a

p riori as a subjective condition under which alone sensible intuition is

possible fo r us. So time must be a p riori and subjective.

43. B = 49.

47. A33 = B4a

 100
The s e co n d c o n clu sio n w h ic h is r e la te d to th e fir s t cane is

th a t tim e is n o th in g but th e form of in n e r sense. O ur in t u itio n of

o u r s e lv e s and of ou r in n e r s ta te s a re a lw a y s c o n d it io n e d by th e

d e te r m in a t io n of tim e . T im e has n o th in g to do w ith shape or p o s itio n of

o u te r a p p ea ra n ce, but as rep re s e n te d to th e in n e r sen se th e o u te r

a p p e a ra n c e m ust b e lo n g to th e d e te r m in a t io n of tim e . The outer

a p p e a ra n c e s w hen b ro u g h t to th e in n e r sense get th e m s e lv e s arra n ged in

s u c c e s s iv e ord er w h ere shape or p o s it io n of th a t r e p r e s e n t a t io n s in

r e la tio n to th e e x te rn a l w o r ld b ea rs no m eaning at a ll. Thus t im e -

d e r te r m in a tio n is a n a lo g o u s to a lin e . Kant w r ite s "w e rep resen t the

tim e -s e q u e n c e by a lin e p r o g r e s s in g to in fin ity , in w h ic h th e m a n ifo ld

c o n s t itu te s a s e r ie s o f one d im e n s io n o n ly , and we re a s o n from the

p r o p e r t ie s o f th is lin e to a ll th e p r o p e r tie s of tim e , w it h t h is one

e x c e p t io n , th a t w h ile th e p a r ts of th e lir e a r e sim u lta n eo u s, th e parts

48
of tim e are a lw a y s s u c c e s s iv e " . The fa c t th a t th e r e la t io n s of tim e

can be exp ressed in th e form of o u te r in t u it io n of a lir e a ls o p ro ves

t ia t tim e i s an in t u it io n .

" T im e is th e fo rm a l a p r io r i c o n d it io n of a ll a p p ea ra n ces

w h a ts o e v e r" - is th e th ir d c o n c lu s io n d ra w n by K an t. T h ou gh in m

e a r lie r o c c a s io n Kant m ade a d ic h o t o m y b e tw e e n o u te r sen se and in n e r

sense, a s c r ib in g space as a form to th e fo r m e r and tim e to th e la t t e r ,

h ere he says (o f c o u rs e r i g h t l y ) th a t a ll a p p ea ra n ces w h eth e r com ing

e x te r n a lly or in t e r n a lly , h a v e to be re p re s e n te d to th e in n e r sense in

th e d e te r m in a tio n of tim e . In h is ow n la n g u a g e , " s in c e a ll

r e p r e s e n t a t io n s w h eth er th e y h ave fo r th e ir o b je c t s o u te r th in g s or not.

48. A33 = B50

 101

belong, in themselves, as determinations of our mind, to our inner

state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of

inner intuition and so belongs to time, time is an a priori condition of

all appearances whatsoever. It is the immediate condition of inns’

appearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate condition of outer
49
appearances" . We have a p riori knowledge about all objects of

a n sible intuition that they must stand in time relations - because they

are to be intuited in time either immediately or mediately.

Thus the status of time-intuition has been determined and

Kant declares that lik e space, time too is em pirically real but

transcendentally id eal. Time as a form of sensibility is valid only under

the condition that something affects us and appears to sen sib ility. So

far as our human way of knowing is concerned, sense intuitions have to

be presented to the inner sense and arranged in temporal relation. This

is the empirical reality or objective va lidity of time. But apart frcm

this condition of being a form of sensibility time has no reality at a il.

Kant says, "If we abstract from our mode of inwardly intuiting ourselves

- the mode of intuition in terms of which we likewise take up into our

faculty of representation all outer intuitions - and so take objects as

they may be in themselves, then time is nothing. It has objective

validity only in respect of appearances, these being things which we

50
feke as objects of our senses" . Human intuition is always sensible,

that is , it arises only when objects affect us. Since time is a form of

human recep tiv ity, it is nothing apart from the subject. So, in respect

49. A 34 = B51.

50. A 35 = B52.
 -102

of o b je c t s not r e la te d to hum an s e n s ib ility t im e is n o t h in g at a ll. T h is

is th e tra n sce n d e n ta l id e a lity of t im e . K an t e x p la in s th e m e a n in g of the

te rm tra n sce n d e n ta l id e a lity s a y in g t h a t " .............. if we a b stra ct fro m th e

s u b je c tiv e c o n d itio n s of s e n s ib le in t u itio n , t im e is n o th in g and can n ot be

a s c r ib e d to th e o b je c t s in th e m s e lv e s (a p a r t fro m th e ir r e la tio n to our

hi
in tu itio n ) in th e w ay e ith e r of s u b s is te n c e or of in h e r e n c e " . T im e is

real o n ly in r e la tio n to o b je c t s p resen ted to our s e n s i b i l i t y , but it red u qes

to m ere n o t h in g if c o n s id e r e d apart fro m th a t r e la tio n .

The id e a lity of tim e , lik e th a t of sp ace, is to be

d is tin g u is h e d fro m th e id e a lity of s e n s a tio n s , becau se th e e m p ir ic a l

s e n s a tio n s th o u g h id e a l, are ta k en as in h e r in g in an o b je c t iv e ly real

o b je c t But tim e never r e fe r s to a n y th in g o b je c t iv e ly r e a l, on th e

con tra ry w h a tev er is in tu ite d in t im e is o n ly an a p p e a ra n ce .

In ord er to stren g th en h is p o s itio n K an t next ta k es up tie

gen eral v ie w about r e a lity of ch a n ge -and c o n s e q u e n tly th a t of t im e and

g iv e s h is ow n e x p la n a tio n a g a in s t th is v ie w . He a d m its th a t g e n e r a lity

we fin d it h ard to b e lie v e th a t th e im m e d ia t e o b je c t s of our in n e r sen se

are m ere a p p earan ces, th o u g h we accep t th e p o s itio n th a t th e r e a lity of

o u it e r o b je c t s is q u e s tio n a b le . K ant p o in ts to th e fa u lt in su ch a ttitu d e

s a y in g "W h a t th e y have fa ile d , how ever to r e c o g n is e is th a t b oth are in

sam e p o s itio n , in n e ith e r case ca n th e ir r e a lity as r e p r e s e n ta tio n s be

q u e s tio n e d , and in b oth cases th e y b e lo n g o n ly to app earan ce, w h ic h

a lw a y s has tw o s id e s , th e one by w h ic h th e o b je c t is v ie w e d in and by

its e lf (w ith o u t regard to th e m ode of in tu itin g it — its n a tu re th e r e fo r e

51. A 36 = B 53.
 103

remaining always problematic), the other by which the form of the

intuition of this object is taken into account. This form is not to be

looked for in the object in itself, but in the subject to which the
52
object appears" . Reality of time therefore is only empirical (in

relation to appearance), whereas in the transcendental sense time is only

ideal. It is only a form of the intuition of an object and so belongs rot

to the object, but to the subject which intuits it.

From the above discussion of space and time as forms of

intuition Kant arrives at the position wherefrom he can easily assert

that these two forms are two sources of a body of a priori synthetic

knowledge, space is of Geometry and time is of the science of moticn.

Kant says, "Time and space taken together, are the pure forms of all

sensible intuition and so are what make a priori synthetic propositions

53
possible" . But significantly Kant here remarks about the self

limitation of space and time when he says," ..... these a priori

saurces of knowledge being merely conditions of our sensibility, just by

this very fact determine their own limits, namely, that they apply to

objects only in so far as objects are viewed as appearances, and do not

54
present things as they are in theselves." Application of space and

time beyond the limit of appearances is unwarranted and invalid.

Kant regards space and time as the only two pure forms of

sensibility. He declares/'Transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more

52. A38 = B55.

53. A39 = B56.

54. Ibid.
 1,04

than these two elements, space and time. This is evident from the fact

that all other concepts belonging to sen sibility, even that of motion, in

which both elements are united, presuppose something em pirical" .

Space and time are the only pure forms, because only they can be

thought and known a p rio ri. So Kant denies any third element as

belonging to sensibility as condition of experience.

Kantian theory of space and time entertains many dualities

which seems to be a favourite way of expression with Kant. The

prominent dualities are of (a) sensibility and understanding (b ) form and

matter of appearances (c ) percept and concept or intuition and thought

(d ) inner and outer and (e) appearance and relality or phenomena and

noumena. P .F . Strawson too mentions 'fou r great d u alities' which

dominate Kant's theory of the nature of human experience. Of the above

mentioned fiv e , the duality of sensibility and understanding has not

been counted by him.

The duality of sensibility and understanding in Kant is a

fundamental one so far as their function is concerned, though, of course,

not as regards their origin. In the introductory chapter itse lf of ths

Critique Kant says, " ... .t h e r e are two stems of human knowledge,

namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a

common, but to us unknown root. Through the former objects are given

55. A41 = B58

 105
56
to u s ; th rou g h th e la t te r th ey are t h o u g h t ."

In th e A e s th e tic K ant is o la te s s e n s ib ility fro m a ll th a t

u n d e r s ta n d in g t h in k s th rou g h con cep ts. He d ev otes th e e n tir e A e s th e tic

part to th e d is c u s s io n of th e fo rm s o f s e n s ib ility and c o m p le te ly a v o id s

any r e fe re n ce to th e process of u n d e r s ta n d in g . T hough th is d u a lity g e ts

som ew h at r e c o n c ile d in th e A n a ly tic th e r e e x is ts every lia b ility to

m is r e a d and m is u n d e r s ta n d th e reason b e h in d th e c a re fu l is o la tio n of the

tw o in th e A e s th e tic .

K a n t ia n d u a lity of m a tter and fo rm of app earan ce m ay be

v ie w e d as h a v in g been c o n c e iv e d fro m th e p o in t of v ie w of th e ir o r ig in

Kant says, "T h a t in th e app earan ce w h ic h correspon ds to s e n s a tio n I

term s its m a tte r; but th a t w h ic h so d e te r m in e s t h e m a in fo ld cf

app ea ra n ce th a t it a llo w s of b e in g ord ered in c e r ta in r e la tio n s , I te r m

57
th e fo rm o f a p p e a r a n c e ."

The d is tin c tio n b etw een fo r m and m a tte r of app earan ces has

been in te r p r e te d fro m v a r io u s s ta n d p o in ts by th e com m en ta tors of K ant

and m ost of th e m a r e c r itic a l of su ch is o la tio n o f e le m e n ts of

e c p e r ie n c e . N. K e m p S m it h c o n c e iv e s th e d is tin c tio n as th a t b e tw e e n th e

m a in fo ld , g iv e n , e m p ir ic a l, c o n tin g e n t m a te r ia ls of sense* on th e one

h an d and th e ’ u n ify in g , a p r io r i, s y n th e tic , r e la tio n a l in s tr u m e n t s of

s e n s ib ility * on th e oth er hand. K em p S m it h t h in k s th a t th e stre n g th as

w e ll as w eak n ess of K a n t ia n p o s itio n depends upon th is d u a l i s t i c m od e o f

56. A 16 = B 30.

57. A 20 = B 34.
 106
c o n c e iv in g th e fa cto rs of e x p e r ie n c e . He c o m m e n ts , "T o its p e r v e r t in g

in f lu e n c e m ost o f th e u n s a tis fa c to r y fe a tu r e s o f h is d o c tr in e o f sp a ce an d

tim e ca n be d ir e c tly tra ce d . But to it is a ls o due h is a p p r e c ia t io n of

th e new c r itic a l p r o b le m s w it h th e ir r e v o lu tio n a r y con sequ en ces as

58
d e v e lo p e d in t h e A n a l y t i c . "

C a s s ir e r is very m u ch e m p h a tic in v o i c i n g h is v ie w s

a g a in s t th e c o m p le te b ifu r c a tio n b etw een th e fo rm a l and m a t e r ia l e le m e n t s

of appearan ce. It is not r e a s o n a b le to t h in k th a t a s u b je c t elem ent

d io u ld be p resen t in th e stru ctu re , but th e sa m e e le m e n t is absent in

th e s e n s ib le m a tter its e lf. He p o in ts ou t, "E ith e r th ere are no good

reasons f o r s u s p e c tin g s e n s ib le e le m e n t s of h a v in g a n y t h in g s u b je c t iv e

a b o u t them i.e . fo r a lle g in g th a t th ey can n ot be c o n c e iv e d e n tir e ly ty

t h e m s e lv e s and in c o m p le te in d e p e n d e n c e of m in d w h ic h becom es aw are

of th e m . Or e ls e , if th ere are su ch grou n ds th e c h a r a c te r is tic of

s ib je c t iv it y an d depen den ce on m in d a ttr ib u ta b le to th em m ust a p p ly to

59
th em in a n y a n d e v e r y r e s p e c t ."

O ffe r in g h is v ie w s on th is d is tin c tio n of fo rm fro m m atter

of ap p earan ces in T ra n scen d en ta l A e s th e tic P a to n says th a t th e is o la tio n

of form from m a tter is s o m e t im e s w r o n g ly tre a te d as a p s y c h o lo g ic a l

is o la tio n to m ean th a t 'w e have fir s t th e m a tte r and th e n th e form or

fir s t th e fo rm and th en th e m a tter. P a to n t h in k s th a t th is k in d of

m is ta k e n p s y c h o lo g ic a l in t e r p r e t a t io n g iv e s r is e to m any errors, lik e

in t e r p r e t in g K ant a s ta k in g o v e r H u m e 's d o c tr in e of s e n s a t io n s a s

58. N. K em p S m it h : C o m m e n ta ry t o K a n t 's C r i t i q u e o f P u re R ea son , p.85.

59. H .W . C a s s ir e r : K a n t 's F ir s t C r itiq u e , p .3 8 .

 , 107
isolated and unrelated atomic entities and regarding the particular

spatial and temporal qualities, such as differences regarding shape etc,

as wholly imposed by the mind. Paton opines that, "The empirical

differences in the shapes and sizes of objects like their empirical

qualitative differences must be ascribed to the 'influence' of things in -

them selves"^

Paton suggests that Kantian doctrine of form and matter

must be looked at from the point of view of the distinction between

em pirical and universal. To quote h is words, "Only what is strictly

universal is imposed by the mind upon ob jects. Empirical differences

are particular determinations of the universal but their particularity is

rat due to the mind and must be due to things".

The duality of percept and concept or intuition or thought

is another significant innovation we come across in Kant. The important

thing t0 note in connection with this duality is that, though percept and

concept are distinct from each other in respect of nature and origin,

the^ are complementary to each other in respect of their function. The

oft-quoted statement of Kant makes the point clear. "Thoughts without

content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is,

therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is , to

add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions

62
intelligible, that is , to bring them under concepts." The percept cr

intuition represents the sensible content which lik e the blind can lead

ED. H.J. Paton: Kant's Metaphysic of Experience. Vol I. p 139.

61. Ib id , p 140.
62. A 52 = B 76.
 108
us now where. The thought or concept too, Is nothing but an empty form

which cannot yield objective knowledge if no intuitions are brought

under its rules.

Strawson's observation on the duality of intuition and

concept in Kant is worth-mentioning. He thinks that this duality is

merely the epistemological aspect of the duality of particular instance

and general type. In its most general form thought is 'o f some

peculiarly intimate connextion between space and time on the one hand,

and the idea of the particular item, the particular instance of the

general concept, on the oth er'. A general concept to be applicable to a

particular instance must find a 'local habitation' if not at least 'a

temporal habitation'. To quote his words, "Spatio-temporal position

provides the fundamental ground of distinction between one particular

item and another of the general type, hence the fundamental ground of

identity of particular items".

This distinction between percept and concept looks otherwise

similar to that between matter and form of appearances but for the

difference that while matter is completely obtained from experience,

percept is constituted of both a posteriori sensation and pure forms of

sensibility ordering it. Moreover, form of appearance refers to the

subjective laws in which sensibility receives sensations, whereas the

concepts are the pure categories having their origin in the understanding

alone.

63. P.F. Strawson : The Bounds of Sense, p. 49

 109
Another very important duality entertained by Kant is the

duality of inner and outer sense. Kant regards the outer sense as a

mental property by which 'we represent to ourselves objects as outside

us and all without exception in s p a ce '. In the same way the inner sense

i's another mental property by which the mind intuits itself and its

other mental states. Intuition of mind and its states is possible only In

time-determination,so time is the form of inner sense.

This concept of inner sense too, has been objected to by

many commentators of Kant. Strawson mainly dwells upon the conclusion

that Kant draws from h is theory of inner and outer sense. Strawson

questions the Kantian assertion that what we know either through the

iiner or the outer sense is only an appearance. Pointing out that we do

have knowledge of ourselves as we really are Strawson observes that

cur own experiences or states of consciousness essentially occur in

temporal order. In knowing our own states of consciousness we know

samething about ourselves as we really are, though we may not know the

same way about other objects of experience.

Kemp Smith has been bery particular in pinpointing Kantian

view of time as the form of inner sense as 'the most vulnerable tenet'

in Kant's whole system. He raises certain issues connected with time as

a form of inner sense, such as, 1) the nature of the a p riori knowledge

which time y ie ld s 2) dependence of time on space, that is wh. ther

time only allows of or whether it demands representation through space

3) p ossib ility of apprehending the co-existent without successive

 110

synthesis of parts 4) simultaneity as a mode of time and 5) the manner

in which appearances are in time regarding all of which Kant's

aiswer is not of definite nature.

Kemp Smithsummerises his observation on this issue in the

following lines. "Kant's view of time as a form merely of inner sense,

aid as having only one dimension, connects with his sujbectivism . His

view of it as inhering in objects, and as having duration and

simultaniety as two of its modes, it bound up with his

64
phenomenalism."

Paton's observation is thatthe doctrine of inner sense

itself is not unreasalable. He says, "As we have clearly ........ an

immediate cognitive relation to our own individual states of mind it is

65
not improper to say that we have an inner sense." He cla rifies, "The

fact that there is no physical organ of inner sense as there is of outer

senses, is irrelevant. The characteristic of sense, for Kant, is not its

fifi
relation to a physical organ, but simply its p a ssiv ity".

The Kantian dualities discussed above are all

epistemological. ‘ Now the fifth one of appearance and reality or

phenomena and noumena is a metaphysical duality grounded on the

epistemological ones. An analysis of human faculties of knowing after

Kant naturally leads us to a kind of dualism between that which is

64. N.Kemp Smith :Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. p>. 138.

65. H.J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysic of Experience V o l.I.p .9 9 .

66. Ibid . p. 101.

 l i t

k n o w a b l e w i t h t h o s e p o w e r s o f o u r o w n a n d t h a t w h i c h s t a n d s b e y o n d t h e

g r a s p o f s u c h p o w e r a n d h e n c e u n k n o w a b l e . P h e n o m e n a a n d n o u m e n a s t a n d

f o r t h o s e t w o c o n c e p t s - t h e f o r m e r f o r t h e k n o w a b l e a n d t h e l a t t e r f o r

t h e u n k n o w a b l e .

T h e s p a d e - w o r k f o r t h i s d u a l i t y t o d e v e l o p h a s b e e n d o n e

i n t h e T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A e s t h e t i c i t s e l f . E x p o s i t i o n o f s p a c e a n d t i m e i n

t h e A e s t h e t i c h a s e s t a b l i s h e d b e y o n d d o u b t t h a t t h e y a r e t h e t w o

u n i v e r s a l a n d n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e ; a n d t h i s

c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n m a k e s s p a c e a n d t i m e , t o s o m e e x t e n t , a c c o u n t a b l e f o r

t h e s t a t u s o f t h e w o r l d e x p e r i e n c e . W h a t e v e r i s k n o w n t h e h u m a n w a y i s

s p a t i a l a n d t e m p o r a l ; b u t s p a c e a n d t i m e b e l o n g t o t h e m i n d a n d n o t t o

t h e o b j e c t . K a n t d e s c r i b e s t h i s a s s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n b y s p a c e a n d t i m e i n

r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i n g s a s t h e y a p p e a r . K a n t s a y s , " t h e s e a

p r i o r i s o u r c e s o f k n o w l e d g e , b e i n g m e r e l y c o n d i t i o n s o f o u r s e n s i b i l i t y ,

j u s t b y t h i s v e r y f a c t d e t e r m i n e t h e i r o w n l i m i t s , n a m e l y t h a t t h e y a p p l y

t o o b j e c t s o n l y i n s o f a r a 6 o b j e c t s a r e v i e w e d a s a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d d o

cn
n o t p r e s e n t t h i n g s a s t h e y a r e i n t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s s o - c a l l e d s e l f

l i m i t a t i o n b y s p a c e a n d t i m e p r o v i d e s s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d f o r d r a w i n g a

l i n e o f d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l a p p e a r a n c e a n d n o n - s p a t i o

t e m p o r a l r e a l i t y . H u m a n m i n d k n o w s o n l y t h r o u g h s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n . I t s

r e c e p t i v e c a p a c i t y h a s t o b e a w a k e n e d s o t h a t t h e s p o n t a n e o u s a c t i v i t y

o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a y f o l l o w a n d k n o w l e d g e m a y b e y i e l d e d . T h e o b j e c t

k n o w n t h r o u g h t h e t w o - f o l d f u n c t i o n o f r e c e p t i o n a n d c o n c e p t i o n i s t h e

m o d i f i e d o n e c o n d i t i o n e d b y s u b j e c t i v e f o r m s o f i n t u i t i o n a n d p u r e

c o n c e p t s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d n o t t h e o b j e c t i n i t s e l f , u n m o d i f i e d a n d

u n c o n d i t i o n e d .

6 7 . A 3 9 = B 5 6
 112

Explaining the fundamental constitution of sensible

knowledge Kant upholds that such knowledge is nothing but appearance

and this concept of appearance in consistent with his theory of space and

time. He clarifies, "What we have meant to say is that all our intuition

is nothing but the representation of appearance, that the things which we

intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their

relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if

the subject, or even the subjective constitution of the senses in general,

be removed the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in

CO

space and time, nay space and time themselves would vanish". This

sentence loaded with ideas amply clarifies Kantian stand regarding the

constitution and status of sensible knowledge and the utter subjectivity of

space and time. Our sensible knowledge, however clear and complete it

may be cannot represent the objects in themselves. To reproduce in

Kantian language, "What the objects may be in themselves would never

become known to us even through the most enlightened knowledge of that

8Q
which is alone given us, namely their appearance"*

Kant distances himself from Locke while explaining the

distinction between appearance and reality. The distinction of primary

and secondary qualities has been coceived by Locke as that of reality

and appearance, because primary qualities are thought of as representing

the true nature of objects by him. Kant observes that Locke's

distinction, in fact, is not between reality and appearance, but within

appearances. The so-called primary qualities which are believed to be

68. A 42 = B 60.

69. A 43 = B 60
 113

o b j e c t i v e a n d r e a l a r e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a p p e a r a n c e s . H e w r i t e s w i t h

o b v i o u s r e f e r e n c e t o L o c k e a n d i s t i n c t i o n , " W e t h e n b e l i e v e t h a t w e k n o w

t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s a n d t h i s i s i n s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e w o r l d

o f s e n s e , h o w e v e r d e e p l y w e e n q u i r e i n t o o b j e c t s , w e h a v e t o d o w i t h

7 0
n o t h i n g b u t a p p e a r a n c e s " . C o m m e n t i n g o n K a n t ' s v i e w P a t o n s a y s , " O n

t h i s v i e w s e c o n d a r y a n d p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s t a k e n t o g e t h e r a r e o p p o s e d t o

t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s a s a p p e a r a n c e t o r e a l i t y . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

s e c o n d a r y a n d p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s i s a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n a p p e a r a n c e , n o t a

7 1
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e a l i t y " .

K a n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e o f s p a c e a n d t i m e h e a d v o c a t e s

m u s t n o t b e t r e a t e d a s a m e r e p l a u s i b l e h y p o t h e s i s , r a t h e r i t i s t o b e

a c c e p t e d a s c e r t a i n . N e c e s s i t y a n d u n i v e r s a l i t y o f s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i

j u d g m e n t s o f G e o m e t r y a n d m e c h a n i c s c a n n e v e r b e e x p l a i n e d u n l e s s s p a c e

a n d t i m e a r e t h e m s e l v e s a p r i o r i a n d i n t u i t i o n s ( p a r t i c u l a r s ) . K a n t

d e c l a r e s , " I t i s , t h e r e f o r e n o t m e r e l y p o s s i b l e a n d p r o b a b l e , b u t

i n d u b i t a b l y c e r t a i n , t h a t 6 p a c e a n d t i m e a s t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f

a l l o u t e r a n d i n n e r e x p e r i e n c e , a r e m e r e l y s u b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s o f a l l

o u r i n t u i t i o n a n d t h a t i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a l l o b j e c t s a r e

t h e r e f o r e m e r e a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d n o t g i v e n u s a s t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s

7 2
w h i c h e x i s t i n t h i s m a n n e r " .

O n K a n t i a n t h e o r y n o t o n l y o b j e c t s o f o u t e r s e n s e a r e

a p p e a r a n c e s , i n n e r s e n s e t o o , g i v e s u s o n l y a p p e a r a n c e s . K a n t ' s v i e w

7 0 . A 4 5 = B 6 3

7 1 . H . J . P a t o n : K a n t ' s M e t a p h y s i c o f E x p e r i e n c e , V o % 6 1 .

7 2 . A 4 9 = B 6 6
 114

about the nature of knowledge obtained through inner sense can be found

in the following lines. "Since this form does not represent anything save

in so far as something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the

mode in which the the mind is affected through its own activity (namely

through this positing of its representation}, and so is affected by itself;

in other words, it is nothing but an inner sense in respect of the form

73
of that sense". Thus our knowledge of ourselves too is nothing other

than appearance. Human consciousness, whether about external object or

mind's inner states and processes, is always preceded by perception of

the manifold which owes its origin to the non-spontaneous mode of

sensibility. Therefore just as the object outside is known to us at least

as an appearance, the knowledge of the self, the knower too, is a mere

appearance.

Rendering of all knowledge of objects, both of outer sense

and inner sense including the knower as appearance, Kant warns, must not

be misundertstood as stamping it as illusion. Kant makes a very clear

distinction between appearance and illusion when he writes, " When I say

that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike

represent the objects and the mind in space and in time, as they affect

our senses, that is as they appear, I do not mean to say that these
74
objects are a mere illusion". The sensible intuitions, for Kant, are

ideal, because they are appearances of the object in relation to the

knowing subject. These would be illusions only when space and time are

regarded as objective and objects are considered as existing

73. B 68.

74. B 69.
 115

independently of all relations to sen sib ility . To quote Kant, "It is only

if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation, that it

becomes im possible for us to prevent everything being thereby

75
transformed into mere illu sion".

Space and time being regarded real in the ob jectiv e sense

would mean that they are two infinite non-entities, neither substances nor

actually inhering in substance, but still they condition the existence of

everything including the knowing se lf and 'must continue to ex ist even

although all existing things be rem oved'. Such an attitude about space

and time will surely reduce everything spatio-temporal into illusion.

Among the commentators of Kant many find fault with his

doctrine of space and time as a p rio ri intuitions. Almost all of them

draw attention towards the ambiguous use of terms in Kantian thought,

Kemp Smith, citing Kantian definition of object as "an excellent instance

of Kant's careless mode of expressing h im self," says that the term

'o b je c t' has been used by Kant in two senses - one as the content or

matter of intuition and the other as the cause of intuition, but these two

meanings KempSmith believes, cannot consistently coincide on Kantian

view . Let us express it in Kemp Sm ith's words, "The object which

affects the mind is independently rea l; the immediate object of intuition

is a sense - content, which Kant following the universally accepted view

of h is time, regards as purely su b joctive."

75. B 70.

76. N. KempSmith: A Commentary to Kant's Critique o f Pure Reason._p.80.

 116

Paton's observation in this regard may be helpful in

clearing up this ambiguity about the use of the term 'o b je c t '. He

suggests that "The simplest interpretation is to suppose that Kant is

speaking on the common sense level. The object may be taken to be a

body. It is given to us so far as it affects our minds throughthe

sense-organs and produces a sensation."77

P.F, Strawson brings into notice another Kantian term liable

to different interpretations. He shows that the term 'a p riori' may be

interpreted in three disthtct senses - 1) austere interprpetation according

to which 'a concept or feature can be called a priori if it is an

essential structural element in any conception of experience which we can

make intelligible to ourselves' 2) transcendental idealist interpretation,

according to which a priori is that element whose presence as a feature'

of experience is attributable entirely to the nature of our cognitive

constitution and not to the nature of things 3) a priori taking as

equivalent to innate. The third sense, Strawson thinks is never

attributable to Kantian space and time. Strawson observes that, "Kant

would have no interest in a thesis to the effect that the ideas of space

and time were in us prior to experience, which did not carry with it

the thesis that space and time themselves were in us prior to

78
experience".

Strawson brings out another 'perilous ambiguity' involved in

the key statement of the Aesthetic, ''space and time are forms of

77. H.J. Paton: Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, Vol.I p.95

78. P.F. Strawson : The Bounds of Sense , p . 69.

 11?

intuition*. According to him this statement means that the spatial and the

temporal are the modes in which we become aware of particular instances

of general concepts as ordered in relation to each other. The ambiguity

is involved in the query as to whether the spatial and the temporal are

the ways in which particular instances are ordered and hence the ways

in which we became aware of them as ordered or they are our ways of

becoming aware of particular instances as ordered and hence the ways in

which they are ordered.

From the Kantian standpoint, however, there is no ambiguity

in the statement as pointed out by strawson. Obvious enough that Kant

would side with the second meaning as amplified by Strawson and never

admit that the particulars exist the spatio-temporal way and hence space

and time are the ways in which we know the particulars.

KempSmith points out "the complicated ambiguities of Kant's

treatment of space" by raising the question as to whether the whole

space preconditions the parts of space or the former arises through

combination of parts. KempSmith observes that Kant's answers to this

question has been contradictory - in the Aesthetic space is conceived as

given as a whole, while in the Analytic it has been said that the

representation of the whole is made possible by the representation of

parts.

KempSmith himself suggests the possible solution when he

opines that, "The divergence of views between the Aesthetic and the

Analytic springs out of the difficulty of meeting at once the logical

demands of a world which Kant conceives objectively and the

 1 1 8

p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e m a n d s w h i c h a r i s e w h e n t h i s s a m e w o r l d i s c o n c e i v e d a s

s u b j e c t i v e l y c o n d i t i o n e d . I n p r i n c i p l e t h e w h o l e p r e c e d e s 1 t h e p a r t s ; i n

t h e p r o c e s s o f b e i n g b r o u g h t i n t o e x i s t e n c e a s a n i n t u i t i o n , t h e p a r t s

7 9

p r e c e d e t h e w h o l e " .

K a n t i a n a r g u m e n t f r o m t h e a p r i o r i c h a r a c t e r o f s p a c e a n d

t i m e t o t h e i r s u b j e c t i v i t y h a s a l s o b e e n t h e o b j e c t o f c r i t i c i s m o f m a n y

o f h i s c r i t i c s . K o r n e r o b s e r v e s t h a t t h i s i s n o t a c o n c l u s i v e a r g u m e n t .

H e w r i t e s , " I t i s a l w a y s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t w h a t w e p e r c e i v e u n d e r

t h e f o r m o f s p a c e a n d t i m e i s s o o r d e r e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o u r

p e r c e p t i o n . l t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t w h a t a p e r s o n s e e s t h r o u g h h i s

i r r e m o v a b l e s p e c t a c l e s a s , l e t u s s a y , p i n k i s a l s o p i n k i n f a c t , a n d

$0
w o u l d b e s e e n s o e v e n i f p e r i m p o s s i b i l e t h e s p e c t a c l e s w e r e r e m o v e d ' r .

T h e r e a l i s t c a n a c c e p t t h e K a n t i a n d i s t i n c t i o n o f f o r m a n d m a t t e r o f

p e r c e p t i o n a n d a t t h e s a m e b r e a t h c a n m a i n t a i n w i t h o u t i n c o n s i s t e n c y t h a t

' t h e t h i n g h e p e r c e i v e s e x i s t s j u s t a s h e p e r c e i v e s i t ' .

P a t o n i s o f t h e v i e w t h a t s p a c e a n d t i m e a s n e c e s s a r y a n d

u n i v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s o f a p p e a r a n c e s a r e a p r i o r i a n d h e n c e a r e d u e t o t h e

n a t u r e o f t h e k n o w i n g m i n d . T h a t t h e y a r e f o r m s o f s e n s i b i l i t y s u g g e s t s

t h a t s p a c e a n d t i m e a r e p o t e n t i a l l y p r e s e n t i n m i n d e v e n b e f o r e

e x p e r i e n c e b e g i n s . B u t t h a t , P a t o n r e m i n d s , s h o u l d n o t b e i n t e r p r e t e d t o

m e a n t h a t s p a c e a n d t i m e a r e a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t i n o u r m i n d s ' p r i o r t o a n y

e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s a c t u a l p r i o r e x i s t e n c e m a y b e a p p l i e d t o s e n s i b i l i t y ,

n o t t o s p a c e a n d t i m e . P a t o n e x p l a i n s , " I t m a y b e a p p l i e d , n o t t o s p a c e

7 9 . N . K e m p S m i t h : A c o m m e n t a r y t o K a n t ' s C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n , p ^ 6 .

8 0 . S . K o r n e r : K a n t ; pp 3 7 - 3 8 .
 119
and time, but to that characteristic of our sensibility in virtue of which

we can sense things only in temporal and spatial relations. This

characteristic does exit in every human being even before experience

k •.,81
begins".

KempSmith's observation in this regard would be helpful ir

understanding the point. He is of the view that in the Aesthetic space is

viewed almost exclusively as a psychological aprlori. KempSmith finds

out two contradictory treatments of space in the Aesthetic itself - (a)

space as antedating experience as an actual,

completed, conscious
p
intuition1 and (b) space as a 'potential disposition*. On KemSmith's view

the first treatment alone is straightforward and unambiguous, since lr

this sense only space can be thought of as that which remains even after

the sense materials are thought away.

Refuting the idea of temporal a priority of space and time

as pure intuitions Paton says that by apriority of space and time is

meant only their logical a priority, not the temporal a priority. He

suggests, "Such an interpretation of Kant is in any case the only one

82
which can have any chance of withstanding criticism ".

Paton makes a very illuminating observation when he says,

"It should be clearly understood that Kant's main argument is not from

the subjectivity of sensible appearances to the subjectivity of space and

time as intimately bound up with sensible appearances. It is precisely

81. H.J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, V ol.I. p.103.

82. Ibid, p. 137

 120

the reverse. Since space and time are known a p r io r i, they must be

su b jectiv e in origin , and therefore the sensible appearances of which

they are the form must be p a rtly determined by the nature of the

m in d ".83

Vaihinger o b je c ts to Kantian argument in favour of

s u b je ctiv ity o f space as deduceable from it being a p r io r i. On h is view

space is su b jectiv e because it is fu ll of con tradiction s. Space is a

conceptual construct of the mind — constructed with a view to bringing

ord er into chaotic and con tradictory mass of sensations. Though a mental

construct space is fa ls e ly attributed o b je c t iv it y w hich lea d s to the

concept of tri-dim ensional sp a ce. T h is tri-dim ensional space creates

84
illu sion o f a real w orld out there w hich is incom prehensible fo r us.

Kantian use o f the term 'a p r i o r i' in relation to space has

a lso been interpreted from d iv e rs e angles by h is commentators. KempSmith

questions - Is the representation of space innate or acqu ired ? T his

question brings in the query about the meaning o f a p r io r ity o f sp a ce.

KempSmith ob serv es that Kant h im self is not clea r about what should be

the p r e c is e meaning of a p r io r i. He points out that throughout the

discu ssion in A esth etic Kant takes the representation of space as

something in born, but in other parts o f the Critique he con sideres the

representation of space as a cq u ired . KempSmith reproduces the Kantian

problem as fo llo w s . "Throughout the C ritique Kant in sists that space is a

form o f r e c e p tiv ity . It has nothing to do with spontaneity or

83. I b id , p . 135.

84. Hans Vaihinger : The P h ilosoph y o f As I f. p . 53.

 121

understanding and th erefore cannot be aquired by re fle c tio n upon any

a c tiv ity of the mind. But neither can it , as a p r io r i, be acquired from

without. But i f given and yet not a cq u ired , it must as a representation

DC

lie ready in the mind from the v e r y b irth o f consciousness".

KempSmith's understanding of the situation may be

supplemented by what Paton says in th is rega rd . "The a p rio ri does not

in volve temporal p r io r it y ... although a ll knowledge begins with

ex p erien ce, it is p o ssib le that some knowledge is not d e riv e d from

oe
exp erien ce and is not dependent on ex p erien ce" He further comments

th at", "on K ant's view the a p r io r i is at work in ex p erien ce from the

s ta r t— there is no experien ce without a form — and it is gradually made

clear to consciousness by r e fle x io n . In that sense a p r io r i knowledge is

87
acquired and not innate".

Refering to the Kantian statement about a p r io r ity o f time in

A 452=B 480 of the Critique Paton w rites, "Time, he sa y s , is o b je c tiv e ly

p r io r to all changes, as the formal condition of th eir p o s s ib ility ,

s u b je ctiv e ly , that is , in actual consciousness, the idea of time is , lik e

e v e ry other, given only through the stimulus of sense p ercep tion s. I can
DO

con ceive no clea rer statement o f K ant's fundamental p o sitio n ".

Paton thinks that a p r io r ity of space and time can be

85. N.KempSmith: A Commentary to K ant's Critique o f Pure R ea son ,p .92

86. H .J.Paton: K ant's M etaphysic o f E xperien ce, V o l.l,f> p .77 -78 .

87. Ib id , p . 78.

88. I b id . p . 80.
 122

u n d e r s to o d in tw o s e n s e s - one a s w h o le s w h ic h n e c e s s a r i l y d e te rm in e th e

ch a ra cter o f t h e ir p a rts and th e o th e r as u n iv e r s a l and n ecessary

c o n d it io n s o f e x p e r ie n c e . He h o ld s th a t i f sp a ce and tim e w e re not a

p r io r i in th e fir s t sense, th ey w ou ld not bea p r io r i in th e s e co n d

sense. P aton com m ents, "It is u n fortu n ate th at Kant d o e s not s u ffic ie n t ly ,

d is t in g u is h and e x p lic itly co n n ect th e s e tw o senses, yet it is th e real

c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n them w h ic h is at th e r o o t o f h i s a m b ig u ou s u se o f th e
♦ „ 89
te rm ".

M odern c r i t i c s o f Kant m ake h i s t h e o r y o f G eom etry th e m ain

ta r g e t o f a tta ck . On K a n t 's v ie w s p a c e ta k en a s t h e a p r i o r i in tu itio n can

a cco u n t f o r th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s y n t h e t ic a p r i o r i p r o p o s it io n s o f G eom etry

and a ls o fo r th e a p p li c a t io n o f su ch p r o p o s it io n s to o r d in a r y s p a t ia l

o b je c t s o f e m p ir ic a l in tu itio n w ith a b s o lu t e n e c e s s i t y . What th e c r i t i c s o f

Kant r a is e fin g e r to is th a t Kant s im p ly w a ste d la b o u r in s o lv in g a

p r o b le m th a t w as n o n -e x is t e n t . The p r o p o s it io n s o f G eom etry e s ta b lis h e d

as n ecessary, are r e a lly t r u th s o f lo g ic , o n ly in c i d e n t a l ly g e o m e tr ic a l,

and th e s y n t h e t ic p r o p o s it io n s th at are e s s e n t ia l ly g e o m e tr ic a l are not

n ecessary at a ll. T hey are n o th in g but 'e m p i r i c a l h y p o th e se s co n ce rn in g

th e s tr u c tu r e of p h y s ic a l sp a ce, s u b je c t to e m p ir ic a l co n firm a tio n or

d is c o n f ir m a t i o n " .

S tra w son fo r w a r d s an im p orta n t o b s e r v a t io n o f K antian t h e o r y

in th e fa c e of th is c r itic is m . He a d m its th a t t h is c r itic is m of K a n t's

th eory o f G eom etry is 't o a very great e x te n t, c o r r e c t ,' but at th e sam e

tim e he r e fu s e s to a g r e e to th e cla im th a t it p r o v id e s s u ff ic ie n t g rou n d

89. I b id . b . 15 4 .
 1 2 3

f o r t h e t o t a l d i s m i s s a l o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y . T e r m i n g t h e a n t i - K a n t i a n v i e w

a s t h e p o s i t i v i s t a c c o u n t S t r a w s o n m a i n t a i n s , . . , " T o a c c e p t t h e p o s i t i v i s t

a c c o u n t o f g e o m e t r y i s t o d e n y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f K a n t ' s p r o b l e m a n d s o t o

r e m o v e t h e m a i n t h e o r e t i c a l s u p p o r t f o r h i s t h e o r y o f a p r i o r i

9 0
i n t u i t i o n " .

O n t h e p o s i t i v i s t v i e w t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f E u c l i d e a n

g e o m e t r y m a y b e l o o k e d a t i n t w o w a y s - a s f o r m u l a e i n a n u n i n t e r p r e t e d

c a l c u l u s ; o r a s t h e b o d y o f l o g i c a l l y c o n n e c t e d e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s

w h i c h r e s u l t f r o m t h e a d o p t i o n o f a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r t h e

f u n d a m e n t a l e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h e f o r m u l a e . S t r a w s o n d i s c o v e r s a t h i r d w a y

b y w h i c h a n a c c e p t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y m a y b e o f f e r e d .

I t c o n s i s t s i n , S t r a w s o n o b s e r v e s , i n t e r p r e t i n g E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y " a s a

b o d y o f u n f a l s i f i a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t p h e n o m e n a l s t r a i g h t l i n e s ,

t r i n g l e s , c i r c l e s e t c . a s a b o d y o f a p r i o r i p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t s p a t i a l

a p p e a r a n c e s o f t h e s e k i n d s a n d h e n c e , o f c o u r s e , a s a t h e o r y w h o s e

9 1
a p p l i c a t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d t o s u c h a p p e a r a n c e s " .

S t r a w s o n e x p l a i n s h i s o b s e r v a t i o n b y p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e

f i g u r e s e m p l o y e d i n g e o m e t r y d o n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . T h e y

c a n s i m p l y b e s a i d a s l o o k s o f t h e n , a n d t h e s e l o o k s m a y b e t e r m e d a s

p h e n o m e n a l f i g u r e s . L e t u s q u o t e h i m , " A n a r r a n g e m e n t o f p h y s i c a l l i n e s

o r e d g e s m a y l o o k t r i a n g u l a r . B u t i t i s n o t t h e p h y s i c a l l i n e s , s o

a r r a n g e d , w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e t r i n a g l e w h i c h i s t h e o b j e c t o f p u r e

i n t u i t i o n ; i t i s r a t h e r t h e t r i a n g u l a r l o o k w h i c h t h e y h a v e t h e

9 0 . P . F . S t r a w s o n : T h e B o u n d s o f S e n s e , p . 2 8 0 .

9 1 . I b i d , p . 2 8 6 .
 124
phenomenal triangle w hich they present, w hich is the o b je ct of pure
q?
in tu ition".

Strawson hopes that the notion o f a phenomenal interpretation

of Euclidean geom etry, if can be made sen sib le, may render Kantian

th eory of pure intuition and of the construction of concepts in pure

intuition p e rfe ctly reasonable, at least upto a point.

The developm ent of modern mathematics has been view ed by

Paton as casting grave doubt w hich shadows K ant's assumptions regarding

Geometry. "Mathematics now aims at so high a degree of generality and

abstractness that it has ceased to have any essential connection with

quantity, and a fo r tio r i with sp a ce. The result is that formal lo g ic ,

mathematical theory and pure mathematics, are a ll merged into an

in d iv is ib le w hole, and th is whole is d e s crib e d as pursuing an analytical

QQ
m ethod".

Development of non Euclidean geom etries too, is a d iffic u lt

prop osition to assert from Kantian v iew o f space and tim e. As against the

Euclidean, in modern times geometry has been conceived to be o f many

kinds carrying with them d ifferen t kinds of space intuitioon o f w hich

none is more fundamental than any other.

The more serious d iffic u lty in defending K ant's theory lie s

in the p o s s ib ility o f the a p p lic a b ility o f non Eluclidean geom etries to the

92. I b id , p . 282.

93. H .J.Paton: K ant's M etaphysic o f E xperien ce, V o l.I . p ,1 5 5 .

 125
actual space of the physical world, th is applicability of geometry to

physical space would make the former empirical and as a result of this,

its conclusions contingent. To use Paton's own language, " If one of the

many geometries does apply and still more if one must apply, to the

physical world we have Kant's problem before us in a more subtle form

: it can hardly be a mere coincidence that some highly, abstract system

of geometry holds to the actual world". 94

We may look for the way out of this perplexing situation in

the suggestion offered by Paton in this regard. He says, "If Kant's

theory is to be maintained in a modern form, we should have to hold

that there is a pure intuition of space-tim e in the light of which

95
different geometries are intelligible". He again suggests, "I do not see

why it should be impossible to re-state Kant's assumptions so as to fit

in modern physical doctrine. It seems to me possible that space-time is

the condition or form of all appearances given to sense, that we can sort

it out, by a special kind of abstraction from the appearances of which

it is the form and study it mathematically as an individual w h ole... and

that in so doing we can discover laws to which the world of appearances

96
must conform".

Kantian doctrine of space and time, thus has been

interpreted by many scholars from diverse standpoints. Careless as he

was in expressing his ideas - novel and revolutionary-Kant's doctrine is

94. Ibid, p. 162.

95. Ibid, pp. 161-162.

96. Ibid, p . 163.

 126

obviously open to the various criticism s levelled by his commentators.

They are very much right in pinpointing the holes in his doctrine and

his way %of expressing it . There are as we have seen, sympathetic

writers too, who have tried to understand the d ifficu lties faced by

Kant's theory and reinstate it from modern perspective.

P .P , Strawson, a modern commentator appreciates Kantian

endeavour saying, "The investigation of the set of ideas which forms the

limiting framework of all our thought about the world and experience of

the w orld, is evidently, an important and interesting philosophical

undertaking. No philosopher has made a more strenuous attempt on it than

97
Kant".

Dwelling on what would be the value of Kant's agrument

about space and time Paton comments that the value of Kantian argument

is not in the fact that it possesses demonstrative certainty as claimed by

Kant him self, but in the prospect o f leading to new philosophies in

98
future by way o f clarification and defence of h is arguments.

Korner too, has a word of tribute to the greatness of Kant

which he expresses at the end of his book. He writes, "One main aim of

the undertaking has been to show that no one who takes these problems

or indeed philosophy seriously can without much loss to him self ignore
QQ
Kant's teaching".

97. P .F . Strawson : The Bounds of Sense, p . 15.

98. H.J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, V ol.I. p p . 183-184

99. S. Korner : Kant, p . 217.

 127

To understand Kantian arguments In the best possible way we

must put ourselves at his point of view. Since the eighteenth century

philosophy has crossed a great distance. Today its problems have got

reformulated with the exploration of new dimensions, new attitudes . Many

of Kantian ideas and doctrines may turn out to be obsolete and become

incompatible with what the philosopher of the modern age thinks or what

the modern physicist discovers about the mysteries of Nature. But that

should not be a point to underestimate Kant or to undermine the value of

his thought. As Paton has very rightly summarises his point saying, "For

the purpose of understanding Kant we must place ourselves at the point

of view of eighteenth century; and form that point of view I would urge

that Kant's-assumptions are, in the main sound".

100.H.J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, V ol.I. p. 163