Reuben Hersh maintains that mathematics is a human activity, intelligible only in a social context;

it is the subject where statements are capable in principle of being proved or disproved and where
proof or disproof brings unanimous agreement by all qualified experts; mathematicians’ proof is
deduction from established mathematics; mathematical objects exist only in the shared
consciousness of human beings.

Agreement
Disagreement

Mainstream, Maverick (Disidente), and Mathematical Practice

Despite the limitations of Lakatos’ approach to methodology qua logic of discovery, the origin of
the maverick tradition must be credited to him, because he was the first to assert that the philosophy
of mathematics must be primarily concerned with methodology qua (in the capacity of, as being)
logic of discovery.
Another approach has been proposed as a third way between mainstream and maverick philosophy
of mathematics, the so-called philosophy of mathematical practice, whose manifesto is Mancosu
(2008). But it is only a refurbished form of foundationalism.
Maverick philosophy of mathematics is essentially different from the philosophy of
mathematical practice. Philosophers of mathematical practice do not have in mind first of all the
discovery and creation of mathematics – mathematical research. They do not aim at reporting and
discussing what people really do in the process of mathematical discovery.

Maverick philosophy of maths:

● Maths are part and fits into human culture (Hersh)

The Definition of Mathematics

Mathematics is the subject where statements are capable in principle of being proved or disproved,
and where proof or disproof bring unanimous agreement by all qualified experts (Hersh).
Cellucci agrees with this partial definition, but he has some disagreements:
● Proof should not be understood, as Hersh says, as deductive proof, but rather as analytic
proof
 ● Instead of saying that proof brings unanimous agreement by all qualified experts, one
should rather say that it brings agreement by the majority of qualified experts, since
empirical research shows that “there is not universal agreement among mathematicians
regarding what constitutes a valid proof.

Philosophy of Mathematics and Human Knowledge

What is the philosophy of mathematics?
Agreements:
● Nature of mathematics cannot be unrelated to the general question of human knowledge,
and hence one must account for mathematics as a part of human knowledge in general.

Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematicians

In Cellucci’s view, the primary task of the philosophy of mathematics is to give an answer
to questions such as: What is the nature of mathematics? How is mathematical knowledge
discovered? What is the nature of mathematical objects? What is mathematical explanation? Why
is mathematics applicable to the world? How is the question of mathematical knowledge related
to the general question of human knowledge? What is the role of mathematics in human life?
Hershel’s point of view: It is the working philosophy of the professional mathematician, the
philosophical attitude toward his work that is assumed by the researcher, teacher, or user of
mathematic
The problem with Hershel’s view is that the view that the philosophy of mathematics is the
working philosophy of the professional mathematician entails that the philosophy of mathematics
can only give answer to questions such as: What is the working philosophy of the professional
mathematician put forward in a particular period, or by a particular school, or by a particular
mathematician?
The Distinction Between Front and Back
He means distinction between mathematics in finished form (history) and mathematics in the
making. Hersh formulates this distinction using the concepts of “front” and “back,”.
Front
● In ‘finished’ form, as it is presented to the public in classrooms, textbooks, and journals.
● The body of mathematics that is accepted as the basis for mathematicians’ proofs
Back
mathematics as it appears among working mathematicians, in informal settings, told to another in
an office behind closed doors

Mainstream philosophy of mathematics does not recognize “that mathematics has a back.
I agree with Hersh that mathematics has a front and a back. But I do not agree with him that the
back of mathematics is mathematics as it appears among working mathematicians, in informal
settings, told to another in an office behind closed doors. Mathematics as it appears there is just a
preliminary, incomplete version of mathematics in finished form. The back of mathematics is,
instead, the creative work of the mathematician, primarily the discovery work.
He also completely agrees with Hersh in that it is impossible to understand the front of
mathematics while ignoring the back.

Deductive Proof as Mathematicians’ Proof

It is widely agreed that proof is a means of extending mathematical knowledge, since “the key
function of proofs is to elaborate methods for solving problems and thereby extending existing
theories or creating new ones” (Rav 2007, 293). This implies that one should not base the concept
of proof on mathematics in finished form, the front, but rather on mathematics in the making,
because it is through the process by which mathematics is made that mathematical knowledge is
extended.
Mainstream philosophy of mathematics bases the concept of proof on mathematics in finished
form.
Hershel says that he “focuses on proof – the ‘front side’ of mathematics” (Hersh 2014, 73).
In his view, proof is deductive proof, because “deductive proof is the standard for acceptance of
one’s findings into the body of established mathematics”
Hersh admits that “plausible reasoning”– such as induction or analogy–“is likely to be
essential in finding the” deductive “proof” (ibid., 82). But he maintains that only deductive proof
“legitimates a result as ‘established’” (ibid.). Therefore, deductive proof “is the method by which
established mathematics becomes established”.
Deductive proof is “mathematicians’ proof: proof as it is understood by mathematicians”.
Mathematicians’ Proof and Axiomatic Proof
To Hershel, deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof means that for him mathematicians’ proof
“doesn’t start from a pre-ordained set of axioms. It starts from relevant pieces of established
mathematics out of which some new mathematical results can be derived and incorporated into
established mathematics” (Hersh 2014, 73). Therefore, mathematicians’ proof is not axiomatic
proof. Axiomatic proof is deduction from axioms that “are not established” but “are simply
postulated. Conversely, mathematicians’ proof is deduction from established mathematics.

Agreements:
● The Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory ZF cannot be the foundation for all of standard
mathematics because, by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, there are mathematical
sentences that are true but cannot be deduced from ZF. So, one cannot maintain that
mathematics is axiomatic systems.
○ From this it follows that the view that axiomatic proof is mathematicians’ proof is
inadequate. In fact, axiomatic proof is not mathematicians’ proof but only a means
to organize results already acquired for didactic purposes
This does not mean, however, that Hersh’s view that deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof is
satisfactory. On the contrary, I will argue that it is faced with serious problems.

Mathematicians’ Proof and Logic

Hersh’s concept of mathematicians’ proof. What is the relation of Hersh’s concept of
mathematicians’ proof to logic? According to Hersh, mathematicians’ proof proceeds by reasoning
that “makes no reference to the rules of logic” (Hersh 2014, 31). In fact, mathematicians “never
mention logic in” their “work”. I suppose, however, that by this, Hersh does not mean to say that
mathematicians’ proof does not rely on the rules of logic. He says that mathematicians’ proof relies
on the rules of logic, and mathematicians implicitly use such rules, even if they are not aware of
it.

Mathematicians’ Proof and Intuition

What is the relation of Hersh’s concept of mathematicians’ proof to intuition?
When researchers use the word “intuition,” they intend to refer to their feeling of “almost knowing”
some hypothesis without having consciously gone through a step-by-step reasoning process to get
there.
Hersh says that “intuition is an essential part of mathematics” (Hersh 1997, 61). But by “intuition,”
he “simply means guesses or insights attained by plausible reasoning, either fully conscious or
partly subconscious” (Hersh 2014, 64). So “mathematical intuition is an application of conscious
or subconscious heuristic thinking of the same kind that is used every day in ordinary life by
ordinary people, as well as in empirical science by scientists. Intuition is a metaphor for him.

Mathematicians’ Proof, Truth, and Certainty

What is the relation of Hersh’s concept of mathematicians’ proof to truth and certainty?
Mainstream philosophy of mathematics holds that mathematics is about truth and certainty.
Hersh opposes this view, by arguing that mathematics cannot be said to be about truth,
because “mathematicians’ proof does not guarantee truth” (Hersh 2014, 80). Nor mathematics can
be said to be about certainty, because “mathematics is human, and nothing human can be
absolutely certain” (ibid., 82). I completely agree with Hersh on these points. Mathematics cannot
be said to be about truth or certainty.
Mathematics cannot be said to be about truth. For, some mathematical theories have theorems that
contradict each other.
Mathematics cannot be said to be about certainty either. For, in order to say that
mathematics is certain on the view that deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof, one should at
least be able to prove by absolutely reliable means that the set of all propositions of any theory of
established mathematics is consistent. But, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, this is
impossible.

Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem and Certainty

The claim that, by Gödel’s second incompleteness, mathematics cannot be said to be certain is
unwarranted because, if mathematics cannot be said to be certain, then Gödel’s second
incompleteness theorem, being a mathematical result, cannot be said to be certain. But the claim
that, by Gödel’s second incompleteness, mathematics cannot be said to be certain depends on the
assumption that Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem can be said to be certain. Therefore, the
claim that, by Gödel’s second incompleteness, mathematics cannot be said to be certain is
unwarranted.
This objection, however, is invalid because the claim that, by Gödel’s second incompleteness,
mathematics cannot be said to be certain does not depend on the assumption that Gödel’s second
incompleteness theorem can be said to be certain. It is a reductio ad absurdum, since it is of the
following kind. Let us suppose, for argument’s sake, that mathematics can be said to be certain.
Then Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, being a mathematical result, can be said to be
certain. But, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, mathematics cannot be said to be certain.
This contradicts our assumption that mathematics can be said to be certain. Therefore, by reductio
ad absurdum, we conclude that mathematics cannot be said to be certain.

Plausibility in Place of Truth and Certainty

Rather than about truth and certainty, mathematics is about plausibility, where a proposition is said
to be plausible if it is compatible with the existing knowledge – in the sense that the arguments for
it are stronger than the arguments against it, on the basis of the existing knowledge.
Conditions for plausibility:
(1) Deduce conclusions from the proposition.
(2) Compare the conclusions with each other, in order to see that the proposition does not lead to
contradictions.
(3) Compare the conclusions with other propositions already known to be plausible, in order to see
that the proposition is compatible with them.
● Unlike truth, which is an absolute concept, plausibility is a relative concept to the existing
knowledge. For, as knowledge develops, new arguments for or against a proposition may
be produced, which may increase or decrease its plausibility.
● Unlike true propositions, which are certain, plausible propositions are not certain. For,
there is no guarantee that no counterexample will ever be found. However, by Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem, plausibility is the best we can achieve.

Warranted Assertibility
Hersh says that mathematics is about “‘warranted assertibility’ (asertabilidad garantizada).
Established mathematics consists of warrantedly assertible propositions, namely, propositions that
are “‘warranted’ by common consent based on shared experience.
This position is problematic. For, according to the pragmatist view of the logic of inquiry
developed by John Dewey, “the end of inquiry” is the “attainment of knowledge, or truth” (Dewey
1938, 7). Now, if truth is the end of inquiry, then inquiry is directed toward it, so truth is the guiding
principle of inquiry. In fact, Dewey states: “That which guides us truly is true” and “demonstrated
capacity for such guidance is precisely what is meant by truth” (Dewey 2004, 90). But, if truth is
the guiding principle of inquiry, then truth is strictly necessary. This conflicts with Hersh’s other
statement that “truth” is not available and not necessary. Therefore, instead of saying that
mathematics is about warranted assertibility, it seems more adequate to say that mathematics is
about plausibility.

Hersh and Pólya

Pólya distinguishes between the front and the back of mathematics, by saying that mathematics
has two “aspects. Finished mathematics presented in ‘finished’ form appears as purely
demonstrative, consisting of proofs only. Yet mathematics in the making resembles any other
human knowledge in the making,” it consists of “plausible reasoning.
Also, Pólya asserts that deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof, by saying that proof is
“a sequence of well-coordinated logical operations, of steps which start from the hypothesis and
end in the desired conclusion of the theorem”. But according to Pólya, plausible reasoning is not
part of the concept of proof. It does not serve to find hypotheses that cannot be deduced from
established mathematics; it is only a heuristic means for finding deductions from established
mathematics. Deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof, because “we secure our mathematical
knowledge by demonstrative reasoning”.
Nevertheless, despite the strong connection of Hersh to Pólya, between them there is a
substantial difference. According to Pólya, “proof is definitive, it establishes irrefutably the truth
of the theorem – once for all” (Pólya 1941, 450). Conversely, according to Hersh, “deductive
proof” does “not establish anything as true” (Hersh 2014, 81). So, “Pólya is mistaken when he
says that deductive proof renders a statement absolutely certain”.
Problems with Deductive Proof as Mathematicians’ Proof
Problems
● If deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof, then it is impossible to prove propositions that
cannot be deduced from established mathematics.
○ The example Cellucci proposes is a Cantors sentence, that of “there are sets of
“size” different from those of the natural numbers and the real numbers
● If deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof, then mathematicians are replaceable by
computers completely.
○ For, there is an algorithm for enumerating all deductions from given premises. This
problem indicates that the assumption that deductive proof is mathematicians’
proof is problematic. For, already Gödel pointed out that, by his first
incompleteness theorem, “it will never be possible to replace the mathematician by
a machine, even if you confine yourself to number-theoretic problems”
● If deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof, then all of mathematical knowledge can
ultimately be deduced from some elementary mathematical propositions, such as 1 + 1 = 2
○ For, if deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof, then, tracing all the deductive
chains all the way back, we will ultimately arrive at some propositions that cannot
have been established by deductive proof themselves. They cannot have been
postulated either, because deductive proof is not axiomatic proof. It only remains
that they are the product of those rudimentary mathematical capacities that,
according to cognitive science, all human beings innately possess as a result of
biological evolution. Such capacities consist, first of all, of “the capacity to perform
simple arithmetical calculations,” such as 1 + 1 = 2

Hippocrates of Chios’ Quadrature of Lunules

Rather than on mathematics in finished form, the concept of proof must be based on mathematics
in the making. Such was the original concept of proof in ancient Greece.

Analytic Proof
The concept of proof underlying Hippocrates of Chios’ quadrature of four cases of lunules is that
of analytic proof, which can be described as follows.
 ● Non-deductive derivation of a hypothesis from the problem and possibly other data already
available. The hypothesis must be plausible, namely, compatible with the existing
knowledge.
● The proof consists, then, in a non-deductive derivation of a new hypothesis from the
previous hypothesis and possibly other data already available. The new hypothesis must be
a sufficient condition for a solution to the problem posed by the previous hypothesis.
Moreover, the new hypothesis must be plausible. That the new hypothesis leads to a
solution to the problem posed by the previous hypothesis increases the plausibility of the
latter.
● And so on ad infinitum.

For this reason, there are not “solved problems and others which are not; there are only problems
more or less solved,” but “it often happens however that an imperfect solution guides us toward a
better one” (Poincaré).

Some Features of Analytic Proof

Analytic proof has several features. Here are some of them:

1. Unlike deductive proof, which only involves a downward path from established
mathematics to the proposition deduced from it, analytic proof involves both an upward
path, from the problem to plausible hypotheses that are sufficient conditions for its solution,
and a downward path, from plausible hypotheses to the problem.
2. The purpose of analytic proof is to discover hypotheses that are sufficient conditions for a
solution to the problem and are plausible. So, analytic proof is both a means of discovery
and a means of justification. It is a means of discovery, because it is intended to discover
hypotheses that are sufficient conditions for a solution to the problem. It is a means of
justification, because it is intended to discover hypotheses that are plausible and hence to
show that the solution is deduced from plausible hypotheses.
3. Unlike deductive proof, which can only make use of hypotheses that can be deduced from
established mathematics, analytic proof can make use of hypotheses that cannot be deduced
from established mathematics.
 4. Intuition, in the sense of all philosophical tradition, plays no role in analytic proof. Indeed,
intuition plays no role in the discovery of hypotheses, because they are obtained from the
problem, and possibly other data, by non-deductive rules,
5. Analytic proof is as rigorous as deductive proof. Deductive proof shows that the
proposition can be deduced from propositions which are not true but only warrantedly
assertible. Analytic proof shows that a solution to the problem can be deduced from
hypotheses which are not true but only plausible.

Analytic Proof as Mathematicians’ Proof

Analytic proof is mathematicians’ proof. This view of proof is not subject to the problems of
Hersh’s view that deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof.
1. If analytic proof is mathematicians’ proof, then it is possible to prove propositions that
cannot be deduced from established mathematics. For, the hypotheses for proving a
proposition are obtained by non-deductive rules, and non-deductive rules are ampliative,
so they can produce hypotheses that cannot be deduced from established mathematics.
2. If analytic proof is mathematicians’ proof, then mathematicians cannot be replaced by
computers completely. For, there is no algorithm capable of producing hypotheses that are
sufficient conditions for the solution to a problem and are plausible. Producing such
hypotheses may involve creating an entirely new framework, which essentially goes
beyond the bounds of established mathematics.
3. If analytic proof is mathematicians’ proof, then not all of mathematical knowledge can
ultimately be deduced from some elementary mathematical propositions, such as 1 + 1 =
2. For, the mathematical problems that are being solved take usually the form of universal
propositions, whereas no universal proposition can be deduced from particular
propositions, such as 1 + 1 = 2.

Hersh’s Objection to Analytic Proof

Hersh objects that a proposition arrived at plausible reasoning, namely, by non-deductive rules, is
an unproved conjecture. For, “a plausible argument” is “not demonstrative,” so “it fails to show
that” the result “is rigidly connected to established mathematics” (Hersh 2014, 58).
Normal Mathematics and Revolutionary Mathematics
This does not mean that between the view that analytic proof is mathematicians’ proof and the
view that deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof there is no essential difference. Their
difference can be appreciated in terms of the distinction between normal mathematics and
revolutionary mathematics
Normal:
● mathematical research which does not require introducing hypotheses that cannot be
deduced from established mathematics.
● Normal mathematics is very extensive, being the kind of research most mathematicians do
all the time.
● The view that deductive proof is mathematicians’ proof may be adequate for normal
mathematics but is inadequate for revolutionary mathematics, which requires introducing
hypotheses that cannot be deduced from established mathematics.
Revolutionary:
● mathematical research which requires introducing hypotheses that cannot be deduced from
established mathematics, and tie together disparate areas, or open new areas of
mathematics.
● Revolutionary mathematics is much more limited, since it primarily consists of turning
points in mathematics.
● the view that analytic proof is mathematicians’ proof is adequate, not only for normal
mathematics but also for revolutionary mathematics, because in analytic proof, the
hypotheses for a solution to the problem need not be deducible from established
mathematics.
The Inexhaustibility of Mathematics
Assuming that axiomatic proof is mathematicians’ proof, Gödel interprets the inexhaustibility of
mathematics negatively, as meaning that no well-defined system of correct axioms can contain all
of mathematics.
Alternatively, assuming that analytic proof is mathematicians’ proof, we can interpret the
inexhaustibility of mathematics positively, as meaning that mathematical knowledge is an infinite
problem-solving process in which, beyond every hypothesis, one looks for deeper hypotheses.
Analytic Proof and Explanation
What is the role of proof in research? According to Hersh, “in research its role is to convince”
(Hersh 2014, 153). For, a proof is “a convincing argument, as judged by qualified judges” (ibid.,
147). This means that the role of proof in research is quite different from the role of proof in the
classroom, which is not to convince but “to explain”.
This, however, contrasts with the view of several mathematicians, who think that the role of proof
in research is not to convince but to explain. Thus, Gleason says that “proofs really aren’t there to
convince you that something is true – they’re there to show why it is true” (Albers et al. 1990, 86).
That is, they are there to explain.

An Objection to the Distinction Between Front and Bac

Greiffenhagen and Sharrock argue that such distinction “downplays the continuity of the two”
(Greiffenhagen and Sharrock 2011, 841). The continuity is clear from a comparison between
mathematical lectures as one example of mathematics in the “front,” and “meetings between a
supervisor and his doctoral students” as “one example of mathematics in the ‘back’” (ibid., 854).
The comparison shows that “the difference between the ‘front’ and the ‘back’” is “not between
two kinds of proof” but only “between different stages
The problem with this objection is that the back of mathematics is not currently unfinished
work; the latter is just a preliminary, incomplete version of the finished product. As already said,
the back of mathematics is, instead, the creative work of the mathematician, primarily the
discovery work. Rather, it is really a difference between two kinds of proof: deductive or axiomatic
proof, the front, and analytic proof, the back.

The Nature of Mathematical Objects

Mathematical objects are hypotheses mathematicians make to solve problems by analytic
proof.When such objects are seen to solve the problems for which they have been made, they
become objects of study themselves.
Hersh agrees that mathematical objects “are right here, in our individual minds, shared also with
many other individual minds,” so their reality “is mental-cultural”.

Conclusion