VII FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Ang Ladlad LGBT party V. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any
act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

B. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

GERONA v Secreaatry of Education

FACTS:
1. When RA 1265 (An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsary In All Educational Institutions)
took effect, the Sec. of Education issued Dept. Order No. 8 prescribing the rules and regulations
for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony.

2. The said order mandates that a proper salute must be given, or at least standing still with arms
and hands straight at sides along with the singing of the National Anthem and recital of the
pledge. However, petitioners’ children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson,
Masbate refused to do so.

3. This was because, as members of Jehova’s Witnesses, they believe that the obligation imposed
by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by the State. This is based on a verse which
states:
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven
above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow
down thyself to them, nor serve them.”

They consider that the flag is an “image” within this command and thus refuse to salute it.
Because of this, they were expelled from the school.

4. The counsel of petitioners wrote to the Sec. of Education that the children be allowed to just
remain silent and stand still with their arms and hands straight at their sides. This was, however,
denied along with the children’s reinstatement.

5. An action was then filed before the CFI with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction but the
complaint was dismissed. Hence, the present petition with the SC issuing a temporary writ
subject to the result of the case.

ISSUE: Should the department order be upheld?

RULING: Yes. The CFI decision was affirmed and the writ of preliminary injunction was
dissolved.
1. First, there was no question with the act of saluting since the department order allows that
students can just stand still with their arms and hands straight at their sides. The issue was
focused on the singing of the national anthem and the recital of pledge.

2. The court eventually held that if the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the
established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to
the latter. The reasons are:

a. the flag is not an image nor the flag ceremony a religious rite; the flag is a symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty.

b. the wordings of the patriotic pledge or the national anthem does not have anything that is
religiously objectionable as they speak only of love of country, patriotism, liberty and the glory
of suffering and dying for it.

c. the State was merely carrying out its constitutional duty to supervise and regulate educational
institutions and see to it that all schools aim to develop civic conscience and teach the duties of
citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the Constitution).

d. considering the separation of the State and Church, the flag does not have any religious
significance.
e. also, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest
with the court; it cannot be left to a religious group or sect or to its follower as there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meaning to be
given as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

f. as emphatically stated, if a man lived on an island, alone and all by himself, he would normally
have complete and absolute rights as to the way he lives, his religion, incuding the manners he
practices his religious beliefs with no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to follow; but since
man is gregarious by nature and instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to receive and
enjoy the benefits of society, he becomes a member of a community or nation; thus, he has to
give up rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the general welfare, just as his fellow
men and companions also agree to a limitation of their rights in his favor.

g. also, exempting the children will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the
school population which by far constitutes the great majority; other pupils would naturally ask
for the same privilege because they might want to do something else such as play or study; if this
exemption is extended, then the flag ceremony would soon be a thing of the past or perhaps
conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens
untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country,
admiration for national heroes, and patriotism — a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because
a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an
exemption.

3. US jurisprudence made as basis:

a. Reynolds vs. US – the law prohibited polygamy which was allowed for Mormons

“Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”

b. Hamilton vs. University of California – the university requires military science and tactics
training but the objectioners believe that war and preparation for war is a violation of their
religious belief

– it was held untenable. The Court stated that California did not call them. They sought
education in the university and the due process clause secured by law will be violated if they are
to be exempted from the training.

In this case, having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they
forfeited their right to attend public schools.
c. Minersville School District vs. Gobitis – same facts with present case; the US Supreme Court
upheld the conduct of flag ceremony but after 3 years, it was reversed in West Virginia State
Board of Education vs. Bernette. This was only because in the latter case, the parents are to be
prosecuted criminally if their children are not in school. It turned out as a dilemma with the
authority against individual rights so the Court then approved the exemption. However, it is not
the ruling in the present case.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in the latter case stating:

“The constitutional protection of religious freedom … gave religious equality, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma…”

EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPER INTENDENT SCHOOL OF CEBU

FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional
limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state
and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony.
The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag
ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement
will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far
constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution
does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm
of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence
of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has
right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand
at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is
no warrant for their expulsion.

INGLESIA NI CRISTO VS COURT OF APPEALS

I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious
group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV
programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations
and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC
ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs.
But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the
respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that
the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV
series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?
 (2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the
respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also
voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent
MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs
like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene
section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed.”

[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of

its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that
reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez
faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels
the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in
our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the
free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to
the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It
failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for
“attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . .
will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were
not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section
3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with
its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner
but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between
the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace
of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite
speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The
constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be
justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject
video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence
of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.

Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to
send their children to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the
constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to public school
until the age of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the
Amish religious beliefs.

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish
religion. Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to
attend public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to
public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the
law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

WISCONSIN VS YODER

Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to
send their children to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the
constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to public school
until the age of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the
Amish religious beliefs.

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish
religion. Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to
attend public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to
public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the
law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked
variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment
hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a crucial period in their
life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the
compulsory attendance could result in not only great psychological harm to Amish children but
ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community.

The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents to
provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. The State’s power is subject to a
balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children.
In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State does not
deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious beliefs
that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.

The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system. Second,
education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We
accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an additional one or two
years of formal high school would do little to serve those interests. Such education may be
necessary for preparation for the modern society in which we live, but is not for the separated
agrarian community of the Amish faith.

The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must be
protected by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a highly
successful social unit within our society, producing productive and law-abiding citizens. The
State also supports its position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave the
Amish community. This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the practical
agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that did choose to leave.

The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed
to not only provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In
these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish
children than for children generally.

The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s
substantive right to a secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as parens
patriae. On this record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish parent’s are
preventing children who wish to further their education from attending school.

Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of the parents and the
State. The children also have a legitimate interest in their education. The inevitable effect of the
decision is to impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children. It is the future of
the student, not the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. The views of the two children
in question were not canvassed, and should be on remand.

Discussion. The majority’s decision did not determine that the statute would violate
Constitutional rights if the children wanted to pursue further education, but found that such a
decision was unnecessary because no such claim was made on the record. The dissent suggested
that the cause should be remanded to determine the desire of the children.

ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR

FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of
Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with
Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s
husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the
judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in
the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing
the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon
and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and
immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition.

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the
Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision

Re: Request of Muslim employees in the Different court in IIligan city

D, Religious Affairs Secular Jurisdiction’

AUSTRIA VS NLRC

Facts:

The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications
form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and
responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his
district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.

The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat
and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be
able to do the collecting.
 A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal
citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of 
employer's duly authorized representative
as grounds for the termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA
for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.

SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and,
as such, involves the separation of church and state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed
by petitioner against the SDA.

Held/Ratio:

1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which
is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.

2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was
expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.

Facts:

Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the

Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal

certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to
certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently,

Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and

designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this

petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the

constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded

preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this

preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA

the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious

freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what

food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing

halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the

Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the

case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on

the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to

OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Issue:
 Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the

separation of Church and State.

Held:

No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was

accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed

this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA

the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the

religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims

what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of

issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation

of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the

case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on

the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to

OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the

community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the

seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a

society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the
affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and

religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to

deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product

as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by

assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and

promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and

ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the

market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do

not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims

VIII LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

MARCOS VS MANGLAPAS

FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travelfrom the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the rightto
travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to
return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and
abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to
be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of
others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context
as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after
the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return
to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED

GUDANI VS SENGA

FACTS

Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine
Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon
invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate
Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio
excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on
Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been
designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP
Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were
among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the
hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.
Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen.
Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the
Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA
Superintendent.

However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the
President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL
OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga
issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee “in spite
of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to
such an appearance;” that such directive was “in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the
Chain of Command;” and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles
of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General
Court Martial proceedings x x x” Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of
their assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of
the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislativeINQUIRY without her
approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other
military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also
pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation
for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection
with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.

The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account
of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUE

Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL
APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER
APPROVAL is unconstitutional?

RULING

The Petition is dismissed.

Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry?
Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential
approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into
consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official
to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and
independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President.
By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not
encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or
executive control.

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which
seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined,
the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the
duty to faithfully execute.

Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from
testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces.
The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as
in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as
Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be
the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit
constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief
clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President
to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise
be sanctioned under civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered
confined under “house arrest” by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos.
Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press
statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously
upheld such restrictions, noting:

“… to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the
military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of
discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules
must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is
from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP,
have to be considered.”
As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be with the consent
and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain
speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters.
For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldier’s ability
to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public
eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by
political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and
of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that
promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or
distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from
their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Judicial relief as remedy:

The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not
absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this
petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies
with the courts.

Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope
and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry,
“with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative
process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to
that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes
critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the
inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published
rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees
in the Bill of Rights.

In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring
executive officials from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent
notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither
branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the
final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance
or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes
between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional
parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the
President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before
Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before
the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final
orders of the courts.

Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-
martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others,
“all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP],” and points out that he is no longer in
the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot
be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice
proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction
has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.
LEAVE DIVISION OFFICE OF ADMINITSTRATION SERVICES OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINSTRATOR vs HUESDENS

IX RIGHT TO INFORMATION

TANADA TUVERA

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a Statute)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn

BEMGZON VS DRILON

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking
the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D.
No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case
of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect,
RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did
the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of
the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of
the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to
them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power
to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of
existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to
veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same
item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The
rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line
item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the
pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other
departments of the government.

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, v. MILITARY

SHRINE SERVICES – PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,Respondent.

RESOLUTION

[G. R. NO. 187654]

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioner, v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES – PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels
of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a
military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later
on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No.
208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and
reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services –
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under
the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

“P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos”2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette3on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but
this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.

(NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1)
the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western
Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476;
(2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management
Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI)
filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by
NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in
Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring
the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina
Aguilar-General dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not
be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172
could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued
on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General stressed that pursuant
to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that
when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court
to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the
addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so
would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the
COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision
granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434
are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by
respondents are likewise DENIED.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions
for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF
WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS
ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF
LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO
THE PRESIDENT INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS
LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING
WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the
ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication
of the said law.
 THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No.
2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation
No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect
of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers
to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark
case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out
by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
“one year after such publication.” The general rule did not apply because it was “otherwise
provided.”

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after
a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations
Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had
any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, “[t]he publication
of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority.” Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western
Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot
rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v.
Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that “[u]nder Article 8 of the Civil Code, ‘[j]udicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.’ This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for
interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating.” The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law to include petitioners’ lots in the
reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April
2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court’s status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt
is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ERMITA

Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) - Digest

Facts:

This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the
ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and
AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived,
Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of
the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and
prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others,
mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this
Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite
the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited,
attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Issue Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

Ruling:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different
functions of the Legislature: The power to conductINQUIRIES in aid of legislation and the
power to conduct inquiry during question hour.

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.”The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department heads’
appearance is merely requested. The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in
relation to the appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to
Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly

recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:“The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”The power of inquiry in aid of
legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

But even where theINQUIRY is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the
power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure
to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President,
or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive
privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons
falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly
state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the
hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the
executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might
be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President
or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,
neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of
the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void.
Section 1(a) are however valid.

AKBAYAN CITIZENS VS AQUINO

Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the
sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a
“milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic
partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).”
JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of
markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a
deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the
Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator
Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard
Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the
views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the
country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that
JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that
touches on broader national development concerns.

Issues:

a. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.

b. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of
the negotiation process.
c. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege.

d. Whether the Respondents’ failed to claim executive privilege on time.

Decision:

Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:

1. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. ‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term that eludes exact definition.
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to
the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.

Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration,
but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has
claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the
same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively
and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

2. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.

3. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient
showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis.
"[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a
fresh balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the relevance of
the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of
the government," and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and “sufficient showing of need”.
The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of
this standard stated in the decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The
Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific
need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade
agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this
Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-
making unless the initial offers are also published.

4.When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the
present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited.

Respondents’ failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not,
however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received
from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for
information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a
subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged request to
Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.

While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to
executive officials – out of respect for their office – until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact
remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not
strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege

SERENO VS CTRM

f Sereno vs Committee on Trade and Related Matters (GR No. 175210), the high court, through
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, said the constitutional guarantee to information “does not
open every door to any and all information but is rather confined to public concern.”

“The State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest,
and is tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law,” the court said in its ruling denying
the petition for certiorari of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines,
Inc. (APMP).
APMP, through its Executive Director Mario Jose E. Sereno, filed a case before the Pasig City
Regional Trial Court Branch 268 to compel the Committee on Tariff and Related Matters
(CTRM) to release documents, research data and other papers which were used as basis in
issuing Executive Order No. 486 in 2006 that lifted the suspension of the tariff reduction on
petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the ASEAN Free Trade Area-Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme.

The high court said there are two requisites that must be complied with before right to
information is granted by mandamus: (1) the information sought must be in relation to matters of
public concern or public interest and (2) it must be exempt by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.

7. IN RE
8. RE

PEOPLE VS CALABQUINTO

[FACTS]

This is a case of child who allegedly raped by her own father. The mother of the child abuse
victim sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text
decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that
confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over public access to information
and pleaded that her daughter’s case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the
Web Page. The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) to comment on the issue:

The position of the OSG in its Comment is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of the
full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the
right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon
which the right to privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of
privacy, it must be shown that the person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. The
reasonableness of such expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable.

According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or
guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy which the
child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial
agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached
by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable
considering the various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the
confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.

The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child abuse cases
should be treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the court proceedings, but even
after the promulgation of the decision in order to protect the right to privacy of the child and her
family and to preclude instances where undue disclosure of information may impair the
treatment and rehabilitation of the child-victim.

The Court likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP and NPC. The KBP informs
the Court that its members have agreed not to identify in their broadcasts the names of children
who are victims of abuse or are in conflict with the law. The NPC, on the other hand, tells us that
the prevailing media practice is to inquire whether these individuals wish to have their names
appear in the report. If they do not, media would normally take off the names and merely provide
a very general description of the individual in recognition of the need to carefully balance the
right to information with the welfare of the parties involved.

ISSUE

Whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases on the Supreme
Court Web Page in cases involving child sexual abuse.

HELD

This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital for
the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules,
RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004, and its implementing rules, and our own Rule on Violence Against Women and their
Children.

The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the dignity and
protect the privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610 provides:

Sec. 29. Confidentiality. — at the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from
the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.

It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in the case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and
director in the case of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized publicity of any
case of a violation of this Act which results in the moral degradation and suffering of the
offended party.
Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:

Sec. 44. Confidentiality.—All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their
children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and
employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the
victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone
number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an
immediate family member, without the latter’s consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of
the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and
a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:

Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.—All hearings of cases of violence against
women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women
and their children and respect for their privacy.

Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever publishes or causes to
be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address,
employer or other identifying information of the parties or an immediate family or household
member, without their consent or without authority of the court, shall be liable for contempt of
court and shall suffer the penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.

Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which unequivocally
express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in cases involving violence
against women and their children, in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real
name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the
personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or
compromise their identities, as well those of their immediate family or household members, shall
not be disclosed.

VILLANUEVA VS JBC

Facts:

After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied for the
vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however informed him that
he was not included in the list of candidates for such position because the JBC’s long-standing
policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts before one can apply as judge for
second-level courts. Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO
and preliminary injunction the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due process
for lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been published because it
will affect all applying judges.

On the other hand, one of the JBC’s arguments was that the writ of certiorari and prohibition
cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function.

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional

Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to
the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President
may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened
with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and
women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the
qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own
set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy

No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the
JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary
for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms
the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’ qualifications. In carrying out its
main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for
every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily
requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus,
the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by the
challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.

Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and those
with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the
assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or
consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a
first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a
premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent
constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven competence.” In
determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and
performance.

Civil Law

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR

No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the
ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the
government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not
covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code.

Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published

Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force
and effect. Exempted from requirement of publication are interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, and the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations
exempted from the publication requirement. It involves a qualification standard by which the
JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because
if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the
selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and
are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows
that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they
would be able to prepare for and comply with them.

Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by analogy,
publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a
constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.

Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are applicable to JBC (Remedial)

Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach. Under Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Consequently, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.

Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC
neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance
of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and
criteria is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC’s constitutional mandate, a
determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the policy of the JBC

No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by

mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC. Second,
petitioner has no clear legal right since there is no law that grants him the right of promotion to
second-level courts.

Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper

No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the
petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in
the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC’s five-year requirement policy. Again, no
person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for
vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege,
and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion
in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.

Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if
only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to BP 129, Sec 19, as amended by R.A.
No. 7691.

The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Court’s supervisory duty over
the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power. But in any event, even if the Court
will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed. ##

ANTOLIN VS DOMONDON

Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure
Exam she took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the
Board of Accountancy (Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was
shown her answer sheets but since these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to determine
why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she asked the Board for copies of the questionnaire, her
answer sheets, the answer keys and an explanation of the grading system (collectively, the
Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only allowed
access to her answer sheets, and reconsideration of the result of her examination can be made
only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2)
the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets)
by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later informed
her that her exam was investigated and no mechanical error was found in the grading. Petitioner
filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction, against the Board and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying
that the Board provide her with all documents that would show whether the Board fairly
administered the exam and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a
certificate of registration as a CPA. She later amended her Petition to clarify that she only
wanted access to the documents requested, not recorrection of her exam, deleting in the process
her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of registration as CPA. Petitioner passed the May
1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC denied her
application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She amended her Petition a second time to
implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the documents she had requested, that if
warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997 Exam results be made by the Board and the
PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the petition. On her motion, however,
the RTC reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent CPA examination
did not render the petition moot because the relief “and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate
of registration as Certified Public Accountant” was deleted from the original petition. As regards
whether she had the constitutional right to have access to the documents she requested, the RTC
resolved to let the parties first adduce evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The
RTC also ordered the PRC to preserve and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer
sheets, and the answer keys for the October 1997 CPA Licensure Exam. When their motion for
reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which set
aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the case because: (1) the petition was
mooted when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article IV of PRC
Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and
access to government documents; (3) the Examination Documents were not of public concern,
because she merely sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or
mandatory function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination
questions of a failing examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she
did not elevate the matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus,
brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel the re-correction
of her examination; (2) Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies;
(3) Whether or not the case was mooted by petitioner’s passing the May 1998 CPA Licensure
Examination; and (4) Whether or not petitioner has the constitutionalright to have access to the
Examination papers

Held: (1) Any claim for re-correction or revision of petitioner’s 1997 examination cannot be
compelled by mandamus. In AgustinRamos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No. 84470, February 2, 1989
(Minute Resolution)], where therespondent Judge was questioned for dismissing therein
petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional
Regulation Commission to re-correct their ratings, the Supreme Court held that “(t)he function of
reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light of
the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical Board,
not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of thewrit of mandamus.” For a
writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right
to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act
must be equally clear. No such clarity exists here. And despite petitioner’s assertion that she did
not demand re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her
prayer that respondents “make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination” belied
this claim. (2) Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the Board’srefusal to
release the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section
5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 223, the PRC has the power to review and approve the policies,
resolutions, rules and regulations, orders and decisions of the various professional Boards,
including the results of their licensure examinations, and the decisions of the Boards on
administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the PRC within 30 days from
promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this power is not limited to administrative
investigations but encompassesrequests for documents. And since the PRC itself issued the
resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338) questioned by petitioner, it was in the best position to
resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. One of the reasons for exhaustion of
administrative remedies is thewell-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins
upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit
not exclusively) within the competence of other departments. However, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when only a
question of law is involved. Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right to demand access
to the Examination Papers was one such question of law which cannot be resolved with finality
by the administrative officer. (3) An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her
right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen
possesses the inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, petitioner’s belated
passing of the CPA Board Exams did not automatically mean that her interest in the Examination
Papers had become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question presented, in view
of the likelihood that the issues in this case would be repeated, warranted review. (4) Like all the
constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is limited to “matters of
public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law” (Section
7, Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to
“transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the meanings of
“public interest” and “public concern” which “embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,” and which are, in the final analysis,
up to the courts to determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234
Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters
of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to
ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all
matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment,
but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.
The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience
of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation,
encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the
questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. The PRC, however, had not
been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the Examination Papers confidential. In view of the far-reaching
implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the
PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court deemed it best to remand
the case to the RTC for further proceedings.